Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of changes for nanbield and have comments back by end of day Tuesday, March 19
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/6688
The following changes since commit f40a53370eac89df38b2fab47c411a61d4df4fc0:
gnutls: Upgrade 3.8.2 -> 3.8.3 (2024-03-12 06:25:19 -1000)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/nanbield-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/nanbield-nut
Alex Kiernan (1):
wireless-regdb: Upgrade 2023.09.01 -> 2024.01.23
Alexander Kanavin (1):
linux-firmware: upgrade 20231211 -> 20240220
Claus Stovgaard (1):
wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2023-52160
Khem Raj (1):
core-image-ptest: Increase disk size to 1.5G for strace ptest image
Lee Chee Yang (1):
openssl: upgrade to 3.1.5
Michael Halstead (1):
yocto-uninative: Update to 4.4 for glibc 2.39
Priyal Doshi (1):
tzdata : Upgrade to 2024a
Simone Weiß (1):
cve-check: Log if CVE_STATUS set but not reported for component
Yoann Congal (6):
cve-update-nvd2-native: Fix typo in comment
cve-update-nvd2-native: Add an age threshold for incremental update
cve-update-nvd2-native: Remove duplicated CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE definition
cve-update-nvd2-native: nvd_request_next: Improve comment
cve-update-nvd2-native: Fix CVE configuration update
cve-update-nvd2-native: Remove rejected CVE from database
meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass | 3 +
meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc | 10 +-
.../openssl/openssl/fix_random_labels.patch | 22 --
.../{openssl_3.1.4.bb => openssl_3.1.5.bb} | 4 +-
...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ++++++++++++++++++
.../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb | 1 +
meta/recipes-core/images/core-image-ptest.bb | 2 +-
.../meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb | 35 ++-
meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc | 6 +-
...20231211.bb => linux-firmware_20240220.bb} | 6 +-
....09.01.bb => wireless-regdb_2024.01.23.bb} | 4 +-
11 files changed, 260 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/fix_random_labels.patch
rename meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/{openssl_3.1.4.bb => openssl_3.1.5.bb} (98%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch
rename meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/{linux-firmware_20231211.bb => linux-firmware_20240220.bb} (99%)
rename meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/{wireless-regdb_2023.09.01.bb => wireless-regdb_2024.01.23.bb} (88%)Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 1/14 cve-check: Log if CVE_STATUS set but not reported for component
From: Simone Weiß <[email protected]>
Log if the CVE_STATUS is set for a CVE, but the cve is not reported for a component. This should hopefully help to clean up not needed CVE_STATUS settings.
--- meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/classes/cve-check.bbclass +3 -0
@@ -418,6 +418,9 @@ def check_cves(d, patched_cves): cves_status.append([product, False]) conn.close() + diff_ignore = list(set(cve_ignore) - set(cves_ignored)) + if diff_ignore: + oe.qa.handle_error("cve_status_not_in_db", "Found CVE (%s) with CVE_STATUS set that are not found in database for this component" % " ".join(diff_ignore), d) if not cves_in_recipe: bb.note("No CVE records for products in recipe %s" % (pn))
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 2/14 wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2023-52160
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Claus Stovgaard <[email protected]>
PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements. Also see
https://www.top10vpn.com/research/wifi-vulnerabilities/
--- ...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ++++++++++++++++++ .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 214 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch new file +213 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +From f6f7cead3661ceeef54b21f7e799c0afc98537ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements + +The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2 +authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated +during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP +specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front +is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than +the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when +unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed +devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the +user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped. + +Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2 +authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session +resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been +configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed +authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more +strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability +issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS +session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues. + +Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1 +configuration parameter option: +'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS +tunnel) behavior for PEAP: + * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication + * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate + (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was + not used (default) + * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-52160 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c] + +Signed-off-by: Claus Stovgaard <[email protected]> + +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_config.h | 8 ++++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 6 +++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h | 5 ++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 7 ++++++ + 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h +index 3238f74..047eec2 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h +@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config { + * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + * 2 = require cryptobinding + * ++ * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++ * tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++ * (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++ * not used (default) ++ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases ++ * + * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and + * uuid=Device_UUID + * +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +index 12e30df..6080697 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data { + u8 cmk[20]; + int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP) + * is enabled. */ ++ enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth; + }; + + +@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data, + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding"); + } + ++ if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases"); ++ } + #ifdef EAP_TNC + if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) { + data->soh = 2; +@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm) + data->force_peap_version = -1; + data->peap_outer_success = 2; + data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING; ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; + + if (config && config->phase1) + eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1); +@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm, + } + + ++static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm, ++ struct eap_peap_data *data) ++{ ++ if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS || ++ (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL && ++ !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && ++ !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) || ++ data->phase2_eap_started) && ++ !data->phase2_eap_success) ++ return false; ++ return true; ++} ++ ++ + /** + * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response + * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init() +@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data, + " - force failed Phase 2"); + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; + ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; ++ } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed"); ++ resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; ++ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; + } else { + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS; + ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC; +@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req: + /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate + * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has + * been completed. */ +- if (data->phase2_eap_started && +- !data->phase2_eap_success) { ++ if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 " + "Success used to indicate success, " + "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet " +@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) + { + struct eap_peap_data *data = priv; ++ + return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && +- data->phase2_success; ++ data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS; + } + + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm, + + sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK); + ++ if (!phase2) ++ data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert || ++ params->client_cert_blob || ++ params->private_key || ++ params->private_key_blob; ++ + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h +index 9ac0012..3348634 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h +@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data { + * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used + */ + int tls_v13; ++ ++ /** ++ * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured ++ */ ++ bool client_cert_conf; + }; + + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +index 6619d6b..d63f73c 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1321,6 +1321,13 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default) + # * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + # * 2 = require cryptobinding ++# 'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++# tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++# * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++# * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++# (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++# not used (default) ++# * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + # EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or + # pbc=1. + #
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch \ file://0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch \ file://0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch \ + file://0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 3/14 cve-update-nvd2-native: Fix typo in comment
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
attmepts -> attempts
--- meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb +1 -1
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ NVDCVE_API_KEY ?= "" # Use a negative value to skip the update CVE_DB_UPDATE_INTERVAL ?= "86400" -# Number of attmepts for each http query to nvd server before giving up +# Number of attempts for each http query to nvd server before giving up CVE_DB_UPDATE_ATTEMPTS ?= "5" CVE_DB_TEMP_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR}/temp_nvdcve_2.db"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 4/14 cve-update-nvd2-native: Add an age threshold for incremental update
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Add a new variable "CVE_DB_INCR_UPDATE_AGE_THRES", which can be used to specify the maximum age of the database for doing an incremental update For older databases, a full re-download is done.
With a value of "0", this forces a full-redownload.
--- .../meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb | 20 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb +16 -4
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ NVDCVE_API_KEY ?= "" # Use a negative value to skip the update CVE_DB_UPDATE_INTERVAL ?= "86400" +# CVE database incremental update age threshold, in seconds. If the database is +# older than this threshold, do a full re-download, else, do an incremental +# update. By default: the maximum allowed value from NVD: 120 days (120*24*60*60) +# Use 0 to force a full download. +CVE_DB_INCR_UPDATE_AGE_THRES ?= "10368000" + # Number of attempts for each http query to nvd server before giving up CVE_DB_UPDATE_ATTEMPTS ?= "5"
@@ -172,18 +178,24 @@ def update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d, database_time): req_args = {'startIndex' : 0} - # The maximum range for time is 120 days - # Force a complete update if our range is longer - if (database_time != 0): + incr_update_threshold = int(d.getVar("CVE_DB_INCR_UPDATE_AGE_THRES")) + if database_time != 0: database_date = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(database_time, tz=datetime.timezone.utc) today_date = datetime.datetime.now(tz=datetime.timezone.utc) delta = today_date - database_date - if delta.days < 120: + if incr_update_threshold == 0: + bb.note("CVE database: forced full update") + elif delta < datetime.timedelta(seconds=incr_update_threshold): bb.note("CVE database: performing partial update") + # The maximum range for time is 120 days + if delta > datetime.timedelta(days=120): + bb.error("CVE database: Trying to do an incremental update on a larger than supported range") req_args['lastModStartDate'] = database_date.isoformat() req_args['lastModEndDate'] = today_date.isoformat() else: bb.note("CVE database: file too old, forcing a full update") + else: + bb.note("CVE database: no preexisting database, do a full download") with bb.progress.ProgressHandler(d) as ph, open(os.path.join(d.getVar("TMPDIR"), 'cve_check'), 'a') as cve_f:
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 5/14 cve-update-nvd2-native: Remove duplicated CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE definition
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE is already defined in cve-check.bbclass which is always inherited in cve-update-nvd2-native (There is a check line 40).
Remove it to avoid confusion. Otherwise, this should not change anything.
--- meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb +0 -2
@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ CVE_DB_UPDATE_ATTEMPTS ?= "5" CVE_DB_TEMP_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR}/temp_nvdcve_2.db" -CVE_CHECK_DB_FILE ?= "${CVE_CHECK_DB_DIR}/nvdcve_2.db" - python () { if not bb.data.inherits_class("cve-check", d): raise bb.parse.SkipRecipe("Skip recipe when cve-check class is not loaded.")
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 6/14 cve-update-nvd2-native: nvd_request_next: Improve comment
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Add a URL to the doc of the API used in the function. ... and fix a small typo dabase -> database
--- meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb +2 -1
@@ -123,7 +123,8 @@ def nvd_request_wait(attempt, min_wait): def nvd_request_next(url, attempts, api_key, args, min_wait): """ - Request next part of the NVD dabase + Request next part of the NVD database + NVD API documentation: https://nvd.nist.gov/developers/vulnerabilities """ import urllib.request
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 7/14 cve-update-nvd2-native: Fix CVE configuration update
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
When a CVE is created, it often has no precise version information and this is stored as "-" (matching any version). After an update, version information is added. The previous "-" must be removed, otherwise, the CVE is still "Unpatched" for cve-check.
--- meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb +4 -0
@@ -357,6 +357,10 @@ def update_db(conn, elt): [cveId, cveDesc, cvssv2, cvssv3, date, accessVector, vectorString]).close() try: + # Remove any pre-existing CVE configuration. Even for partial database + # update, those will be repopulated. This ensures that old + # configuration is not kept for an updated CVE. + conn.execute("delete from PRODUCTS where ID = ?", [cveId]).close() for config in elt['cve']['configurations']: # This is suboptimal as it doesn't handle AND/OR and negate, but is better than nothing for node in config["nodes"]:
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 8/14 cve-update-nvd2-native: Remove rejected CVE from database
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
When a CVE is updated to be rejected, matching database entries must be removed. Otherwise:
* an incremental update is not equivalent the to an initial download.
* rejected CVEs might still appear as Unpatched in cve-check.
--- meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb +4 -0
@@ -324,6 +324,10 @@ def update_db(conn, elt): vectorString = None cveId = elt['cve']['id'] if elt['cve']['vulnStatus'] == "Rejected": + c = conn.cursor() + c.execute("delete from PRODUCTS where ID = ?;", [cveId]) + c.execute("delete from NVD where ID = ?;", [cveId]) + c.close() return cveDesc = "" for desc in elt['cve']['descriptions']:
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 9/14 openssl: upgrade to 3.1.5
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Lee Chee Yang <[email protected]>
Changes between 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 [30 Jan 2024]
* A file in PKCS12 format can contain certificates and keys and may
come from
an untrusted source. The PKCS12 specification allows certain fields
to be
NULL, but OpenSSL did not correctly check for this case. A fix has
been
applied to prevent a NULL pointer dereference that results in OpenSSL crashing. If an application processes PKCS12 files from an untrusted
source
using the OpenSSL APIs then that application will be vulnerable to
this
issue prior to this fix.
OpenSSL APIs that were vulnerable to this are: PKCS12_parse(), PKCS12_unpack_p7data(), PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(),PKCS12_unpack_authsafes()
and PKCS12_newpass().
We have also fixed a similar issue in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). However
since this
function is related to writing data we do not consider it security significant.
([CVE-2024-0727])
https://www.openssl.org/news/cl31.txt
drop fix_random_labels.patch as fixed in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/99630a1b08fd6464d95052dee4a3500afeb95867
---
.../openssl/openssl/fix_random_labels.patch | 22 -------------------
.../{openssl_3.1.4.bb => openssl_3.1.5.bb} | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/fix_random_labels.patch
rename meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/{openssl_3.1.4.bb => openssl_3.1.5.bb} (98%)meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/fix_random_labels.patch deleted +0 -22
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@ -The perl script adds random suffixes to the local function names to ensure -it doesn't clash with other parts of openssl. Set the random number seed -to something predictable so the assembler files are generated consistently -and our own reproducible builds tests pass. - -Upstream-Status: Pending -Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <[email protected]> - -Index: openssl-3.1.0/crypto/modes/asm/aes-gcm-avx512.pl -=================================================================== ---- openssl-3.1.0.orig/crypto/modes/asm/aes-gcm-avx512.pl -+++ openssl-3.1.0/crypto/modes/asm/aes-gcm-avx512.pl -@@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ my $CTX_OFFSET_HTable = (16 * 6); - # ;;; Helper functions - # ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; - -+# Ensure the local labels are reproduicble -+srand(10000); -+ - # ; Generates "random" local labels - sub random_string() { - my @chars = ('a' .. 'z', 'A' .. 'Z', '0' .. '9', '_');
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.1.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.1.4.bb +2 -2
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://run-ptest \ file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \ file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \ - file://fix_random_labels.patch \ file://0001-Added-handshake-history-reporting-when-test-fails.patch \ "
@@ -19,7 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \ file://environment.d-openssl.sh \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "840af5366ab9b522bde525826be3ef0fb0af81c6a9ebd84caa600fea1731eee3" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6ae015467dabf0469b139ada93319327be24b98251ffaeceda0221848dc09262" inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest perlnative manpages MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"
@@ -187,6 +186,7 @@ PTEST_BUILD_HOST_PATTERN = "perl_version =" do_install_ptest () { install -d ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test install -m755 ${B}/test/p_test.so ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test + install -m755 ${B}/test/p_minimal.so ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test install -m755 ${B}/test/provider_internal_test.cnf ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/test # Prune the build tree
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 10/14 wireless-regdb: Upgrade 2023.09.01 -> 2024.01.23
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Alex Kiernan <[email protected]>
Upstream maintainer has changed to Chen-Yu Tsai <[email protected]>:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAGb2v657baNMPKU3QADijx7hZa=GUcSv2LEDdn6N=QQaFX8r-g@mail.gmail.com/
Note that fb768d3b13ff ("wifi: cfg80211: Add my certificate") and 3c2a8ebe3fe6 ("wifi: cfg80211: fix certs build to not depend on file order") are required if you are using kernel signature verification.
---
...eless-regdb_2023.09.01.bb => wireless-regdb_2024.01.23.bb} | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
rename meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/{wireless-regdb_2023.09.01.bb => wireless-regdb_2024.01.23.bb} (88%)meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2024.01.23.bb renamed from meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2023.09.01.bb +2 -2
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ LICENSE = "ISC" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=07c4f6dea3845b02a18dc00c8c87699c" SRC_URI = "https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "26d4c2a727cc59239b84735aad856b7c7d0b04e30aa5c235c4f7f47f5f053491" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c8a61c9acf76fa7eb4239e89f640dee3e87098d9f69b4d3518c9c60fc6d20c55" inherit bin_package allarch
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ do_install() { install -d -m0755 ${D}${nonarch_libdir}/crda install -d -m0755 ${D}${sysconfdir}/wireless-regdb/pubkeys install -m 0644 regulatory.bin ${D}${nonarch_libdir}/crda/regulatory.bin - install -m 0644 sforshee.key.pub.pem ${D}${sysconfdir}/wireless-regdb/pubkeys/sforshee.key.pub.pem + install -m 0644 wens.key.pub.pem ${D}${sysconfdir}/wireless-regdb/pubkeys/wens.key.pub.pem install -m 0644 -D regulatory.db ${D}${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/regulatory.db install -m 0644 regulatory.db.p7s ${D}${nonarch_base_libdir}/firmware/regulatory.db.p7s
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 11/14 linux-firmware: upgrade 20231211 -> 20240220
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]>
License-Update: additional files
---
...inux-firmware_20231211.bb => linux-firmware_20240220.bb} | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
rename meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/{linux-firmware_20231211.bb => linux-firmware_20240220.bb} (99%)meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_20240220.bb renamed from meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_20231211.bb +3 -3
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.Abilis;md5=b5ee3f410780e56711ad48eadc22b8bc \ file://LICENCE.cadence;md5=009f46816f6956cfb75ede13d3e1cee0 \ file://LICENCE.cavium;md5=c37aaffb1ebe5939b2580d073a95daea \ file://LICENCE.chelsio_firmware;md5=819aa8c3fa453f1b258ed8d168a9d903 \ - file://LICENSE.cirrus;md5=bb18d943382abf8e8232a9407bfdafe0 \ + file://LICENSE.cirrus;md5=662ea2c1a8888f7d79ed7f27c27472e1 \ file://LICENCE.cnm;md5=93b67e6bac7f8fec22b96b8ad0a1a9d0 \ file://LICENCE.cw1200;md5=f0f770864e7a8444a5c5aa9d12a3a7ed \ file://LICENCE.cypress;md5=48cd9436c763bf873961f9ed7b5c147b \
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.Abilis;md5=b5ee3f410780e56711ad48eadc22b8bc \ " # WHENCE checksum is defined separately to ease overriding it if # class-devupstream is selected. -WHENCE_CHKSUM = "3113c4ea08e5171555f3bf49eceb5b07" +WHENCE_CHKSUM = "a344e6c28970fc7daafa81c10247aeb6" # These are not common licenses, set NO_GENERIC_LICENSE for them # so that the license files will be copied from fetched source
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ SRC_URI:class-devupstream = "git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/firmw # Pin this to the 20220509 release, override this in local.conf SRCREV:class-devupstream ?= "b19cbdca78ab2adfd210c91be15a22568e8b8cae" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "96af7e4b5eabd37869cdb3dcbb7ab36911106d39b76e799fa1caab16a9dbe8bb" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bf0f239dc0801e9d6bf5d5fb3e2f549575632cf4688f4348184199cb02c2bcd7" inherit allarch
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 12/14 tzdata : Upgrade to 2024a
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Priyal Doshi <[email protected]>
--- meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc +3 -3
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ SECTION = "base" LICENSE = "PD & BSD-3-Clause" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=c679c9d6b02bc2757b3eaf8f53c43fba" -PV = "2023d" +PV = "2024a" SRC_URI =" http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzcode${PV}.tar.gz;name=tzcode;subdir=tz \ http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzdata${PV}.tar.gz;name=tzdata;subdir=tz \
@@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/tz" UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://www.iana.org/time-zones" -SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "e9a5f9e118886d2de92b62bb05510a28cc6c058d791c93bd6b84d3292c3c161e" -SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "dbca21970b0a8b8c0ceceec1d7b91fa903be0f6eca5ae732b5329672232a08f3" +SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "80072894adff5a458f1d143e16e4ca1d8b2a122c9c5399da482cb68cba6a1ff8" +SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "0d0434459acbd2059a7a8da1f3304a84a86591f6ed69c6248fffa502b6edffe3"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 13/14 yocto-uninative: Update to 4.4 for glibc 2.39
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Michael Halstead <[email protected]>
--- meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
meta/conf/distro/include/yocto-uninative.inc +5 -5
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ # to the distro running on the build machine. # -UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.38" -UNINATIVE_VERSION = "4.3" +UNINATIVE_MAXGLIBCVERSION = "2.39" +UNINATIVE_VERSION = "4.4" UNINATIVE_URL ?= "http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/uninative/${UNINATIVE_VERSION}/" -UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "8df05f4a41455018b4303b2e0ea4eac5c960b5a13713f6dbb33dfdb3e32753ec" -UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "bea76b4a97c9ba0077c0dd1295f519cd599dbf71f0ca1c964471c4cdb043addd" -UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "1c35f09a75c4096749bbe1e009df4e3968cde151424062cf4aa3ed89db22b030" +UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[aarch64] ?= "b61876130f494f75092f21086b4a64ea5fb064045769bf1d32e9cb6af17ea8ec" +UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[i686] ?= "9f28627828f0082cc0344eede4d9a861a9a064bfa8f36e072e46212f0fe45fcc" +UNINATIVE_CHECKSUM[x86_64] ?= "d81c54284be2bb886931fc87281d58177a2cd381cf99d1981f8923039a72a302"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 14/14 core-image-ptest: Increase disk size to 1.5G for strace ptest image
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
Autobuilder sees and intermittent failure on strace tests and it occurs quite often therefore bump the size of image as the space requirement is more now with parallel execution enabled.
[YOCTO #15370]
--- meta/recipes-core/images/core-image-ptest.bb | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-core/images/core-image-ptest.bb +1 -1
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ BBCLASSEXTEND = "${@' '.join(['mcextend:'+x for x in d.getVar('PTESTS').split()] IMAGE_OVERHEAD_FACTOR = "1.0" IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE = "324288" IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE:virtclass-mcextend-mdadm = "1524288" -IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE:virtclass-mcextend-strace = "1024288" +IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE:virtclass-mcextend-strace = "1524288" IMAGE_ROOTFS_EXTRA_SPACE:virtclass-mcextend-lttng-tools = "1524288" # tar-ptest in particular needs more space
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1