Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by end of day Thursday, July 30.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/?#/builders/29/builds/4312
The following changes since commit 762321beb0260b1411c7f98f13458ec99a118280:
bzip2: fix 'bzip2 --version > /tmp/aaa 2>&1' hang (2026-07-25 23:57:45 +0200)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut
for you to fetch changes up to 543550522f831479f07d332a40ba343c53ae1065:
openssh: set status for CVE-2026-59998 (2026-07-28 15:30:13 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
AshishKumar Mishra (1):
package.bbclass: hardcode emit_pkgdata to run last
Darsh Kelaiya (5):
gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40467
gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40468
gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40469
gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40553
python3-setuptools: Fix CVE-2026-59890
Deepak Rathore (1):
sqlite3: fix CVE-2026-11822 and CVE-2026-11824
Devansh Patel (1):
openssh: set status for CVE-2026-59998
João Marcos Costa (1):
curl: add annotation for CVE-2026-10536
Martin Schwan (1):
cargo-update-recipe-crates: Don't fail for partially empty Cargo.lock
Shubham Pushpkar (1):
libsolv: Fix CVE-2026-9149
Siddharth Doshi (5):
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-28422
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-42307
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-43961
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-47162
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-47167
mark.yang (3):
python3-cryptography: set CVE_PRODUCT
python3-ply: set CVE_PRODUCT
python3-pyasn1: set CVE_PRODUCT
meta/classes-global/package.bbclass | 7 +- .../cargo-update-recipe-crates.bbclass | 16 +- .../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb | 1 + .../python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb | 2 + .../python/python3-ply_3.11.bb | 2 + .../python/python3-pyasn1_0.5.1.bb | 1 + .../python3-setuptools/CVE-2026-59890.patch | 194 ++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-setuptools_69.1.1.bb | 1 + .../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40467.patch | 63 ++++++ .../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40468.patch | 65 ++++++ .../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40469.patch | 90 ++++++++ .../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p1.patch | 50 +++++ .../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p2.patch | 44 ++++ meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb | 5 + .../libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-9149.patch | 152 ++++++++++++++ .../libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb | 1 + meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 + .../CVE-2026-11822_CVE-2026-11824.patch | 41 ++++ meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.45.3.bb | 1 + .../vim/files/CVE-2026-28422.patch | 44 ++++ .../vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch | 121 +++++++++++ .../vim/files/CVE-2026-43961.patch | 65 ++++++ .../vim/files/CVE-2026-47162.patch | 39 ++++ .../vim/files/CVE-2026-47167.patch | 39 ++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 5 + 25 files changed, 1039 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2026-59890.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40467.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40468.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40469.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-9149.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2026-11822_CVE-2026-11824.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28422.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-43961.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47162.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47167.patch
PATCH 1/19 libsolv: Fix CVE-2026-9149
From: Shubham Pushpkar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [1], using the CVE advisory shown in [2].
[1] https://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv/commit/210386037c892a720972ad35a3d8f7073b4d763b
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9149
--- .../libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-9149.patch | 152 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 153 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-9149.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-9149.patch new file +152 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +From 175bd2008d3b3a4b54253bd6657cc46948360534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Petr Písař <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 18:04:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Cope with integer overflow in data size arithmetics in + repo_add_solv() + +When parsing solv files with maliciously large "maxsize" or "allsize" +data size, e.g. this maxsize value at offset 0x29--0x2E: + + 00000000 53 4f 4c 56 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 |SOLV............| + 00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 |................| + 00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8f ff ff bf 77 86 8d |.............w..| + 00000030 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | ...............| + 00000040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| + * + 00002030 00 |.| + 00002031 + +read_id() function will decode and return 4294959095 value, and a subsequent +assignment: + + int maxsize; + [...] + maxsize = read_id(&data, 0); + +will experience an integer overflow on plaforms where signed int has 4-byte +size (e.g. x86_64). + +The same flaw is possible at the next line: + + allsize = read_id(&data, 0); + +Subsequent arithmetics will interpreter the value as a very large negative +number, possibly doing wrong decisions: + + maxsize += 5; /* so we can read the next schema of an array */ + if (maxsize > allsize) + maxsize = allsize; + +and finally, the negative value passed to solv_calloc(): + + buf = solv_calloc(maxsize + DATA_READ_CHUNK + 4, 1); /* 4 extra bytes to detect overflows */ + +will be coerced to an unsigned type (size_t) leading to allocating a smaller +buffer then intended. Then writing to the small buffer will experience a heap +buffer overflow: + + l = maxsize; + if (l < DATA_READ_CHUNK) + l = DATA_READ_CHUNK; + if (l > allsize) + l = allsize; + if (!l || fread(buf, l, 1, data.fp) != 1) + +This flaw can be demostrated by passing that solv file to the dumpsolv tool which +will crash if compiled with ASAN: + + $ /tmp/b/tools/dumpsolv /tmp/vuln_1_101_1_negative_maxsize.solv + ================================================================= + ==17608==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c0a2ede00b1 at pc 0x7fea30451468 b + p 0x7ffe07220a50 sp 0x7ffe07220220 + WRITE of size 8192 at 0x7c0a2ede00b1 thread T0 + #0 0x7fea30451467 in fread.part.0 (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0x51467) (BuildId: 80bfc4ae44fdec6ef5fecfb01 + e2b57d28660991c) + #1 0x7fea3028eef1 in repo_add_solv /home/test/libsolv/src/repo_solv.c:1034 + #2 0x0000004041cc in main /home/test/libsolv/tools/dumpsolv.c:471 + #3 0x7fea3003c680 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3680) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #4 0x7fea3003c797 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3797) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #5 0x000000400694 in _start (/tmp/b/tools/dumpsolv+0x400694) (BuildId: 0a70b5b14e5cd81f90a309bb2ff3219dfbf30bb8) + + 0x7c0a2ede00b1 is located 0 bytes after 1-byte region [0x7c0a2ede00b0,0x7c0a2ede00b1) + allocated by thread T0 here: + #0 0x7fea304ef41f in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xef41f) (BuildId: 80bfc4ae44fdec6ef5fecfb01e2b57d28660991c) + #1 0x7fea302e4b4c in solv_calloc /home/test/libsolv/src/util.c:77 + #2 0x7fea3028ee38 in repo_add_solv /home/test/libsolv/src/repo_solv.c:1025 + #3 0x0000004041cc in main /home/test/libsolv/tools/dumpsolv.c:471 + #4 0x7fea3003c680 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3680) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #5 0x7fea3003c797 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3797) (BuildId: c04494d63bca865bedf571a4075ef8867ccf9fa9) + #6 0x000000400694 in _start (/tmp/b/tools/dumpsolv+0x400694) (BuildId: 0a70b5b14e5cd81f90a309bb2ff3219dfbf30bb8) + + SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/test/libsolv/src/repo_solv.c:1034 in repo_add_solv + +This patch catches the integer overflow, sets an error and jumps to the end of +the function just after deallocation of the buffer (which would contain an +undefined pointer). This patch also handles a possible integer overflow at +"maxsize += 5" line. + +I originally wanted to replace read_id() with read_u32(), but +complemtary repowriter_write() function also stored the value as +a signed integer, so I guess the the Id type is inteded there. + +There are probably other ways how to fix it, like passing INT_MAX-5 +limit to read_id(), though the error message would be less +understandable. + +It's also possible to reject this patch with an explanation that loading +untrusted solv files is not supported. Though some kind of +fortification would be welcomed by people who debug solver problems +from reported solv files. + +Reported by Aisle Research. + +CVE: CVE-2026-9149 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv/commit/210386037c892a720972ad35a3d8f7073b4d763b] + +(cherry picked from commit 210386037c892a720972ad35a3d8f7073b4d763b) +Signed-off-by: Shubham Pushpkar <[email protected]> +--- + src/repo_solv.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/repo_solv.c b/src/repo_solv.c +index 629ac683..00639aa0 100644 +--- a/src/repo_solv.c ++++ b/src/repo_solv.c +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <unistd.h> + #include <string.h> ++#include <limits.h> + + #include "repo_solv.h" + #include "util.h" +@@ -1078,6 +1079,18 @@ repo_add_solv(Repo *repo, FILE *fp, int flags) + + maxsize = read_id(&data, 0); + allsize = read_id(&data, 0); ++ if (maxsize < 0 || allsize < 0) ++ { ++ data.error = pool_error(pool, SOLV_ERROR_CORRUPT, "negative data size in solv header"); ++ id = 0; ++ goto data_error; ++ } ++ if (maxsize > INT_MAX - 5) ++ { ++ data.error = pool_error(pool, SOLV_ERROR_OVERFLOW, "data size overflow in solv header"); ++ id = 0; ++ goto data_error; ++ } + maxsize += 5; /* so we can read the next schema of an array */ + if (maxsize > allsize) + maxsize = allsize; +@@ -1403,6 +1416,7 @@ printf("=> %s %s %p\n", pool_id2str(pool, keys[key].name), pool_id2str(pool, key + } + solv_free(buf); + ++data_error: + if (data.error) + { + /* free solvables */ +-- +2.35.6
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ DEPENDS = "expat zlib zstd" SRC_URI = "git://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://0001-utils-Conside-musl-when-wrapping-qsort_r.patch \ file://CVE-2026-9150.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-9149.patch \ " SRCREV = "c8dbb3a77c86600ce09d4f80a504cf4e78a3c359"
PATCH 2/19 package.bbclass: hardcode emit_pkgdata to run last
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: AshishKumar Mishra <[email protected]>
Ensure emit_pkgdata runs after all PACKAGEFUNCS to allow layers to extend packaging behavior.
Layers can now append custom functions via PACKAGEFUNCS += "func_name" and they will run before emit_pkgdata generates package metadata.
--- meta/classes-global/package.bbclass | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/classes-global/package.bbclass +5 -2
@@ -468,8 +468,7 @@ PACKAGEFUNCS += " \ package_do_shlibs \ package_do_pkgconfig \ read_shlibdeps \ - package_depchains \ - emit_pkgdata" + package_depchains" python do_package () { # Change the following version to cause sstate to invalidate the package
@@ -561,9 +560,13 @@ python do_package () { for file in files: pkgfiles[pkg].append(walkroot + os.sep + file) + + # We want emit_pkgdata to run last, after everything for f in (d.getVar('PACKAGEFUNCS') or '').split(): bb.build.exec_func(f, d) + bb.build.exec_func("emit_pkgdata", d) + oe.qa.exit_if_errors(d) }
PATCH 3/19 gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40467
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gawk.git/commit/?id=a2d18c74109e41bec29a23098eba2e00057286d8
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40467
--- .../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40467.patch | 63 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40467.patch
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40467.patch new file +63 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From 22fd9e360251f70b34e9b46635b6d75bce49202f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Arnold D. Robbins" <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2026 12:02:11 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Small memory management fix in io.c. + +CVE: CVE-2026-40467 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gawk.git/commit/?id=a2d18c74109e41bec29a23098eba2e00057286d8] + +(cherry picked from commit a2d18c74109e41bec29a23098eba2e00057286d8) +Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]> +--- + ChangeLog | 6 ++++++ + io.c | 5 ++++- + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog +index 2fa8b2f0..6bc88ebb 100644 +--- a/ChangeLog ++++ b/ChangeLog +@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ ++2026-04-03 Arnold D. Robbins <[email protected]> ++ ++ * io.c (do_getline_redir): Don't DEREF redir_exp too early. ++ Thanks to Michał Majchrowicz <[email protected]> ++ for the report. ++ + 2023-11-02 Arnold D. Robbins <[email protected]> + + * 5.3.0: Release tar ball made. +diff --git a/io.c b/io.c +index 44671ebd..4db4b21d 100644 +--- a/io.c ++++ b/io.c +@@ -2836,22 +2836,25 @@ do_getline_redir(int into_variable, enum redirval redirtype) + assert(redirtype != redirect_none); + redir_exp = TOP(); + rp = redirect(redir_exp, redirtype, & redir_error, false); +- DEREF(redir_exp); + decr_sp(); + if (rp == NULL) { + if (redir_error) { /* failed redirect */ + if (! do_traditional) + update_ERRNO_int(redir_error); + } ++ DEREF(redir_exp); + return make_number((AWKNUM) -1.0); + } else if ((rp->flag & RED_TWOWAY) != 0 && rp->iop == NULL) { + if (is_non_fatal_redirect(redir_exp->stptr, redir_exp->stlen)) { + update_ERRNO_int(EBADF); ++ DEREF(redir_exp); + return make_number((AWKNUM) -1.0); + } + (void) close_rp(rp, CLOSE_ALL); ++ DEREF(redir_exp); // we're about to die, but what the heck, release it anyway + fatal(_("getline: attempt to read from closed read end of two-way pipe")); + } ++ DEREF(redir_exp); + iop = rp->iop; + if (iop == NULL) /* end of input */ + return make_number((AWKNUM) 0.0); +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/gawk/gawk-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-m4-readline-add-missing-includes.patch \ file://run-ptest \ file://0001-Fix-some-C23-compilatio-issues.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-40467.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "378f8864ec21cfceaa048f7e1869ac9b4597b449087caf1eb55e440d30273336"
PATCH 4/19 gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40468
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gawk.git/commit/?id=062f2f2581b991362c046f7f2e238ffa34e6f8c7
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40468
--- .../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40468.patch | 65 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40468.patch
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40468.patch new file +65 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From e281dfa04afc4660419ad69c9f24bc6b4067f8d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Arnold D. Robbins" <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2026 21:45:58 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Minor integer overflow fixes. + +CVE: CVE-2026-40468 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gawk.git/commit/?id=062f2f2581b991362c046f7f2e238ffa34e6f8c7] + +Backport Changes: +- Adapt the parse_escape() type change for gawk 5.3.0, where i is + declared int instead of long. + +(cherry picked from commit 062f2f2581b991362c046f7f2e238ffa34e6f8c7) +Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]> +--- + ChangeLog | 8 ++++++++ + builtin.c | 2 +- + node.c | 2 +- + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog +index 6bc88ebb..e691b241 100644 +--- a/ChangeLog ++++ b/ChangeLog +@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@ ++2026-04-04 Arnold D. Robbins <[email protected]> ++ ++ * builtin.c (do_sub): Make `sofar' be size_t to avoid ++ integer overflows. Thanks to Michał Majchrowicz ++ <[email protected]> for the report. ++ * node.c (parse_escape): Change `i' to int64_t to avoid ++ overflows. Thanks to ASan with gcc -m32. ++ + 2026-04-03 Arnold D. Robbins <[email protected]> + + * io.c (do_getline_redir): Don't DEREF redir_exp too early. +diff --git a/builtin.c b/builtin.c +index ba3459db..80ab6069 100644 +--- a/builtin.c ++++ b/builtin.c +@@ -2985,7 +2985,7 @@ do_sub(int nargs, unsigned int flags) + char *repl; + char *replend; + size_t repllen; +- int sofar; ++ size_t sofar; + int ampersands; + int matches = 0; + Regexp *rp; +diff --git a/node.c b/node.c +index f08a57d7..12a8fab4 100644 +--- a/node.c ++++ b/node.c +@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ parse_escape(const char **string_ptr, const char **result, size_t *nbytes) + static char buf[MB_LEN_MAX]; + enum escape_results retval = ESCAPE_OK; + int c = *(*string_ptr)++; +- int i; ++ int64_t i; + int count; + int j; + const char *start; +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/gawk/gawk-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://run-ptest \ file://0001-Fix-some-C23-compilatio-issues.patch \ file://CVE-2026-40467.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-40468.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "378f8864ec21cfceaa048f7e1869ac9b4597b449087caf1eb55e440d30273336"
PATCH 5/19 gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40469
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]>
NVD [3] identifies upstream merge commit [2] as the fix. The CVE-specific change is its second parent [1], which adds 32-bit overflow checking in do_sub().
[1] https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gawk.git/commit/?id=aa7272a6e1184cdd21ab8f89200219abd8053eda
[2] https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gawk.git/commit/?id=ae1b2d508f46913269a9e62aceda3636afe8147b
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40469
--- .../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40469.patch | 90 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40469.patch
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40469.patch new file +90 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From f907980a3e7a58006b796308021c8410a24e0f3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Arnold D. Robbins" <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2026 10:56:38 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Add overflow checking in do_sub for 32 bit systems. + +CVE: CVE-2026-40469 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gawk.git/commit/?id=aa7272a6e1184cdd21ab8f89200219abd8053eda] + +(cherry picked from commit aa7272a6e1184cdd21ab8f89200219abd8053eda) +Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]> +--- + ChangeLog | 9 +++++++++ + builtin.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog +index e691b241..74eea81f 100644 +--- a/ChangeLog ++++ b/ChangeLog +@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@ ++2026-04-06 Arnold D. Robbins <[email protected]> ++ ++ * builtin.c (do_sub): Check for overflow in calculation of size ++ of result buffer by doing the math in 64 bits. This provides ++ a fatal message on 32 bit systems if overflow happens instead ++ of letting dynamic memory get corrupted and likely causing ++ a core dump. Thanks to Michał Majchrowicz <[email protected]> ++ for the report and fix. ++ + 2026-04-04 Arnold D. Robbins <[email protected]> + + * builtin.c (do_sub): Make `sofar' be size_t to avoid +diff --git a/builtin.c b/builtin.c +index 80ab6069..d63cf47b 100644 +--- a/builtin.c ++++ b/builtin.c +@@ -2998,11 +2998,13 @@ do_sub(int nargs, unsigned int flags) + long current; + bool lastmatchnonzero; + char *mb_indices = NULL; ++ const char *fname = NULL; // for fatal message, below + + if ((flags & GENSUB) != 0) { + double d; + NODE *glob_flag; + ++ fname = "gensub"; + check_exact_args(nargs, "gensub", 4); + + tmp = PEEK(3); +@@ -3033,11 +3035,9 @@ do_sub(int nargs, unsigned int flags) + } + DEREF(glob_flag); + } else { +- if ((flags & GSUB) != 0) { +- check_exact_args(nargs, "gsub", 3); +- } else { +- check_exact_args(nargs, "sub", 3); +- } ++ fname = ((flags & GSUB) != 0) ? "gsub" : "sub"; ++ ++ check_exact_args(nargs, fname, 3); + + /* take care of regexp early, in case re_update is fatal */ + +@@ -3153,6 +3153,21 @@ do_sub(int nargs, unsigned int flags) + * vary since ampersand is actual text of regexp match. + */ + ++ // 4/2026: This overflow check simply provides a fatal ++ // message instead of letting realloc() die later after ++ // a buffer overrun. It simply makes the user experience better, ++ // but does not prevent gawk from dying miserably. I suppose ++ // it's worth the trouble, but just barely. ++ ++ /* uint64_t so the product is 64-bit even on 32-bit ILP32 builds */ ++ uint64_t repl_contribution = ++ (uint64_t)(unsigned int)ampersands ++ * (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)(matchend - matchstart); ++ if (repl_contribution > (uint64_t)SIZE_MAX ++ || repl_contribution > (uint64_t)SIZE_MAX - (size_t)(matchend - text) ++ - repllen - 1) ++ fatal(_("%s: replacement expansion too large"), fname); ++ + /* + * add 1 to len to handle "empty" case where + * matchend == matchstart and we force a match on a single +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/gawk/gawk-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-Fix-some-C23-compilatio-issues.patch \ file://CVE-2026-40467.patch \ file://CVE-2026-40468.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-40469.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "378f8864ec21cfceaa048f7e1869ac9b4597b449087caf1eb55e440d30273336"
PATCH 6/19 gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40553
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [3], using the commit shown in [1]. It also applies the corrective follow-up [2], which fixes the snprintf() truncation boundary check. Both commits are included in gawk 5.4.1, identified as the fixed release in [4].
[1] https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gawk.git/commit/?id=cca0366144336b49aaa7d5d949966ce8e2c70843
[2] https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gawk.git/commit/?id=bfa2e4b890a44100a99d26b54af385479528b12e
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40553
[4] https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/07/CVE-2026-40467/
--- .../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p1.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++ .../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p2.patch | 44 ++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p2.patch
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p1.patch new file +50 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From aa39cac4bda6333be0f6253ecb7dfade26cb9641 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Arnold D. Robbins" <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 09:39:02 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid buffer overflow in extension/readdir.c. + +CVE: CVE-2026-40553 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gawk.git/commit/?id=cca0366144336b49aaa7d5d949966ce8e2c70843] + +(cherry picked from commit cca0366144336b49aaa7d5d949966ce8e2c70843) +Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]> +--- + extension/ChangeLog | 6 ++++++ + extension/readdir.c | 6 +++++- + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/extension/ChangeLog b/extension/ChangeLog +index 40ed6dd0..52a4c6ab 100644 +--- a/extension/ChangeLog ++++ b/extension/ChangeLog +@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ ++2026-04-15 Arnold D. Robbins <[email protected]> ++ ++ * readdir.c (ftype): Use snprintf() to check for buffer ++ overflow in the file name before calling stat(). Thanks to ++ Marcin Wyczechowski <[email protected]> for the report. ++ + 2023-11-02 Arnold D. Robbins <[email protected]> + + * 5.3.0: Release tar ball made. +diff --git a/extension/readdir.c b/extension/readdir.c +index 788e1d1e..b525fe21 100644 +--- a/extension/readdir.c ++++ b/extension/readdir.c +@@ -117,8 +117,12 @@ ftype(struct dirent *entry, const char *dirname) + #endif + char fname[PATH_MAX]; + struct stat sbuf; ++ int count; ++ ++ count = snprintf(fname, sizeof(fname), "%s/%s", dirname, entry->d_name); ++ if (count > sizeof(fname)) ++ return "u"; // buffer overflow. skip stat() call. + +- sprintf(fname, "%s/%s", dirname, entry->d_name); + if (stat(fname, &sbuf) == 0) { + if (S_ISBLK(sbuf.st_mode)) + return "b"; +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p2.patch new file +44 -0
44 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb +2 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/gawk/gawk-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2026-40467.patch \ file://CVE-2026-40468.patch \ file://CVE-2026-40469.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-40553_p1.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-40553_p2.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "378f8864ec21cfceaa048f7e1869ac9b4597b449087caf1eb55e440d30273336"
PATCH 7/19 python3-cryptography: set CVE_PRODUCT
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: mark.yang <[email protected]>
NVD lists it as cryptography.io:cryptography and CNA lists it as pyca:cryptography, so set both vendor:product pairs to match correctly and precisely.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb +2 -0
@@ -65,4 +65,6 @@ FILES:${PN}-dbg += " \ ${PYTHON_SITEPACKAGES_DIR}/${SRCNAME}/hazmat/bindings/.debug \ " +CVE_PRODUCT = "cryptography.io:cryptography pyca:cryptography" + BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
PATCH 8/19 python3-ply: set CVE_PRODUCT
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: mark.yang <[email protected]>
NVD registers ply as dabeaz:ply, so the default python:ply vendor prefix never matches and no CVEs are reported. Use the exact vendor:product pair.
CVE-2025-56005 will then show as unpatched; no fixed release exists.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-ply_3.11.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-ply_3.11.bb +2 -0
@@ -15,4 +15,6 @@ RDEPENDS:${PN}:class-target += "\ python3-shell \ " +CVE_PRODUCT = "dabeaz:ply" + BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
PATCH 9/19 python3-pyasn1: set CVE_PRODUCT
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: mark.yang <[email protected]>
The default python:pyasn1 does not match the NVD/CNA entries which use pyasn1 as vendor, so CVEs like CVE-2026-30922 are never reported. Use the exact pyasn1:pyasn1 pair.
Note: Original commit was for python3-pyasn1_0.6.3.bb. This is adjusted for scarthgap where recipe version is python3-pyasn1_0.5.1.bb.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pyasn1_0.5.1.bb | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pyasn1_0.5.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ inherit pypi setuptools3 require python-pyasn1.inc +CVE_PRODUCT = "pyasn1:pyasn1"
PATCH 10/19 python3-setuptools: Fix CVE-2026-59890
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59890
--- .../python3-setuptools/CVE-2026-59890.patch | 194 ++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-setuptools_69.1.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 195 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2026-59890.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2026-59890.patch new file +194 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +From d54dff79a9568c25551092711c7ebc28422006a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason R. Coombs" <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2026 10:46:34 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Normalize Unicode form when matching MANIFEST.in patterns + +FileList matched MANIFEST.in patterns against on-disk names byte-for-byte +with no Unicode normalization. On macOS APFS/HFS+, a file stored NFD and a +pattern authored NFC denote the same file but differ byte-for-byte, so an +exclude/global-exclude/recursive-exclude/prune rule could silently fail to +drop a non-ASCII-named file, publishing it in the sdist despite the rule. + +Normalize both the pattern and the candidate path to NFC before matching, +via a new unicode_utils.normalize() helper and a _NormalizedMatcher wrapper +around the compiled pattern in translate_pattern. + +Fixes GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c. + +CVE: CVE-2026-59890 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f] + +Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit dd9f436a36486b4cb8a4c70a2321548b0be09b8f) +Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]> +--- + newsfragments/+ghsa-h35f-9h28-mq5c.bugfix.rst | 7 +++ + setuptools/command/egg_info.py | 28 +++++++++++- + setuptools/tests/test_manifest.py | 45 +++++++++++++++++++ + setuptools/unicode_utils.py | 14 ++++++ + 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 newsfragments/+ghsa-h35f-9h28-mq5c.bugfix.rst + +diff --git a/newsfragments/+ghsa-h35f-9h28-mq5c.bugfix.rst b/newsfragments/+ghsa-h35f-9h28-mq5c.bugfix.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000..42d6c4cfe +--- /dev/null ++++ b/newsfragments/+ghsa-h35f-9h28-mq5c.bugfix.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ ++``MANIFEST.in`` matching (via ``FileList``) is now insensitive to Unicode ++normalization form. A pattern authored in one form (e.g. NFC, as typically ++saved by editors) now matches a file whose name is stored on disk in another ++(e.g. NFD, as produced by macOS APFS/HFS+). Previously an ``exclude``, ++``global-exclude``, ``recursive-exclude``, or ``prune`` rule could silently ++fail to drop a non-ASCII-named file from the source distribution, publishing ++it despite the exclusion -- see GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c. +diff --git a/setuptools/command/egg_info.py b/setuptools/command/egg_info.py +index 62d2feea9..e858708ee 100644 +--- a/setuptools/command/egg_info.py ++++ b/setuptools/command/egg_info.py +@@ -34,6 +34,27 @@ from ..warnings import SetuptoolsDeprecationWarning + PY_MAJOR = '{}.{}'.format(*sys.version_info) + + ++class _NormalizedMatcher: ++ """ ++ Wrap a compiled pattern so that matching is insensitive to Unicode ++ normalization form. ++ ++ File names walked from disk (NFD on macOS APFS/HFS+) and patterns from ++ ``MANIFEST.in`` (typically NFC) can denote the same file while differing ++ byte-for-byte. Normalizing both sides before matching keeps an exclusion ++ (or inclusion) from silently failing. See GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c. ++ """ ++ ++ def __init__(self, pattern: re.Pattern) -> None: ++ self._pattern = pattern ++ ++ def match(self, path): ++ return self._pattern.match(unicode_utils.normalize(path)) ++ ++ def search(self, path): ++ return self._pattern.search(unicode_utils.normalize(path)) ++ ++ + def translate_pattern(glob): # noqa: C901 # is too complex (14) # FIXME + """ + Translate a file path glob like '*.txt' in to a regular expression. +@@ -43,6 +64,11 @@ def translate_pattern(glob): # noqa: C901 # is too complex (14) # FIXME + """ + pat = '' + ++ # Normalize the pattern so it matches paths regardless of the Unicode ++ # normalization form used on disk (GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c). Candidate paths ++ # are normalized to the same form by ``_NormalizedMatcher``. ++ glob = unicode_utils.normalize(glob) ++ + # This will split on '/' within [character classes]. This is deliberate. + chunks = glob.split(os.path.sep) + +@@ -114,7 +140,7 @@ def translate_pattern(glob): # noqa: C901 # is too complex (14) # FIXME + pat += sep + + pat += r'\Z' +- return re.compile(pat, flags=re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL) ++ return _NormalizedMatcher(re.compile(pat, flags=re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL)) + + + class InfoCommon: +diff --git a/setuptools/tests/test_manifest.py b/setuptools/tests/test_manifest.py +index fbd21b197..1a7441fc3 100644 +--- a/setuptools/tests/test_manifest.py ++++ b/setuptools/tests/test_manifest.py +@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import io + import logging + from distutils import log + from distutils.errors import DistutilsTemplateError ++import unicodedata + + from setuptools.command.egg_info import FileList, egg_info, translate_pattern + from setuptools.dist import Distribution +@@ -158,6 +159,21 @@ def test_translated_pattern_mismatch(pattern_mismatch): + assert not translate_pattern(pattern).match(target) + + ++def test_translate_pattern_unicode_normalization(): ++ """ ++ Matching is insensitive to Unicode normalization form: a pattern authored ++ in one form matches a path stored on disk in another (and vice versa), so ++ that an exclusion cannot be bypassed by an NFC/NFD mismatch. ++ ++ Regression test for GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c. ++ """ ++ nfc = unicodedata.normalize('NFC', 'café.txt') # 'café.txt' composed ++ nfd = unicodedata.normalize('NFD', 'café.txt') # 'café.txt' decomposed ++ assert nfc != nfd # the two byte forms genuinely differ ++ assert translate_pattern(nfc).match(nfd) ++ assert translate_pattern(nfd).match(nfc) ++ ++ + class TempDirTestCase: + def setup_method(self, method): + self.temp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp() +@@ -331,6 +347,35 @@ class TestManifestTest(TempDirTestCase): + files = default_files | set([ml('app/a.txt'), ml('app/b.txt'), ml('app/c.rst')]) + assert files == self.get_files() + ++ def test_global_exclude_unicode_normalization(self): ++ """ ++ A ``global-exclude`` authored NFC must drop a file whose on-disk name ++ is NFD: on macOS APFS/HFS+ the two are the same file, and even on ++ case/normalization-exact filesystems the decomposed name can be ++ committed and reach the build. Otherwise the file is published in the ++ sdist despite the exclusion. ++ ++ Regression test for GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c. ++ """ ++ nfc_name = unicodedata.normalize('NFC', 'café.txt') ++ nfd_name = unicodedata.normalize('NFD', 'café.txt') ++ assert nfc_name != nfd_name ++ # write the file under its decomposed (NFD) name ... ++ touch(os.path.join(self.temp_dir, 'app', nfd_name)) ++ # ... and exclude it with the composed (NFC) form. ++ self.make_manifest( ++ f""" ++ global-include *.txt ++ global-exclude {nfc_name} ++ """ ++ ) ++ leaked = { ++ f ++ for f in self.get_files() ++ if unicodedata.normalize('NFC', os.path.basename(f)) == nfc_name ++ } ++ assert not leaked, f"excluded file leaked into manifest: {leaked}" ++ + + class TestFileListTest(TempDirTestCase): + """ +diff --git a/setuptools/unicode_utils.py b/setuptools/unicode_utils.py +index d43dcc11f..311d4075a 100644 +--- a/setuptools/unicode_utils.py ++++ b/setuptools/unicode_utils.py +@@ -15,6 +15,20 @@ def decompose(path): + return path + + ++def normalize(text): ++ """ ++ Return *text* in a canonical Unicode form (NFC) so that names which are ++ visually identical but encoded differently compare equal. ++ ++ macOS APFS/HFS+ store file names in decomposed form (NFD), while patterns ++ in ``MANIFEST.in`` are typically authored composed (NFC). The two denote ++ the same file but differ byte-for-byte, so matching them directly lets an ++ exclusion silently fail. Normalizing both the walked path and the pattern ++ to a single form before matching avoids that (GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c). ++ """ ++ return unicodedata.normalize('NFC', text) if isinstance(text, str) else text ++ ++ + def filesys_decode(path): + """ + Ensure that the given path is decoded, +-- +2.44.4
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools_69.1.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ SRC_URI += " \ file://CVE-2024-6345.patch \ file://CVE-2025-47273-pre1.patch \ file://CVE-2025-47273.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59890.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5c0806c7d9af348e6dd3777b4f4dbb42c7ad85b190104837488eab9a7c945cf8"
PATCH 11/19 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-28422
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28422
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-28422
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-28422.patch | 44 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28422.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28422.patch new file +44 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From fcf19885004325f5a52db6bd6893cb5b387799d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2026 20:29:20 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 01/17] patch 9.2.0078: [security]: stack-buffer-overflow in + build_stl_str_hl() + +Problem: A stack-buffer-overflow occurs when rendering a statusline + with a multi-byte fill character on a very wide terminal. + The size check in build_stl_str_hl() uses the cell width + rather than the byte length, allowing the subsequent fill + loop to write beyond the 4096-byte MAXPATHL buffer + (ehdgks0627, un3xploitable). +Solution: Update the size check to account for the byte length of + the fill character (using MB_CHAR2LEN). + +Github Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-gmqx-prf2-8mwf + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/4e5b9e31cb7484ad156fba995fdce3c9b075b5fd] +CVE: CVE-2026-28422 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/buffer.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/buffer.c b/src/buffer.c +index 0feafc590d..363dd0e04a 100644 +--- a/src/buffer.c ++++ b/src/buffer.c +@@ -5293,7 +5293,8 @@ build_stl_str_hl( + } + width = maxwidth; + } +- else if (width < maxwidth && outputlen + maxwidth - width + 1 < outlen) ++ else if (width < maxwidth && ++ outputlen + (maxwidth - width) * MB_CHAR2LEN(fillchar) + 1 < outlen) + { + // Find how many separators there are, which we will use when + // figuring out how many groups there are. +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-52858.patch \ file://CVE-2026-52859.patch \ file://CVE-2026-52860.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-28422.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 12/19 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-42307
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42307
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-42307
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch | 121 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 122 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch new file +121 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From 936634660e3836e1a495965b48a0dc913e9d0deb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 19:03:02 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 02/17] patch 9.2.0383: [security]: runtime(netrw): + shell-injection via sftp: and file: URLs + +Problem: runtime(netrw): shell-injection via sftp: and file: URLs + (Joshua Rogers) +Solution: Escape temporary file names, harden filename suffix regex, + drop unused g:netrw_tmpfile_escape variable + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/405e2fb6d54d5653523809e2853d99d1c000a5fc] +CVE: CVE-2026-42307 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/doc/pi_netrw.txt | 4 ---- + runtime/doc/tags | 1 - + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim | 16 +++++++++------- + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/doc/netrw.txt | 4 ---- + 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/doc/pi_netrw.txt b/runtime/doc/pi_netrw.txt +index a86cac36ba..2d98a8407b 100644 +--- a/runtime/doc/pi_netrw.txt ++++ b/runtime/doc/pi_netrw.txt +@@ -2854,10 +2854,6 @@ your browsing preferences. (see also: |netrw-settings|) + such as listing, file removal, etc. + default: ssh + +- *g:netrw_tmpfile_escape* =' &;' +- escape() is applied to all temporary files +- to escape these characters. +- + *g:netrw_timefmt* specify format string to vim's strftime(). + The default, "%c", is "the preferred date + and time representation for the current +diff --git a/runtime/doc/tags b/runtime/doc/tags +index 300dfd18a6..7ce3b63075 100644 +--- a/runtime/doc/tags ++++ b/runtime/doc/tags +@@ -7863,7 +7863,6 @@ g:netrw_ssh_browse_reject pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_ssh_browse_reject* + g:netrw_ssh_cmd pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_ssh_cmd* + g:netrw_sshport pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_sshport* + g:netrw_timefmt pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_timefmt* +-g:netrw_tmpfile_escape pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_tmpfile_escape* + g:netrw_uid pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_uid* + g:netrw_use_noswf pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_use_noswf* + g:netrw_use_nt_rcp pi_netrw.txt /*g:netrw_use_nt_rcp* +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +index 1c98104d00..805474616d 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +@@ -378,7 +378,6 @@ else + call s:NetrwInit("g:netrw_glob_escape",'*[]?`{~$\') + endif + call s:NetrwInit("g:netrw_menu_escape",'.&? \') +-call s:NetrwInit("g:netrw_tmpfile_escape",' &;') + call s:NetrwInit("s:netrw_map_escape","<|\n\r\\\<C-V>\"") + if has("gui_running") && (&enc == 'utf-8' || &enc == 'utf-16' || &enc == 'ucs-4') + let s:treedepthstring= "│ " +@@ -1799,14 +1798,14 @@ function netrw#NetRead(mode,...) + "......................................... + " NetRead: (sftp) NetRead Method #9 {{{3 + elseif b:netrw_method == 9 +- call netrw#os#Execute(s:netrw_silentxfer."!".g:netrw_sftp_cmd." ".netrw#os#Escape(g:netrw_machine.":".b:netrw_fname,1)." ".tmpfile) ++ call netrw#os#Execute(s:netrw_silentxfer."!".g:netrw_sftp_cmd." ".netrw#os#Escape(g:netrw_machine.":".b:netrw_fname,1)." ".netrw#os#Escape(tmpfile,1)) + let result = s:NetrwGetFile(readcmd, tmpfile, b:netrw_method) + let b:netrw_lastfile = choice + + "......................................... + " NetRead: (file) NetRead Method #10 {{{3 + elseif b:netrw_method == 10 && exists("g:netrw_file_cmd") +- call netrw#os#Execute(s:netrw_silentxfer."!".g:netrw_file_cmd." ".netrw#os#Escape(b:netrw_fname,1)." ".tmpfile) ++ call netrw#os#Execute(s:netrw_silentxfer."!".g:netrw_file_cmd." ".netrw#os#Escape(b:netrw_fname,1)." ".netrw#os#Escape(tmpfile,1)) + let result = s:NetrwGetFile(readcmd, tmpfile, b:netrw_method) + let b:netrw_lastfile = choice + +@@ -8927,14 +8926,17 @@ function s:GetTempfile(fname) + endif + + " use fname's suffix for the temporary file ++ " Restrict the suffix to word characters so shell metacharacters in a ++ " remote filename (e.g. sftp://host/foo.txt;id) cannot ride along into ++ " the tempfile name and out into a downstream shell command. + if a:fname != "" +- if a:fname =~ '\.[^./]\+$' ++ if a:fname =~ '\.\w\+$' + if a:fname =~ '\.tar\.gz$' || a:fname =~ '\.tar\.bz2$' || a:fname =~ '\.tar\.xz$' +- let suffix = ".tar".substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.[^./]\+\)$','\1','e') ++ let suffix = ".tar".substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.\w\+\)$','\1','e') + elseif a:fname =~ '.txz$' +- let suffix = ".txz".substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.[^./]\+\)$','\1','e') ++ let suffix = ".txz".substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.\w\+\)$','\1','e') + else +- let suffix = substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.[^./]\+\)$','\1','e') ++ let suffix = substitute(a:fname,'^.*\(\.\w\+\)$','\1','e') + endif + let tmpfile= substitute(tmpfile,'\.tmp$','','e') + let tmpfile .= suffix +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/doc/netrw.txt b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/doc/netrw.txt +index 01a5bda597..144bab5fb3 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/doc/netrw.txt ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/doc/netrw.txt +@@ -2854,10 +2854,6 @@ your browsing preferences. (see also: |netrw-settings|) + such as listing, file removal, etc. + default: ssh + +- *g:netrw_tmpfile_escape* =' &;' +- escape() is applied to all temporary files +- to escape these characters. +- + *g:netrw_timefmt* specify format string to vim's strftime(). + The default, "%c", is "the preferred date + and time representation for the current +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-52859.patch \ file://CVE-2026-52860.patch \ file://CVE-2026-28422.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-42307.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 13/19 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-43961
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/8af0f098c3a42a28661d0295364e
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-43961
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-43961.patch | 65 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-43961.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-43961.patch new file +65 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From f38c7cb2fcc9d5839386ea4722463ea921f0bbce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 16:43:15 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 03/17] patch 9.2.0480: [security]: runtime(netrw): code + injection via mf command + +Problem: [security]: runtime(netrw): code injection via mf command + (Christopher Lusk, Zdenek Dohnal) +Solution: Do not use string concatenation inside the filter() commands + (Zdenek Dohnal) + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-66hr-7p6x-x5j3 + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/8af0f098c3a42a28661d0295364e] +CVE: CVE-2026-43961 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim | 7 +++---- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +index 805474616d..e484de5c93 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +@@ -5155,7 +5155,7 @@ function s:NetrwMarkFile(islocal,fname) + + else + " remove filename from buffer's markfilelist +- call filter(s:netrwmarkfilelist_{curbufnr},'v:val != a:fname') ++ call filter(s:netrwmarkfilelist_{curbufnr}, {_, v -> v !=# a:fname}) + if s:netrwmarkfilelist_{curbufnr} == [] + " local markfilelist is empty; remove it entirely + call s:NetrwUnmarkList(curbufnr,curdir) +@@ -5176,7 +5176,6 @@ function s:NetrwMarkFile(islocal,fname) + + else + " initialize new markfilelist +- + let s:netrwmarkfilelist_{curbufnr}= [] + call add(s:netrwmarkfilelist_{curbufnr},substitute(a:fname,'[|@]$','','')) + +@@ -5196,7 +5195,7 @@ function s:NetrwMarkFile(islocal,fname) + call add(s:netrwmarkfilelist,netrw#fs#ComposePath(b:netrw_curdir,a:fname)) + else + " remove new filename from global markfilelist +- call filter(s:netrwmarkfilelist,'v:val != "'.dname.'"') ++ call filter(s:netrwmarkfilelist, {_, v -> v !=# dname}) + if s:netrwmarkfilelist == [] + unlet s:netrwmarkfilelist + endif +@@ -7202,7 +7201,7 @@ function s:NetrwTreeDisplay(dir,depth) + " hide given patterns + let listhide= split(g:netrw_list_hide,',') + for pat in listhide +- call filter(w:netrw_treedict[dir],'v:val !~ "'.escape(pat,'\\').'"') ++ call filter(w:netrw_treedict[dir], {_, v -> v !~# pat}) + endfor + + elseif g:netrw_hide == 2 +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-52860.patch \ file://CVE-2026-28422.patch \ file://CVE-2026-42307.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-43961.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 14/19 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-47162
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47162
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-47162
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-47162.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47162.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47162.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From d254c3b584e19555f2aecc4886ae7c92c0acc199 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 18:53:48 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 04/17] patch 9.2.0495: [security]: runtime(netrw): code + injection via NetrwBookHistSave() + +Problem: [security]: runtime(netrw): code injection via + NetrwBookHistSave() +Solution: Properly quote the directory name using string() function + (Srinivas Piskala Ganesh Babu) + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-crm5-rh6j-2c7c + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/f08ab2f4d7d2947c8dd6c179ae08ee6146a2694b] +CVE: CVE-2026-47162 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +index e484de5c93..9014ca339b 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +@@ -2921,7 +2921,7 @@ function s:NetrwBookHistSave() + while ( first || cnt != g:netrw_dirhistcnt ) + let lastline= lastline + 1 + if exists("g:netrw_dirhist_{cnt}") +- call setline(lastline,'let g:netrw_dirhist_'.cnt."='".g:netrw_dirhist_{cnt}."'") ++ call setline(lastline,'let g:netrw_dirhist_'.cnt.'='.string(g:netrw_dirhist_{cnt})) + endif + let first = 0 + let cnt = ( cnt - 1 ) % g:netrw_dirhistmax +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-28422.patch \ file://CVE-2026-42307.patch \ file://CVE-2026-43961.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-47162.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 15/19 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-47167
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47167
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-47167
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-47167.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47167.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47167.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From e117fcc6f1c1973602c8e2c6529fba9ee1ce59b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 19:39:24 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 05/17] patch 9.2.0496: [security]: Code Injection in cucumber + filetype plugin + +Problem: [security]: Code Injection in cucumber filetype plugin + (Christopher Lusk) +Solution: Use rubys Regexp.new() with the untrusted pattern + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-4473-94jm-w5x9 + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/a65a52d684bc58535ad28a4ae824d22e76399934] +CVE: CVE-2026-47167 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim b/runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim +index f4848d1c60..3361f1db4a 100644 +--- a/runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim ++++ b/runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim +@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ function! s:stepmatch(receiver,target) + catch + endtry + if has("ruby") && pattern !~ '\\\@<!#{' +- ruby VIM.command("return #{if (begin; Kernel.eval('/'+VIM.evaluate('pattern')+'/'); rescue SyntaxError; end) === VIM.evaluate('a:target') then 1 else 0 end}") ++ " Use Regexp.new, so the pattern stays untrusted data and cannot inject Ruby ++ ruby VIM.command("return #{if (begin; Regexp.new(VIM.evaluate('pattern')); rescue RegexpError; end) === VIM.evaluate('a:target') then 1 else 0 end}") + else + return 0 + endif +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-42307.patch \ file://CVE-2026-43961.patch \ file://CVE-2026-47162.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-47167.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 16/19 sqlite3: fix CVE-2026-11822 and CVE-2026-11824
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Deepak Rathore <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix [1], which addresses memory corruption vulnerabilities in the SQLite FTS5 full-text search extension. The GitHub mirror commit [1] corresponds to the SQLite Fossil check-in shown in [2].
[1] https://github.com/sqlite/sqlite/commit/e0b995b2a62b78979eb65bb8dadfa912eaa8e62f
[2] https://sqlite.org/src/info/061febcf41ca
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11822
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11824
--- .../CVE-2026-11822_CVE-2026-11824.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.45.3.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2026-11822_CVE-2026-11824.patch
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2026-11822_CVE-2026-11824.patch new file +41 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From ceece94b0040125a12192f6f23b1ec413871b04c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: drh <> +Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 12:00:19 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix potential buffer overwrite that could occur in fts5 when + processing corrupt records. + +FossilOrigin-Name: 061febcf41ca4872a0f407951e1507209daca7895122b909a7806c60b6e200c4 + +CVE: CVE-2026-11822 CVE-2026-11824 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/sqlite/sqlite/commit/e0b995b2a62b78979eb65bb8dadfa912eaa8e62f] + +Backport Changes: +- Applied the upstream fts5LeafRead() fix from ext/fts5/fts5_index.c + to sqlite3.c because the Yocto sqlite-autoconf source uses the + amalgamated SQLite layout. +- Omitted ext/fts5/test/fts5corruptA.test because this extracted + recipe source contains the SQLite autoconf/amalgamation layout and + does not carry the upstream Tcl test tree. +- Omitted Git mirror metadata files manifest and manifest.uuid because + they are not required for the security fix in this source layout. + +Signed-off-by: Deepak Rathore <[email protected]> +--- + sqlite3.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/sqlite3.c b/sqlite3.c +index fb42adcd7..6acf46a5b 100644 +--- a/sqlite3.c ++++ b/sqlite3.c +@@ -239694,7 +239694,7 @@ static void fts5DataRelease(Fts5Data *pData){ + static Fts5Data *fts5LeafRead(Fts5Index *p, i64 iRowid){ + Fts5Data *pRet = fts5DataRead(p, iRowid); + if( pRet ){ +- if( pRet->nn<4 || pRet->szLeaf>pRet->nn ){ ++ if( pRet->szLeaf<4 || pRet->szLeaf>pRet->nn ){ + p->rc = FTS5_CORRUPT; + fts5DataRelease(pRet); + pRet = 0; +-- +2.51.0
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.45.3.bb +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.sqlite.org/2024/sqlite-autoconf-${SQLITE_PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-6965.patch \ file://CVE-2025-7709.patch \ file://CVE-2025-70873.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-11822_CVE-2026-11824.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b2809ca53124c19c60f42bf627736eae011afdcc205bb48270a5ee9a38191531"
PATCH 17/19 curl: add annotation for CVE-2026-10536
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: João Marcos Costa <[email protected]>
This CVE is detailed here: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2026-10536.html
and the fix essentially consolidates the fact that HTTP2 stream dependency is deprecated.
While oe-core provides a PACKAGECONFIG to enable HTTP2, it is not actually used so the affected part of the code is not compiled. For instance, in the do_configure logs:
"""
(...)
HTTP2: no (--with-nghttp2, --with-hyper)
(...)
"""
Ignore this CVE unless 'nghttp2' is enabled.
--- meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2024-32928] = "ignored: CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER was disabled on go CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-0725] = "not-applicable-config: gzip decompression of content-encoded HTTP responses with the `CURLOPT_ACCEPT_ENCODING` option, using zlib 1.2.0.3 or older" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-5025] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'openssl', 'not-applicable-config: applicable only with wolfssl','unpatched',d)}" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-10966] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'openssl', 'not-applicable-config: applicable only with wolfssl','unpatched',d)}" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-10536] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'nghttp2', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: applicable only with HTTP/2', d)}" inherit autotools pkgconfig binconfig multilib_header ptest
PATCH 18/19 cargo-update-recipe-crates: Don't fail for partially empty Cargo.lock
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Martin Schwan <[email protected]>
Do not fail if only some Cargo.lock files are empty. Only fail, if there are absolutely no dependencies found in any Cargo.lock.
This fixes the following error message, which would occur with "bitbake -c update_crates python3-orjson":
ERROR: python3-orjson-3.10.17-r0 do_update_crates: Execution of '.../python3-orjson/3.10.17/temp/run.do_update_crates.70693' failed with exit code 1
ERROR: Logfile of failure stored in: .../python3-orjson/3.10.17/temp/log.do_update_crates.70693
Log data follows:
| DEBUG: Executing python function extend_recipe_sysroot
| NOTE: Direct dependencies are ['.../sources/oe-core/../oe-core/meta/recipes-devtools/quilt/quilt-native_0.69.bb:do_populate_sysroot', 'virtual:native:.../sources/oe-core/../oe-core/meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch_2.8.bb:do_populate_sysroot', 'virtual:native:.../sources/oe-core/../oe-core/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.13.9.bb:do_populate_sysroot'] | NOTE: Installed into sysroot: []
| NOTE: Skipping as already exists in sysroot: ['gettext-minimal-native', 'cmake-native', 'libtool-native', 'quilt-native', 'texinfo-dummy-native', 'openssl-native', 'expat-native', 'ncurses-native', 'util-linux-libuuid-native', 'zlib-native', 'libedit-native', 'make-native', 'patch-native', 'perl-native', 'python3-native', 'bzip2-native', 'xz-native', 'zstd-native', 'attr-native', 'gdbm-native', 'libffi-native', 'sqlite3-native'] | DEBUG: Python function extend_recipe_sysroot finished
| DEBUG: Executing shell function do_update_crates
| Traceback (most recent call last):
| File "<stdin>", line 41, in <module>
| File "<stdin>", line 12, in get_crates
| ValueError: Unable to find any candidate crates that use crates.io
|
| The above exception was the direct cause of the following exception:
|
| Traceback (most recent call last):
| File "<stdin>", line 43, in <module>
| ValueError: Cannot parse '.../python3-orjson/3.10.17/sources/orjson-3.10.17/include/cargo/simdutf8-0.1.5/Cargo.lock'
| WARNING: exit code 1 from a shell command.
ERROR: Task (.../sources/oe-core/../meta-openembedded/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-orjson_3.10.17.bb:do_update_crates) failed with exit code '1'
--- .../cargo-update-recipe-crates.bbclass | 16 +++++++--------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
meta/classes-recipe/cargo-update-recipe-crates.bbclass +7 -9
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ def get_crates(f): crates_candidates = list(filter(lambda c: 'crates.io' in c.get('source', ''), crates['package'])) if not crates_candidates: - raise ValueError("Unable to find any candidate crates that use crates.io") + print("WARNING: Unable to find any candidate crates that use crates.io") + return None # Update crates uri and their checksum, to avoid name clashing on the checksum # we need to rename crates with name and version to have a unique key
@@ -63,14 +64,11 @@ for root, dirs, files in os.walk('${CARGO_LOCK_SRC_DIR}'): continue for file in files: if file == 'Cargo.lock': - try: - cargo_lock_path = os.path.join(root, file) - crates += get_crates(os.path.join(root, file)) - except Exception as e: - raise ValueError("Cannot parse '%s'" % cargo_lock_path) from e - else: - found = True -if not found: + cargo_lock_path = os.path.join(root, file) + c = get_crates(cargo_lock_path) + if c is not None: + crates += c +if crates is None: raise ValueError("Unable to find any Cargo.lock in ${CARGO_LOCK_SRC_DIR}") open("${TARGET_FILE}", 'w').write(crates) EOF
PATCH 19/19 openssh: set status for CVE-2026-59998
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
Analysis:
- CVE-2026-59998 concerns an undocumented limitation of GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck in Windows Active Directory environments [1].
- Upstream OpenSSH 10.4 only documents the existing behavior and provides no code remediation [2].
- The recipe disables Kerberos/GSSAPI by default. Mark the CVE not-applicable-config when PACKAGECONFIG lacks kerberos, and unpatched when kerberos is enabled.
Reference:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59998
[2] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/8058c5bdb507591b79ec926221fbe6fcc296d432
[YC: See previous version of this patch for context about ignoring vs
this CVE vs patching:
https://patchwork.yoctoproject.org/project/oe-core/patch/[email protected]/#40497 ]
--- meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb +1 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 and when running in a Kerberos environment" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2008-3844] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to some distributed RHEL binaries." CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-51767] = "upstream-wontfix: It was demonstrated on modified sshd and does not exist in upstream openssh https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3656#c1." CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3497] = "not-applicable-platform: Only affects GSSAPI Key Exchange patches used by some Linux distributions and does not exist in upstream openssh." +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-59998] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is disabled in the default OpenSSH configuration', d)}" PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd"