Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of changes for kirkstone and have comments back by end of day Wednesday, January 22
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/842
The following changes since commit 8c32d91b64ae296d7832ddeb42983f4f3c237946:
ofono: fix CVE-2024-7547 (2025-01-14 05:49:41 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/kirkstone-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/kirkstone-nut
Aleksandar Nikolic (1):
scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 4.0.23
Alexander Kanavin (1):
rsync: update 3.2.5 -> 3.2.7
Archana Polampalli (6):
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12084
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12085
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12086
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12087
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12088
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12747
Divya Chellam (1):
wget: fix CVE-2024-10524
Khem Raj (1):
rsync: Delete pedantic errors re-ordering patch
Peter Marko (2):
socat: patch CVE-2024-54661
ofono: patch CVE-2024-7540, CVE-2024-7541, CVE-2024-7542
Ross Burton (2):
classes/nativesdk: also override TUNE_PKGARCH classes/qemu: use tune to select QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS, not package
architecture
Zhang Peng (2):
avahi: fix CVE-2024-52616
vte: fix CVE-2024-37535
meta/classes/nativesdk.bbclass | 1 +
meta/classes/qemu.bbclass | 8 +-
meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi_0.8.bb | 1 +
.../avahi/files/CVE-2024-52616.patch | 104 +++++++++
...024-7540_CVE-2024-7541_CVE-2024-7542.patch | 52 +++++
meta/recipes-connectivity/ofono/ofono_1.34.bb | 1 +
.../socat/socat/CVE-2024-54661.patch | 113 ++++++++++
.../socat/socat_1.7.4.4.bb | 4 +-
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-testsuite.inc | 6 +-
...-prototypes-to-function-declarations.patch | 28 ++-
...antic-errors-at-the-end-of-configure.patch | 68 ------
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch | 156 ++++++++++++++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch | 43 ++++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12085.patch | 32 +++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch | 42 ++++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch | 108 ++++++++++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch | 108 ++++++++++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch | 41 ++++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch | 49 +++++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch | 31 +++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch | 40 ++++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12088.patch | 141 +++++++++++++
.../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12747.patch | 192 +++++++++++++++++
.../rsync/{rsync_3.2.5.bb => rsync_3.2.7.bb} | 15 +-
.../wget/wget/CVE-2024-10524.patch | 197 ++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb | 1 +
.../vte/vte/CVE-2024-37535-0001.patch | 63 ++++++
.../vte/vte/CVE-2024-37535-0002.patch | 85 ++++++++
meta/recipes-support/vte/vte_0.66.2.bb | 9 +-
scripts/install-buildtools | 4 +-
30 files changed, 1645 insertions(+), 98 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2024-52616.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/ofono/ofono/CVE-2024-7540_CVE-2024-7541_CVE-2024-7542.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat/CVE-2024-54661.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/0001-Turn-on-pedantic-errors-at-the-end-of-configure.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12085.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12088.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12747.patch
rename meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/{rsync_3.2.5.bb => rsync_3.2.7.bb} (81%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2024-10524.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vte/vte/CVE-2024-37535-0001.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vte/vte/CVE-2024-37535-0002.patchSignature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 1/16 avahi: fix CVE-2024-52616
From: Zhang Peng <[email protected]>
CVE-2024-52616:
A flaw was found in the Avahi-daemon, where it initializes DNS transaction IDs randomly only once at startup, incrementing them sequentially after that. This predictable behavior facilitates DNS spoofing attacks, allowing attackers to guess transaction IDs.
Reference:
[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52616]
[https://github.com/avahi/avahi/security/advisories/GHSA-r9j3-vjjh-p8vm]
Upstream patches:
[https://github.com/avahi/avahi/commit/f8710bdc8b29ee1176fe3bfaeabebbda1b7a79f7]
--- meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi_0.8.bb | 1 + .../avahi/files/CVE-2024-52616.patch | 104 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2024-52616.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi_0.8.bb +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/releases/download/v${PV}/avahi-${PV} file://CVE-2023-38471-2.patch \ file://CVE-2023-38472.patch \ file://CVE-2023-38473.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-52616.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/lathiat/avahi/releases/"
meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2024-52616.patch new file +104 -0
104 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 2/16 socat: patch CVE-2024-54661
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Picked upstream commit
https://repo.or.cz/socat.git/commitdiff/4ee1f31cf80019c5907876576d6dfd49368d660f
Since this was the only commit in 1.8.0.2 it also contained release changes which were dropped.
--- .../socat/socat/CVE-2024-54661.patch | 113 ++++++++++++++++++ .../socat/socat_1.7.4.4.bb | 4 +- 2 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat/CVE-2024-54661.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat/CVE-2024-54661.patch new file +113 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +From 4ee1f31cf80019c5907876576d6dfd49368d660f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerhard Rieger <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2024 11:42:09 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Version 1.8.0.2 - CVE-2024-54661: Arbitrary file overwrite in + readline.sh + +CVE: CVE-2024-54661 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://repo.or.cz/socat.git/commitdiff/4ee1f31cf80019c5907876576d6dfd49368d660f] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + readline.sh | 10 +++++++-- + test.sh | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/readline.sh b/readline.sh +index b6f8438..1045303 100755 +--- a/readline.sh ++++ b/readline.sh +@@ -22,9 +22,15 @@ if [ "$withhistfile" ]; then + else + HISTOPT= + fi +-mkdir -p /tmp/$USER || exit 1 + # + # + +-exec socat -d readline"$HISTOPT",noecho='[Pp]assword:' exec:"$PROGRAM",sigint,pty,setsid,ctty,raw,echo=0,stderr 2>/tmp/$USER/stderr2 ++if test -w .; then ++ STDERR=./socat-readline.${1##*/}.log ++ rm -f $STDERR ++else ++ STDERR=/dev/null ++fi ++ ++exec socat -d readline"$HISTOPT",noecho='[Pp]assword:' exec:"$PROGRAM",sigint,pty,setsid,ctty,raw,echo=0,stderr 2>$STDERR + +diff --git a/test.sh b/test.sh +index 46bebf8..5204ac7 100755 +--- a/test.sh ++++ b/test.sh +@@ -15657,6 +15657,69 @@ esac + N=$((N+1)) + + ++# Test the readline.sh file overwrite vulnerability ++NAME=READLINE_SH_OVERWRITE ++case "$TESTS" in ++*%$N%*|*%functions%*|*%bugs%*|*%readline%*|*%security%*|*%$NAME%*) ++TEST="$NAME: Test the readline.sh file overwrite vulnerability" ++# Create a symlink /tmp/$USER/stderr2 pointing to a temporary file, ++# run readline.sh ++# When the temporary file is kept the test succeeded ++if ! eval $NUMCOND; then : ++elif ! cond=$(checkconds \ ++ "" \ ++ "" \ ++ "readline.sh" \ ++ "" \ ++ "" \ ++ "" \ ++ "" ); then ++ $PRINTF "test $F_n $TEST... ${YELLOW}$cond${NORMAL}\n" $N ++ numCANT=$((numCANT+1)) ++ listCANT="$listCANT $N" ++ namesCANT="$namesCANT $NAME" ++else ++ tf="$td/test$N.file" ++ te="$td/test$N.stderr" ++ tdiff="$td/test$N.diff" ++ da="test$N $(date) $RANDOM" ++ echo "$da" >"$tf" ++ ln -sf "$tf" /tmp/$USER/stderr2 ++ CMD0="readline.sh cat" ++ printf "test $F_n $TEST... " $N ++ $CMD0 </dev/null >/dev/null 2>"${te}0" ++ rc0=$? ++# if [ "$rc0" -ne 0 ]; then ++# $PRINTF "$CANT (rc0=$rc0)\n" ++# echo "$CMD0" ++# cat "${te}0" >&2 ++# numCANT=$((numCANT+1)) ++# listCANT="$listCANT $N" ++# namesCANT="$namesCANT $NAME" ++# elif ! echo "$da" |diff - "$tf" >$tdiff; then ++ if ! echo "$da" |diff - "$tf" >$tdiff; then ++ $PRINTF "$FAILED (diff)\n" ++ echo "$CMD0 &" ++ cat "${te}0" >&2 ++ echo "// diff:" >&2 ++ cat "$tdiff" >&2 ++ numFAIL=$((numFAIL+1)) ++ listFAIL="$listFAIL $N" ++ namesFAIL="$namesFAIL $NAME" ++ else ++ $PRINTF "$OK\n" ++ if [ "$VERBOSE" ]; then echo "$CMD0 &"; fi ++ if [ "$DEBUG" ]; then cat "${te}0" >&2; fi ++ if [ "$VERBOSE" ]; then echo "$CMD1"; fi ++ if [ "$DEBUG" ]; then cat "${te}1" >&2; fi ++ numOK=$((numOK+1)) ++ listOK="$listOK $N" ++ fi ++fi # NUMCOND ++ ;; ++esac ++N=$((N+1)) ++ + # end of common tests + + ################################################################################## +-- +2.30.2 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat_1.7.4.4.bb +3 -1
@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ LICENSE = "GPL-2.0-with-OpenSSL-exception" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263 \ file://README;beginline=257;endline=287;md5=82520b052f322ac2b5b3dfdc7c7eea86" -SRC_URI = "http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/download/socat-${PV}.tar.bz2" +SRC_URI = "http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/download/socat-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ + file://CVE-2024-54661.patch \ + " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "fbd42bd2f0e54a3af6d01bdf15385384ab82dbc0e4f1a5e153b3e0be1b6380ac"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 3/16 wget: fix CVE-2024-10524
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Divya Chellam <[email protected]>
Applications that use Wget to access a remote resource using shorthand URLs and pass arbitrary user credentials in the URL are vulnerable. In these cases attackers can enter crafted credentials which will cause Wget to access an arbitrary host.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10524
Upstream-patch:
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=c419542d956a2607bbce5df64b9d378a8588d778
--- .../wget/wget/CVE-2024-10524.patch | 197 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 198 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2024-10524.patch
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2024-10524.patch new file +197 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +From c419542d956a2607bbce5df64b9d378a8588d778 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tim Rühsen <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 27 Oct 2024 19:53:14 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2024-10524 (drop support for shorthand URLs) + +* doc/wget.texi: Add documentation for removed support for shorthand URLs. +* src/html-url.c (src/html-url.c): Call maybe_prepend_scheme. +* src/main.c (main): Likewise. +* src/retr.c (getproxy): Likewise. +* src/url.c: Rename definition of rewrite_shorthand_url to maybe_prepend_scheme, + add new function is_valid_port. +* src/url.h: Rename declaration of rewrite_shorthand_url to maybe_prepend_scheme. + +Reported-by: Goni Golan <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2024-10524 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=c419542d956a2607bbce5df64b9d378a8588d778] + +Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <[email protected]> +--- + doc/wget.texi | 12 ++++------- + src/html-url.c | 2 +- + src/main.c | 2 +- + src/retr.c | 2 +- + src/url.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++---------------------------------- + src/url.h | 2 +- + 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/doc/wget.texi b/doc/wget.texi +index 3c24de2..503a03d 100644 +--- a/doc/wget.texi ++++ b/doc/wget.texi +@@ -314,8 +314,8 @@ for text files. Here is an example: + ftp://host/directory/file;type=a + @end example + +-Two alternative variants of @sc{url} specification are also supported, +-because of historical (hysterical?) reasons and their widespreaded use. ++The two alternative variants of @sc{url} specifications are no longer ++supported because of security considerations: + + @sc{ftp}-only syntax (supported by @code{NcFTP}): + @example +@@ -327,12 +327,8 @@ host:/dir/file + host[:port]/dir/file + @end example + +-These two alternative forms are deprecated, and may cease being +-supported in the future. +- +-If you do not understand the difference between these notations, or do +-not know which one to use, just use the plain ordinary format you use +-with your favorite browser, like @code{Lynx} or @code{Netscape}. ++These two alternative forms have been deprecated long time ago, ++and support is removed with version 1.22.0. + + @c man begin OPTIONS + +diff --git a/src/html-url.c b/src/html-url.c +index 896d6fc..3deea9c 100644 +--- a/src/html-url.c ++++ b/src/html-url.c +@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ get_urls_file (const char *file) + url_text = merged; + } + +- new_url = rewrite_shorthand_url (url_text); ++ new_url = maybe_prepend_scheme (url_text); + if (new_url) + { + xfree (url_text); +diff --git a/src/main.c b/src/main.c +index d1c3c3e..f1d7792 100644 +--- a/src/main.c ++++ b/src/main.c +@@ -2126,7 +2126,7 @@ only if outputting to a regular file.\n")); + struct iri *iri = iri_new (); + struct url *url_parsed; + +- t = rewrite_shorthand_url (argv[optind]); ++ t = maybe_prepend_scheme (argv[optind]); + if (!t) + t = argv[optind]; + +diff --git a/src/retr.c b/src/retr.c +index 38c9fcf..a124046 100644 +--- a/src/retr.c ++++ b/src/retr.c +@@ -1493,7 +1493,7 @@ getproxy (struct url *u) + + /* Handle shorthands. `rewritten_storage' is a kludge to allow + getproxy() to return static storage. */ +- rewritten_url = rewrite_shorthand_url (proxy); ++ rewritten_url = maybe_prepend_scheme (proxy); + if (rewritten_url) + return rewritten_url; + +diff --git a/src/url.c b/src/url.c +index 0acd3f3..6868825 100644 +--- a/src/url.c ++++ b/src/url.c +@@ -594,60 +594,39 @@ parse_credentials (const char *beg, const char *end, char **user, char **passwd) + return true; + } + +-/* Used by main.c: detect URLs written using the "shorthand" URL forms +- originally popularized by Netscape and NcFTP. HTTP shorthands look +- like this: +- +- www.foo.com[:port]/dir/file -> http://www.foo.com[:port]/dir/file +- www.foo.com[:port] -> http://www.foo.com[:port] +- +- FTP shorthands look like this: +- +- foo.bar.com:dir/file -> ftp://foo.bar.com/dir/file +- foo.bar.com:/absdir/file -> ftp://foo.bar.com//absdir/file ++static bool is_valid_port(const char *p) ++{ ++ unsigned port = (unsigned) atoi (p); ++ if (port == 0 || port > 65535) ++ return false; + +- If the URL needs not or cannot be rewritten, return NULL. */ ++ int digits = strspn (p, "0123456789"); ++ return digits && (p[digits] == '/' || p[digits] == '\0'); ++} + ++/* Prepend "http://" to url if scheme is missing, otherwise return NULL. */ + char * +-rewrite_shorthand_url (const char *url) ++maybe_prepend_scheme (const char *url) + { +- const char *p; +- char *ret; +- + if (url_scheme (url) != SCHEME_INVALID) + return NULL; + +- /* Look for a ':' or '/'. The former signifies NcFTP syntax, the +- latter Netscape. */ +- p = strpbrk (url, ":/"); ++ const char *p = strchr (url, ':'); + if (p == url) + return NULL; + + /* If we're looking at "://", it means the URL uses a scheme we + don't support, which may include "https" when compiled without +- SSL support. Don't bogusly rewrite such URLs. */ ++ SSL support. Don't bogusly prepend "http://" to such URLs. */ + if (p && p[0] == ':' && p[1] == '/' && p[2] == '/') + return NULL; + +- if (p && *p == ':') +- { +- /* Colon indicates ftp, as in foo.bar.com:path. Check for +- special case of http port number ("localhost:10000"). */ +- int digits = strspn (p + 1, "0123456789"); +- if (digits && (p[1 + digits] == '/' || p[1 + digits] == '\0')) +- goto http; +- +- /* Turn "foo.bar.com:path" to "ftp://foo.bar.com/path". */ +- if ((ret = aprintf ("ftp://%s", url)) != NULL) +- ret[6 + (p - url)] = '/'; +- } +- else +- { +- http: +- /* Just prepend "http://" to URL. */ +- ret = aprintf ("http://%s", url); +- } +- return ret; ++ if (p && p[0] == ':' && !is_valid_port (p + 1)) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ ++ fprintf(stderr, "Prepended http:// to '%s'\n", url); ++ return aprintf ("http://%s", url); + } + + static void split_path (const char *, char **, char **); +diff --git a/src/url.h b/src/url.h +index fb9da33..5f99b0a 100644 +--- a/src/url.h ++++ b/src/url.h +@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ char *uri_merge (const char *, const char *); + + int mkalldirs (const char *); + +-char *rewrite_shorthand_url (const char *); ++char *maybe_prepend_scheme (const char *); + bool schemes_are_similar_p (enum url_scheme a, enum url_scheme b); + + bool are_urls_equal (const char *u1, const char *u2); +-- +2.40.0 +
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/wget/wget-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0002-improve-reproducibility.patch \ file://CVE-2024-38428.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-10524.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "81542f5cefb8faacc39bbbc6c82ded80e3e4a88505ae72ea51df27525bcde04c"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 4/16 vte: fix CVE-2024-37535
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Zhang Peng <[email protected]>
CVE-2024-37535:
GNOME VTE before 0.76.3 allows an attacker to cause a denial of service
(memory consumption) via a window resize escape sequence, a related
issue to CVE-2000-0476.
Reference:
[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37535]
Upstream patches:
[https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/vte/-/commit/036bc3ddcbb56f05c6ca76712a53b89dee1369e2]
[https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/vte/-/commit/c313849c2e5133802e21b13fa0b141b360171d39]
--- .../vte/vte/CVE-2024-37535-0001.patch | 63 ++++++++++++++ .../vte/vte/CVE-2024-37535-0002.patch | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vte/vte_0.66.2.bb | 9 +- 3 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vte/vte/CVE-2024-37535-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vte/vte/CVE-2024-37535-0002.patch
meta/recipes-support/vte/vte/CVE-2024-37535-0001.patch new file +63 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From 036bc3ddcbb56f05c6ca76712a53b89dee1369e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Persch <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2024 19:19:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] emulation: Restrict resize request to sane numbers + +Fixes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/vte/-/issues/2786 +(cherry picked from commit fd5511f24b7269195a7083f409244e9787c705dc) + +CVE: CVE-2024-37535 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/vte/-/commit/036bc3ddcbb56f05c6ca76712a53b89dee1369e2] + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Peng <[email protected]> +--- + src/vteseq.cc | 20 ++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/vteseq.cc b/src/vteseq.cc +index 2c5b1e128..5b3f398e2 100644 +--- a/src/vteseq.cc ++++ b/src/vteseq.cc +@@ -213,9 +213,18 @@ Terminal::emit_bell() + /* Emit a "resize-window" signal. (Grid size.) */ + void + Terminal::emit_resize_window(guint columns, +- guint rows) +-{ +- _vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_SIGNALS, "Emitting `resize-window'.\n"); ++ guint rows) ++{ ++ // Ignore resizes with excessive number of rows or columns, ++ // see https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/vte/-/issues/2786 ++ if (columns < VTE_MIN_GRID_WIDTH || ++ columns > 511 || ++ rows < VTE_MIN_GRID_HEIGHT || ++ rows > 511) ++ return; ++ ++ _vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_SIGNALS, "Emitting `resize-window' %d columns %d rows.\n", ++ columns, rows); + g_signal_emit(m_terminal, signals[SIGNAL_RESIZE_WINDOW], 0, columns, rows); + } + +@@ -4467,8 +4476,6 @@ Terminal::DECSLPP(vte::parser::Sequence const& seq) + else if (param < 24) + return; + +- _vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_EMULATION, "Resizing to %d rows.\n", param); +- + emit_resize_window(m_column_count, param); + } + +@@ -8990,9 +8997,6 @@ Terminal::XTERM_WM(vte::parser::Sequence const& seq) + seq.collect(1, {&height, &width}); + + if (width != -1 && height != -1) { +- _vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_EMULATION, +- "Resizing window to %d columns, %d rows.\n", +- width, height); + emit_resize_window(width, height); + } + break; +-- +GitLab
meta/recipes-support/vte/vte/CVE-2024-37535-0002.patch new file +85 -0
85 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-support/vte/vte_0.66.2.bb +7 -2
@@ -19,8 +19,13 @@ GIR_MESON_OPTION = 'gir' inherit gnomebase gtk-doc features_check upstream-version-is-even gobject-introspection # vapigen.m4 is required when vala is not present (but the one from vala should be used normally) -SRC_URI += "file://0001-Add-W_EXITCODE-macro-for-non-glibc-systems.patch \ - file://0001-Makefile.docs-correctly-substitute-gtkdoc-qemu-wrapp.patch" +SRC_URI += " \ + file://0001-Add-W_EXITCODE-macro-for-non-glibc-systems.patch \ + file://0001-Makefile.docs-correctly-substitute-gtkdoc-qemu-wrapp.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-37535-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-37535-0002.patch \ + " + SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "e89974673a72a0a06edac6d17830b82bb124decf0cb3b52cebc92ec3ff04d976" ANY_OF_DISTRO_FEATURES = "${GTK3DISTROFEATURES}"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 5/16 rsync: update 3.2.5 -> 3.2.7
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]>
Rebase patches.
(From OE-Core rev: 827c787893caa973c509acf7cac9e17fec5692a4)
---
...-prototypes-to-function-declarations.patch | 28 +++++++--------
...antic-errors-at-the-end-of-configure.patch | 36 ++++---------------
.../rsync/{rsync_3.2.5.bb => rsync_3.2.7.bb} | 2 +-
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/{rsync_3.2.5.bb => rsync_3.2.7.bb} (97%)meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/0001-Add-missing-prototypes-to-function-declarations.patch +13 -15
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 785c0072c80c2f6e0839478453cf65fdeac15da0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 651425fced0691d9063fe417388ba6ca1c38c40b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Khem Raj <[email protected]> Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2022 19:53:28 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Add missing prototypes to function declarations
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ Fixes errors like Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://lists.samba.org/archive/rsync/2022-August/032858.html] Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]> + --- checksum.c | 2 +- exclude.c | 2 +-
@@ -29,23 +30,23 @@ Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]> 10 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/checksum.c b/checksum.c -index fb8c0a0..174c28c 100644 +index 60de365..67a9e16 100644 --- a/checksum.c +++ b/checksum.c -@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ int sum_end(char *sum) - return csum_len_for_type(cursum_type, 0); +@@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ static void verify_digest(struct name_num_item *nni, BOOL check_auth_list) } + #endif -void init_checksum_choices() +void init_checksum_choices(void) { - #ifdef SUPPORT_XXH3 - char buf[32816]; + #if defined SUPPORT_XXH3 || defined USE_OPENSSL + struct name_num_item *nni; diff --git a/exclude.c b/exclude.c -index adc82e2..79f5a82 100644 +index ffe55b1..a85ea76 100644 --- a/exclude.c +++ b/exclude.c -@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ void implied_include_partial_string(const char *s_start, const char *s_end) +@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ void implied_include_partial_string(const char *s_start, const char *s_end) memcpy(partial_string_buf, s_start, partial_string_len); }
@@ -53,9 +54,9 @@ index adc82e2..79f5a82 100644 +void free_implied_include_partial_string(void) { if (partial_string_buf) { - free(partial_string_buf); + if (partial_string_len) diff --git a/hlink.c b/hlink.c -index 66810a3..6511dfb 100644 +index 20291f2..5c26a6b 100644 --- a/hlink.c +++ b/hlink.c @@ -117,8 +117,7 @@ static void match_gnums(int32 *ndx_list, int ndx_count)
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ index a1a7245..4eae062 100644 /* statistical data */ diff --git a/log.c b/log.c -index 44344e2..991e359 100644 +index e4ba1cc..8482b71 100644 --- a/log.c +++ b/log.c @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void logit(int priority, const char *buf)
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ index 44344e2..991e359 100644 int options = LOG_PID; diff --git a/main.c b/main.c -index 9ebfbea..affa244 100644 +index d2a7b9b..c50af45 100644 --- a/main.c +++ b/main.c @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ void read_del_stats(int f)
@@ -168,6 +169,3 @@ index bbba7b2..61f8dc9 100644 { uLong flags; --- -2.37.2 -
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/0001-Turn-on-pedantic-errors-at-the-end-of-configure.patch +6 -30
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From e64a58387db46239902b610871a0eb81626e99ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From e6321b0b456fca987b48d5ec7aba7e2826128e5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Eggert <[email protected]> Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 07:46:28 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Turn on -pedantic-errors at the end of 'configure'
@@ -6,37 +6,16 @@ Subject: [PATCH] Turn on -pedantic-errors at the end of 'configure' Problem reported by Khem Raj in: https://lists.gnu.org/r/autoconf-patches/2022-08/msg00009.html Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://lists.samba.org/archive/rsync/2022-August/032862.html] + --- - configure.ac | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- - 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + configure.ac | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index d185b2d3..7e9514f7 100644 +index a2c9955..afabef0 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac -@@ -1071,21 +1071,6 @@ elif test x"$ac_cv_header_popt_h" != x"yes"; then - with_included_popt=yes - fi - --if test x"$GCC" = x"yes"; then -- if test x"$with_included_popt" != x"yes"; then -- # Turn pedantic warnings into errors to ensure an array-init overflow is an error. -- CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -pedantic-errors" -- else -- # Our internal popt code cannot be compiled with pedantic warnings as errors, so try to -- # turn off pedantic warnings (which will not lose the error for array-init overflow). -- # Older gcc versions don't understand -Wno-pedantic, so check if --help=warnings lists -- # -Wpedantic and use that as a flag. -- case `$CC --help=warnings 2>/dev/null | grep Wpedantic` in -- *-Wpedantic*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -pedantic-errors -Wno-pedantic" ;; -- esac -- fi --fi -- - AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to use included libpopt]) - if test x"$with_included_popt" = x"yes"; then - AC_MSG_RESULT($srcdir/popt) -@@ -1444,6 +1429,26 @@ case "$CC" in +@@ -1437,6 +1437,26 @@ case "$CC" in ;; esac
@@ -63,6 +42,3 @@ index d185b2d3..7e9514f7 100644 AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile lib/dummy zlib/dummy popt/dummy shconfig]) AC_OUTPUT --- -2.37.1 -
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.5.bb +1 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://0001-Turn-on-pedantic-errors-at-the-end-of-configure.patch \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2ac4d21635cdf791867bc377c35ca6dda7f50d919a58be45057fd51600c69aba" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb" # -16548 required for v3.1.3pre1. Already in v3.1.3. CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += " CVE-2017-16548 "
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 6/16 rsync: Delete pedantic errors re-ordering patch
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
It has been fixed by removing the check upstream see
https://github.com/WayneD/rsync/commit/9a3449a3980421f84ac55498ba565bc112b20d6c
(From OE-Core rev: c6228b8371ea5c3c452db7b536948ae96d83844b)
--- ...antic-errors-at-the-end-of-configure.patch | 44 ------------------- meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb | 1 - 2 files changed, 45 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/0001-Turn-on-pedantic-errors-at-the-end-of-configure.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/0001-Turn-on-pedantic-errors-at-the-end-of-configure.patch deleted +0 -44
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -From e6321b0b456fca987b48d5ec7aba7e2826128e5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Paul Eggert <[email protected]> -Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 07:46:28 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH] Turn on -pedantic-errors at the end of 'configure' - -Problem reported by Khem Raj in: -https://lists.gnu.org/r/autoconf-patches/2022-08/msg00009.html -Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://lists.samba.org/archive/rsync/2022-August/032862.html] - ---- - configure.ac | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index a2c9955..afabef0 100644 ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -1437,6 +1437,26 @@ case "$CC" in - ;; - esac - -+# Enable -pedantic-errors last, so that it doesn't mess up other -+# 'configure' tests. For example, Autoconf uses empty function -+# prototypes like 'int main () {}' which Clang 15's -pedantic-errors -+# would reject. Generally it's not a good idea to try to run -+# 'configure' itself with strict compiler checking. -+if test x"$GCC" = x"yes"; then -+ if test x"$with_included_popt" != x"yes"; then -+ # Turn pedantic warnings into errors to ensure an array-init overflow is an error. -+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -pedantic-errors" -+ else -+ # Our internal popt code cannot be compiled with pedantic warnings as errors, so try to -+ # turn off pedantic warnings (which will not lose the error for array-init overflow). -+ # Older gcc versions don't understand -Wno-pedantic, so check if --help=warnings lists -+ # -Wpedantic and use that as a flag. -+ case `$CC --help=warnings 2>/dev/null | grep Wpedantic` in -+ *-Wpedantic*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -pedantic-errors -Wno-pedantic" ;; -+ esac -+ fi -+fi -+ - AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile lib/dummy zlib/dummy popt/dummy shconfig]) - AC_OUTPUT -
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +0 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://makefile-no-rebuild.patch \ file://determism.patch \ file://0001-Add-missing-prototypes-to-function-declarations.patch \ - file://0001-Turn-on-pedantic-errors-at-the-end-of-configure.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 7/16 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12084
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
A heap-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the rsync daemon. This issue is due to improper handling of attacker-controlled checksum lengths (s2length) in the code. When MAX_DIGEST_LEN exceeds the fixed SUM_LENGTH (16 bytes), an attacker can write out of bounds in the sum2 buffer.
--- .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch | 156 ++++++++++++++++++ .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch | 43 +++++ meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 201 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch new file +156 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +From 0902b52f6687b1f7952422080d50b93108742e53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Wayne Davison <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2024 22:55:29 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Some checksum buffer fixes. + +- Put sum2_array into sum_struct to hold an array of sum2 checksums + that are each xfer_sum_len bytes. +- Remove sum2 buf from sum_buf. +- Add macro sum2_at() to access each sum2 array element. +- Throw an error if a sums header has an s2length larger than + xfer_sum_len. + +CVE: CVE-2024-12084 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=0902b52f6687b1f7952422080d50b93108742e53] + +Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]> +--- + io.c | 3 ++- + match.c | 8 ++++---- + rsync.c | 5 ++++- + rsync.h | 4 +++- + sender.c | 4 +++- + 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/io.c b/io.c +index a99ac0ec..bb60eeca 100644 +--- a/io.c ++++ b/io.c +@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ extern int read_batch; + extern int compat_flags; + extern int protect_args; + extern int checksum_seed; ++extern int xfer_sum_len; + extern int daemon_connection; + extern int protocol_version; + extern int remove_source_files; +@@ -1977,7 +1978,7 @@ void read_sum_head(int f, struct sum_struct *sum) + exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); + } + sum->s2length = protocol_version < 27 ? csum_length : (int)read_int(f); +- if (sum->s2length < 0 || sum->s2length > MAX_DIGEST_LEN) { ++ if (sum->s2length < 0 || sum->s2length > xfer_sum_len) { + rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum length %d [%s]\n", + sum->s2length, who_am_i()); + exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); +diff --git a/match.c b/match.c +index cdb30a15..36e78ed2 100644 +--- a/match.c ++++ b/match.c +@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s, + done_csum2 = 1; + } + +- if (memcmp(sum2,s->sums[i].sum2,s->s2length) != 0) { ++ if (memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length) != 0) { + false_alarms++; + continue; + } +@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s, + if (i != aligned_i) { + if (sum != s->sums[aligned_i].sum1 + || l != s->sums[aligned_i].len +- || memcmp(sum2, s->sums[aligned_i].sum2, s->s2length) != 0) ++ || memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, aligned_i), s->s2length) != 0) + goto check_want_i; + i = aligned_i; + } +@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s, + if (sum != s->sums[i].sum1) + goto check_want_i; + get_checksum2((char *)map, l, sum2); +- if (memcmp(sum2, s->sums[i].sum2, s->s2length) != 0) ++ if (memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length) != 0) + goto check_want_i; + /* OK, we have a re-alignment match. Bump the offset + * forward to the new match point. */ +@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s, + && (!updating_basis_file || s->sums[want_i].offset >= offset + || s->sums[want_i].flags & SUMFLG_SAME_OFFSET) + && sum == s->sums[want_i].sum1 +- && memcmp(sum2, s->sums[want_i].sum2, s->s2length) == 0) { ++ && memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, want_i), s->s2length) == 0) { + /* we've found an adjacent match - the RLL coder + * will be happy */ + i = want_i; +diff --git a/rsync.c b/rsync.c +index cd288f57..b130aba5 100644 +--- a/rsync.c ++++ b/rsync.c +@@ -437,7 +437,10 @@ int read_ndx_and_attrs(int f_in, int f_out, int *iflag_ptr, uchar *type_ptr, cha + */ + void free_sums(struct sum_struct *s) + { +- if (s->sums) free(s->sums); ++ if (s->sums) { ++ free(s->sums); ++ free(s->sum2_array); ++ } + free(s); + } + +diff --git a/rsync.h b/rsync.h +index d3709fe0..8ddbe702 100644 +--- a/rsync.h ++++ b/rsync.h +@@ -958,12 +958,12 @@ struct sum_buf { + uint32 sum1; /**< simple checksum */ + int32 chain; /**< next hash-table collision */ + short flags; /**< flag bits */ +- char sum2[SUM_LENGTH]; /**< checksum */ + }; + + struct sum_struct { + OFF_T flength; /**< total file length */ + struct sum_buf *sums; /**< points to info for each chunk */ ++ char *sum2_array; /**< checksums of length xfer_sum_len */ + int32 count; /**< how many chunks */ + int32 blength; /**< block_length */ + int32 remainder; /**< flength % block_length */ +@@ -982,6 +982,8 @@ struct map_struct { + int status; /* first errno from read errors */ + }; + ++#define sum2_at(s, i) ((s)->sum2_array + ((OFF_T)(i) * xfer_sum_len)) ++ + #define NAME_IS_FILE (0) /* filter name as a file */ + #define NAME_IS_DIR (1<<0) /* filter name as a dir */ + #define NAME_IS_XATTR (1<<2) /* filter name as an xattr */ +diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c +index 3d4f052e..ab205341 100644 +--- a/sender.c ++++ b/sender.c +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ extern int log_before_transfer; + extern int stdout_format_has_i; + extern int logfile_format_has_i; + extern int want_xattr_optim; ++extern int xfer_sum_len; + extern int csum_length; + extern int append_mode; + extern int copy_links; +@@ -94,10 +95,11 @@ static struct sum_struct *receive_sums(int f) + return(s); + + s->sums = new_array(struct sum_buf, s->count); ++ s->sum2_array = new_array(char, s->count * xfer_sum_len); + + for (i = 0; i < s->count; i++) { + s->sums[i].sum1 = read_int(f); +- read_buf(f, s->sums[i].sum2, s->s2length); ++ read_buf(f, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length); + + s->sums[i].offset = offset; + s->sums[i].flags = 0; +-- +2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch new file +43 -0
43 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +2 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://makefile-no-rebuild.patch \ file://determism.patch \ file://0001-Add-missing-prototypes-to-function-declarations.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 8/16 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12085
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
A flaw was found in the rsync daemon which could be triggered when rsync compares file checksums. This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the checksum length (s2length) to cause a comparison between a checksum and uninitialized memory and leak one byte of uninitialized stack data at a time.
--- .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12085.patch | 32 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12085.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12085.patch new file +32 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 589b0691e59f761ccb05ddb8e1124991440db2c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 09:57:08 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] prevent information leak off the stack + +prevent leak of uninitialised stack data in hash_search + +CVE: CVE-2024-12085 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=589b0691e59f761ccb05ddb8e1124991440db2c7] + +Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]> +--- + match.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/match.c b/match.c +index 36e78ed2..dfd6af2c 100644 +--- a/match.c ++++ b/match.c +@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s, + int more; + schar *map; + ++ // prevent possible memory leaks ++ memset(sum2, 0, sizeof sum2); ++ + /* want_i is used to encourage adjacent matches, allowing the RLL + * coding of the output to work more efficiently. */ + want_i = 0; +-- +2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://0001-Add-missing-prototypes-to-function-declarations.patch \ file://CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12085.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 9/16 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12086
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
A flaw was found in rsync. It could allow a server to enumerate the contents of an arbitrary file from the client's machine. This issue occurs when files are being copied from a client to a server. During this process, the rsync server will send checksums of local data to the client to compare with in order to determine what data needs to be sent to the server. By sending specially constructed checksum values for arbitrary files, an attacker may be able to reconstruct the data of those files byte-by-byte based on the responses from the client.
--- .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch | 42 +++++++ .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch | 108 ++++++++++++++++++ .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch | 108 ++++++++++++++++++ .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch | 41 +++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb | 4 + 5 files changed, 303 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch new file +42 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 8ad4b5d912fad1df29717dddaa775724da77d299 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 11:08:03 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] refuse fuzzy options when fuzzy not selected + +this prevents a malicious server providing a file to compare to when +the user has not given the fuzzy option + +CVE: CVE-2024-12086 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=8ad4b5d912fad1df29717dddaa775724da77d299] + +Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]> +--- + receiver.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c +index 6b4b369e..2d7f6033 100644 +--- a/receiver.c ++++ b/receiver.c +@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ extern char sender_file_sum[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; + extern struct file_list *cur_flist, *first_flist, *dir_flist; + extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list; + extern OFF_T preallocated_len; ++extern int fuzzy_basis; + + extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni; + extern int xfer_sum_len; +@@ -716,6 +717,10 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name) + fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname); + break; + case FNAMECMP_FUZZY: ++ if (fuzzy_basis == 0) { ++ rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious fuzzy operation for %s\n", xname); ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); ++ } + if (file->dirname) { + pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, file->dirname, xname); + fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf; +-- +2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch new file +108 -0
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meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch new file +108 -0
108 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch new file +41 -0
41 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +4 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2024-12085.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 10/16 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12087
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
A path traversal vulnerability exists in rsync. It stems from behavior enabled by the --inc-recursive option, a default-enabled option for many client options and can be enabled by the server even if not explicitly enabled by the client. When using the --inc-recursive option, a lack of proper symlink verification coupled with deduplication checks occurring on a per-file-list basis could allow a server to write files outside of the client's intended destination directory. A malicious server could write malicious files to arbitrary locations named after valid directories/paths on the client.
--- .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch | 49 +++++++++++++++++++ .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch | 31 ++++++++++++ .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch | 40 +++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb | 3 ++ 4 files changed, 123 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch new file +49 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 688f5c379a433038bde36897a156d589be373a98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Wayne Davison <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 15:46:50 -0800 +Subject: [PATCH] Refuse a duplicate dirlist. + +CVE: CVE-2024-12087 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=688f5c379a433038bde36897a156d589be373a98] + +Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]> +--- + flist.c | 9 +++++++++ + rsync.h | 1 + + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c +index 464d556e..847b1054 100644 +--- a/flist.c ++++ b/flist.c +@@ -2584,6 +2584,15 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx) + init_hard_links(); + #endif + ++ if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) { ++ struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx]; ++ if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) { ++ rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx); ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); ++ } ++ file->flags |= FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST; ++ } ++ + flist = flist_new(0, "recv_file_list"); + flist_expand(flist, FLIST_START_LARGE); + +diff --git a/rsync.h b/rsync.h +index 0f9e277f..b9a7101a 100644 +--- a/rsync.h ++++ b/rsync.h +@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ + #define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4) /* sender */ + #define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4) /* generator */ + #define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5) /* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */ ++#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */ + #define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6) /* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */ + #define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6) /* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */ + #define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7) /* receiver/generator */ +-- +2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch new file +31 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From 344327385fa47fa5bb67a32c237735e6240cfb93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 16:12:45 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] range check dir_ndx before use + +CVE: CVE-2024-12087 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=344327385fa47fa5bb67a32c237735e6240cfb93] + +Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]> +--- + flist.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c +index 847b1054..087f9da6 100644 +--- a/flist.c ++++ b/flist.c +@@ -2585,6 +2585,10 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx) + #endif + + if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) { ++ if (dir_ndx >= dir_flist->used) { ++ rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing invalid dir_ndx %u >= %u\n", dir_ndx, dir_flist->used); ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); ++ } + struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx]; + if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) { + rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx); +-- +2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch new file +40 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 996af4a79f9afe4d7158ecdd87c78cee382c6b39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Natanael Copa <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 15:10:24 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST collission with FLAG_HLINKED + +fixes commit 688f5c379a43 (Refuse a duplicate dirlist.) + +Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/702 +Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/697 +CVE: CVE-2024-12087 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/996af4a79f9afe4d7158ecdd87c78cee382c6b39] + +Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]> +--- + rsync.h | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/rsync.h b/rsync.h +index 9be1297b..479ac484 100644 +--- a/rsync.h ++++ b/rsync.h +@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ + #define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4) /* sender */ + #define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4) /* generator */ + #define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5) /* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */ +-#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */ + #define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6) /* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */ + #define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6) /* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */ + #define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7) /* receiver/generator */ +@@ -93,6 +92,7 @@ + #define FLAG_SKIP_GROUP (1<<10) /* receiver/generator */ + #define FLAG_TIME_FAILED (1<<11)/* generator */ + #define FLAG_MOD_NSEC (1<<12) /* sender/receiver/generator */ ++#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<13)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */ + + /* These flags are passed to functions but not stored. */ + +-- +2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +3 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch \ file://CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 11/16 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12088
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
A flaw was found in rsync. When using the --safe-links option, rsync fails to properly verify if a symbolic link destination contains another symbolic link within it. This results in a path traversal vulnerability, which may lead to arbitrary file write outside the desired directory
--- .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12088.patch | 141 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 142 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12088.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12088.patch new file +141 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +From 407c71c7ce562137230e8ba19149c81ccc47c387 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 15:15:53 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] make --safe-links stricter + +when --safe-links is used also reject links where a '../' component is +included in the destination as other than the leading part of the +filename + +CVE: CVE-2024-12088 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=407c71c7ce562137230e8ba19149c81ccc47c387] + +Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]> +--- + testsuite/safe-links.test | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + testsuite/unsafe-byname.test | 2 +- + util1.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++- + 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 testsuite/safe-links.test + +diff --git a/testsuite/safe-links.test b/testsuite/safe-links.test +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000..6e95a4b9 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/testsuite/safe-links.test +@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ ++#!/bin/sh ++ ++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns" ++ ++test_symlink() { ++ is_a_link "$1" || test_fail "File $1 is not a symlink" ++} ++ ++test_regular() { ++ if [ ! -f "$1" ]; then ++ test_fail "File $1 is not regular file or not exists" ++ fi ++} ++ ++test_notexist() { ++ if [ -e "$1" ]; then ++ test_fail "File $1 exists" ++ fi ++ if [ -h "$1" ]; then ++ test_fail "File $1 exists as a symlink" ++ fi ++} ++ ++cd "$tmpdir" ++ ++mkdir from ++ ++mkdir "from/safe" ++mkdir "from/unsafe" ++ ++mkdir "from/safe/files" ++mkdir "from/safe/links" ++ ++touch "from/safe/files/file1" ++touch "from/safe/files/file2" ++touch "from/unsafe/unsafefile" ++ ++ln -s ../files/file1 "from/safe/links/" ++ln -s ../files/file2 "from/safe/links/" ++ln -s ../../unsafe/unsafefile "from/safe/links/" ++ln -s a/a/a/../../../unsafe2 "from/safe/links/" ++ ++#echo "LISTING FROM" ++#ls -lR from ++ ++echo "rsync with relative path and just -a" ++$RSYNC -avv --safe-links from/safe/ to ++ ++#echo "LISTING TO" ++#ls -lR to ++ ++test_symlink to/links/file1 ++test_symlink to/links/file2 ++test_notexist to/links/unsafefile ++test_notexist to/links/unsafe2 +diff --git a/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test b/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test +index 75e72014..d2e318ef 100644 +--- a/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test ++++ b/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test +@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ test_unsafe ..//../dest from/dir unsafe + test_unsafe .. from/file safe + test_unsafe ../.. from/file unsafe + test_unsafe ..//.. from//file unsafe +-test_unsafe dir/.. from safe ++test_unsafe dir/.. from unsafe + test_unsafe dir/../.. from unsafe + test_unsafe dir/..//.. from unsafe + +diff --git a/util1.c b/util1.c +index da50ff1e..f260d398 100644 +--- a/util1.c ++++ b/util1.c +@@ -1318,7 +1318,14 @@ int handle_partial_dir(const char *fname, int create) + * + * "src" is the top source directory currently applicable at the level + * of the referenced symlink. This is usually the symlink's full path +- * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer. */ ++ * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer. ++ * ++ * NOTE: this also rejects dest names with a .. component in other ++ * than the first component of the name ie. it rejects names such as ++ * a/b/../x/y. This needs to be done as the leading subpaths 'a' or ++ * 'b' could later be replaced with symlinks such as a link to '.' ++ * resulting in the link being transferred now becoming unsafe ++ */ + int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src) + { + const char *name, *slash; +@@ -1328,6 +1335,23 @@ int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src) + if (!dest || !*dest || *dest == '/') + return 1; + ++ // reject destinations with /../ in the name other than at the start of the name ++ const char *dest2 = dest; ++ while (strncmp(dest2, "../", 3) == 0) { ++ dest2 += 3; ++ while (*dest2 == '/') { ++ // allow for ..//..///../foo ++ dest2++; ++ } ++ } ++ if (strstr(dest2, "/../")) ++ return 1; ++ ++ // reject if the destination ends in /.. ++ const size_t dlen = strlen(dest); ++ if (dlen > 3 && strcmp(&dest[dlen-3], "/..") == 0) ++ return 1; ++ + /* find out what our safety margin is */ + for (name = src; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) { + /* ".." segment starts the count over. "." segment is ignored. */ +-- +2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch \ file://CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12088.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 12/16 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12747
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
A flaw was found in rsync. This vulnerability arises from a race condition during rsync's handling of symbolic links. Rsync's default behavior when encountering symbolic links is to skip them. If an attacker replaced a regular file with a symbolic link at the right time, it was possible to bypass the default behavior and traverse symbolic links. Depending on the privileges of the rsync process, an attacker could leak sensitive information, potentially leading to privilege escalation.
--- .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12747.patch | 192 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 193 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12747.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12747.patch new file +192 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +From 0590b09d9a34ae72741b91ec0708a820650198b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2024 08:59:42 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] fixed symlink race condition in sender + +when we open a file that we don't expect to be a symlink use +O_NOFOLLOW to prevent a race condition where an attacker could change +a file between being a normal file and a symlink + +CVE: CVE-2024-12747 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=0590b09d9a34ae72741b91ec0708a820650198b0] + +Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]> +--- + checksum.c | 2 +- + flist.c | 2 +- + generator.c | 4 ++-- + receiver.c | 2 +- + sender.c | 2 +- + syscall.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + t_unsafe.c | 3 +++ + tls.c | 3 +++ + trimslash.c | 2 ++ + util1.c | 2 +- + 10 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/checksum.c b/checksum.c +index cb21882c..66e80896 100644 +--- a/checksum.c ++++ b/checksum.c +@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum) + int32 remainder; + int fd; + +- fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ fd = do_open_checklinks(fname); + if (fd == -1) { + memset(sum, 0, file_sum_len); + return; +diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c +index 087f9da6..17832533 100644 +--- a/flist.c ++++ b/flist.c +@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ struct file_struct *make_file(const char *fname, struct file_list *flist, + + if (copy_devices && am_sender && IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode)) { + if (st.st_size == 0) { +- int fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ int fd = do_open_checklinks(fname); + if (fd >= 0) { + st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fname); + close(fd); +diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c +index 110db28f..3f13bb95 100644 +--- a/generator.c ++++ b/generator.c +@@ -1798,7 +1798,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx, + + if (write_devices && IS_DEVICE(sx.st.st_mode) && sx.st.st_size == 0) { + /* This early open into fd skips the regular open below. */ +- if ((fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) >= 0) ++ if ((fd = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) + real_sx.st.st_size = sx.st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fnamecmp); + } + +@@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx, + } + + /* open the file */ +- if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) { ++ if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open_checklinks(fnamecmp)) < 0) { + rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to open %s, continuing", + full_fname(fnamecmp)); + pretend_missing: +diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c +index 8031b8f4..edfbb210 100644 +--- a/receiver.c ++++ b/receiver.c +@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name) + if (fnamecmp != fname) { + fnamecmp = fname; + fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_FNAME; +- fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ fd1 = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY); + } + + if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) { +diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c +index 2bbff2fa..a4d46c39 100644 +--- a/sender.c ++++ b/sender.c +@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out) + exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); + } + +- fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ fd = do_open_checklinks(fname); + if (fd == -1) { + if (errno == ENOENT) { + enum logcode c = am_daemon && protocol_version < 28 ? FERROR : FWARNING; +diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c +index 081357bb..8cea2900 100644 +--- a/syscall.c ++++ b/syscall.c +@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ extern int preallocate_files; + extern int preserve_perms; + extern int preserve_executability; + extern int open_noatime; ++extern int copy_links; ++extern int copy_unsafe_links; + + #ifndef S_BLKSIZE + # if defined hpux || defined __hpux__ || defined __hpux +@@ -788,3 +790,21 @@ cleanup: + return retfd; + #endif // O_NOFOLLOW, O_DIRECTORY + } ++ ++/* ++ varient of do_open/do_open_nofollow which does do_open() if the ++ copy_links or copy_unsafe_links options are set and does ++ do_open_nofollow() otherwise ++ ++ This is used to prevent a race condition where an attacker could be ++ switching a file between being a symlink and being a normal file ++ ++ The open is always done with O_RDONLY flags ++ */ ++int do_open_checklinks(const char *pathname) ++{ ++ if (copy_links || copy_unsafe_links) { ++ return do_open(pathname, O_RDONLY, 0); ++ } ++ return do_open_nofollow(pathname, O_RDONLY); ++} +diff --git a/t_unsafe.c b/t_unsafe.c +index 010cac50..e10619a2 100644 +--- a/t_unsafe.c ++++ b/t_unsafe.c +@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ int am_root = 0; + int am_sender = 1; + int read_only = 0; + int list_only = 0; ++int copy_links = 0; ++int copy_unsafe_links = 0; ++ + short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG]; + + int +diff --git a/tls.c b/tls.c +index e6b0708a..858f8f10 100644 +--- a/tls.c ++++ b/tls.c +@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ int list_only = 0; + int link_times = 0; + int link_owner = 0; + int nsec_times = 0; ++int safe_symlinks = 0; ++int copy_links = 0; ++int copy_unsafe_links = 0; + + #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS + +diff --git a/trimslash.c b/trimslash.c +index 1ec928ca..f2774cd7 100644 +--- a/trimslash.c ++++ b/trimslash.c +@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ int am_root = 0; + int am_sender = 1; + int read_only = 1; + int list_only = 0; ++int copy_links = 0; ++int copy_unsafe_links = 0; + + int + main(int argc, char **argv) +diff --git a/util1.c b/util1.c +index f260d398..d84bc414 100644 +--- a/util1.c ++++ b/util1.c +@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int tmpfilefd, mode_t mode) + int len; /* Number of bytes read into `buf'. */ + OFF_T prealloc_len = 0, offset = 0; + +- if ((ifd = do_open(source, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) { ++ if ((ifd = do_open_nofollow(source, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + int save_errno = errno; + rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s", full_fname(source)); + errno = save_errno; +-- +2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch \ file://CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch \ file://CVE-2024-12088.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-12747.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 13/16 ofono: patch CVE-2024-7540, CVE-2024-7541, CVE-2024-7542
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Cherry-pick commit
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/ofono/ofono.git/commit/?id=29ff6334b492504ace101be748b256e6953d2c2f
--- ...024-7540_CVE-2024-7541_CVE-2024-7542.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-connectivity/ofono/ofono_1.34.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/ofono/ofono/CVE-2024-7540_CVE-2024-7541_CVE-2024-7542.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/ofono/ofono/CVE-2024-7540_CVE-2024-7541_CVE-2024-7542.patch new file +52 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 29ff6334b492504ace101be748b256e6953d2c2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Sicelo A. Mhlongo" <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 11:31:28 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] atmodem: sms: ensure buffer is initialized before use + +Fixes: CVE-2024-7540 +Fixes: CVE-2024-7541 +Fixes: CVE-2024-7542 + +CVE: CVE-2024-7540 +CVE: CVE-2024-7541 +CVE: CVE-2024-7542 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/ofono/ofono.git/commit/?id=29ff6334b492504ace101be748b256e6953d2c2f] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + drivers/atmodem/sms.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/drivers/atmodem/sms.c b/drivers/atmodem/sms.c +index d994856b..0668c631 100644 +--- a/drivers/atmodem/sms.c ++++ b/drivers/atmodem/sms.c +@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ static void at_cmt_notify(GAtResult *result, gpointer user_data) + struct sms_data *data = ofono_sms_get_data(sms); + GAtResultIter iter; + const char *hexpdu; +- unsigned char pdu[176]; ++ unsigned char pdu[176] = {0}; + long pdu_len; + int tpdu_len; + +@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static void at_cmgr_notify(GAtResult *result, gpointer user_data) + struct sms_data *data = ofono_sms_get_data(sms); + GAtResultIter iter; + const char *hexpdu; +- unsigned char pdu[176]; ++ unsigned char pdu[176] = {0}; + long pdu_len; + int tpdu_len; + +@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static void at_cmgl_notify(GAtResult *result, gpointer user_data) + struct sms_data *data = ofono_sms_get_data(sms); + GAtResultIter iter; + const char *hexpdu; +- unsigned char pdu[176]; ++ unsigned char pdu[176] = {0}; + long pdu_len; + int tpdu_len; + int index; +-- +2.30.2 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/ofono/ofono_1.34.bb +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://CVE-2024-7545.patch \ file://CVE-2024-7546.patch \ file://CVE-2024-7547.patch \ + file://CVE-2024-7540_CVE-2024-7541_CVE-2024-7542.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c0b96d3013447ec2bcb74579bef90e4e59c68dbfa4b9c6fbce5d12401a43aac7"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 14/16 scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 4.0.23
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Aleksandar Nikolic <[email protected]>
Update to the 4.0.23 release of the 4.0 series for buildtools.
--- scripts/install-buildtools | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
scripts/install-buildtools +2 -2
@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ logger = scriptutils.logger_create(PROGNAME, stream=sys.stdout) DEFAULT_INSTALL_DIR = os.path.join(os.path.split(scripts_path)[0],'buildtools') DEFAULT_BASE_URL = 'https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto' -DEFAULT_RELEASE = 'yocto-4.0.22' -DEFAULT_INSTALLER_VERSION = '4.0.22' +DEFAULT_RELEASE = 'yocto-4.0.23' +DEFAULT_INSTALLER_VERSION = '4.0.23' DEFAULT_BUILDDATE = '202110XX' # Python version sanity check
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 15/16 classes/nativesdk: also override TUNE_PKGARCH
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Ross Burton <[email protected]>
The nativesdk class overrides PACKAGE_ARCH and unsets TUNE_FEATURES, but as recipes might want to look at TUNE_PKGARCH too (for example, when setting QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS) we should also override that variable.
Otherwise, a nativesdk recipe will have the TUNE_PKGARCH of the target, which leads to errors (eg passing mips arguments to an arm qemu).
--- meta/classes/nativesdk.bbclass | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/classes/nativesdk.bbclass +1 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ RECIPE_SYSROOT = "${WORKDIR}/recipe-sysroot" # PACKAGE_ARCH = "${SDK_ARCH}-${SDKPKGSUFFIX}" PACKAGE_ARCHS = "${SDK_PACKAGE_ARCHS}" +TUNE_PKGARCH = "${SDK_ARCH}" # # We need chrpath >= 0.14 to ensure we can deal with 32 and 64 bit
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 16/16 classes/qemu: use tune to select QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS, not package architecture
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Ross Burton <[email protected]>
Using the package architecture to select the right qemu options to pass to qemu-user is incorrect, and fails for recipes that set PACKAGE_ARCH to MACHINE_ARCH (as the qemuppc workarounds suggest) because there are not typically any options set for the machine name.
Solve this by using TUNE_PKGARCH instead: for the majority of recipes this is the same value, but for machine-specific recipes it remains the same instead of changing to the machine name.
This means we can remove the qemuppc workarounds, as they're obsolete.
Also update the gcc-testsuite recipe which uses the same pattern to use TUNE_PKGARCH, and generalise the else codepath to avoid needing to update the list of architectures.
[ YOCTO #15647 ]
--- meta/classes/qemu.bbclass | 8 ++------ meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-testsuite.inc | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
meta/classes/qemu.bbclass +2 -6
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ def qemu_run_binary(data, rootfs_path, binary): # this dance). For others (e.g. arm) a -cpu option is not necessary, since the # qemu-arm default CPU supports all required architecture levels. -QEMU_OPTIONS = "-r ${OLDEST_KERNEL} ${@d.getVar("QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_%s" % d.getVar('PACKAGE_ARCH')) or ""}" -QEMU_OPTIONS[vardeps] += "QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_${PACKAGE_ARCH}" +QEMU_OPTIONS = "-r ${OLDEST_KERNEL} ${@d.getVar("QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_%s" % d.getVar('TUNE_PKGARCH')) or ""}" +QEMU_OPTIONS[vardeps] += "QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_${TUNE_PKGARCH}" QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_ppce500v2 = " -cpu e500v2" QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_ppce500mc = " -cpu e500mc"
@@ -65,7 +65,3 @@ QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_ppce6500 = " -cpu e500mc" QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_ppc64e6500 = " -cpu e500mc" QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_ppc7400 = " -cpu 7400" QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_powerpc64le = " -cpu POWER9" -# Some packages e.g. fwupd sets PACKAGE_ARCH = MACHINE_ARCH and uses meson which -# needs right options to usermode qemu -QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_qemuppc = " -cpu 7400" -QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_qemuppc64 = " -cpu POWER9"
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-testsuite.inc +4 -2
@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ python check_prepare() { # - valid for x86*, powerpc, arm, arm64 if qemu_binary.lstrip("qemu-") in ["x86_64", "i386", "arm", "aarch64"]: args += ["-cpu", "max"] - elif qemu_binary.lstrip("qemu-") in ["ppc"]: - args += d.getVar("QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_%s" % d.getVar('PACKAGE_ARCH')).split() + else: + extra = d.getVar("QEMU_EXTRAOPTIONS_%s" % d.getVar('TUNE_PKGARCH')) + if extra: + args += extra.split() sysroot = d.getVar("RECIPE_SYSROOT") args += ["-L", sysroot] # lib paths are static here instead of using $libdir since this is used by a -cross recipe
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0