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PATCH New Fabien Thomas 1 participant 24 messages May 5

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Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by end of day Thursday, May 6.

Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/3774

The following changes since commit dc2df90b1d4f71023169d492f3819326e0e6c055:

liburcu: upgrade 0.14.0 -> 0.14.2 (2026-04-24 16:06:21 +0200)

are available in the Git repository at:

https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut

for you to fetch changes up to 3c2f2b6f7af2bb743655859b64faae4786080cb9:

libsoup: fix CVE-2025-32049 (2026-05-05 13:01:04 +0200)

----------------------------------------------------------------

Adarsh Jagadish Kamini (2):
binutils: fix CVE-2025-69647
binutils: fix CVE-2025-69648

Bruce Ashfield (3):
linux-yocto/6.6: update to v6.6.124
linux-yocto/6.6: update to v6.6.126
linux-yocto/6.6: update to v6.6.127

Changqing Li (2):
libsoup: fix CVE-2025-14523
libsoup: fix CVE-2025-32049

Fabien Thomas (1):
ghostscript: Pin to C17 std

Himanshu Jadon (1):
apt: Add CVE_PRODUCT to support product name

Hitendra Prajapati (3):
rsync: fix for CVE-2026-41035
systemd: fix for CVE-2026-40225
systemd: fix for CVE-2026-40226

Hongxu Jia (3):
u-boot: fix CVE-2025-24857
ovmf: fix CVE-2025-2296
ovmf: fix CVE-2024-38798

Hugo SIMELIERE (3):
expat: patch CVE-2026-32776
expat: patch CVE-2026-32777
expat: patch CVE-2026-32778

Jhonata Poma-Hansen (1):
dbus: gate user-session PACKAGECONFIG on systemd in DISTRO_FEATURES

Martin Jansa (1):
ghostscript: fix build with gcc-15 on host

Sudhir Dumbhare (1):
libpng: fix CVE-2026-33636

Vijay Anusuri (2):
avahi: Fix CVE-2026-34933
gdk-pixbuf: Fix CVE-2026-5201

 .../u-boot/files/CVE-2025-24857.patch         |  42 +
 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common.inc     |   4 +-
 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi_0.8.bb  |   2 +
 .../avahi/files/CVE-2026-34933-1.patch        | 108 +++
 .../avahi/files/CVE-2026-34933-2.patch        |  96 +++
 meta/recipes-core/dbus/dbus_1.14.10.bb        |   2 +-
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-32776.patch          |  91 +++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-32777-01.patch       |  49 ++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-32777-02.patch       |  66 ++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-32778-01.patch       |  91 +++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-32778-02.patch       |  61 ++
 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.6.4.bb        |   5 +
 ...mdSev-Halt-on-failed-blob-allocation.patch | 159 ++++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2024-38798.patch            | 116 +++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-1.patch           | 762 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-2.patch           | 175 ++++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-3.patch           |  42 +
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-4.patch           |  34 +
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-5.patch           |  36 +
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-6.patch           |  54 ++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-7.patch           | 124 +++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-8.patch           | 125 +++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-9.patch           | 108 +++
 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb            |  11 +
 .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40225-01.patch   | 131 +++
 .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40225-02.patch   |  39 +
 .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40226-01.patch   |  63 ++
 .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40226-02.patch   |  39 +
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_255.21.bb   |   4 +
 meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt_2.6.1.bb        |   3 +
 .../binutils/binutils-2.42.inc                |   2 +
 .../binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-69647.patch    |  85 ++
 .../binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-69648.patch    | 190 +++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-41035.patch          |  39 +
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb    |   1 +
 ...Fix-compatibility-with-C23-compilers.patch |  67 ++
 .../ghostscript/ghostscript_10.05.1.bb        |   3 +
 .../gdk-pixbuf/gdk-pixbuf/CVE-2026-5201.patch |  44 +
 .../gdk-pixbuf/gdk-pixbuf_2.42.12.bb          |   1 +
 .../linux/linux-yocto-rt_6.6.bb               |   6 +-
 .../linux/linux-yocto-tiny_6.6.bb             |   6 +-
 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_6.6.bb  |  28 +-
 .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch         |  99 +++
 .../libpng/libpng_1.6.42.bb                   |   1 +
 .../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-14523.patch        | 715 ++++++++++++++++
 .../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-1.patch      | 229 ++++++
 .../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-2.patch      |  34 +
 .../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-3.patch      | 134 +++
 .../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-4.patch      | 292 +++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.4.4.bb |   5 +
 50 files changed, 4601 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2025-24857.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2026-34933-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2026-34933-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32776.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32777-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32777-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32778-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32778-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-AmdSev-Halt-on-failed-blob-allocation.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2024-38798.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-4.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-5.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-6.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-7.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-8.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-9.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40225-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40225-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40226-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40226-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-69647.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-69648.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-41035.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/0001-Bug-708160-Fix-compatibility-with-C23-compilers.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-gnome/gdk-pixbuf/gdk-pixbuf/CVE-2026-5201.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-14523.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-4.patch
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/23 libpng: fix CVE-2026-33636

From: Sudhir Dumbhare <[email protected]>

Pick the patch [1] as mentioned in [2].

[1] https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/aba9f18eba870d14fb52c5ba5d73451349e339c3
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33636

Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-33636
https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-33636.html

---
 .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch         | 99 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../libpng/libpng_1.6.42.bb                   |  1 +
 2 files changed, 100 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-33636.patch new file +99 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3bd6aae2a4
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+From 9ff847dfcbb54f6dee3fd4e408150ae944278391 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2026 23:48:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fix(arm): Resolve out-of-bounds read/write in NEON palette
+ expansion
+
+Both `png_do_expand_palette_rgba8_neon` and
+`png_do_expand_palette_rgb8_neon` advanced in fixed-size chunks without
+guarding the final iteration, allowing out-of-bounds reads and writes
+when the row width is not a multiple of the chunk size.
+
+Restrict the NEON loop to full chunks only, remove the now-unnecessary
+post-loop adjustment, and undo the `*ddp` pre-adjustment before the
+pointer handoff to the scalar fallback.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-33636
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/aba9f18eba870d14fb52c5ba5d73451349e339c3]
+
+Reported-by: Amemoyoi <[email protected]>
+Co-authored-by: Amemoyoi <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]>
+(cherry picked from commit aba9f18eba870d14fb52c5ba5d73451349e339c3)
+Signed-off-by: Sudhir Dumbhare <[email protected]>
+---
+ arm/palette_neon_intrinsics.c | 29 +++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arm/palette_neon_intrinsics.c b/arm/palette_neon_intrinsics.c
+index 92c7d6f9f..bdd15849d 100644
+--- a/arm/palette_neon_intrinsics.c
++++ b/arm/palette_neon_intrinsics.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ 
+ /* palette_neon_intrinsics.c - NEON optimised palette expansion functions
+  *
+- * Copyright (c) 2018-2019 Cosmin Truta
++ * Copyright (c) 2018-2026 Cosmin Truta
+  * Copyright (c) 2017-2018 Arm Holdings. All rights reserved.
+  * Written by Richard Townsend <[email protected]>, February 2017.
+  *
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ png_do_expand_palette_rgba8_neon(png_structrp png_ptr, png_row_infop row_info,
+     */
+    *ddp = *ddp - ((pixels_per_chunk * sizeof(png_uint_32)) - 1);
+ 
+-   for (i = 0; i < row_width; i += pixels_per_chunk)
++   for (i = 0; i + pixels_per_chunk <= row_width; i += pixels_per_chunk)
+    {
+       uint32x4_t cur;
+       png_bytep sp = *ssp - i, dp = *ddp - (i << 2);
+@@ -90,13 +90,12 @@ png_do_expand_palette_rgba8_neon(png_structrp png_ptr, png_row_infop row_info,
+       cur = vld1q_lane_u32(riffled_palette + *(sp - 0), cur, 3);
+       vst1q_u32((void *)dp, cur);
+    }
+-   if (i != row_width)
+-   {
+-      /* Remove the amount that wasn't processed. */
+-      i -= pixels_per_chunk;
+-   }
+ 
+-   /* Decrement output pointers. */
++   /* Undo the pre-adjustment of *ddp before the pointer handoff,
++    * so the scalar fallback in pngrtran.c receives a dp that points
++    * to the correct position.
++    */
++   *ddp = *ddp + (pixels_per_chunk * 4 - 1);
+    *ssp = *ssp - i;
+    *ddp = *ddp - (i << 2);
+    return i;
+@@ -121,7 +120,7 @@ png_do_expand_palette_rgb8_neon(png_structrp png_ptr, png_row_infop row_info,
+    /* Seeking this back by 8 pixels x 3 bytes. */
+    *ddp = *ddp - ((pixels_per_chunk * sizeof(png_color)) - 1);
+ 
+-   for (i = 0; i < row_width; i += pixels_per_chunk)
++   for (i = 0; i + pixels_per_chunk <= row_width; i += pixels_per_chunk)
+    {
+       uint8x8x3_t cur;
+       png_bytep sp = *ssp - i, dp = *ddp - ((i << 1) + i);
+@@ -136,13 +135,11 @@ png_do_expand_palette_rgb8_neon(png_structrp png_ptr, png_row_infop row_info,
+       vst3_u8((void *)dp, cur);
+    }
+ 
+-   if (i != row_width)
+-   {
+-      /* Remove the amount that wasn't processed. */
+-      i -= pixels_per_chunk;
+-   }
+-
+-   /* Decrement output pointers. */
++   /* Undo the pre-adjustment of *ddp before the pointer handoff,
++    * so the scalar fallback in pngrtran.c receives a dp that points
++    * to the correct position.
++    */
++   *ddp = *ddp + (pixels_per_chunk * 3 - 1);
+    *ssp = *ssp - i;
+    *ddp = *ddp - ((i << 1) + i);
+    return i;
+-- 
+2.44.4
+
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.42.bb +1 -0
index 7471315fdd..923ed79896 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/${PV}/${BP}.tar.xz
            file://CVE-2026-22695.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-22801.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-25646.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-33636.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c919dbc11f4c03b05aba3f8884d8eb7adfe3572ad228af972bb60057bdb48450"
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/23 binutils: fix CVE-2025-69647

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <[email protected]>

Backport upstream fix for CVE-2025-69647 [1].

[1] https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=455446bbdc8675f34808187de2bbad4682016ff7

---
 .../binutils/binutils-2.42.inc                |  1 +
 .../binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-69647.patch    | 85 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 86 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-69647.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.42.inc +1 -0
index 096ccf42c2..fcbe7fbfab 100644
@@ -72,5 +72,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\
      file://0028-CVE-2025-11494.patch \
      file://0029-CVE-2025-11839.patch \
      file://0030-CVE-2025-11840.patch \
+     file://CVE-2025-69647.patch \
 "
 S  = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-69647.patch new file +85 -0

85 lines not on this page · raw message

#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/23 binutils: fix CVE-2025-69648

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <[email protected]>

Backport upstream fix for CVE-2025-69648 [1].

[1] https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;h=598704a00cbac5e85c2bedd363357b5bf6fcee33

---
 .../binutils/binutils-2.42.inc                |   1 +
 .../binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-69648.patch    | 190 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 191 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-69648.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils-2.42.inc +1 -0
index fcbe7fbfab..1a865c45f4 100644
@@ -73,5 +73,6 @@ SRC_URI = "\
      file://0029-CVE-2025-11839.patch \
      file://0030-CVE-2025-11840.patch \
      file://CVE-2025-69647.patch \
+     file://CVE-2025-69648.patch \
 "
 S  = "${WORKDIR}/git"
meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/CVE-2025-69648.patch new file +190 -0

190 lines not on this page · raw message

#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/23 dbus: gate user-session PACKAGECONFIG on systemd in DISTRO_FEATURES

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Jhonata Poma-Hansen <[email protected]>

On scarthgap images built without systemd in DISTRO_FEATURES, dbus still shipped dbus.socket and dbus.service under ${systemd_user_unitdir} (/usr/lib/systemd/user), because the 'user-session' PACKAGECONFIG was always enabled and passed --enable-user-session --with-systemduserunitdir=... to configure.

In dbus-1.14.10 the user-session autoconf option (configure.ac and bus/Makefile.am 'if DBUS_ENABLE_USER_SESSION') only installs systemd user units; it has no non-systemd effect. Enabling it on a sysvinit image has no benefit and produces the stale unit files.

Make user-session a systemd-gated PACKAGECONFIG by using bb.utils.contains in the default, so it is enabled when systemd is in DISTRO_FEATURES and disabled otherwise. No changes to the PACKAGECONFIG[user-session] or PACKAGECONFIG[systemd] entries are
needed: --disable-user-session is passed on sysvinit builds, which prevents the configure/Makefile machinery from ever setting up the user-unit install step.

This is the scarthgap equivalent of master commit a296b0623eb2 ("dbus: use the systemd class to handle the unit files"), adapted to the autotools 1.14.10 recipe. The master fix was broader because the meson 1.16.2 build handles unit-file install differently, which let that commit drop the manual do_install unit block, the systemctl mask postinst, and PACKAGE_WRITE_DEPS. On 1.14.10 those pieces are still needed; the minimal correct gate here is the user-session default.

Fixes [YOCTO #15779]

---
 meta/recipes-core/dbus/dbus_1.14.10.bb | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-core/dbus/dbus_1.14.10.bb +1 -1
index ffbf0780ed..e57a01478b 100644
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_OECONF = "--disable-xml-docs \
 EXTRA_OECONF:append:class-target = " SYSTEMCTL=${base_bindir}/systemctl"
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= "${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'systemd x11', d)} \
-                   user-session \
+                   ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'systemd', 'user-session', '', d)} \
                   "
 PACKAGECONFIG:class-native = ""
 PACKAGECONFIG:class-nativesdk = ""
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/23 expat: patch CVE-2026-32776

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Hugo SIMELIERE <[email protected]>

Pick patch from [1] also mentioned in [2].

[1] https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/1158
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-32776

---
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-32776.patch          | 91 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.6.4.bb        |  1 +
 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32776.patch
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32776.patch new file +91 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..96a869a7c8
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+From 3340f971f2f92e499adf03156024105bb9bb7ed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Francesco Bertolaccini <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2026 16:41:43 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix NULL function-pointer dereference for empty external
+ parameter entities
+
+When an external parameter entity with empty text is referenced inside
+an entity declaration value, the sub-parser created to handle it receives
+0 bytes of input.  Processing enters entityValueInitProcessor which calls
+storeEntityValue() with the parser's encoding; since no bytes were ever
+processed, encoding detection has not yet occurred and the encoding is
+still the initial probing encoding set up by XmlInitEncoding().  That
+encoding only populates scanners[] (for prolog and content), not
+literalScanners[].  XmlEntityValueTok() calls through
+literalScanners[XML_ENTITY_VALUE_LITERAL] which is NULL, causing a
+SEGV.
+
+Skip the tokenization loop entirely when entityTextPtr >= entityTextEnd,
+and initialize the `next` pointer before the early exit so that callers
+(callStoreEntityValue) receive a valid value through nextPtr.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32776
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/5be25657583ea91b09025c858b4785834c20f59c]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 5be25657583ea91b09025c858b4785834c20f59c)
+Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/xmlparse.c      |  9 ++++++++-
+ tests/basic_tests.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index aa5e91e4..56faf2eb 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -6777,7 +6777,14 @@ storeEntityValue(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc,
+       return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+   }
+ 
+-  const char *next;
++  const char *next = entityTextPtr;
++
++  /* Nothing to tokenize. */
++  if (entityTextPtr >= entityTextEnd) {
++    result = XML_ERROR_NONE;
++    goto endEntityValue;
++  }
++
+   for (;;) {
+     next
+         = entityTextPtr; /* XmlEntityValueTok doesn't always set the last arg */
+diff --git a/tests/basic_tests.c b/tests/basic_tests.c
+index 2a5e43d6..023d9ce4 100644
+--- a/tests/basic_tests.c
++++ b/tests/basic_tests.c
+@@ -6210,6 +6210,24 @@ START_TEST(test_varying_buffer_fills) {
+ }
+ END_TEST
+ 
++START_TEST(test_empty_ext_param_entity_in_value) {
++  const char *text = "<!DOCTYPE r SYSTEM \"ext.dtd\"><r/>";
++  ExtOption options[] = {
++      {XCS("ext.dtd"), "<!ENTITY % pe SYSTEM \"empty\">"
++                       "<!ENTITY ge \"%pe;\">"},
++      {XCS("empty"), ""},
++      {NULL, NULL},
++  };
++
++  XML_SetParamEntityParsing(g_parser, XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_ALWAYS);
++  XML_SetExternalEntityRefHandler(g_parser, external_entity_optioner);
++  XML_SetUserData(g_parser, options);
++  if (_XML_Parse_SINGLE_BYTES(g_parser, text, (int)strlen(text), XML_TRUE)
++      == XML_STATUS_ERROR)
++    xml_failure(g_parser);
++}
++END_TEST
++
+ void
+ make_basic_test_case(Suite *s) {
+   TCase *tc_basic = tcase_create("basic tests");
+@@ -6456,6 +6474,7 @@ make_basic_test_case(Suite *s) {
+   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_empty_element_abort);
+   tcase_add_test__ifdef_xml_dtd(tc_basic,
+                                 test_pool_integrity_with_unfinished_attr);
++  tcase_add_test__ifdef_xml_dtd(tc_basic, test_empty_ext_param_entity_in_value);
+   tcase_add_test__if_xml_ge(tc_basic, test_entity_ref_no_elements);
+   tcase_add_test__if_xml_ge(tc_basic, test_deep_nested_entity);
+   tcase_add_test__if_xml_ge(tc_basic, test_deep_nested_attribute_entity);
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.6.4.bb +1 -0
index 048093f010..631aebe6ca 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/R_${VERSION_TAG}/expat-${PV}.tar.bz2  \
            file://CVE-2026-25210-01.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-25210-02.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-25210-03.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32776.patch \
            "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/"
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/23 expat: patch CVE-2026-32777

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Hugo SIMELIERE <[email protected]>

Pick patches from [1] also mentioned in [2].

[1] https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/1162
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-32777

---
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-32777-01.patch       | 49 ++++++++++++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-32777-02.patch       | 66 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.6.4.bb        |  2 +
 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32777-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32777-02.patch
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32777-01.patch new file +49 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50ba27dcd4
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From a6e6cf7c30e54402b2fa3c49f9d98702e74f8c34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2026 20:16:13 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] lib: Reject XML_TOK_INSTANCE_START infinite loop in
+ entityValueProcessor
+
+.. that OSS-Fuzz/ClusterFuzz uncovered
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32777
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/55cda8c7125986e17d7e1825cba413bd94a35d02]
+
+(cherry picked from commit 55cda8c7125986e17d7e1825cba413bd94a35d02)
+Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/xmlparse.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index 56faf2eb..bfb8ac58 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -5077,7 +5077,7 @@ entityValueInitProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
+     }
+     /* If we get this token, we have the start of what might be a
+        normal tag, but not a declaration (i.e. it doesn't begin with
+-       "<!").  In a DTD context, that isn't legal.
++       "<!" or "<?").  In a DTD context, that isn't legal.
+     */
+     else if (tok == XML_TOK_INSTANCE_START) {
+       *nextPtr = next;
+@@ -5166,6 +5166,15 @@ entityValueProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
+       /* found end of entity value - can store it now */
+       return storeEntityValue(parser, enc, s, end, XML_ACCOUNT_DIRECT, NULL);
+     }
++    /* If we get this token, we have the start of what might be a
++       normal tag, but not a declaration (i.e. it doesn't begin with
++       "<!" or "<?").  In a DTD context, that isn't legal.
++    */
++    else if (tok == XML_TOK_INSTANCE_START) {
++      *nextPtr = next;
++      return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
++    }
++
+     start = next;
+   }
+ }
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32777-02.patch new file +66 -0

66 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.6.4.bb +2 -0
index 631aebe6ca..f78d9a8a60 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/R_${VERSION_TAG}/expat-${PV}.tar.bz2  \
            file://CVE-2026-25210-02.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-25210-03.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-32776.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32777-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32777-02.patch \
            "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/"
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/23 expat: patch CVE-2026-32778

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Hugo SIMELIERE <[email protected]>

Pick patches from [1] also mentioned in [2].

[1] https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/1163
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-32778

---
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-32778-01.patch       | 91 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-32778-02.patch       | 61 +++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.6.4.bb        |  2 +
 3 files changed, 154 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32778-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32778-02.patch
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32778-01.patch new file +91 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0105fe7417
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+From b878628b560a2ba1e11b3a12ff8df0dab7d6b8bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: laserbear <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2026 17:28:06 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] copy prefix name to pool before lookup
+
+.. so that we cannot end up with a zombie PREFIX in the pool
+that has NULL for a name.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32778
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/576b61e42feeea704253cb7c7bedb2eeb3754387]
+
+Co-authored-by: Sebastian Pipping <[email protected]>
+(cherry picked from commit 576b61e42feeea704253cb7c7bedb2eeb3754387)
+Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/xmlparse.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index bfb8ac58..9bc67f38 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -590,6 +590,8 @@ static XML_Char *poolStoreString(STRING_POOL *pool, const ENCODING *enc,
+ static XML_Bool FASTCALL poolGrow(STRING_POOL *pool);
+ static const XML_Char *FASTCALL poolCopyString(STRING_POOL *pool,
+                                                const XML_Char *s);
++static const XML_Char *FASTCALL poolCopyStringNoFinish(STRING_POOL *pool,
++                                                       const XML_Char *s);
+ static const XML_Char *poolCopyStringN(STRING_POOL *pool, const XML_Char *s,
+                                        int n);
+ static const XML_Char *FASTCALL poolAppendString(STRING_POOL *pool,
+@@ -7443,16 +7445,24 @@ setContext(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *context) {
+       else {
+         if (! poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
+           return XML_FALSE;
+-        prefix
+-            = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes,
+-                               poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool), sizeof(PREFIX));
+-        if (! prefix)
++        const XML_Char *const prefixName = poolCopyStringNoFinish(
++            &dtd->pool, poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool));
++        if (! prefixName) {
+           return XML_FALSE;
+-        if (prefix->name == poolStart(&parser->m_tempPool)) {
+-          prefix->name = poolCopyString(&dtd->pool, prefix->name);
+-          if (! prefix->name)
+-            return XML_FALSE;
+         }
++
++        prefix = (PREFIX *)lookup(parser, &dtd->prefixes, prefixName,
++                                  sizeof(PREFIX));
++
++        const bool prefixNameUsed = prefix && prefix->name == prefixName;
++        if (prefixNameUsed)
++          poolFinish(&dtd->pool);
++        else
++          poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
++
++        if (! prefix)
++          return XML_FALSE;
++
+         poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
+       }
+       for (context = s + 1; *context != CONTEXT_SEP && *context != XML_T('\0');
+@@ -8041,6 +8051,23 @@ poolCopyString(STRING_POOL *pool, const XML_Char *s) {
+   return s;
+ }
+ 
++// A version of `poolCopyString` that does not call `poolFinish`
++// and reverts any partial advancement upon failure.
++static const XML_Char *FASTCALL
++poolCopyStringNoFinish(STRING_POOL *pool, const XML_Char *s) {
++  const XML_Char *const original = s;
++  do {
++    if (! poolAppendChar(pool, *s)) {
++      // Revert any previously successful advancement
++      const ptrdiff_t advancedBy = s - original;
++      if (advancedBy > 0)
++        pool->ptr -= advancedBy;
++      return NULL;
++    }
++  } while (*s++);
++  return pool->start;
++}
++
+ static const XML_Char *
+ poolCopyStringN(STRING_POOL *pool, const XML_Char *s, int n) {
+   if (! pool->ptr && ! poolGrow(pool)) {
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-32778-02.patch new file +61 -0

61 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.6.4.bb +2 -0
index f78d9a8a60..151720a9e3 100644
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/R_${VERSION_TAG}/expat-${PV}.tar.bz2  \
            file://CVE-2026-32776.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-32777-01.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-32777-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32778-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32778-02.patch \
            "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/"
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/23 linux-yocto/6.6: update to v6.6.124

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Bruce Ashfield <[email protected]>

Updating linux-yocto/6.6 to the latest korg -stable release that comprises the following commits:

1b4ef5214f17e Linux 6.6.124
23897ece6167c ALSA: hda/realtek: Really fix headset mic for TongFang X6AR55xU.
d0a6e43d7cccc spi: tegra114: Preserve SPI mode bits in def_command1_reg
126a09f4fcd2b spi: tegra: Fix a memory leak in tegra_slink_probe()
dfc6367898077 spi: tegra210-quad: Protect curr_xfer clearing in tegra_qspi_non_combined_seq_xfer 712cde8d91688 spi: tegra210-quad: Protect curr_xfer in tegra_qspi_combined_seq_xfer 53eba2a4a4666 spi: tegra210-quad: Protect curr_xfer assignment in tegra_qspi_setup_transfer_one f9cafa63039b8 spi: tegra210-quad: Move curr_xfer read inside spinlock
552e3d8a8bef2 spi: tegra210-quad: Return IRQ_HANDLED when timeout already processed transfer a168f2002b2b4 gve: Correct ethtool rx_dropped calculation
d4a81b8ec6398 btrfs: fix racy bitfield write in btrfs_clear_space_info_full()
0e0120214b5dc ASoC: amd: fix memory leak in acp3x pdm dma ops
50b7c7a255858 ipv6: Fix ECMP sibling count mismatch when clearing RTF_ADDRCONF
42c574c1504aa netfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate() 8c934bafd10b9 hwmon: (occ) Mark occ_init_attribute() as __printf
3f89a4ef6505a drm/mgag200: fix mgag200_bmc_stop_scanout()
9d40a85138568 net: gro: fix outer network offset
00a7512ff7195 net: ethernet: adi: adin1110: Check return value of devm_gpiod_get_optional() in adin1110_check_spi() 17d340e81c4b5 tipc: use kfree_sensitive() for session key material
b2c9edad3620f net: don't touch dev->stats in BPF redirect paths
11ba9f0dc8651 macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink()
f89e33c9c37f0 dpaa2-switch: add bounds check for if_id in IRQ handler
3bf519e39b51c net: liquidio: Fix off-by-one error in VF setup_nic_devices() cleanup a0d2389c8cdc1 net: liquidio: Fix off-by-one error in PF setup_nic_devices() cleanup c0ed6c77ec340 net: liquidio: Initialize netdev pointer before queue setup
b97415c4362f7 dpaa2-switch: prevent ZERO_SIZE_PTR dereference when num_ifs is zero
13336a6239b9d net/sched: cls_u32: use skb_header_pointer_careful()
fcbda653b5a88 net: add skb_header_pointer_careful() helper
3a6d6b332f929 smb/client: fix memory leak in smb2_open_file()
f54886e18b856 platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: Skip empty attribute names
9423990550a2a platform/x86: intel_telemetry: Fix PSS event register mask
ca9ff71c15bc8 platform/x86: toshiba_haps: Fix memory leaks in add/remove routines
bae0565fa975d wifi: mac80211: don't increment crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt twice
ccd1843b63f64 wifi: mac80211: correctly check if CSA is active
73b487d44bf4f scsi: target: iscsi: Fix use-after-free in iscsit_dec_conn_usage_count() 29fe5ff92433a ALSA: hda/realtek: Fix headset mic for TongFang X6AR55xU
11ebafffce31e scsi: target: iscsi: Fix use-after-free in iscsit_dec_session_usage_count() 2f4f008f622d4 wifi: cfg80211: Fix bitrate calculation overflow for HE rates
d61171cf09715 regmap: maple: free entry on mas_store_gfp() failure
f9b06d28a60b3 spi: hisi-kunpeng: Fixed the wrong debugfs node name in hisi_spi debugfs initialization 254f303cd6663 ASoC: tlv320adcx140: Propagate error codes during probe
e2c03961b01a8 ASoC: amd: yc: Fix microphone on ASUS M6500RE
f532b29b0e313 nvmet-tcp: fixup hang in nvmet_tcp_listen_data_ready()
7c54d3f5ebbc5 nvme-fc: release admin tagset if init fails
1d395dae332ba ASoC: davinci-evm: Fix reference leak in davinci_evm_probe
db1bef623ae32 wifi: mac80211: collect station statistics earlier when disconnect
1fbb409652e3d ring-buffer: Avoid softlockup in ring_buffer_resize() during memory free f63f30607dd8e HID: Apply quirk HID_QUIRK_ALWAYS_POLL to Edifier QR30 (2d99:a101)
cff3f619fd1cb HID: i2c-hid: fix potential buffer overflow in i2c_hid_get_report()
68ab5057e690e HID: quirks: Add another Chicony HP 5MP Cameras to hid_ignore_list
383bc94e90661 netfilter: replace -EEXIST with -EBUSY
a58fbeda600fe ALSA: hda/realtek: add HP Laptop 15s-eq1xxx mute LED quirk
bfcfb9e548bc1 HID: playstation: Center initial joystick axes to prevent spurious events 9edee94001b63 HID: intel-ish-hid: Reset enum_devices_done before enumeration
28b97fcbbf523 btrfs: fix reservation leak in some error paths when inserting inline extent 9ab846d8dd027 HID: multitouch: add MT_QUIRK_STICKY_FINGERS to MT_CLS_VTL
5b25505b52dff HID: intel-ish-hid: Update ishtp bus match to support device ID table 07df5ff4f6490 smb/server: fix refcount leak in parse_durable_handle_context()
73ede654d9daa LoongArch: Enable exception fixup for specific ADE subcode
2456fde2b1377 smb/server: fix refcount leak in smb2_open()
5fbdf95d2575e LoongArch: Set correct protection_map[] for VM_NONE/VM_SHARED
04dd114b682a4 smb/server: call ksmbd_session_rpc_close() on error path in create_smb2_pipe() b03415955ed31 block,bfq: fix aux stat accumulation destination
8365785e59ea4 net: usb: sr9700: support devices with virtual driver CD
b167312390fdd wifi: wlcore: ensure skb headroom before skb_push
ffe1e19c3b0e5 wifi: mac80211: ocb: skip rx_no_sta when interface is not joined
d75245dad5cc6 tracing: Fix ftrace event field alignments
df54838ab6182 gve: Fix stats report corruption on queue count change
a8adf1ceee4e1 KVM: selftests: Add -U_FORTIFY_SOURCE to avoid some unpredictable test failures 46c93903e4c19 binderfs: fix ida_alloc_max() upper bound
ebb6aa6928d5c binder: fix BR_FROZEN_REPLY error log
9f6022b2573ae sched/rt: Fix race in push_rt_task
64c0b7e229375 ublk: fix deadlock when reading partition table
c3db89ea1ed3d hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in hfsplus_uni2asc()
df524a68d9021 netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: clamp maximum map bucket size to INT_MAX
b61f9b2fcf181 KVM: Don't clobber irqfd routing type when deassigning irqfd
d2bddc2da2b3b Revert "drm/amd: Check if ASPM is enabled from PCIe subsystem"
7f7467be748eb ARM: 9468/1: fix memset64() on big-endian
4f9f1fdc0ebdf rbd: check for EOD after exclusive lock is ensured to be held
071159ff5c0bf pmdomain: imx8m-blk-ctrl: fix out-of-range access of bc->domains
7aa0c2bb0771a pmdomain: imx8mp-blk-ctrl: Keep usb phy power domain on for system wakeup e2e1c77319d52 pmdomain: imx: gpcv2: Fix the imx8mm gpu hang due to wrong adb400 reset 1267af5b2033d pmdomain: imx8mp-blk-ctrl: Keep gpc power domain on for system wakeup c28dcc1cb4fda pmdomain: qcom: rpmpd: fix off-by-one error in clamping to the highest state 302651ccef698 platform/x86: intel_telemetry: Fix swapped arrays in PSS output
c56b4c84b3b21 x86/kfence: fix booting on 32bit non-PAE systems
dca1a6ba0da9f nvmet-tcp: add bounds checks in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec

---
 .../linux/linux-yocto-rt_6.6.bb               |  6 ++--
 .../linux/linux-yocto-tiny_6.6.bb             |  6 ++--
 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_6.6.bb  | 28 +++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-rt_6.6.bb +3 -3
index 3ad8bd54fa..3c28f96906 100644
@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ python () {
         raise bb.parse.SkipRecipe("Set PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel to linux-yocto-rt to enable it")
 }
 
-SRCREV_machine ?= "5a49ab75e554557c1d3665b22233c4de9a2c2a75"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "17375dce1754d0783fb3fb9e684691951f9ff357"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "a32dc01f5dbce65781e06a973624a2c3572fa7cd"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "307ef96123620278563ff5b1c9fb8b7b4da26970"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;branch=${KBRANCH};name=machine;protocol=https \
            git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-6.6;destsuffix=${KMETA};protocol=https"
 
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.123"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.124"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6bc538ed5bd9a7fc9398086aedcd7e46"
 
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-tiny_6.6.bb +3 -3
index 50c8e69d5c..08c176a698 100644
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ require recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto.inc
 # CVE exclusions
 include recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion_6.6.inc
 
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.123"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.124"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6bc538ed5bd9a7fc9398086aedcd7e46"
 
 DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('ARCH', 'x86', 'elfutils-native', '', d)}"
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ DEPENDS += "openssl-native util-linux-native"
 KMETA = "kernel-meta"
 KCONF_BSP_AUDIT_LEVEL = "2"
 
-SRCREV_machine ?= "18a3ba79eed015d2cbd1f5af2c1417d12b369698"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "17375dce1754d0783fb3fb9e684691951f9ff357"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "a00c570459f5486c036aefc93ab323efa8c7e645"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "307ef96123620278563ff5b1c9fb8b7b4da26970"
 
 PV = "${LINUX_VERSION}+git"
 
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_6.6.bb +14 -14
index 3f8b40e305..565022a615 100644
@@ -18,25 +18,25 @@ KBRANCH:qemux86-64 ?= "v6.6/standard/base"
 KBRANCH:qemuloongarch64  ?= "v6.6/standard/base"
 KBRANCH:qemumips64 ?= "v6.6/standard/mti-malta64"
 
-SRCREV_machine:qemuarm ?= "b562777a433f835ae245e08c27df6b47e3ae2505"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuarm64 ?= "2df2455c7199cb8db4ea0118f908f952ff73eb97"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuloongarch64 ?= "af240d7d57ebf66e87bc2dff34855e630a97ead1"
-SRCREV_machine:qemumips ?= "6b9c16676cd4c8494ca7cdff355cb1cfe4d8fb3a"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuppc ?= "bf3f6c731ea41e519389b24104458870475dce20"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv64 ?= "af240d7d57ebf66e87bc2dff34855e630a97ead1"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv32 ?= "af240d7d57ebf66e87bc2dff34855e630a97ead1"
-SRCREV_machine:qemux86 ?= "af240d7d57ebf66e87bc2dff34855e630a97ead1"
-SRCREV_machine:qemux86-64 ?= "af240d7d57ebf66e87bc2dff34855e630a97ead1"
-SRCREV_machine:qemumips64 ?= "9fb8ff244fe5c5d6aa08457cfb9bbe4a3ef47366"
-SRCREV_machine ?= "af240d7d57ebf66e87bc2dff34855e630a97ead1"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "17375dce1754d0783fb3fb9e684691951f9ff357"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuarm ?= "225cb65775de5e687da708da8f126bf94a426c54"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuarm64 ?= "632fdc720fa54154453715becbbf57793363b62d"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuloongarch64 ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
+SRCREV_machine:qemumips ?= "083f8e7fb7cacf7167aaf41b6366dc63b0b42b9a"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuppc ?= "0149565b9e2219e923ba0eebc4f7c60661778453"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv64 ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv32 ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
+SRCREV_machine:qemux86 ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
+SRCREV_machine:qemux86-64 ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
+SRCREV_machine:qemumips64 ?= "3f1d938eafffaadd2fa9d9bc83446c90d8f36093"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "307ef96123620278563ff5b1c9fb8b7b4da26970"
 
 # set your preferred provider of linux-yocto to 'linux-yocto-upstream', and you'll
 # get the <version>/base branch, which is pure upstream -stable, and the same
 # meta SRCREV as the linux-yocto-standard builds. Select your version using the
 # normal PREFERRED_VERSION settings.
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "devupstream:target"
-SRCREV_machine:class-devupstream ?= "c56aaf1a85ae918dd521fb2869028cf533d2755a"
+SRCREV_machine:class-devupstream ?= "1b4ef5214f17e671cc13f2da4a678574ce91d151"
 PN:class-devupstream = "linux-yocto-upstream"
 KBRANCH:class-devupstream = "v6.6/base"
 
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;name=machine;branch=${KBRA
            git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-6.6;destsuffix=${KMETA};protocol=https"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6bc538ed5bd9a7fc9398086aedcd7e46"
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.123"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.124"
 
 PV = "${LINUX_VERSION}+git"
 
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/23 linux-yocto/6.6: update to v6.6.126

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Bruce Ashfield <[email protected]>

Updating linux-yocto/6.6 to the latest korg -stable release that comprises the following commits:

56865d9b7074c Linux 6.6.126
673dafb9a8634 Revert "driver core: enforce device_lock for driver_match_device()" ae462074fde3b Linux 6.6.125
1c04c3a4de8d4 gpio: omap: do not register driver in probe()
455e882192c98 mptcp: fix race in mptcp_pm_nl_flush_addrs_doit()
2b890bc3a5774 selftests: mptcp: pm: ensure unknown flags are ignored
8df235f768cea spi: cadence-quadspi: Implement refcount to handle unbind during busy 665e570600733 vsock/test: verify socket options after setting them
a9e757473561d netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: prevent overflow in lookup table allocation 1c4f72fa96993 netfilter: nf_tables: missing objects with no memcg accounting 30405b23b4d5e nfsd: don't ignore the return code of svc_proc_register() 57770faaff8ee net: sfp: Fix quirk for Ubiquiti U-Fiber Instant SFP module dccf7bc011d0e scsi: qla2xxx: Query FW again before proceeding with login aed16d37696f4 scsi: qla2xxx: Free sp in error path to fix system crash 528b2f1027edf scsi: qla2xxx: Delay module unload while fabric scan in progress ccbfcaa4b88e5 scsi: qla2xxx: Allow recovery for tape devices
949010291bb94 scsi: qla2xxx: Validate sp before freeing associated memory 71dee092903ad wifi: rtw88: Fix alignment fault in rtw_core_enable_beacon() df1e20796c9f3 nilfs2: Fix potential block overflow that cause system hang dd1f6c9206385 crypto: virtio - Remove duplicated virtqueue_kick in virtio_crypto_skcipher_crypt_req d6f0d58680868 crypto: virtio - Add spinlock protection with virtqueue notification 6edf8df4bd29f crypto: omap - Allocate OMAP_CRYPTO_FORCE_COPY scatterlists correctly 7dbeeafcb6e50 crypto: octeontx - Fix length check to avoid truncation in ucode_load_store 6dda9f0699054 Bluetooth: btusb: Add USB ID 7392:e611 for Edimax EW-7611UXB adc1796eced46 driver core: enforce device_lock for driver_match_device() 787769c8cc504 smb: server: fix leak of active_num_conn in ksmbd_tcp_new_connection() 5accdc5b7f28a ksmbd: fix infinite loop caused by next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off reset in error paths 4386f6af8aaed smb: client: split cached_fid bitfields to avoid shared-byte RMW races

---
 .../linux/linux-yocto-rt_6.6.bb               |  6 ++--
 .../linux/linux-yocto-tiny_6.6.bb             |  6 ++--
 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_6.6.bb  | 28 +++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-rt_6.6.bb +3 -3
index 3c28f96906..e5f3c9b6cb 100644
@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ python () {
         raise bb.parse.SkipRecipe("Set PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel to linux-yocto-rt to enable it")
 }
 
-SRCREV_machine ?= "a32dc01f5dbce65781e06a973624a2c3572fa7cd"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "307ef96123620278563ff5b1c9fb8b7b4da26970"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "aaa3191196fccd0d26d55a88dcc2396ce79cfc21"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "17b54189a09494c54960a80a479098010e428f81"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;branch=${KBRANCH};name=machine;protocol=https \
            git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-6.6;destsuffix=${KMETA};protocol=https"
 
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.124"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.126"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6bc538ed5bd9a7fc9398086aedcd7e46"
 
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-tiny_6.6.bb +3 -3
index 08c176a698..56b3e52003 100644
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ require recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto.inc
 # CVE exclusions
 include recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion_6.6.inc
 
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.124"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.126"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6bc538ed5bd9a7fc9398086aedcd7e46"
 
 DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('ARCH', 'x86', 'elfutils-native', '', d)}"
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ DEPENDS += "openssl-native util-linux-native"
 KMETA = "kernel-meta"
 KCONF_BSP_AUDIT_LEVEL = "2"
 
-SRCREV_machine ?= "a00c570459f5486c036aefc93ab323efa8c7e645"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "307ef96123620278563ff5b1c9fb8b7b4da26970"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "3a9d8ba770fff7d27a4d2607644d9d6925329e73"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "17b54189a09494c54960a80a479098010e428f81"
 
 PV = "${LINUX_VERSION}+git"
 
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_6.6.bb +14 -14
index 565022a615..b4d9452b80 100644
@@ -18,25 +18,25 @@ KBRANCH:qemux86-64 ?= "v6.6/standard/base"
 KBRANCH:qemuloongarch64  ?= "v6.6/standard/base"
 KBRANCH:qemumips64 ?= "v6.6/standard/mti-malta64"
 
-SRCREV_machine:qemuarm ?= "225cb65775de5e687da708da8f126bf94a426c54"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuarm64 ?= "632fdc720fa54154453715becbbf57793363b62d"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuloongarch64 ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
-SRCREV_machine:qemumips ?= "083f8e7fb7cacf7167aaf41b6366dc63b0b42b9a"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuppc ?= "0149565b9e2219e923ba0eebc4f7c60661778453"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv64 ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv32 ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
-SRCREV_machine:qemux86 ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
-SRCREV_machine:qemux86-64 ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
-SRCREV_machine:qemumips64 ?= "3f1d938eafffaadd2fa9d9bc83446c90d8f36093"
-SRCREV_machine ?= "6e00181d086766512ef48806d649d032c479566d"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "307ef96123620278563ff5b1c9fb8b7b4da26970"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuarm ?= "746f0ca46b4fdd56ba711cf7b49b9a71d4f64acf"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuarm64 ?= "9da440425610b9335df95d76dfa2a56ea4e492eb"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuloongarch64 ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
+SRCREV_machine:qemumips ?= "208bd32390022fec5948b1808e6d9ea83d88d9bd"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuppc ?= "9645b14ebe59396b0d1035c5f96ac74ae483f4c7"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv64 ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv32 ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
+SRCREV_machine:qemux86 ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
+SRCREV_machine:qemux86-64 ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
+SRCREV_machine:qemumips64 ?= "b7972053efd2ad49abf9a0637dfa2b4b1bdff8a4"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "17b54189a09494c54960a80a479098010e428f81"
 
 # set your preferred provider of linux-yocto to 'linux-yocto-upstream', and you'll
 # get the <version>/base branch, which is pure upstream -stable, and the same
 # meta SRCREV as the linux-yocto-standard builds. Select your version using the
 # normal PREFERRED_VERSION settings.
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "devupstream:target"
-SRCREV_machine:class-devupstream ?= "1b4ef5214f17e671cc13f2da4a678574ce91d151"
+SRCREV_machine:class-devupstream ?= "56865d9b7074c08d8191bc721b1e46baa650d9cd"
 PN:class-devupstream = "linux-yocto-upstream"
 KBRANCH:class-devupstream = "v6.6/base"
 
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;name=machine;branch=${KBRA
            git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-6.6;destsuffix=${KMETA};protocol=https"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6bc538ed5bd9a7fc9398086aedcd7e46"
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.124"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.126"
 
 PV = "${LINUX_VERSION}+git"
 
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/23 linux-yocto/6.6: update to v6.6.127

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Bruce Ashfield <[email protected]>

Updating linux-yocto/6.6 to the latest korg -stable release that comprises the following commits:

7a137e9bfa0e Linux 6.6.127
f478b8239d65 net: tunnel: make skb_vlan_inet_prepare() return drop reasons
35ac888bf8ac USB: serial: option: add Telit FN920C04 RNDIS compositions
d4534a7f6c92 f2fs: fix to avoid mapping wrong physical block for swapfile
20a8bad29d18 f2fs: fix zoned block device information initialization
acc2c97fc000 f2fs: fix to avoid UAF in f2fs_write_end_io()
75e19da068ad f2fs: fix IS_CHECKPOINTED flag inconsistency issue caused by concurrent atomic commit and checkpoint writes eebd72cff518 f2fs: fix out-of-bounds access in sysfs attribute read/write
81193503af1f f2fs: fix to add gc count stat in f2fs_gc_range
0634e8d65099 fbdev: smscufx: properly copy ioctl memory to kernelspace
78daf5984d96 fbdev: rivafb: fix divide error in nv3_arb()
f42a2d49c465 LoongArch: Add writecombine support for DMW-based ioremap()
6e5eccdef67e cpuset: Fix missing adaptation for cpuset_is_populated
ff37dd18ce77 mm/hugetlb: fix excessive IPI broadcasts when unsharing PMD tables using mmu_gather 2eeca9383efe mm/hugetlb: fix two comments related to huge_pmd_unshare()
51dcf459845f mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb_pmd_shared()
8c9a1b071051 mm/hugetlb: fix copy_hugetlb_page_range() to use ->pt_share_count
168ee1549fa2 Revert "wireguard: device: enable threaded NAPI"
78e706f9b197 LoongArch: Rework KASAN initialization for PTW-enabled systems
f507fc06c7cd LoongArch: Add WriteCombine shadow mapping in KASAN
16f137fb74c1 gpiolib: acpi: Fix gpio count with string references
61e007657bf7 ASoC: fsl_xcvr: fix missing lock in fsl_xcvr_mode_put()
f49d2497da14 ASoC: cs42l43: Correct handling of 3-pole jack load detection
329bb274a3a9 platform/x86: panasonic-laptop: Fix sysfs group leak in error path
e8f5d1306a3a platform/x86/amd/pmc: Add quirk for MECHREVO Wujie 15X Pro
c3876edb0184 ASoC: amd: yc: Add quirk for HP 200 G2a 16
d7d7b93aca64 ASoC: Intel: sof_es8336: Add DMI quirk for Huawei BOD-WXX9
9cf4b9b8ad09 platform/x86: classmate-laptop: Add missing NULL pointer checks
e120bae4c56d drm/tegra: hdmi: sor: Fix error: variable ‘j’ set but not used
cbd9931e6456 romfs: check sb_set_blocksize() return value
79100c3bc0c4 ASoC: cs35l45: Corrects ASP_TX5 DAPM widget channel
6834804ad484 ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Inspur S14-G1
b204c5ec24a2 gpio: sprd: Change sprd_gpio lock to raw_spin_lock
4cfb1aed4753 ASoC: amd: yc: Add ASUS ExpertBook PM1503CDA to quirks list
2accd79be906 ALSA: hda/realtek: Fix headset mic for TongFang X6AR55xU
b19838402873 bus: fsl-mc: fix use-after-free in driver_override_show()
3118a9c6875b bus: fsl-mc: Replace snprintf and sprintf with sysfs_emit in sysfs show functions 8cb905eca739 PCI: endpoint: Avoid creating sub-groups asynchronously
68c9fdb01af8 PCI: endpoint: Remove unused field in struct pci_epf_group
74e7458537cd scsi: qla2xxx: Fix bsg_done() causing double free

---
 .../linux/linux-yocto-rt_6.6.bb               |  6 ++--
 .../linux/linux-yocto-tiny_6.6.bb             |  6 ++--
 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_6.6.bb  | 28 +++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-rt_6.6.bb +3 -3
index e5f3c9b6cb..8685e5cbf6 100644
@@ -14,13 +14,13 @@ python () {
         raise bb.parse.SkipRecipe("Set PREFERRED_PROVIDER_virtual/kernel to linux-yocto-rt to enable it")
 }
 
-SRCREV_machine ?= "aaa3191196fccd0d26d55a88dcc2396ce79cfc21"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "17b54189a09494c54960a80a479098010e428f81"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "c45743dc8dc2ddfbe7bd165997e1f7cf887fa6b7"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "45f69741c733e066ed1a12b6025e347e5cd6063e"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;branch=${KBRANCH};name=machine;protocol=https \
            git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-6.6;destsuffix=${KMETA};protocol=https"
 
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.126"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.127"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6bc538ed5bd9a7fc9398086aedcd7e46"
 
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto-tiny_6.6.bb +3 -3
index 56b3e52003..d6a9afdf17 100644
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ require recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto.inc
 # CVE exclusions
 include recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion_6.6.inc
 
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.126"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.127"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6bc538ed5bd9a7fc9398086aedcd7e46"
 
 DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('ARCH', 'x86', 'elfutils-native', '', d)}"
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ DEPENDS += "openssl-native util-linux-native"
 KMETA = "kernel-meta"
 KCONF_BSP_AUDIT_LEVEL = "2"
 
-SRCREV_machine ?= "3a9d8ba770fff7d27a4d2607644d9d6925329e73"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "17b54189a09494c54960a80a479098010e428f81"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "8247922ff493e4fef938ce36562cac9c0cce86aa"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "45f69741c733e066ed1a12b6025e347e5cd6063e"
 
 PV = "${LINUX_VERSION}+git"
 
meta/recipes-kernel/linux/linux-yocto_6.6.bb +14 -14
index b4d9452b80..92ad6afa3a 100644
@@ -18,25 +18,25 @@ KBRANCH:qemux86-64 ?= "v6.6/standard/base"
 KBRANCH:qemuloongarch64  ?= "v6.6/standard/base"
 KBRANCH:qemumips64 ?= "v6.6/standard/mti-malta64"
 
-SRCREV_machine:qemuarm ?= "746f0ca46b4fdd56ba711cf7b49b9a71d4f64acf"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuarm64 ?= "9da440425610b9335df95d76dfa2a56ea4e492eb"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuloongarch64 ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
-SRCREV_machine:qemumips ?= "208bd32390022fec5948b1808e6d9ea83d88d9bd"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuppc ?= "9645b14ebe59396b0d1035c5f96ac74ae483f4c7"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv64 ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
-SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv32 ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
-SRCREV_machine:qemux86 ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
-SRCREV_machine:qemux86-64 ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
-SRCREV_machine:qemumips64 ?= "b7972053efd2ad49abf9a0637dfa2b4b1bdff8a4"
-SRCREV_machine ?= "c6bff8c03457825a34929284be97de7fd99f0c83"
-SRCREV_meta ?= "17b54189a09494c54960a80a479098010e428f81"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuarm ?= "aa66687c1abe2afe2ee6c00c36bfaaf3d5d9636c"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuarm64 ?= "cf88783fdb92901d9d228afb7d700c6575742f1b"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuloongarch64 ?= "70af2998be31b72a111de67966b7816b3d54d472"
+SRCREV_machine:qemumips ?= "cbd6f9a670486dcd83ef0f8b90a75b2b7b44b447"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuppc ?= "bce75aa765505d7db3bb1bfefb5d3f524a1a5b64"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv64 ?= "70af2998be31b72a111de67966b7816b3d54d472"
+SRCREV_machine:qemuriscv32 ?= "70af2998be31b72a111de67966b7816b3d54d472"
+SRCREV_machine:qemux86 ?= "70af2998be31b72a111de67966b7816b3d54d472"
+SRCREV_machine:qemux86-64 ?= "70af2998be31b72a111de67966b7816b3d54d472"
+SRCREV_machine:qemumips64 ?= "4cc6d51a6f63436a37c3ba4ea2da93c7fd3240b4"
+SRCREV_machine ?= "70af2998be31b72a111de67966b7816b3d54d472"
+SRCREV_meta ?= "45f69741c733e066ed1a12b6025e347e5cd6063e"
 
 # set your preferred provider of linux-yocto to 'linux-yocto-upstream', and you'll
 # get the <version>/base branch, which is pure upstream -stable, and the same
 # meta SRCREV as the linux-yocto-standard builds. Select your version using the
 # normal PREFERRED_VERSION settings.
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "devupstream:target"
-SRCREV_machine:class-devupstream ?= "56865d9b7074c08d8191bc721b1e46baa650d9cd"
+SRCREV_machine:class-devupstream ?= "7a137e9bfa0e1919555d60f9dc0c05a7a5ba75d0"
 PN:class-devupstream = "linux-yocto-upstream"
 KBRANCH:class-devupstream = "v6.6/base"
 
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/linux-yocto.git;name=machine;branch=${KBRA
            git://git.yoctoproject.org/yocto-kernel-cache;type=kmeta;name=meta;branch=yocto-6.6;destsuffix=${KMETA};protocol=https"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=6bc538ed5bd9a7fc9398086aedcd7e46"
-LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.126"
+LINUX_VERSION ?= "6.6.127"
 
 PV = "${LINUX_VERSION}+git"
 
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/23 rsync: fix for CVE-2026-41035

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Pick patch from [1] also mentioned at Debian report in [2]

[1] https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/bb0a8118c2d2ab01140bac5e4e327e5e1ef90c9c
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-41035
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41035

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2026-41035.patch          | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb    |  1 +
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-41035.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2026-41035.patch new file +39 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..66b1b93672
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From bb0a8118c2d2ab01140bac5e4e327e5e1ef90c9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 09:57:45 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] xattrs: fixed count in qsort
+
+this fixes the count passed to the sort of the xattr list. This issue
+was reported here:
+
+https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/16/2
+
+the bug is not exploitable due to the fork-per-connection design of
+rsync, the attack is the equivalent of the user closing the socket
+themselves.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-41035
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/bb0a8118c2d2ab01140bac5e4e327e5e1ef90c9c]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ xattrs.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xattrs.c b/xattrs.c
+index 26e50a6..65166ee 100644
+--- a/xattrs.c
++++ b/xattrs.c
+@@ -860,8 +860,8 @@ void receive_xattr(int f, struct file_struct *file)
+ 		rxa->num = num;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (need_sort && count > 1)
+-		qsort(temp_xattr.items, count, sizeof (rsync_xa), rsync_xal_compare_names);
++	if (need_sort && temp_xattr.count > 1)
++		qsort(temp_xattr.items, temp_xattr.count, sizeof (rsync_xa), rsync_xal_compare_names);
+ 
+ 	ndx = rsync_xal_store(&temp_xattr); /* adds item to rsync_xal_l */
+ 
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +1 -0
index 14beafb681..2a1c3d9d56 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2024-12088.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12747.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-10158.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-41035.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
 
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/23 u-boot: fix CVE-2025-24857

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>

According to [1], Improper access control for volatile memory containing boot code in Universal Boot Loader (U-Boot) before 2017.11 and Qualcomm chips IPQ4019, IPQ5018, IPQ5322, IPQ6018, IPQ8064, IPQ8074, and IPQ9574 could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

Backport a patch [2] from upstream to fix CVE-2025-24857

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24857
[2] https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/87d85139a96a39429120cca838e739408ef971a2

---
 .../u-boot/files/CVE-2025-24857.patch         | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common.inc     |  4 +-
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2025-24857.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2025-24857.patch new file +42 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..99acd5bab1
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 15a46d72515c04d0eeaca19bf0356a39efc9cf93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tom Rini <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 15:23:01 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] fs: fat: Perform sanity checks on getsize in get_fatent()
+
+We do not perform a check on the value of getsize in get_fatent to
+ensure that it will fit within the allocated buffer. For safety sake,
+add a check now and if the value exceeds FATBUFBLOCKS use that value
+instead. While not currently actively exploitable, it was in the past so
+adding this check is worthwhile.
+
+This addresses CVE-2025-24857 and was originally reported by Harvey
+Phillips of Amazon Element55.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-24857
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/87d85139a96a39429120cca838e739408ef971a2]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
+---
+ fs/fat/fat.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/fs/fat/fat.c b/fs/fat/fat.c
+index e2570e81676..f6dc7ed15fe 100644
+--- a/fs/fat/fat.c
++++ b/fs/fat/fat.c
+@@ -215,6 +215,11 @@ static __u32 get_fatent(fsdata *mydata, __u32 entry)
+ 		if (flush_dirty_fat_buffer(mydata) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+ 
++		if (getsize > FATBUFBLOCKS) {
++			debug("getsize is too large for bufptr\n");
++			getsize = FATBUFBLOCKS;
++		}
++
+ 		if (disk_read(startblock, getsize, bufptr) < 0) {
+ 			debug("Error reading FAT blocks\n");
+ 			return ret;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common.inc +3 -1
index 1f17bd7d0a..5f6bd44ab7 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ PE = "1"
 # repo during parse
 SRCREV = "866ca972d6c3cabeaf6dbac431e8e08bb30b3c8e"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot.git;protocol=https;branch=master"
+SRC_URI = "git://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
+           file://CVE-2025-24857.patch \
+"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 B = "${WORKDIR}/build"
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/23 ovmf: fix CVE-2025-2296

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>

According to [1], EDK2 contains a vulnerability in BIOS where an attacker may cause “ Improper Input Validation” by local access. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could alter control flow in unexpected ways, potentially allowing arbitrary command execution and impacting Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.

Backport patches from upstream [2] to fix CVE-2025-2296

Note: backport 0001-AmdSev-Halt-on-failed-blob-allocation.patch to apply the CVE patches without confliction

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2296
[2] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/10628

---
 ...mdSev-Halt-on-failed-blob-allocation.patch | 159 ++++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-1.patch           | 762 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-2.patch           | 175 ++++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-3.patch           |  42 +
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-4.patch           |  34 +
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-5.patch           |  36 +
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-6.patch           |  54 ++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-7.patch           | 124 +++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-8.patch           | 125 +++
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-9.patch           | 108 +++
 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb            |  10 +
 11 files changed, 1629 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-AmdSev-Halt-on-failed-blob-allocation.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-4.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-5.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-6.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-7.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-8.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-9.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/0001-AmdSev-Halt-on-failed-blob-allocation.patch new file +159 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..181ff3376a
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+From dbec8dc5ba6341d816ffd495fcd7eeece1716bb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2024 20:07:19 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] AmdSev: Halt on failed blob allocation
+
+A malicious host may be able to undermine the fw_cfg
+interface such that loading a blob fails.
+
+In this case rather than continuing to the next boot
+option, the blob verifier should halt.
+
+For non-confidential guests, the error should be non-fatal.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/10b4bb8d6d0c515ed9663691aea3684be8f7b0fc]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
+---
+ .../BlobVerifierSevHashes.c                     | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
+ OvmfPkg/Include/Library/BlobVerifierLib.h       | 11 +++++++----
+ .../BlobVerifierLibNull/BlobVerifierNull.c      | 13 ++++++++-----
+ .../QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c                     |  9 ++++-----
+ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/BlobVerifierLibSevHashes/BlobVerifierSevHashes.c b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/BlobVerifierLibSevHashes/BlobVerifierSevHashes.c
+index 2e58794c3c..6477c5c3d3 100644
+--- a/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/BlobVerifierLibSevHashes/BlobVerifierSevHashes.c
++++ b/OvmfPkg/AmdSev/BlobVerifierLibSevHashes/BlobVerifierSevHashes.c
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ FindBlobEntryGuid (
+   @param[in] BlobName           The name of the blob
+   @param[in] Buf                The data of the blob
+   @param[in] BufSize            The size of the blob in bytes
++  @param[in] FetchStatus        The status of the previous blob fetch
+ 
+   @retval EFI_SUCCESS           The blob was verified successfully.
+   @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED     The blob could not be verified, and therefore
+@@ -90,13 +91,27 @@ EFIAPI
+ VerifyBlob (
+   IN  CONST CHAR16  *BlobName,
+   IN  CONST VOID    *Buf,
+-  IN  UINT32        BufSize
++  IN  UINT32        BufSize,
++  IN  EFI_STATUS    FetchStatus
+   )
+ {
+   CONST GUID  *Guid;
+   INT32       Remaining;
+   HASH_TABLE  *Entry;
+ 
++  // Enter a dead loop if the fetching of this blob
++  // failed. This prevents a malicious host from
++  // circumventing the following checks.
++  if (EFI_ERROR (FetchStatus)) {
++    DEBUG ((
++      DEBUG_ERROR,
++      "%a: Fetching blob failed.\n",
++      __func__
++      ));
++
++    CpuDeadLoop ();
++  }
++
+   if ((mHashesTable == NULL) || (mHashesTableSize == 0)) {
+     DEBUG ((
+       DEBUG_ERROR,
+diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/BlobVerifierLib.h b/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/BlobVerifierLib.h
+index 7e1af27574..09af1b77de 100644
+--- a/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/BlobVerifierLib.h
++++ b/OvmfPkg/Include/Library/BlobVerifierLib.h
+@@ -22,17 +22,20 @@
+   @param[in] BlobName           The name of the blob
+   @param[in] Buf                The data of the blob
+   @param[in] BufSize            The size of the blob in bytes
++  @param[in] FetchStatus        The status of fetching this blob
+ 
+-  @retval EFI_SUCCESS           The blob was verified successfully.
+-  @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED     The blob could not be verified, and therefore
+-                                should be considered non-secure.
++  @retval EFI_SUCCESS           The blob was verified successfully or was not
++                                found in the hash table.
++  @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED     Kernel hashes not supported but the boot can
++                                continue safely.
+ **/
+ EFI_STATUS
+ EFIAPI
+ VerifyBlob (
+   IN  CONST CHAR16  *BlobName,
+   IN  CONST VOID    *Buf,
+-  IN  UINT32        BufSize
++  IN  UINT32        BufSize,
++  IN  EFI_STATUS    FetchStatus
+   );
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --git a/OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLibNull/BlobVerifierNull.c b/OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLibNull/BlobVerifierNull.c
+index e817c3cc95..db5320571c 100644
+--- a/OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLibNull/BlobVerifierNull.c
++++ b/OvmfPkg/Library/BlobVerifierLibNull/BlobVerifierNull.c
+@@ -16,18 +16,21 @@
+   @param[in] BlobName           The name of the blob
+   @param[in] Buf                The data of the blob
+   @param[in] BufSize            The size of the blob in bytes
++  @param[in] FetchStatus        The status of the fetch of this blob
+ 
+-  @retval EFI_SUCCESS           The blob was verified successfully.
+-  @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED     The blob could not be verified, and therefore
+-                                should be considered non-secure.
++  @retval EFI_SUCCESS           The blob was verified successfully or was not
++                                found in the hash table.
++  @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED     Kernel hashes not supported but the boot can
++                                continue safely.
+ **/
+ EFI_STATUS
+ EFIAPI
+ VerifyBlob (
+   IN  CONST CHAR16  *BlobName,
+   IN  CONST VOID    *Buf,
+-  IN  UINT32        BufSize
++  IN  UINT32        BufSize,
++  IN  EFI_STATUS    FetchStatus
+   )
+ {
+-  return EFI_SUCCESS;
++  return FetchStatus;
+ }
+diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c
+index 3c12085f6c..cf58c97cd2 100644
+--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c
++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c
+@@ -1042,6 +1042,7 @@ QemuKernelLoaderFsDxeEntrypoint (
+   KERNEL_BLOB  *CurrentBlob;
+   KERNEL_BLOB  *KernelBlob;
+   EFI_STATUS   Status;
++  EFI_STATUS   FetchStatus;
+   EFI_HANDLE   FileSystemHandle;
+   EFI_HANDLE   InitrdLoadFile2Handle;
+ 
+@@ -1060,15 +1061,13 @@ QemuKernelLoaderFsDxeEntrypoint (
+   //
+   for (BlobType = 0; BlobType < KernelBlobTypeMax; ++BlobType) {
+     CurrentBlob = &mKernelBlob[BlobType];
+-    Status      = FetchBlob (CurrentBlob);
+-    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+-      goto FreeBlobs;
+-    }
++    FetchStatus = FetchBlob (CurrentBlob);
+ 
+     Status = VerifyBlob (
+                CurrentBlob->Name,
+                CurrentBlob->Data,
+-               CurrentBlob->Size
++               CurrentBlob->Size,
++               FetchStatus
+                );
+     if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+       goto FreeBlobs;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-1.patch new file +762 -0

762 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-2.patch new file +175 -0

175 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-3.patch new file +42 -0

42 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-4.patch new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bba3b51c78
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 1111e9fe7078eed9e5c50e1808776ee40a629e16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2025 15:52:54 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 04/10] OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe: drop bogus assert
+
+Triggers when trying to get root directory info.
+Reproducer:
+ * Use qemu -kernel with something edk2 can not load.
+ * When dropped into the efi shell try inspect the file system.
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-2296
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/1111e9fe7078eed9e5c50e1808776ee40a629e16]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
+---
+ OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c
+index 0947b6bf2d..3e1a876bf0 100644
+--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c
++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c
+@@ -290,7 +290,6 @@ QemuKernelBlobTypeToFileInfo (
+ 
+   NameSize     = (StrLen (Name) + 1) * 2;
+   FileInfoSize = OFFSET_OF (EFI_FILE_INFO, FileName) + NameSize;
+-  ASSERT (FileInfoSize >= sizeof *FileInfo);
+ 
+   OriginalBufferSize = *BufferSize;
+   *BufferSize        = FileInfoSize;
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-5.patch new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e3a8292356
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 46ae4e4b9574530e5081e98af0495d6f6d28379f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2025 16:03:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 05/10] OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe: accept absolute paths
+
+EFI shell looks for "\startup.nsh".
+Try "-fw_cfg name=etc/boot/startup.nsh,string='echo hello'" ;)
+
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2025-2296
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/46ae4e4b9574530e5081e98af0495d6f6d28379f]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
+---
+ OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c b/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c
+index 3e1a876bf0..5b90420dad 100644
+--- a/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c
++++ b/OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.c
+@@ -806,6 +806,11 @@ QemuKernelStubFileOpen (
+   //
+   // Locate the file.
+   //
++  if (FileName[0] == '\\') {
++    // also accept absolute paths, i.e. '\kernel' for 'kernel'
++    FileName++;
++  }
++
+   Blob = FindKernelBlob (FileName);
+ 
+   if (Blob == NULL) {
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-6.patch new file +54 -0

54 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-7.patch new file +124 -0

124 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-8.patch new file +125 -0

125 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2025-2296-9.patch new file +108 -0

108 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +10 -0
index badde30d97..fd5ff25dc9 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,16 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://0006-BaseTools-StringFuncs-fix-gcc-16-warning.patch \
            file://0007-BaseTools-EfiRom-fix-compiler-warning.patch \
            file://0008-BaseTools-Pccts-set-C-standard.patch \
+           file://0001-AmdSev-Halt-on-failed-blob-allocation.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-2296-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-2296-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-2296-3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-2296-4.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-2296-5.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-2296-6.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-2296-7.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-2296-8.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-2296-9.patch \
            "
 
 PV = "edk2-stable202402"
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/23 ovmf: fix CVE-2024-38798

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>

According to [1],

EDK2 contains a vulnerability in BIOS where an attacker may cause “Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor” by local access. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability will lead to possible information disclosure or escalation of privilege and impact Confidentiality.

Backport a patch [2] from upstream to fix CVE-2024-38798

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38798
[2] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/0cad130cb4885961da201bb9b08424b3fd3d2249

---
 .../ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2024-38798.patch            | 116 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb            |   1 +
 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2024-38798.patch
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf/CVE-2024-38798.patch new file +116 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d0a73c7a6
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+From 81263e46ad8cf2a6c7d86bc51c95342d07ec31ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 5 Jan 2026 13:04:18 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] MdeModulePkg : Clear keyboard queue buffer after reading
+
+There is a possibility to retrieve user input keystroke data stored in the
+queue buffer via the EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_INPUT_PROTOCOL pointer. To prevent
+exposure of the password string, clear the queue buffer by filling it
+with zeros after reading.
+
+Signed-off-by: Nick Wang <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-38798
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/0cad130cb4885961da201bb9b08424b3fd3d2249]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
+---
+ MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KbdCtrller.c       | 2 ++
+ MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KbdTextIn.c        | 1 +
+ MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbKbDxe/KeyBoard.c                  | 2 +-
+ .../Universal/Console/ConSplitterDxe/ConSplitter.c        | 1 +
+ .../Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConIn.c         | 8 ++++++--
+ 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KbdCtrller.c b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KbdCtrller.c
+index 981309f..32757a7 100644
+--- a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KbdCtrller.c
++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KbdCtrller.c
+@@ -650,6 +650,8 @@ PopScancodeBufHead (
+     if (Buf != NULL) {
+       Buf[Index] = Queue->Buffer[Queue->Head];
+     }
++
++    Queue->Buffer[Queue->Head] = 0;
+   }
+ 
+   return EFI_SUCCESS;
+diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KbdTextIn.c b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KbdTextIn.c
+index 81d3c6e..e03c88f 100644
+--- a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KbdTextIn.c
++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KbdTextIn.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ PopEfikeyBufHead (
+     CopyMem (KeyData, &Queue->Buffer[Queue->Head], sizeof (EFI_KEY_DATA));
+   }
+ 
++  ZeroMem (&Queue->Buffer[Queue->Head], sizeof (EFI_KEY_DATA));
+   Queue->Head = (Queue->Head + 1) % KEYBOARD_EFI_KEY_MAX_COUNT;
+   return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbKbDxe/KeyBoard.c b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbKbDxe/KeyBoard.c
+index b5a6459..7df1566 100644
+--- a/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbKbDxe/KeyBoard.c
++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbKbDxe/KeyBoard.c
+@@ -1840,7 +1840,7 @@ Dequeue (
+   }
+ 
+   CopyMem (Item, Queue->Buffer[Queue->Head], ItemSize);
+-
++  ZeroMem (Queue->Buffer[Queue->Head], ItemSize);
+   //
+   // Adjust the head pointer of the FIFO keyboard buffer.
+   //
+diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConSplitterDxe/ConSplitter.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConSplitterDxe/ConSplitter.c
+index 0a776f3..5c1a35e 100644
+--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConSplitterDxe/ConSplitter.c
++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConSplitterDxe/ConSplitter.c
+@@ -3537,6 +3537,7 @@ ConSplitterTextInExDequeueKey (
+     &Private->KeyQueue[1],
+     Private->CurrentNumberOfKeys * sizeof (EFI_KEY_DATA)
+     );
++  ZeroMem (&Private->KeyQueue[Private->CurrentNumberOfKeys], sizeof (EFI_KEY_DATA));
+   return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConIn.c b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConIn.c
+index f1d0a34..8aafb4b 100644
+--- a/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConIn.c
++++ b/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalConIn.c
+@@ -760,7 +760,8 @@ RawFiFoRemoveOneKey (
+     return FALSE;
+   }
+ 
+-  *Output = TerminalDevice->RawFiFo->Data[Head];
++  *Output                             = TerminalDevice->RawFiFo->Data[Head];
++  TerminalDevice->RawFiFo->Data[Head] = 0;
+ 
+   TerminalDevice->RawFiFo->Head = (UINT8)((Head + 1) % (RAW_FIFO_MAX_NUMBER + 1));
+ 
+@@ -881,6 +882,7 @@ EfiKeyFiFoForNotifyRemoveOneKey (
+   }
+ 
+   CopyMem (Output, &EfiKeyFiFo->Data[Head], sizeof (EFI_INPUT_KEY));
++  ZeroMem (&EfiKeyFiFo->Data[Head], sizeof (EFI_INPUT_KEY));
+ 
+   EfiKeyFiFo->Head = (UINT8)((Head + 1) % (FIFO_MAX_NUMBER + 1));
+ 
+@@ -1032,6 +1034,7 @@ EfiKeyFiFoRemoveOneKey (
+   }
+ 
+   CopyMem (Output, &TerminalDevice->EfiKeyFiFo->Data[Head], sizeof (EFI_INPUT_KEY));
++  ZeroMem (&TerminalDevice->EfiKeyFiFo->Data[Head], sizeof (EFI_INPUT_KEY));
+ 
+   TerminalDevice->EfiKeyFiFo->Head = (UINT8)((Head + 1) % (FIFO_MAX_NUMBER + 1));
+ 
+@@ -1142,7 +1145,8 @@ UnicodeFiFoRemoveOneKey (
+   Head = TerminalDevice->UnicodeFiFo->Head;
+   ASSERT (Head < FIFO_MAX_NUMBER + 1);
+ 
+-  *Output = TerminalDevice->UnicodeFiFo->Data[Head];
++  *Output                                 = TerminalDevice->UnicodeFiFo->Data[Head];
++  TerminalDevice->UnicodeFiFo->Data[Head] = 0;
+ 
+   TerminalDevice->UnicodeFiFo->Head = (UINT8)((Head + 1) % (FIFO_MAX_NUMBER + 1));
+ }
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +1 -0
index fd5ff25dc9..4e6227f484 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SRC_URI = "gitsm://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://CVE-2025-2296-7.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-2296-8.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-2296-9.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-38798.patch \
            "
 
 PV = "edk2-stable202402"
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/23 apt: Add CVE_PRODUCT to support product name

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Himanshu Jadon <[email protected]>

- Keep both the older deprecated debian:apt alias and the active debian:advanced_package_tool identity in CVE_PRODUCT.
- This preserves completeness and avoids missing CVEs in case older aliases are still used in NVD records.

(cherry picked from commit 4c777220ee5740b800f4128da79c24f7e42c7b88)
[FT: Rebase onto scarthgap-next]
---
 meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt_2.6.1.bb | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt_2.6.1.bb +3 -0
index 436e2e8cad..12915660b0 100644
@@ -141,3 +141,6 @@ do_install:append() {
 	# Avoid non-reproducible -src package
 	sed -i -e "s,${B}/include/,,g" ${B}/apt-pkg/tagfile-keys.cc
 }
+
+# Add CVE_PRODUCT to match the NVD CPE product name
+CVE_PRODUCT = "debian:apt debian:advanced_package_tool"
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/23 avahi: Fix CVE-2026-34933

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>

Pick patch according to [1]

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-34933
[2] https://github.com/avahi/avahi/pull/891
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34933

---
 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi_0.8.bb  |   2 +
 .../avahi/files/CVE-2026-34933-1.patch        | 108 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../avahi/files/CVE-2026-34933-2.patch        |  96 ++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 206 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2026-34933-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2026-34933-2.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/avahi_0.8.bb +2 -0
index fce2d7cd56..31febc360d 100644
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/v${PV}/avahi-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2025-68468.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-68471.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-24401.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34933-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-34933-2.patch \
            "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/avahi/avahi/releases/"
meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2026-34933-1.patch new file +108 -0

108 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-connectivity/avahi/files/CVE-2026-34933-2.patch new file +96 -0

96 lines not on this page · raw message

#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/23 gdk-pixbuf: Fix CVE-2026-5201

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>

Pick patch according to [1]

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-5201
[2] https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gdk-pixbuf/-/issues/304

---
 .../gdk-pixbuf/gdk-pixbuf/CVE-2026-5201.patch | 44 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../gdk-pixbuf/gdk-pixbuf_2.42.12.bb          |  1 +
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-gnome/gdk-pixbuf/gdk-pixbuf/CVE-2026-5201.patch
meta/recipes-gnome/gdk-pixbuf/gdk-pixbuf/CVE-2026-5201.patch new file +44 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..97e0dddb62
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 6cce9311e70b969cbcc6e3e1e74ae1756ed02d5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matthias Clasen <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 12:21:56 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] jpeg: Reject unsupported number of components
+
+This condition was already checked for incremental loading.
+This commit adds the same check in the nonincremental
+code path.
+
+Closes: #304
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gdk-pixbuf/-/commit/6cce9311e70b969cbcc6e3e1e74ae1756ed02d5b]
+CVE: CVE-2026-5201
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
+---
+ gdk-pixbuf/io-jpeg.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/gdk-pixbuf/io-jpeg.c b/gdk-pixbuf/io-jpeg.c
+index 9ee1d21..d419812 100644
+--- a/gdk-pixbuf/io-jpeg.c
++++ b/gdk-pixbuf/io-jpeg.c
+@@ -625,6 +625,18 @@ gdk_pixbuf__real_jpeg_image_load (FILE *f, struct jpeg_decompress_struct *cinfo,
+ 	cinfo->do_fancy_upsampling = FALSE;
+ 	cinfo->do_block_smoothing = FALSE;
+ 
++	/* Reject unsupported component counts */
++	if (cinfo->output_components != 3 && cinfo->output_components != 4 &&
++	    !(cinfo->output_components == 1 &&
++	      cinfo->out_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE)) {
++		g_set_error (error,
++			     GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR,
++			     GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_CORRUPT_IMAGE,
++			     _("Unsupported number of color components (%d)"),
++			     cinfo->output_components);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	pixbuf = gdk_pixbuf_new (GDK_COLORSPACE_RGB, 
+ 				 cinfo->out_color_components == 4 ? TRUE : FALSE, 
+ 				 8,
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
meta/recipes-gnome/gdk-pixbuf/gdk-pixbuf_2.42.12.bb +1 -0
index 7c58fe1e1d..2f0de425b5 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${MAJ_VER}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://0001-meson.build-allow-a-subset-of-tests-in-cross-compile.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-7345.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-6199.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-5201.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b9505b3445b9a7e48ced34760c3bcb73e966df3ac94c95a148cb669ab748e3c7"
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/23 ghostscript: Pin to C17 std

In reply to Fabien Thomas

The code defines a custom 'bool' type (as an 'int'), which is incompatible with C23 in which bool is a keyword, and trying to use <stdbool.h> fails because 'int' and 'bool' are used interchangeably in the code.

Add the flag to CC variable, since CFLAGS is used by both c and c++ compilers and clang++ is less forgiving when C compiler only option is used on its cmdline so it complains about -std=gnu17 and bails out.

(From OE-Core rev: 49657089ef215824f8f79a81deb7baf4f27d0030)

---
 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_10.05.1.bb | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_10.05.1.bb +2 -0
index a48ad671c7..57a1098521 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ EXTRA_OECONF:append:mipsarcho32 = " --with-large_color_index=0"
 EXTRA_OECONF:append:armv7a = "${@bb.utils.contains('TUNE_FEATURES','neon','',' --disable-neon',d)}"
 EXTRA_OECONF:append:armv7ve = "${@bb.utils.contains('TUNE_FEATURES','neon','',' --disable-neon',d)}"
 
+CC += "-std=gnu17"
+
 # Uses autoconf but not automake, can't do out-of-tree
 inherit autotools-brokensep pkgconfig
 
#19 lore raw

PATCH 19/23 ghostscript: fix build with gcc-15 on host

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Martin Jansa <[email protected]>

(From OE-Core rev: 02e282f6417274a93c6f01978bf33e2d171297b0)

---
 ...Fix-compatibility-with-C23-compilers.patch | 67 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../ghostscript/ghostscript_10.05.1.bb        |  1 +
 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/0001-Bug-708160-Fix-compatibility-with-C23-compilers.patch
meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/0001-Bug-708160-Fix-compatibility-with-C23-compilers.patch new file +67 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..78f3fc1c34
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From c595086bfe206776676e290df98cd09e91210e27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alex Cherepanov <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2025 17:19:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Bug 708160: Fix compatibility with C23 compilers
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+* fixes:
+  http://errors.yoctoproject.org/Errors/Details/853021/
+
+In file included from ./base/genconf.c:18:
+./base/stdpre.h:348:13: error: ‘bool’ cannot be defined via ‘typedef’
+  348 | typedef int bool;
+      |             ^~~~
+./base/stdpre.h:348:13: note: ‘bool’ is a keyword with ‘-std=c23’ onwards
+./base/stdpre.h:348:1: warning: useless type name in empty declaration
+  348 | typedef int bool;
+      | ^~~~~~~
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [Partial backport of https://cgit.ghostscript.com/cgi-bin/cgit.cgi/ghostpdl.git/commit/base/stdpre.h?id=ae940946473ceb8c5353bc6e7f04673c6e60502d]
+
+Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <[email protected]>
+---
+ base/stdpre.h | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/base/stdpre.h b/base/stdpre.h
+index dda30b6..2f9c84e 100644
+--- a/base/stdpre.h
++++ b/base/stdpre.h
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* Copyright (C) 2001-2023 Artifex Software, Inc.
++/* Copyright (C) 2001-2025 Artifex Software, Inc.
+    All Rights Reserved.
+ 
+    This software is provided AS-IS with no warranty, either express or
+@@ -341,7 +341,9 @@ typedef signed char schar;
+  * and the MetroWerks C++ compiler insists that bool be equivalent to
+  * unsigned char.
+  */
+-#ifndef __cplusplus
++
++/* C23 has bool as a builtin type. */
++#if !defined(__cplusplus) && (!defined(__STDC_VERSION__) || __STDC_VERSION__ < 202311L)
+ #ifdef __BEOS__
+ typedef unsigned char bool;
+ #else
+diff --git a/base/gp.h b/base/gp.h
+index ad5bb61..cf2c9cf 100644
+--- a/base/gp.h
++++ b/base/gp.h
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* Copyright (C) 2001-2023 Artifex Software, Inc.
++/* Copyright (C) 2001-2025 Artifex Software, Inc.
+    All Rights Reserved.
+ 
+    This software is provided AS-IS with no warranty, either express or
+@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ int gp_fseek_impl(FILE *strm, gs_offset_t offset, int origin);
+ /* Create a second open gp_file on the basis of a given one */
+ FILE *gp_fdup_impl(FILE *f, const char *mode);
+ 
+-int gp_fseekable_impl(FILE *f);
++bool gp_fseekable_impl(FILE *f);
+ 
+ /* Force given file into binary mode (no eol translations, etc) */
+ /* if 2nd param true, text mode if 2nd param false */
meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_10.05.1.bb +1 -0
index 57a1098521..f7e1de734d 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/ArtifexSoftware/ghostpdl-downloads/releases/downlo
            file://CVE-2025-59798.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-59799.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-59800.patch \
+           file://0001-Bug-708160-Fix-compatibility-with-C23-compilers.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "121861b6d29b2461dec6575c9f3cab665b810bd408d4ec02c86719fa708b0a49"
#20 lore raw

PATCH 20/23 systemd: fix for CVE-2026-40225

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Backport commit[0] and [1] which fixes this vulnerability as mentioned in Debian report [2].

[0] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/03bb697b8df0339c37f4b845025320b261aeb7cc
[1] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/5887e72ff87d3a66a4c3fa91897fbec1545f4d3d
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-40225

More details : https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40225

---
 .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40225-01.patch   | 131 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40225-02.patch   |  39 ++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_255.21.bb   |   2 +
 3 files changed, 172 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40225-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40225-02.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40225-01.patch new file +131 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f616e636c2
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+From 03bb697b8df0339c37f4b845025320b261aeb7cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Luca Boccassi <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2026 19:32:35 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] udev: check for invalid chars in various fields received from
+ the kernel
+
+(cherry picked from commit 16325b35fa6ecb25f66534a562583ce3b96d52f3)
+(cherry picked from commit 3513862eabe9ec4a6a095d7266e98f998f289ed2)
+(cherry picked from commit c20d21e0da293e715db468f9f4a15a5c8fbf8273)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40225
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/03bb697b8df0339c37f4b845025320b261aeb7cc]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/udev/dmi_memory_id/dmi_memory_id.c | 3 ++-
+ src/udev/scsi_id/scsi_id.c             | 5 +++--
+ src/udev/udev-builtin-net_id.c         | 9 +++++++++
+ src/udev/v4l_id/v4l_id.c               | 5 ++++-
+ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/udev/dmi_memory_id/dmi_memory_id.c b/src/udev/dmi_memory_id/dmi_memory_id.c
+index 52ea250af8..4f2c21b80b 100644
+--- a/src/udev/dmi_memory_id/dmi_memory_id.c
++++ b/src/udev/dmi_memory_id/dmi_memory_id.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ #include "string-util.h"
+ #include "udev-util.h"
+ #include "unaligned.h"
++#include "utf8.h"
+ 
+ #define SUPPORTED_SMBIOS_VER 0x030300
+ 
+@@ -185,7 +186,7 @@ static void dmi_memory_device_string(
+ 
+         str = strdupa_safe(dmi_string(h, s));
+         str = strstrip(str);
+-        if (!isempty(str))
++        if (!isempty(str) && utf8_is_valid(str) && !string_has_cc(str, /* ok= */ NULL))
+                 printf("MEMORY_DEVICE_%u_%s=%s\n", slot_num, attr_suffix, str);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/udev/scsi_id/scsi_id.c b/src/udev/scsi_id/scsi_id.c
+index 6308c52b7e..7e18bc755a 100644
+--- a/src/udev/scsi_id/scsi_id.c
++++ b/src/udev/scsi_id/scsi_id.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include "strv.h"
+ #include "strxcpyx.h"
+ #include "udev-util.h"
++#include "utf8.h"
+ 
+ static const struct option options[] = {
+         { "device",             required_argument, NULL, 'd' },
+@@ -443,8 +444,8 @@ static int scsi_id(char *maj_min_dev) {
+                 }
+                 if (dev_scsi.tgpt_group[0] != '\0')
+                         printf("ID_TARGET_PORT=%s\n", dev_scsi.tgpt_group);
+-                if (dev_scsi.unit_serial_number[0] != '\0')
+-                        printf("ID_SCSI_SERIAL=%s\n", dev_scsi.unit_serial_number);
++                if (dev_scsi.unit_serial_number[0] != '\0' && utf8_is_valid(dev_scsi.unit_serial_number) && !string_has_cc(dev_scsi.unit_serial_number, /* ok= */ NULL))
++                        printf("ID_SCSI_SERIAL=%s\n", serial_str);
+                 goto out;
+         }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/udev/udev-builtin-net_id.c b/src/udev/udev-builtin-net_id.c
+index 91b40088f4..715184e282 100644
+--- a/src/udev/udev-builtin-net_id.c
++++ b/src/udev/udev-builtin-net_id.c
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include "strv.h"
+ #include "strxcpyx.h"
+ #include "udev-builtin.h"
++#include "utf8.h"
+ 
+ #define ONBOARD_14BIT_INDEX_MAX ((1U << 14) - 1)
+ #define ONBOARD_16BIT_INDEX_MAX ((1U << 16) - 1)
+@@ -247,6 +248,9 @@ static int get_port_specifier(sd_device *dev, bool fallback_to_dev_id, char **re
+                         }
+                 }
+ 
++                if (!utf8_is_valid(phys_port_name) || string_has_cc(phys_port_name, /* ok= */ NULL))
++                        return log_device_debug_errno(dev, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid phys_port_name");
++
+                 /* Otherwise, use phys_port_name as is. */
+                 buf = strjoin("n", phys_port_name);
+                 if (!buf)
+@@ -351,6 +355,9 @@ static int names_pci_onboard_label(sd_device *dev, sd_device *pci_dev, const cha
+         if (r < 0)
+                 return log_device_debug_errno(pci_dev, r, "Failed to get PCI onboard label: %m");
+ 
++        if (!utf8_is_valid(label) || string_has_cc(label, /* ok= */ NULL))
++                return log_device_debug_errno(dev, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid label");
++
+         char str[ALTIFNAMSIZ];
+         if (snprintf_ok(str, sizeof str, "%s%s",
+                         naming_scheme_has(NAMING_LABEL_NOPREFIX) ? "" : prefix,
+@@ -1209,6 +1216,8 @@ static int names_netdevsim(sd_device *dev, const char *prefix, bool test) {
+         if (isempty(phys_port_name))
+                 return log_device_debug_errno(dev, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
+                                               "The 'phys_port_name' attribute is empty.");
++        if (!utf8_is_valid(phys_port_name) || string_has_cc(phys_port_name, /* ok= */ NULL))
++                return log_device_debug_errno(dev, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid phys_port_name");
+ 
+         char str[ALTIFNAMSIZ];
+         if (snprintf_ok(str, sizeof str, "%si%un%s", prefix, addr, phys_port_name))
+diff --git a/src/udev/v4l_id/v4l_id.c b/src/udev/v4l_id/v4l_id.c
+index 30527e9556..2ec96d8d3a 100644
+--- a/src/udev/v4l_id/v4l_id.c
++++ b/src/udev/v4l_id/v4l_id.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
+ #include "build.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+ #include "main-func.h"
++#include "string-util.h"
++#include "utf8.h"
+ 
+ static const char *arg_device = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -82,7 +84,8 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+                 int capabilities;
+ 
+                 printf("ID_V4L_VERSION=2\n");
+-                printf("ID_V4L_PRODUCT=%s\n", v2cap.card);
++                if (utf8_is_valid((char *)v2cap.card) && !string_has_cc((char *)v2cap.card, /* ok= */ NULL))
++                        printf("ID_V4L_PRODUCT=%s\n", v2cap.card);
+                 printf("ID_V4L_CAPABILITIES=:");
+ 
+                 if (v2cap.capabilities & V4L2_CAP_DEVICE_CAPS)
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40225-02.patch new file +39 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bc0a5514d4
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 5887e72ff87d3a66a4c3fa91897fbec1545f4d3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Luca Boccassi <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2026 11:10:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] udev: fix review mixup
+
+The previous version in the PR changed variable and sanitized it
+in place. The second version switched to skip if CCs are in the
+string instead, but didn't move back to the original variable.
+Because it's an existing variable, no CI caught it.
+
+Follow-up for 16325b35fa6ecb25f66534a562583ce3b96d52f3
+
+(cherry picked from commit 54f880b02ecf7362e630ffc885d1466df6ee6820)
+(cherry picked from commit 4425d8523e79f3cc00b3b93a0b5e7c6cdc284a97)
+(cherry picked from commit 75c585beae60e73208941e6b3f64cf249223f53d)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40225
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/5887e72ff87d3a66a4c3fa91897fbec1545f4d3d]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/udev/scsi_id/scsi_id.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/udev/scsi_id/scsi_id.c b/src/udev/scsi_id/scsi_id.c
+index 7e18bc755a..b2df8d9f7f 100644
+--- a/src/udev/scsi_id/scsi_id.c
++++ b/src/udev/scsi_id/scsi_id.c
+@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static int scsi_id(char *maj_min_dev) {
+                 if (dev_scsi.tgpt_group[0] != '\0')
+                         printf("ID_TARGET_PORT=%s\n", dev_scsi.tgpt_group);
+                 if (dev_scsi.unit_serial_number[0] != '\0' && utf8_is_valid(dev_scsi.unit_serial_number) && !string_has_cc(dev_scsi.unit_serial_number, /* ok= */ NULL))
+-                        printf("ID_SCSI_SERIAL=%s\n", serial_str);
++                        printf("ID_SCSI_SERIAL=%s\n", dev_scsi.unit_serial_number);
+                 goto out;
+         }
+ 
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_255.21.bb +2 -0
index 87e186bbfa..fe9d699816 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ SRC_URI += " \
            file://0002-binfmt-Don-t-install-dependency-links-at-install-tim.patch \
            file://0003-timedated-Respond-on-org.freedesktop.timedate1.SetNT.patch \
            file://0008-implment-systemd-sysv-install-for-OE.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40225-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40225-02.patch \
            "
 
 # patches needed by musl
#21 lore raw

PATCH 21/23 systemd: fix for CVE-2026-40226

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Backport commit[0] and [1] which fixes this vulnerability as mentioned in Debian report [2].

[0] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/773fd3b6e72e6c83cbb1cfc1cb20f3793db8649a
[1] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/bfa0a842822c4f79da9d47f8a773fd128d8f8a0a
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-40226

More details : https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40226

---
 .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40226-01.patch   | 63 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40226-02.patch   | 39 ++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_255.21.bb   |  2 +
 3 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40226-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40226-02.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40226-01.patch new file +63 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f2893cab7
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From 773fd3b6e72e6c83cbb1cfc1cb20f3793db8649a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Luca Boccassi <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2026 12:15:26 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] nspawn: apply BindUser/Ephemeral from settings file only if
+ trusted
+
+Originally reported on yeswehack.com as:
+YWH-PGM9780-116
+
+Follow-up for 2f8930449079403b26c9164b8eeac78d5af2c8df
+Follow-up for a2f577fca0be79b23f61f033229b64884e7d840a
+
+(cherry picked from commit 61bceb1bff4b1f9c126b18dc971ca3e6d8c71c40)
+(cherry picked from commit 718711ed876c870a72149eea279b819cdab14e91)
+(cherry picked from commit e4db9c12957d315c0ed22c6ca87a816d0927d6dc)
+
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40226
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/773fd3b6e72e6c83cbb1cfc1cb20f3793db8649a]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/nspawn/nspawn.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
+index 005a3d2be1..0ac0c94f06 100644
+--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
++++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
+@@ -4275,8 +4275,13 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
+         }
+ 
+         if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_EPHEMERAL) == 0 &&
+-            settings->ephemeral >= 0)
+-                arg_ephemeral = settings->ephemeral;
++            settings->ephemeral >= 0) {
++
++                if (!arg_settings_trusted)
++                        log_warning("Ignoring ephemeral setting, file %s is not trusted.", path);
++                else
++                        arg_ephemeral = settings->ephemeral;
++        }
+ 
+         if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_DIRECTORY) == 0 &&
+             settings->root) {
+@@ -4444,8 +4449,13 @@ static int merge_settings(Settings *settings, const char *path) {
+         }
+ 
+         if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_BIND_USER) == 0 &&
+-            !strv_isempty(settings->bind_user))
+-                strv_free_and_replace(arg_bind_user, settings->bind_user);
++            !strv_isempty(settings->bind_user)) {
++
++                if (!arg_settings_trusted)
++                        log_warning("Ignoring bind user setting, file %s is not trusted.", path);
++                else
++                        strv_free_and_replace(arg_bind_user, settings->bind_user);
++        }
+ 
+         if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_NOTIFY_READY) == 0 &&
+             settings->notify_ready >= 0)
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-40226-02.patch new file +39 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..47f780e6c5
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From bfa0a842822c4f79da9d47f8a773fd128d8f8a0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Luca Boccassi <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:27:14 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] nspawn: normalize pivot_root paths
+
+Originally reported on yeswehack.com as:
+YWH-PGM9780-116
+
+Follow-up for b53ede699cdc5233041a22591f18863fb3fe2672
+
+(cherry picked from commit 7b85f5498a958e5bb660c703b8f4a71cceed3373)
+(cherry picked from commit 6566dc1451089e07090f5a114ae2eb43ed39188d)
+(cherry picked from commit 1c55a0a5e26a07df828f72092ad1203e221b60db)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-40226
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/bfa0a842822c4f79da9d47f8a773fd128d8f8a0a]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
+index 470f477f22..09c442a63a 100644
+--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
++++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-mount.c
+@@ -1255,7 +1255,9 @@ int pivot_root_parse(char **pivot_root_new, char **pivot_root_old, const char *s
+ 
+         if (!path_is_absolute(root_new))
+                 return -EINVAL;
+-        if (root_old && !path_is_absolute(root_old))
++        if (!path_is_normalized(root_new))
++                return -EINVAL;
++        if (root_old && (!path_is_absolute(root_old) || !path_is_normalized(root_old)))
+                 return -EINVAL;
+ 
+         free_and_replace(*pivot_root_new, root_new);
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_255.21.bb +2 -0
index fe9d699816..9c5f8af240 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ SRC_URI += " \
            file://0008-implment-systemd-sysv-install-for-OE.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40225-01.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-40225-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40226-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-40226-02.patch \
            "
 
 # patches needed by musl
#22 lore raw

PATCH 22/23 libsoup: fix CVE-2025-14523

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Changqing Li <[email protected]>

Refer:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/work_items/472

---
 .../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-14523.patch        | 715 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.4.4.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 716 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-14523.patch
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-14523.patch new file +715 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1cf5c9d667
@@ -0,0 +1,715 @@
+From 70123da95418f5d6e00e8ac2d586fb6c5d02cdc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Catanzaro <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2026 14:50:33 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] Reject duplicate Host headers
+
+RFC 9112 section 3.2 says:
+
+A server MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request) status code to any
+HTTP/1.1 request message that lacks a Host header field and to any
+request message that contains more than one Host header field line or a
+Host header field with an invalid field value.
+
+In addition to rejecting a duplicate header when parsing headers, also
+reject attempts to add the duplicate header using the
+soup_message_headers_append() API, and add tests for both cases.
+
+These checks will also apply to HTTP/2. I'm not sure whether this is
+actually desired or not, but the header processing code is not aware of
+which HTTP version is in use.
+
+(Note that while SoupMessageHeaders does not require the Host header to
+be present in an HTTP/1.1 request, SoupServer itself does. So we can't
+test the case of missing Host header via the header parsing test, but it
+really is enforced.)
+
+Fixes #472
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/aecd8daadc110f8561fb2d6b2806a4cacf2e4c85]
+CVE: CVE-2025-14523
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+---
+ libsoup/soup-headers.c                 |   3 +-
+ libsoup/soup-message-headers-private.h |   4 +-
+ libsoup/soup-message-headers.c         |  80 +++++++------
+ tests/header-parsing-test.c            | 148 +++++++++++++++++--------
+ 4 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libsoup/soup-headers.c b/libsoup/soup-headers.c
+index 155c11d..3fec9b3 100644
+--- a/libsoup/soup-headers.c
++++ b/libsoup/soup-headers.c
+@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ soup_headers_parse (const char *str, int len, SoupMessageHeaders *dest)
+ 		for (p = strchr (value, '\r'); p; p = strchr (p, '\r'))
+ 			*p = ' ';
+ 
+-		soup_message_headers_append_untrusted_data (dest, name, value);
++		if (!soup_message_headers_append_untrusted_data (dest, name, value))
++                        goto done;
+         }
+ 	success = TRUE;
+ 
+diff --git a/libsoup/soup-message-headers-private.h b/libsoup/soup-message-headers-private.h
+index 9815464..770f3ef 100644
+--- a/libsoup/soup-message-headers-private.h
++++ b/libsoup/soup-message-headers-private.h
+@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
+ 
+ G_BEGIN_DECLS
+ 
+-void        soup_message_headers_append_untrusted_data  (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
++gboolean    soup_message_headers_append_untrusted_data  (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
+                                                          const char         *name,
+                                                          const char         *value);
+-void        soup_message_headers_append_common          (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
++gboolean    soup_message_headers_append_common          (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
+                                                          SoupHeaderName      name,
+                                                          const char         *value);
+ const char *soup_message_headers_get_one_common         (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
+diff --git a/libsoup/soup-message-headers.c b/libsoup/soup-message-headers.c
+index d69d6e8..ce4b3b3 100644
+--- a/libsoup/soup-message-headers.c
++++ b/libsoup/soup-message-headers.c
+@@ -267,12 +267,16 @@ soup_message_headers_clean_connection_headers (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs)
+ 	soup_header_free_list (tokens);
+ }
+ 
+-void
++gboolean
+ soup_message_headers_append_common (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
+                                     SoupHeaderName      name,
+                                     const char         *value)
+ {
+         SoupCommonHeader header;
++        if (name == SOUP_HEADER_HOST && soup_message_headers_get_one (hdrs, "Host")) {
++                g_warning ("soup_message_headers_append_common: Rejecting duplicate Host header");
++                return FALSE;
++        }
+ 
+         if (!hdrs->common_headers)
+                 hdrs->common_headers = g_array_sized_new (FALSE, FALSE, sizeof (SoupCommonHeader), 6);
+@@ -284,32 +288,18 @@ soup_message_headers_append_common (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
+                 g_hash_table_remove (hdrs->common_concat, GUINT_TO_POINTER (header.name));
+ 
+         soup_message_headers_set (hdrs, name, value);
++        return TRUE;
+ }
+ 
+-/**
+- * soup_message_headers_append:
+- * @hdrs: a #SoupMessageHeaders
+- * @name: the header name to add
+- * @value: the new value of @name
+- *
+- * Appends a new header with name @name and value @value to @hdrs.
+- *
+- * (If there is an existing header with name @name, then this creates a second
+- * one, which is only allowed for list-valued headers; see also
+- * [[email protected]].)
+- *
+- * The caller is expected to make sure that @name and @value are
+- * syntactically correct.
+- **/
+-void
+-soup_message_headers_append (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
+-			     const char *name, const char *value)
++static gboolean
++soup_message_headers_append_internal (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
++                         const char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ 	SoupUncommonHeader header;
+         SoupHeaderName header_name;
+ 
+-	g_return_if_fail (name != NULL);
+-	g_return_if_fail (value != NULL);
++	g_return_val_if_fail (name != NULL, FALSE);
++	g_return_val_if_fail (value != NULL, FALSE);
+ 
+ 	/* Setting a syntactically invalid header name or value is
+ 	 * considered to be a programming error. However, it can also
+@@ -317,23 +307,22 @@ soup_message_headers_append (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
+ 	 * compiled with G_DISABLE_CHECKS.
+ 	 */
+ #ifndef G_DISABLE_CHECKS
+-	g_return_if_fail (*name && strpbrk (name, " \t\r\n:") == NULL);
+-	g_return_if_fail (strpbrk (value, "\r\n") == NULL);
++	g_return_val_if_fail (*name && strpbrk (name, " \t\r\n:") == NULL, FALSE);
++	g_return_val_if_fail (strpbrk (value, "\r\n") == NULL, FALSE);
+ #else
+ 	if (*name && strpbrk (name, " \t\r\n:")) {
+-		g_warning ("soup_message_headers_append: Ignoring bad name '%s'", name);
+-		return;
++		g_warning ("soup_message_headers_append: Rejecting bad name '%s'", name);
++		return FALSE;
+ 	}
+ 	if (strpbrk (value, "\r\n")) {
+-		g_warning ("soup_message_headers_append: Ignoring bad value '%s'", value);
+-		return;
++		g_warning ("soup_message_headers_append: Rejecting bad value '%s'", value);
++		return FALSE;
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+         header_name = soup_header_name_from_string (name);
+         if (header_name != SOUP_HEADER_UNKNOWN) {
+-                soup_message_headers_append_common (hdrs, header_name, value);
+-                return;
++                return soup_message_headers_append_common (hdrs, header_name, value);
+         }
+ 
+         if (!hdrs->uncommon_headers)
+@@ -344,21 +333,48 @@ soup_message_headers_append (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
+ 	g_array_append_val (hdrs->uncommon_headers, header);
+ 	if (hdrs->uncommon_concat)
+ 		g_hash_table_remove (hdrs->uncommon_concat, header.name);
++        return TRUE;
++}
++
++/**
++ * soup_message_headers_append:
++ * @hdrs: a #SoupMessageHeaders
++ * @name: the header name to add
++ * @value: the new value of @name
++ *
++ * Appends a new header with name @name and value @value to @hdrs.
++ *
++ * (If there is an existing header with name @name, then this creates a second
++ * one, which is only allowed for list-valued headers; see also
++ * [[email protected]].)
++ *
++ * The caller is expected to make sure that @name and @value are
++ * syntactically correct.
++ **/
++void
++soup_message_headers_append (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
++			     const char *name, const char *value)
++{
++	soup_message_headers_append_internal (hdrs, name, value);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * Appends a header value ensuring that it is valid UTF8.
++ * Appends a header value ensuring that it is valid UTF-8, and also checking the
++ * return value of soup_message_headers_append_internal() to report whether the
++ * headers are invalid for various other reasons.
+  */
+-void
++gboolean
+ soup_message_headers_append_untrusted_data (SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs,
+                                             const char         *name,
+                                             const char         *value)
+ {
+         char *safe_value = g_utf8_make_valid (value, -1);
+         char *safe_name = g_utf8_make_valid (name, -1);
+-        soup_message_headers_append (hdrs, safe_name, safe_value);
++        gboolean result = soup_message_headers_append_internal (hdrs, safe_name, safe_value);
++
+         g_free (safe_value);
+         g_free (safe_name);
++        return result;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/tests/header-parsing-test.c b/tests/header-parsing-test.c
+index 9490559..98a22a4 100644
+--- a/tests/header-parsing-test.c
++++ b/tests/header-parsing-test.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	const char *method, *path;
+ 	SoupHTTPVersion version;
+ 	Header headers[10];
++	GLogLevelFlags log_flags;
+ } reqtests[] = {
+ 	/**********************/
+ 	/*** VALID REQUESTS ***/
+@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET / HTTP/1.0\r\n", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_OK,
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_0,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 1 header", NULL,
+@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 1 header, no leading whitespace", NULL,
+@@ -51,7 +52,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 1 header including trailing whitespace", NULL,
+@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 1 header, wrapped", NULL,
+@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Foo", "bar baz" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 1 header, wrapped with additional whitespace", NULL,
+@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Foo", "bar baz" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 1 header, wrapped with tab", NULL,
+@@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Foo", "bar baz" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 1 header, wrapped before value", NULL,
+@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Foo", "bar baz" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 1 header with empty value", NULL,
+@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Host", "" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 2 headers", NULL,
+@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { "Connection", "close" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 3 headers", NULL,
+@@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	    { "Connection", "close" },
+ 	    { "Blah", "blah" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 3 headers, 1st wrapped", NULL,
+@@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+             { "Foo", "bar baz" },
+ 	    { "Blah", "blah" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 3 headers, 2nd wrapped", NULL,
+@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	    { "Blah", "blah" },
+ 	    { "Foo", "bar baz" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ 3 headers, 3rd wrapped", NULL,
+@@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	    { "Blah", "blah" },
+ 	    { "Foo", "bar baz" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ same header multiple times", NULL,
+@@ -168,7 +169,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Foo", "bar, baz, quux" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Connection header on HTTP/1.0 message", NULL,
+@@ -178,21 +179,21 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  { { "Connection", "Bar, Quux" },
+             { "Foo", "bar" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "GET with full URI", "667637",
+ 	  "GET http://example.com HTTP/1.1\r\n", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_OK,
+ 	  "GET", "http://example.com", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "GET with full URI in upper-case", "667637",
+ 	  "GET HTTP://example.com HTTP/1.1\r\n", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_OK,
+ 	  "GET", "HTTP://example.com", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	/* It's better for this to be passed through: this means a SoupServer
+@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET AbOuT: HTTP/1.1\r\n", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_OK,
+ 	  "GET", "AbOuT:", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	/****************************/
+@@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	/* RFC 2616 section 3.1 says we MUST accept this */
+@@ -228,7 +229,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	/* RFC 2616 section 19.3 says we SHOULD accept these */
+@@ -240,7 +241,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { "Connection", "close" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "LF instead of CRLF after Request-Line", NULL,
+@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Mixed CRLF/LF", "666316",
+@@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	    { "e", "f" },
+ 	    { "g", "h" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ incorrect whitespace in Request-Line", NULL,
+@@ -270,7 +271,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Req w/ incorrect whitespace after Request-Line", "475169",
+@@ -279,7 +280,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET", "/", SOUP_HTTP_1_1,
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	/* If the request/status line is parseable, then we
+@@ -293,7 +294,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { "Bar", "two" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "First header line is continuation", "666316",
+@@ -303,7 +304,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  { { "Host", "example.com" },
+ 	    { "c", "d" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Zero-length header name", "666316",
+@@ -313,7 +314,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  { { "a", "b" },
+ 	    { "c", "d" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "CR in header name", "666316",
+@@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  { { "a", "b" },
+ 	    { "c", "d" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "CR in header value", "666316",
+@@ -336,7 +337,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	    { "s", "t" },		/* CR at end is ignored */
+ 	    { "c", "d" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Tab in header name", "666316",
+@@ -351,7 +352,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	    { "p", "q z: w" },
+ 	    { "c", "d" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Tab in header value", "666316",
+@@ -364,7 +365,7 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	    { "z", "w" },	/* trailing tab ignored */
+ 	    { "c", "d" },
+ 	    { NULL }
+-	  }
++	  }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	/************************/
+@@ -375,77 +376,77 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET /\r\n", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "HTTP 1.2 request (no such thing)", NULL,
+ 	  "GET / HTTP/1.2\r\n", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_HTTP_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "HTTP 2000 request (no such thing)", NULL,
+ 	  "GET / HTTP/2000.0\r\n", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_HTTP_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Long HTTP version terminating at missing minor version", "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/404",
+ 	  unterminated_http_version, sizeof (unterminated_http_version),
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+            NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Non-HTTP request", NULL,
+ 	  "GET / SOUP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Junk after Request-Line", NULL,
+ 	  "GET / HTTP/1.1 blah\r\nHost: example.com\r\n", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "NUL in Method", NULL,
+ 	  "G\x00T / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n", 37,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "NUL at beginning of Method", "666316",
+ 	  "\x00 / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n", 35,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "NUL in Path", NULL,
+ 	  "GET /\x00 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n", 38,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "No terminating CRLF", NULL,
+ 	  "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Unrecognized expectation", NULL,
+ 	  "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\nExpect: the-impossible\r\n", -1,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_EXPECTATION_FAILED,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	// https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/377
+@@ -453,21 +454,40 @@ static struct RequestTest {
+ 	  "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost\x00: example.com\r\n", 36,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+ 	  NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "NUL in header value", NULL,
+ 	  "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nFoo: b\x00" "ar\r\n", 28,
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+            NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
+ 	},
+ 
+ 	{ "Only newlines", NULL,
+ 	  only_newlines, sizeof (only_newlines),
+ 	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
+            NULL, NULL, -1,
+-	  { { NULL } }
++	  { { NULL } }, 0
++	},
++	{ "Duplicate Host headers",
++	  "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/472",
++	  "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\nHost: example.org\r\n",
++	  -1,
++	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
++	  NULL, NULL, -1,
++	  { { NULL } },
++	  G_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING
++	},
++
++	{ "Duplicate Host headers, case insensitive",
++	  "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/472",
++	  "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\nhost: example.org\r\n",
++	  -1,
++	  SOUP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST,
++	  NULL, NULL, -1,
++	  { { NULL } },
++	  G_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING
+ 	}
+ };
+ static const int num_reqtests = G_N_ELEMENTS (reqtests);
+@@ -915,10 +935,17 @@ do_request_tests (void)
+ 			len = strlen (reqtests[i].request);
+ 		else
+ 			len = reqtests[i].length;
++
++		if (reqtests[i].log_flags)
++			g_test_expect_message ("libsoup", reqtests[i].log_flags, "*");
++
+ 		status = soup_headers_parse_request (reqtests[i].request, len,
+ 						     headers, &method, &path,
+ 						     &version);
+ 		g_assert_cmpint (status, ==, reqtests[i].status);
++		if (reqtests[i].log_flags)
++			g_test_assert_expected_messages ();
++
+ 		if (SOUP_STATUS_IS_SUCCESSFUL (status)) {
+ 			g_assert_cmpstr (method, ==, reqtests[i].method);
+ 			g_assert_cmpstr (path, ==, reqtests[i].path);
+@@ -1312,6 +1339,32 @@ do_bad_header_tests (void)
+ 	soup_message_headers_unref (hdrs);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++do_append_duplicate_host_test (void)
++{
++   SoupMessageHeaders *hdrs;
++   const char *list_value;
++
++   hdrs = soup_message_headers_new (SOUP_MESSAGE_HEADERS_REQUEST);
++   soup_message_headers_append (hdrs, "Host", "a");
++
++   g_test_expect_message ("libsoup", G_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
++                      "soup_message_headers_append_common: Rejecting duplicate Host header");
++   soup_message_headers_append (hdrs, "Host", "b");
++   g_test_assert_expected_messages ();
++
++        /* Case insensitive */
++   g_test_expect_message ("libsoup", G_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING,
++                      "soup_message_headers_append_common: Rejecting duplicate Host header");
++   soup_message_headers_append (hdrs, "host", "b");
++   g_test_assert_expected_messages ();
++
++   list_value = soup_message_headers_get_list (hdrs, "Host");
++   g_assert_cmpstr (list_value, ==, "a");
++
++   soup_message_headers_unref (hdrs);
++}
++
+ int
+ main (int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+@@ -1327,6 +1380,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	g_test_add_func ("/header-parsing/content-type", do_content_type_tests);
+ 	g_test_add_func ("/header-parsing/append-param", do_append_param_tests);
+ 	g_test_add_func ("/header-parsing/bad", do_bad_header_tests);
++	g_test_add_func ("/header-parsing/append-duplicate-host", do_append_duplicate_host_test);
+ 
+ 	ret = g_test_run ();
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.4.4.bb +1 -0
index c09b06fec2..6be31806f1 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/libsoup/${SHRT_VER}/libsoup-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2025-2784.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-4945.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-12105.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-14523.patch \
 "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "291c67725f36ed90ea43efff25064b69c5a2d1981488477c05c481a3b4b0c5aa"
 
#23 lore raw

PATCH 23/23 libsoup: fix CVE-2025-32049

In reply to Fabien Thomas

From: Changqing Li <[email protected]>

Refer:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/issues/390

---
 .../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-1.patch      | 229 ++++++++++++++
 .../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-2.patch      |  34 ++
 .../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-3.patch      | 134 ++++++++
 .../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-4.patch      | 292 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.4.4.bb |   4 +
 5 files changed, 693 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-3.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-4.patch
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-1.patch new file +229 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0772c759dc
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+From 176cb31003252a69d3fc7908e8f505c0ee006b7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2024 15:20:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/4] websocket: add a way to restrict the total message size
+
+Otherwise a client could send small packages smaller than
+total-incoming-payload-size but still to break the server
+with a big allocation
+
+Fixes: #390
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/db87805ab565d67533dfed2cb409dbfd63c7fdce]
+CVE: CVE-2025-32049
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+---
+ libsoup/websocket/soup-websocket-connection.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++-
+ libsoup/websocket/soup-websocket-connection.h |   7 ++
+ 2 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libsoup/websocket/soup-websocket-connection.c b/libsoup/websocket/soup-websocket-connection.c
+index 5eb8150..19bdd39 100644
+--- a/libsoup/websocket/soup-websocket-connection.c
++++ b/libsoup/websocket/soup-websocket-connection.c
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ enum {
+ 	PROP_MAX_INCOMING_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
+ 	PROP_KEEPALIVE_INTERVAL,
+ 	PROP_EXTENSIONS,
+-
++	PROP_MAX_TOTAL_MESSAGE_SIZE,
+         LAST_PROPERTY
+ };
+ 
+@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char *origin;
+ 	char *protocol;
+ 	guint64 max_incoming_payload_size;
++	guint64 max_total_message_size;
+ 	guint keepalive_interval;
+ 
+ 	gushort peer_close_code;
+@@ -156,6 +157,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ } SoupWebsocketConnectionPrivate;
+ 
+ #define MAX_INCOMING_PAYLOAD_SIZE_DEFAULT   128 * 1024
++#define MAX_TOTAL_MESSAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT   128 * 1024
+ #define READ_BUFFER_SIZE 1024
+ #define MASK_LENGTH 4
+ 
+@@ -670,8 +672,8 @@ bad_data_error_and_close (SoupWebsocketConnection *self)
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-too_big_error_and_close (SoupWebsocketConnection *self,
+-                         guint64 payload_len)
++too_big_incoming_payload_error_and_close (SoupWebsocketConnection *self,
++                                          guint64 payload_len)
+ {
+         SoupWebsocketConnectionPrivate *priv = soup_websocket_connection_get_instance_private (self);
+ 	GError *error;
+@@ -687,6 +689,24 @@ too_big_error_and_close (SoupWebsocketConnection *self,
+ 	emit_error_and_close (self, error, TRUE);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++too_big_message_error_and_close (SoupWebsocketConnection *self,
++                                 guint64 len)
++{
++	SoupWebsocketConnectionPrivate *priv = soup_websocket_connection_get_instance_private (self);
++	GError *error;
++
++	error = g_error_new_literal (SOUP_WEBSOCKET_ERROR,
++				     SOUP_WEBSOCKET_CLOSE_TOO_BIG,
++				     priv->connection_type == SOUP_WEBSOCKET_CONNECTION_SERVER ?
++				     "Received WebSocket payload from the client larger than configured max-total-message-size" :
++				     "Received WebSocket payload from the server larger than configured max-total-message-size");
++	g_debug ("%s received message of size %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT " or greater, but max supported size is %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT,
++	         priv->connection_type == SOUP_WEBSOCKET_CONNECTION_SERVER ? "server" : "client",
++	         len, priv->max_total_message_size);
++	emit_error_and_close (self, error, TRUE);
++}
++
+ static void
+ close_connection (SoupWebsocketConnection *self,
+                   gushort                  code,
+@@ -918,6 +938,12 @@ process_contents (SoupWebsocketConnection *self,
+ 		switch (priv->message_opcode) {
+ 		case 0x01:
+ 		case 0x02:
++			/* Safety valve */
++			if (priv->max_total_message_size > 0 &&
++			    (priv->message_data->len + payload_len) > priv->max_total_message_size) {
++				too_big_message_error_and_close (self, (priv->message_data->len + payload_len));
++				return;
++			}
+ 			g_byte_array_append (priv->message_data, payload, payload_len);
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+@@ -1056,7 +1082,7 @@ process_frame (SoupWebsocketConnection *self)
+ 	/* Safety valve */
+ 	if (priv->max_incoming_payload_size > 0 &&
+ 	    payload_len > priv->max_incoming_payload_size) {
+-		too_big_error_and_close (self, payload_len);
++		too_big_incoming_payload_error_and_close (self, payload_len);
+ 		return FALSE;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1363,6 +1389,10 @@ soup_websocket_connection_get_property (GObject *object,
+ 		g_value_set_pointer (value, priv->extensions);
+ 		break;
+ 
++        case PROP_MAX_TOTAL_MESSAGE_SIZE:
++		g_value_set_uint64 (value, priv->max_total_message_size);
++		break;
++
+ 	default:
+ 		G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1416,6 +1446,10 @@ soup_websocket_connection_set_property (GObject *object,
+ 		priv->extensions = g_value_get_pointer (value);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case PROP_MAX_TOTAL_MESSAGE_SIZE:
++		priv->max_total_message_size = g_value_get_uint64 (value);
++		break;
++
+ 	default:
+ 		G_OBJECT_WARN_INVALID_PROPERTY_ID (object, prop_id, pspec);
+ 		break;
+@@ -1628,6 +1662,26 @@ soup_websocket_connection_class_init (SoupWebsocketConnectionClass *klass)
+                                       G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT_ONLY |
+                                       G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
+ 
++	/**
++	 * SoupWebsocketConnection:max-total-message-size:
++	 *
++	 * The total message size for incoming packets.
++	 *
++	 * The protocol expects or 0 to not limit it.
++	 *
++	 * Since: 3.8
++	 */
++        properties[PROP_MAX_TOTAL_MESSAGE_SIZE] =
++                g_param_spec_uint64 ("max-total-message-size",
++                                     "Max total message size",
++                                     "Max total message size ",
++                                     0,
++                                     G_MAXUINT64,
++                                     MAX_TOTAL_MESSAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT,
++                                     G_PARAM_READWRITE |
++                                     G_PARAM_CONSTRUCT |
++                                     G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS);
++
+         g_object_class_install_properties (gobject_class, LAST_PROPERTY, properties);
+ 
+ 	/**
+@@ -2111,6 +2165,51 @@ soup_websocket_connection_set_max_incoming_payload_size (SoupWebsocketConnection
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++/**
++ * soup_websocket_connection_get_max_total_message_size:
++ * @self: the WebSocket
++ *
++ * Gets the maximum total message size allowed for packets.
++ *
++ * Returns: the maximum total message size.
++ *
++ * Since: 3.8
++ */
++guint64
++soup_websocket_connection_get_max_total_message_size (SoupWebsocketConnection *self)
++{
++	SoupWebsocketConnectionPrivate *priv = soup_websocket_connection_get_instance_private (self);
++
++	g_return_val_if_fail (SOUP_IS_WEBSOCKET_CONNECTION (self), MAX_TOTAL_MESSAGE_SIZE_DEFAULT);
++
++	return priv->max_total_message_size;
++}
++
++/**
++ * soup_websocket_connection_set_max_total_message_size:
++ * @self: the WebSocket
++ * @max_total_message_size: the maximum total message size
++ *
++ * Sets the maximum total message size allowed for packets.
++ *
++ * It does not limit the outgoing packet size.
++ *
++ * Since: 3.8
++ */
++void
++soup_websocket_connection_set_max_total_message_size (SoupWebsocketConnection *self,
++                                                      guint64                  max_total_message_size)
++{
++	SoupWebsocketConnectionPrivate *priv = soup_websocket_connection_get_instance_private (self);
++
++	g_return_if_fail (SOUP_IS_WEBSOCKET_CONNECTION (self));
++
++	if (priv->max_total_message_size != max_total_message_size) {
++		priv->max_total_message_size = max_total_message_size;
++		g_object_notify_by_pspec (G_OBJECT (self), properties[PROP_MAX_TOTAL_MESSAGE_SIZE]);
++	}
++}
++
+ /**
+  * soup_websocket_connection_get_keepalive_interval:
+  * @self: the WebSocket
+diff --git a/libsoup/websocket/soup-websocket-connection.h b/libsoup/websocket/soup-websocket-connection.h
+index eeb093d..922de56 100644
+--- a/libsoup/websocket/soup-websocket-connection.h
++++ b/libsoup/websocket/soup-websocket-connection.h
+@@ -88,6 +88,13 @@ SOUP_AVAILABLE_IN_ALL
+ void                soup_websocket_connection_set_max_incoming_payload_size (SoupWebsocketConnection *self,
+                                                                              guint64                  max_incoming_payload_size);
+ 
++SOUP_AVAILABLE_IN_3_0
++guint64             soup_websocket_connection_get_max_total_message_size    (SoupWebsocketConnection *self);
++
++SOUP_AVAILABLE_IN_3_0
++void                soup_websocket_connection_set_max_total_message_size    (SoupWebsocketConnection *self,
++                                                                             guint64                  max_total_message_size);
++
+ SOUP_AVAILABLE_IN_ALL
+ guint               soup_websocket_connection_get_keepalive_interval (SoupWebsocketConnection *self);
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-2.patch new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f00fabfdb
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 81eb7cf7422878f0b78b833a3b741f734502921f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ignacio Casal Quinteiro <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2024 12:12:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/4] websocket-test: set the total message size
+
+This is required when sending a big amount of data
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libsoup/-/commit/4904a46a2d9a014efa6be01a186ac353dbf5047b]
+CVE: CVE-2025-32049
+
+Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]>
+---
+ tests/websocket-test.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tests/websocket-test.c b/tests/websocket-test.c
+index a0b8334..827b041 100644
+--- a/tests/websocket-test.c
++++ b/tests/websocket-test.c
+@@ -567,6 +567,11 @@ test_send_big_packets (Test *test,
+ 	soup_websocket_connection_set_max_incoming_payload_size (test->server, 1000 * 1000 + 1);
+ 	g_assert (soup_websocket_connection_get_max_incoming_payload_size (test->server) == (1000 * 1000 + 1));
+ 
++	soup_websocket_connection_set_max_total_message_size (test->client, 1000 * 1000 + 1);
++	g_assert (soup_websocket_connection_get_max_total_message_size (test->client) == (1000 * 1000 + 1));
++	soup_websocket_connection_set_max_total_message_size (test->server, 1000 * 1000 + 1);
++	g_assert (soup_websocket_connection_get_max_total_message_size (test->server) == (1000 * 1000 + 1));
++
+ 	sent = g_bytes_new_take (g_strnfill (1000 * 1000, '?'), 1000 * 1000);
+ 	soup_websocket_connection_send_text (test->server, g_bytes_get_data (sent, NULL));
+ 	WAIT_UNTIL (received != NULL);
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-3.patch new file +134 -0

134 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-32049-4.patch new file +292 -0

292 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.4.4.bb +4 -0
index 6be31806f1..fc4a286dcf 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNOME_MIRROR}/libsoup/${SHRT_VER}/libsoup-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2025-4945.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-12105.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-14523.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-32049-1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-32049-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-32049-3.patch \
+           file://CVE-2025-32049-4.patch \
 "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "291c67725f36ed90ea43efff25064b69c5a2d1981488477c05c481a3b4b0c5aa"