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PATCH New Steve Sakoman 1 participant 15 messages Apr 30, 2025

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cover Patch review

Please review this set of changes for kirkstone and have comments back by end of day Thursday, May 1

Passed a-full on autobuilder:

https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/1494

The following changes since commit f23d1bfca0ea57150c397bc2e495191fb61423d0:

ruby: fix CVE-2024-43398 (2025-04-15 06:43:55 -0700)

are available in the Git repository at:

https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/kirkstone-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/kirkstone-nut

Chen Qi (1):
systemd: backport patch to fix journal issue

Deepesh Varatharajan (1):
binutils: Fix CVE-2025-1178

Haitao Liu (1):
systemd: systemd-journald fails to setup LogNamespace

Peter Marko (8):
sqlite3: patch CVE-2025-29088
ppp: patch CVE-2024-58250
ghostscript: ignore CVE-2025-27833
libarchive: ignore CVE-2024-48615
libxml2: patch CVE-2025-32414
libxml2: patch CVE-2025-32415
glib-2.0: patch CVE-2025-3360
Revert "cve-update-nvd2-native: Tweak to work better with NFS DL_DIR"

Priyal Doshi (1):
tzdata/tzcode-native: upgrade 2025a -> 2025b

Shubham Kulkarni (1):
libpam: Update fix for CVE-2024-10041

Soumya Sambu (1):
python3-setuptools: Fix CVE-2024-6345

 .../ppp/ppp/CVE-2024-58250.patch              | 185 +++++++++
 meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp_2.4.9.bb    |   2 +-
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-01.patch  |  57 +++
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-02.patch  |  53 +++
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-03.patch  |  36 ++
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-04.patch  |  76 ++++
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-05.patch  |  57 +++
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-06.patch  |  50 +++
 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0_2.72.3.bb |   6 +
 .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-32414.patch       |  74 ++++
 .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-32415.patch       |  39 ++
 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.14.bb    |   2 +
 .../meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb            |   2 -
 ...n-in-mkdir_p-when-parent-directory-e.patch |  78 ++++
 ...journal_previous-next-return-0-at-HE.patch |  87 +++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_250.14.bb   |   2 +
 .../binutils/binutils-2.38.inc                |   1 +
 .../binutils/0039-CVE-2025-1178.patch         |  33 ++
 .../python3-setuptools/CVE-2024-6345.patch    | 353 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../python/python3-setuptools_59.5.0.bb       |   1 +
 .../ghostscript/ghostscript_9.55.0.bb         |   3 +-
 .../libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb            |   2 +
 ...024-10041.patch => CVE-2024-10041-1.patch} |   0
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2024-10041-2.patch         |  77 ++++
 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.2.bb     |   3 +-
 meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc   |   6 +-
 .../sqlite/files/CVE-2025-29088.patch         | 179 +++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.38.5.bb |   1 +
 28 files changed, 1457 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp/CVE-2024-58250.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-03.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-04.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-05.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-06.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-32414.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-32415.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-basic-do-not-warn-in-mkdir_p-when-parent-directory-e.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-journal-Make-sd_journal_previous-next-return-0-at-HE.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0039-CVE-2025-1178.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2024-6345.patch
 rename meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/{CVE-2024-10041.patch => CVE-2024-10041-1.patch} (100%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-10041-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2025-29088.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/14 sqlite3: patch CVE-2025-29088

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick commit [1] mentioned in [2].

[1] https://github.com/sqlite/sqlite/commit/56d2fd008b108109f489339f5fd55212bb50afd4
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29088

---
 .../sqlite/files/CVE-2025-29088.patch         | 179 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.38.5.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 180 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2025-29088.patch
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/files/CVE-2025-29088.patch new file +179 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..470ee9564c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+From 40f668e88d70d47b17652ca629d5f36fafaae0e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: drh <>
+Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 14:16:49 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Harden the SQLITE_DBCONFIG_LOOKASIDE interface against
+ misuse, such as described in [forum:/forumpost/48f365daec|forum post
+ 48f365daec].  Enhancements to the SQLITE_DBCONFIG_LOOKASIDE documentation. 
+ Test cases in TH3.
+
+FossilOrigin-Name: 1ec4c308c76c69fba031184254fc3340f07607cfbf8342b13713ab445563d377
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-29088
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/sqlite/sqlite/commit/56d2fd008b108109f489339f5fd55212bb50afd4]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ sqlite3.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ sqlite3.h | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sqlite3.c b/sqlite3.c
+index 0b979f7a7d..27bea6f2e0 100644
+--- a/sqlite3.c
++++ b/sqlite3.c
+@@ -169267,17 +169267,22 @@ SQLITE_API int sqlite3_config(int op, ...){
+ ** If lookaside is already active, return SQLITE_BUSY.
+ **
+ ** The sz parameter is the number of bytes in each lookaside slot.
+-** The cnt parameter is the number of slots.  If pStart is NULL the
+-** space for the lookaside memory is obtained from sqlite3_malloc().
+-** If pStart is not NULL then it is sz*cnt bytes of memory to use for
+-** the lookaside memory.
++** The cnt parameter is the number of slots.  If pBuf is NULL the
++** space for the lookaside memory is obtained from sqlite3_malloc()
++** or similar.  If pBuf is not NULL then it is sz*cnt bytes of memory
++** to use for the lookaside memory.
+ */
+-static int setupLookaside(sqlite3 *db, void *pBuf, int sz, int cnt){
++static int setupLookaside(
++  sqlite3 *db,    /* Database connection being configured */
++  void *pBuf,     /* Memory to use for lookaside.  May be NULL */
++  int sz,         /* Desired size of each lookaside memory slot */
++  int cnt         /* Number of slots to allocate */
++){
+ #ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_LOOKASIDE
+-  void *pStart;
+-  sqlite3_int64 szAlloc = sz*(sqlite3_int64)cnt;
+-  int nBig;   /* Number of full-size slots */
+-  int nSm;    /* Number smaller LOOKASIDE_SMALL-byte slots */
++  void *pStart;          /* Start of the lookaside buffer */
++  sqlite3_int64 szAlloc; /* Total space set aside for lookaside memory */
++  int nBig;              /* Number of full-size slots */
++  int nSm;               /* Number smaller LOOKASIDE_SMALL-byte slots */
+ 
+   if( sqlite3LookasideUsed(db,0)>0 ){
+     return SQLITE_BUSY;
+@@ -169290,17 +169295,22 @@ static int setupLookaside(sqlite3 *db, void *pBuf, int sz, int cnt){
+     sqlite3_free(db->lookaside.pStart);
+   }
+   /* The size of a lookaside slot after ROUNDDOWN8 needs to be larger
+-  ** than a pointer to be useful.
++  ** than a pointer and small enough to fit in a u16.
+   */
+-  sz = ROUNDDOWN8(sz);  /* IMP: R-33038-09382 */
++  sz = ROUNDDOWN8(sz);
+   if( sz<=(int)sizeof(LookasideSlot*) ) sz = 0;
+-  if( cnt<0 ) cnt = 0;
+-  if( sz==0 || cnt==0 ){
++  if( sz>65528 ) sz = 65528;
++  /* Count must be at least 1 to be useful, but not so large as to use
++  ** more than 0x7fff0000 total bytes for lookaside. */
++  if( cnt<1 ) cnt = 0;
++  if( sz>0 && cnt>(0x7fff0000/sz) ) cnt = 0x7fff0000/sz;
++  szAlloc = (i64)sz*(i64)cnt;
++  if( szAlloc==0 ){
+     sz = 0;
+     pStart = 0;
+   }else if( pBuf==0 ){
+     sqlite3BeginBenignMalloc();
+-    pStart = sqlite3Malloc( szAlloc );  /* IMP: R-61949-35727 */
++    pStart = sqlite3Malloc( szAlloc );
+     sqlite3EndBenignMalloc();
+     if( pStart ) szAlloc = sqlite3MallocSize(pStart);
+   }else{
+@@ -169309,10 +169319,10 @@ static int setupLookaside(sqlite3 *db, void *pBuf, int sz, int cnt){
+ #ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_TWOSIZE_LOOKASIDE
+   if( sz>=LOOKASIDE_SMALL*3 ){
+     nBig = szAlloc/(3*LOOKASIDE_SMALL+sz);
+-    nSm = (szAlloc - sz*nBig)/LOOKASIDE_SMALL;
++    nSm = (szAlloc - (i64)sz*(i64)nBig)/LOOKASIDE_SMALL;
+   }else if( sz>=LOOKASIDE_SMALL*2 ){
+     nBig = szAlloc/(LOOKASIDE_SMALL+sz);
+-    nSm = (szAlloc - sz*nBig)/LOOKASIDE_SMALL;
++    nSm = (szAlloc - (i64)sz*(i64)nBig)/LOOKASIDE_SMALL;
+   }else
+ #endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_TWOSIZE_LOOKASIDE */
+   if( sz>0 ){
+diff --git a/sqlite3.h b/sqlite3.h
+index de393da9dc..04e6b616d5 100644
+--- a/sqlite3.h
++++ b/sqlite3.h
+@@ -1914,13 +1914,16 @@ struct sqlite3_mem_methods {
+ **
+ ** [[SQLITE_CONFIG_LOOKASIDE]] <dt>SQLITE_CONFIG_LOOKASIDE</dt>
+ ** <dd> ^(The SQLITE_CONFIG_LOOKASIDE option takes two arguments that determine
+-** the default size of lookaside memory on each [database connection].
++** the default size of [lookaside memory] on each [database connection].
+ ** The first argument is the
+-** size of each lookaside buffer slot and the second is the number of
+-** slots allocated to each database connection.)^  ^(SQLITE_CONFIG_LOOKASIDE
+-** sets the <i>default</i> lookaside size. The [SQLITE_DBCONFIG_LOOKASIDE]
+-** option to [sqlite3_db_config()] can be used to change the lookaside
+-** configuration on individual connections.)^ </dd>
++** size of each lookaside buffer slot ("sz") and the second is the number of
++** slots allocated to each database connection ("cnt").)^
++** ^(SQLITE_CONFIG_LOOKASIDE sets the <i>default</i> lookaside size.
++** The [SQLITE_DBCONFIG_LOOKASIDE] option to [sqlite3_db_config()] can
++** be used to change the lookaside configuration on individual connections.)^
++** The [-DSQLITE_DEFAULT_LOOKASIDE] option can be used to change the
++** default lookaside configuration at compile-time.
++** </dd>
+ **
+ ** [[SQLITE_CONFIG_PCACHE2]] <dt>SQLITE_CONFIG_PCACHE2</dt>
+ ** <dd> ^(The SQLITE_CONFIG_PCACHE2 option takes a single argument which is
+@@ -2133,24 +2136,43 @@ struct sqlite3_mem_methods {
+ ** <dt>SQLITE_DBCONFIG_LOOKASIDE</dt>
+ ** <dd> ^This option takes three additional arguments that determine the
+ ** [lookaside memory allocator] configuration for the [database connection].
+-** ^The first argument (the third parameter to [sqlite3_db_config()] is a
++** <ol>
++** <li><p>The first argument ("buf") is a
+ ** pointer to a memory buffer to use for lookaside memory.
+-** ^The first argument after the SQLITE_DBCONFIG_LOOKASIDE verb
+-** may be NULL in which case SQLite will allocate the
+-** lookaside buffer itself using [sqlite3_malloc()]. ^The second argument is the
+-** size of each lookaside buffer slot.  ^The third argument is the number of
+-** slots.  The size of the buffer in the first argument must be greater than
+-** or equal to the product of the second and third arguments.  The buffer
+-** must be aligned to an 8-byte boundary.  ^If the second argument to
+-** SQLITE_DBCONFIG_LOOKASIDE is not a multiple of 8, it is internally
+-** rounded down to the next smaller multiple of 8.  ^(The lookaside memory
++** The first argument may be NULL in which case SQLite will allocate the
++** lookaside buffer itself using [sqlite3_malloc()].
++** <li><P>The second argument ("sz") is the
++** size of each lookaside buffer slot.  Lookaside is disabled if "sz"
++** is less than 8.  The "sz" argument should be a multiple of 8 less than
++** 65536.  If "sz" does not meet this constraint, it is reduced in size until
++** it does.
++** <li><p>The third argument ("cnt") is the number of slots. Lookaside is disabled
++** if "cnt"is less than 1.  The "cnt" value will be reduced, if necessary, so
++** that the product of "sz" and "cnt" does not exceed 2,147,418,112.  The "cnt"
++** parameter is usually chosen so that the product of "sz" and "cnt" is less
++** than 1,000,000.
++** </ol>
++** <p>If the "buf" argument is not NULL, then it must
++** point to a memory buffer with a size that is greater than
++** or equal to the product of "sz" and "cnt".
++** The buffer must be aligned to an 8-byte boundary.
++** The lookaside memory
+ ** configuration for a database connection can only be changed when that
+ ** connection is not currently using lookaside memory, or in other words
+-** when the "current value" returned by
+-** [sqlite3_db_status](D,[SQLITE_CONFIG_LOOKASIDE],...) is zero.
++** when the value returned by [SQLITE_DBSTATUS_LOOKASIDE_USED] is zero.
+ ** Any attempt to change the lookaside memory configuration when lookaside
+ ** memory is in use leaves the configuration unchanged and returns
+-** [SQLITE_BUSY].)^</dd>
++** [SQLITE_BUSY].
++** If the "buf" argument is NULL and an attempt
++** to allocate memory based on "sz" and "cnt" fails, then
++** lookaside is silently disabled.
++** <p>
++** The [SQLITE_CONFIG_LOOKASIDE] configuration option can be used to set the
++** default lookaside configuration at initialization.  The
++** [-DSQLITE_DEFAULT_LOOKASIDE] option can be used to set the default lookaside
++** configuration at compile-time.  Typical values for lookaside are 1200 for
++** "sz" and 40 to 100 for "cnt".
++** </dd>
+ **
+ ** [[SQLITE_DBCONFIG_ENABLE_FKEY]]
+ ** <dt>SQLITE_DBCONFIG_ENABLE_FKEY</dt>
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.38.5.bb +1 -0
index 0a7a136c53..f47a9871e2 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.sqlite.org/2022/sqlite-autoconf-${SQLITE_PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2022-46908.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-36191.patch \
            file://CVE-2023-7104.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-29088.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5af07de982ba658fd91a03170c945f99c971f6955bc79df3266544373e39869c"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/14 libpam: Update fix for CVE-2024-10041

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Shubham Kulkarni <[email protected]>

Initially, PAM community fixed CVE-2024-10041 in the version v1.6.0 via commit b3020da. But not all cases were covered with this fix and issues were reported after the release. In the v1.6.1 release, PAM community fixed these issues via commit b7b9636. Backport this commit b7b9636, which

Fixes b3020da ("pam_unix/passverify: always run the helper to obtain shadow password file entries")

Backport from https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/commit/b7b96362087414e52524d3d9d9b3faa21e1db620

---
 ...024-10041.patch => CVE-2024-10041-1.patch} |  0
 .../pam/libpam/CVE-2024-10041-2.patch         | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.2.bb     |  3 +-
 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 rename meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/{CVE-2024-10041.patch => CVE-2024-10041-1.patch} (100%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-10041-2.patch
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-10041-1.patch renamed from meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-10041.patch +0 -0
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-10041.patch
rename to meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-10041-1.patch
meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/CVE-2024-10041-2.patch new file +77 -0

77 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.5.2.bb +2 -1
index 05fe232f6a..567f9741cb 100644
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/linux-pam/linux-pam/releases/download/v${PV}/Linux
            file://CVE-2022-28321-0002.patch \
            file://0001-pam_motd-do-not-rely-on-all-filesystems-providing-a-.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-22365.patch \
-           file://CVE-2024-10041.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-10041-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-10041-2.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "e4ec7131a91da44512574268f493c6d8ca105c87091691b8e9b56ca685d4f94d"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/14 ppp: patch CVE-2024-58250

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Backport patch to remove vulnerable component.

This is a breaking change, but there will be no other fix for this CVE as upstream did the deletion without providing a fix first. If someone really needs this feature, which the commit message describes as deprecated, bbappend with patch removal is possible.

License-Update: passprompt plugin removed

---
 .../ppp/ppp/CVE-2024-58250.patch              | 185 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp_2.4.9.bb    |   2 +-
 2 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp/CVE-2024-58250.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp/CVE-2024-58250.patch new file +185 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b07d28253f
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+From 0a66ad22e54c72690ec2a29a019767c55c5281fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 20:22:57 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] pppd: Remove passprompt plugin
+
+This is prompted by a number of factors:
+
+* It was more useful back in the dial-up days, but no-one uses dial-up
+  any more
+
+* In many cases there will be no terminal accessible to the prompter
+  program at the point where the prompter is run
+
+* The passwordfd plugin does much the same thing but does it more
+  cleanly and securely
+
+* The handling of privileges and file descriptors needs to be audited
+  thoroughly.
+
+Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-58250
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ppp-project/ppp/commit/0a66ad22e54c72690ec2a29a019767c55c5281fc]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ pppd/plugins/Makefile.linux |   2 +-
+ pppd/plugins/Makefile.sol2  |   6 --
+ pppd/plugins/passprompt.c   | 119 ------------------------------------
+ 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 126 deletions(-)
+ delete mode 100644 pppd/plugins/passprompt.c
+
+diff --git a/pppd/plugins/Makefile.linux b/pppd/plugins/Makefile.linux
+index 6403e3d..fcc36e4 100644
+--- a/pppd/plugins/Makefile.linux
++++ b/pppd/plugins/Makefile.linux
+@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ CFLAGS += -DUSE_EAPTLS=1
+ SUBDIRS := pppoe pppoatm pppol2tp
+ # Uncomment the next line to include the radius authentication plugin
+ SUBDIRS += radius
+-PLUGINS := minconn.so passprompt.so passwordfd.so winbind.so
++PLUGINS := minconn.so passwordfd.so winbind.so
+ 
+ # This setting should match the one in ../Makefile.linux
+ MPPE=y
+diff --git a/pppd/plugins/Makefile.sol2 b/pppd/plugins/Makefile.sol2
+index bc7d85d..f77ea1d 100644
+--- a/pppd/plugins/Makefile.sol2
++++ b/pppd/plugins/Makefile.sol2
+@@ -17,11 +17,5 @@ minconn.so: minconn.o
+ minconn.o: minconn.c
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $? 
+ 
+-passprompt.so: passprompt.o
+-	ld -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) -h $@ passprompt.o
+-
+-passprompt.o: passprompt.c
+-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $?
+-
+ clean:
+ 	rm -f *.o *.so
+diff --git a/pppd/plugins/passprompt.c b/pppd/plugins/passprompt.c
+deleted file mode 100644
+index 7779d51..0000000
+--- a/pppd/plugins/passprompt.c
++++ /dev/null
+@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
+-/*
+- * passprompt.c - pppd plugin to invoke an external PAP password prompter
+- *
+- * Copyright 1999 Paul Mackerras, Alan Curry.
+- *
+- *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+- *  modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+- *  as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+- *  2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+- */
+-#include <errno.h>
+-#include <unistd.h>
+-#include <sys/wait.h>
+-#include <syslog.h>
+-#include "pppd.h"
+-
+-char pppd_version[] = VERSION;
+-
+-static char promptprog[PATH_MAX+1];
+-static int promptprog_refused = 0;
+-
+-static option_t options[] = {
+-    { "promptprog", o_string, promptprog,
+-      "External PAP password prompting program",
+-      OPT_STATIC, NULL, PATH_MAX },
+-    { NULL }
+-};
+-
+-static int promptpass(char *user, char *passwd)
+-{
+-    int p[2];
+-    pid_t kid;
+-    int readgood, wstat;
+-    ssize_t red;
+-
+-    if (promptprog_refused || promptprog[0] == 0 || access(promptprog, X_OK) < 0)
+-	return -1;	/* sorry, can't help */
+-
+-    if (!passwd)
+-	return 1;
+-
+-    if (pipe(p)) {
+-	warn("Can't make a pipe for %s", promptprog);
+-	return 0;
+-    }
+-    if ((kid = fork()) == (pid_t) -1) {
+-	warn("Can't fork to run %s", promptprog);
+-	close(p[0]);
+-	close(p[1]);
+-	return 0;
+-    }
+-    if (!kid) {
+-	/* we are the child, exec the program */
+-	char *argv[5], fdstr[32];
+-	sys_close();
+-	closelog();
+-	close(p[0]);
+-	seteuid(getuid());
+-	setegid(getgid());
+-	argv[0] = promptprog;
+-	argv[1] = user;
+-	argv[2] = remote_name;
+-	sprintf(fdstr, "%d", p[1]);
+-	argv[3] = fdstr;
+-	argv[4] = 0;
+-	execv(*argv, argv);
+-	_exit(127);
+-    }
+-
+-    /* we are the parent, read the password from the pipe */
+-    close(p[1]);
+-    readgood = 0;
+-    do {
+-	red = read(p[0], passwd + readgood, MAXSECRETLEN-1 - readgood);
+-	if (red == 0)
+-	    break;
+-	if (red < 0) {
+-	    if (errno == EINTR && !got_sigterm)
+-		continue;
+-	    error("Can't read secret from %s: %m", promptprog);
+-	    readgood = -1;
+-	    break;
+-	}
+-	readgood += red;
+-    } while (readgood < MAXSECRETLEN - 1);
+-    close(p[0]);
+-
+-    /* now wait for child to exit */
+-    while (waitpid(kid, &wstat, 0) < 0) {
+-	if (errno != EINTR || got_sigterm) {
+-	    warn("error waiting for %s: %m", promptprog);
+-	    break;
+-	}
+-    }
+-
+-    if (readgood < 0)
+-	return 0;
+-    passwd[readgood] = 0;
+-    if (!WIFEXITED(wstat))
+-	warn("%s terminated abnormally", promptprog);
+-    if (WEXITSTATUS(wstat)) {
+-	    warn("%s exited with code %d", promptprog, WEXITSTATUS(wstat));
+-	    /* code when cancel was hit in the prompt prog */
+-	    if (WEXITSTATUS(wstat) == 128) {
+-	        promptprog_refused = 1;
+-	    }
+-	    return -1;
+-    }
+-    return 1;
+-}
+-
+-void plugin_init(void)
+-{
+-    add_options(options);
+-    pap_passwd_hook = promptpass;
+-#ifdef USE_EAPTLS
+-    eaptls_passwd_hook = promptpass;
+-#endif
+-}
meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp_2.4.9.bb +1 -1
index b7f71b673d..e25929febf 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ BUGTRACKER = "http://ppp.samba.org/cgi-bin/ppp-bugs"
 DEPENDS = "libpcap openssl virtual/crypt"
 LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause & BSD-3-Clause-Attribution & GPL-2.0-or-later & LGPL-2.0-or-later & PD & RSA-MD"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://pppd/ccp.c;beginline=1;endline=29;md5=e2c43fe6e81ff77d87dc9c290a424dea \
-                    file://pppd/plugins/passprompt.c;beginline=1;endline=10;md5=3bcbcdbf0e369c9a3e0b8c8275b065d8 \
                     file://pppd/tdb.c;beginline=1;endline=27;md5=4ca3a9991b011038d085d6675ae7c4e6 \
                     file://chat/chat.c;beginline=1;endline=15;md5=0d374b8545ee5c62d7aff1acbd38add2"
 
@@ -26,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://[email protected] \
            file://0001-ppp-fix-build-against-5.15-headers.patch \
            file://CVE-2022-4603.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-58250.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f938b35eccde533ea800b15a7445b2f1137da7f88e32a16898d02dee8adc058d"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/14 ghostscript: ignore CVE-2025-27833

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Vulnerable code was introduced in 9.56.0, so 9.55.0 is not affected yet

Commit introducing vulnerable feature:
* https://cgit.ghostscript.com/cgi-bin/cgit.cgi/ghostpdl.git/commit/pdf/pdf_fmap.c?id=0a1d08d91a95746f41e8c1d578a4e4af81ee5949
Commit fixing the vulnerability:
* https://cgit.ghostscript.com/cgi-bin/cgit.cgi/ghostpdl.git/commit/?id=477e36cfa1faa0037069a22eeeb4fc750733f120

---
 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.55.0.bb | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.55.0.bb +2 -1
index 8499bb3676..3d4ac77cfa 100644
@@ -22,9 +22,10 @@ UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
 # As of ghostscript 9.54.0 the jpeg issue in the CVE is present in the gs jpeg sources
 # however we use an external jpeg which doesn't have the issue.
 CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2013-6629"
-
 # Issue in the GhostPCL. GhostPCL not part of this GhostScript recipe.
 CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2023-38560 CVE-2024-46954"
+# Vulnerable code was introduced in 9.56.0, so 9.55.0 is not affected yet
+CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2025-27833"
 
 def gs_verdir(v):
     return "".join(v.split("."))
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/14 libarchive: ignore CVE-2024-48615

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Fix for this CVE [1] is patchong code introduced by [2] in v3.7.5. So v3.6.2 is not affected yet and the CVE can be safely ignored. Also Debian tracker [3] contains this statement.

[1] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/565b5aea491671ae33df1ca63697c10d54c00165
[2] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/2d8a5760c5ec553283a95a1aaca746f6eb472d0f
[3] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-48615

---
 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.6.2.bb +2 -0
index f7e576b688..87d3794ab7 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2023-30571"
 CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2024-37407"
 # cpe-incorrect: bsdtar was introduced in v3.7.0, so 3.6.2 is not affected yet
 CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2025-1632"
+# cpe-incorrect: vulnerable code introduced in v3.7.5, so 3.6.2 is not affected yet
+CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2024-48615"
 
 inherit autotools update-alternatives pkgconfig
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/14 libxml2: patch CVE-2025-32414

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick commit from 2.12 branch as 2.9 branch is unmaintained now.

---
 .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-32414.patch       | 74 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.14.bb    |  1 +
 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-32414.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-32414.patch new file +74 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..23a2316672
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From d7657811964eac1cb9743bb98649278ad948f0d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maks Verver <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2025 13:13:55 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2025-32414] python: Read at most len/4 characters.
+
+Fixes #889 by reserving space in the buffer for UTF-8 encoding of text.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-32414
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/d7657811964eac1cb9743bb98649278ad948f0d2]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ python/libxml.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/python/libxml.c b/python/libxml.c
+index 1fe8d685..2bf14078 100644
+--- a/python/libxml.c
++++ b/python/libxml.c
+@@ -287,7 +287,9 @@ xmlPythonFileReadRaw (void * context, char * buffer, int len) {
+ #endif
+     file = (PyObject *) context;
+     if (file == NULL) return(-1);
+-    ret = PyEval_CallMethod(file, (char *) "read", (char *) "(i)", len);
++    /* When read() returns a string, the length is in characters not bytes, so
++       request at most len / 4 characters to leave space for UTF-8 encoding. */
++    ret = PyEval_CallMethod(file, (char *) "read", (char *) "(i)", len / 4);
+     if (ret == NULL) {
+ 	printf("xmlPythonFileReadRaw: result is NULL\n");
+ 	return(-1);
+@@ -322,10 +324,12 @@ xmlPythonFileReadRaw (void * context, char * buffer, int len) {
+ 	Py_DECREF(ret);
+ 	return(-1);
+     }
+-    if (lenread > len)
+-	memcpy(buffer, data, len);
+-    else
+-	memcpy(buffer, data, lenread);
++    if (lenread < 0 || lenread > len) {
++	printf("xmlPythonFileReadRaw: invalid lenread\n");
++	Py_DECREF(ret);
++	return(-1);
++    }
++    memcpy(buffer, data, lenread);
+     Py_DECREF(ret);
+     return(lenread);
+ }
+@@ -352,7 +356,9 @@ xmlPythonFileRead (void * context, char * buffer, int len) {
+ #endif
+     file = (PyObject *) context;
+     if (file == NULL) return(-1);
+-    ret = PyEval_CallMethod(file, (char *) "io_read", (char *) "(i)", len);
++    /* When io_read() returns a string, the length is in characters not bytes, so
++       request at most len / 4 characters to leave space for UTF-8 encoding. */
++    ret = PyEval_CallMethod(file, (char *) "io_read", (char *) "(i)", len / 4);
+     if (ret == NULL) {
+ 	printf("xmlPythonFileRead: result is NULL\n");
+ 	return(-1);
+@@ -387,10 +393,12 @@ xmlPythonFileRead (void * context, char * buffer, int len) {
+ 	Py_DECREF(ret);
+ 	return(-1);
+     }
+-    if (lenread > len)
+-	memcpy(buffer, data, len);
+-    else
+-	memcpy(buffer, data, lenread);
++    if (lenread < 0 || lenread > len) {
++	printf("xmlPythonFileRead: invalid lenread\n");
++	Py_DECREF(ret);
++	return(-1);
++    }
++    memcpy(buffer, data, lenread);
+     Py_DECREF(ret);
+     return(lenread);
+ }
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.14.bb +1 -0
index 1cbd620b34..e281a39fd4 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20080827.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt
            file://CVE-2025-27113.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-56171.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-24928.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-32414.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "60d74a257d1ccec0475e749cba2f21559e48139efba6ff28224357c7c798dfee"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/14 libxml2: patch CVE-2025-32415

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick commit from 2.13 branch as 2.9 branch is unmaintained now.

---
 .../libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-32415.patch       | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.14.bb    |  1 +
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-32415.patch
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2/CVE-2025-32415.patch new file +39 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f39bb824b
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 384cc7c182fc00c6d5e2ab4b5e3671b2e3f93c84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Wellnhofer <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 6 Apr 2025 12:41:11 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2025-32415] schemas: Fix heap buffer overflow in
+ xmlSchemaIDCFillNodeTables
+
+Don't use local variable which could contain a stale value.
+
+Fixes #890.
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-32415
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/384cc7c182fc00c6d5e2ab4b5e3671b2e3f93c84]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ xmlschemas.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xmlschemas.c b/xmlschemas.c
+index 28b14bd4..428e3c82 100644
+--- a/xmlschemas.c
++++ b/xmlschemas.c
+@@ -23607,7 +23607,7 @@ xmlSchemaIDCFillNodeTables(xmlSchemaValidCtxtPtr vctxt,
+ 			j++;
+ 		    } while (j < nbDupls);
+ 		}
+-		if (nbNodeTable) {
++		if (bind->nbNodes) {
+ 		    j = 0;
+ 		    do {
+ 			if (nbFields == 1) {
+@@ -23657,7 +23657,7 @@ xmlSchemaIDCFillNodeTables(xmlSchemaValidCtxtPtr vctxt,
+ 
+ next_node_table_entry:
+ 			j++;
+-		    } while (j < nbNodeTable);
++		    } while (j < bind->nbNodes);
+ 		}
+ 		/*
+ 		* If everything is fine, then add the IDC target-node to
meta/recipes-core/libxml/libxml2_2.9.14.bb +1 -0
index e281a39fd4..bd6dd88dee 100644
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "http://www.w3.org/XML/Test/xmlts20080827.tar;subdir=${BP};name=testt
            file://CVE-2024-56171.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-24928.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-32414.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-32415.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[archive.sha256sum] = "60d74a257d1ccec0475e749cba2f21559e48139efba6ff28224357c7c798dfee"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/14 glib-2.0: patch CVE-2025-3360

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Backport commits from [1] fixing [2] for 2.82.x.

[1] https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/merge_requests/4499
[2] https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/-/issues/3647x

---
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-01.patch  | 57 ++++++++++++++
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-02.patch  | 53 +++++++++++++
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-03.patch  | 36 +++++++++
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-04.patch  | 76 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-05.patch  | 57 ++++++++++++++
 .../glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-06.patch  | 50 ++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0_2.72.3.bb |  6 ++
 7 files changed, 335 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-03.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-04.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-05.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-06.patch
meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-01.patch new file +57 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..91ea6c3748
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+From fe6af80931c35fafc6a2cd0651b6de052d1bffae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Withnall <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 16:44:58 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] gdatetime: Fix integer overflow when parsing very long
+ ISO8601 inputs
+
+This will only happen with invalid (or maliciously invalid) potential
+ISO8601 strings, but `g_date_time_new_from_iso8601()` needs to be robust
+against that.
+
+Prevent `length` overflowing by correctly defining it as a `size_t`.
+Similarly for `date_length`, but additionally track its validity in a
+boolean rather than as its sign.
+
+Spotted by chamalsl as #YWH-PGM9867-43.
+
+Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-3360
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/glib/commit/fe6af80931c35fafc6a2cd0651b6de052d1bffae]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ glib/gdatetime.c | 12 ++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gdatetime.c b/glib/gdatetime.c
+index ad9c190b6..b33db2c20 100644
+--- a/glib/gdatetime.c
++++ b/glib/gdatetime.c
+@@ -1493,7 +1493,8 @@ parse_iso8601_time (const gchar *text, gsize length,
+ GDateTime *
+ g_date_time_new_from_iso8601 (const gchar *text, GTimeZone *default_tz)
+ {
+-  gint length, date_length = -1;
++  size_t length, date_length = 0;
++  gboolean date_length_set = FALSE;
+   gint hour = 0, minute = 0;
+   gdouble seconds = 0.0;
+   GTimeZone *tz = NULL;
+@@ -1504,11 +1505,14 @@ g_date_time_new_from_iso8601 (const gchar *text, GTimeZone *default_tz)
+   /* Count length of string and find date / time separator ('T', 't', or ' ') */
+   for (length = 0; text[length] != '\0'; length++)
+     {
+-      if (date_length < 0 && (text[length] == 'T' || text[length] == 't' || text[length] == ' '))
+-        date_length = length;
++      if (!date_length_set && (text[length] == 'T' || text[length] == 't' || text[length] == ' '))
++        {
++          date_length = length;
++          date_length_set = TRUE;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+-  if (date_length < 0)
++  if (!date_length_set)
+     return NULL;
+ 
+   if (!parse_iso8601_time (text + date_length + 1, length - (date_length + 1),
meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-02.patch new file +53 -0

53 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-03.patch new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..25eb0c6fdd
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 5e8a3c19fcad2936dc5e070cf0767a5c5af907c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Philip Withnall <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 16:55:18 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] gdatetime: Track timezone length as an unsigned size_t
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+It’s guaranteed to be in (0, length] by the calculations above.
+
+This avoids the possibility of integer overflow through `gssize` not
+being as big as `size_t`.
+
+Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-3360
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNOME/glib/commit/5e8a3c19fcad2936dc5e070cf0767a5c5af907c5]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ glib/gdatetime.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/glib/gdatetime.c b/glib/gdatetime.c
+index 792c2ed15..6335bcbe2 100644
+--- a/glib/gdatetime.c
++++ b/glib/gdatetime.c
+@@ -1347,7 +1347,8 @@ parse_iso8601_date (const gchar *text, gsize length,
+ static GTimeZone *
+ parse_iso8601_timezone (const gchar *text, gsize length, size_t *tz_offset)
+ {
+-  gint i, tz_length, offset_hours, offset_minutes;
++  size_t tz_length;
++  gint i, offset_hours, offset_minutes;
+   gint offset_sign = 1;
+   GTimeZone *tz;
+ 
meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-04.patch new file +76 -0

76 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-05.patch new file +57 -0

57 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0/CVE-2025-3360-06.patch new file +50 -0

50 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/glib-2.0/glib-2.0_2.72.3.bb +6 -0
index b8c75eaa49..cebd84dd50 100644
@@ -54,6 +54,12 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/glib/${SHRT_VER}/glib-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://gdatetime-test-fail-0001.patch \
            file://gdatetime-test-fail-0002.patch \
            file://gdatetime-test-fail-0003.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-3360-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-3360-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-3360-03.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-3360-04.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-3360-05.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-3360-06.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI:append:class-native = " file://relocate-modules.patch"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/14 binutils: Fix CVE-2025-1178

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Deepesh Varatharajan <[email protected]>

Prevent an abort in the bfd linker when attempting to generate dynamic relocs for a corrupt input file.

PR 32638

Backport a patch from upstream to fix CVE-2025-1178
Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=75086e9de1707281172cc77f178e7949a4414ed0]

---
 .../binutils/binutils-2.38.inc                |  1 +
 .../binutils/0039-CVE-2025-1178.patch         | 33 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0039-CVE-2025-1178.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.38.inc +1 -0
index 26d0b570f3..82dd5c9eb6 100644
@@ -73,5 +73,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\
      file://0036-CVE-2023-39130.patch \
      file://0037-CVE-2024-53589.patch \
      file://0038-CVE-2025-0840.patch \
+     file://0039-CVE-2025-1178.patch \
 "
 S  = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/0039-CVE-2025-1178.patch new file +33 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d2054abab
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 75086e9de1707281172cc77f178e7949a4414ed0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Clifton <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 13:26:51 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Prevent an abort in the bfd linker when attempting to
+ generate dynamic relocs for a corrupt input file.
+
+PR 32638
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=75086e9de1707281172cc77f178e7949a4414ed0]
+CVE: CVE-2025-1178
+
+Signed-off-by: Deepesh Varatharajan <[email protected]>
+
+diff --git a/bfd/elf64-x86-64.c b/bfd/elf64-x86-64.c
+index 970379de..cbd16abc 100644
+--- a/bfd/elf64-x86-64.c
++++ b/bfd/elf64-x86-64.c
+@@ -4575,6 +4575,15 @@ elf_x86_64_finish_dynamic_symbol (bfd *output_bfd,
+ 
+       if (generate_dynamic_reloc)
+ 	{
++	  /* If the relgot section has not been created, then
++	     generate an error instead of a reloc.  cf PR 32638.  */
++	  if (relgot == NULL || relgot->size == 0)
++	    {
++	      info->callbacks->einfo (_("%F%pB: Unable to generate dynamic relocs because a suitable section does not exist\n"),
++					output_bfd);
++	      return false;
++	    }
++	  
+ 	  if (relative_reloc_name != NULL
+ 	      && htab->params->report_relative_reloc)
+ 	    _bfd_x86_elf_link_report_relative_reloc
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/14 python3-setuptools: Fix CVE-2024-6345

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>

A vulnerability in the package_index module of pypa/setuptools versions up to 69.1.1 allows for remote code execution via its download functions. These functions, which are used to download packages from URLs provided by users or retrieved from package index servers, are susceptible to code injection. If these functions are exposed to user-controlled inputs, such as package URLs, they can execute arbitrary commands on the system. The issue is fixed in version 70.0.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6345
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2024-6345

Upstream patch:
https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/88807c7062788254f654ea8c03427adc859321f0

---
 .../python3-setuptools/CVE-2024-6345.patch    | 353 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../python/python3-setuptools_59.5.0.bb       |   1 +
 2 files changed, 354 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2024-6345.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2024-6345.patch new file +353 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..958ddf559b
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+From 88807c7062788254f654ea8c03427adc859321f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason R. Coombs <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon Apr 29 20:01:38 2024 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #4332 from pypa/debt/package-index-vcs
+
+Modernize package_index VCS handling
+
+Source: https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/setuptools/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2024-6345.patch?h=applied/ubuntu/jammy-devel
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-6345
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/88807c7062788254f654ea8c03427adc859321f0]
+
+Note: Cannot do exact upstream patch backport as the code changed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <[email protected]>
+---
+ setup.cfg                             |   1 +
+ setuptools/package_index.py           | 145 +++++++++++++++-----------
+ setuptools/tests/test_packageindex.py |  78 +++++++-------
+ 3 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 101 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/setup.cfg b/setup.cfg
+index 0bc0101..b8585d7 100644
+--- a/setup.cfg
++++ b/setup.cfg
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ testing =
+ 	jaraco.envs>=2.2
+ 	pytest-xdist
+ 	sphinx
++	pytest-subprocess
+ 	jaraco.path>=3.2.0
+ docs = 
+ 	sphinx
+diff --git a/setuptools/package_index.py b/setuptools/package_index.py
+index e93fcc6..3a893df 100644
+--- a/setuptools/package_index.py
++++ b/setuptools/package_index.py
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ """PyPI and direct package downloading"""
+ import sys
++import subprocess
+ import os
+ import re
+ import io
+@@ -566,7 +567,7 @@ class PackageIndex(Environment):
+             scheme = URL_SCHEME(spec)
+             if scheme:
+                 # It's a url, download it to tmpdir
+-                found = self._download_url(scheme.group(1), spec, tmpdir)
++                found = self._download_url(spec, tmpdir)
+                 base, fragment = egg_info_for_url(spec)
+                 if base.endswith('.py'):
+                     found = self.gen_setup(found, fragment, tmpdir)
+@@ -785,7 +786,7 @@ class PackageIndex(Environment):
+                 raise DistutilsError("Download error for %s: %s"
+                                      % (url, v)) from v
+ 
+-    def _download_url(self, scheme, url, tmpdir):
++    def _download_url(self, url, tmpdir):
+         # Determine download filename
+         #
+         name, fragment = egg_info_for_url(url)
+@@ -800,19 +801,57 @@ class PackageIndex(Environment):
+ 
+         filename = os.path.join(tmpdir, name)
+ 
+-        # Download the file
+-        #
+-        if scheme == 'svn' or scheme.startswith('svn+'):
+-            return self._download_svn(url, filename)
+-        elif scheme == 'git' or scheme.startswith('git+'):
+-            return self._download_git(url, filename)
+-        elif scheme.startswith('hg+'):
+-            return self._download_hg(url, filename)
+-        elif scheme == 'file':
+-            return urllib.request.url2pathname(urllib.parse.urlparse(url)[2])
+-        else:
+-            self.url_ok(url, True)  # raises error if not allowed
+-            return self._attempt_download(url, filename)
++        return self._download_vcs(url, filename) or self._download_other(url, filename)
++
++    @staticmethod
++    def _resolve_vcs(url):
++        """
++        >>> rvcs = PackageIndex._resolve_vcs
++        >>> rvcs('git+http://foo/bar')
++        'git'
++        >>> rvcs('hg+https://foo/bar')
++        'hg'
++        >>> rvcs('git:myhost')
++        'git'
++        >>> rvcs('hg:myhost')
++        >>> rvcs('http://foo/bar')
++        """
++        scheme = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url).scheme
++        pre, sep, post = scheme.partition('+')
++        # svn and git have their own protocol; hg does not
++        allowed = set(['svn', 'git'] + ['hg'] * bool(sep))
++        return next(iter({pre} & allowed), None)
++
++    def _download_vcs(self, url, spec_filename):
++        vcs = self._resolve_vcs(url)
++        if not vcs:
++            return
++        if vcs == 'svn':
++            return self._download_svn(url, spec_filename)
++
++        filename, _, _ = spec_filename.partition('#')
++        url, rev = self._vcs_split_rev_from_url(url)
++
++        self.info(f"Doing {vcs} clone from {url} to {filename}")
++        subprocess.check_call([vcs, 'clone', '--quiet', url, filename])
++
++        co_commands = dict(
++            git=[vcs, '-C', filename, 'checkout', '--quiet', rev],
++            hg=[vcs, '--cwd', filename, 'up', '-C', '-r', rev, '-q'],
++        )
++        if rev is not None:
++            self.info(f"Checking out {rev}")
++            subprocess.check_call(co_commands[vcs])
++
++        return filename
++
++    def _download_other(self, url, filename):
++        scheme = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url).scheme
++        if scheme == 'file':  # pragma: no cover
++            return urllib.request.url2pathname(urllib.parse.urlparse(url).path)
++        # raise error if not allowed
++        self.url_ok(url, True)
++        return self._attempt_download(url, filename)
+ 
+     def scan_url(self, url):
+         self.process_url(url, True)
+@@ -842,7 +881,7 @@ class PackageIndex(Environment):
+     def _download_svn(self, url, filename):
+         warnings.warn("SVN download support is deprecated", UserWarning)
+         url = url.split('#', 1)[0]  # remove any fragment for svn's sake
+-        creds = ''
++        creds = []
+         if url.lower().startswith('svn:') and '@' in url:
+             scheme, netloc, path, p, q, f = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
+             if not netloc and path.startswith('//') and '/' in path[2:]:
+@@ -851,65 +890,49 @@ class PackageIndex(Environment):
+                 if auth:
+                     if ':' in auth:
+                         user, pw = auth.split(':', 1)
+-                        creds = " --username=%s --password=%s" % (user, pw)
++                        creds.extend(["--username", user, "--password", pw])
+                     else:
+-                        creds = " --username=" + auth
++                        creds.extend(["--username", auth])
+                     netloc = host
+                     parts = scheme, netloc, url, p, q, f
+                     url = urllib.parse.urlunparse(parts)
+         self.info("Doing subversion checkout from %s to %s", url, filename)
+-        os.system("svn checkout%s -q %s %s" % (creds, url, filename))
++        cmd = ["svn", "checkout", "-q"] + creds + [url, filename]
++        subprocess.check_call(cmd)
++
+         return filename
+ 
+     @staticmethod
+-    def _vcs_split_rev_from_url(url, pop_prefix=False):
+-        scheme, netloc, path, query, frag = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
++    def _vcs_split_rev_from_url(url):
++        """
++        Given a possible VCS URL, return a clean URL and resolved revision if any.
++
++        >>> vsrfu = PackageIndex._vcs_split_rev_from_url
++        >>> vsrfu('git+https://github.com/pypa/[email protected]#egg-info=setuptools')
++        ('https://github.com/pypa/setuptools', 'v69.0.0')
++        >>> vsrfu('git+https://github.com/pypa/setuptools#egg-info=setuptools')
++        ('https://github.com/pypa/setuptools', None)
++        >>> vsrfu('http://foo/bar')
++        ('http://foo/bar', None)
++        """
++        parts = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
+ 
+-        scheme = scheme.split('+', 1)[-1]
++        clean_scheme = parts.scheme.split('+', 1)[-1]
+ 
+         # Some fragment identification fails
+-        path = path.split('#', 1)[0]
+-
+-        rev = None
+-        if '@' in path:
+-            path, rev = path.rsplit('@', 1)
++        no_fragment_path, _, _ = parts.path.partition('#')
+ 
+-        # Also, discard fragment
+-        url = urllib.parse.urlunsplit((scheme, netloc, path, query, ''))
++        pre, sep, post = no_fragment_path.rpartition('@')
++        clean_path, rev = (pre, post) if sep else (post, None)
+ 
+-        return url, rev
+-
+-    def _download_git(self, url, filename):
+-        filename = filename.split('#', 1)[0]
+-        url, rev = self._vcs_split_rev_from_url(url, pop_prefix=True)
+-
+-        self.info("Doing git clone from %s to %s", url, filename)
+-        os.system("git clone --quiet %s %s" % (url, filename))
+-
+-        if rev is not None:
+-            self.info("Checking out %s", rev)
+-            os.system("git -C %s checkout --quiet %s" % (
+-                filename,
+-                rev,
+-            ))
++        resolved = parts._replace(
++            scheme=clean_scheme,
++            path=clean_path,
++            # discard the fragment
++            fragment='',
++        ).geturl()
+ 
+-        return filename
+-
+-    def _download_hg(self, url, filename):
+-        filename = filename.split('#', 1)[0]
+-        url, rev = self._vcs_split_rev_from_url(url, pop_prefix=True)
+-
+-        self.info("Doing hg clone from %s to %s", url, filename)
+-        os.system("hg clone --quiet %s %s" % (url, filename))
+-
+-        if rev is not None:
+-            self.info("Updating to %s", rev)
+-            os.system("hg --cwd %s up -C -r %s -q" % (
+-                filename,
+-                rev,
+-            ))
+-
+-        return filename
++        return resolved, rev
+ 
+     def debug(self, msg, *args):
+         log.debug(msg, *args)
+diff --git a/setuptools/tests/test_packageindex.py b/setuptools/tests/test_packageindex.py
+index 8e9435e..cc7e86c 100644
+--- a/setuptools/tests/test_packageindex.py
++++ b/setuptools/tests/test_packageindex.py
+@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import urllib.request
+ import urllib.error
+ import http.client
+ 
+-import mock
+ import pytest
+ 
+ import setuptools.package_index
+@@ -193,61 +192,60 @@ class TestPackageIndex:
+             assert dists[0].version == ''
+             assert dists[1].version == vc
+ 
+-    def test_download_git_with_rev(self, tmpdir):
++    def test_download_git_with_rev(self, tmp_path, fp):
+         url = 'git+https://github.example/group/project@master#egg=foo'
+         index = setuptools.package_index.PackageIndex()
+ 
+-        with mock.patch("os.system") as os_system_mock:
+-            result = index.download(url, str(tmpdir))
++        expected_dir = tmp_path / 'project@master'
++        fp.register([
++            'git',
++            'clone',
++            '--quiet',
++            'https://github.example/group/project',
++            expected_dir,
++        ])
++        fp.register(['git', '-C', expected_dir, 'checkout', '--quiet', 'master'])
+ 
+-        os_system_mock.assert_called()
++        result = index.download(url, tmp_path)
+ 
+-        expected_dir = str(tmpdir / 'project@master')
+-        expected = (
+-            'git clone --quiet '
+-            'https://github.example/group/project {expected_dir}'
+-        ).format(**locals())
+-        first_call_args = os_system_mock.call_args_list[0][0]
+-        assert first_call_args == (expected,)
++        assert result == str(expected_dir)
++        assert len(fp.calls) == 2
+ 
+-        tmpl = 'git -C {expected_dir} checkout --quiet master'
+-        expected = tmpl.format(**locals())
+-        assert os_system_mock.call_args_list[1][0] == (expected,)
+-        assert result == expected_dir
+-
+-    def test_download_git_no_rev(self, tmpdir):
++    def test_download_git_no_rev(self, tmp_path, fp):
+         url = 'git+https://github.example/group/project#egg=foo'
+         index = setuptools.package_index.PackageIndex()
+ 
+-        with mock.patch("os.system") as os_system_mock:
+-            result = index.download(url, str(tmpdir))
+-
+-        os_system_mock.assert_called()
++        expected_dir = tmp_path / 'project'
++        fp.register([
++            'git',
++            'clone',
++            '--quiet',
++            'https://github.example/group/project',
++            expected_dir,
++        ])
++        result = index.download(url, tmp_path)
+ 
+-        expected_dir = str(tmpdir / 'project')
+-        expected = (
+-            'git clone --quiet '
+-            'https://github.example/group/project {expected_dir}'
+-        ).format(**locals())
+-        os_system_mock.assert_called_once_with(expected)
++        assert result == str(expected_dir)
++        assert len(fp.calls) == 1
+ 
+-    def test_download_svn(self, tmpdir):
++    def test_download_svn(self, tmp_path, fp):
+         url = 'svn+https://svn.example/project#egg=foo'
+         index = setuptools.package_index.PackageIndex()
+ 
+-        with pytest.warns(UserWarning):
+-            with mock.patch("os.system") as os_system_mock:
+-                result = index.download(url, str(tmpdir))
+-
+-        os_system_mock.assert_called()
++        expected_dir = tmp_path / 'project'
++        fp.register([
++            'svn',
++            'checkout',
++            '-q',
++            'svn+https://svn.example/project',
++            expected_dir,
++        ])
+ 
+-        expected_dir = str(tmpdir / 'project')
+-        expected = (
+-            'svn checkout -q '
+-            'svn+https://svn.example/project {expected_dir}'
+-        ).format(**locals())
+-        os_system_mock.assert_called_once_with(expected)
++        with pytest.warns(UserWarning, match="SVN download support is deprecated"):
++            result = index.download(url, tmp_path)
+ 
++        assert result == str(expected_dir)
++        assert len(fp.calls) == 1
+ 
+ class TestContentCheckers:
+     def test_md5(self):
+-- 
+2.40.0
+
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools_59.5.0.bb +1 -0
index 5f2676a04a..0c0f1e9d81 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\
     file://0001-change-shebang-to-python3.patch \
     file://0001-_distutils-sysconfig-append-STAGING_LIBDIR-python-sy.patch \
     file://0001-Limit-the-amount-of-whitespace-to-search-backtrack.-.patch \
+    file://CVE-2024-6345.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d144f85102f999444d06f9c0e8c737fd0194f10f2f7e5fdb77573f6e2fa4fad0"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/14 tzdata/tzcode-native: upgrade 2025a -> 2025b

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Priyal Doshi <[email protected]>

---
 meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc +3 -3
index 3fe6c3142b..bb81d77ccc 100644
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ SECTION = "base"
 LICENSE = "PD & BSD-3-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=c679c9d6b02bc2757b3eaf8f53c43fba"
 
-PV = "2025a"
+PV = "2025b"
 
 SRC_URI =" https://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzcode${PV}.tar.gz;name=tzcode;subdir=tz \
            https://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzdata${PV}.tar.gz;name=tzdata;subdir=tz \
@@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/tz"
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://www.iana.org/time-zones"
 
-SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "119679d59f76481eb5e03d3d2a47d7870d592f3999549af189dbd31f2ebf5061"
-SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "4d5fcbc72c7c450ebfe0b659bd0f1c02fbf52fd7f517a9ea13fe71c21eb5f0d0"
+SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "05f8fedb3525ee70d49c87d3fae78a8a0dbae4fe87aa565c65cda9948ae135ec"
+SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "11810413345fc7805017e27ea9fa4885fd74cd61b2911711ad038f5d28d71474"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/14 systemd: backport patch to fix journal issue

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Chen Qi <[email protected]>

Backport a patch to fix systemd journal issue about sd_journal_next not behaving correctly after sd_journal_seek_tail.

---
 ...journal_previous-next-return-0-at-HE.patch | 87 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_250.14.bb   |  1 +
 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-journal-Make-sd_journal_previous-next-return-0-at-HE.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-journal-Make-sd_journal_previous-next-return-0-at-HE.patch new file +87 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..17e83448e3
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From e8d0681eb49697d91f277e2f9f4cff32a30b316c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daan De Meyer <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 15:22:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] journal: Make sd_journal_previous/next() return 0 at
+ HEAD/TAIL
+
+Currently, both these functions don't return 0 if we're at HEAD/TAIL
+and move in the corresponding direction. Let's fix that.
+
+Replaces #23480
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/977ad21b5b8f6323515297bd8995dcaaca0905df]
+
+[Rebased for v250]
+Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/journal/test-journal-interleaving.c | 4 ++++
+ src/libsystemd/sd-journal/sd-journal.c  | 8 ++++----
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/journal/test-journal-interleaving.c b/src/journal/test-journal-interleaving.c
+index c543b87b69..f0ed1b4c74 100644
+--- a/src/journal/test-journal-interleaving.c
++++ b/src/journal/test-journal-interleaving.c
+@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ static void test_skip(void (*setup)(void)) {
+          */
+         assert_ret(sd_journal_open_directory(&j, t, 0));
+         assert_ret(sd_journal_seek_head(j));
++        assert_ret(sd_journal_previous(j) == 0);
+         assert_ret(sd_journal_next(j));
+         test_check_numbers_down(j, 4);
+         sd_journal_close(j);
+@@ -166,6 +167,7 @@ static void test_skip(void (*setup)(void)) {
+          */
+         assert_ret(sd_journal_open_directory(&j, t, 0));
+         assert_ret(sd_journal_seek_tail(j));
++        assert_ret(sd_journal_next(j) == 0);
+         assert_ret(sd_journal_previous(j));
+         test_check_numbers_up(j, 4);
+         sd_journal_close(j);
+@@ -174,6 +176,7 @@ static void test_skip(void (*setup)(void)) {
+          */
+         assert_ret(sd_journal_open_directory(&j, t, 0));
+         assert_ret(sd_journal_seek_tail(j));
++        assert_ret(sd_journal_next(j) == 0);
+         assert_ret(r = sd_journal_previous_skip(j, 4));
+         assert_se(r == 4);
+         test_check_numbers_down(j, 4);
+@@ -183,6 +186,7 @@ static void test_skip(void (*setup)(void)) {
+          */
+         assert_ret(sd_journal_open_directory(&j, t, 0));
+         assert_ret(sd_journal_seek_head(j));
++        assert_ret(sd_journal_previous(j) == 0);
+         assert_ret(r = sd_journal_next_skip(j, 4));
+         assert_se(r == 4);
+         test_check_numbers_up(j, 4);
+diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-journal/sd-journal.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-journal/sd-journal.c
+index 7a6cc4aca3..04cafdf1c8 100644
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-journal/sd-journal.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-journal/sd-journal.c
+@@ -611,9 +611,9 @@ static int find_location_for_match(
+                 /* FIXME: missing: find by monotonic */
+ 
+                 if (j->current_location.type == LOCATION_HEAD)
+-                        return journal_file_next_entry_for_data(f, dp, DIRECTION_DOWN, ret, offset);
++                        return direction == DIRECTION_DOWN ? journal_file_next_entry_for_data(f, dp, DIRECTION_DOWN, ret, offset) : 0;
+                 if (j->current_location.type == LOCATION_TAIL)
+-                        return journal_file_next_entry_for_data(f, dp, DIRECTION_UP, ret, offset);
++                        return direction == DIRECTION_UP ? journal_file_next_entry_for_data(f, dp, DIRECTION_UP, ret, offset) : 0;
+                 if (j->current_location.seqnum_set && sd_id128_equal(j->current_location.seqnum_id, f->header->seqnum_id))
+                         return journal_file_move_to_entry_by_seqnum_for_data(f, dp, j->current_location.seqnum, direction, ret, offset);
+                 if (j->current_location.monotonic_set) {
+@@ -704,9 +704,9 @@ static int find_location_with_matches(
+                 /* No matches is simple */
+ 
+                 if (j->current_location.type == LOCATION_HEAD)
+-                        return journal_file_next_entry(f, 0, DIRECTION_DOWN, ret, offset);
++                        return direction == DIRECTION_DOWN ? journal_file_next_entry(f, 0, DIRECTION_DOWN, ret, offset) : 0;
+                 if (j->current_location.type == LOCATION_TAIL)
+-                        return journal_file_next_entry(f, 0, DIRECTION_UP, ret, offset);
++                        return direction == DIRECTION_UP ? journal_file_next_entry(f, 0, DIRECTION_UP, ret, offset) : 0;
+                 if (j->current_location.seqnum_set && sd_id128_equal(j->current_location.seqnum_id, f->header->seqnum_id))
+                         return journal_file_move_to_entry_by_seqnum(f, j->current_location.seqnum, direction, ret, offset);
+                 if (j->current_location.monotonic_set) {
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_250.14.bb +1 -0
index ef0476fad9..b79284d79c 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0001-nspawn-make-sure-host-root-can-write-to-the-uidmappe.patch \
            file://fix-vlan-qos-mapping.patch \
            file://0001-core-fix-build-when-seccomp-is-off.patch \
+           file://0001-journal-Make-sd_journal_previous-next-return-0-at-HE.patch \
            "
 
 # patches needed by musl
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/14 systemd: systemd-journald fails to setup LogNamespace

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Haitao Liu <[email protected]>

A LogNamespace error for systemd v250:

"""

Apr 28 17:44:00 a-rinline2b systemd[467]:
[email protected]: Failed to set up special execution
directory in /var/log: Not a directory
Apr 28 17:44:00 a-rinline2b systemd[467]:

[email protected]: Failed at step LOGS_DIRECTORY spawning /lib/systemd/systemd-journald: Not a directory
"""
That's because that "/var/log/journal" couldn't be created during program runtime.

---
 ...n-in-mkdir_p-when-parent-directory-e.patch | 78 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_250.14.bb   |  1 +
 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-basic-do-not-warn-in-mkdir_p-when-parent-directory-e.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-basic-do-not-warn-in-mkdir_p-when-parent-directory-e.patch new file +78 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..723b8ca4f7
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From e01e68e70ae1db9fe61adec3e7bdcced7adc1930 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 08:30:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] basic: do not warn in mkdir_p() when parent directory exists
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+This effectively disables warnings about type/mode/ownership of existing
+directories when recursively creating parent directories. (Or files. If there's
+a file in a place we expect a directory, the code will later try to create
+a file and fail. This follows the general pattern where we do (void)mkdir()
+if the mkdir() is immediately followed by opening of a file.)
+
+I was recently debugging an issue with the fstab-generator [1], and it says:
+'Directory "/tmp" already exists, but has mode 0777 that is too permissive (0644 was requested), refusing.'
+which is very specific but totally wrong in this context.
+This output was added in 37c1d5e97dbc869edd8fc178427714e2d9428d2b, and I still
+think it is worth to do it, because if you actually *do* want the directory, if
+there's something wrong, the precise error message will make it much easier to
+diagnose. And we can't easily pass the information what failed up the call chain
+because there are multiple things we check (ownership, permission mask, type)…
+So passing a param whether to warn or not down into the library code seems like
+the best solution, despite not being very elegant.
+
+[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2051285
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/e01e68e70ae1db9fe61adec3e7bdcced7adc1930]
+
+Signed-off-by: Haitao Liu <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/basic/mkdir.c | 5 ++++-
+ src/basic/mkdir.h | 5 +++--
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/mkdir.c b/src/basic/mkdir.c
+index 27144dd45a..cf7cf4a357 100644
+--- a/src/basic/mkdir.c
++++ b/src/basic/mkdir.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ int mkdir_safe_internal(
+                         return -errno;
+         }
+ 
++        if (flags & MKDIR_IGNORE_EXISTING)
++                return 0;
++
+         if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+                 return log_full_errno(flags & MKDIR_WARN_MODE ? LOG_WARNING : LOG_DEBUG, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTDIR),
+                                       "Path \"%s\" already exists and is not a directory, refusing.", path);
+@@ -142,7 +145,7 @@ int mkdir_parents_internal(const char *prefix, const char *path, mode_t mode, ui
+                 s[n] = '\0';
+ 
+                 if (!prefix || !path_startswith_full(prefix, path, /* accept_dot_dot= */ false)) {
+-                        r = mkdir_safe_internal(path, mode, uid, gid, flags, _mkdirat);
++                        r = mkdir_safe_internal(path, mode, uid, gid, flags | MKDIR_IGNORE_EXISTING, _mkdirat);
+                         if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
+                                 return r;
+                 }
+diff --git a/src/basic/mkdir.h b/src/basic/mkdir.h
+index 34a5227577..c0c0ea6c4f 100644
+--- a/src/basic/mkdir.h
++++ b/src/basic/mkdir.h
+@@ -4,8 +4,9 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ typedef enum MkdirFlags {
+-        MKDIR_FOLLOW_SYMLINK = 1 << 0,
+-        MKDIR_WARN_MODE      = 1 << 1,
++        MKDIR_FOLLOW_SYMLINK  = 1 << 0,
++        MKDIR_IGNORE_EXISTING = 1 << 1,  /* Quietly accept a preexisting directory (or file) */
++        MKDIR_WARN_MODE       = 1 << 2,  /* Log at LOG_WARNING when mode doesn't match */
+ } MkdirFlags;
+ 
+ int mkdirat_errno_wrapper(int dirfd, const char *pathname, mode_t mode);
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_250.14.bb +1 -0
index b79284d79c..b3e31e1f23 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://fix-vlan-qos-mapping.patch \
            file://0001-core-fix-build-when-seccomp-is-off.patch \
            file://0001-journal-Make-sd_journal_previous-next-return-0-at-HE.patch \
+           file://0001-basic-do-not-warn-in-mkdir_p-when-parent-directory-e.patch \
            "
 
 # patches needed by musl
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/14 Revert "cve-update-nvd2-native: Tweak to work better with NFS DL_DIR"

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

This reverts commit 7adaec468d3a61d88c990b1b319b34850bee7e44.

It does not seem to fix the issue it was supposed to fix. Additionally it breaks code which decides in full/partial update, because it manipulates timestamp that code is relying on.

(cherry picked from commit ebc65fdddd7ce51f0f1008baa30d0ae7918ae0bb)
---
 meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-core/meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb +0 -2
index 9808120cab..d50d9a2cea 100644
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ python do_fetch() {
     if update_db_file(db_tmp_file, d, database_time) == True:
         # Update downloaded correctly, can swap files
         shutil.move(db_tmp_file, db_file)
-        # Need to 'touch' the file to ensure NFS sees the data
-        os.utime(db_file)
     else:
         # Update failed, do not modify the database
         bb.warn("CVE database update failed")
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0