Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of changes for kirkstone and have comments back by end of day Friday, December 6
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://valkyrie.yoctoproject.org/#/builders/29/builds/581
The following changes since commit 13b13b81b91f618c13cf972067c47bd810de852f:
gstreamer1.0: improve test reliability (2024-11-27 06:57:56 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/kirkstone-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/kirkstone-nut
Changqing Li (2):
libsoup: fix CVE-2024-52531
rxvt-unicode.inc: disable the terminfo installation by setting TIC to
:
Divya Chellam (1):
qemu: fix CVE-2024-3446
Hongxu Jia (3):
ovmf: fix CVE-2024-38796
ovmf: fix CVE-2024-1298
python3-zipp: fix CVE-2024-5569
Jiaying Song (1):
diffoscope: fix CVE-2024-25711
Peter Marko (6):
cpio: ignore CVE-2023-7216
gnupg: ignore CVE-2022-3515
qemu: ignore CVE-2022-36648
grub: ignore CVE-2024-1048 and CVE-2023-4001
pixman: ignore CVE-2023-37769
qemu: patch CVE-2024-6505
Richard Purdie (12):
do_package/sstate/sstatesig: Change timestamp clamping to hash output
only
selftest/reproducible: Drop rawlogs
selftest/reproducible: Clean up pathnames
resulttool: Allow store to filter to specific revisions
resulttool: Use single space indentation in json output oeqa/utils/gitarchive: Return tag name and improve exclude handling
resulttool: Fix passthrough of --all files in store mode
resulttool: Add --logfile-archive option to store mode
resulttool: Handle ltp rawlogs as well as ptest
resulttool: Clean up repoducible build logs
resulttool: Trim the precision of duration information
resulttool: Improve repo layout for oeselftest results
Soumya Sambu (11):
ovmf: Fix CVE-2022-36763
ovmf: Fix CVE-2022-36764
ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45230
ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45231
ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45232, CVE-2023-45233
ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45234
ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45235
ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45229
ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45237
ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45236
ovmf: Fix CVE-2022-36765
Vijay Anusuri (1):
libsoup-2.4: Backport fix for CVE-2024-52531
Yogita Urade (1):
qemu: fix CVE-2024-3447
meta/classes/sstate.bbclass | 16 - meta/lib/oe/sstatesig.py | 7 +- meta/lib/oeqa/core/runner.py | 2 +- meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/reproducible.py | 8 +- meta/lib/oeqa/utils/gitarchive.py | 4 +- meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 2 + ...ential-UINT32-overflow-in-S3-ResumeC.patch | 51 + ...-Fix-overflow-issue-in-BasePeCoffLib.patch | 37 + .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0001.patch | 985 ++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0002.patch | 889 +++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0003.patch | 55 + .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0001.patch | 271 +++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0002.patch | 281 +++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0003.patch | 48 + .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0001.patch | 179 ++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0002.patch | 157 ++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0003.patch | 135 ++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0001.patch | 604 ++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0002.patch | 539 ++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0003.patch | 244 +++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0004.patch | 157 ++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45230-0001.patch | 1617 +++++++++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45230-0002.patch | 604 ++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45231-0001.patch | 65 + .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45231-0002.patch | 250 +++ .../CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0001.patch | 360 ++++ .../CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0002.patch | 417 +++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45234-0001.patch | 154 ++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45234-0002.patch | 485 +++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45235-0001.patch | 243 +++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45235-0002.patch | 379 ++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45236.patch | 829 +++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45237-0001.patch | 78 + .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45237-0002.patch | 1288 +++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 28 + .../0001-Add-SanitizedNames-mixin.patch | 89 + ...Names-in-CompleteDirs.-Fixes-broken-.patch | 30 + .../0003-Removed-SanitizedNames.patch | 95 + ...-loop-when-zipfile-begins-with-more-.patch | 48 + ...ath.rstrip-to-consolidate-checks-for.patch | 30 + .../python/python3-zipp_3.7.0.bb | 8 + meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 13 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0001.patch | 218 +++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0002.patch | 427 +++++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0003.patch | 68 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0004.patch | 144 ++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0005.patch | 42 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0006.patch | 43 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3447.patch | 137 ++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-6505.patch | 40 + meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.14.bb | 2 + .../xorg-lib/pixman_0.40.0.bb | 3 + .../rxvt-unicode/rxvt-unicode.inc | 3 +- .../diffoscope/CVE-2024-25711.patch | 116 ++ .../diffoscope/diffoscope_208.bb | 1 + meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.3.7.bb | 2 + .../libsoup-2.4/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch | 131 ++ .../libsoup-2.4/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch | 36 + .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4_2.74.2.bb | 2 + .../libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch | 116 ++ .../libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch | 40 + .../libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-3.patch | 136 ++ meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.0.7.bb | 3 + scripts/lib/resulttool/manualexecution.py | 2 +- scripts/lib/resulttool/report.py | 2 +- scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py | 76 +- scripts/lib/resulttool/store.py | 26 +- 67 files changed, 13550 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-MdeModulePkg-Potential-UINT32-overflow-in-S3-ResumeC.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-MdePkg-Fix-overflow-issue-in-BasePeCoffLib.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0003.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0003.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0003.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0003.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0004.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45230-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45230-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45231-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45231-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45234-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45234-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45235-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45235-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45236.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45237-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45237-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0001-Add-SanitizedNames-mixin.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0002-Employ-SanitizedNames-in-CompleteDirs.-Fixes-broken-.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0003-Removed-SanitizedNames.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0004-Address-infinite-loop-when-zipfile-begins-with-more-.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0005-Prefer-simpler-path.rstrip-to-consolidate-checks-for.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0003.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0004.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0005.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0006.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3447.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-6505.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/diffoscope/diffoscope/CVE-2024-25711.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-3.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 1/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2022-36763
From: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
EDK2 is susceptible to a vulnerability in the Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function, allowing a user to trigger a heap buffer overflow via a local network. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in a compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36763
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/224446543206450ddb5830e6abd026d61d3c7f4b
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/4776a1b39ee08fc45c70c1eab5a0195f325000d3
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1ddcb9fc6b4164e882687b031e8beacfcf7df29e
--- .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0001.patch | 985 ++++++++++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0002.patch | 889 ++++++++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0003.patch | 55 + meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 1932 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0003.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0001.patch new file +985 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,985 @@ +From 224446543206450ddb5830e6abd026d61d3c7f4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Douglas Flick [MSFT]" <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 02:16:01 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4117 - CVE + 2022-36763 + +This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib +CVE 2022-36763. + +Cc: Jiewen Yao <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2022-36763 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/224446543206450ddb5830e6abd026d61d3c7f4b] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 69 ++-- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf | 4 +- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 275 ++++++++++++++++ + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 113 +++++++ + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 303 ++++++++++++++++++ + ...Tpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf | 28 ++ + SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml | 1 + + 7 files changed, 763 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c + create mode 100644 SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +index 36a256a7af..0475103d6e 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ Copyright (c) 2013 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> + (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR> + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + ++Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR> ++SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + **/ + + #include <PiDxe.h> +@@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + #include <Library/HobLib.h> + #include <Protocol/CcMeasurement.h> + ++#include "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h" ++ + typedef struct { + EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol; + EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol; +@@ -144,10 +148,11 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; + EFI_CC_EVENT *CcEvent; + EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; +- UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINT32 TcgEventSize; + EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL *Tcg2Protocol; + EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL *CcProtocol; + EFI_CC_MR_INDEX MrIndex; ++ UINT32 AllocSize; + + if (mTcg2MeasureGptCount > 0) { + return EFI_SUCCESS; +@@ -195,25 +200,22 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + BlockIo->Media->BlockSize, + (UINT8 *)PrimaryHeader + ); +- if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to Read Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || EFI_ERROR (SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (PrimaryHeader, BlockIo))) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Failed to read Partition Table Header or invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + // +- // PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry should not be zero ++ // Read the partition entry. + // +- if (PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry == 0) { +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SizeOfPartitionEntry should not be zero!\n")); ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (PrimaryHeader, &AllocSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; + } + +- // +- // Read the partition entry. +- // +- EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ EntryPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocatePool (AllocSize); + if (EntryPtr == NULL) { + FreePool (PrimaryHeader); + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; +@@ -223,7 +225,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + DiskIo, + BlockIo->Media->MediaId, + MultU64x32 (PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize), +- PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, ++ AllocSize, + EntryPtr + ); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +@@ -248,16 +250,21 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + // + // Prepare Data for Measurement (CcProtocol and Tcg2Protocol) + // +- EventSize = (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) +- + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry); +- EventPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)); ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &TcgEventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ FreePool (PrimaryHeader); ++ FreePool (EntryPtr); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ EventPtr = (UINT8 *)AllocateZeroPool (TcgEventSize); + if (EventPtr == NULL) { + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + goto Exit; + } + + Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr; +- Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event); ++ Tcg2Event->Size = TcgEventSize; + Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER); + Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION; + Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex = 5; +@@ -310,7 +317,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + CcProtocol, + 0, + (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)(VOID *)GptData, +- (UINT64)EventSize, ++ (UINT64)TcgEventSize - OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event), + CcEvent + ); + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +@@ -326,7 +333,7 @@ Tcg2MeasureGptTable ( + Tcg2Protocol, + 0, + (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)(VOID *)GptData, +- (UINT64)EventSize, ++ (UINT64)TcgEventSize - OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event), + Tcg2Event + ); + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +@@ -443,11 +450,13 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + Tcg2Event->Header.PCRIndex = 2; + break; + default: +- DEBUG (( +- DEBUG_ERROR, +- "Tcg2MeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d", +- ImageType +- )); ++ DEBUG ( ++ ( ++ DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "Tcg2MeasurePeImage: Unknown subsystem type %d", ++ ImageType ++ ) ++ ); + goto Finish; + } + +@@ -515,7 +524,7 @@ Finish: + + @param MeasureBootProtocols Pointer to the located measure boot protocol instances. + +- @retval EFI_SUCCESS Sucessfully locate the measure boot protocol instances (at least one instance). ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Successfully locate the measure boot protocol instances (at least one instance). + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Measure boot is not supported. + **/ + EFI_STATUS +@@ -646,12 +655,14 @@ DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler ( + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + +- DEBUG (( +- DEBUG_INFO, +- "Tcg2Protocol = %p, CcMeasurementProtocol = %p\n", +- MeasureBootProtocols.Tcg2Protocol, +- MeasureBootProtocols.CcProtocol +- )); ++ DEBUG ( ++ ( ++ DEBUG_INFO, ++ "Tcg2Protocol = %p, CcMeasurementProtocol = %p\n", ++ MeasureBootProtocols.Tcg2Protocol, ++ MeasureBootProtocols.CcProtocol ++ ) ++ ); + + // + // Copy File Device Path +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf +index 6dca79a20c..28995f438d 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.inf +@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ + + [Sources] + DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h + + [Packages] + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +@@ -46,6 +48,7 @@ + + [LibraryClasses] + BaseMemoryLib ++ SafeIntLib + DebugLib + MemoryAllocationLib + DevicePathLib +@@ -65,4 +68,3 @@ + gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlockProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiBlockIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + gEfiDiskIoProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES +- +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..e2309655d3 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@ ++/** @file ++ The library instance provides security service of TPM2 measure boot and ++ Confidential Computing (CC) measure boot. ++ ++ Caution: This file requires additional review when modified. ++ This library will have external input - PE/COFF image and GPT partition. ++ This external input must be validated carefully to avoid security issue like ++ buffer overflow, integer overflow. ++ ++ This file will pull out the validation logic from the following functions, in an ++ attempt to validate the untrusted input in the form of unit tests ++ ++ These are those functions: ++ ++ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content ++ read is within the image buffer. ++ ++ Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse ++ partition data carefully. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR> ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++#include <Uefi.h> ++#include <Uefi/UefiSpec.h> ++#include <Library/SafeIntLib.h> ++#include <Library/UefiLib.h> ++#include <Library/DebugLib.h> ++#include <Library/BaseLib.h> ++#include <IndustryStandard/UefiTcgPlatform.h> ++#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h> ++#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h> ++ ++#include "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h" ++ ++#define GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1 0x00010000 ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is safe to parse ++ However this function will not attempt to verify the validity of the GPT partition ++ It will check the following: ++ - Signature ++ - Revision ++ - AlternateLBA ++ - FirstUsableLBA ++ - LastUsableLBA ++ - PartitionEntryLBA ++ - NumberOfPartitionEntries ++ - SizeOfPartitionEntry ++ - BlockIo ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[in] BlockIo ++ Pointer to the EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL structure. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo ++ ) ++{ ++ // ++ // Verify that the input parameters are safe to use ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((BlockIo == NULL) || (BlockIo->Media == NULL)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid BlockIo!\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // The signature must be EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID ("EFI PART" in ASCII) ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->Header.Signature != EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // The version must be GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1 (0x00010000) ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->Header.Revision != GPT_HEADER_REVISION_V1) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header Revision!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // The HeaderSize must be greater than or equal to 92 and must be less than or equal to the logical block size ++ // ++ if ((PrimaryHeader->Header.HeaderSize < sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER)) || (PrimaryHeader->Header.HeaderSize > BlockIo->Media->BlockSize)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header HeaderSize!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // The partition entries should all be before the first usable block ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->FirstUsableLBA <= PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "GPT PartitionEntryLBA is not less than FirstUsableLBA!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Check that the PartitionEntryLBA greater than the Max LBA ++ // This will be used later for multiplication ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->PartitionEntryLBA > DivU64x32 (MAX_UINT64, BlockIo->Media->BlockSize)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header PartitionEntryLBA!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Check that the number of partition entries is greater than zero ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries == 0) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // SizeOfPartitionEntry must be 128, 256, 512... improper size may lead to accessing uninitialized memory ++ // ++ if ((PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry < 128) || ((PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry & (PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry - 1)) != 0)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // This check is to prevent overflow when calculating the allocation size for the partition entries ++ // This check will be used later for multiplication ++ // ++ if (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries > DivU64x32 (MAX_UINT64, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!\n")); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - AllocationSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[out] AllocationSize ++ Pointer to the allocation size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The allocation size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ The allocation size is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (AllocationSize == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry; ++ // ++ Status = SafeUint32Mult (PrimaryHeader->NumberOfPartitionEntries, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, AllocationSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Allocation Size would have overflowed!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the Gpt Event Size calculated from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ Important: This function includes the entire length of the allocated space, including ++ (sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)) . When hashing the buffer allocated with this ++ size, the caller must subtract the size of the (sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)) ++ from the size of the buffer before hashing. ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader - Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ @param[in] NumberOfPartition - Number of partitions. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINT32 SafeNumberOfPartitions; ++ ++ if (PrimaryHeader == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (EventSize == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // We shouldn't even attempt to perform the multiplication if the number of partitions is greater than the maximum value of UINT32 ++ // ++ Status = SafeUintnToUint32 (NumberOfPartition, &SafeNumberOfPartitions); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "NumberOfPartition would have overflowed!\n")); ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // (UINT32)(sizeof (EFI_GPT_DATA) - sizeof (GptData->Partitions) + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ // ++ Status = SafeUint32Mult (SafeNumberOfPartitions, PrimaryHeader->SizeOfPartitionEntry, EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Event Size would have overflowed!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // *EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event); ++ // ++ Status = SafeUint32Add ( ++ OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event) + OFFSET_OF (EFI_GPT_DATA, Partitions), ++ *EventSize, ++ EventSize ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Event Size would have overflowed because of GPTData!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..048b738987 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ ++/** @file ++ This file includes the function prototypes for the sanitization functions. ++ ++ These are those functions: ++ ++ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibImageRead() function will make sure the PE/COFF image content ++ read is within the image buffer. ++ ++ Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse ++ partition data carefully. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR> ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++ ++**/ ++ ++#ifndef DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_ ++#define DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_ ++ ++#include <Uefi.h> ++#include <Uefi/UefiSpec.h> ++#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h> ++#include <IndustryStandard/UefiTcgPlatform.h> ++#include <Protocol/Tcg2Protocol.h> ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is safe to parse ++ However this function will not attempt to verify the validity of the GPT partition ++ It will check the following: ++ - Signature ++ - Revision ++ - AlternateLBA ++ - FirstUsableLBA ++ - LastUsableLBA ++ - PartitionEntryLBA ++ - NumberOfPartitionEntries ++ - SizeOfPartitionEntry ++ - BlockIo ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[in] BlockIo ++ Pointer to the EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL structure. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ The EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN CONST EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL *BlockIo ++ ); ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - AllocationSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader ++ Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ ++ @param[out] AllocationSize ++ Pointer to the allocation size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The allocation size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ The allocation size is invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ OUT UINT32 *AllocationSize ++ ); ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the Gpt Event Size calculated from the primary header is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ Important: This function includes the entire length of the allocated space, including ++ (sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)) . When hashing the buffer allocated with this ++ size, the caller must subtract the size of the (sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)) ++ from the size of the buffer before hashing. ++ ++ @param[in] PrimaryHeader - Pointer to the EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER structure. ++ @param[in] NumberOfPartition - Number of partitions. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++ IN CONST EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER *PrimaryHeader, ++ IN UINTN NumberOfPartition, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ); ++ ++#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..3eb9763e3c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@ ++/** @file ++ This file includes the unit test cases for the DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c. ++ ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR> ++ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++**/ ++ ++#include <Uefi.h> ++#include <Library/UefiLib.h> ++#include <Library/DebugLib.h> ++#include <Library/UnitTestLib.h> ++#include <Protocol/BlockIo.h> ++#include <Library/MemoryAllocationLib.h> ++#include <Library/BaseMemoryLib.h> ++#include <IndustryStandard/UefiTcgPlatform.h> ++#include <Protocol/Tcg2Protocol.h> ++ ++#include "../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h" ++ ++#define UNIT_TEST_NAME "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest" ++#define UNIT_TEST_VERSION "1.0" ++ ++#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION 0x00010000 ++#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES 1 ++#define DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY 128 ++ ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader function. ++ It's intent is to test that a malicious EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER ++ structure will not cause undefined or unexpected behavior. ++ ++ In general the TPM should still be able to measure the data, but ++ be the header should be sanitized to prevent any unexpected behavior. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL BlockIo; ++ EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA BlockMedia; ++ ++ // Generate EFI_BLOCK_IO_MEDIA test data ++ BlockMedia.MediaId = 1; ++ BlockMedia.RemovableMedia = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.MediaPresent = TRUE; ++ BlockMedia.LogicalPartition = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.ReadOnly = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.WriteCaching = FALSE; ++ BlockMedia.BlockSize = 512; ++ BlockMedia.IoAlign = 1; ++ BlockMedia.LastBlock = 0; ++ ++ // Generate EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL test data ++ BlockIo.Revision = 1; ++ BlockIo.Media = &BlockMedia; ++ BlockIo.Reset = NULL; ++ BlockIo.ReadBlocks = NULL; ++ BlockIo.WriteBlocks = NULL; ++ BlockIo.FlushBlocks = NULL; ++ ++ // Geneate EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER test data ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.Signature = EFI_PTAB_HEADER_ID; ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION; ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); ++ PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1; ++ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2; ++ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3; ++ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4; ++ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid ++ ++ // Calculate the CRC32 of the PrimaryHeader ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.CRC32 = CalculateCrc32 ((UINT8 *)&PrimaryHeader, PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize); ++ ++ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ // Test that when number of partition entries is 0, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ++ // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header NumberOfPartitionEntries!"" ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 0; ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ ++ // Test that when the header size is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ++ // Should print "Invalid Partition Table Header Size!" ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = 0; ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); ++ PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); ++ ++ // Test that when the SizeOfPartitionEntry is too small, the function returns EFI_DEVICE_ERROR ++ // should print: "SizeOfPartitionEntry shall be set to a value of 128 x 2^n where n is an integer greater than or equal to zero (e.g., 128, 256, 512, etc.)!" ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 1; ++ Status = SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader (&PrimaryHeader, &BlockIo); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER ++ structure will not cause an overflow when calculating the allocation size. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 AllocationSize; ++ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ // Test that the allocation size is correct compared to the existing logic ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (AllocationSize, PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ ++ // Test that an overflow is detected ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = 5; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ // Test the inverse ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ // Test the worst case scenario ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = MAX_UINT32; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize (&PrimaryHeader, &AllocationSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a EFI_GPT_DATA structure ++ will not cause an overflow when calculating the event size. ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINT32 ExistingLogicEventSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; ++ UINTN NumberOfPartition; ++ EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; ++ EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; ++ ++ Tcg2Event = NULL; ++ GptData = NULL; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation ++ PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; ++ ++ // set the number of partitions ++ NumberOfPartition = 13; ++ ++ // that the primary event size is correct ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_NOT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ ++ // Calculate the existing logic event size ++ ExistingLogicEventSize = (UINT32)(OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event) + OFFSET_OF (EFI_GPT_DATA, Partitions) ++ + NumberOfPartition * PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry); ++ ++ // Check that the event size is correct ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (EventSize, ExistingLogicEventSize); ++ ++ // Tests that the primary event size may not overflow ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ // Test that the size of partition entries may not overflow ++ PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = MAX_UINT32; ++ Status = SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize (&PrimaryHeader, NumberOfPartition, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ ++// *--------------------------------------------------------------------* ++// * Unit Test Code Main Function ++// *--------------------------------------------------------------------* ++ ++/** ++ This function acts as the entry point for the unit tests. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++ @retval others The test failed. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++UefiTestMain ( ++ VOID ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UNIT_TEST_FRAMEWORK_HANDLE Framework; ++ UNIT_TEST_SUITE_HANDLE Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite; ++ ++ Framework = NULL; ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: TestMain() - Start\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME)); ++ ++ Status = InitUnitTestFramework (&Framework, UNIT_TEST_NAME, gEfiCallerBaseName, UNIT_TEST_VERSION); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: Failed in InitUnitTestFramework. Status = %r\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME, Status)); ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ Status = CreateUnitTestSuite (&Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, Framework, "Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", NULL, NULL); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%s: Failed in CreateUnitTestSuite for Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME)); ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto EXIT; ++ } ++ ++ // -----------Suite---------------------------------Description----------------------------Class----------------------------------Test Function------------------------Pre---Clean-Context ++ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework); ++ ++EXIT: ++ if (Framework != NULL) { ++ FreeUnitTestFramework (Framework); ++ } ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: TestMain() - End\n", UNIT_TEST_NAME)); ++ return Status; ++} ++ ++/// ++/// Avoid ECC error for function name that starts with lower case letter ++/// ++#define DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibUnitTestMain main ++ ++/** ++ Standard POSIX C entry point for host based unit test execution. ++ ++ @param[in] Argc Number of arguments ++ @param[in] Argv Array of pointers to arguments ++ ++ @retval 0 Success ++ @retval other Error ++**/ ++INT32 ++DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibUnitTestMain ( ++ IN INT32 Argc, ++ IN CHAR8 *Argv[] ++ ) ++{ ++ return (INT32)UefiTestMain (); ++} +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..2999aa2a44 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTestHost.inf +@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ ++## @file ++# This file builds the unit tests for DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib ++# ++# Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation.<BR> ++# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ++## ++ ++[Defines] ++ INF_VERSION = 0x00010006 ++ BASE_NAME = DxeTpm2MeasuredBootLibTest ++ FILE_GUID = 144d757f-d423-484e-9309-a23695fad5bd ++ MODULE_TYPE = HOST_APPLICATION ++ VERSION_STRING = 1.0 ++ ENTRY_POINT = main ++ ++[Sources] ++ DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++ ../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++ ++[Packages] ++ MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++ ++[LibraryClasses] ++ BaseLib ++ DebugLib ++ UnitTestLib ++ PrintLib ++ SafeIntLib +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml +index 7912142398..da811fdf93 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml ++++ b/SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.ci.yaml +@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ + ## "<ErrorID>", "<KeyWord>" + ## ] + "ExceptionList": [ ++ "8001", "DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibUnitTestMain", + ], + ## Both file path and directory path are accepted. + "IgnoreFiles": [ +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0002.patch new file +889 -0
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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36763-0003.patch new file +55 -0
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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +3 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://0006-reproducible.patch \ file://0001-BaseTools-fix-gcc12-warning.patch \ file://0001-BaseTools-fix-gcc12-warning-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-36763-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-36763-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-36763-0003.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 2/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2022-36764
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
EDK2 is susceptible to a vulnerability in the Tcg2MeasurePeImage() function, allowing a user to trigger a heap buffer overflow via a local network. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in a compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36764
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/c7b27944218130cca3bbb20314ba5b88b5de4aa4
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/0d341c01eeabe0ab5e76693b36e728b8f538a40e
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/8f6d343ae639fba8e4b80e45257275e23083431f
--- .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0001.patch | 271 +++++++++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0002.patch | 281 ++++++++++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0003.patch | 48 +++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 603 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0003.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0001.patch new file +271 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@ +From c7b27944218130cca3bbb20314ba5b88b5de4aa4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Douglas Flick [MSFT]" <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 02:16:04 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] SecurityPkg: DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib: SECURITY PATCH 4118 - CVE + 2022-36764 + +This commit contains the patch files and tests for DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib +CVE 2022-36764. + +Cc: Jiewen Yao <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2022-36764 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/c7b27944218130cca3bbb20314ba5b88b5de4aa4] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c | 12 ++-- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c | 46 +++++++++++++- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h | 28 ++++++++- + .../DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++--- + 4 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +index 0475103d6e..714cc8e03e 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c +@@ -378,7 +378,6 @@ Exit: + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough resource to measure image. + @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED ImageType is unsupported or PE image is mal-format. + @retval other error value +- + **/ + EFI_STATUS + EFIAPI +@@ -405,6 +404,7 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + ImageLoad = NULL; + EventPtr = NULL; ++ Tcg2Event = NULL; + + Tcg2Protocol = MeasureBootProtocols->Tcg2Protocol; + CcProtocol = MeasureBootProtocols->CcProtocol; +@@ -420,18 +420,22 @@ Tcg2MeasurePeImage ( + } + + FilePathSize = (UINT32)GetDevicePathSize (FilePath); ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } + + // + // Determine destination PCR by BootPolicy + // +- EventSize = sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; +- EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event)); ++ // from a malicious GPT disk partition ++ EventPtr = AllocateZeroPool (EventSize); + if (EventPtr == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + Tcg2Event = (EFI_TCG2_EVENT *)EventPtr; +- Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event); ++ Tcg2Event->Size = EventSize; + Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER); + Tcg2Event->Header.HeaderVersion = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION; + ImageLoad = (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT *)Tcg2Event->Event; +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +index e2309655d3..2a4d52c6d5 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.c +@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ SanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + } + + /** +- This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane ++ This function will validate that the allocation size from the primary header is sane + It will check the following: + - AllocationSize does not overflow + +@@ -273,3 +273,47 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } ++ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UINT32 FilePathSize, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ) ++{ ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // sizeof (*ImageLoad) - sizeof (ImageLoad->DevicePath) + FilePathSize; ++ Status = SafeUint32Add (OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath), FilePathSize, EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ // Replacing logic: ++ // EventSize + sizeof (EFI_TCG2_EVENT) - sizeof (Tcg2Event->Event) ++ Status = SafeUint32Add (*EventSize, OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event), EventSize); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "EventSize would overflow!\n")); ++ return EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ } ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +index 048b738987..8f72ba4240 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitization.h +@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ + Tcg2MeasureGptTable() function will receive untrusted GPT partition table, and parse + partition data carefully. + ++ Tcg2MeasurePeImage() function will accept untrusted PE/COFF image and validate its ++ data structure within this image buffer before use. ++ + Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation.<BR> + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +@@ -110,4 +113,27 @@ SanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + OUT UINT32 *EventSize + ); + +-#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_SANITATION_ ++/** ++ This function will validate that the PeImage Event Size from the loaded image is sane ++ It will check the following: ++ - EventSize does not overflow ++ ++ @param[in] FilePathSize - Size of the file path. ++ @param[out] EventSize - Pointer to the event size. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS ++ The event size is valid. ++ ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES ++ Overflow would have occurred. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ++ One of the passed parameters was invalid. ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++SanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UINT32 FilePathSize, ++ OUT UINT32 *EventSize ++ ); ++ ++#endif // DXE_TPM2_MEASURE_BOOT_LIB_VALIDATION_ +diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +index 3eb9763e3c..820e99aeb9 100644 +--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c ++++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib/InternalUnitTest/DxeTpm2MeasureBootLibSanitizationTest.c +@@ -72,10 +72,10 @@ TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader ( + PrimaryHeader.Header.Revision = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_REVISION; + PrimaryHeader.Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER); + PrimaryHeader.MyLBA = 1; +- PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 2; +- PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 3; +- PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 4; +- PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 5; ++ PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryLBA = 2; ++ PrimaryHeader.AlternateLBA = 3; ++ PrimaryHeader.FirstUsableLBA = 4; ++ PrimaryHeader.LastUsableLBA = 5; + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_NUMBER_OF_PARTITION_ENTRIES; + PrimaryHeader.SizeOfPartitionEntry = DEFAULT_PRIMARY_TABLE_HEADER_SIZE_OF_PARTITION_ENTRY; + PrimaryHeader.PartitionEntryArrayCRC32 = 0; // Purposely invalid +@@ -187,11 +187,6 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_PARTITION_TABLE_HEADER PrimaryHeader; + UINTN NumberOfPartition; +- EFI_GPT_DATA *GptData; +- EFI_TCG2_EVENT *Tcg2Event; +- +- Tcg2Event = NULL; +- GptData = NULL; + + // Test that a normal PrimaryHeader passes validation + PrimaryHeader.NumberOfPartitionEntries = 5; +@@ -225,6 +220,52 @@ TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize ( + return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; + } + ++/** ++ This function tests the SanitizePeImageEventSize function. ++ It's intent is to test that the untrusted input from a file path when generating a ++ EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT structure will not cause an overflow when calculating ++ the event size when allocating space ++ ++ @param[in] Context The unit test context. ++ ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_PASSED The test passed. ++ @retval UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED The test failed. ++**/ ++UNIT_TEST_STATUS ++EFIAPI ++TestSanitizePeImageEventSize ( ++ IN UNIT_TEST_CONTEXT Context ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT32 EventSize; ++ UINTN ExistingLogicEventSize; ++ UINT32 FilePathSize; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ FilePathSize = 255; ++ ++ // Test that a normal PE image passes validation ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (FilePathSize, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_SUCCESS); ++ ++ // Test that the event size is correct compared to the existing logic ++ ExistingLogicEventSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_IMAGE_LOAD_EVENT, DevicePath) + FilePathSize; ++ ExistingLogicEventSize += OFFSET_OF (EFI_TCG2_EVENT, Event); ++ ++ if (EventSize != ExistingLogicEventSize) { ++ UT_LOG_ERROR ("SanitizePeImageEventSize returned an incorrect event size. Expected %u, got %u\n", ExistingLogicEventSize, EventSize); ++ return UNIT_TEST_ERROR_TEST_FAILED; ++ } ++ ++ // Test that the event size may not overflow ++ Status = SanitizePeImageEventSize (MAX_UINT32, &EventSize); ++ UT_ASSERT_EQUAL (Status, EFI_BAD_BUFFER_SIZE); ++ ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "%a: Test passed\n", __func__)); ++ ++ return UNIT_TEST_PASSED; ++} ++ + // *--------------------------------------------------------------------* + // * Unit Test Code Main Function + // *--------------------------------------------------------------------* +@@ -267,6 +308,7 @@ UefiTestMain ( + AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Validating EFI Partition Table", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizeEfiPartitionTableHeader, NULL, NULL, NULL); + AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header gpt event checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderAllocationSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); + AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests Primary header allocation size checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePrimaryHeaderGptEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ AddTestCase (Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidationTestSuite, "Tests PE Image and FileSize checks for overflow", "Common.Tcg2MeasureBootLibValidation", TestSanitizePeImageEventSize, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + Status = RunAllTestSuites (Framework); + +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0002.patch new file +281 -0
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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36764-0003.patch new file +48 -0
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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +3 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2022-36763-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2022-36763-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2022-36763-0003.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-36764-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-36764-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-36764-0003.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 3/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45230
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to a buffer overflow vulnerability via a long server ID option in DHCPv6 client. This vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access and potentially lead to a loss of Confidentiality, Integrity and/or Availability.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45230
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/f31453e8d6542461d92d835e0b79fec8b039174d
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/5f3658197bf29c83b3349b0ab1d99cdb0c3814bc
--- .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45230-0001.patch | 1617 +++++++++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45230-0002.patch | 604 ++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 2223 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45230-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45230-0002.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45230-0001.patch new file +1617 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,1617 @@ +From f31453e8d6542461d92d835e0b79fec8b039174d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Doug Flick via groups.io" <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 05:54:43 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45230 Patch + +REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4535 + +Bug Details: +PixieFail Bug #2 +CVE-2023-45230 +CVSS 8.3 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H +CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds + of a Memory Buffer + +Changes Overview: +> -UINT8 * +> +EFI_STATUS +> Dhcp6AppendOption ( +> - IN OUT UINT8 *Buf, +> - IN UINT16 OptType, +> - IN UINT16 OptLen, +> - IN UINT8 *Data +> + IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, +> + IN OUT UINT8 **PacketCursor, +> + IN UINT16 OptType, +> + IN UINT16 OptLen, +> + IN UINT8 *Data +> ); + +Dhcp6AppendOption() and variants can return errors now. All callsites +are adapted accordingly. + +It gets passed in EFI_DHCP6_PACKET as additional parameter ... + +> + // +> + // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet +> + // +> + if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) +> + || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) +> + { +> + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +> + } + +... so it can look at Packet->Size when checking buffer space. +Also to allow Packet->Length updates. + +Lots of checks added. + +Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> +Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-45230 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/f31453e8d6542461d92d835e0b79fec8b039174d] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h | 43 +++ + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c | 409 +++++++++++++++++++---------- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c | 373 +++++++++++++++++++++----- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.h | 82 +++--- + 4 files changed, 668 insertions(+), 239 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h +index 0eb9c669b5..f2422c2f28 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h +@@ -45,6 +45,49 @@ typedef struct _DHCP6_INSTANCE DHCP6_INSTANCE; + #define DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('D', 'H', '6', 'S') + #define DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('D', 'H', '6', 'I') + ++// ++// For more information on DHCP options see RFC 8415, Section 21.1 ++// ++// The format of DHCP options is: ++// ++// 0 1 2 3 ++// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | option-code | option-len | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | option-data | ++// | (option-len octets) | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE (sizeof(UINT16)) ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN (sizeof(UINT16)) ++ ++// ++// Combined size of Code and Length ++// ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN) ++ ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN == 4, ++ "Combined size of Code and Length must be 4 per RFC 8415" ++ ); ++ ++// ++// Offset to the length is just past the code ++// ++#define DHCP6_OPT_LEN_OFFSET(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OPT_LEN_OFFSET (0) == 2, ++ "Offset of length is + 2 past start of option" ++ ); ++ ++#define DHCP6_OPT_DATA_OFFSET(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OPT_DATA_OFFSET (0) == 4, ++ "Offset to option data should be +4 from start of option" ++ ); ++ + #define DHCP6_PACKET_ALL 0 + #define DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL 1 + #define DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS 2 +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c +index dcd01e6268..bf5aa7a769 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c +@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ + + (C) Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR> + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation + + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent +- + **/ + + #include "Dhcp6Impl.h" +@@ -930,7 +930,8 @@ Dhcp6SendSolicitMsg ( + // + Packet = AllocateZeroPool (DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE + UserLen); + if (Packet == NULL) { +- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + Packet->Size = DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE + UserLen; +@@ -944,54 +945,64 @@ Dhcp6SendSolicitMsg ( + Cursor = Packet->Dhcp6.Option; + + Length = HTONS (ClientId->Length); +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptClientId), + Length, + ClientId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance, + &Elapsed + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance->IaCb.Ia, + Instance->IaCb.T1, + Instance->IaCb.T2, + Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + + // + // Append user-defined when configurate Dhcp6 service. + // + for (Index = 0; Index < Instance->Config->OptionCount; Index++) { + UserOpt = Instance->Config->OptionList[Index]; +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + UserOpt->OpCode, + UserOpt->OpLen, + UserOpt->Data + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + } + +- // +- // Determine the size/length of packet. +- // +- Packet->Length += (UINT32)(Cursor - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); + ASSERT (Packet->Size > Packet->Length + 8); + + // + // Callback to user with the packet to be sent and check the user's feedback. + // + Status = Dhcp6CallbackUser (Instance, Dhcp6SendSolicit, &Packet); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // +@@ -1005,10 +1016,8 @@ Dhcp6SendSolicitMsg ( + Instance->StartTime = 0; + + Status = Dhcp6TransmitPacket (Instance, Packet, Elapsed); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // +@@ -1020,6 +1029,14 @@ Dhcp6SendSolicitMsg ( + Elapsed, + Instance->Config->SolicitRetransmission + ); ++ ++ON_ERROR: ++ ++ if (Packet) { ++ FreePool (Packet); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; + } + + /** +@@ -1110,7 +1127,8 @@ Dhcp6SendRequestMsg ( + // + Packet = AllocateZeroPool (DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE + UserLen); + if (Packet == NULL) { +- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + Packet->Size = DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE + UserLen; +@@ -1124,51 +1142,67 @@ Dhcp6SendRequestMsg ( + Cursor = Packet->Dhcp6.Option; + + Length = HTONS (ClientId->Length); +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptClientId), + Length, + ClientId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance, + &Elapsed + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptServerId), + ServerId->Length, + ServerId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance->IaCb.Ia, + Instance->IaCb.T1, + Instance->IaCb.T2, + Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + + // + // Append user-defined when configurate Dhcp6 service. + // + for (Index = 0; Index < Instance->Config->OptionCount; Index++) { + UserOpt = Instance->Config->OptionList[Index]; +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + UserOpt->OpCode, + UserOpt->OpLen, + UserOpt->Data + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + } + +- // +- // Determine the size/length of packet. +- // +- Packet->Length += (UINT32)(Cursor - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); + ASSERT (Packet->Size > Packet->Length + 8); + + // +@@ -1177,8 +1211,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRequestMsg ( + Status = Dhcp6CallbackUser (Instance, Dhcp6SendRequest, &Packet); + + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // +@@ -1194,14 +1227,21 @@ Dhcp6SendRequestMsg ( + Status = Dhcp6TransmitPacket (Instance, Packet, Elapsed); + + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // + // Enqueue the sent packet for the retransmission in case reply timeout. + // + return Dhcp6EnqueueRetry (Instance, Packet, Elapsed, NULL); ++ ++ON_ERROR: ++ ++ if (Packet) { ++ FreePool (Packet); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; + } + + /** +@@ -1266,7 +1306,8 @@ Dhcp6SendDeclineMsg ( + // + Packet = AllocateZeroPool (DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE); + if (Packet == NULL) { +- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + Packet->Size = DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE; +@@ -1280,42 +1321,58 @@ Dhcp6SendDeclineMsg ( + Cursor = Packet->Dhcp6.Option; + + Length = HTONS (ClientId->Length); +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptClientId), + Length, + ClientId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance, + &Elapsed + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptServerId), + ServerId->Length, + ServerId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendIaOption (Cursor, DecIa, 0, 0, Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType); ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, ++ DecIa, ++ 0, ++ 0, ++ Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- // +- // Determine the size/length of packet. +- // +- Packet->Length += (UINT32)(Cursor - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); + ASSERT (Packet->Size > Packet->Length + 8); + + // + // Callback to user with the packet to be sent and check the user's feedback. + // + Status = Dhcp6CallbackUser (Instance, Dhcp6SendDecline, &Packet); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // +@@ -1329,16 +1386,22 @@ Dhcp6SendDeclineMsg ( + Instance->StartTime = 0; + + Status = Dhcp6TransmitPacket (Instance, Packet, Elapsed); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // + // Enqueue the sent packet for the retransmission in case reply timeout. + // + return Dhcp6EnqueueRetry (Instance, Packet, Elapsed, NULL); ++ ++ON_ERROR: ++ ++ if (Packet) { ++ FreePool (Packet); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; + } + + /** +@@ -1399,7 +1462,8 @@ Dhcp6SendReleaseMsg ( + // + Packet = AllocateZeroPool (DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE); + if (Packet == NULL) { +- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + Packet->Size = DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE; +@@ -1413,45 +1477,61 @@ Dhcp6SendReleaseMsg ( + Cursor = Packet->Dhcp6.Option; + + Length = HTONS (ClientId->Length); +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptClientId), + Length, + ClientId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + + // + // ServerId is extracted from packet, it's network order. + // +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptServerId), + ServerId->Length, + ServerId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance, + &Elapsed + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendIaOption (Cursor, RelIa, 0, 0, Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType); ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, ++ RelIa, ++ 0, ++ 0, ++ Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- // +- // Determine the size/length of packet +- // +- Packet->Length += (UINT32)(Cursor - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); + ASSERT (Packet->Size > Packet->Length + 8); + + // + // Callback to user with the packet to be sent and check the user's feedback. + // + Status = Dhcp6CallbackUser (Instance, Dhcp6SendRelease, &Packet); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // +@@ -1461,16 +1541,22 @@ Dhcp6SendReleaseMsg ( + Instance->IaCb.Ia->State = Dhcp6Releasing; + + Status = Dhcp6TransmitPacket (Instance, Packet, Elapsed); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // + // Enqueue the sent packet for the retransmission in case reply timeout. + // + return Dhcp6EnqueueRetry (Instance, Packet, Elapsed, NULL); ++ ++ON_ERROR: ++ ++ if (Packet) { ++ FreePool (Packet); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; + } + + /** +@@ -1529,7 +1615,8 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + // + Packet = AllocateZeroPool (DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE + UserLen); + if (Packet == NULL) { +- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + Packet->Size = DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE + UserLen; +@@ -1543,26 +1630,38 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + Cursor = Packet->Dhcp6.Option; + + Length = HTONS (ClientId->Length); +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptClientId), + Length, + ClientId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance, + &Elapsed + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance->IaCb.Ia, + Instance->IaCb.T1, + Instance->IaCb.T2, + Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + + if (!RebindRequest) { + // +@@ -1578,18 +1677,22 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ Status = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + ServerId = (EFI_DHCP6_DUID *)(Option + 2); + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptServerId), + ServerId->Length, + ServerId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + } + + // +@@ -1597,18 +1700,18 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + // + for (Index = 0; Index < Instance->Config->OptionCount; Index++) { + UserOpt = Instance->Config->OptionList[Index]; +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + UserOpt->OpCode, + UserOpt->OpLen, + UserOpt->Data + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + } + +- // +- // Determine the size/length of packet. +- // +- Packet->Length += (UINT32)(Cursor - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); + ASSERT (Packet->Size > Packet->Length + 8); + + // +@@ -1618,10 +1721,8 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + Event = (RebindRequest) ? Dhcp6EnterRebinding : Dhcp6EnterRenewing; + + Status = Dhcp6CallbackUser (Instance, Event, &Packet); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // +@@ -1638,16 +1739,22 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + Instance->StartTime = 0; + + Status = Dhcp6TransmitPacket (Instance, Packet, Elapsed); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // + // Enqueue the sent packet for the retransmission in case reply timeout. + // + return Dhcp6EnqueueRetry (Instance, Packet, Elapsed, NULL); ++ ++ON_ERROR: ++ ++ if (Packet) { ++ FreePool (Packet); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; + } + + /** +@@ -1811,7 +1918,8 @@ Dhcp6SendInfoRequestMsg ( + // + Packet = AllocateZeroPool (DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE + UserLen); + if (Packet == NULL) { +- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + Packet->Size = DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE + UserLen; +@@ -1828,44 +1936,56 @@ Dhcp6SendInfoRequestMsg ( + + if (SendClientId) { + Length = HTONS (ClientId->Length); +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptClientId), + Length, + ClientId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance, + &Elapsed + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + OptionRequest->OpCode, + OptionRequest->OpLen, + OptionRequest->Data + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + + // + // Append user-defined when configurate Dhcp6 service. + // + for (Index = 0; Index < OptionCount; Index++) { + UserOpt = OptionList[Index]; +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + UserOpt->OpCode, + UserOpt->OpLen, + UserOpt->Data + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + } + +- // +- // Determine the size/length of packet. +- // +- Packet->Length += (UINT32)(Cursor - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); + ASSERT (Packet->Size > Packet->Length + 8); + + // +@@ -1877,16 +1997,22 @@ Dhcp6SendInfoRequestMsg ( + // Send info-request packet with no state. + // + Status = Dhcp6TransmitPacket (Instance, Packet, Elapsed); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // + // Enqueue the sent packet for the retransmission in case reply timeout. + // + return Dhcp6EnqueueRetry (Instance, Packet, Elapsed, Retransmission); ++ ++ON_ERROR: ++ ++ if (Packet) { ++ FreePool (Packet); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; + } + + /** +@@ -1937,7 +2063,8 @@ Dhcp6SendConfirmMsg ( + // + Packet = AllocateZeroPool (DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE + UserLen); + if (Packet == NULL) { +- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + Packet->Size = DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE + UserLen; +@@ -1951,54 +2078,64 @@ Dhcp6SendConfirmMsg ( + Cursor = Packet->Dhcp6.Option; + + Length = HTONS (ClientId->Length); +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + HTONS (Dhcp6OptClientId), + Length, + ClientId->Duid + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendETOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance, + &Elapsed + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + Instance->IaCb.Ia, + Instance->IaCb.T1, + Instance->IaCb.T2, + Packet->Dhcp6.Header.MessageType + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + + // + // Append user-defined when configurate Dhcp6 service. + // + for (Index = 0; Index < Instance->Config->OptionCount; Index++) { + UserOpt = Instance->Config->OptionList[Index]; +- Cursor = Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- Cursor, ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendOption ( ++ Packet, ++ &Cursor, + UserOpt->OpCode, + UserOpt->OpLen, + UserOpt->Data + ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } + } + +- // +- // Determine the size/length of packet. +- // +- Packet->Length += (UINT32)(Cursor - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); + ASSERT (Packet->Size > Packet->Length + 8); + + // + // Callback to user with the packet to be sent and check the user's feedback. + // + Status = Dhcp6CallbackUser (Instance, Dhcp6SendConfirm, &Packet); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // +@@ -2012,16 +2149,22 @@ Dhcp6SendConfirmMsg ( + Instance->StartTime = 0; + + Status = Dhcp6TransmitPacket (Instance, Packet, Elapsed); +- + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { +- FreePool (Packet); +- return Status; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // + // Enqueue the sent packet for the retransmission in case reply timeout. + // + return Dhcp6EnqueueRetry (Instance, Packet, Elapsed, NULL); ++ ++ON_ERROR: ++ ++ if (Packet) { ++ FreePool (Packet); ++ } ++ ++ return Status; + } + + /** +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c +index e6368b5b1c..705c665c51 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.c +@@ -577,24 +577,33 @@ Dhcp6OnTransmitted ( + } + + /** +- Append the option to Buf, and move Buf to the end. ++ Append the option to Buf, update the length of packet, and move Buf to the end. + +- @param[in, out] Buf The pointer to the buffer. +- @param[in] OptType The option type. +- @param[in] OptLen The length of option contents. +- @param[in] Data The pointer to the option content. ++ @param[in, out] Packet A pointer to the packet, on success Packet->Length ++ will be updated. ++ @param[in, out] PacketCursor The pointer in the packet, on success PacketCursor ++ will be moved to the end of the option. ++ @param[in] OptType The option type. ++ @param[in] OptLen The length of option contents. ++ @param[in] Data The pointer to the option content. + +- @return Buf The position to append the next option. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An argument provided to the function was invalid ++ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The buffer is too small to append the option. ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The option is appended successfully. + + **/ +-UINT8 * ++EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- IN OUT UINT8 *Buf, +- IN UINT16 OptType, +- IN UINT16 OptLen, +- IN UINT8 *Data ++ IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, ++ IN OUT UINT8 **PacketCursor, ++ IN UINT16 OptType, ++ IN UINT16 OptLen, ++ IN UINT8 *Data + ) + { ++ UINT32 Length; ++ UINT32 BytesNeeded; ++ + // + // The format of Dhcp6 option: + // +@@ -607,35 +616,95 @@ Dhcp6AppendOption ( + // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // + +- ASSERT (OptLen != 0); ++ // ++ // Verify the arguments are valid ++ // ++ if (Packet == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((PacketCursor == NULL) || (*PacketCursor == NULL)) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (Data == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (OptLen == 0) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet ++ // ++ if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) ++ || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) ++ { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Calculate the bytes needed for the option ++ // ++ BytesNeeded = DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + NTOHS (OptLen); ++ ++ // ++ // Space remaining in the packet ++ // ++ Length = Packet->Size - Packet->Length; ++ if (Length < BytesNeeded) { ++ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet ++ // ++ if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) ++ || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) ++ { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, OptType); ++ *PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE; ++ WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, OptLen); ++ *PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN; ++ CopyMem (*PacketCursor, Data, NTOHS (OptLen)); ++ *PacketCursor += NTOHS (OptLen); + +- WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)Buf, OptType); +- Buf += 2; +- WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)Buf, OptLen); +- Buf += 2; +- CopyMem (Buf, Data, NTOHS (OptLen)); +- Buf += NTOHS (OptLen); ++ // Update the packet length by the length of the option + 4 bytes ++ Packet->Length += BytesNeeded; + +- return Buf; ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + /** + Append the appointed IA Address option to Buf, and move Buf to the end. + +- @param[in, out] Buf The pointer to the position to append. ++ @param[in, out] Packet A pointer to the packet, on success Packet->Length ++ will be updated. ++ @param[in, out] PacketCursor The pointer in the packet, on success PacketCursor ++ will be moved to the end of the option. + @param[in] IaAddr The pointer to the IA Address. + @param[in] MessageType Message type of DHCP6 package. + +- @return Buf The position to append the next option. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An argument provided to the function was invalid ++ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The buffer is too small to append the option. ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The option is appended successfully. + + **/ +-UINT8 * ++EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption ( +- IN OUT UINT8 *Buf, ++ IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, ++ IN OUT UINT8 **PacketCursor, + IN EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS *IaAddr, + IN UINT32 MessageType + ) + { ++ UINT32 BytesNeeded; ++ UINT32 Length; ++ + // The format of the IA Address option is: + // + // 0 1 2 3 +@@ -657,17 +726,60 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption ( + // . . + // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + ++ // ++ // Verify the arguments are valid ++ // ++ if (Packet == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((PacketCursor == NULL) || (*PacketCursor == NULL)) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (IaAddr == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet ++ // ++ if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) ++ || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) ++ { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ BytesNeeded = DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN; ++ BytesNeeded += sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS); ++ // ++ // Even if the preferred-lifetime is 0, it still needs to store it. ++ // ++ BytesNeeded += sizeof (IaAddr->PreferredLifetime); ++ // ++ // Even if the valid-lifetime is 0, it still needs to store it. ++ // ++ BytesNeeded += sizeof (IaAddr->ValidLifetime); ++ ++ // ++ // Space remaining in the packet ++ // ++ Length = Packet->Size - Packet->Length; ++ if (Length < BytesNeeded) { ++ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; ++ } ++ + // + // Fill the value of Ia Address option type + // +- WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)Buf, HTONS (Dhcp6OptIaAddr)); +- Buf += 2; ++ WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, HTONS (Dhcp6OptIaAddr)); ++ *PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE; + +- WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)Buf, HTONS (sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS))); +- Buf += 2; ++ WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, HTONS (sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS))); ++ *PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN; + +- CopyMem (Buf, &IaAddr->IpAddress, sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); +- Buf += sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS); ++ CopyMem (*PacketCursor, &IaAddr->IpAddress, sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); ++ *PacketCursor += sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS); + + // + // Fill the value of preferred-lifetime and valid-lifetime. +@@ -675,44 +787,58 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption ( + // should set to 0 when initiate a Confirm message. + // + if (MessageType != Dhcp6MsgConfirm) { +- WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)Buf, HTONL (IaAddr->PreferredLifetime)); ++ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)*PacketCursor, HTONL (IaAddr->PreferredLifetime)); + } + +- Buf += 4; ++ *PacketCursor += sizeof (IaAddr->PreferredLifetime); + + if (MessageType != Dhcp6MsgConfirm) { +- WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)Buf, HTONL (IaAddr->ValidLifetime)); ++ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)*PacketCursor, HTONL (IaAddr->ValidLifetime)); + } + +- Buf += 4; ++ *PacketCursor += sizeof (IaAddr->ValidLifetime); ++ ++ // ++ // Update the packet length ++ // ++ Packet->Length += BytesNeeded; + +- return Buf; ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + /** + Append the appointed Ia option to Buf, and move Buf to the end. + +- @param[in, out] Buf The pointer to the position to append. ++ @param[in, out] Packet A pointer to the packet, on success Packet->Length ++ will be updated. ++ @param[in, out] PacketCursor The pointer in the packet, on success PacketCursor ++ will be moved to the end of the option. + @param[in] Ia The pointer to the Ia. + @param[in] T1 The time of T1. + @param[in] T2 The time of T2. + @param[in] MessageType Message type of DHCP6 package. + +- @return Buf The position to append the next Ia option. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An argument provided to the function was invalid ++ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The buffer is too small to append the option. ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The option is appended successfully. + + **/ +-UINT8 * ++EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( +- IN OUT UINT8 *Buf, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_IA *Ia, +- IN UINT32 T1, +- IN UINT32 T2, +- IN UINT32 MessageType ++ IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, ++ IN OUT UINT8 **PacketCursor, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_IA *Ia, ++ IN UINT32 T1, ++ IN UINT32 T2, ++ IN UINT32 MessageType + ) + { +- UINT8 *AddrOpt; +- UINT16 *Len; +- UINTN Index; ++ UINT8 *AddrOpt; ++ UINT16 *Len; ++ UINTN Index; ++ UINT32 BytesNeeded; ++ UINT32 Length; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; + + // + // The format of IA_NA and IA_TA option: +@@ -733,32 +859,74 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( + // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // + ++ // ++ // Verify the arguments are valid ++ // ++ if (Packet == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((PacketCursor == NULL) || (*PacketCursor == NULL)) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (Ia == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet ++ // ++ if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) ++ || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) ++ { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ BytesNeeded = DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN; ++ BytesNeeded += sizeof (Ia->Descriptor.IaId); ++ // ++ // + N for the IA_NA-options/IA_TA-options ++ // Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption will need to check the length for each address ++ // ++ if (Ia->Descriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) { ++ BytesNeeded += sizeof (T1) + sizeof (T2); ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Space remaining in the packet ++ // ++ Length = (UINT16)(Packet->Size - Packet->Length); ++ if (Length < BytesNeeded) { ++ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; ++ } ++ + // + // Fill the value of Ia option type + // +- WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)Buf, HTONS (Ia->Descriptor.Type)); +- Buf += 2; ++ WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, HTONS (Ia->Descriptor.Type)); ++ *PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE; + + // + // Fill the len of Ia option later, keep the pointer first + // +- Len = (UINT16 *)Buf; +- Buf += 2; ++ Len = (UINT16 *)*PacketCursor; ++ *PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN; + + // + // Fill the value of iaid + // +- WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)Buf, HTONL (Ia->Descriptor.IaId)); +- Buf += 4; ++ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)*PacketCursor, HTONL (Ia->Descriptor.IaId)); ++ *PacketCursor += sizeof (Ia->Descriptor.IaId); + + // + // Fill the value of t1 and t2 if iana, keep it 0xffffffff if no specified. + // + if (Ia->Descriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) { +- WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)Buf, HTONL ((T1 != 0) ? T1 : 0xffffffff)); +- Buf += 4; +- WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)Buf, HTONL ((T2 != 0) ? T2 : 0xffffffff)); +- Buf += 4; ++ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)*PacketCursor, HTONL ((T1 != 0) ? T1 : 0xffffffff)); ++ *PacketCursor += sizeof (T1); ++ WriteUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)*PacketCursor, HTONL ((T2 != 0) ? T2 : 0xffffffff)); ++ *PacketCursor += sizeof (T2); + } + + // +@@ -766,35 +934,51 @@ Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( + // + for (Index = 0; Index < Ia->IaAddressCount; Index++) { + AddrOpt = (UINT8 *)Ia->IaAddress + Index * sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS); +- Buf = Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption (Buf, (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS *)AddrOpt, MessageType); ++ Status = Dhcp6AppendIaAddrOption (Packet, PacketCursor, (EFI_DHCP6_IA_ADDRESS *)AddrOpt, MessageType); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } + } + + // + // Fill the value of Ia option length + // +- *Len = HTONS ((UINT16)(Buf - (UINT8 *)Len - 2)); ++ *Len = HTONS ((UINT16)(*PacketCursor - (UINT8 *)Len - 2)); + +- return Buf; ++ // ++ // Update the packet length ++ // ++ Packet->Length += BytesNeeded; ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + /** + Append the appointed Elapsed time option to Buf, and move Buf to the end. + +- @param[in, out] Buf The pointer to the position to append. ++ @param[in, out] Packet A pointer to the packet, on success Packet->Length ++ @param[in, out] PacketCursor The pointer in the packet, on success PacketCursor ++ will be moved to the end of the option. + @param[in] Instance The pointer to the Dhcp6 instance. + @param[out] Elapsed The pointer to the elapsed time value in +- the generated packet. ++ the generated packet. + +- @return Buf The position to append the next Ia option. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An argument provided to the function was invalid ++ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The buffer is too small to append the option. ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The option is appended successfully. + + **/ +-UINT8 * ++EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6AppendETOption ( +- IN OUT UINT8 *Buf, +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- OUT UINT16 **Elapsed ++ IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, ++ IN OUT UINT8 **PacketCursor, ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ OUT UINT16 **Elapsed + ) + { ++ UINT32 BytesNeeded; ++ UINT32 Length; ++ + // + // The format of elapsed time option: + // +@@ -806,27 +990,70 @@ Dhcp6AppendETOption ( + // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // + ++ // ++ // Verify the arguments are valid ++ // ++ if (Packet == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((PacketCursor == NULL) || (*PacketCursor == NULL)) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if (Instance == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ if ((Elapsed == NULL)) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Verify the PacketCursor is within the packet ++ // ++ if ( (*PacketCursor < Packet->Dhcp6.Option) ++ || (*PacketCursor >= Packet->Dhcp6.Option + (Packet->Size - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER)))) ++ { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ BytesNeeded = DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN; ++ // ++ // + 2 for elapsed-time ++ // ++ BytesNeeded += sizeof (UINT16); ++ // ++ // Space remaining in the packet ++ // ++ Length = Packet->Size - Packet->Length; ++ if (Length < BytesNeeded) { ++ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; ++ } ++ + // + // Fill the value of elapsed-time option type. + // +- WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)Buf, HTONS (Dhcp6OptElapsedTime)); +- Buf += 2; ++ WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, HTONS (Dhcp6OptElapsedTime)); ++ *PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE; + + // + // Fill the len of elapsed-time option, which is fixed. + // +- WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)Buf, HTONS (2)); +- Buf += 2; ++ WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, HTONS (2)); ++ *PacketCursor += DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN; + + // + // Fill in elapsed time value with 0 value for now. The actual value is + // filled in later just before the packet is transmitted. + // +- WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)Buf, HTONS (0)); +- *Elapsed = (UINT16 *)Buf; +- Buf += 2; ++ WriteUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)*PacketCursor, HTONS (0)); ++ *Elapsed = (UINT16 *)*PacketCursor; ++ *PacketCursor += sizeof (UINT16); + +- return Buf; ++ Packet->Length += BytesNeeded; ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + /** +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.h b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.h +index 046454ff4a..06947f6c1f 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Utility.h +@@ -160,69 +160,85 @@ Dhcp6OnTransmitted ( + ); + + /** +- Append the appointed option to the buf, and move the buf to the end. +- +- @param[in, out] Buf The pointer to buffer. +- @param[in] OptType The option type. +- @param[in] OptLen The length of option content.s +- @param[in] Data The pointer to the option content. +- +- @return Buf The position to append the next option. +- ++ Append the option to Buf, update the length of packet, and move Buf to the end. ++ ++ @param[in, out] Packet A pointer to the packet, on success Packet->Length ++ will be updated. ++ @param[in, out] PacketCursor The pointer in the packet, on success PacketCursor ++ will be moved to the end of the option. ++ @param[in] OptType The option type. ++ @param[in] OptLen The length of option contents. ++ @param[in] Data The pointer to the option content. ++ ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An argument provided to the function was invalid ++ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The buffer is too small to append the option. ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The option is appended successfully. + **/ +-UINT8 * ++EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6AppendOption ( +- IN OUT UINT8 *Buf, +- IN UINT16 OptType, +- IN UINT16 OptLen, +- IN UINT8 *Data ++ IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, ++ IN OUT UINT8 **PacketCursor, ++ IN UINT16 OptType, ++ IN UINT16 OptLen, ++ IN UINT8 *Data + ); + + /** +- Append the Ia option to Buf, and move Buf to the end. +- +- @param[in, out] Buf The pointer to the position to append. ++ Append the appointed Ia option to Buf, update the Ia option length, and move Buf ++ to the end of the option. ++ @param[in, out] Packet A pointer to the packet, on success Packet->Length ++ will be updated. ++ @param[in, out] PacketCursor The pointer in the packet, on success PacketCursor ++ will be moved to the end of the option. + @param[in] Ia The pointer to the Ia. + @param[in] T1 The time of T1. + @param[in] T2 The time of T2. + @param[in] MessageType Message type of DHCP6 package. + +- @return Buf The position to append the next Ia option. +- ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An argument provided to the function was invalid ++ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The buffer is too small to append the option. ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The option is appended successfully. + **/ +-UINT8 * ++EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6AppendIaOption ( +- IN OUT UINT8 *Buf, +- IN EFI_DHCP6_IA *Ia, +- IN UINT32 T1, +- IN UINT32 T2, +- IN UINT32 MessageType ++ IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, ++ IN OUT UINT8 **PacketCursor, ++ IN EFI_DHCP6_IA *Ia, ++ IN UINT32 T1, ++ IN UINT32 T2, ++ IN UINT32 MessageType + ); + + /** + Append the appointed Elapsed time option to Buf, and move Buf to the end. + +- @param[in, out] Buf The pointer to the position to append. ++ @param[in, out] Packet A pointer to the packet, on success Packet->Length ++ @param[in, out] PacketCursor The pointer in the packet, on success PacketCursor ++ will be moved to the end of the option. + @param[in] Instance The pointer to the Dhcp6 instance. + @param[out] Elapsed The pointer to the elapsed time value in + the generated packet. + +- @return Buf The position to append the next Ia option. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An argument provided to the function was invalid ++ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The buffer is too small to append the option. ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The option is appended successfully. + + **/ +-UINT8 * ++EFI_STATUS + Dhcp6AppendETOption ( +- IN OUT UINT8 *Buf, +- IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, +- OUT UINT16 **Elapsed ++ IN OUT EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *Packet, ++ IN OUT UINT8 **PacketCursor, ++ IN DHCP6_INSTANCE *Instance, ++ OUT UINT16 **Elapsed + ); + + /** + Set the elapsed time based on the given instance and the pointer to the + elapsed time option. + +- @param[in] Elapsed The pointer to the position to append. +- @param[in] Instance The pointer to the Dhcp6 instance. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER An argument provided to the function was invalid ++ @retval EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The buffer is too small to append the option. ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The option is appended successfully. + **/ + VOID + SetElapsedTime ( +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45230-0002.patch new file +604 -0
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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +2 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2022-36764-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2022-36764-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2022-36764-0003.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45230-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45230-0002.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 4/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45231
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to an out-of-bounds read vulnerability when processing Neighbor Discovery Redirect message. This vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access and potentially lead to a loss of Confidentiality.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45231
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/bbfee34f4188ac00371abe1389ae9c9fb989a0cd
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/6f77463d72807ec7f4ed6518c3dac29a1040df9f
--- .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45231-0001.patch | 65 +++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45231-0002.patch | 250 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 317 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45231-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45231-0002.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45231-0001.patch new file +65 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From bbfee34f4188ac00371abe1389ae9c9fb989a0cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Doug Flick <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 05:54:48 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45231 Patch + +REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4536 + +Bug Overview: +PixieFail Bug #3 +CVE-2023-45231 +CVSS 6.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N +CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read + +Out-of-bounds read when handling a ND Redirect message with truncated +options + +Change Overview: + +Adds a check to prevent truncated options from being parsed ++ // ++ // Cannot process truncated options. ++ // Cannot process options with a length of 0 as there is no Type +field. ++ // ++ if (OptionLen < sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } + +Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> +Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-45231 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/bbfee34f4188ac00371abe1389ae9c9fb989a0cd] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c +index 199eea124d..8718d5d875 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c +@@ -137,6 +137,14 @@ Ip6IsNDOptionValid ( + return FALSE; + } + ++ // ++ // Cannot process truncated options. ++ // Cannot process options with a length of 0 as there is no Type field. ++ // ++ if (OptionLen < sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER)) { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ + Offset = 0; + + // +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45231-0002.patch new file +250 -0
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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +2 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2022-36764-0003.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45230-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45230-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45231-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45231-0002.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 5/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45232, CVE-2023-45233
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
CVE-2023-45232:
EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to an infinite loop vulnerability when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options header of IPv6. This vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access and potentially lead to a loss of Availability.
CVE-2023-45233:
EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to an infinite lop vulnerability when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options header of IPv6. This vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access and potentially lead to a loss of Availability.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45232
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45233
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/4df0229ef992d4f2721a8508787ebf9dc81fbd6e
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/c9c87f08dd6ace36fa843424522c3558a8374cac
--- .../CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0001.patch | 360 +++++++++++++++ .../CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0002.patch | 417 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 779 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0002.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0001.patch new file +360 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@ +From 4df0229ef992d4f2721a8508787ebf9dc81fbd6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Doug Flick <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 05:54:50 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] NetworkPkg: Ip6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45232 Patch + +REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4537 +REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4538 + +Bug Details: +PixieFail Bug #4 +CVE-2023-45232 +CVSS 7.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H +CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') + +Infinite loop when parsing unknown options in the Destination Options +header + +PixieFail Bug #5 +CVE-2023-45233 +CVSS 7.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H +CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') + +Infinite loop when parsing a PadN option in the Destination Options +header + +Change Overview: + +Most importantly this change corrects the following incorrect math +and cleans up the code. + +> // It is a PadN option +> // +> - Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1) + 2); +> + OptDataLen = ((EFI_IP6_OPTION *)(Option + Offset))->Length; +> + Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen); + +> case Ip6OptionSkip: +> - Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1)); +> OptDataLen = ((EFI_IP6_OPTION *)(Option + Offset))->Length; +> Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen); + +Additionally, this change also corrects incorrect math where the calling +function was calculating the HDR EXT optionLen as a uint8 instead of a +uint16 + +> - OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 1) * 8 - 2); +> + OptionLen = IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (*Option) - +IP6_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_NEXT_HDR_AND_LEN; + +Additionally this check adds additional logic to santize the incoming +data + +Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> +Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-45232, CVE-2023-45233 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/4df0229ef992d4f2721a8508787ebf9dc81fbd6e] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++ + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h +index 860934a167..bf64e9114e 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Nd.h +@@ -56,13 +56,48 @@ VOID + VOID *Context + ); + ++// ++// Per RFC8200 Section 4.2 ++// ++// Two of the currently-defined extension headers -- the Hop-by-Hop ++// Options header and the Destination Options header -- carry a variable ++// number of type-length-value (TLV) encoded "options", of the following ++// format: ++// ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - - ++// | Option Type | Opt Data Len | Option Data ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- - - - - - - - - ++// ++// Option Type 8-bit identifier of the type of option. ++// ++// Opt Data Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the Option ++// Data field of this option, in octets. ++// ++// Option Data Variable-length field. Option-Type-specific ++// data. ++// + typedef struct _IP6_OPTION_HEADER { ++ /// ++ /// identifier of the type of option. ++ /// + UINT8 Type; ++ /// ++ /// Length of the Option Data field of this option, in octets. ++ /// + UINT8 Length; ++ /// ++ /// Option-Type-specific data. ++ /// + } IP6_OPTION_HEADER; + + STATIC_ASSERT (sizeof (IP6_OPTION_HEADER) == 2, "IP6_OPTION_HEADER is expected to be exactly 2 bytes long."); + ++#define IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET(offset, length) (offset + sizeof(IP6_OPTION_HEADER) + length) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (0, 0) == 2, ++ "The next option is minimally the combined size of the option tag and length" ++ ); ++ + typedef struct _IP6_ETHE_ADDR_OPTION { + UINT8 Type; + UINT8 Length; +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c +index 8718d5d875..fd97ce116f 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.c +@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ + @param[in] IpSb The IP6 service data. + @param[in] Packet The to be validated packet. + @param[in] Option The first byte of the option. +- @param[in] OptionLen The length of the whole option. ++ @param[in] OptionLen The length of all options, expressed in byte length of octets. ++ Maximum length is 2046 bytes or ((n + 1) * 8) - 2 where n is 255. + @param[in] Pointer Identifies the octet offset within + the invoking packet where the error was detected. + +@@ -31,12 +32,33 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid ( + IN IP6_SERVICE *IpSb, + IN NET_BUF *Packet, + IN UINT8 *Option, +- IN UINT8 OptionLen, ++ IN UINT16 OptionLen, + IN UINT32 Pointer + ) + { +- UINT8 Offset; +- UINT8 OptionType; ++ UINT16 Offset; ++ UINT8 OptionType; ++ UINT8 OptDataLen; ++ ++ if (Option == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (Option != NULL); ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ if ((OptionLen <= 0) || (OptionLen > IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH)) { ++ ASSERT (OptionLen > 0 && OptionLen <= IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH); ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ if (Packet == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (Packet != NULL); ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ if (IpSb == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (IpSb != NULL); ++ return FALSE; ++ } + + Offset = 0; + +@@ -54,7 +76,8 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid ( + // + // It is a PadN option + // +- Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1) + 2); ++ OptDataLen = ((IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)(Option + Offset))->Length; ++ Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen); + break; + case Ip6OptionRouterAlert: + // +@@ -69,7 +92,8 @@ Ip6IsOptionValid ( + // + switch (OptionType & Ip6OptionMask) { + case Ip6OptionSkip: +- Offset = (UINT8)(Offset + *(Option + Offset + 1)); ++ OptDataLen = ((IP6_OPTION_HEADER *)(Option + Offset))->Length; ++ Offset = IP6_NEXT_OPTION_OFFSET (Offset, OptDataLen); + break; + case Ip6OptionDiscard: + return FALSE; +@@ -308,7 +332,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + UINT32 Pointer; + UINT32 Offset; + UINT8 *Option; +- UINT8 OptionLen; ++ UINT16 OptionLen; + BOOLEAN Flag; + UINT8 CountD; + UINT8 CountA; +@@ -385,6 +409,36 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + // Fall through + // + case IP6_DESTINATION: ++ // ++ // See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2460#section-4.2 page 23 ++ // ++ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++ // | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | | ++ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + ++ // | | ++ // . . ++ // . Options . ++ // . . ++ // | | ++ // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++ // ++ // ++ // Next Header 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header ++ // immediately following the Destination Options ++ // header. Uses the same values as the IPv4 ++ // Protocol field [RFC-1700 et seq.]. ++ // ++ // Hdr Ext Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the ++ // Destination Options header in 8-octet units, not ++ // including the first 8 octets. ++ // ++ // Options Variable-length field, of length such that the ++ // complete Destination Options header is an ++ // integer multiple of 8 octets long. Contains one ++ // or more TLV-encoded options, as described in ++ // section 4.2. ++ // ++ + if (*NextHeader == IP6_DESTINATION) { + CountD++; + } +@@ -398,7 +452,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + + Offset++; + Option = ExtHdrs + Offset; +- OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 1) * 8 - 2); ++ OptionLen = IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (*Option) - sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR); + Option++; + Offset++; + +@@ -430,7 +484,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + // + // Ignore the routing header and proceed to process the next header. + // +- Offset = Offset + (RoutingHead->HeaderLen + 1) * 8; ++ Offset = Offset + IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (RoutingHead->HeaderLen); + + if (UnFragmentLen != NULL) { + *UnFragmentLen = Offset; +@@ -441,7 +495,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + // to the packet's source address, pointing to the unrecognized routing + // type. + // +- Pointer = Offset + 2 + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); ++ Pointer = Offset + sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR) + sizeof (EFI_IP6_HEADER); + if ((IpSb != NULL) && (Packet != NULL) && + !IP6_IS_MULTICAST (&Packet->Ip.Ip6->DestinationAddress)) + { +@@ -527,7 +581,7 @@ Ip6IsExtsValid ( + // + // RFC2402, Payload length is specified in 32-bit words, minus "2". + // +- OptionLen = (UINT8)((*Option + 2) * 4); ++ OptionLen = ((UINT16)(*Option + 2) * 4); + Offset = Offset + OptionLen; + break; + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h +index bd8e223c8a..fb07c28f5a 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Ip6Dxe/Ip6Option.h +@@ -12,6 +12,77 @@ + + #define IP6_FRAGMENT_OFFSET_MASK (~0x3) + ++// ++// For more information see RFC 8200, Section 4.3, 4.4, and 4.6 ++// ++// This example format is from section 4.6 ++// This does not apply to fragment headers ++// ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + ++// | | ++// . . ++// . Header-Specific Data . ++// . . ++// | | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// ++// Next Header 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of ++// header immediately following the extension ++// header. Uses the same values as the IPv4 ++// Protocol field [IANA-PN]. ++// ++// Hdr Ext Len 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the ++// Destination Options header in 8-octet units, ++// not including the first 8 octets. ++ ++// ++// These defines apply to the following: ++// 1. Hop by Hop ++// 2. Routing ++// 3. Destination ++// ++typedef struct _IP6_EXT_HDR { ++ /// ++ /// The Next Header field identifies the type of header immediately ++ /// ++ UINT8 NextHeader; ++ /// ++ /// The Hdr Ext Len field specifies the length of the Hop-by-Hop Options ++ /// ++ UINT8 HdrExtLen; ++ /// ++ /// Header-Specific Data ++ /// ++} IP6_EXT_HDR; ++ ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ sizeof (IP6_EXT_HDR) == 2, ++ "The combined size of Next Header and Len is two 8 bit fields" ++ ); ++ ++// ++// IPv6 extension headers contain an 8-bit length field which describes the size of ++// the header. However, the length field only includes the size of the extension ++// header options, not the size of the first 8 bytes of the header. Therefore, in ++// order to calculate the full size of the extension header, we add 1 (to account ++// for the first 8 bytes omitted by the length field reporting) and then multiply ++// by 8 (since the size is represented in 8-byte units). ++// ++// a is the length field of the extension header (UINT8) ++// The result may be up to 2046 octets (UINT16) ++// ++#define IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN(a) (((UINT16)((UINT8)(a)) + 1) * 8) ++ ++// This is the maxmimum length permissible by a extension header ++// Length is UINT8 of 8 octets not including the first 8 octets ++#define IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH (IP6_HDR_EXT_LEN (MAX_UINT8) - sizeof(IP6_EXT_HDR)) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ IP6_MAX_EXT_DATA_LENGTH == 2046, ++ "Maximum data length is ((MAX_UINT8 + 1) * 8) - 2" ++ ); ++ + typedef struct _IP6_FRAGMENT_HEADER { + UINT8 NextHeader; + UINT8 Reserved; +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0002.patch new file +417 -0
417 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +2 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2023-45230-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45231-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45231-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0002.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 6/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45234
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to a buffer overflow vulnerability when processing DNS Servers option from a DHCPv6 Advertise message. This vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access and potentially lead to a loss of Confidentiality, Integrity and/or Availability.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45234
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1b53515d53d303166b2bbd31e2cc7f16fd0aecd7
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/458c582685fc0e8057d2511c5a0394078d988c17
--- .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45234-0001.patch | 154 ++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45234-0002.patch | 485 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 641 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45234-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45234-0002.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45234-0001.patch new file +154 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +From 1b53515d53d303166b2bbd31e2cc7f16fd0aecd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Doug Flick <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 05:54:52 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45234 Patch + +REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4539 + +Bug Details: +PixieFail Bug #6 +CVE-2023-45234 +CVSS 8.3 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H +CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of + a Memory Buffer + +Buffer overflow when processing DNS Servers option in a DHCPv6 +Advertise message + +Change Overview: + +Introduces a function to cache the Dns Server and perform sanitizing +on the incoming DnsServerLen to ensure that the length is valid + +> + EFI_STATUS +> + PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses ( +> + IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private, +> + IN PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6 +> + ) + +Additional code cleanup + +Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> +Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-45234 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1b53515d53d303166b2bbd31e2cc7f16fd0aecd7] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c +index 425e0cf806..2b2d372889 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c +@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ + + (C) Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR> + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation + + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + +@@ -1312,6 +1313,65 @@ PxeBcSelectDhcp6Offer ( + } + } + ++/** ++ Cache the DHCPv6 DNS Server addresses ++ ++ @param[in] Private The pointer to PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA. ++ @param[in] Cache6 The pointer to PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Cache the DHCPv6 DNS Server address successfully. ++ @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate resources. ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The DNS Server Address Length provided by a untrusted ++ option is not a multiple of 16 bytes (sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)). ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses ( ++ IN PXEBC_PRIVATE_DATA *Private, ++ IN PXEBC_DHCP6_PACKET_CACHE *Cache6 ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT16 DnsServerLen; ++ ++ DnsServerLen = NTOHS (Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpLen); ++ // ++ // Make sure that the number is nonzero ++ // ++ if (DnsServerLen == 0) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Make sure the DnsServerlen is a multiple of EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS (16) ++ // ++ if (DnsServerLen % sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS) != 0) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // This code is currently written to only support a single DNS Server instead ++ // of multiple such as is spec defined (RFC3646, Section 3). The proper behavior ++ // would be to allocate the full space requested, CopyMem all of the data, ++ // and then add a DnsServerCount field to Private and update additional code ++ // that depends on this. ++ // ++ // To support multiple DNS servers the `AllocationSize` would need to be changed to DnsServerLen ++ // ++ // This is tracked in https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1886 ++ // ++ Private->DnsServer = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); ++ if (Private->DnsServer == NULL) { ++ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Intentionally only copy over the first server address. ++ // To support multiple DNS servers, the `Length` would need to be changed to DnsServerLen ++ // ++ CopyMem (Private->DnsServer, Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->Data, sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ + /** + Handle the DHCPv6 offer packet. + +@@ -1335,6 +1395,7 @@ PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer ( + UINT32 SelectIndex; + UINT32 Index; + ++ ASSERT (Private != NULL); + ASSERT (Private->SelectIndex > 0); + SelectIndex = (UINT32)(Private->SelectIndex - 1); + ASSERT (SelectIndex < PXEBC_OFFER_MAX_NUM); +@@ -1342,15 +1403,13 @@ PxeBcHandleDhcp6Offer ( + Status = EFI_SUCCESS; + + // +- // First try to cache DNS server address if DHCP6 offer provides. ++ // First try to cache DNS server addresses if DHCP6 offer provides. + // + if (Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER] != NULL) { +- Private->DnsServer = AllocateZeroPool (NTOHS (Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->OpLen)); +- if (Private->DnsServer == NULL) { +- return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ Status = PxeBcCacheDnsServerAddresses (Private, Cache6); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; + } +- +- CopyMem (Private->DnsServer, Cache6->OptList[PXEBC_DHCP6_IDX_DNS_SERVER]->Data, sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); + } + + if (Cache6->OfferType == PxeOfferTypeDhcpBinl) { +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45234-0002.patch new file +485 -0
485 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +2 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2023-45231-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45234-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45234-0002.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 7/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45235
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to a buffer overflow vulnerability when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy Advertise message. This vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access and potentially lead to a loss of Confidentiality, Integrity and/or Availability.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45235
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/fac297724e6cc343430cd0104e55cd7a96d1151e
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/ff2986358f75d8f58ef08a66fe673539c9c48f41
--- .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45235-0001.patch | 243 +++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45235-0002.patch | 379 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 624 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45235-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45235-0002.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45235-0001.patch new file +243 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +From fac297724e6cc343430cd0104e55cd7a96d1151e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Doug Flick <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 05:54:55 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] NetworkPkg: UefiPxeBcDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45235 Patch + +REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4540 + +Bug Details: +PixieFail Bug #7 +CVE-2023-45235 +CVSS 8.3 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H +CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of + a Memory Buffer + +Buffer overflow when handling Server ID option from a DHCPv6 proxy +Advertise message + +Change Overview: + +Performs two checks + +1. Checks that the length of the duid is accurate +> + // +> + // Check that the minimum and maximum requirements are met +> + // +> + if ((OpLen < PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID) || +(OpLen > PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID)) { +> + Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; +> + goto ON_ERROR; +> + } + +2. Ensures that the amount of data written to the buffer is tracked and +never exceeds that +> + // +> + // Check that the option length is valid. +> + // +> + if ((DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN) + > DiscoverLenNeeded) { +> + Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; +> + goto ON_ERROR; +> + } + +Additional code clean up and fix for memory leak in case Option was NULL + +Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> +Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-45235 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/fac297724e6cc343430cd0104e55cd7a96d1151e] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ + NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h | 17 ++++++ + 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c +index 2b2d372889..7fd1281c11 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.c +@@ -887,6 +887,7 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService ( + EFI_STATUS Status; + EFI_DHCP6_PACKET *IndexOffer; + UINT8 *Option; ++ UINTN DiscoverLenNeeded; + + PxeBc = &Private->PxeBc; + Request = Private->Dhcp6Request; +@@ -899,7 +900,8 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService ( + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +- Discover = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET)); ++ DiscoverLenNeeded = sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET); ++ Discover = AllocateZeroPool (DiscoverLenNeeded); + if (Discover == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } +@@ -924,16 +926,34 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService ( + DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +- return EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND; ++ goto ON_ERROR; + } + + // + // Add Server ID Option. + // + OpLen = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)Option)->OpLen); +- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, Option, OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4); ++ ++ // ++ // Check that the minimum and maximum requirements are met ++ // ++ if ((OpLen < PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID) || (OpLen > PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID)) { ++ Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Check that the option length is valid. ++ // ++ if ((DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN) > DiscoverLenNeeded) { ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, Option, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); + } + + while (RequestLen < Request->Length) { +@@ -944,16 +964,24 @@ PxeBcRequestBootService ( + (OpCode != DHCP6_OPT_SERVER_ID) + ) + { ++ // ++ // Check that the option length is valid. ++ // ++ if (DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN > DiscoverLenNeeded) { ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } ++ + // + // Copy all the options except IA option and Server ID + // +- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4); ++ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); + } + +- RequestOpt += (OpLen + 4); +- RequestLen += (OpLen + 4); ++ RequestOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ RequestLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); + } + + // +@@ -2154,6 +2182,7 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover ( + UINT16 OpLen; + UINT32 Xid; + EFI_STATUS Status; ++ UINTN DiscoverLenNeeded; + + PxeBc = &Private->PxeBc; + Mode = PxeBc->Mode; +@@ -2169,7 +2198,8 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover ( + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +- Discover = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET)); ++ DiscoverLenNeeded = sizeof (EFI_PXE_BASE_CODE_DHCPV6_PACKET); ++ Discover = AllocateZeroPool (DiscoverLenNeeded); + if (Discover == NULL) { + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } +@@ -2185,22 +2215,37 @@ PxeBcDhcp6Discover ( + DiscoverLen = sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER); + RequestLen = DiscoverLen; + ++ // ++ // The request packet is generated by the UEFI network stack. In the DHCP4 DORA and DHCP6 SARR sequence, ++ // the first (discover in DHCP4 and solicit in DHCP6) and third (request in both DHCP4 and DHCP6) are ++ // generated by the DHCP client (the UEFI network stack in this case). By the time this function executes, ++ // the DHCP sequence already has been executed once (see UEFI Specification Figures 24.2 and 24.3), with ++ // Private->Dhcp6Request being a cached copy of the DHCP6 request packet that UEFI network stack previously ++ // generated and sent. ++ // ++ // Therefore while this code looks like it could overflow, in practice it's not possible. ++ // + while (RequestLen < Request->Length) { + OpCode = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)RequestOpt)->OpCode); + OpLen = NTOHS (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)RequestOpt)->OpLen); + if ((OpCode != EFI_DHCP6_IA_TYPE_NA) && + (OpCode != EFI_DHCP6_IA_TYPE_TA)) + { ++ if (DiscoverLen + OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN > DiscoverLenNeeded) { ++ Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; ++ goto ON_ERROR; ++ } ++ + // + // Copy all the options except IA option. + // +- CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + 4); +- DiscoverLen += (OpLen + 4); ++ CopyMem (DiscoverOpt, RequestOpt, OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ DiscoverLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); + } + +- RequestOpt += (OpLen + 4); +- RequestLen += (OpLen + 4); ++ RequestOpt += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); ++ RequestLen += (OpLen + PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN); + } + + Status = PxeBc->UdpWrite ( +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h +index c86f6d391b..6357d27fae 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/UefiPxeBcDxe/PxeBcDhcp6.h +@@ -34,6 +34,23 @@ + #define PXEBC_ADDR_START_DELIMITER '[' + #define PXEBC_ADDR_END_DELIMITER ']' + ++// ++// A DUID consists of a 2-octet type code represented in network byte ++// order, followed by a variable number of octets that make up the ++// actual identifier. The length of the DUID (not including the type ++// code) is at least 1 octet and at most 128 octets. ++// ++#define PXEBC_MIN_SIZE_OF_DUID (sizeof(UINT16) + 1) ++#define PXEBC_MAX_SIZE_OF_DUID (sizeof(UINT16) + 128) ++ ++// ++// This define represents the combineds code and length field from ++// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3315#section-22.1 ++// ++#define PXEBC_COMBINED_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE_AND_LEN \ ++ (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpCode) + \ ++ sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpLen)) ++ + #define GET_NEXT_DHCP6_OPTION(Opt) \ + (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *) ((UINT8 *) (Opt) + \ + sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION) + (NTOHS ((Opt)->OpLen)) - 1) +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45235-0002.patch new file +379 -0
379 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +2 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2023-45232-CVE-2023-45233-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45234-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45234-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45235-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45235-0002.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 8/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45229
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to an out-of-bounds read vulnerability when processing the IA_NA or IA_TA option in a DHCPv6 Advertise message. This vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access and potentially lead to a loss of Confidentiality.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45229
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1dbb10cc52dc8ef49bb700daa1cefc76b26d52e0
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/07362769ab7a7d74dbea1c7a7a3662c7b5d1f097
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1c440a5eceedc64e892877eeac0f1a4938f5abbb
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1d0b95f6457d225c5108302a9da74b4ed7aa5a38
--- .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0001.patch | 604 ++++++++++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0002.patch | 539 ++++++++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0003.patch | 244 +++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0004.patch | 157 +++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 4 + 5 files changed, 1548 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0003.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0004.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0001.patch new file +604 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,604 @@ +From 1dbb10cc52dc8ef49bb700daa1cefc76b26d52e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Doug Flick via groups.io" <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 05:54:46 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] NetworkPkg: Dhcp6Dxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45229 Patch + +REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4534 + +Bug Details: +PixieFail Bug #1 +CVE-2023-45229 +CVSS 6.5 : CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N +CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read + +Change Overview: + +Introduce Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe which performs checks before seeking +the Inner Option from a DHCP6 Option. + +> +> EFI_STATUS +> Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( +> IN UINT16 IaType, +> IN UINT8 *Option, +> IN UINT32 OptionLen, +> OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt, +> OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen +> ); +> + +Lots of code cleanup to improve code readability. + +Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> +Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-45229 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1dbb10cc52dc8ef49bb700daa1cefc76b26d52e0] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h | 138 +++++++++++++++++++--- + NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c | 203 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 2 files changed, 256 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h +index f2422c2f28..220e7c68f1 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Impl.h +@@ -45,6 +45,20 @@ typedef struct _DHCP6_INSTANCE DHCP6_INSTANCE; + #define DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('D', 'H', '6', 'S') + #define DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32 ('D', 'H', '6', 'I') + ++#define DHCP6_PACKET_ALL 0 ++#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL 1 ++#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS 2 ++ ++#define DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE 1024 ++ ++#define DHCP6_PORT_CLIENT 546 ++#define DHCP6_PORT_SERVER 547 ++ ++#define DHCP_CHECK_MEDIA_WAITING_TIME EFI_TIMER_PERIOD_SECONDS(20) ++ ++#define DHCP6_INSTANCE_FROM_THIS(Instance) CR ((Instance), DHCP6_INSTANCE, Dhcp6, DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE) ++#define DHCP6_SERVICE_FROM_THIS(Service) CR ((Service), DHCP6_SERVICE, ServiceBinding, DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE) ++ + // + // For more information on DHCP options see RFC 8415, Section 21.1 + // +@@ -59,12 +73,10 @@ typedef struct _DHCP6_INSTANCE DHCP6_INSTANCE; + // | (option-len octets) | + // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + // +-#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE (sizeof(UINT16)) +-#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN (sizeof(UINT16)) ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpCode)) ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN (sizeof (((EFI_DHCP6_PACKET_OPTION *)0)->OpLen)) + +-// + // Combined size of Code and Length +-// + #define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE + \ + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_LEN) + +@@ -73,34 +85,122 @@ STATIC_ASSERT ( + "Combined size of Code and Length must be 4 per RFC 8415" + ); + +-// + // Offset to the length is just past the code +-// +-#define DHCP6_OPT_LEN_OFFSET(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE) ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_OPT_CODE) + STATIC_ASSERT ( +- DHCP6_OPT_LEN_OFFSET (0) == 2, ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (0) == 2, + "Offset of length is + 2 past start of option" + ); + +-#define DHCP6_OPT_DATA_OFFSET(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN) ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN) + STATIC_ASSERT ( +- DHCP6_OPT_DATA_OFFSET (0) == 4, ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (0) == 4, + "Offset to option data should be +4 from start of option" + ); ++// ++// Identity Association options (both NA (Non-Temporary) and TA (Temporary Association)) ++// are defined in RFC 8415 and are a deriviation of a TLV stucture ++// For more information on IA_NA see Section 21.4 ++// For more information on IA_TA see Section 21.5 ++// ++// ++// The format of IA_NA and IA_TA option: ++// ++// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | OPTION_IA_NA | option-len | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | IAID (4 octets) | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | T1 (only for IA_NA) | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | T2 (only for IA_NA) | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | | ++// . IA_NA-options/IA_TA-options . ++// . . ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID (sizeof(UINT32)) ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL (sizeof(UINT32)) + +-#define DHCP6_PACKET_ALL 0 +-#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATEFUL 1 +-#define DHCP6_PACKET_STATELESS 2 ++// Combined size of IAID, T1, and T2 ++#define DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2 (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2 == 12, ++ "Combined size of IAID, T1, T2 must be 12 per RFC 8415" ++ ); + +-#define DHCP6_BASE_PACKET_SIZE 1024 ++// This is the size of IA_TA without options ++#define DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA (DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA == 8, ++ "Minimum combined size of IA_TA per RFC 8415" ++ ); + +-#define DHCP6_PORT_CLIENT 546 +-#define DHCP6_PORT_SERVER 547 ++// Offset to a IA_TA inner option ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT(a) (a + DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (0) == 8, ++ "Offset of IA_TA Inner option is + 8 past start of option" ++ ); + +-#define DHCP_CHECK_MEDIA_WAITING_TIME EFI_TIMER_PERIOD_SECONDS(20) ++// This is the size of IA_NA without options (16) ++#define DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2 ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA == 16, ++ "Minimum combined size of IA_TA per RFC 8415" ++ ); + +-#define DHCP6_INSTANCE_FROM_THIS(Instance) CR ((Instance), DHCP6_INSTANCE, Dhcp6, DHCP6_INSTANCE_SIGNATURE) +-#define DHCP6_SERVICE_FROM_THIS(Service) CR ((Service), DHCP6_SERVICE, ServiceBinding, DHCP6_SERVICE_SIGNATURE) ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT(a) (a + DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (0) == 16, ++ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 16 past start of option" ++ ); ++ ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1(a) (a + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (0) == 8, ++ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 8 past start of option" ++ ); ++ ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2(a) (a + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN +\ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID + \ ++ DHCP6_SIZE_OF_TIME_INTERVAL) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (0) == 12, ++ "Offset of IA_NA Inner option is + 12 past start of option" ++ ); ++ ++// ++// For more information see RFC 8415 Section 21.13 ++// ++// The format of the Status Code Option: ++// ++// 0 1 2 3 ++// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | OPTION_STATUS_CODE | option-len | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// | status-code | | ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ++// . . ++// . status-message . ++// . . ++// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++// ++#define DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE(a) (a + DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN) ++STATIC_ASSERT ( ++ DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (0) == 4, ++ "Offset of status is + 4 past start of option" ++ ); + + extern EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS mAllDhcpRelayAndServersAddress; + extern EFI_DHCP6_PROTOCOL gDhcp6ProtocolTemplate; +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c +index bf5aa7a769..89d16484a5 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/Dhcp6Dxe/Dhcp6Io.c +@@ -598,8 +598,8 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + // The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len. + // + if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) { +- T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(Option + 8))); +- T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(Option + 12))); ++ T1 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T1 (Option)))); ++ T2 = NTOHL (ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_T2 (Option)))); + // + // Refer to RFC3155 Chapter 22.4. If a client receives an IA_NA with T1 greater than T2, + // and both T1 and T2 are greater than 0, the client discards the IA_NA option and processes +@@ -609,13 +609,14 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + +- IaInnerOpt = Option + 16; +- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(Option + 2))) - 12); ++ IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option); ++ IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2); + } else { +- T1 = 0; +- T2 = 0; +- IaInnerOpt = Option + 8; +- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(Option + 2))) - 4); ++ T1 = 0; ++ T2 = 0; ++ ++ IaInnerOpt = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option); ++ IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))) - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID); + } + + // +@@ -641,7 +642,7 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode); + + if (Option != NULL) { +- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(Option + 4))); ++ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))); + if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +@@ -661,6 +662,87 @@ Dhcp6UpdateIaInfo ( + return Status; + } + ++/** ++ Seeks the Inner Options from a DHCP6 Option ++ ++ @param[in] IaType The type of the IA option. ++ @param[in] Option The pointer to the DHCP6 Option. ++ @param[in] OptionLen The length of the DHCP6 Option. ++ @param[out] IaInnerOpt The pointer to the IA inner option. ++ @param[out] IaInnerLen The length of the IA inner option. ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS Seek the inner option successfully. ++ @retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The OptionLen is invalid. On Error, ++ the pointers are not modified ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( ++ IN UINT16 IaType, ++ IN UINT8 *Option, ++ IN UINT32 OptionLen, ++ OUT UINT8 **IaInnerOpt, ++ OUT UINT16 *IaInnerLen ++ ) ++{ ++ UINT16 IaInnerLenTmp; ++ UINT8 *IaInnerOptTmp; ++ ++ if (Option == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (Option != NULL); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (IaInnerOpt == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (IaInnerOpt != NULL); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (IaInnerLen == NULL) { ++ ASSERT (IaInnerLen != NULL); ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIana) { ++ // Verify we have a fully formed IA_NA ++ if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_NA) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_NA_INNER_OPT (Option); ++ ++ // Verify the IaInnerLen is valid. ++ IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option))); ++ if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_IAID_T1_T2; ++ } else if (IaType == Dhcp6OptIata) { ++ // Verify the OptionLen is valid. ++ if (OptionLen < DHCP6_MIN_SIZE_OF_IA_TA) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ IaInnerOptTmp = DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_IA_TA_INNER_OPT (Option); ++ ++ // Verify the IaInnerLen is valid. ++ IaInnerLenTmp = (UINT16)NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_LEN (Option)))); ++ if (IaInnerLenTmp < DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID) { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ IaInnerLenTmp -= DHCP6_SIZE_OF_IAID; ++ } else { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; ++ } ++ ++ *IaInnerOpt = IaInnerOptTmp; ++ *IaInnerLen = IaInnerLenTmp; ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; ++} ++ + /** + Seek StatusCode Option in package. A Status Code option may appear in the + options field of a DHCP message and/or in the options field of another option. +@@ -684,6 +766,12 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + UINT8 *IaInnerOpt; + UINT16 IaInnerLen; + UINT16 StsCode; ++ UINT32 OptionLen; ++ ++ // OptionLen is the length of the Options excluding the DHCP header. ++ // Length of the EFI_DHCP6_PACKET from the first byte of the Header field to the last ++ // byte of the Option[] field. ++ OptionLen = Packet->Length - sizeof (Packet->Dhcp6.Header); + + // + // Seek StatusCode option directly in DHCP message body. That is, search in +@@ -691,12 +779,12 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + // + *Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ OptionLen, + Dhcp6OptStatusCode + ); + + if (*Option != NULL) { +- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(*Option + 4))); ++ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (*Option)))); + if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +@@ -707,7 +795,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + // + *Option = Dhcp6SeekIaOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), ++ OptionLen, + &Instance->Config->IaDescriptor + ); + if (*Option == NULL) { +@@ -715,52 +803,35 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + } + + // +- // The format of the IA_NA option is: ++ // Calculate the distance from Packet->Dhcp6.Option to the IA option. + // +- // 0 1 2 3 +- // 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | OPTION_IA_NA | option-len | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | IAID (4 octets) | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | T1 | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | T2 | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | | +- // . IA_NA-options . +- // . . +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++ // Packet->Size and Packet->Length are both UINT32 type, and Packet->Size is ++ // the size of the whole packet, including the DHCP header, and Packet->Length ++ // is the length of the DHCP message body, excluding the DHCP header. + // +- // The format of the IA_TA option is: ++ // (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option) is the number of bytes from the start of ++ // DHCP6 option area to the start of the IA option. + // +- // 0 1 2 3 +- // 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | OPTION_IA_TA | option-len | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | IAID (4 octets) | +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +- // | | +- // . IA_TA-options . +- // . . +- // +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ++ // Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe() is searching starting from the start of the ++ // IA option to the end of the DHCP6 option area, thus subtract the space ++ // up until this option + // ++ OptionLen = OptionLen - (*Option - Packet->Dhcp6.Option); + + // +- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId) = 8 +- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1) = 12 +- // sizeof (option-code + option-len + IaId + T1 + T2) = 16 +- // +- // The inner options still start with 2 bytes option-code and 2 bytes option-len. ++ // Seek the inner option + // +- if (Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type == Dhcp6OptIana) { +- IaInnerOpt = *Option + 16; +- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(*Option + 2))) - 12); +- } else { +- IaInnerOpt = *Option + 8; +- IaInnerLen = (UINT16)(NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(*Option + 2))) - 4); ++ if (EFI_ERROR ( ++ Dhcp6SeekInnerOptionSafe ( ++ Instance->Config->IaDescriptor.Type, ++ *Option, ++ OptionLen, ++ &IaInnerOpt, ++ &IaInnerLen ++ ) ++ )) ++ { ++ return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } + + // +@@ -784,7 +855,7 @@ Dhcp6SeekStsOption ( + // + *Option = Dhcp6SeekOption (IaInnerOpt, IaInnerLen, Dhcp6OptStatusCode); + if (*Option != NULL) { +- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(*Option + 4))); ++ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)((DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (*Option))))); + if (StsCode != Dhcp6StsSuccess) { + return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + } +@@ -1105,7 +1176,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRequestMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Instance->AdSelect->Dhcp6.Option, +- Instance->AdSelect->Length - 4, ++ Instance->AdSelect->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +@@ -1289,7 +1360,7 @@ Dhcp6SendDeclineMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + LastReply->Dhcp6.Option, +- LastReply->Length - 4, ++ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +@@ -1448,7 +1519,7 @@ Dhcp6SendReleaseMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + LastReply->Dhcp6.Option, +- LastReply->Length - 4, ++ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +@@ -1673,7 +1744,7 @@ Dhcp6SendRenewRebindMsg ( + + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + LastReply->Dhcp6.Option, +- LastReply->Length - 4, ++ LastReply->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + if (Option == NULL) { +@@ -2208,7 +2279,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptRapidCommit + ); + +@@ -2354,7 +2425,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleReplyMsg ( + // + // Any error status code option is found. + // +- StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)(Option + 4))); ++ StsCode = NTOHS (ReadUnaligned16 ((UINT16 *)((DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_STATUS_CODE (Option))))); + switch (StsCode) { + case Dhcp6StsUnspecFail: + // +@@ -2487,7 +2558,7 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + AdSelect->Dhcp6.Option, +- AdSelect->Length - 4, ++ AdSelect->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerUnicast + ); + +@@ -2498,7 +2569,7 @@ Dhcp6SelectAdvertiseMsg ( + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + +- CopyMem (Instance->Unicast, Option + 4, sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); ++ CopyMem (Instance->Unicast, DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option), sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)); + } + + // +@@ -2551,7 +2622,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptRapidCommit + ); + +@@ -2645,7 +2716,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleAdvertiseMsg ( + CopyMem (Instance->AdSelect, Packet, Packet->Size); + + if (Option != NULL) { +- Instance->AdPref = *(Option + 4); ++ Instance->AdPref = *(DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option)); + } + } else { + // +@@ -2714,11 +2785,11 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ Packet->Length - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN, + Dhcp6OptClientId + ); + +- if ((Option == NULL) || (CompareMem (Option + 4, ClientId->Duid, ClientId->Length) != 0)) { ++ if ((Option == NULL) || (CompareMem (DHCP6_OFFSET_OF_OPT_DATA (Option), ClientId->Duid, ClientId->Length) != 0)) { + goto ON_CONTINUE; + } + +@@ -2727,7 +2798,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateful ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ Packet->Length - DHCP6_SIZE_OF_COMBINED_CODE_AND_LEN, + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + +@@ -2832,7 +2903,7 @@ Dhcp6HandleStateless ( + // + Option = Dhcp6SeekOption ( + Packet->Dhcp6.Option, +- Packet->Length - 4, ++ Packet->Length - sizeof (EFI_DHCP6_HEADER), + Dhcp6OptServerId + ); + +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0002.patch new file +539 -0
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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0003.patch new file +244 -0
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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45229-0004.patch new file +157 -0
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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +4 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2023-45234-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45235-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45235-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45229-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45229-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45229-0003.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45229-0004.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 9/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45237
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to a predictable TCP Initial Sequence Number. This vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access and potentially lead to a loss of Confidentiality.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45237
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/cf07238e5fa4f8b1138ac1c9e80530b4d4e59f1c
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/4c4ceb2ceb80c42fd5545b2a4bd80321f07f4345
--- .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45237-0001.patch | 78 + .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45237-0002.patch | 1288 +++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 1368 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45237-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45237-0002.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45237-0001.patch new file +78 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +From cf07238e5fa4f8b1138ac1c9e80530b4d4e59f1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Pierre Gondois <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2023 16:33:06 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] MdePkg/Rng: Add GUID to describe Arm Rndr Rng algorithms + +BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4441 + +The EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL can rely on the RngLib. The RngLib has multiple +implementations, some of them are unsafe (e.g. BaseRngLibTimerLib). +To allow the RngDxe to detect when such implementation is used, +a GetRngGuid() function is added in a following patch. + +Prepare GetRngGuid() return values and add a gEfiRngAlgorithmArmRndr +to describe a Rng algorithm accessed through Arm's RNDR instruction. +[1] states that the implementation of this algorithm should be +compliant to NIST SP900-80. The compliance is not guaranteed. + +[1] Arm Architecture Reference Manual Armv8, for A-profile architecture +sK12.1 'Properties of the generated random number' + +Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <[email protected]> +Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]> +Tested-by: Kun Qin <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-45237 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/cf07238e5fa4f8b1138ac1c9e80530b4d4e59f1c] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Rng.h | 10 ++++++++++ + MdePkg/MdePkg.dec | 1 + + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Rng.h b/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Rng.h +index baf425587b..38bde53240 100644 +--- a/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Rng.h ++++ b/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/Rng.h +@@ -67,6 +67,15 @@ typedef EFI_GUID EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM; + { \ + 0xe43176d7, 0xb6e8, 0x4827, {0xb7, 0x84, 0x7f, 0xfd, 0xc4, 0xb6, 0x85, 0x61 } \ + } ++/// ++/// The Arm Architecture states the RNDR that the DRBG algorithm should be compliant ++/// with NIST SP800-90A, while not mandating a particular algorithm, so as to be ++/// inclusive of different geographies. ++/// ++#define EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM_ARM_RNDR \ ++ { \ ++ 0x43d2fde3, 0x9d4e, 0x4d79, {0x02, 0x96, 0xa8, 0x9b, 0xca, 0x78, 0x08, 0x41} \ ++ } + + /** + Returns information about the random number generation implementation. +@@ -146,5 +155,6 @@ extern EFI_GUID gEfiRngAlgorithmSp80090Ctr256Guid; + extern EFI_GUID gEfiRngAlgorithmX9313DesGuid; + extern EFI_GUID gEfiRngAlgorithmX931AesGuid; + extern EFI_GUID gEfiRngAlgorithmRaw; ++extern EFI_GUID gEfiRngAlgorithmArmRndr; + + #endif +diff --git a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +index 59b405928b..a449dbc556 100644 +--- a/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec ++++ b/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec +@@ -594,6 +594,7 @@ + gEfiRngAlgorithmX9313DesGuid = { 0x63c4785a, 0xca34, 0x4012, {0xa3, 0xc8, 0x0b, 0x6a, 0x32, 0x4f, 0x55, 0x46 }} + gEfiRngAlgorithmX931AesGuid = { 0xacd03321, 0x777e, 0x4d3d, {0xb1, 0xc8, 0x20, 0xcf, 0xd8, 0x88, 0x20, 0xc9 }} + gEfiRngAlgorithmRaw = { 0xe43176d7, 0xb6e8, 0x4827, {0xb7, 0x84, 0x7f, 0xfd, 0xc4, 0xb6, 0x85, 0x61 }} ++ gEfiRngAlgorithmArmRndr = { 0x43d2fde3, 0x9d4e, 0x4d79, {0x02, 0x96, 0xa8, 0x9b, 0xca, 0x78, 0x08, 0x41 }} + + ## Include/Protocol/AdapterInformation.h + gEfiAdapterInfoMediaStateGuid = { 0xD7C74207, 0xA831, 0x4A26, {0xB1, 0xF5, 0xD1, 0x93, 0x06, 0x5C, 0xE8, 0xB6 }} +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45237-0002.patch new file +1288 -0
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meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +2 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2023-45229-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45229-0003.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45229-0004.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45237-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45237-0002.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 10/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2023-45236
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
EDK2's Network Package is susceptible to a predictable TCP Initial Sequence Number. This vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access and potentially lead to a loss of Confidentiality.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45236
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1904a64bcc18199738e5be183d28887ac5d837d7
--- .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45236.patch | 829 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 830 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45236.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2023-45236.patch new file +829 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,829 @@ +From 1904a64bcc18199738e5be183d28887ac5d837d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Doug Flick <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 8 May 2024 22:56:29 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 + +REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 +REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt +REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt +REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt + +Bug Overview: +PixieFail Bug #8 +CVE-2023-45236 +CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N +CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor + +Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the +connection's identifying parameters and a secret key. +This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other +connection. + +This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293. + +RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection + + A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock- + driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD + generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression: + + ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) + + where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom + function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip, + localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey") + (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or + an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used + for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a + cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection + parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of + a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data, + please see Section 3 of [42]. + + For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive + sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by + the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number + (IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure. + + For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers + must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is + done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a + control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence + numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also + called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for + picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake + to exchange the ISNs. + +Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> +Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-45236 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1904a64bcc18199738e5be183d28887ac5d837d7] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml | 22 +++ + NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c | 92 ++++++++++++- + NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf | 8 +- + NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h | 23 ++-- + NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c | 13 +- + NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h | 59 ++++++-- + NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c | 244 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c | 3 +- + 8 files changed, 415 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml +index 2b2c794697..ab355419cc 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml ++++ b/NetworkPkg/SecurityFixes.yaml +@@ -121,6 +121,28 @@ CVE_2023_45235: + - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2 + - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html + - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html ++CVE_2023_45236: ++ commit_titles: ++ - "NetworkPkg: TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 Patch" ++ cve: CVE-2023-45236 ++ date_reported: 2023-08-28 13:56 UTC ++ description: "Bug 08 - edk2/NetworkPkg: Predictable TCP Initial Sequence Numbers" ++ note: ++ files_impacted: ++ - NetworkPkg/Include/Library/NetLib.h ++ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c ++ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf ++ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h ++ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c ++ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h ++ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c ++ - NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c ++ links: ++ - https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 ++ - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45236 ++ - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/16/2 ++ - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176574/PixieFail-Proof-Of-Concepts.html ++ - https://blog.quarkslab.com/pixiefail-nine-vulnerabilities-in-tianocores-edk-ii-ipv6-network-stack.html + CVE_2023_45237: + commit_titles: + - "NetworkPkg:: SECURITY PATCH CVE 2023-45237" +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c +index 8fe6badd68..40bba4080c 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c +@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL gTcpServiceBinding = { + TcpServiceBindingDestroyChild + }; + ++// ++// This is the handle for the Hash2ServiceBinding Protocol instance this driver produces ++// if the platform does not provide one. ++// ++EFI_HANDLE mHash2ServiceHandle = NULL; ++ + /** + Create and start the heartbeat timer for the TCP driver. + +@@ -165,6 +171,23 @@ TcpDriverEntryPoint ( + EFI_STATUS Status; + UINT32 Random; + ++ // ++ // Initialize the Secret used for hashing TCP sequence numbers ++ // ++ // Normally this should be regenerated periodically, but since ++ // this is only used for UEFI networking and not a general purpose ++ // operating system, it is not necessary to regenerate it. ++ // ++ Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&mTcpGlobalSecret); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status)); ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Get a random number used to generate a random port number ++ // Intentionally not linking this to mTcpGlobalSecret to avoid leaking information about the secret ++ // + Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&Random); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a Failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status)); +@@ -207,9 +230,8 @@ TcpDriverEntryPoint ( + } + + // +- // Initialize ISS and random port. ++ // Initialize the random port. + // +- mTcpGlobalIss = Random % mTcpGlobalIss; + mTcp4RandomPort = (UINT16)(TCP_PORT_KNOWN + (Random % TCP_PORT_KNOWN)); + mTcp6RandomPort = mTcp4RandomPort; + +@@ -224,6 +246,8 @@ TcpDriverEntryPoint ( + @param[in] IpVersion IP_VERSION_4 or IP_VERSION_6. + + @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate some resources. ++ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Service Binding Protocols are unavailable. ++ @retval EFI_ALREADY_STARTED The TCP driver is already started on the controller. + @retval EFI_SUCCESS A new IP6 service binding private was created. + + **/ +@@ -234,11 +258,13 @@ TcpCreateService ( + IN UINT8 IpVersion + ) + { +- EFI_STATUS Status; +- EFI_GUID *IpServiceBindingGuid; +- EFI_GUID *TcpServiceBindingGuid; +- TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData; +- IP_IO_OPEN_DATA OpenData; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_GUID *IpServiceBindingGuid; ++ EFI_GUID *TcpServiceBindingGuid; ++ TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData; ++ IP_IO_OPEN_DATA OpenData; ++ EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *Hash2ServiceBinding; ++ EFI_HASH2_PROTOCOL *Hash2Protocol; + + if (IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) { + IpServiceBindingGuid = &gEfiIp4ServiceBindingProtocolGuid; +@@ -272,6 +298,33 @@ TcpCreateService ( + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + ++ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiHash2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&Hash2Protocol); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ // ++ // If we can't find the Hashing protocol, then we need to create one. ++ // ++ ++ // ++ // Platform is expected to publish the hash service binding protocol to support TCP. ++ // ++ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol ( ++ &gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid, ++ NULL, ++ (VOID **)&Hash2ServiceBinding ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (Hash2ServiceBinding == NULL) || (Hash2ServiceBinding->CreateChild == NULL)) { ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Create an instance of the hash protocol for this controller. ++ // ++ Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->CreateChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, &mHash2ServiceHandle); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } ++ } ++ + // + // Create the TCP service data. + // +@@ -423,6 +476,7 @@ TcpDestroyService ( + EFI_STATUS Status; + LIST_ENTRY *List; + TCP_DESTROY_CHILD_IN_HANDLE_BUF_CONTEXT Context; ++ EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *Hash2ServiceBinding; + + ASSERT ((IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) || (IpVersion == IP_VERSION_6)); + +@@ -439,6 +493,30 @@ TcpDestroyService ( + return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + ++ // ++ // Destroy the Hash2ServiceBinding instance if it is created by Tcp driver. ++ // ++ if (mHash2ServiceHandle != NULL) { ++ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol ( ++ &gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid, ++ NULL, ++ (VOID **)&Hash2ServiceBinding ++ ); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (Hash2ServiceBinding == NULL) || (Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild == NULL)) { ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Destroy the instance of the hashing protocol for this controller. ++ // ++ Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, &mHash2ServiceHandle); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; ++ } ++ ++ mHash2ServiceHandle = NULL; ++ } ++ + Status = gBS->OpenProtocol ( + NicHandle, + ServiceBindingGuid, +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf +index cf5423f4c5..76de4cf9ec 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf ++++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDxe.inf +@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ + # stack has been loaded in system. This driver supports both IPv4 and IPv6 network stack. + # + # Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> ++# Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation + # + # SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + # +@@ -68,7 +69,6 @@ + NetLib + IpIoLib + +- + [Protocols] + ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES + ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES +@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ + gEfiIp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid ## TO_START + gEfiTcp6ProtocolGuid ## BY_START + gEfiTcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid ## BY_START ++ gEfiHash2ProtocolGuid ## BY_START ++ gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid ## BY_START ++ ++[Guids] ++ gEfiHashAlgorithmMD5Guid ## CONSUMES ++ gEfiHashAlgorithmSha256Guid ## CONSUMES + + [Depex] + gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h +index a7af01fff2..c707bee3e5 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpFunc.h +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ + Declaration of external functions shared in TCP driver. + + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> +- ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + + **/ +@@ -36,8 +36,11 @@ VOID + + @param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB of this TCP instance. + ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully ++ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation ++ + **/ +-VOID ++EFI_STATUS + TcpInitTcbLocal ( + IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb + ); +@@ -128,17 +131,6 @@ TcpCloneTcb ( + IN TCP_CB *Tcb + ); + +-/** +- Compute an ISS to be used by a new connection. +- +- @return The result ISS. +- +-**/ +-TCP_SEQNO +-TcpGetIss ( +- VOID +- ); +- + /** + Get the local mss. + +@@ -202,8 +194,11 @@ TcpFormatNetbuf ( + @param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB that wants to initiate a + connection. + ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully ++ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation ++ + **/ +-VOID ++EFI_STATUS + TcpOnAppConnect ( + IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb + ); +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c +index fb1aa827f8..0477a15d0c 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpInput.c +@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@ TcpInput ( + TCP_SEQNO Urg; + UINT16 Checksum; + INT32 Usable; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; + + ASSERT ((Version == IP_VERSION_4) || (Version == IP_VERSION_6)); + +@@ -872,7 +873,17 @@ TcpInput ( + Tcb->LocalEnd.Port = Head->DstPort; + Tcb->RemoteEnd.Port = Head->SrcPort; + +- TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb); ++ Status = TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ( ++ (DEBUG_ERROR, ++ "TcpInput: discard a segment because failed to init local end for TCB %p\n", ++ Tcb) ++ ); ++ ++ goto DISCARD; ++ } ++ + TcpInitTcbPeer (Tcb, Seg, &Option); + + TcpSetState (Tcb, TCP_SYN_RCVD); +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h +index c0c9b7f46e..4d5566ab93 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h ++++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMain.h +@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ + It is the common head file for all Tcp*.c in TCP driver. + + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2016, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> +- ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + + **/ +@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ + + #include <Protocol/ServiceBinding.h> + #include <Protocol/DriverBinding.h> ++#include <Protocol/Hash2.h> + #include <Library/IpIoLib.h> + #include <Library/DevicePathLib.h> + #include <Library/PrintLib.h> +@@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ extern EFI_UNICODE_STRING_TABLE *gTcpControllerNameTable; + + extern LIST_ENTRY mTcpRunQue; + extern LIST_ENTRY mTcpListenQue; +-extern TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalIss; ++extern TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalSecret; + extern UINT32 mTcpTick; + + /// +@@ -45,14 +46,6 @@ extern UINT32 mTcpTick; + + #define TCP_EXPIRE_TIME 65535 + +-/// +-/// The implementation selects the initial send sequence number and the unit to +-/// be added when it is increased. +-/// +-#define TCP_BASE_ISS 0x4d7e980b +-#define TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_1 2048 +-#define TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_2 100 +- + typedef union { + EFI_TCP4_CONFIG_DATA Tcp4CfgData; + EFI_TCP6_CONFIG_DATA Tcp6CfgData; +@@ -774,4 +767,50 @@ Tcp6Poll ( + IN EFI_TCP6_PROTOCOL *This + ); + ++/** ++ Retrieves the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) for a TCP connection identified by local ++ and remote IP addresses and ports. ++ ++ This method is based on https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9293#section-3.4.1 ++ Where the ISN is computed as follows: ++ ISN = TimeStamp + MD5(LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Secret) ++ ++ Otherwise: ++ ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) ++ ++ "Here M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the ++ connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") ++ and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the ++ outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ++ ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a ++ cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some ++ secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and ++ management of the secret key data." ++ ++ @param[in] LocalIp A pointer to the local IP address of the TCP connection. ++ @param[in] LocalIpSize The size, in bytes, of the LocalIp buffer. ++ @param[in] LocalPort The local port number of the TCP connection. ++ @param[in] RemoteIp A pointer to the remote IP address of the TCP connection. ++ @param[in] RemoteIpSize The size, in bytes, of the RemoteIp buffer. ++ @param[in] RemotePort The remote port number of the TCP connection. ++ @param[out] Isn A pointer to the variable that will receive the Initial ++ Sequence Number (ISN). ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully, and the ISN was ++ retrieved. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the input parameters are invalid. ++ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The operation is not supported. ++ ++**/ ++EFI_STATUS ++TcpGetIsn ( ++ IN UINT8 *LocalIp, ++ IN UINTN LocalIpSize, ++ IN UINT16 LocalPort, ++ IN UINT8 *RemoteIp, ++ IN UINTN RemoteIpSize, ++ IN UINT16 RemotePort, ++ OUT TCP_SEQNO *Isn ++ ); ++ + #endif +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c +index c93212d47d..3310306f63 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpMisc.c +@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ + + (C) Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR> + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2017, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> +- ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + + **/ +@@ -20,7 +20,34 @@ LIST_ENTRY mTcpListenQue = { + &mTcpListenQue + }; + +-TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalIss = TCP_BASE_ISS; ++// ++// The Session secret ++// This must be initialized to a random value at boot time ++// ++TCP_SEQNO mTcpGlobalSecret; ++ ++// ++// Union to hold either an IPv4 or IPv6 address ++// This is used to simplify the ISN hash computation ++// ++typedef union { ++ UINT8 IPv4[4]; ++ UINT8 IPv6[16]; ++} NETWORK_ADDRESS; ++ ++// ++// The ISN is computed by hashing this structure ++// It is initialized with the local and remote IP addresses and ports ++// and the secret ++// ++// ++typedef struct { ++ UINT16 LocalPort; ++ UINT16 RemotePort; ++ NETWORK_ADDRESS LocalAddress; ++ NETWORK_ADDRESS RemoteAddress; ++ TCP_SEQNO Secret; ++} ISN_HASH_CTX; + + CHAR16 *mTcpStateName[] = { + L"TCP_CLOSED", +@@ -41,12 +68,18 @@ CHAR16 *mTcpStateName[] = { + + @param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB of this TCP instance. + ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully ++ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation ++ + **/ +-VOID ++EFI_STATUS + TcpInitTcbLocal ( + IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb + ) + { ++ TCP_SEQNO Isn; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ + // + // Compute the checksum of the fixed parts of pseudo header + // +@@ -57,6 +90,16 @@ TcpInitTcbLocal ( + 0x06, + 0 + ); ++ ++ Status = TcpGetIsn ( ++ Tcb->LocalEnd.Ip.v4.Addr, ++ sizeof (IPv4_ADDRESS), ++ Tcb->LocalEnd.Port, ++ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Ip.v4.Addr, ++ sizeof (IPv4_ADDRESS), ++ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Port, ++ &Isn ++ ); + } else { + Tcb->HeadSum = NetIp6PseudoHeadChecksum ( + &Tcb->LocalEnd.Ip.v6, +@@ -64,9 +107,25 @@ TcpInitTcbLocal ( + 0x06, + 0 + ); ++ ++ Status = TcpGetIsn ( ++ Tcb->LocalEnd.Ip.v6.Addr, ++ sizeof (IPv6_ADDRESS), ++ Tcb->LocalEnd.Port, ++ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Ip.v6.Addr, ++ sizeof (IPv6_ADDRESS), ++ Tcb->RemoteEnd.Port, ++ &Isn ++ ); ++ } ++ ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "TcpInitTcbLocal: failed to get isn\n")); ++ ASSERT (FALSE); ++ return Status; + } + +- Tcb->Iss = TcpGetIss (); ++ Tcb->Iss = Isn; + Tcb->SndUna = Tcb->Iss; + Tcb->SndNxt = Tcb->Iss; + +@@ -82,6 +141,8 @@ TcpInitTcbLocal ( + Tcb->RetxmitSeqMax = 0; + + Tcb->ProbeTimerOn = FALSE; ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + /** +@@ -506,18 +567,162 @@ TcpCloneTcb ( + } + + /** +- Compute an ISS to be used by a new connection. +- +- @return The resulting ISS. ++ Retrieves the Initial Sequence Number (ISN) for a TCP connection identified by local ++ and remote IP addresses and ports. ++ ++ This method is based on https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9293#section-3.4.1 ++ Where the ISN is computed as follows: ++ ISN = TimeStamp + MD5(LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Secret) ++ ++ Otherwise: ++ ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) ++ ++ "Here M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the ++ connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") ++ and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the ++ outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ++ ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a ++ cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some ++ secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and ++ management of the secret key data." ++ ++ @param[in] LocalIp A pointer to the local IP address of the TCP connection. ++ @param[in] LocalIpSize The size, in bytes, of the LocalIp buffer. ++ @param[in] LocalPort The local port number of the TCP connection. ++ @param[in] RemoteIp A pointer to the remote IP address of the TCP connection. ++ @param[in] RemoteIpSize The size, in bytes, of the RemoteIp buffer. ++ @param[in] RemotePort The remote port number of the TCP connection. ++ @param[out] Isn A pointer to the variable that will receive the Initial ++ Sequence Number (ISN). ++ ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully, and the ISN was ++ retrieved. ++ @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER One or more of the input parameters are invalid. ++ @retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The operation is not supported. + + **/ +-TCP_SEQNO +-TcpGetIss ( +- VOID ++EFI_STATUS ++TcpGetIsn ( ++ IN UINT8 *LocalIp, ++ IN UINTN LocalIpSize, ++ IN UINT16 LocalPort, ++ IN UINT8 *RemoteIp, ++ IN UINTN RemoteIpSize, ++ IN UINT16 RemotePort, ++ OUT TCP_SEQNO *Isn + ) + { +- mTcpGlobalIss += TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_1; +- return mTcpGlobalIss; ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ EFI_HASH2_PROTOCOL *Hash2Protocol; ++ EFI_HASH2_OUTPUT HashResult; ++ ISN_HASH_CTX IsnHashCtx; ++ EFI_TIME TimeStamp; ++ ++ // ++ // Check that the ISN pointer is valid ++ // ++ if (Isn == NULL) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // The local ip may be a v4 or v6 address and may not be NULL ++ // ++ if ((LocalIp == NULL) || (LocalIpSize == 0) || (RemoteIp == NULL) || (RemoteIpSize == 0)) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // the local ip may be a v4 or v6 address ++ // ++ if ((LocalIpSize != sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS)) && (LocalIpSize != sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS))) { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Locate the Hash Protocol ++ // ++ Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiHash2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&Hash2Protocol); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to locate Hash Protocol: %r\n", Status)); ++ ++ // ++ // TcpCreateService(..) is expected to be called prior to this function ++ // ++ ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Initialize the hash algorithm ++ // ++ Status = Hash2Protocol->HashInit (Hash2Protocol, &gEfiHashAlgorithmSha256Guid); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to initialize sha256 hash algorithm: %r\n", Status)); ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ IsnHashCtx.LocalPort = LocalPort; ++ IsnHashCtx.RemotePort = RemotePort; ++ IsnHashCtx.Secret = mTcpGlobalSecret; ++ ++ // ++ // Check the IP address family and copy accordingly ++ // ++ if (LocalIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS)) { ++ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.LocalAddress.IPv4, LocalIp, LocalIpSize); ++ } else if (LocalIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)) { ++ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.LocalAddress.IPv6, LocalIp, LocalIpSize); ++ } else { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; // Unsupported address size ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Repeat the process for the remote IP address ++ // ++ if (RemoteIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv4_ADDRESS)) { ++ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.RemoteAddress.IPv4, RemoteIp, RemoteIpSize); ++ } else if (RemoteIpSize == sizeof (EFI_IPv6_ADDRESS)) { ++ CopyMem (&IsnHashCtx.RemoteAddress.IPv6, RemoteIp, RemoteIpSize); ++ } else { ++ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; // Unsupported address size ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Compute the hash ++ // Update the hash with the data ++ // ++ Status = Hash2Protocol->HashUpdate (Hash2Protocol, (UINT8 *)&IsnHashCtx, sizeof (IsnHashCtx)); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to update hash: %r\n", Status)); ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // Finalize the hash and retrieve the result ++ // ++ Status = Hash2Protocol->HashFinal (Hash2Protocol, &HashResult); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_NET, "Failed to finalize hash: %r\n", Status)); ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ Status = gRT->GetTime (&TimeStamp, NULL); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } ++ ++ // ++ // copy the first 4 bytes of the hash result into the ISN ++ // ++ CopyMem (Isn, HashResult.Md5Hash, sizeof (*Isn)); ++ ++ // ++ // now add the timestamp to the ISN as 4 microseconds units (1000 / 4 = 250) ++ // ++ *Isn += (TCP_SEQNO)TimeStamp.Nanosecond * 250; ++ ++ return Status; + } + + /** +@@ -721,17 +926,28 @@ TcpFormatNetbuf ( + @param[in, out] Tcb Pointer to the TCP_CB that wants to initiate a + connection. + ++ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully ++ @retval others The underlying functions failed and could not complete the operation ++ + **/ +-VOID ++EFI_STATUS + TcpOnAppConnect ( + IN OUT TCP_CB *Tcb + ) + { +- TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb); ++ EFI_STATUS Status; ++ ++ Status = TcpInitTcbLocal (Tcb); ++ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { ++ return Status; ++ } ++ + TcpSetState (Tcb, TCP_SYN_SENT); + + TcpSetTimer (Tcb, TCP_TIMER_CONNECT, Tcb->ConnectTimeout); + TcpToSendData (Tcb, 1); ++ ++ return EFI_SUCCESS; + } + + /** +diff --git a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c +index 5d2e124977..065b1bdf5f 100644 +--- a/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c ++++ b/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpTimer.c +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ + TCP timer related functions. + + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2010, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> +- ++ Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation + SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent + + **/ +@@ -483,7 +483,6 @@ TcpTickingDpc ( + INT16 Index; + + mTcpTick++; +- mTcpGlobalIss += TCP_ISS_INCREMENT_2; + + // + // Don't use LIST_FOR_EACH, which isn't delete safe. +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +1 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2023-45229-0004.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45237-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45237-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-45236.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 11/38 ovmf: Fix CVE-2022-36765
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
EDK2 is susceptible to a vulnerability in the CreateHob() function, allowing a user to trigger a integer overflow to buffer overflow via a local network. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may result in a compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36765
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/59f024c76ee57c2bec84794536302fc770cd6ec2
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/aeaee8944f0eaacbf4cdf39279785b9ba4836bb6
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/9a75b030cf27d2530444e9a2f9f11867f79bf679
--- .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0001.patch | 179 ++++++++++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0002.patch | 157 +++++++++++++++ .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0003.patch | 135 +++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 474 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0003.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0001.patch new file +179 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +From 59f024c76ee57c2bec84794536302fc770cd6ec2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gua Guo <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 13:01:19 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] UefiPayloadPkg/Hob: Integer Overflow in CreateHob() + +REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4166 + +Fix integer overflow in various CreateHob instances. +Fixes: CVE-2022-36765 + +The CreateHob() function aligns the requested size to 8 +performing the following operation: +``` +HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7)); +``` + +No checks are performed to ensure this value doesn't +overflow, and could lead to CreateHob() returning a smaller +HOB than requested, which could lead to OOB HOB accesses. + +Reported-by: Marc Beatove <[email protected]> +Cc: Guo Dong <[email protected]> +Cc: Sean Rhodes <[email protected]> +Cc: James Lu <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Gua Guo <[email protected]> +Cc: John Mathew <[email protected]> +Authored-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Gua Guo <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2022-36765 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/59f024c76ee57c2bec84794536302fc770cd6ec2] + +Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]> +--- + .../Library/PayloadEntryHobLib/Hob.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++ + .../UefiPayloadEntry/UniversalPayloadEntry.c | 8 ++-- + 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/UefiPayloadPkg/Library/PayloadEntryHobLib/Hob.c b/UefiPayloadPkg/Library/PayloadEntryHobLib/Hob.c +index 2c3acbbc19..51c2e28d7d 100644 +--- a/UefiPayloadPkg/Library/PayloadEntryHobLib/Hob.c ++++ b/UefiPayloadPkg/Library/PayloadEntryHobLib/Hob.c +@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ CreateHob ( + + HandOffHob = GetHobList (); + ++ // ++ // Check Length to avoid data overflow. ++ // ++ if (HobLength > MAX_UINT16 - 0x7) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + HobLength = (UINT16)((HobLength + 0x7) & (~0x7)); + + FreeMemory = HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryTop - HandOffHob->EfiFreeMemoryBottom; +@@ -160,6 +167,9 @@ BuildResourceDescriptorHob ( + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR, sizeof (EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR)); + ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->ResourceType = ResourceType; + Hob->ResourceAttribute = ResourceAttribute; +@@ -330,6 +340,10 @@ BuildModuleHob ( + ); + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_MODULE)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + CopyGuid (&(Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.Name), &gEfiHobMemoryAllocModuleGuid); + Hob->MemoryAllocationHeader.MemoryBaseAddress = MemoryAllocationModule; +@@ -378,6 +392,11 @@ BuildGuidHob ( + ASSERT (DataLength <= (0xffff - sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE))); + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_GUID_EXTENSION, (UINT16)(sizeof (EFI_HOB_GUID_TYPE) + DataLength)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + CopyGuid (&Hob->Name, Guid); + return Hob + 1; + } +@@ -441,6 +460,10 @@ BuildFvHob ( + EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress; + Hob->Length = Length; +@@ -472,6 +495,10 @@ BuildFv2Hob ( + EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2 *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV2, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME2)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress; + Hob->Length = Length; +@@ -513,6 +540,10 @@ BuildFv3Hob ( + EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME3 *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV3, sizeof (EFI_HOB_FIRMWARE_VOLUME3)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->BaseAddress = BaseAddress; + Hob->Length = Length; +@@ -546,6 +577,10 @@ BuildCpuHob ( + EFI_HOB_CPU *Hob; + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_CPU, sizeof (EFI_HOB_CPU)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + Hob->SizeOfMemorySpace = SizeOfMemorySpace; + Hob->SizeOfIoSpace = SizeOfIoSpace; +@@ -583,6 +618,10 @@ BuildStackHob ( + ); + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_STACK)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + CopyGuid (&(Hob->AllocDescriptor.Name), &gEfiHobMemoryAllocStackGuid); + Hob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress = BaseAddress; +@@ -664,6 +703,10 @@ BuildMemoryAllocationHob ( + ); + + Hob = CreateHob (EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION, sizeof (EFI_HOB_MEMORY_ALLOCATION)); ++ ASSERT (Hob != NULL); ++ if (Hob == NULL) { ++ return; ++ } + + ZeroMem (&(Hob->AllocDescriptor.Name), sizeof (EFI_GUID)); + Hob->AllocDescriptor.MemoryBaseAddress = BaseAddress; +diff --git a/UefiPayloadPkg/UefiPayloadEntry/UniversalPayloadEntry.c b/UefiPayloadPkg/UefiPayloadEntry/UniversalPayloadEntry.c +index edb3c20471..abfe75bd7b 100644 +--- a/UefiPayloadPkg/UefiPayloadEntry/UniversalPayloadEntry.c ++++ b/UefiPayloadPkg/UefiPayloadEntry/UniversalPayloadEntry.c +@@ -111,10 +111,12 @@ AddNewHob ( + } + + NewHob.Header = CreateHob (Hob->Header->HobType, Hob->Header->HobLength); +- +- if (NewHob.Header != NULL) { +- CopyMem (NewHob.Header + 1, Hob->Header + 1, Hob->Header->HobLength - sizeof (EFI_HOB_GENERIC_HEADER)); ++ ASSERT (NewHob.Header != NULL); ++ if (NewHob.Header == NULL) { ++ return; + } ++ ++ CopyMem (NewHob.Header + 1, Hob->Header + 1, Hob->Header->HobLength - sizeof (EFI_HOB_GENERIC_HEADER)); + } + + /** +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0002.patch new file +157 -0
157 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2022-36765-0003.patch new file +135 -0
135 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +3 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2023-45237-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45237-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2023-45236.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-36765-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-36765-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-36765-0003.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 12/38 ovmf: fix CVE-2024-38796
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
Backport a fix from upstream to resolve CVE-2024-38796
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/c95233b8525ca6828921affd1496146cff262e65
--- ...-Fix-overflow-issue-in-BasePeCoffLib.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-MdePkg-Fix-overflow-issue-in-BasePeCoffLib.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-MdePkg-Fix-overflow-issue-in-BasePeCoffLib.patch new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From c4d6af8428375c0343fcfd20bf1465e6d4be4690 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Doug Flick <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 17:44:27 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] MdePkg: Fix overflow issue in BasePeCoffLib + +The RelocDir->Size is a UINT32 value, and RelocDir->VirtualAddress is +also a UINT32 value. The current code does not check for overflow when +adding RelocDir->Size to RelocDir->VirtualAddress. This patch adds a +check to ensure that the addition does not overflow. + +Signed-off-by: Doug Flick <[email protected]> +Authored-by: sriraamx gobichettipalayam <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2024-38796 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/c95233b8525ca6828921affd1496146cff262e65] + +Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]> +--- + MdePkg/Library/BasePeCoffLib/BasePeCoff.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/MdePkg/Library/BasePeCoffLib/BasePeCoff.c b/MdePkg/Library/BasePeCoffLib/BasePeCoff.c +index 6d8d9faeb8..2339b111b5 100644 +--- a/MdePkg/Library/BasePeCoffLib/BasePeCoff.c ++++ b/MdePkg/Library/BasePeCoffLib/BasePeCoff.c +@@ -1014,7 +1014,7 @@ PeCoffLoaderRelocateImage ( + RelocDir = &Hdr.Te->DataDirectory[0]; + } + +- if ((RelocDir != NULL) && (RelocDir->Size > 0)) { ++ if ((RelocDir != NULL) && (RelocDir->Size > 0) && (RelocDir->Size - 1 < MAX_UINT32 - RelocDir->VirtualAddress)) { + RelocBase = (EFI_IMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION *)PeCoffLoaderImageAddress (ImageContext, RelocDir->VirtualAddress, TeStrippedOffset); + RelocBaseEnd = (EFI_IMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION *)PeCoffLoaderImageAddress ( + ImageContext, +-- +2.34.1 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +1 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2022-36765-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2022-36765-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2022-36765-0003.patch \ + file://0001-MdePkg-Fix-overflow-issue-in-BasePeCoffLib.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 13/38 ovmf: fix CVE-2024-1298
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
Backport a fix from upstream to resolve CVE-2024-1298
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/284dbac43da752ee34825c8b3f6f9e8281cb5a19
--- ...ential-UINT32-overflow-in-S3-ResumeC.patch | 51 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-MdeModulePkg-Potential-UINT32-overflow-in-S3-ResumeC.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-MdeModulePkg-Potential-UINT32-overflow-in-S3-ResumeC.patch new file +51 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +From 63f29c180dd04d13614440740a8795ee422567b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 17:43:28 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] MdeModulePkg: Potential UINT32 overflow in S3 ResumeCount + +REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4677 + +Attacker able to modify physical memory and ResumeCount. +System will crash/DoS when ResumeCount reaches its MAX_UINT32. + +Cc: Zhiguang Liu <[email protected]> +Cc: Dandan Bi <[email protected]> +Cc: Liming Gao <[email protected]> + +Signed-off-by: Pakkirisamy ShanmugavelX <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2024-1298 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/284dbac43da752ee34825c8b3f6f9e8281cb5a19] +Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]> +--- + .../FirmwarePerformancePei.c | 12 ++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/FirmwarePerformanceDataTablePei/FirmwarePerformancePei.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/FirmwarePerformanceDataTablePei/FirmwarePerformancePei.c +index 2f2b2a80b2..2ba9215226 100644 +--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/FirmwarePerformanceDataTablePei/FirmwarePerformancePei.c ++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/FirmwarePerformanceDataTablePei/FirmwarePerformancePei.c +@@ -112,11 +112,15 @@ FpdtStatusCodeListenerPei ( + // + S3ResumeTotal = MultU64x32 (AcpiS3ResumeRecord->AverageResume, AcpiS3ResumeRecord->ResumeCount); + AcpiS3ResumeRecord->ResumeCount++; +- AcpiS3ResumeRecord->AverageResume = DivU64x32 (S3ResumeTotal + AcpiS3ResumeRecord->FullResume, AcpiS3ResumeRecord->ResumeCount); ++ if (AcpiS3ResumeRecord->ResumeCount > 0) { ++ AcpiS3ResumeRecord->AverageResume = DivU64x32 (S3ResumeTotal + AcpiS3ResumeRecord->FullResume, AcpiS3ResumeRecord->ResumeCount); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "\nFPDT: S3 Resume Performance - AverageResume = 0x%x\n", AcpiS3ResumeRecord->AverageResume)); ++ } else { ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "\nFPDT: S3 ResumeCount reaches the MAX_UINT32 value. S3 ResumeCount record reset to Zero.")); ++ } + +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FPDT: S3 Resume Performance - ResumeCount = %d\n", AcpiS3ResumeRecord->ResumeCount)); +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FPDT: S3 Resume Performance - FullResume = %ld\n", AcpiS3ResumeRecord->FullResume)); +- DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FPDT: S3 Resume Performance - AverageResume = %ld\n", AcpiS3ResumeRecord->AverageResume)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FPDT: S3 Resume Performance - ResumeCount = 0x%x\n", AcpiS3ResumeRecord->ResumeCount)); ++ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FPDT: S3 Resume Performance - FullResume = 0x%x\n", AcpiS3ResumeRecord->FullResume)); + + // + // Update S3 Suspend Performance Record. +-- +2.34.1 +
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +1 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2022-36765-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2022-36765-0003.patch \ file://0001-MdePkg-Fix-overflow-issue-in-BasePeCoffLib.patch \ + file://0001-MdeModulePkg-Potential-UINT32-overflow-in-S3-ResumeC.patch \ " PV = "edk2-stable202202"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 14/38 libsoup: fix CVE-2024-52531
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
CVE-2024-52531:
GNOME libsoup before 3.6.1 allows a buffer overflow in applications that perform conversion to UTF-8 in soup_header_parse_param_list_strict. Input received over the network cannot trigger this.
Refer:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52531
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/merge_requests/407/
--- .../libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch | 116 +++++++++++++++ .../libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch | 40 ++++++ .../libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-3.patch | 136 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.0.7.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 295 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-3.patch
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch new file +116 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +From 4ec9e3d286b6d3e982cb0fc3564dee0bf8d87ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Griffis <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 12:18:58 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] fuzzing: Cover soup_header_parse_param_list + +CVE: CVE-2024-52531 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/merge_requests/407/diffs?commit_id=4ec9e3d286b6d3e982cb0fc3564dee0bf8d87ede] + +Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]> + +--- + fuzzing/fuzz.h | 9 +++++++-- + fuzzing/fuzz_header_parsing.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ + fuzzing/fuzz_header_parsing.dict | 8 ++++++++ + fuzzing/meson.build | 2 ++ + 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 fuzzing/fuzz_header_parsing.c + create mode 100644 fuzzing/fuzz_header_parsing.dict + +diff --git a/fuzzing/fuzz.h b/fuzzing/fuzz.h +index 0d380285..f3bd28ee 100644 +--- a/fuzzing/fuzz.h ++++ b/fuzzing/fuzz.h +@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@ + #include "libsoup/soup.h" + + int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (const unsigned char *data, size_t size); ++static int set_logger = 0; + + #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION + static GLogWriterOutput + empty_logging_func (GLogLevelFlags log_level, const GLogField *fields, + gsize n_fields, gpointer user_data) + { +- return G_LOG_WRITER_HANDLED; ++ return G_LOG_WRITER_HANDLED; + } + #endif + +@@ -16,6 +17,10 @@ static void + fuzz_set_logging_func (void) + { + #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION +- g_log_set_writer_func (empty_logging_func, NULL, NULL); ++ if (!set_logger) ++ { ++ set_logger = 1; ++ g_log_set_writer_func (empty_logging_func, NULL, NULL); ++ } + #endif + } +diff --git a/fuzzing/fuzz_header_parsing.c b/fuzzing/fuzz_header_parsing.c +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..a8e5c1f9 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/fuzzing/fuzz_header_parsing.c +@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ ++#include "fuzz.h" ++ ++int ++LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput (const unsigned char *data, size_t size) ++{ ++ GHashTable *elements; ++ ++ // We only accept NUL terminated strings ++ if (!size || data[size - 1] != '\0') ++ return 0; ++ ++ fuzz_set_logging_func (); ++ ++ elements = soup_header_parse_param_list((char*)data); ++ ++ g_hash_table_unref(elements); ++ ++ return 0; ++} +\ No newline at end of file +diff --git a/fuzzing/fuzz_header_parsing.dict b/fuzzing/fuzz_header_parsing.dict +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..1562ca3a +--- /dev/null ++++ b/fuzzing/fuzz_header_parsing.dict +@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ ++"*=UTF-8''" ++"*=iso-8859-1''" ++"'" ++"''" ++"=" ++"*=" ++""" ++";" +\ No newline at end of file +diff --git a/fuzzing/meson.build b/fuzzing/meson.build +index b14cbb50..5dd0f417 100644 +--- a/fuzzing/meson.build ++++ b/fuzzing/meson.build +@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ fuzz_targets = [ + 'fuzz_cookie_parse', + 'fuzz_content_sniffer', + 'fuzz_date_time', ++ 'fuzz_header_parsing', + ] + + fuzzing_args = '-fsanitize=fuzzer,address,undefined' +@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ if have_fuzzing and (fuzzing_feature.enabled() or fuzzing_feature.auto()) + '-runs=200000', + '-artifact_prefix=meson-logs/' + target + '-', + '-print_final_stats=1', ++ '-max_len=4096', + ] + extra_args, + env: [ + 'ASAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=0', +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch new file +40 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 825fda3425546847b42ad5270544e9388ff349fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Griffis <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 13:52:08 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] tests: Add test for passing invalid UTF-8 to + soup_header_parse_semi_param_list() + +CVE: CVE-2024-52531 +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/merge_requests/407/diffs?commit_id=825fda3425546847b42ad5270544e9388ff349fe] + +Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]> +--- + tests/header-parsing-test.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/tests/header-parsing-test.c b/tests/header-parsing-test.c +index 715c2c6f..5e423d2b 100644 +--- a/tests/header-parsing-test.c ++++ b/tests/header-parsing-test.c +@@ -825,6 +825,17 @@ static struct ParamListTest { + { "filename", "t\xC3\xA9st.txt" }, + }, + }, ++ ++ /* This tests invalid UTF-8 data which *should* never be passed here but it was designed to be robust against it. */ ++ { TRUE, ++ "invalid*=\x69\x27\x27\x93\x93\x93\x93\xff\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x0a; filename*=iso-8859-1''\x69\x27\x27\x93\x93\x93\x93\xff\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x0a; foo", ++ { ++ { "filename", "i''\302\223\302\223\302\223\302\223\303\277aaaaaaabcde" }, ++ { "invalid", "\302\223\302\223\302\223\302\223\303\277aaaaaaabcde" }, ++ { "foo", NULL }, ++ ++ }, ++ } + }; + static const int num_paramlisttests = G_N_ELEMENTS (paramlisttests); + +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup/CVE-2024-52531-3.patch new file +136 -0
136 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.0.7.bb +3 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/libsoup/${SHRT_VER}/libsoup-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2024-52530.patch \ file://CVE-2024-52532-1.patch \ file://CVE-2024-52532-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-52531-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-52531-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-52531-3.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ebdf90cf3599c11acbb6818a9d9e3fc9d2c68e56eb829b93962972683e1bf7c8"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 15/38 python3-zipp: fix CVE-2024-5569
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
According to [1] which provided the fix link [2], but upstream author reworked it later [3][4][5]
Backport and rebase all the patches for tracing
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5569
[2] https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/fd604bd34f0343472521a36da1fbd22e793e14fd
[3] https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/3cb5609002263eb19f7b5efda82d96f1f57fe876
[4] https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/f89b93f0370dd85d23d243e25dfc1f99f4d8de48
[5] https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/cc61e6140f0dfde2ff372db932442cf6df890f09
--- .../0001-Add-SanitizedNames-mixin.patch | 89 +++++++++++++++++ ...Names-in-CompleteDirs.-Fixes-broken-.patch | 30 ++++++ .../0003-Removed-SanitizedNames.patch | 95 +++++++++++++++++++ ...-loop-when-zipfile-begins-with-more-.patch | 48 ++++++++++ ...ath.rstrip-to-consolidate-checks-for.patch | 30 ++++++ .../python/python3-zipp_3.7.0.bb | 8 ++ 6 files changed, 300 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0001-Add-SanitizedNames-mixin.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0002-Employ-SanitizedNames-in-CompleteDirs.-Fixes-broken-.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0003-Removed-SanitizedNames.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0004-Address-infinite-loop-when-zipfile-begins-with-more-.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0005-Prefer-simpler-path.rstrip-to-consolidate-checks-for.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0001-Add-SanitizedNames-mixin.patch new file +89 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +From ef2227e35d1ae833b7bfa1674a45f58c732ae1a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason R. Coombs" <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 23:27:57 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 1/5] Add SanitizedNames mixin. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/564fcc10cdbfdaecdb33688e149827465931c9e0] +CVE: CVE-2024-5569 +Rebase to v3.7.0 +Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]> +--- + zipp.py | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/zipp.py b/zipp.py +index 26b723c..8f0950f 100644 +--- a/zipp.py ++++ b/zipp.py +@@ -68,6 +68,68 @@ def _difference(minuend, subtrahend): + return itertools.filterfalse(set(subtrahend).__contains__, minuend) + + ++class SanitizedNames: ++ """ ++ ZipFile mix-in to ensure names are sanitized. ++ """ ++ ++ def namelist(self): ++ return list(map(self._sanitize, super().namelist())) ++ ++ @staticmethod ++ def _sanitize(name): ++ r""" ++ Ensure a relative path with posix separators and no dot names. ++ ++ Modeled after ++ https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/bcc1be39cb1d04ad9fc0bd1b9193d3972835a57c/Lib/zipfile/__init__.py#L1799-L1813 ++ but provides consistent cross-platform behavior. ++ ++ >>> san = SanitizedNames._sanitize ++ >>> san('/foo/bar') ++ 'foo/bar' ++ >>> san('//foo.txt') ++ 'foo.txt' ++ >>> san('foo/.././bar.txt') ++ 'foo/bar.txt' ++ >>> san('foo../.bar.txt') ++ 'foo../.bar.txt' ++ >>> san('\\foo\\bar.txt') ++ 'foo/bar.txt' ++ >>> san('D:\\foo.txt') ++ 'D/foo.txt' ++ >>> san('\\\\server\\share\\file.txt') ++ 'server/share/file.txt' ++ >>> san('\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Volume3') ++ '?/GLOBALROOT/Volume3' ++ >>> san('\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive1\\root') ++ 'PhysicalDrive1/root' ++ ++ Retain any trailing slash. ++ >>> san('abc/') ++ 'abc/' ++ ++ Raises a ValueError if the result is empty. ++ >>> san('../..') ++ Traceback (most recent call last): ++ ... ++ ValueError: Empty filename ++ """ ++ ++ def allowed(part): ++ return part and part not in {'..', '.'} ++ ++ # Remove the drive letter. ++ # Don't use ntpath.splitdrive, because that also strips UNC paths ++ bare = re.sub('^([A-Z]):', r'\1', name, flags=re.IGNORECASE) ++ clean = bare.replace('\\', '/') ++ parts = clean.split('/') ++ joined = '/'.join(filter(allowed, parts)) ++ if not joined: ++ raise ValueError("Empty filename") ++ return joined + '/' * name.endswith('/') ++ ++ + class CompleteDirs(zipfile.ZipFile): + """ + A ZipFile subclass that ensures that implied directories +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0002-Employ-SanitizedNames-in-CompleteDirs.-Fixes-broken-.patch new file +30 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 8b09dbf95b3ba78a63f220941e31ac92f4ad192c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason R. Coombs" <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 23:31:57 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Employ SanitizedNames in CompleteDirs. Fixes broken test. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/58115d2be968644ce71ce6bcc9b79826c82a1806] +Remove test code +Rebase to v3.7.0 +CVE: CVE-2024-5569 +Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]> +--- + zipp.py | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/zipp.py b/zipp.py +index 8f0950f..29d2572 100644 +--- a/zipp.py ++++ b/zipp.py +@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ class SanitizedNames: + return joined + '/' * name.endswith('/') + + +-class CompleteDirs(zipfile.ZipFile): ++class CompleteDirs(SanitizedNames, zipfile.ZipFile): + """ + A ZipFile subclass that ensures that implied directories + are always included in the namelist. +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0003-Removed-SanitizedNames.patch new file +95 -0
95 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0004-Address-infinite-loop-when-zipfile-begins-with-more-.patch new file +48 -0
48 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp/0005-Prefer-simpler-path.rstrip-to-consolidate-checks-for.patch new file +30 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 9084bc59784cb240628996c1cb95f4f786ebedcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason R. Coombs" <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 23:38:28 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Prefer simpler path.rstrip to consolidate checks for + empty or only paths. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/jaraco/zipp/commit/cc61e6140f0dfde2ff372db932442cf6df890f09] +Rebase to v3.7.0 +CVE: CVE-2024-5569 +Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]> +--- + zipp.py | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/zipp.py b/zipp.py +index 236af49..87c4219 100644 +--- a/zipp.py ++++ b/zipp.py +@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ def _ancestry(path): + ['//b//d///f', '//b//d', '//b'] + """ + path = path.rstrip(posixpath.sep) +- while path and not path.endswith(posixpath.sep): ++ while path.rstrip(posixpath.sep): + yield path + path, tail = posixpath.split(path) + +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-zipp_3.7.0.bb +8 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,14 @@ DEPENDS += "${PYTHON_PN}-setuptools-scm-native" inherit pypi python_setuptools_build_meta +SRC_URI += " \ + file://0001-Add-SanitizedNames-mixin.patch \ + file://0002-Employ-SanitizedNames-in-CompleteDirs.-Fixes-broken-.patch \ + file://0003-Removed-SanitizedNames.patch \ + file://0004-Address-infinite-loop-when-zipfile-begins-with-more-.patch \ + file://0005-Prefer-simpler-path.rstrip-to-consolidate-checks-for.patch \ +" + DEPENDS += "${PYTHON_PN}-toml-native" RDEPENDS:${PN} += "${PYTHON_PN}-compression \
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 16/38 libsoup-2.4: Backport fix for CVE-2024-52531
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
import patch from ubuntu to fix
CVE-2024-52531
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsoup2.4/tree/debian/patches?h=ubuntu/jammy-security
Upstream commit
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/a35222dd0bfab2ac97c10e86b95f762456628283
&
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/825fda3425546847b42ad5270544e9388ff349fe]
Reference:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/merge_requests/407/
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2024-52531
--- .../libsoup-2.4/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch | 131 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libsoup-2.4/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch | 36 +++++ .../libsoup/libsoup-2.4_2.74.2.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 169 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch new file +131 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +From a35222dd0bfab2ac97c10e86b95f762456628283 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Griffis <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 13:53:26 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] headers: Be more robust against invalid input when + parsing params + +If you pass invalid input to a function such as soup_header_parse_param_list_strict() +it can cause an overflow if it decodes the input to UTF-8. + +This should never happen with valid UTF-8 input which libsoup's client API +ensures, however it's server API does not currently. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsoup2.4/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2024-52531-1.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security +Upstream commit https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/a35222dd0bfab2ac97c10e86b95f762456628283] +CVE: CVE-2024-52531 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + libsoup/soup-headers.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) + +Index: libsoup2.4-2.74.2/libsoup/soup-headers.c +=================================================================== +--- libsoup2.4-2.74.2.orig/libsoup/soup-headers.c ++++ libsoup2.4-2.74.2/libsoup/soup-headers.c +@@ -643,8 +643,9 @@ soup_header_contains (const char *header + } + + static void +-decode_quoted_string (char *quoted_string) ++decode_quoted_string_inplace (GString *quoted_gstring) + { ++ char *quoted_string = quoted_gstring->str; + char *src, *dst; + + src = quoted_string + 1; +@@ -658,10 +659,11 @@ decode_quoted_string (char *quoted_strin + } + + static gboolean +-decode_rfc5987 (char *encoded_string) ++decode_rfc5987_inplace (GString *encoded_gstring) + { + char *q, *decoded; + gboolean iso_8859_1 = FALSE; ++ const char *encoded_string = encoded_gstring->str; + + q = strchr (encoded_string, '\''); + if (!q) +@@ -690,14 +692,7 @@ decode_rfc5987 (char *encoded_string) + decoded = utf8; + } + +- /* If encoded_string was UTF-8, then each 3-character %-escape +- * will be converted to a single byte, and so decoded is +- * shorter than encoded_string. If encoded_string was +- * iso-8859-1, then each 3-character %-escape will be +- * converted into at most 2 bytes in UTF-8, and so it's still +- * shorter. +- */ +- strcpy (encoded_string, decoded); ++ g_string_assign (encoded_gstring, decoded); + g_free (decoded); + return TRUE; + } +@@ -707,15 +702,17 @@ parse_param_list (const char *header, ch + { + GHashTable *params; + GSList *list, *iter; +- char *item, *eq, *name_end, *value; +- gboolean override, duplicated; + + params = g_hash_table_new_full (soup_str_case_hash, + soup_str_case_equal, +- g_free, NULL); ++ g_free, g_free); + + list = parse_list (header, delim); + for (iter = list; iter; iter = iter->next) { ++ char *item, *eq, *name_end; ++ gboolean override, duplicated; ++ GString *parsed_value = NULL; ++ + item = iter->data; + override = FALSE; + +@@ -730,19 +727,19 @@ parse_param_list (const char *header, ch + + *name_end = '\0'; + +- value = (char *)skip_lws (eq + 1); ++ parsed_value = g_string_new ((char *)skip_lws (eq + 1)); + + if (name_end[-1] == '*' && name_end > item + 1) { + name_end[-1] = '\0'; +- if (!decode_rfc5987 (value)) { ++ if (!decode_rfc5987_inplace (parsed_value)) { ++ g_string_free (parsed_value, TRUE); + g_free (item); + continue; + } + override = TRUE; +- } else if (*value == '"') +- decode_quoted_string (value); +- } else +- value = NULL; ++ } else if (parsed_value->str[0] == '"') ++ decode_quoted_string_inplace (parsed_value); ++ } + + duplicated = g_hash_table_lookup_extended (params, item, NULL, NULL); + +@@ -750,11 +747,16 @@ parse_param_list (const char *header, ch + soup_header_free_param_list (params); + params = NULL; + g_slist_foreach (iter, (GFunc)g_free, NULL); ++ if (parsed_value) ++ g_string_free (parsed_value, TRUE); + break; +- } else if (override || !duplicated) +- g_hash_table_replace (params, item, value); +- else ++ } else if (override || !duplicated) { ++ g_hash_table_replace (params, item, parsed_value ? g_string_free (parsed_value, FALSE) : NULL); ++ } else { ++ if (parsed_value) ++ g_string_free (parsed_value, TRUE); + g_free (item); ++ } + } + + g_slist_free (list);
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch new file +36 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 825fda3425546847b42ad5270544e9388ff349fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Patrick Griffis <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 13:52:08 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] tests: Add test for passing invalid UTF-8 to + soup_header_parse_semi_param_list() + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libsoup2.4/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2024-52531-2.patch?h=ubuntu/jammy-security +Upstream commit https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/825fda3425546847b42ad5270544e9388ff349fe] +CVE: CVE-2024-52531 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + tests/header-parsing-test.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +Index: libsoup2.4-2.74.2/tests/header-parsing-test.c +=================================================================== +--- libsoup2.4-2.74.2.orig/tests/header-parsing-test.c ++++ libsoup2.4-2.74.2/tests/header-parsing-test.c +@@ -825,6 +825,17 @@ static struct ParamListTest { + { "filename", "t\xC3\xA9st.txt" }, + }, + }, ++ ++ /* This tests invalid UTF-8 data which *should* never be passed here but it was designed to be robust against it. */ ++ { TRUE, ++ "invalid*=\x69\x27\x27\x93\x93\x93\x93\xff\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x0a; filename*=iso-8859-1''\x69\x27\x27\x93\x93\x93\x93\xff\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x0a; foo", ++ { ++ { "filename", "i''\302\223\302\223\302\223\302\223\303\277aaaaaaabcde" }, ++ { "invalid", "\302\223\302\223\302\223\302\223\303\277aaaaaaabcde" }, ++ { "foo", NULL }, ++ ++ }, ++ } + }; + static const int num_paramlisttests = G_N_ELEMENTS (paramlisttests); +
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-2.4_2.74.2.bb +2 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/libsoup/${SHRT_VER}/libsoup-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2024-52530.patch \ file://CVE-2024-52532-1.patch \ file://CVE-2024-52532-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-52531-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-52531-2.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f0a427656e5fe19e1df71c107e88dfa1b2e673c25c547b7823b6018b40d01159"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 17/38 cpio: ignore CVE-2023-7216
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Same was done in newer Yocto releases.
See commit See commit 0f2cd2bbaddba3b8c80d71db274bbcd941d0e60e
--- meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.14.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.14.bb +2 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ inherit autotools gettext texinfo # Issue applies to use of cpio in SUSE/OBS, doesn't apply to us CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2010-4226" +# disputed: intended behaviour, see https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-cpio/2024-03/msg00000.html +CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2023-7216" EXTRA_OECONF += "DEFAULT_RMT_DIR=${sbindir}"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 18/38 gnupg: ignore CVE-2022-3515
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
This is vulnerability of libksba and we use fixed libksba version (currently 1.6.4).
--- meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.3.7.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.3.7.bb +2 -0
@@ -87,3 +87,5 @@ lcl_maybe_fortify:mipsarch = "" # upstream-wontfix: Upstream doesn't seem to be keen on merging the proposed commit - https://dev.gnupg.org/T5993 CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2022-3219" +# cpe-incorrect: this is vulnerability of libksba and we use fixed libksba version +CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2022-3515"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 19/38 qemu: ignore CVE-2022-36648
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
The CVE has disputed flag in NVD DB.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +5 -0
@@ -148,6 +148,11 @@ CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2023-0664" # RHEL specific issue CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2023-2680" +# The CVE has disputed flag in NVD DB and also descrition contains: +# Note: This has been disputed by multiple third parties as not a valid vulnerability +# due to the rocker device not falling within the virtualization use case. +CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2022-36648" + COMPATIBLE_HOST:mipsarchn32 = "null" COMPATIBLE_HOST:mipsarchn64 = "null" COMPATIBLE_HOST:riscv32 = "null"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 20/38 grub: ignore CVE-2024-1048 and CVE-2023-4001
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Same was done in newer Yocto releases.
See commit: f99b25355133fe8f65a55737270e67ea10b79d52 See commit: 40cd768368167f81de5bb55e9ff0584035f4c1b4
--- meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +2 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "23b64b4c741569f9426ed2e3d0e6780796fca081bee4c99f62aa3f53ae CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2019-14865" # Applies only to SUSE CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2021-46705" +# not-applicable-platform: Applies only to RHEL/Fedora +CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2024-1048 CVE-2023-4001" DEPENDS = "flex-native bison-native gettext-native"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 21/38 pixman: ignore CVE-2023-37769
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Same was done in newer Yocto releases.
See commit 72f2d4cf44b795f766ecdee0b8362c7e162c5efc
--- meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/pixman_0.40.0.bb | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/pixman_0.40.0.bb +3 -0
@@ -40,3 +40,6 @@ EXTRA_OEMESON:append:class-target:powerpc64 = " ${@bb.utils.contains("TUNE_FEATU EXTRA_OEMESON:append:class-target:powerpc64le = " ${@bb.utils.contains("TUNE_FEATURES", "altivec", "-Dvmx=enabled", "-Dvmx=disabled", d)}" BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk" + +# not-applicable-config: stress-test is an uninstalled test +CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2023-37769"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 22/38 qemu: patch CVE-2024-6505
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Backport patch [3] as linked from [1] via [2].
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6505
[2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2295760
[3] https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/f1595ceb
--- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-6505.patch | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-6505.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +1 -0
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2024-4467-0005.patch \ file://CVE-2023-3019-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2023-3019-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-6505.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-6505.patch new file +40 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From f1595ceb9aad36a6c1da95bcb77ab9509b38822d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Akihiko Odaki <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2024 20:58:04 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] virtio-net: Ensure queue index fits with RSS + +Ensure the queue index points to a valid queue when software RSS +enabled. The new calculation matches with the behavior of Linux's TAP +device with the RSS eBPF program. + +Fixes: 4474e37a5b3a ("virtio-net: implement RX RSS processing") +Reported-by: Zhibin Hu <[email protected]> +Cc: [email protected] +Signed-off-by: Akihiko Odaki <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2024-6505 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/f1595ceb9aad36a6c1da95bcb77ab9509b38822d] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + hw/net/virtio-net.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c +index 8f30972708..5635620a31 100644 +--- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c ++++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c +@@ -1752,7 +1752,8 @@ static ssize_t virtio_net_receive_rcu(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, + if (!no_rss && n->rss_data.enabled && n->rss_data.enabled_software_rss) { + int index = virtio_net_process_rss(nc, buf, size); + if (index >= 0) { +- NetClientState *nc2 = qemu_get_subqueue(n->nic, index); ++ NetClientState *nc2 = ++ qemu_get_subqueue(n->nic, index % n->curr_queue_pairs); + return virtio_net_receive_rcu(nc2, buf, size, true); + } + } +-- +2.30.2 +
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 23/38 qemu: fix CVE-2024-3446
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
A double free vulnerability was found in QEMU virtio devices (virtio-gpu, virtio-serial-bus, virtio-crypto), where the mem_reentrancy_guard flag insufficiently protects against DMA reentrancy issues. This issue could allow a malicious privileged guest to crash the QEMU process on the host, resulting in a d enial of service or allow arbitrary code execution within the context of the QEMU process on the host.
CVE-2024-3446-0004, CVE-2024-3446-0005, CVE-2024-3446-0006 are CVE fix and CVE-2024-3446-0001, CVE-2024-3446-0002, CVE-2024-3446-0003 are dependent commits to fix the CVE.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3446
Upstream patches:
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/9c86c97f12c060bf7484dd931f38634e166a81f0
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/f63192b0544af5d3e4d5edfd85ab520fcf671377
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/ec0504b989ca61e03636384d3602b7bf07ffe4da
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/ba28e0ff4d95b56dc334aac2730ab3651ffc3132
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/b4295bff25f7b50de1d9cc94a9c6effd40056bca
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/f4729ec39ad97a42ceaa7b5697f84f440ea6e5dc
--- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 6 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0001.patch | 218 +++++++++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0002.patch | 427 ++++++++++++++++++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0003.patch | 68 +++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0004.patch | 144 ++++++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0005.patch | 42 ++ .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0006.patch | 43 ++ 7 files changed, 948 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0003.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0004.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0005.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0006.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +6 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,12 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2023-3019-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2023-3019-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2024-6505.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-3446-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-3446-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-3446-0003.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-3446-0004.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-3446-0005.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-3446-0006.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0001.patch new file +218 -0
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meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0002.patch new file +427 -0
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meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0003.patch new file +68 -0
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meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0004.patch new file +144 -0
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meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0005.patch new file +42 -0
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meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3446-0006.patch new file +43 -0
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2.34.1
PATCH 24/38 qemu: fix CVE-2024-3447
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Yogita Urade <[email protected]>
A heap-based buffer overflow was found in the SDHCI device emulation of QEMU. The bug is triggered when both s->data_count and the size of s->fifo_buffer are set to 0x200, leading to an out-of-bound access. A malicious guest could use this flaw to crash the QEMU process on the host, resulting in a denial of service condition.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3447
Upstream patch:
https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/2429cb7a9f460b544f4b07bcf02dbdedfc4dcb39
--- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 1 + .../qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3447.patch | 137 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 138 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3447.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +1 -0
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.qemu.org/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2024-3446-0004.patch \ file://CVE-2024-3446-0005.patch \ file://CVE-2024-3446-0006.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-3447.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "qemu-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu/CVE-2024-3447.patch new file +137 -0
137 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 25/38 diffoscope: fix CVE-2024-25711
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Jiaying Song <[email protected]>
diffoscope before 256 allows directory traversal via an embedded filename in a GPG file. Contents of any file, such as ../.ssh/id_rsa, may be disclosed to an attacker. This occurs because the value of the gpg --use-embedded-filenames option is trusted.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25711
Upstream patches:
https://salsa.debian.org/reproducible-builds/diffoscope/-/commit/458f7f04bc053a0066aa7d2fd3251747d4899476
--- .../diffoscope/CVE-2024-25711.patch | 116 ++++++++++++++++++ .../diffoscope/diffoscope_208.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/diffoscope/diffoscope/CVE-2024-25711.patch
meta/recipes-support/diffoscope/diffoscope/CVE-2024-25711.patch new file +116 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +From 1eda4012c5350efae02fcc058e0a36cc71ad62fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Lamb <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 10:43:18 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Use a determistic name instead of trusting gpg's + --use-embedded-filenames. (Closes: reproducible-builds/diffoscope#361) + +... but also expose the embedded name by attaching the ("unstable") output of +--list-packets. + +Many thanks to Daniel Kahn Gillmor <[email protected]> for reporting this issue +and providing feedback. + +Upstream-Status: Backport +[https://salsa.debian.org/reproducible-builds/diffoscope/-/commit/458f7f04bc053a0066aa7d2fd3251747d4899476] + +CVE: CVE-2024-25711 + +Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <[email protected]> +--- + diffoscope/comparators/pgp.py | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + tests/comparators/test_pgp.py | 3 ++- + 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/diffoscope/comparators/pgp.py b/diffoscope/comparators/pgp.py +index eea997b..9215664 100644 +--- a/diffoscope/comparators/pgp.py ++++ b/diffoscope/comparators/pgp.py +@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ from .utils.command import Command, our_check_output + + logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + ++re_name = re.compile(r", created \d+, name=\"(?P<name>[^\"]+)\",") ++ + + class Pgpdump(Command): + @tool_required("pgpdump") +@@ -46,21 +48,31 @@ class Pgpdump(Command): + ) + + ++class GpgListPackets(Command): ++ @tool_required("gpg") ++ def cmdline(self): ++ return ( ++ "gpg", ++ "--no-keyring", ++ "--list-packets", ++ self.path, ++ ) ++ ++ + class PGPContainer(Archive): + @tool_required("gpg") + def open_archive(self): +- # Extract to a fresh temporary directory so that we can use the +- # embedded filename. +- ++ # Extract to a fresh temporary directory. + self._temp_dir = get_temporary_directory(suffix="pgp") + + try: + our_check_output( + ( + "gpg", +- "--use-embedded-filename", + "--decrypt", + "--no-keyring", ++ "--output", ++ os.path.join(self._temp_dir.name, "contents"), + os.path.abspath(self.source.path), + ), + cwd=self._temp_dir.name, +@@ -75,7 +87,7 @@ class PGPContainer(Archive): + self._temp_dir.cleanup() + + def get_member_names(self): +- # Will only return one filename, taken from the signature file itself. ++ # Will only ever return one filename + return os.listdir(self._temp_dir.name) + + def extract(self, member_name, dest_dir): +@@ -136,4 +148,16 @@ class PgpSignature(TextFile): + ] + ) + ++ # ... as well as gpg --list-packets ++ difference.add_details( ++ [ ++ Difference.from_operation( ++ GpgListPackets, ++ self.path, ++ other.path, ++ source="gpg --list-packets", ++ ) ++ ] ++ ) ++ + return difference +diff --git a/tests/comparators/test_pgp.py b/tests/comparators/test_pgp.py +index 8652ea9..49b3fa0 100644 +--- a/tests/comparators/test_pgp.py ++++ b/tests/comparators/test_pgp.py +@@ -80,8 +80,9 @@ def test_pgp_signature_identification(signature1, signature2): + def test_pgp_signature(signature1, signature2): + difference = signature1.compare(signature2) + assert_diff(difference, "pgp_signature_expected_diff") ++ assert len(difference.details) == 2 + assert difference.details[0].source1 == "pgpdump" +- assert len(difference.details) == 1 ++ assert difference.details[1].source1 == "gpg --list-packets" + + + @skip_unless_tools_exist("pgpdump") +-- +2.25.1 +
meta/recipes-support/diffoscope/diffoscope_208.bb +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ PYPI_PACKAGE = "diffoscope" inherit pypi setuptools3 +SRC_URI += " file://CVE-2024-25711.patch" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2c5c0ac1159eefce158154849fe67f0f527dffc5295bfd3ca1aef14962ffcbcb" RDEPENDS:${PN} += "binutils vim squashfs-tools python3-libarchive-c python3-magic python3-rpm"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 26/38 do_package/sstate/sstatesig: Change timestamp clamping to hash output only
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
The code was changing the timestamps of the files in the do_package output, particularly the files added for debug sources. This was to do two things:
a) make do_package sstate more reproducible
b) ensure better hash equivalence matching
Unfortuately the debug source files are hardlinks into the source tree for efficiency so touching these, touches a lot of files in ${B} and ${S}. This causes unpredictable effects if compile is run again for example, or could cause compiling in the install task.
The hash equivalence matching is of key importance but we can mimic that using clamping of the file timestamps in the depsig output used to generate the hashes.
This patch drops the global timestamp clamping, instead allowing the files to retain their creation timestamps into sstate. This makes do_package sstate slightly less reproducibile. We could clamp the sstate timestamps but that would lead to two different sets of timestamps depending on whether the data came from sstate or not. I'd prefer to have consistent code behaviour, rather than differing behavhour depending on whether data came from sstate or not.
If we wanted to have reproducibiliy and fix the "corruption" of S/B and have consistent codepaths, the only other option would be two copies of the sources, which could end up huge and seems the least desireable option.
This patch therefore drops the timestamp clamping in the sstate files and tweaks the depsig data generation to clamp the timestamps for do_package instead since this seems the best compromise.
I validated that rpm/deb/ipk files still generate correctly as before.
--- meta/classes/sstate.bbclass | 16 ---------------- meta/lib/oe/sstatesig.py | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
meta/classes/sstate.bbclass +0 -16
@@ -660,15 +660,6 @@ def sstate_package(ss, d): tmpdir = d.getVar('TMPDIR') - fixtime = False - if ss['task'] == "package": - fixtime = True - - def fixtimestamp(root, path): - f = os.path.join(root, path) - if os.lstat(f).st_mtime > sde: - os.utime(f, (sde, sde), follow_symlinks=False) - sstatebuild = d.expand("${WORKDIR}/sstate-build-%s/" % ss['task']) sde = int(d.getVar("SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH") or time.time()) d.setVar("SSTATE_CURRTASK", ss['task'])
@@ -683,8 +674,6 @@ def sstate_package(ss, d): # to sstate tasks but there aren't many of these so better just avoid them entirely. for walkroot, dirs, files in os.walk(state[1]): for file in files + dirs: - if fixtime: - fixtimestamp(walkroot, file) srcpath = os.path.join(walkroot, file) if not os.path.islink(srcpath): continue
@@ -706,11 +695,6 @@ def sstate_package(ss, d): bb.utils.mkdirhier(plain) bb.utils.mkdirhier(pdir) bb.utils.rename(plain, pdir) - if fixtime: - fixtimestamp(pdir, "") - for walkroot, dirs, files in os.walk(pdir): - for file in files + dirs: - fixtimestamp(walkroot, file) d.setVar('SSTATE_BUILDDIR', sstatebuild) d.setVar('SSTATE_INSTDIR', sstatebuild)
meta/lib/oe/sstatesig.py +6 -1
@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ def OEOuthashBasic(path, sigfile, task, d): if task == "package": include_timestamps = True include_root = False + source_date_epoch = float(d.getVar("SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH")) hash_version = d.getVar('HASHEQUIV_HASH_VERSION') extra_sigdata = d.getVar("HASHEQUIV_EXTRA_SIGDATA")
@@ -601,7 +602,11 @@ def OEOuthashBasic(path, sigfile, task, d): raise Exception(msg).with_traceback(e.__traceback__) if include_timestamps: - update_hash(" %10d" % s.st_mtime) + # Need to clamp to SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH + if s.st_mtime > source_date_epoch: + update_hash(" %10d" % source_date_epoch) + else: + update_hash(" %10d" % s.st_mtime) update_hash(" ") if stat.S_ISBLK(s.st_mode) or stat.S_ISCHR(s.st_mode):
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 27/38 rxvt-unicode.inc: disable the terminfo installation by setting TIC to :
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
Without this change, TIC is the native tic in recipe-sysroot-native. By default, native tic has set its default terminfo path to native path:
${datadir}/terminfo; $HOME/.terminfo
When sstate cache is used, the cached native tic's terminfo path could be a path not exist on current host, then native tic will try to install terminfo to HOME dir, cause host contamination.
Disable the terminfo installation by setting TIC to :
--- meta/recipes-sato/rxvt-unicode/rxvt-unicode.inc | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-sato/rxvt-unicode/rxvt-unicode.inc +2 -1
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ EXTRA_OECONF = "--enable-xim \ --with-codesets=eu --enable-pointer-blank \ --enable-text-blink --enable-rxvt-scroll \ --enable-combining --disable-perl \ - --with-x=${STAGING_DIR_HOST}${prefix}" + --with-x=${STAGING_DIR_HOST}${prefix} \ + ac_cv_path_TIC=:" PACKAGECONFIG ??= "" PACKAGECONFIG[startup] = "--enable-startup-notification,--disable-startup-notification,startup-notification,"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 28/38 selftest/reproducible: Drop rawlogs
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
The "rawlogs" data consists of a long string of results data which is already in a structured data format. I can't see this is adding much value in duplciating the data but it does create a huge string with a lot of long problematic pathnames and inflates the results data size.
I suggest we drop this data as obsolete and not necessary.
--- meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/reproducible.py | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/reproducible.py +0 -6
@@ -163,12 +163,8 @@ class ReproducibleTests(OESelftestTestCase): setattr(self, v.lower(), bb_vars[v]) self.extraresults = {} - self.extraresults.setdefault('reproducible.rawlogs', {})['log'] = '' self.extraresults.setdefault('reproducible', {}).setdefault('files', {}) - def append_to_log(self, msg): - self.extraresults['reproducible.rawlogs']['log'] += msg - def compare_packages(self, reference_dir, test_dir, diffutils_sysroot): result = PackageCompareResults()
@@ -282,8 +278,6 @@ class ReproducibleTests(OESelftestTestCase): self.logger.info('Reproducibility summary for %s: %s' % (c, result)) - self.append_to_log('\n'.join("%s: %s" % (r.status, r.test) for r in result.total)) - self.write_package_list(package_class, 'missing', result.missing) self.write_package_list(package_class, 'different', result.different) self.write_package_list(package_class, 'different_excluded', result.different_excluded)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 29/38 selftest/reproducible: Clean up pathnames
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
There are several problems with these paths. Firstly they contain full system paths which depend upon where the test was run. These are pretty pointless and just take up a lot of space making the results files large.
Secondly, they contain the same path twice. The reference and target path will always be the same thing in two different locations.
Strip off the prefix and remove the duplication. This does change the output data but that can't really be avoided. It does shrink the results data and makes it more readable.
--- meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/reproducible.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/reproducible.py +1 -1
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ class ReproducibleTests(OESelftestTestCase): def write_package_list(self, package_class, name, packages): self.extraresults['reproducible']['files'].setdefault(package_class, {})[name] = [ - {'reference': p.reference, 'test': p.test} for p in packages] + p.reference.split("/./")[1] for p in packages] def copy_file(self, source, dest): bb.utils.mkdirhier(os.path.dirname(dest))
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 30/38 resulttool: Allow store to filter to specific revisions
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
We have a challenge on the autobuilder where test results from both OE-Core and poky are being mixed together during result storage which is confusing the data. Add a way to filter to specific revisions as the least worst way to fix the various issues this is causing.
--- scripts/lib/resulttool/store.py | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
scripts/lib/resulttool/store.py +5 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ def store(args, logger): for r in revisions: results = revisions[r] + if args.revision and r[0] != args.revision: + logger.info('skipping %s as non-matching' % r[0]) + continue keywords = {'commit': r[0], 'branch': r[1], "commit_count": r[2]} subprocess.check_call(["find", tempdir, "!", "-path", "./.git/*", "-delete"]) resultutils.save_resultsdata(results, tempdir, ptestlogs=True)
@@ -102,3 +105,5 @@ def register_commands(subparsers): help='add executed-by configuration to each result file') parser_build.add_argument('-t', '--extra-test-env', default='', help='add extra test environment data to each result file configuration') + parser_build.add_argument('-r', '--revision', default='', + help='only store data for the specified revision')
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 31/38 resulttool: Use single space indentation in json output
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Using 4 space indentation in resulted in hundreds of megabytes of extra file size in general use. Reduce this to make filesizes more managable and reduce the processing cost. Some level of indentation and spacing does make the files more readable and allows use of git diff so we need to retain some of it.
--- meta/lib/oeqa/core/runner.py | 2 +- scripts/lib/resulttool/manualexecution.py | 2 +- scripts/lib/resulttool/report.py | 2 +- scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py | 2 +- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
meta/lib/oeqa/core/runner.py +1 -1
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ class OETestResultJSONHelper(object): os.makedirs(write_dir, exist_ok=True) test_results = self._get_existing_testresults_if_available(write_dir) test_results[result_id] = {'configuration': configuration, 'result': test_result} - json_testresults = json.dumps(test_results, sort_keys=True, indent=4) + json_testresults = json.dumps(test_results, sort_keys=True, indent=1) self._write_file(write_dir, self.testresult_filename, json_testresults) if has_bb: bb.utils.unlockfile(lf)
scripts/lib/resulttool/manualexecution.py +1 -1
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ def load_json_file(f): def write_json_file(f, json_data): os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(f), exist_ok=True) with open(f, 'w') as filedata: - filedata.write(json.dumps(json_data, sort_keys=True, indent=4)) + filedata.write(json.dumps(json_data, sort_keys=True, indent=1)) class ManualTestRunner(object):
scripts/lib/resulttool/report.py +1 -1
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ class ResultsTextReport(object): if selected_test_case_only: print_selected_testcase_result(raw_results, selected_test_case_only) else: - print(json.dumps(raw_results, sort_keys=True, indent=4)) + print(json.dumps(raw_results, sort_keys=True, indent=1)) else: print('Could not find raw test result for %s' % raw_test) return 0
scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py +1 -1
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ def save_resultsdata(results, destdir, fn="testresults.json", ptestjson=False, p if not ptestjson: resultsout = strip_ptestresults(results[res]) with open(dst, 'w') as f: - f.write(json.dumps(resultsout, sort_keys=True, indent=4)) + f.write(json.dumps(resultsout, sort_keys=True, indent=1)) for res2 in results[res]: if ptestlogs and 'result' in results[res][res2]: seriesresults = results[res][res2]['result']
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 32/38 oeqa/utils/gitarchive: Return tag name and improve exclude handling
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Tweak the gitarchive exclude handling not to error if excluded files don't match.
Also return the tagname created so that other code can then use it.
--- meta/lib/oeqa/utils/gitarchive.py | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/lib/oeqa/utils/gitarchive.py +3 -1
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ def git_commit_data(repo, data_dir, branch, message, exclude, notes, log): # Remove files that are excluded if exclude: - repo.run_cmd(['rm', '--cached'] + [f for f in exclude], env_update) + repo.run_cmd(['rm', '--cached', '--ignore-unmatch'] + [f for f in exclude], env_update) tree = repo.run_cmd('write-tree', env_update)
@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ def gitarchive(data_dir, git_dir, no_create, bare, commit_msg_subject, commit_ms log.info("Pushing data to remote") data_repo.run_cmd(cmd) + return tag_name + # Container class for tester revisions TestedRev = namedtuple('TestedRev', 'commit commit_number tags')
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 33/38 resulttool: Fix passthrough of --all files in store mode
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
When using store mode, --all was broken as not all files were being preserved. Fix this by limiting the scope of the git rm command.
--- scripts/lib/resulttool/store.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/lib/resulttool/store.py +1 -1
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ def store(args, logger): logger.info('skipping %s as non-matching' % r[0]) continue keywords = {'commit': r[0], 'branch': r[1], "commit_count": r[2]} - subprocess.check_call(["find", tempdir, "!", "-path", "./.git/*", "-delete"]) + subprocess.check_call(["find", tempdir, "-name", "testresults.json", "!", "-path", "./.git/*", "-delete"]) resultutils.save_resultsdata(results, tempdir, ptestlogs=True) logger.info('Storing test result into git repository %s' % args.git_dir)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 34/38 resulttool: Add --logfile-archive option to store mode
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Storing the log files inside the testresults git repo isn't scaling and isn't really appropriate use of a git repository. Allow these to be optionally stored in a separate filesystem location so the git repo can remain managable.
--- scripts/lib/resulttool/store.py | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
scripts/lib/resulttool/store.py +17 -2
@@ -74,12 +74,25 @@ def store(args, logger): logger.info('Storing test result into git repository %s' % args.git_dir) - gitarchive.gitarchive(tempdir, args.git_dir, False, False, + excludes = [] + if args.logfile_archive: + excludes = ['*.log', "*.log.zst"] + + tagname = gitarchive.gitarchive(tempdir, args.git_dir, False, False, "Results of {branch}:{commit}", "branch: {branch}\ncommit: {commit}", "{branch}", False, "{branch}/{commit_count}-g{commit}/{tag_number}", 'Test run #{tag_number} of {branch}:{commit}', '', - [], [], False, keywords, logger) + excludes, [], False, keywords, logger) + if args.logfile_archive: + logdir = args.logfile_archive + "/" + tagname + shutil.copytree(tempdir, logdir) + for root, dirs, files in os.walk(logdir): + for name in files: + if not name.endswith(".log"): + continue + f = os.path.join(root, name) + subprocess.run(["zstd", f, "--rm"], check=True, capture_output=True) finally: subprocess.check_call(["rm", "-rf", tempdir])
@@ -107,3 +120,5 @@ def register_commands(subparsers): help='add extra test environment data to each result file configuration') parser_build.add_argument('-r', '--revision', default='', help='only store data for the specified revision') + parser_build.add_argument('-l', '--logfile-archive', default='', + help='directory to separately archive log files along with a copy of the results')
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 35/38 resulttool: Handle ltp rawlogs as well as ptest
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Improve the rawlogs handling to include ltp logs as well as the ptest ones to reduce the size of the results git repos.
--- scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py | 33 ++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py +20 -13
@@ -14,8 +14,11 @@ import scriptpath import copy import urllib.request import posixpath +import logging scriptpath.add_oe_lib_path() +logger = logging.getLogger('resulttool') + flatten_map = { "oeselftest": [], "runtime": [],
@@ -38,6 +41,12 @@ store_map = { "manual": ['TEST_TYPE', 'TEST_MODULE', 'MACHINE', 'IMAGE_BASENAME'] } +rawlog_sections = { + "ptestresult.rawlogs": "ptest", + "ltpresult.rawlogs": "ltp", + "ltpposixresult.rawlogs": "ltpposix" +} + def is_url(p): """ Helper for determining if the given path is a URL
@@ -108,15 +117,14 @@ def filter_resultsdata(results, resultid): newresults[r][i] = results[r][i] return newresults -def strip_ptestresults(results): +def strip_logs(results): newresults = copy.deepcopy(results) - #for a in newresults2: - # newresults = newresults2[a] for res in newresults: if 'result' not in newresults[res]: continue - if 'ptestresult.rawlogs' in newresults[res]['result']: - del newresults[res]['result']['ptestresult.rawlogs'] + for logtype in rawlog_sections: + if logtype in newresults[res]['result']: + del newresults[res]['result'][logtype] if 'ptestresult.sections' in newresults[res]['result']: for i in newresults[res]['result']['ptestresult.sections']: if 'log' in newresults[res]['result']['ptestresult.sections'][i]:
@@ -155,9 +163,6 @@ def generic_get_rawlogs(sectname, results): return None return decode_log(results[sectname]['log']) -def ptestresult_get_rawlogs(results): - return generic_get_rawlogs('ptestresult.rawlogs', results) - def save_resultsdata(results, destdir, fn="testresults.json", ptestjson=False, ptestlogs=False): for res in results: if res:
@@ -167,16 +172,18 @@ def save_resultsdata(results, destdir, fn="testresults.json", ptestjson=False, p os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(dst), exist_ok=True) resultsout = results[res] if not ptestjson: - resultsout = strip_ptestresults(results[res]) + resultsout = strip_logs(results[res]) with open(dst, 'w') as f: f.write(json.dumps(resultsout, sort_keys=True, indent=1)) for res2 in results[res]: if ptestlogs and 'result' in results[res][res2]: seriesresults = results[res][res2]['result'] - rawlogs = ptestresult_get_rawlogs(seriesresults) - if rawlogs is not None: - with open(dst.replace(fn, "ptest-raw.log"), "w+") as f: - f.write(rawlogs) + for logtype in rawlog_sections: + logdata = generic_get_rawlogs(logtype, seriesresults) + if logdata is not None: + logger.info("Extracting " + rawlog_sections[logtype] + "-raw.log") + with open(dst.replace(fn, rawlog_sections[logtype] + "-raw.log"), "w+") as f: + f.write(logdata) if 'ptestresult.sections' in seriesresults: for i in seriesresults['ptestresult.sections']: sectionlog = ptestresult_get_log(seriesresults, i)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 36/38 resulttool: Clean up repoducible build logs
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
We've improved the data stored for reproduicible builds. Teach resulttool how to apply those cleanups when reprocessing data so we can reduce results file sizes and make the data easier to process.
--- scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py +22 -0
@@ -131,6 +131,27 @@ def strip_logs(results): del newresults[res]['result']['ptestresult.sections'][i]['log'] return newresults +def handle_cleanups(results): + # Remove pointless path duplication from old format reproducibility results + for res2 in results: + try: + section = results[res2]['result']['reproducible']['files'] + for pkgtype in section: + for filelist in section[pkgtype].copy(): + if section[pkgtype][filelist] and type(section[pkgtype][filelist][0]) == dict: + newlist = [] + for entry in section[pkgtype][filelist]: + newlist.append(entry["reference"].split("/./")[1]) + section[pkgtype][filelist] = newlist + + except KeyError: + pass + # Remove pointless duplicate rawlogs data + try: + del results[res2]['result']['reproducible.rawlogs'] + except KeyError: + pass + def decode_log(logdata): if isinstance(logdata, str): return logdata
@@ -173,6 +194,7 @@ def save_resultsdata(results, destdir, fn="testresults.json", ptestjson=False, p resultsout = results[res] if not ptestjson: resultsout = strip_logs(results[res]) + handle_cleanups(resultsout) with open(dst, 'w') as f: f.write(json.dumps(resultsout, sort_keys=True, indent=1)) for res2 in results[res]:
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 37/38 resulttool: Trim the precision of duration information
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
The duration values have pointless amounts of precision. Removing some of the least significant digits reduces result size and makes the results easier to read.
--- scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py +17 -0
@@ -131,6 +131,22 @@ def strip_logs(results): del newresults[res]['result']['ptestresult.sections'][i]['log'] return newresults +# For timing numbers, crazy amounts of precision don't make sense and just confuse +# the logs. For numbers over 1, trim to 3 decimal places, for numbers less than 1, +# trim to 4 significant digits +def trim_durations(results): + for res in results: + if 'result' not in results[res]: + continue + for entry in results[res]['result']: + if 'duration' in results[res]['result'][entry]: + duration = results[res]['result'][entry]['duration'] + if duration > 1: + results[res]['result'][entry]['duration'] = float("%.3f" % duration) + elif duration < 1: + results[res]['result'][entry]['duration'] = float("%.4g" % duration) + return results + def handle_cleanups(results): # Remove pointless path duplication from old format reproducibility results for res2 in results:
@@ -194,6 +210,7 @@ def save_resultsdata(results, destdir, fn="testresults.json", ptestjson=False, p resultsout = results[res] if not ptestjson: resultsout = strip_logs(results[res]) + trim_durations(resultsout) handle_cleanups(resultsout) with open(dst, 'w') as f: f.write(json.dumps(resultsout, sort_keys=True, indent=1))
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 38/38 resulttool: Improve repo layout for oeselftest results
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Having all oe-selftest results on top of each other results in a large 640MB json file which is hard to use. Split the results out per machine and test type.
This also stops the toolchain raw logs from overwriting each other meaning more than one MACHINE is preserved.
--- scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/lib/resulttool/resultutils.py +1 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ regression_map = { "manual": ['TEST_TYPE', 'TEST_MODULE', 'IMAGE_BASENAME', 'MACHINE'] } store_map = { - "oeselftest": ['TEST_TYPE'], + "oeselftest": ['TEST_TYPE', 'TESTSERIES', 'MACHINE'], "runtime": ['TEST_TYPE', 'DISTRO', 'MACHINE', 'IMAGE_BASENAME'], "sdk": ['TEST_TYPE', 'MACHINE', 'SDKMACHINE', 'IMAGE_BASENAME'], "sdkext": ['TEST_TYPE', 'MACHINE', 'SDKMACHINE', 'IMAGE_BASENAME'],
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1