Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of changes for kirkstone and have comments back by end of day Thursday, December 4
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/2808
The following changes since commit ceef3cde9b761b7b5de6f7b6b1fb8e99663af9ca:
flac: patch seeking bug (2025-11-24 07:34:36 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/kirkstone-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/kirkstone-nut
Archana Polampalli (4):
go: fix CVE-2025-58187
go: fix CVE-2025-58189
go: fix CVE-2025-61723
go: fix CVE-2025-61724
Gyorgy Sarvari (1):
systemd-bootchart: update SRC_URI branch
Peter Marko (5):
gnutls: patch CVE-2025-9820
libpng: patch CVE-2025-64505
libpng: patch CVE-2025-64506
libpng: patch CVE-2025-64720
libpng: patch CVE-2025-65018
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc | 4 + .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58187.patch | 349 ++++++++++++++++++ .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58189.patch | 51 +++ .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61723.patch | 221 +++++++++++ .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61724.patch | 74 ++++ .../systemd-bootchart_234.bb | 2 +- .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch | 111 ++++++ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch | 163 ++++++++ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch | 52 +++ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch | 57 +++ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch | 103 ++++++ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch | 60 +++ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch | 163 ++++++++ .../libpng/libpng_1.6.39.bb | 7 + .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2025-9820.patch | 250 +++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.7.4.bb | 1 + 16 files changed, 1667 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58187.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58189.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61723.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61724.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2025-9820.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 1/10 gnutls: patch CVE-2025-9820
From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
This CVE is announced under [1].
Pick commit which mentions this CVE per [2].
[1] https://www.gnutls.org/security-new.html#GNUTLS-SA-2025-11-18
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-9820
--- .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2025-9820.patch | 250 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.7.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 251 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2025-9820.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2025-9820.patch new file +250 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +From 1d56f96f6ab5034d677136b9d50b5a75dff0faf5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 13:17:55 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] pkcs11: avoid stack overwrite when initializing a token + +If gnutls_pkcs11_token_init is called with label longer than 32 +characters, the internal storage used to blank-fill it would +overflow. This adds a guard to prevent that. + +Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2025-9820 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/1d56f96f6ab5034d677136b9d50b5a75dff0faf5] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + NEWS | 4 + + lib/pkcs11_write.c | 5 +- + tests/Makefile.am | 2 +- + tests/pkcs11/long-label.c | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tests/pkcs11/long-label.c + +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 0ae3c9991..d6df70ee6 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ Copyright (C) 2000-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + Copyright (C) 2013-2019 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos + See the end for copying conditions. + ++** libgnutls: Fix stack overwrite in gnutls_pkcs11_token_init ++ Reported by Luigino Camastra from Aisle Research. [GNUTLS-SA-2025-11-18, ++ CVSS: low] [CVE-2025-9820] ++ + ** libgnutls: Fix NULL pointer dereference when 2nd Client Hello omits PSK + Reported by Stefan Bühler. [GNUTLS-SA-2025-07-07-4, CVSS: medium] + [CVE-2025-6395] +diff --git a/lib/pkcs11_write.c b/lib/pkcs11_write.c +index f5e9058e0..64b85a2df 100644 +--- a/lib/pkcs11_write.c ++++ b/lib/pkcs11_write.c +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + #include "pkcs11x.h" + #include <x509/common.h> + #include "pk.h" ++#include "minmax.h" + + static const ck_bool_t tval = 1; + static const ck_bool_t fval = 0; +@@ -1199,7 +1200,7 @@ int gnutls_pkcs11_delete_url(const char *object_url, unsigned int flags) + * gnutls_pkcs11_token_init: + * @token_url: A PKCS #11 URL specifying a token + * @so_pin: Security Officer's PIN +- * @label: A name to be used for the token ++ * @label: A name to be used for the token, at most 32 characters + * + * This function will initialize (format) a token. If the token is + * at a factory defaults state the security officer's PIN given will be +@@ -1238,7 +1239,7 @@ gnutls_pkcs11_token_init(const char *token_url, + /* so it seems memset has other uses than zeroing! */ + memset(flabel, ' ', sizeof(flabel)); + if (label != NULL) +- memcpy(flabel, label, strlen(label)); ++ memcpy(flabel, label, MIN(sizeof(flabel), strlen(label))); + + rv = pkcs11_init_token(module, slot, (uint8_t *) so_pin, + strlen(so_pin), (uint8_t *) flabel); +diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am +index be4966f4b..8327c90ca 100644 +--- a/tests/Makefile.am ++++ b/tests/Makefile.am +@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ buffer_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) \ + if ENABLE_PKCS11 + if !WINDOWS + ctests += tls13/post-handshake-with-cert-pkcs11 pkcs11/tls-neg-pkcs11-no-key \ +- global-init-override ++ global-init-override pkcs11/long-label + tls13_post_handshake_with_cert_pkcs11_DEPENDENCIES = libpkcs11mock2.la libutils.la + tls13_post_handshake_with_cert_pkcs11_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBDL) + pkcs11_tls_neg_pkcs11_no_key_DEPENDENCIES = libpkcs11mock2.la libutils.la +diff --git a/tests/pkcs11/long-label.c b/tests/pkcs11/long-label.c +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000..a70bc9728 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/pkcs11/long-label.c +@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. ++ * ++ * Author: Daiki Ueno ++ * ++ * This file is part of GnuTLS. ++ * ++ * GnuTLS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it ++ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by ++ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or ++ * (at your option) any later version. ++ * ++ * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but ++ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU ++ * General Public License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License ++ * along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/> ++ */ ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H ++#include "config.h" ++#endif ++ ++#include <stdbool.h> ++#include <stdio.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> ++ ++#if defined(_WIN32) ++ ++int main(void) ++{ ++ exit(77); ++} ++ ++#else ++ ++#include <string.h> ++#include <unistd.h> ++#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> ++ ++#include "cert-common.h" ++#include "pkcs11/softhsm.h" ++#include "utils.h" ++ ++/* This program tests that a token can be initialized with ++ * a label longer than 32 characters. ++ */ ++ ++static void tls_log_func(int level, const char *str) ++{ ++ fprintf(stderr, "server|<%d>| %s", level, str); ++} ++ ++#define PIN "1234" ++ ++#define CONFIG_NAME "softhsm-long-label" ++#define CONFIG CONFIG_NAME ".config" ++ ++static int pin_func(void *userdata, int attempt, const char *url, ++ const char *label, unsigned flags, char *pin, ++ size_t pin_max) ++{ ++ if (attempt == 0) { ++ strcpy(pin, PIN); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++static void test(const char *provider) ++{ ++ int ret; ++ size_t i; ++ ++ gnutls_pkcs11_init(GNUTLS_PKCS11_FLAG_MANUAL, NULL); ++ ++ success("test with %s\n", provider); ++ ++ if (debug) { ++ gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func); ++ gnutls_global_set_log_level(4711); ++ } ++ ++ /* point to SoftHSM token that libpkcs11mock4.so internally uses */ ++ setenv(SOFTHSM_ENV, CONFIG, 1); ++ ++ gnutls_pkcs11_set_pin_function(pin_func, NULL); ++ ++ ret = gnutls_pkcs11_add_provider(provider, "trusted"); ++ if (ret != 0) { ++ fail("gnutls_pkcs11_add_provider: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret)); ++ } ++ ++ /* initialize softhsm token */ ++ ret = gnutls_pkcs11_token_init( ++ SOFTHSM_URL, PIN, ++ "this is a very long label whose length exceeds 32"); ++ if (ret < 0) { ++ fail("gnutls_pkcs11_token_init: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret)); ++ } ++ ++ for (i = 0;; i++) { ++ char *url = NULL; ++ ++ ret = gnutls_pkcs11_token_get_url(i, 0, &url); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ break; ++ if (strstr(url, ++ "token=this%20is%20a%20very%20long%20label%20whose")) ++ break; ++ } ++ if (ret < 0) ++ fail("gnutls_pkcs11_token_get_url: %s\n", gnutls_strerror(ret)); ++ ++ gnutls_pkcs11_deinit(); ++} ++ ++void doit(void) ++{ ++ const char *bin; ++ const char *lib; ++ char buf[128]; ++ ++ if (gnutls_fips140_mode_enabled()) ++ exit(77); ++ ++ /* this must be called once in the program */ ++ global_init(); ++ ++ /* we call gnutls_pkcs11_init manually */ ++ gnutls_pkcs11_deinit(); ++ ++ /* check if softhsm module is loadable */ ++ lib = softhsm_lib(); ++ ++ /* initialize SoftHSM token that libpkcs11mock4.so internally uses */ ++ bin = softhsm_bin(); ++ ++ set_softhsm_conf(CONFIG); ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), ++ "%s --init-token --slot 0 --label test --so-pin " PIN ++ " --pin " PIN, ++ bin); ++ system(buf); ++ ++ test(lib); ++ ++ lib = getenv("P11MOCKLIB4"); ++ if (lib == NULL) { ++ fail("P11MOCKLIB4 is not set\n"); ++ } ++ ++ set_softhsm_conf(CONFIG); ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), ++ "%s --init-token --slot 0 --label test --so-pin " PIN ++ " --pin " PIN, ++ bin); ++ system(buf); ++ ++ test(lib); ++} ++#endif /* _WIN32 */
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.7.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar file://CVE-2025-32988.patch \ file://CVE-2025-32990.patch \ file://CVE-2025-6395.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-9820.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "e6adbebcfbc95867de01060d93c789938cf89cc1d1f6ef9ef661890f6217451f"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 2/10 libpng: patch CVE-2025-64505
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Pick commit per NVD report.
Add two patches to apply it cleanly.
--- .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch | 111 ++++++++++++ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch | 163 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch | 52 ++++++ .../libpng/libpng_1.6.39.bb | 3 + 4 files changed, 329 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-01.patch new file +111 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +From 0fa3c0f698c2ca618a0fa44e10a822678df85373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 21:53:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] chore: Clean up the spurious uses of `sizeof(png_byte)`; fix + the manual + +By definition, `sizeof(png_byte)` is 1. + +Remove all the occurences of `sizeof(png_byte)` from the code, and fix +a related typo in the libpng manual. + +Also update the main .editorconfig file to reflect the fixing expected +by a FIXME note. + +CVE: CVE-2025-64505 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/0fa3c0f698c2ca618a0fa44e10a822678df85373] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + libpng-manual.txt | 4 ++-- + libpng.3 | 4 ++-- + pngrtran.c | 17 +++++++---------- + 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libpng-manual.txt b/libpng-manual.txt +index eb24ef483..d2918ce31 100644 +--- a/libpng-manual.txt ++++ b/libpng-manual.txt +@@ -1180,11 +1180,11 @@ where row_pointers is an array of pointers to the pixel data for each row: + If you know your image size and pixel size ahead of time, you can allocate + row_pointers prior to calling png_read_png() with + +- if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/(sizeof (png_byte))) ++ if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / (sizeof (png_bytep))) + png_error (png_ptr, + "Image is too tall to process in memory"); + +- if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/pixel_size) ++ if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / pixel_size) + png_error (png_ptr, + "Image is too wide to process in memory"); + +diff --git a/libpng.3 b/libpng.3 +index 57d06f2db..8875b219a 100644 +--- a/libpng.3 ++++ b/libpng.3 +@@ -1699,11 +1699,11 @@ where row_pointers is an array of pointers to the pixel data for each row: + If you know your image size and pixel size ahead of time, you can allocate + row_pointers prior to calling png_read_png() with + +- if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/(sizeof (png_byte))) ++ if (height > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / (sizeof (png_bytep))) + png_error (png_ptr, + "Image is too tall to process in memory"); + +- if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX/pixel_size) ++ if (width > PNG_UINT_32_MAX / pixel_size) + png_error (png_ptr, + "Image is too wide to process in memory"); + +diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c +index 74cca476b..041f9306c 100644 +--- a/pngrtran.c ++++ b/pngrtran.c +@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette, + int i; + + png_ptr->quantize_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, +- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * (sizeof (png_byte)))); ++ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); + for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) + png_ptr->quantize_index[i] = (png_byte)i; + } +@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette, + + /* Initialize an array to sort colors */ + png_ptr->quantize_sort = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, +- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * (sizeof (png_byte)))); ++ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); + + /* Initialize the quantize_sort array */ + for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) +@@ -592,11 +592,9 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette, + + /* Initialize palette index arrays */ + png_ptr->index_to_palette = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, +- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * +- (sizeof (png_byte)))); ++ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); + png_ptr->palette_to_index = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, +- (png_alloc_size_t)((png_uint_32)num_palette * +- (sizeof (png_byte)))); ++ (png_alloc_size_t)num_palette); + + /* Initialize the sort array */ + for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) +@@ -761,12 +759,11 @@ png_set_quantize(png_structrp png_ptr, png_colorp palette, + size_t num_entries = ((size_t)1 << total_bits); + + png_ptr->palette_lookup = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr, +- (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries * (sizeof (png_byte)))); ++ (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries)); + +- distance = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, (png_alloc_size_t)(num_entries * +- (sizeof (png_byte)))); ++ distance = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, (png_alloc_size_t)num_entries); + +- memset(distance, 0xff, num_entries * (sizeof (png_byte))); ++ memset(distance, 0xff, num_entries); + + for (i = 0; i < num_palette; i++) + {
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-02.patch new file +163 -0
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meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64505-03.patch new file +52 -0
52 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.39.bb +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ LIBV = "16" SRC_URI = "\ ${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://run-ptest \ + file://CVE-2025-64505-01.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-64505-02.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-64505-03.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1f4696ce70b4ee5f85f1e1623dc1229b210029fa4b7aee573df3e2ba7b036937"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 3/10 libpng: patch CVE-2025-64506
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Pick commit per NVD report.
--- .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch | 57 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libpng/libpng_1.6.39.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64506.patch new file +57 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +From 2bd84c019c300b78e811743fbcddb67c9d9bf821 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2025 22:40:05 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix a heap buffer overflow in `png_write_image_8bit` + +The condition guarding the pre-transform path incorrectly allowed 8-bit +input data to enter `png_write_image_8bit` which expects 16-bit input. +This caused out-of-bounds reads when processing 8-bit grayscale+alpha +images (GitHub #688), or 8-bit RGB or RGB+alpha images (GitHub #746), +with the `convert_to_8bit` flag set (an invalid combination that should +bypass the pre-transform path). + +The second part of the condition, i.e. + + colormap == 0 && convert_to_8bit != 0 + +failed to verify that input was 16-bit, i.e. + + linear != 0 + +contradicting the comment "This only applies when the input is 16-bit". + +The fix consists in restructuring the condition to ensure both the +`alpha` path and the `convert_to_8bit` path require linear (16-bit) +input. The corrected condition, i.e. + + linear != 0 && (alpha != 0 || display->convert_to_8bit != 0) + +matches the expectation of the `png_write_image_8bit` function and +prevents treating 8-bit buffers as 16-bit data. + +Reported-by: Samsung-PENTEST <[email protected]> +Reported-by: weijinjinnihao <[email protected]> +Analyzed-by: degrigis <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: John Bowler <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2025-64506 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/2bd84c019c300b78e811743fbcddb67c9d9bf821] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + pngwrite.c | 3 +-- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/pngwrite.c b/pngwrite.c +index 35a5d17b6..83148960e 100644 +--- a/pngwrite.c ++++ b/pngwrite.c +@@ -2129,8 +2129,7 @@ png_image_write_main(png_voidp argument) + * before it is written. This only applies when the input is 16-bit and + * either there is an alpha channel or it is converted to 8-bit. + */ +- if ((linear != 0 && alpha != 0 ) || +- (colormap == 0 && display->convert_to_8bit != 0)) ++ if (linear != 0 && (alpha != 0 || display->convert_to_8bit != 0)) + { + png_bytep row = png_voidcast(png_bytep, png_malloc(png_ptr, + png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr)));
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.39.bb +1 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://CVE-2025-64505-01.patch \ file://CVE-2025-64505-02.patch \ file://CVE-2025-64505-03.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-64506.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1f4696ce70b4ee5f85f1e1623dc1229b210029fa4b7aee573df3e2ba7b036937"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 4/10 libpng: patch CVE-2025-64720
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Pick commit per NVD report.
--- .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch | 103 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libpng/libpng_1.6.39.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 104 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-64720.patch new file +103 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From 08da33b4c88cfcd36e5a706558a8d7e0e4773643 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 13:46:23 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overflow in `png_init_read_transformations` + +The palette compositing code in `png_init_read_transformations` was +incorrectly applying background compositing when PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA +was set. This violated the premultiplied alpha invariant +`component <= alpha` expected by `png_image_read_composite`, causing +values that exceeded the valid range for the PNG_sRGB_FROM_LINEAR lookup +tables. + +When PNG_ALPHA_OPTIMIZED is active, palette entries should contain pure +premultiplied RGB values without background compositing. The background +compositing must happen later in `png_image_read_composite` where the +actual background color from the PNG file is available. + +The fix consists in introducing conditional behavior based on +PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA: when set, the code performs only +premultiplication using the formula `component * alpha + 127) / 255` +with proper gamma correction. When not set, the original background +compositing calculation based on the `png_composite` macro is preserved. + +This prevents buffer overflows in `png_image_read_composite` where +out-of-range premultiplied values would cause out-of-bounds array access +in `png_sRGB_base[]` and `png_sRGB_delta[]`. + +Reported-by: Samsung-PENTEST <[email protected]> +Analyzed-by: John Bowler <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2025-64720 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/08da33b4c88cfcd36e5a706558a8d7e0e4773643] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + pngrtran.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/pngrtran.c b/pngrtran.c +index 548780030..2f5202255 100644 +--- a/pngrtran.c ++++ b/pngrtran.c +@@ -1698,19 +1698,51 @@ png_init_read_transformations(png_structrp png_ptr) + } + else /* if (png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] != 0xff) */ + { +- png_byte v, w; ++ if ((png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_OPTIMIZE_ALPHA) != 0) ++ { ++ /* Premultiply only: ++ * component = round((component * alpha) / 255) ++ */ ++ png_uint_32 component; + +- v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].red]; +- png_composite(w, v, png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.red); +- palette[i].red = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; ++ component = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].red]; ++ component = ++ (component * png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] + 128) / 255; ++ palette[i].red = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[component]; + +- v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].green]; +- png_composite(w, v, png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.green); +- palette[i].green = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; ++ component = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].green]; ++ component = ++ (component * png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] + 128) / 255; ++ palette[i].green = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[component]; + +- v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].blue]; +- png_composite(w, v, png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.blue); +- palette[i].blue = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; ++ component = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].blue]; ++ component = ++ (component * png_ptr->trans_alpha[i] + 128) / 255; ++ palette[i].blue = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[component]; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* Composite with background color: ++ * component = ++ * alpha * component + (1 - alpha) * background ++ */ ++ png_byte v, w; ++ ++ v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].red]; ++ png_composite(w, v, ++ png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.red); ++ palette[i].red = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; ++ ++ v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].green]; ++ png_composite(w, v, ++ png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.green); ++ palette[i].green = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; ++ ++ v = png_ptr->gamma_to_1[palette[i].blue]; ++ png_composite(w, v, ++ png_ptr->trans_alpha[i], back_1.blue); ++ palette[i].blue = png_ptr->gamma_from_1[w]; ++ } + } + } + else
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.39.bb +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://CVE-2025-64505-02.patch \ file://CVE-2025-64505-03.patch \ file://CVE-2025-64506.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-64720.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1f4696ce70b4ee5f85f1e1623dc1229b210029fa4b7aee573df3e2ba7b036937"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 5/10 libpng: patch CVE-2025-65018
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Pick commits per NVD report.
--- .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch | 60 +++++++ .../libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch | 163 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libpng/libpng_1.6.39.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 225 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-01.patch new file +60 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From 16b5e3823918840aae65c0a6da57c78a5a496a4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2025 20:38:47 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix a buffer overflow in `png_image_finish_read` +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Reject bit-depth mismatches between IHDR and the requested output +format. When a 16-bit PNG is processed with an 8-bit output format +request, `png_combine_row` writes using the IHDR depth before +transformation, causing writes beyond the buffer allocated via +`PNG_IMAGE_SIZE(image)`. + +The validation establishes a safe API contract where +`PNG_IMAGE_SIZE(image)` is guaranteed to be sufficient across the +transformation pipeline. + +Example overflow (32×32 pixels, 16-bit RGB to 8-bit RGBA): +- Input format: 16 bits/channel × 3 channels = 6144 bytes +- Output buffer: 8 bits/channel × 4 channels = 4096 bytes +- Overflow: 6144 bytes - 4096 bytes = 2048 bytes + +Larger images produce proportionally larger overflows. For example, +for 256×256 pixels, the overflow is 131072 bytes. + +Reported-by: yosiimich <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2025-65018 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/16b5e3823918840aae65c0a6da57c78a5a496a4d] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + pngread.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/pngread.c b/pngread.c +index 212afb7d2..92571ec33 100644 +--- a/pngread.c ++++ b/pngread.c +@@ -4164,6 +4164,20 @@ png_image_finish_read(png_imagep image, png_const_colorp background, + int result; + png_image_read_control display; + ++ /* Reject bit depth mismatches to avoid buffer overflows. */ ++ png_uint_32 ihdr_bit_depth = ++ image->opaque->png_ptr->bit_depth; ++ int requested_linear = ++ (image->format & PNG_FORMAT_FLAG_LINEAR) != 0; ++ if (ihdr_bit_depth == 16 && !requested_linear) ++ return png_image_error(image, ++ "png_image_finish_read: " ++ "16-bit PNG must use 16-bit output format"); ++ if (ihdr_bit_depth < 16 && requested_linear) ++ return png_image_error(image, ++ "png_image_finish_read: " ++ "8-bit PNG must not use 16-bit output format"); ++ + memset(&display, 0, (sizeof display)); + display.image = image; + display.buffer = buffer;
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2025-65018-02.patch new file +163 -0
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meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.39.bb +2 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ SRC_URI = "\ file://CVE-2025-64505-03.patch \ file://CVE-2025-64506.patch \ file://CVE-2025-64720.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-65018-01.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-65018-02.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1f4696ce70b4ee5f85f1e1623dc1229b210029fa4b7aee573df3e2ba7b036937"
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 6/10 go: fix CVE-2025-58187
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
Due to the design of the name constraint checking algorithm, the processing time of some inputs scale non-linearly with respect to the size of the certificate. This affects programs which validate arbitrary certificate chains.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc | 1 + .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58187.patch | 349 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 350 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58187.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc +1 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://golang.org/dl/go${PV}.src.tar.gz;name=main \ file://CVE-2025-47907.patch \ file://CVE-2025-47906.patch \ file://CVE-2024-24783.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-58187.patch \ " SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58187.patch new file +349 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 7/10 go: fix CVE-2025-58189
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
When Conn.Handshake fails during ALPN negotiation the error contains attacker controlled information (the ALPN protocols sent by the client) which is not escaped.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc | 1 + .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58189.patch | 51 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58189.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc +1 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://golang.org/dl/go${PV}.src.tar.gz;name=main \ file://CVE-2025-47906.patch \ file://CVE-2024-24783.patch \ file://CVE-2025-58187.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-58189.patch \ " SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-58189.patch new file +51 -0
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2.43.0
PATCH 8/10 go: fix CVE-2025-61723
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
The processing time for parsing some invalid inputs scales non-linearly with respect to the size of the input. This affects programs which parse untrusted PEM inputs.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc | 1 + .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61723.patch | 221 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 222 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61723.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc +1 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://golang.org/dl/go${PV}.src.tar.gz;name=main \ file://CVE-2024-24783.patch \ file://CVE-2025-58187.patch \ file://CVE-2025-58189.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-61723.patch \ " SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61723.patch new file +221 -0
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2.43.0
PATCH 9/10 go: fix CVE-2025-61724
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
The Reader.ReadResponse function constructs a response string through repeated string concatenation of lines. When the number of lines in a response is large, this can cause excessive CPU consumption.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc | 1 + .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61724.patch | 74 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61724.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc +1 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://golang.org/dl/go${PV}.src.tar.gz;name=main \ file://CVE-2025-58187.patch \ file://CVE-2025-58189.patch \ file://CVE-2025-61723.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-61724.patch \ " SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "a1a48b23afb206f95e7bbaa9b898d965f90826f6f1d1fc0c1d784ada0cd300fd"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2025-61724.patch new file +74 -0
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2.43.0
PATCH 10/10 systemd-bootchart: update SRC_URI branch
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Gyorgy Sarvari <[email protected]>
The branch was renamed from master to main.
--- .../recipes-devtools/systemd-bootchart/systemd-bootchart_234.bb | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-devtools/systemd-bootchart/systemd-bootchart_234.bb +1 -1
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ LICENSE = "LGPL-2.1-only & GPL-2.0-only" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE.LGPL2.1;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c \ file://LICENSE.GPL2;md5=751419260aa954499f7abaabaa882bbe" -SRC_URI = "git://github.com/systemd/systemd-bootchart.git;protocol=https;branch=master \ +SRC_URI = "git://github.com/systemd/systemd-bootchart.git;protocol=https;branch=main \ file://0001-architecture-Recognise-RISCV-32-RISCV-64.patch \ file://mips64.patch \ file://no_lto.patch \
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0