smb: client: harden POSIX SID length parsing
Subsystems (2)
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
PATCH 1/2 smb: client: fix create context out-of-bounds reads
From: Zihan Xi <[email protected]>
smb2_parse_contexts() validates generic create-context layout but does not ensure each handler's minimum size before parsing. A malicious server can supply a truncated QFid (Query On Disk ID) context with DataLength zero; parse_query_id_ctxt() then reads fixed offsets past the context boundary and triggers a slab out-of-bounds read.
Bound each context by its Next field and reject lease, QFid, and POSIX contexts that are shorter than their parsers require.
--- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +19 -2
@@ -2405,6 +2405,7 @@ int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp = rsp_iov->iov_base;struct create_context *cc;size_t rem, off, len; +size_t cc_len;size_t doff, dlen;size_t noff, nlen;char *name;
@@ -2427,9 +2428,18 @@ int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, buf->IndexNumber =0 ;while (rem >=sizeof (*cc)) { + off =le32_to_cpu (cc->Next); +if (off) { +if ((off &0x7 ) || off > rem) +return -EINVAL ; + cc_len = off; + }else { + cc_len = rem; + } + doff =le16_to_cpu (cc->DataOffset); dlen =le32_to_cpu (cc->DataLength); -if (check_add_overflow (doff, dlen, &len) || len > rem) +if (check_add_overflow (doff, dlen, &len) || len > cc_len)return -EINVAL ; noff =le16_to_cpu (cc->NameOffset);
@@ -2441,16 +2451,23 @@ int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,switch (nlen) {case 4 :if (!strncmp (name,SMB2_CREATE_REQUEST_LEASE ,4 )) { +if (cc_len < server->vals->create_lease_size) +return -EINVAL ; *oplock = server->ops->parse_lease_buf (cc, epoch, lease_key); }else if (buf && !strncmp (name,SMB2_CREATE_QUERY_ON_DISK_ID ,4 )) { +if (cc_len <sizeof (struct create_disk_id_rsp )) +return -EINVAL ;parse_query_id_ctxt (cc, buf); }break ;case 16 : -if (posix && !memcmp (name, smb3_create_tag_posix,16 )) +if (posix && !memcmp (name, smb3_create_tag_posix,16 )) { +if (dlen <3 *sizeof (__le32) +MIN_SID_LEN +2 ) +return -EINVAL ;parse_posix_ctxt (cc, buf, posix); + }break ;default : cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: unhandled context (nlen=%zu dlen=%zu)\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix create context out-of-bounds reads
This regresses all xfstests when I tried it. Looks like a bug in the
patch so have not merged this one (although have merged smb-client-harden-POSIX-SID-length-parsing pending more testing). Let me know if you update it.
Quoted 86 lines · Ren Wei
From: Zihan Xi <[email protected]>
smb2_parse_contexts()validates generic create-context layout but does not ensure each handler's minimum size before parsing. A malicious server can supply a truncated QFid (Query On Disk ID) context with DataLength zero;parse_query_id_ctxt()then reads fixed offsets past the context boundary and triggers a slab out-of-bounds read.Bound each context by its Next field and reject lease, QFid, and POSIX contexts that are shorter than their parsers require.
Fixes 89a5bfa350fa ("smb3: optimize open to not send query file internal info")Reported-by Yuan Tan <[email protected]>Reported-by Yifan Wu <[email protected]>Reported-by Juefei Pu <[email protected]>Reported-by Xin Liu <[email protected]>Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.4Signed-off-by Zihan Xi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ren Wei <[email protected]>--- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +19
-3@@ -2405,6 +2405,7 @@ int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,struct smb2_create_rsp *rsp = rsp_iov->iov_base;struct create_context *cc;size_t rem, off, len; +size_t cc_len;size_t doff, dlen;size_t noff, nlen;char *name;@@ -2427,9 +2428,18 @@ int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, buf->IndexNumber =0 ;while (rem >=sizeof (*cc)) { + off =le32_to_cpu (cc->Next); +if (off) { +if ((off &0x7 ) || off > rem) +return -EINVAL ; + cc_len = off; + }else { + cc_len = rem; + } + doff =le16_to_cpu (cc->DataOffset); dlen =le32_to_cpu (cc->DataLength); -if (check_add_overflow (doff, dlen, &len) || len > rem) +if (check_add_overflow (doff, dlen, &len) || len > cc_len)return -EINVAL ; noff =le16_to_cpu (cc->NameOffset);@@ -2441,16 +2451,23 @@ int smb2_parse_contexts(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,switch (nlen) {case 4 :if (!strncmp (name,SMB2_CREATE_REQUEST_LEASE ,4 )) { +if (cc_len < server->vals->create_lease_size) +return -EINVAL ; *oplock = server->ops->parse_lease_buf (cc, epoch, lease_key); }else if (buf && !strncmp (name,SMB2_CREATE_QUERY_ON_DISK_ID ,4 )) { +if (cc_len <sizeof (struct create_disk_id_rsp )) +return -EINVAL ;parse_query_id_ctxt (cc, buf); }break ;case 16 : -if (posix && !memcmp (name, smb3_create_tag_posix,16 )) +if (posix && !memcmp (name, smb3_create_tag_posix,16 )) { +if (dlen <3 *sizeof (__le32) +MIN_SID_LEN +2 ) +return -EINVAL ;parse_posix_ctxt (cc, buf, posix); + }break ;default : cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: unhandled context (nlen=%zu dlen=%zu)\n", --2.43.0
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, Steve
PATCH 2/2 smb: client: harden POSIX SID length parsing
In reply to a message not in the archiveFrom: Zihan Xi <[email protected]>
posix_info_sid_size() reads sid[1] to obtain the subauthority count, but its existing boundary check still accepts buffers with only one remaining byte. Require two bytes before reading sid[1] so all client paths that reuse the helper reject truncated POSIX SIDs safely.
--- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +1 -1
@@ -5385,7 +5385,7 @@ int posix_info_sid_size(const void *beg, const void *end)size_t subauth;int total; -if (beg +1 > end) +if (beg +2 > end)return -1 ; subauth = *(u8 *)(beg+1 );
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0