x86/bugs: BHI updates
Subsystems (6)
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerv6 cover x86/bugs: BHI updates
Dear x86 maintainers, can you take these for -next?
v6:
- added Tested-bys / Reviewed-bys
- fixed documentation oops
Josh Poimboeuf (3):
x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 86 +++---------------- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 ++- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 10 ++- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 9 +- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 7 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 +- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 16 ++-- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c | 10 ++- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 11 ++- scripts/syscalltbl.sh | 18 +++- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 4 + 12 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.45.1
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerPATCH v6 1/3 x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.
Fix that by marking the exit syscall declarations __noreturn.
Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation
--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 9 ++++++--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 11 +++++++---- scripts/syscalltbl.sh | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 4 ++++ 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +6 -4
@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); - +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -28,11 +31,10 @@const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = { #include <asm/syscalls_32.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __ia32_##sym(regs); -long ia32_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +6 -3
@@ -8,8 +8,12 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -20,10 +24,9 @@ const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); -long x64_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c +5 -2
@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_x32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); -long x32_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +3 -3
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # 32-bit system call numbers and entry vectors # # The format is: -# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> <compat entry point> +# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]] # # The __ia32_sys and __ia32_compat_sys stubs are created on-the-fly for # sys_*() system calls and compat_sys_*() compat system calls if
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ # The abi is always "i386" for this file. # 0 i386 restart_syscall sys_restart_syscall -1 i386 exit sys_exit +1 i386 exit sys_exit - noreturn 2 i386 fork sys_fork 3 i386 read sys_read 4 i386 write sys_write
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ 249 i386 io_cancel sys_io_cancel 250 i386 fadvise64 sys_ia32_fadvise64 # 251 is available for reuse (was briefly sys_set_zone_reclaim) -252 i386 exit_group sys_exit_group +252 i386 exit_group sys_exit_group - noreturn 253 i386 lookup_dcookie 254 i386 epoll_create sys_epoll_create 255 i386 epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctl
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +3 -3
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # 64-bit system call numbers and entry vectors # # The format is: -# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> +# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]] # # The __x64_sys_*() stubs are created on-the-fly for sys_*() system calls #
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ 57 common fork sys_fork 58 common vfork sys_vfork 59 64 execve sys_execve -60 common exit sys_exit +60 common exit sys_exit - noreturn 61 common wait4 sys_wait4 62 common kill sys_kill 63 common uname sys_newuname
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ 228 common clock_gettime sys_clock_gettime 229 common clock_getres sys_clock_getres 230 common clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep -231 common exit_group sys_exit_group +231 common exit_group sys_exit_group - noreturn 232 common epoll_wait sys_epoll_wait 233 common epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctl 234 common tgkill sys_tgkill
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c +6 -4
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@#include <linux/cache.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> +extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long ); +/* * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64 * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -22,15 +26,13 @@#define sys_vm86 sys_ni_syscall#define __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT (nr, native, compat) __SYSCALL(nr, native) +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> +#undef __SYSCALL -#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) sym, - -extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ); - const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> };
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c +7 -4
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@#include <linux/cache.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> +extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long ); +/* * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64 * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -18,14 +22,13 @@#define sys_iopl sys_ni_syscall#define sys_ioperm sys_ni_syscall +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL +#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> +#undef __SYSCALL -#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) sym, - -extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ); - const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> };
scripts/syscalltbl.sh +16 -2
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ nxt=0 grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | { - while read nr abi name native compat ; do + while read nr abi name native compat noreturn; do if [ $nxt -gt $nr ]; then echo "error: $infile: syscall table is not sorted or duplicates the same syscall number" >&2
@@ -66,7 +66,21 @@ grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | { nxt=$((nxt + 1)) done - if [ -n "$compat" ]; then + if [ "$compat" = "-" ]; then + unset compat + fi + + if [ -n "$noreturn" ]; then + if [ "$noreturn" != "noreturn" ]; then + echo "error: $infile: invalid string \"$noreturn\" in 'noreturn' column" + exit 1 + fi + if [ -n "$compat" ]; then + echo "__SYSCALL_COMPAT_NORETURN($nr, $native, $compat)" + else + echo "__SYSCALL_NORETURN($nr, $native)" + fi + elif [ -n "$compat" ]; then echo "__SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT($nr, $native, $compat)" elif [ -n "$native" ]; then echo "__SYSCALL($nr, $native)"
tools/objtool/noreturns.h +4 -0
@@ -7,12 +7,16 @@* Yes, this is unfortunate. A better solution is in the works. */ NORETURN(__fortify_panic) +NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit) +NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit_group) NORETURN(__kunit_abort) NORETURN(__module_put_and_kthread_exit) NORETURN(__reiserfs_panic) NORETURN(__stack_chk_fail) NORETURN(__tdx_hypercall_failed) NORETURN(__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable) +NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit) +NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit_group) NORETURN(arch_cpu_idle_dead) NORETURN(bch2_trans_in_restart_error) NORETURN(bch2_trans_restart_error)
Signature · 1 line
2.45.1
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerPATCH v6 2/3 x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions
In reply to Josh PoimboeufDuplicating the documentation of all the Spectre kernel cmdline options in two separate files is unwieldy and error-prone. Instead just add a reference to kernel-parameters.txt from spectre.rst.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 86 +++---------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +10 -76
@@ -592,85 +592,19 @@ Spectre variant 2 Mitigation control on the kernel command line --------------------------------------------- -Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the -kernel command line. +In general the kernel selects reasonable default mitigations for the +current CPU. - nospectre_v1 +Spectre default mitigations can be disabled or changed at the kernel +command line with the following options: - [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 - (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are - possible in the system. + - nospectre_v1 + - nospectre_v2 + - spectre_v2={option} + - spectre_v2_user={option} + - spectre_bhi={option} - nospectre_v2 - - [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 - (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may - allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent - to spectre_v2=off. - - - spectre_v2= - - [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 - (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. - The default operation protects the kernel from - user space attacks. - - on - unconditionally enable, implies - spectre_v2_user=on - off - unconditionally disable, implies - spectre_v2_user=off - auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is - vulnerable - - Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a - mitigation method at run time according to the - CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the - CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option, - and the compiler with which the kernel was built. - - Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation - against user space to user space task attacks. - - Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and - the user space protections. - - Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: - - retpoline auto pick between generic,lfence - retpoline,generic Retpolines - retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch - retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence - eibrs Enhanced/Auto IBRS - eibrs,retpoline Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines - eibrs,lfence Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE - ibrs use IBRS to protect kernel - - Not specifying this option is equivalent to - spectre_v2=auto. - - In general the kernel by default selects - reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To - disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with - spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations - cannot be disabled. - - spectre_bhi= - - [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection - (BHI) vulnerability. This setting affects the deployment - of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - - on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as - needed. - off - Disable the mitigation. - -For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +For more details on the available options, refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt Mitigation selection guide --------------------------
Signature · 1 line
2.45.1
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerPATCH v6 3/3 x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In reply to Josh PoimboeufIn cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.
This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:
36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")
with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -3
@@ -6136,9 +6136,15 @@ deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation - as needed. - off - Disable the mitigation. + on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as + needed. This protects the kernel from + both syscalls and VMs. + vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation + available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit + ONLY. On such systems, the host kernel is + protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but + may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks. + off - Disable the mitigation. spectre_v2= [X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +11 -5
@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)enum bhi_mitigations {BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ,BHI_MITIGATION_ON , +BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY , }; static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; + else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit")) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; else pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);
@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)return ; } +/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */ if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis ())return ;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))return ; -/* Mitigate KVM by default */ -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n" ); +if (bhi_mitigation ==BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ) { +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); +return ; + } -/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */ +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and vm exit\n" );setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); }static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.45.1
Re: [PATCH v6 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 16 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking the exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotationFixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>Tested-by Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Quoted 11 lines
--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 9 ++++++--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 11 +++++++---- scripts/syscalltbl.sh | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 4 ++++ 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
Hi,
This is the friendly patch-bot of Greg Kroah-Hartman. You have sent him a patch that has triggered this response. He used to manually respond to these common problems, but in order to save his sanity (he kept writing the same thing over and over, yet to different people), I was created. Hopefully you will not take offence and will fix the problem in your patch and resubmit it so that it can be accepted into the Linux kernel tree.
You are receiving this message because of the following common error(s) as indicated below:
- You have marked a patch with a "Fixes:" tag for a commit that is in an older released kernel, yet you do not have a cc: stable line in the signed-off-by area at all, which means that the patch will not be applied to any older kernel releases. To properly fix this, please follow the documented rules in the Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst file for how to resolve this.
If you wish to discuss this problem further, or you have questions about how to resolve this issue, please feel free to respond to this email and Greg will reply once he has dug out from the pending patches received from other developers.
thanks,
greg k-h's patch email bot
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking the exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.
Quoted 8 lines
Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotationFixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
This here talks about
1e3ad78334a6 ("x86/syscall: Don't force use of indirect calls for system calls")
being the culprit.
But Fixes points to something unrelated...?
In any case, I won't send this to Linus now as urgent material unless someone presents a reasonable argument for it...
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v6 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
Quoted 18 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking the exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.Quoted 8 lines
Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotationFixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>This here talks about
Quoted 8 lines
1e3ad78334a6("x86/syscall: Don't force use of indirect calls for system calls")being the culprit.
But Fixes points to something unrelated...?
In any case, I won't send this to Linus now as urgent material unless someone presents a reasonable argument for it...
Its being in -next now and going into the upcoming merge window works just fine for me, thank you!
Thanx, Paul
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 1/3] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 16 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 6 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the
exit()andexit_group()syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.Fix that by marking the exit syscall declarations
__noreturn.Quoted 8 lines
Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:
x64_sys_call+0x2804:__x64_sys_exit()is missing a__noreturnannotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool:ia32_sys_call+0x29b6:__ia32_sys_exit_group()is missing a__noreturnannotationFixes 7390db8aea0d ("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")Reported-by "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
This here talks about
1e3ad78334a6("x86/syscall: Don't force use of indirect calls for system calls")being the culprit.
But Fixes points to something unrelated...?
Ah yeah, it should be
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 3/3] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In reply to Josh Poimboeufarch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) · line 1673
Quoted 5 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2
-3-/* Mitigate KVM by default */ -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n" ); +if (bhi_mitigation ==BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ) { +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit only\n" );
"... VM exit... "
I'll touch up when applying.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[tip: x86/bugs] x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
In reply to Josh PoimboeufThe following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 9142be9e6443fd641ca37f820efe00d9cd890eb1 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/9142be9e6443fd641ca37f820efe00d9cd890eb1 Author: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 23:02:00 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Fri, 28 Jun 2024 15:23:38 +02:00
x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit() and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't optimized accordingly.
Fix that by marking the exit syscall declarations __noreturn.
Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation
--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c | 9 ++++++--- arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 6 +++--- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 11 +++++++---- scripts/syscalltbl.sh | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- tools/objtool/noreturns.h | 4 ++++ 9 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c +6 -4
@@ -14,9 +14,12 @@#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); - +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __ia32_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -28,11 +31,10 @@const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = { #include <asm/syscalls_32.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL#endif #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __ia32_##sym(regs); -long ia32_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c +6 -3
@@ -8,8 +8,12 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL + +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL/* * The sys_call_table[] is no longer used for system calls, but
@@ -20,10 +24,9 @@ const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] = {#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> }; -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); -long x64_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscall_x32.c +5 -2
@@ -8,11 +8,14 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern long __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *); +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN (nr, sym) extern long __noreturn __x64_##sym(const struct pt_regs *);#include <asm/syscalls_x32.h> -#undef __SYSCALL +#undef __SYSCALL -#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs); +#undef __SYSCALL_NORETURN +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL +#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) case nr: return __x64_##sym(regs);long x32_sys_call (const struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned int nr) {switch (nr) {
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl +3 -3
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # 32-bit system call numbers and entry vectors # # The format is: -# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> <compat entry point> +# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]] # # The __ia32_sys and __ia32_compat_sys stubs are created on-the-fly for # sys_*() system calls and compat_sys_*() compat system calls if
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ # The abi is always "i386" for this file. # 0 i386 restart_syscall sys_restart_syscall -1 i386 exit sys_exit +1 i386 exit sys_exit - noreturn 2 i386 fork sys_fork 3 i386 read sys_read 4 i386 write sys_write
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ 249 i386 io_cancel sys_io_cancel 250 i386 fadvise64 sys_ia32_fadvise64 # 251 is available for reuse (was briefly sys_set_zone_reclaim) -252 i386 exit_group sys_exit_group +252 i386 exit_group sys_exit_group - noreturn 253 i386 lookup_dcookie 254 i386 epoll_create sys_epoll_create 255 i386 epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctl
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +3 -3
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # 64-bit system call numbers and entry vectors # # The format is: -# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> +# <number> <abi> <name> <entry point> [<compat entry point> [noreturn]] # # The __x64_sys_*() stubs are created on-the-fly for sys_*() system calls #
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ 57 common fork sys_fork 58 common vfork sys_vfork 59 64 execve sys_execve -60 common exit sys_exit +60 common exit sys_exit - noreturn 61 common wait4 sys_wait4 62 common kill sys_kill 63 common uname sys_newuname
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ 228 common clock_gettime sys_clock_gettime 229 common clock_getres sys_clock_getres 230 common clock_nanosleep sys_clock_nanosleep -231 common exit_group sys_exit_group +231 common exit_group sys_exit_group - noreturn 232 common epoll_wait sys_epoll_wait 233 common epoll_ctl sys_epoll_ctl 234 common tgkill sys_tgkill
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_32.c +6 -4
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@#include <linux/cache.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> +extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long ); +/* * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64 * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -22,15 +26,13 @@#define sys_vm86 sys_ni_syscall#define __SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT (nr, native, compat) __SYSCALL(nr, native) +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> +#undef __SYSCALL -#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) sym, - -extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ); - const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {#include <asm/syscalls_32.h> };
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c +7 -4
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@#include <linux/cache.h> #include <asm/syscall.h> +extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long , +unsigned long ,unsigned long ); +/* * Below you can see, in terms of #define's, the differences between the x86-64 * and the UML syscall table.
@@ -18,14 +22,13 @@#define sys_iopl sys_ni_syscall#define sys_ioperm sys_ni_syscall +#define __SYSCALL_NORETURN __SYSCALL +#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) extern asmlinkage long sym(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> +#undef __SYSCALL -#undef __SYSCALL#define __SYSCALL (nr, sym) sym, - -extern asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall (unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ,unsigned long ); - const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[] ____cacheline_aligned = {#include <asm/syscalls_64.h> };
scripts/syscalltbl.sh +16 -2
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ nxt=0 grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | { - while read nr abi name native compat ; do + while read nr abi name native compat noreturn; do if [ $nxt -gt $nr ]; then echo "error: $infile: syscall table is not sorted or duplicates the same syscall number" >&2
@@ -66,7 +66,21 @@ grep -E "^[0-9]+[[:space:]]+$abis" "$infile" | { nxt=$((nxt + 1)) done - if [ -n "$compat" ]; then + if [ "$compat" = "-" ]; then + unset compat + fi + + if [ -n "$noreturn" ]; then + if [ "$noreturn" != "noreturn" ]; then + echo "error: $infile: invalid string \"$noreturn\" in 'noreturn' column" + exit 1 + fi + if [ -n "$compat" ]; then + echo "__SYSCALL_COMPAT_NORETURN($nr, $native, $compat)" + else + echo "__SYSCALL_NORETURN($nr, $native)" + fi + elif [ -n "$compat" ]; then echo "__SYSCALL_WITH_COMPAT($nr, $native, $compat)" elif [ -n "$native" ]; then echo "__SYSCALL($nr, $native)"
tools/objtool/noreturns.h +4 -0
@@ -7,12 +7,16 @@* Yes, this is unfortunate. A better solution is in the works. */ NORETURN(__fortify_panic) +NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit) +NORETURN(__ia32_sys_exit_group) NORETURN(__kunit_abort) NORETURN(__module_put_and_kthread_exit) NORETURN(__reiserfs_panic) NORETURN(__stack_chk_fail) NORETURN(__tdx_hypercall_failed) NORETURN(__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable) +NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit) +NORETURN(__x64_sys_exit_group) NORETURN(arch_cpu_idle_dead) NORETURN(bch2_trans_in_restart_error) NORETURN(bch2_trans_restart_error)
[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions
In reply to Josh PoimboeufThe following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 4586c93ebf410c2b7f480cc4762edd59012a66c0 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/4586c93ebf410c2b7f480cc4762edd59012a66c0 Author: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 23:02:01 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Fri, 28 Jun 2024 15:28:38 +02:00
x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions
Duplicating the documentation of all the Spectre kernel cmdline options in two separate files is unwieldy and error-prone. Instead just add a reference to kernel-parameters.txt from spectre.rst.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 86 ++---------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +10 -76
@@ -592,85 +592,19 @@ Spectre variant 2 Mitigation control on the kernel command line --------------------------------------------- -Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the -kernel command line. +In general the kernel selects reasonable default mitigations for the +current CPU. - nospectre_v1 +Spectre default mitigations can be disabled or changed at the kernel +command line with the following options: - [X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 - (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are - possible in the system. + - nospectre_v1 + - nospectre_v2 + - spectre_v2={option} + - spectre_v2_user={option} + - spectre_bhi={option} - nospectre_v2 - - [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 - (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may - allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent - to spectre_v2=off. - - - spectre_v2= - - [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 - (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. - The default operation protects the kernel from - user space attacks. - - on - unconditionally enable, implies - spectre_v2_user=on - off - unconditionally disable, implies - spectre_v2_user=off - auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is - vulnerable - - Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a - mitigation method at run time according to the - CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the - CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option, - and the compiler with which the kernel was built. - - Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation - against user space to user space task attacks. - - Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and - the user space protections. - - Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: - - retpoline auto pick between generic,lfence - retpoline,generic Retpolines - retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch - retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence - eibrs Enhanced/Auto IBRS - eibrs,retpoline Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines - eibrs,lfence Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE - ibrs use IBRS to protect kernel - - Not specifying this option is equivalent to - spectre_v2=auto. - - In general the kernel by default selects - reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To - disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with - spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations - cannot be disabled. - - spectre_bhi= - - [X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection - (BHI) vulnerability. This setting affects the deployment - of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - - on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as - needed. - off - Disable the mitigation. - -For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +For more details on the available options, refer to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt Mitigation selection guide --------------------------
[tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In reply to Josh PoimboeufThe following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 42c141fbb651b64db492aab35bc1d96eb4c20261 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/42c141fbb651b64db492aab35bc1d96eb4c20261 Author: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 23:02:02 -07:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Fri, 28 Jun 2024 15:35:54 +02:00
x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option
In cloud environments it can be useful to *only* enable the vmexit mitigation and leave syscalls vulnerable. Add that as an option.
This is similar to the old spectre_bhi=auto option which was removed with the following commit:
36d4fe147c87 ("x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto")
with the main difference being that this has a more descriptive name and is disabled by default.
Mitigation switch requested by Maksim Davydov <[email protected]>.
[ bp: Massage. ]
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -3
@@ -6136,9 +6136,15 @@ deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence. - on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation - as needed. - off - Disable the mitigation. + on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as + needed. This protects the kernel from + both syscalls and VMs. + vmexit - On systems which don't have the HW mitigation + available, enable the SW mitigation on vmexit + ONLY. On such systems, the host kernel is + protected from VM-originated BHI attacks, but + may still be vulnerable to syscall attacks. + off - Disable the mitigation. spectre_v2= [X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +11 -5
@@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)enum bhi_mitigations {BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ,BHI_MITIGATION_ON , +BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY , }; static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -1639,6 +1640,8 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_OFF ; else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_ON ; + else if (!strcmp(str, "vmexit")) + bhi_mitigation =BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ; else pr_err("Ignoring unknown spectre_bhi option (%s)", str);
@@ -1659,19 +1662,22 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)return ; } +/* Mitigate in hardware if supported */ if (spec_ctrl_bhi_dis ())return ;if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))return ; -/* Mitigate KVM by default */ -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on vm exit\n" ); +if (bhi_mitigation ==BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY ) { +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on VM exit only\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); +return ; + } -/* Mitigate syscalls when the mitigation is forced =on */ +pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall and VM exit\n" );setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP ); -pr_info ("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT ); }static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation (void )