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bpf: add bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfunc

PATCH Superseded Rong Tao 3 participants 6 messages Jul 20 – Jul 22 1 message not in the archive

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Rong Tao

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#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/2 bpf: add bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfunc

In reply to a message not in the archive

From: Rong Tao <[email protected]>

Add string concatenation kfuncs, prototype:

  int bpf_strcat(char *dst, u32 dst__sz, const char *src__ign);
  int bpf_strncat(char *dst, u32 dst__sz, const char *src__ign, u32 len);

This differs from the glibc library functions strcat and strncat, which, for safety reasons, require the size of the target string's memory space as a parameter.

The src parameter cannot directly pass a string constant, such as "XYZ", otherwise it will throw an error "write into map forbidden".

---
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +70 -0
index c18f1e16edee..2c09044de311 100644
@@ -4195,6 +4195,74 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_strncasestr(const char *s1__ign, const char *s2__ign,
 	return __bpf_strnstr(s1__ign, s2__ign, len, true);
 }
 
+static int __bpf_strncat(char *dst, u32 dsz, const char *src, u32 sz)
+{
+	int dlen = 0, space, copied;
+
+	while (dst[dlen] != '\0')
+		dlen++;
+
+	if (dlen >= dsz || sz == 0 || dsz == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	space = dsz - dlen;
+	if (space < 1)
+		return -E2BIG;
+
+	copied = strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(dst + dlen, src, min(sz, space));
+	if (copied < 0)
+		return copied;
+	else if (copied == 0 || copied == 1)
+		return dlen;
+
+	/* The copied character count includes '\0'. */
+	return dlen + copied - 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_strcat - Append non-null bytes from a source string, and null-terminate
+ *              the result
+ * @dst: Destination string.
+ * @dst__sz: Maximum bytes of @dst__ign, includes the trailing NUL.
+ * @src: Source string.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * >=0      - Length of the concatenated string.
+ *
+ * * %-EINVAL - String @dst__ign is invalid.
+ * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read or write one of the strings.
+ * * %-E2BIG  - String @src__ign is too large or the remaining space in
+ *              @dst__ign is too small.
+ * * %-ERANGE - One of the strings is outside of kernel address space
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strcat(char *dst, u32 dst__sz, const char *src)
+{
+	return __bpf_strncat(dst, dst__sz, src, dst__sz);
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_strncat - Append non-null bytes from a source string, and null-terminate
+ *               the result
+ * @dst: Destination string.
+ * @dst__sz: Maximum bytes of @dst__ign, includes the trailing NUL.
+ * @src: Source string.
+ * @len: the maximum number of characters to concatenate, the null terminator
+ *       \0 of the target string @dst will also be included.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * >=0      - Length of the concatenated string.
+ *
+ * * %-EINVAL - String @dst__ign is invalid.
+ * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read or write one of the strings.
+ * * %-E2BIG  - String @src__ign is too large or the remaining space in
+ *              @dst__ign is too small.
+ * * %-ERANGE - One of the strings is outside of kernel address space
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strncat(char *dst, u32 dst__sz, const char *src, u32 len)
+{
+	return __bpf_strncat(dst, dst__sz, src, len);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 /**
  * bpf_lookup_user_key - lookup a key by its serial
@@ -4958,6 +5026,8 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strstr);
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcasestr);
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strnstr);
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strncasestr);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcat);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strncat);
 #if defined(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) && defined(CONFIG_CGROUPS)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cgroup_read_xattr, KF_RCU)
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
author
#3 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/2 selftests/bpf: Test bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfuncs

In reply to a message not in the archive

From: Rong Tao <[email protected]>

Add tests for new kfuncs bpf_strcat() and bpf_strncat().

And remove extra whitespaces in selftests string_kfuncs_failure1.c.

---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c  |  2 +
 .../bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c        | 53 +++++++++++--------
 .../bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c        |  3 ++
 .../bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c         | 10 ++++
 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c +2 -0
index 300032a19445..460567ef622a 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ static const char * const test_cases[] = {
 	"strcasestr",
 	"strnstr",
 	"strncasestr",
+	"strcat",
+	"strncat",
 };
 
 void run_too_long_tests(void)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c +32 -21

78 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c +3 -0
index 412c53b87b18..2dbd1349689e 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/limits.h>
 
 char long_str[XATTR_SIZE_MAX + 1];
+char str[] = "hello";
 
 SEC("syscall") int test_strcmp_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(long_str, long_str); }
 SEC("syscall") int test_strcasecmp_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcasecmp(long_str, long_str); }
@@ -23,5 +24,7 @@ SEC("syscall") int test_strstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(long_str,
 SEC("syscall") int test_strcasestr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcasestr(long_str, "hello"); }
 SEC("syscall") int test_strnstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(long_str, "hello", sizeof(long_str)); }
 SEC("syscall") int test_strncasestr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncasestr(long_str, "hello", sizeof(long_str)); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strcat_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcat(long_str, sizeof(long_str), str); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strncat_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncat(long_str, sizeof(long_str), str, 3); }
 
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c +10 -0
index f65b1226a81a..71fbbe97b4c5 100644
@@ -59,5 +59,15 @@ __test(-ENOENT) int test_strncasestr_notfound1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncases
 __test(-ENOENT) int test_strncasestr_notfound2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncasestr(str, "hello", 4); }
 __test(-ENOENT) int test_strncasestr_notfound3(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncasestr("", "a", 0); }
 __test(0) int test_strncasestr_empty(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncasestr(str, "", 1); }
+__test(0) int test_strcat_success(void *ctx) {
+	char buf[32] = "hello";
+	bpf_strcat(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
+	return bpf_strcmp(buf, "hellohello world");
+}
+__test(8) int test_strncat_success(void *ctx) {
+	char buf[32] = "hello";
+	bpf_strncat(buf, sizeof(buf), str, 3);
+	return bpf_strcmp(buf, "hellohe");
+}
 
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/2] selftests/bpf: Test bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfuncs

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 5 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Critical] `__bpf_strncat` contains a critical out-of-bounds read and potential kernel panic when `dst`…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 5 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] __bpf_strncat contains a critical out-of-bounds read and potential kernel panic when dst is not null-terminated.
- [High] The new failure tests passing scalar or invalid pointers to bpf_strcat and bpf_strncat will be rejected by the verifier, breaking the selftest suite.
- [High] The test_strncat_success test asserts an incorrect return value and checks against the wrong string, guaranteeing runtime failure.
- [High] The src argument in bpf_strcat and bpf_strncat lacks a string or size suffix, causing the verifier to only enforce a 1-byte size, leading to kernel memory disclosure.
- [High] run_too_long_tests asserts -E2BIG but __bpf_strncat returns -EINVAL, breaking the test suite.
--

--- Patch [2]: [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/2] selftests/bpf: Test bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfuncs --- commit 08f044c5d96948cad08013caa519f6e718db089c
Author: Rong Tao <[email protected]>

selftests/bpf: Test bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfuncs

This patch adds selftests for the newly introduced bpf_strcat() and bpf_strncat() kfuncs. It extends existing string kfunc failure and success test suites to validate these operations. It also cleans up some extra whitespace in string_kfuncs_failure1.c.

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c static const char * const test_cases[] = { · line 29

Quoted 11 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c +2 -0
index 300032a194451..460567ef622a5 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ static const char * const test_cases[] = {
 	"strcasestr",
 	"strnstr",
 	"strncasestr",
+	"strcat",
+	"strncat",
 };

[Severity: High]
Will run_too_long_tests() fail for these new test cases due to a mismatched error code?

The run_too_long_tests() loop expects all over-long string tests to return -E2BIG. However, looking at __bpf_strncat() in kernel/bpf/helpers.c, if the destination buffer is full because it lacks a null terminator within dsz bounds:

    if (dlen >= dsz || sz == 0 || dsz == 0)
        return -EINVAL;

Since the test string is completely filled without a null terminator, wouldn't it return -EINVAL instead of -E2BIG, causing the ASSERT_EQ to fail?

Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c +0 -0
index bddc4e8579d24..d432d4990f802 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c +0 -0
@@ -30,29 +31,31 @@ char *invalid_kern_ptr = (char *)-1;
 
 /* Passing NULL to string kfuncs (treated as a userspace ptr) */

[ ... ]

Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c +2 -0
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcat_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcat(kern_buf, sizeof(kern_buf), NULL); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strncat_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncat(kern_buf, sizeof(kern_buf), NULL, 2); }
 
 /* Passing userspace ptr to string kfuncs */

[ ... ]

Quoted 1 line

+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcat_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcat(user_ptr, 1, kern_buf); }

[Severity: High]
Will these tests fail to load during verification rather than failing at runtime?

Because the dst and src parameters in bpf_strcat() lack the __ign or __nullable suffix in their kernel definitions, the verifier treats them as strictly typed KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM.

If we pass a scalar like user_ptr or NULL, won't the verifier reject the program during the load phase, breaking the test suite when the skeleton is loaded?

Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c +0 -0
index 412c53b87b182..2dbd1349689ea 100644

[ ... ]

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c SEC("syscall") int test_strstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(long_str, · line 27

Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c +1 -0
@@ -23,5 +24,7 @@ SEC("syscall") int test_strstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(long_str,
 SEC("syscall") int test_strcasestr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcasestr(long_str, "hello"); }
 SEC("syscall") int test_strnstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(long_str, "hello", sizeof(long_str)); }
 SEC("syscall") int test_strncasestr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncasestr(long_str, "hello", sizeof(long_str)); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strcat_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcat(long_str, sizeof(long_str), str); }

[Severity: Critical]
Could this test trigger an out-of-bounds read and kernel panic?

Looking at __bpf_strncat() in kernel/bpf/helpers.c, when calculating dlen there is no bounds check against dsz:

    while (dst[dlen] != '\0')
        dlen++;

If test_strcat_too_long() passes a completely filled long_str without a null terminator, won't this loop read past the end of the BPF-provided buffer into adjacent kernel memory?

Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c +0 -0
index f65b1226a81a3..71fbbe97b4c50 100644

[ ... ]

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c __test(-ENOENT) int test_strncasestr_notfound1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncases · line 66

Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c +5 -0
+__test(0) int test_strcat_success(void *ctx) {
+	char buf[32] = "hello";
+	bpf_strcat(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
+	return bpf_strcmp(buf, "hellohello world");
+}

[Severity: High]
Does the signature of bpf_strcat() allow arbitrary kernel memory disclosure?

The src parameter in bpf_strcat() is annotated simply as const char *src, lacking a __str suffix or a paired size argument in kernel/bpf/helpers.c:

__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strcat(char *dst, u32 dst__sz, const char *src)

This causes the verifier to check only the size of the base type (1 byte). If a BPF program passes a valid 1-byte memory region, could strncpy_from_kernel_nofault() safely copy past the 1-byte verified region, exposing adjacent kernel memory into dst?

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c __test(-ENOENT) int test_strncasestr_notfound1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncases · line 71

Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c +5 -0
+__test(8) int test_strncat_success(void *ctx) {
+	char buf[32] = "hello";
+	bpf_strncat(buf, sizeof(buf), str, 3);
+	return bpf_strcmp(buf, "hellohe");
+}

[Severity: High]
Is the expected return value correct here?

The test uses __test(8), expecting the program to return 8. However, bpf_strcmp() evaluates to 0 on a successful match. Wouldn't the program return 0 instead of 8, causing this test to fail reliably?

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2
#2 lore raw
In reply to Rong Tao
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] The while (dst[dlen] != '\0') loop in __bpf_strncat lacks a bounds check against dsz, allowing…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] The while (dst[dlen] != '\0') loop in __bpf_strncat lacks a bounds check against dsz, allowing out-of-bounds reads and potential kernel panics.
- [High] The src argument in bpf_strcat and bpf_strncat lacks a __str suffix or size parameter, causing the verifier to only guarantee 1 byte of memory safety, allowing strncpy_from_kernel_nofault to leak adjacent kernel memory.
- [Medium] Silent string truncation occurs without returning -E2BIG as documented, and the space < 1 check is mathematically unreachable.
- [Low] Incompatible types in strict min() macro trigger compile-time warnings/errors due to signedness mismatch.
--

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH bpf-next v4 1/2] bpf: add bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfunc --- commit e18a916b95792b0a70aea4ebf35e2830d909b3ee
Author: Rong Tao <[email protected]>

bpf: add bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfunc

This commit adds string concatenation kfuncs bpf_strcat and bpf_strncat. These differ from standard glibc functions by requiring the destination size as a parameter for safety.

Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +0 -0
index c18f1e16edee4..2c09044de3112 100644

kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_strncasestr(const char *s1__ign, const char *s2__ign, · line 4203

Quoted 9 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +6 -0
@@ -4195,6 +4195,74 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_strncasestr(const char *s1__ign, const char *s2__ign,
 	return __bpf_strnstr(s1__ign, s2__ign, len, true);
 }
 
+static int __bpf_strncat(char *dst, u32 dsz, const char *src, u32 sz)
+{
+	int dlen = 0, space, copied;
+
+	while (dst[dlen] != '\0')
+		dlen++;

[Severity: High]
Does this loop need a bounds check against dsz? If a BPF program passes a buffer for dst that does not contain a null terminator, this loop will increment dlen indefinitely and read past the end of the verified buffer.

kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_strncasestr(const char *s1__ign, const char *s2__ign, · line 4210

Quoted 7 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +7 -0
+
+	if (dlen >= dsz || sz == 0 || dsz == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	space = dsz - dlen;
+	if (space < 1)
+		return -E2BIG;

[Severity: Medium]
Since dlen >= dsz is checked right before this, space = dsz - dlen is guaranteed to be >= 1. Doesn't that make this space < 1 check dead code?

Also, if the remaining space is too small for the source string, the code below silently truncates instead of returning -E2BIG as documented. Should it return an error instead?

kernel/bpf/helpers.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_strncasestr(const char *s1__ign, const char *s2__ign, · line 4212

Quoted 2 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +2 -0
+
+	copied = strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(dst + dlen, src, min(sz, space));

[Severity: Low]
Will this trigger a build error? The min() macro requires arguments of compatible types, but sz is u32 (unsigned) and space is int (signed).

Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +8 -0
+	if (copied < 0)
+		return copied;
+	else if (copied == 0 || copied == 1)
+		return dlen;
+
+	/* The copied character count includes '\0'. */
+	return dlen + copied - 1;
+}

[ ... ]

Quoted 1 line

+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strcat(char *dst, u32 dst__sz, const char *src)

[Severity: High]
Without a __str or __sz suffix, won't the verifier treat const char *src as a pointer to a single byte?

A BPF program could pass a pointer to a 1-byte map value, and __bpf_strncat() could then use strncpy_from_kernel_nofault() to read up to dst__sz bytes, potentially leaking out-of-bounds kernel memory into dst.

Quoted 3 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +3 -0
+{
+	return __bpf_strncat(dst, dst__sz, src, dst__sz);
+}

[ ... ]

Quoted 1 line

+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strncat(char *dst, u32 dst__sz, const char *src, u32 len)

[Severity: High]
Does this src parameter also need a __str suffix or a src__sz parameter to prevent the verifier from treating it as a 1-byte buffer?

Quoted 3 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +3 -0
+{
+	return __bpf_strncat(dst, dst__sz, src, len);
+}
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/2] selftests/bpf: Test bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfuncs

In reply to Rong Tao
This isn't a bug, but could the whitespace cleanup in string_kfuncs_failure1.c be split into its own patch rather than folded into the commit that adds the strcat/strncat tests? The commit message…
Quoted 7 lines

selftests/bpf: Test bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfuncs

Add tests for new kfuncs bpf_strcat() and bpf_strncat().

And remove extra whitespaces in selftests string_kfuncs_failure1.c.

This isn't a bug, but could the whitespace cleanup in string_kfuncs_failure1.c be split into its own patch rather than folded into the commit that adds the strcat/strncat tests? The commit message already describes them as two separate changes, and the whitespace-only churn ends up mixed in with the new test cases:

Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c +0 -0
index bddc4e8579d2..d432d4990f80 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 9 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c +2 -2
@@ -30,29 +31,31 @@ char *invalid_kern_ptr = (char *)-1;
 
 /* Passing NULL to string kfuncs (treated as a userspace ptr) */
 SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcmp_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp(NULL, "hello"); }
-SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcmp_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp("hello", NULL); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcmp_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcmp("hello", NULL); }
 SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcasecmp_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcasecmp(NULL, "HELLO"); }
-SEC("syscall")  __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcasecmp_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcasecmp("HELLO", NULL); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcasecmp_null2(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcasecmp("HELLO", NULL); }

[ ... ]

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c char *invalid_kern_ptr = (char *)-1; · line 58

Quoted 2 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c +2 -0
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcat_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcat(kern_buf, sizeof(kern_buf), NULL); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strncat_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncat(kern_buf, sizeof(kern_buf), NULL, 2); }

Keeping the two apart would make the new test additions easier to read on their own.

---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md

CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/29729113722

author
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/2] selftests/bpf: Test bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfuncs

In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 39 lines · On 7/20/26 16:51, [email protected] wrote:

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 5 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] __bpf_strncat contains a critical out-of-bounds read and potential kernel panic when dst is not null-terminated.
- [High] The new failure tests passing scalar or invalid pointers to bpf_strcat and bpf_strncat will be rejected by the verifier, breaking the selftest suite.
- [High] The test_strncat_success test asserts an incorrect return value and checks against the wrong string, guaranteeing runtime failure.
- [High] The src argument in bpf_strcat and bpf_strncat lacks a string or size suffix, causing the verifier to only enforce a 1-byte size, leading to kernel memory disclosure.
- [High] run_too_long_tests asserts -E2BIG but __bpf_strncat returns -EINVAL, breaking the test suite.
--

--- Patch [2]: [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/2] selftests/bpf: Test bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfuncs --- commit 08f044c5d96948cad08013caa519f6e718db089c
Author: Rong Tao <[email protected]>

selftests/bpf: Test bpf_strcat,bpf_strncat kfuncs

This patch adds selftests for the newly introduced bpf_strcat() and bpf_strncat() kfuncs. It extends existing string kfunc failure and success test suites to validate these operations. It also cleans up some extra whitespace in string_kfuncs_failure1.c.

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c static const char * const test_cases[] = { · line 29

Quoted 11 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/string_kfuncs.c +2 -0
index 300032a194451..460567ef622a5 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ static const char * const test_cases[] = {
  	"strcasestr",
  	"strnstr",
  	"strncasestr",
+	"strcat",
+	"strncat",
  };

[Severity: High]
Will run_too_long_tests() fail for these new test cases due to a mismatched error code?

The run_too_long_tests() loop expects all over-long string tests to return -E2BIG. However, looking at __bpf_strncat() in kernel/bpf/helpers.c, if the destination buffer is full because it lacks a null terminator within dsz bounds:

Quoted 5 lines
     if (dlen >= dsz || sz == 0 || dsz == 0)
         return -EINVAL;

Since the test string is completely filled without a null terminator, wouldn't it return -EINVAL instead of -E2BIG, causing the ASSERT_EQ to fail?

Thanks, i'll fix it.

Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c +0 -0
index bddc4e8579d24..d432d4990f802 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c +0 -0
@@ -30,29 +31,31 @@ char *invalid_kern_ptr = (char *)-1;
 
  /* Passing NULL to string kfuncs (treated as a userspace ptr) */

[ ... ]

Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure1.c +2 -0
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strcat_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcat(kern_buf, sizeof(kern_buf), NULL); }
+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR)int test_strncat_null1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncat(kern_buf, sizeof(kern_buf), NULL, 2); }
 
  /* Passing userspace ptr to string kfuncs */

[ ... ]

Quoted 1 line

+SEC("syscall") __retval(USER_PTR_ERR) int test_strcat_user_ptr1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcat(user_ptr, 1, kern_buf); }

[Severity: High]
Will these tests fail to load during verification rather than failing at runtime?

Quoted 7 lines

Because the dst and src parameters in bpf_strcat() lack the __ign or __nullable suffix in their kernel definitions, the verifier treats them as strictly typed KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM.

If we pass a scalar like user_ptr or NULL, won't the verifier reject the program during the load phase, breaking the test suite when the skeleton is loaded?

Thanks, i think, we should remove these user_ptr tests.

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c +0 -0
index 412c53b87b182..2dbd1349689ea 100644

[ ... ]

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c SEC("syscall") int test_strstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(long_str, · line 27

Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_failure2.c +1 -0
@@ -23,5 +24,7 @@ SEC("syscall") int test_strstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strstr(long_str,
  SEC("syscall") int test_strcasestr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcasestr(long_str, "hello"); }
  SEC("syscall") int test_strnstr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strnstr(long_str, "hello", sizeof(long_str)); }
  SEC("syscall") int test_strncasestr_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncasestr(long_str, "hello", sizeof(long_str)); }
+SEC("syscall") int test_strcat_too_long(void *ctx) { return bpf_strcat(long_str, sizeof(long_str), str); }

[Severity: Critical]
Could this test trigger an out-of-bounds read and kernel panic?

Looking at __bpf_strncat() in kernel/bpf/helpers.c, when calculating dlen there is no bounds check against dsz:

Quoted 6 lines
     while (dst[dlen] != '\0')
         dlen++;

If test_strcat_too_long() passes a completely filled long_str without a null terminator, won't this loop read past the end of the BPF-provided buffer into adjacent kernel memory?

Thanks, i'll change it to:

    while (dlen < dsz && dst[dlen] != '\0')

Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c +0 -0
index f65b1226a81a3..71fbbe97b4c50 100644

[ ... ]

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c __test(-ENOENT) int test_strncasestr_notfound1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncases · line 66

Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c +5 -0
+__test(0) int test_strcat_success(void *ctx) {
+	char buf[32] = "hello";
+	bpf_strcat(buf, sizeof(buf), str);
+	return bpf_strcmp(buf, "hellohello world");
+}

[Severity: High]
Does the signature of bpf_strcat() allow arbitrary kernel memory disclosure?

The src parameter in bpf_strcat() is annotated simply as const char *src, lacking a __str suffix or a paired size argument in kernel/bpf/helpers.c:

__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strcat(char *dst, u32 dst__sz, const char *src)

This causes the verifier to check only the size of the base type (1 byte). If a BPF program passes a valid 1-byte memory region, could strncpy_from_kernel_nofault() safely copy past the 1-byte verified region, exposing adjacent kernel memory into dst?

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c __test(-ENOENT) int test_strncasestr_notfound1(void *ctx) { return bpf_strncases · line 71

Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/string_kfuncs_success.c +5 -0
+__test(8) int test_strncat_success(void *ctx) {
+	char buf[32] = "hello";
+	bpf_strncat(buf, sizeof(buf), str, 3);
+	return bpf_strcmp(buf, "hellohe");
+}

[Severity: High]
Is the expected return value correct here?

The test uses __test(8), expecting the program to return 8. However, bpf_strcmp() evaluates to 0 on a successful match. Wouldn't the program return 0 instead of 8, causing this test to fail reliably?