Always allow sleepable and fmod_ret programs on syscalls
Subsystems (4)
v2 cover Always allow sleepable and fmod_ret programs on syscalls
Both sleepable and fmod_ret programs are only allowed on selected functions. For convenience, the error injection list was originally used.
When error injection is disabled, that list is empty and sleepable tracing programs, as well as fmod_ret programs, are effectively unavailable.
This patch series addresses the issue by at least enabling sleepable and fmod_ret programs on syscalls, if error injection is disabled. More details on why syscalls are used can be found in [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQK6qP8izg+k9yV0vdcT-+=axtFQ2fKw7D-2Ei-V6WS5Dw@mail.gmail.com/
Changes from v1:
- Check "sys_" prefix instead of "sys" for powerpc syscalls (AI review)
- Add link to the original discussion (Kumar)
- Add explanation why arch syscall prefixes are hard-coded (Leon)
Viktor Malik (3):
bpf: Always allow sleepable programs on syscalls
bpf: Always allow fmod_ret programs on syscalls selftests/bpf: Move sleepable refcounted_kptr tests to syscalls
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 83 +++++++++++++++---- .../selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr.c | 4 +- .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 1/3 bpf: Always allow sleepable programs on syscalls
Sleepable BPF programs can only be attached to selected functions. For convenience, the error injection list was originally used, which contains syscalls and several other functions.
When error injection is disabled (CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION=n), that list is empty and sleepable tracing programs are effectively unavailable. In such a case, at least enable sleepable programs on syscalls. For discussion why syscalls were chosen, see [1].
To detect that a function is a syscall handler, we check for arch-specific prefixes for the most common architectures. Unfortunately, the prefixes are hard-coded in arch syscall code so we need to hard-code them, too.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQK6qP8izg+k9yV0vdcT-+=axtFQ2fKw7D-2Ei-V6WS5Dw@mail.gmail.com/
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +52 -6
@@ -24930,6 +24930,8 @@ static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)return -EINVAL ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION +/* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list */
@@ -24951,6 +24953,55 @@ static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id)return btf_id_set_contains (&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); } +static int check_attach_sleepable (u32 btf_id,unsigned long addr,const char *func_name) +{ +/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are +* attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. +*/ +if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject (btf_id) && +within_error_injection_list (addr)) +return 0 ; + +return -EINVAL ; +} + +#else + +/* Unfortunately, the arch-specific prefixes are hard-coded in arch syscall code +* so we need to hard-code them, too. Ftrace has arch_syscall_match_sym_name() +* but that just compares two concrete function names. +*/ +static bool has_arch_syscall_prefix (const char *func_name) +{ +#if defined(__x86_64__) +return !strncmp (func_name,"__x64_" ,6 ); +#elif defined(__i386__) +return !strncmp (func_name,"__ia32_" ,7 ); +#elif defined(__s390x__) +return !strncmp (func_name,"__s390x_" ,8 ); +#elif defined(__aarch64__) +return !strncmp (func_name,"__arm64_" ,8 ); +#elif defined(__riscv) +return !strncmp (func_name,"__riscv_" ,8 ); +#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__) +return !strncmp (func_name,"sys_" ,4 ); +#else +return false; +#endif +} + +/* Without error injection, allow sleepable progs on syscalls. */ + +static int check_attach_sleepable (u32 btf_id,unsigned long addr,const char *func_name) +{ +if (has_arch_syscall_prefix (func_name)) +return 0 ; + +return -EINVAL ; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION */ + int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog,
@@ -25230,12 +25281,7 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, ret = -EINVAL ;switch (prog->type) {case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING : - -/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are -* attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. -*/ -if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject (btf_id) && -within_error_injection_list (addr)) +if (!check_attach_sleepable (btf_id, addr, tname)) ret =0 ;/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag.
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 2/3 bpf: Always allow fmod_ret programs on syscalls
In reply to Viktor Malikfmod_ret BPF programs can only be attached to selected functions. For convenience, the error injection list was originally used (along with functions prefixed with "security_"), which contains syscalls and several other functions.
When error injection is disabled (CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION=n), that list is empty and fmod_ret programs are effectively unavailable for most of the functions. In such a case, at least enable fmod_ret programs on syscalls.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +19 -10
@@ -24921,15 +24921,6 @@ static int check_struct_ops_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) }#define SECURITY_PREFIX "security_" -static int check_attach_modify_return (unsigned long addr,const char *func_name) -{ -if (within_error_injection_list (addr) || - !strncmp (SECURITY_PREFIX , func_name,sizeof (SECURITY_PREFIX ) -1 )) -return 0 ; - -return -EINVAL ; -} -#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION /* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on
@@ -24965,6 +24956,15 @@ static int check_attach_sleepable(u32 btf_id, unsigned long addr, const char *fu return -EINVAL; } +static int check_attach_modify_return (unsigned long addr,const char *func_name) +{ +if (within_error_injection_list (addr) || + !strncmp (SECURITY_PREFIX , func_name,sizeof (SECURITY_PREFIX ) -1 )) +return 0 ; + +return -EINVAL ; +} +#else /* Unfortunately, the arch-specific prefixes are hard-coded in arch syscall code
@@ -24990,7 +24990,7 @@ static bool has_arch_syscall_prefix(const char *func_name)#endif } -/* Without error injection, allow sleepable progs on syscalls. */ +/* Without error injection, allow sleepable and fmod_ret progs on syscalls. */ static int check_attach_sleepable (u32 btf_id,unsigned long addr,const char *func_name) {
@@ -25000,6 +25000,15 @@ static int check_attach_sleepable(u32 btf_id, unsigned long addr, const char *fureturn -EINVAL ; } +static int check_attach_modify_return (unsigned long addr,const char *func_name) +{ +if (has_arch_syscall_prefix (func_name) || + !strncmp (SECURITY_PREFIX , func_name,sizeof (SECURITY_PREFIX ) -1 )) +return 0 ; + +return -EINVAL ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION */ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH v2 3/3 selftests/bpf: Move sleepable refcounted_kptr tests to syscalls
In reply to Viktor MalikNow that sleepable programs are always enabled on syscalls, let refcounted_kptr tests use syscalls rather than bpf_testmod_test_read, which is not sleepable with error injection disabled.
The tests just check that the verifier can handle usage of RCU locks in sleepable programs and never actually attach. So, the attachment target doesn't matter (as long as it is sleepable) and with syscalls, the tests pass on kernels with disabled error injection.
--- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr.c | 4 ++-- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr.c +2 -2
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ long rbtree_wrong_owner_remove_fail_a2(void *ctx)return 0 ; } -SEC("?fentry.s/bpf_testmod_test_read") +SEC("?fentry.s/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_getpgid") __success int BPF_PROG(rbtree_sleepable_rcu, struct file *file, struct kobject *kobj,
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(rbtree_sleepable_rcu,return 0 ; } -SEC("?fentry.s/bpf_testmod_test_read") +SEC("?fentry.s/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_getpgid") __success int BPF_PROG(rbtree_sleepable_rcu_no_explicit_rcu_lock, struct file *file, struct kobject *kobj,
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c +1 -1
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ long rbtree_refcounted_node_ref_escapes_owning_input(void *ctx)return 0 ; } -SEC("?fentry.s/bpf_testmod_test_read") +SEC("?fentry.s/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_getpgid") __failure __msg("function calls are not allowed while holding a lock") int BPF_PROG(rbtree_fail_sleepable_lock_across_rcu, struct file *file, struct kobject *kobj,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/3] bpf: Always allow sleepable programs on syscalls
In reply to Viktor MalikQuoted 15 lines · Viktor Malik
Sleepable BPF programs can only be attached to selected functions. For convenience, the error injection list was originally used, which contains syscalls and several other functions.
When error injection is disabled (
CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION=n), that list is empty and sleepable tracing programs are effectively unavailable. In such a case, at least enable sleepable programs on syscalls. For discussion why syscalls were chosen, see [1].To detect that a function is a syscall handler, we check for arch-specific prefixes for the most common architectures. Unfortunately, the prefixes are hard-coded in arch syscall code so we need to hard-code them, too.
Quoted 5 lines
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQK6qP8izg+k9yV0vdcT-+=axtFQ2fKw7D-2Ei-V6WS5Dw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by Viktor Malik <[email protected]>---
Quoted 1 line
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Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/3] bpf: Always allow fmod_ret programs on syscalls
In reply to Viktor MalikQuoted 6 lines · Viktor Malik
fmod_retBPF programs can only be attached to selected functions. For convenience, the error injection list was originally used (along with functions prefixed with "security_"), which contains syscalls and several other functions.
Quoted 8 lines
When error injection is disabled (
CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION=n), that list is empty andfmod_retprograms are effectively unavailable for most of the functions. In such a case, at least enablefmod_retprograms on syscalls.Signed-off-by Viktor Malik <[email protected]>---
Quoted 1 line
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Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 3/3] selftests/bpf: Move sleepable refcounted_kptr tests to syscalls
In reply to Viktor MalikQuoted 5 lines · Viktor Malik
Now that sleepable programs are always enabled on syscalls, let
refcounted_kptrtests use syscalls rather thanbpf_testmod_test_read, which is not sleepable with error injection disabled.
Quoted 8 lines
The tests just check that the verifier can handle usage of RCU locks in sleepable programs and never actually attach. So, the attachment target doesn't matter (as long as it is sleepable) and with syscalls, the tests pass on kernels with disabled error injection.
Signed-off-by Viktor Malik <[email protected]>---
Quoted 1 line
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Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/3] bpf: Always allow sleepable programs on syscalls
In reply to Viktor MalikQuoted 59 lines · Viktor Malik
Sleepable BPF programs can only be attached to selected functions. For convenience, the error injection list was originally used, which contains syscalls and several other functions.
When error injection is disabled (
CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION=n), that list is empty and sleepable tracing programs are effectively unavailable. In such a case, at least enable sleepable programs on syscalls. For discussion why syscalls were chosen, see [1].To detect that a function is a syscall handler, we check for arch-specific prefixes for the most common architectures. Unfortunately, the prefixes are hard-coded in arch syscall code so we need to hard-code them, too.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQK6qP8izg+k9yV0vdcT-+=axtFQ2fKw7D-2Ei-V6WS5Dw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by Viktor Malik <[email protected]>--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)kernel/bpf/verifier.c +23
-0@@ -24930,6 +24930,8 @@ static int check_attach_modify_return(unsigned long addr, const char *func_name)return -EINVAL ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION +/* list of non-sleepable functions that are otherwise on * ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION list */ @@ -24951,6 +24953,55 @@ static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id)return btf_id_set_contains (&btf_non_sleepable_error_inject, btf_id); } +static int check_attach_sleepable (u32 btf_id,unsigned long addr,const char *func_name) +{ +/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are +* attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. +*/ +if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject (btf_id) && +within_error_injection_list (addr)) +return 0 ; + +return -EINVAL ; +} + +#else + +/* Unfortunately, the arch-specific prefixes are hard-coded in arch syscall code +* so we need to hard-code them, too. Ftrace has arch_syscall_match_sym_name() +* but that just compares two concrete function names. + */> +static bool has_arch_syscall_prefix(const char *func_name) +{ +#if defined(__x86_64__) +return !strncmp (func_name,"__x64_" ,6 );
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_non_sleepable_error_inject(u32 btf_id) · line 24986
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10
-0+#elif defined(__i386__) +return !strncmp (func_name,"__ia32_" ,7 ); +#elif defined(__s390x__) +return !strncmp (func_name,"__s390x_" ,8 ); +#elif defined(__aarch64__) +return !strncmp (func_name,"__arm64_" ,8 ); +#elif defined(__riscv) +return !strncmp (func_name,"__riscv_" ,8 ); +#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__) +return !strncmp (func_name,"sys_" ,4 );
LoongArch is missing here, as LoongArch supports trampoline.
#elif defined(__loongarch__)
return !strncmp(func_name, "sys_", 4);
After adding it,
Thanks,
Leon
Quoted 34 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +18
-6+#else +return false; +#endif +} + +/* Without error injection, allow sleepable progs on syscalls. */ + +static int check_attach_sleepable (u32 btf_id,unsigned long addr,const char *func_name) +{ +if (has_arch_syscall_prefix (func_name)) +return 0 ; + +return -EINVAL ; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION */ + int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog,@@ -25230,12 +25281,7 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, ret = -EINVAL ;switch (prog->type) {case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING : - -/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are -* attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist. -*/ -if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject (btf_id) && -within_error_injection_list (addr)) +if (!check_attach_sleepable (btf_id, addr, tname)) ret =0 ;/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag.
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/3] bpf: Always allow fmod_ret programs on syscalls
In reply to Viktor MalikQuoted 5 lines · Viktor Malik
fmod_retBPF programs can only be attached to selected functions. For convenience, the error injection list was originally used (along with functions prefixed with "security_"), which contains syscalls and several other functions.
Quoted 7 lines
When error injection is disabled (
CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION=n), that list is empty andfmod_retprograms are effectively unavailable for most of the functions. In such a case, at least enablefmod_retprograms on syscalls.Signed-off-by Viktor Malik <[email protected]>---
LGTM
Quoted 1 line
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