Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by end of day Thursday, September 3.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/4636
The following changes since commit 310eec2cb646d7d1a3ca99bad7e37495bb418a0d:
build-appliance-image: Update to scarthgap head revision (2026-08-28 09:52:39 +0100)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut
for you to fetch changes up to 1b1e13055b4eed838e1411d91dea46de08e1d72f:
patch: Fix CVE-2026-56288 (2026-09-01 17:07:13 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Emily Vekariya (2):
python3-pyasn1: Fix CVE-2026-59886
python3-pyasn1: Fix CVE-2026-59884
Hemanth Kumar M D (1):
glibc: fix CVE-2026-5435
Hetvi Thakar (5):
wget: Fix CVE-2026-58469
wget: Fix CVE-2026-58471
wget: Fix CVE-2026-58472
patch: Fix CVE-2026-56289
patch: Fix CVE-2026-56288
Jaipaul Cheernam (4):
systemd: Fix CVE-2026-29111
perl: fix CVE-2026-13221
perl: fix CVE-2026-57432
perl: fix CVE-2025-40909
Martin Jansa (1):
socat: fix native build on host with newer glibc
Peter Marko (5):
python3: upgrade 3.12.13 -> 3.12.14
systemd: upgrade 255.21 -> 255.22
libarchive: handle CVE-2026-5121
libarchive: patch CVE-2026-5745
gnutls: set status for CVE-2026-1584
Siddharth Doshi (9):
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55693
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55892
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55895
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-57452
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-57455
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59856
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59857
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59858
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-57456
...ixed-strchr-with-const-for-new-glibc.patch | 38 +
.../socat/socat_1.8.0.0.bb | 1 +
.../glibc/glibc/0024-CVE-2026-5435.patch | 137 ++
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.39.bb | 1 +
...55.21.bb => systemd-boot-native_255.22.bb} | 0
...-boot_255.21.bb => systemd-boot_255.22.bb} | 0
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd.inc | 2 +-
.../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-01.patch | 170 +++
.../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-02.patch | 85 ++
.../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-03.patch | 106 ++
.../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-04.patch | 35 +
.../{systemd_255.21.bb => systemd_255.22.bb} | 4 +
.../patch/patch/CVE-2026-56288.patch | 75 +
.../patch/patch/CVE-2026-56289.patch | 36 +
meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch_2.7.6.bb | 2 +
.../perl-cross/files/CVE-2025-40909-dep.patch | 25 +
.../perl-cross/perlcross_1.6.2.bb | 1 +
.../perl/files/CVE-2025-40909.patch | 412 ++++++
.../perl/files/CVE-2026-13221.patch | 75 +
.../perl/files/CVE-2026-57432-01.patch | 52 +
.../perl/files/CVE-2026-57432-02.patch | 34 +
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.38.4.bb | 4 +
.../recipes-devtools/python/python-pyasn1.inc | 2 +
.../python3-pyasn1/CVE-2026-59884.patch | 245 ++++
.../python3-pyasn1/CVE-2026-59886.patch | 252 ++++
...shebang-overflow-on-python-config.py.patch | 2 +-
...-qemu-wrapper-when-gathering-profile.patch | 2 +-
...e-treat-overflow-in-UID-GID-as-failu.patch | 2 +-
.../python/python3/CVE-2025-13462.patch | 142 --
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-11940.patch | 66 -
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-11972.patch | 60 -
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-1502.patch | 113 --
.../python3/CVE-2026-3644_CVE-2026-0672.patch | 154 --
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-4224.patch | 121 --
.../python3/CVE-2026-4519_CVE-2026-4786.patch | 66 -
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_p1.patch | 107 --
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_p2.patch | 159 ---
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-6100.patch | 75 -
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-7210.patch | 148 --
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-9669.patch | 96 --
.../python/python3/makerace.patch | 2 +-
...{python3_3.12.13.bb => python3_3.12.14.bb} | 24 +-
...atch => CVE-2026-4426_CVE-2026-5121.patch} | 1 +
.../libarchive/CVE-2026-5121-02.patch | 1270 +++++++++++++++++
.../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-5745.patch | 39 +
.../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb | 4 +-
.../wget/CVE-2026-58469-regression_p1.patch | 39 +
.../wget/CVE-2026-58469-regression_p2.patch | 26 +
.../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469.patch | 53 +
.../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58471.patch | 71 +
.../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58472-regression.patch | 236 +++
.../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58472.patch | 77 +
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb | 6 +
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.4.bb | 1 +
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-55693.patch | 88 ++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-55892.patch | 81 ++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch | 53 +
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-57452.patch | 76 +
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-57455.patch | 72 +
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-57456.patch | 90 ++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-59856.patch | 103 ++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-59857.patch | 110 ++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch | 134 ++
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 9 +
64 files changed, 4444 insertions(+), 1328 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/files/0001-Fixed-strchr-with-const-for-new-glibc.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0024-CVE-2026-5435.patch
rename meta/recipes-core/systemd/{systemd-boot-native_255.21.bb => systemd-boot-native_255.22.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-core/systemd/{systemd-boot_255.21.bb => systemd-boot_255.22.bb} (100%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-01.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-02.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-03.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-04.patch
rename meta/recipes-core/systemd/{systemd_255.21.bb => systemd_255.22.bb} (99%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2026-56288.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2026-56289.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl-cross/files/CVE-2025-40909-dep.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2025-40909.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-13221.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-57432-01.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-57432-02.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pyasn1/CVE-2026-59884.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pyasn1/CVE-2026-59886.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2025-13462.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-11940.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-11972.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-1502.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-3644_CVE-2026-0672.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4224.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_CVE-2026-4786.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_p1.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_p2.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-6100.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-7210.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-9669.patch
rename meta/recipes-devtools/python/{python3_3.12.13.bb => python3_3.12.14.bb} (96%)
rename meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/{CVE-2026-4426.patch => CVE-2026-4426_CVE-2026-5121.patch} (99%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-5121-02.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-5745.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469-regression_p1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469-regression_p2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58471.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58472-regression.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58472.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55693.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55892.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57452.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57455.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57456.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59856.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59857.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patchPATCH 1/27 socat: fix native build on host with newer glibc
From: Martin Jansa <[email protected]>
Fixes:../socat-1.8.0.0/filan.c: In function ?printtime?:../socat-1.8.0.0/filan.c:1065:46: error: assignment of read-only location ?*(const char *)strchr(s, 10)?
1065 | if (strchr(s, '\n')) *strchr(s, '\n') = '\0';
| ^
--- ...ixed-strchr-with-const-for-new-glibc.patch | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ .../socat/socat_1.8.0.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/files/0001-Fixed-strchr-with-const-for-new-glibc.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/files/0001-Fixed-strchr-with-const-for-new-glibc.patch new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 3033625d5a67514e3d74021fc39f7fcb542d7f2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerhard Rieger <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2026 14:06:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fixed strchr with const for new glibc + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://repo.or.cz/socat.git/commit/a7058c9340db0bf90bf4372de0ae87ad37f57735] +Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <[email protected]> +--- + filan.c | 2 +- + xio-ip6.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/filan.c b/filan.c +index 36def50..e256f74 100644 +--- a/filan.c ++++ b/filan.c +@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ const char *getfiletypestring(int st_mode) { + } + + static int printtime(FILE *outfile, time_t time) { +- const char *s; ++ char *s; + + if (filan_rawoutput) { + fprintf(outfile, "\t"F_time, time); +diff --git a/xio-ip6.c b/xio-ip6.c +index bd94bdd..09abdd1 100644 +--- a/xio-ip6.c ++++ b/xio-ip6.c +@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int xioparsenetwork_ip6( + struct xiorange *range, + const int ai_flags[2]) + { +- char *delimpos; /* absolute address of delimiter */ ++ const char *delimpos; /* absolute address of delimiter */ + size_t delimind; /* index of delimiter in string */ + unsigned int bits; /* netmask bits */ + char *endptr;
meta/recipes-connectivity/socat/socat_1.8.0.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=b234ee4d69f5fce4486a80fdaf4a4263 \ SRC_URI = "http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/download/socat-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://0001-fix-compile-procan.c-failed.patch \ + file://0001-Fixed-strchr-with-const-for-new-glibc.patch \ file://CVE-2024-54661.patch \ file://CVE-2026-56123.patch \ "
PATCH 2/27 glibc: fix CVE-2026-5435
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hemanth Kumar M D <[email protected]>
resolv: More types as unknown in ns_sprintrrf (CVE-2026-5435)
Specifically, CERT, TKEY, TSIG, OPT. This removes the buggy implementations of TSIG, fixing bug 34033, and partially fixing bug 34069.
Reference:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5435
[2] https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=34033
[3] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=ca44a6609c29a683b03575fa035c6d17aa591e72
[YC: This patch will change output of a debug and deprecated function.
Upstream chose to remove the vulnerable implementation instead of
fixing it.
See: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob_plain;f=advisories/GLIBC-SA-2026-0011
]
--- .../glibc/glibc/0024-CVE-2026-5435.patch | 137 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.39.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 138 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0024-CVE-2026-5435.patch
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0024-CVE-2026-5435.patch new file +137 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +From 5d41b8e5aaec3580e4a05d93c5ff2fc69bb3d5a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Florian Weimer <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 18:22:20 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] resolv: More types as unknown in ns_sprintrrf (CVE-2026-5435) + +Specifically, CERT, TKEY, TSIG, OPT. This removes the buggy +implementations of TSIG, fixing bug 34033, and partially +fixing bug 34069. + +Reviewed-by: Carlos O'Donell <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-5435 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=patch;h=ca44a6609c29a683b03575fa035c6d17aa591e72] + +Signed-off-by: Hemanth Kumar M D <[email protected]> +--- + resolv/ns_print.c | 96 ----------------------------------------------- + 1 file changed, 96 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/resolv/ns_print.c b/resolv/ns_print.c +index cef2212fd2..882a86e58e 100644 +--- a/resolv/ns_print.c ++++ b/resolv/ns_print.c +@@ -434,96 +434,6 @@ ns_sprintrrf(const u_char *msg, size_t msglen, + break; + } + +- case ns_t_cert: { +- u_int c_type, key_tag, alg; +- int n; +- unsigned int siz; +- char base64_cert[8192], tmp[40]; +- const char *leader; +- +- c_type = ns_get16(rdata); rdata += NS_INT16SZ; +- key_tag = ns_get16(rdata); rdata += NS_INT16SZ; +- alg = (u_int) *rdata++; +- +- len = SPRINTF((tmp, "%d %d %d ", c_type, key_tag, alg)); +- T(addstr(tmp, len, &buf, &buflen)); +- siz = (edata-rdata)*4/3 + 4; /* "+4" accounts for trailing \0 */ +- if (siz > sizeof(base64_cert) * 3/4) { +- const char *str = "record too long to print"; +- T(addstr(str, strlen(str), &buf, &buflen)); +- } +- else { +- len = b64_ntop(rdata, edata-rdata, base64_cert, siz); +- +- if (len < 0) +- goto formerr; +- else if (len > 15) { +- T(addstr(" (", 2, &buf, &buflen)); +- leader = "\n\t\t"; +- spaced = 0; +- } +- else +- leader = " "; +- +- for (n = 0; n < len; n += 48) { +- T(addstr(leader, strlen(leader), +- &buf, &buflen)); +- T(addstr(base64_cert + n, MIN(len - n, 48), +- &buf, &buflen)); +- } +- if (len > 15) +- T(addstr(" )", 2, &buf, &buflen)); +- } +- break; +- } +- +- case ns_t_tkey: { +- /* KJD - need to complete this */ +- u_long t; +- int mode, err, keysize; +- +- /* Algorithm name. */ +- T(addname(msg, msglen, &rdata, origin, &buf, &buflen)); +- T(addstr(" ", 1, &buf, &buflen)); +- +- /* Inception. */ +- t = ns_get32(rdata); rdata += NS_INT32SZ; +- len = SPRINTF((tmp, "%lu ", t)); +- T(addstr(tmp, len, &buf, &buflen)); +- +- /* Expiration. */ +- t = ns_get32(rdata); rdata += NS_INT32SZ; +- len = SPRINTF((tmp, "%lu ", t)); +- T(addstr(tmp, len, &buf, &buflen)); +- +- /* Mode , Error, Key Size. */ +- /* Priority, Weight, Port. */ +- mode = ns_get16(rdata); rdata += NS_INT16SZ; +- err = ns_get16(rdata); rdata += NS_INT16SZ; +- keysize = ns_get16(rdata); rdata += NS_INT16SZ; +- len = SPRINTF((tmp, "%u %u %u ", mode, err, keysize)); +- T(addstr(tmp, len, &buf, &buflen)); +- +- /* XXX need to dump key, print otherdata length & other data */ +- break; +- } +- +- case ns_t_tsig: { +- /* BEW - need to complete this */ +- int n; +- +- T(len = addname(msg, msglen, &rdata, origin, &buf, &buflen)); +- T(addstr(" ", 1, &buf, &buflen)); +- rdata += 8; /*%< time */ +- n = ns_get16(rdata); rdata += INT16SZ; +- rdata += n; /*%< sig */ +- n = ns_get16(rdata); rdata += INT16SZ; /*%< original id */ +- sprintf(buf, "%d", ns_get16(rdata)); +- rdata += INT16SZ; +- addlen(strlen(buf), &buf, &buflen); +- break; +- } +- + case ns_t_a6: { + struct in6_addr a; + int pbyte, pbit; +@@ -557,12 +467,6 @@ ns_sprintrrf(const u_char *msg, size_t msglen, + break; + } + +- case ns_t_opt: { +- len = SPRINTF((tmp, "%u bytes", class)); +- T(addstr(tmp, len, &buf, &buflen)); +- break; +- } +- + default: + snprintf (errbuf, sizeof (errbuf), "unknown RR type %d", type); + comment = errbuf; +-- +2.49.0 +
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.39.bb +1 -0
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GLIBC_GIT_URI};branch=${SRCBRANCH};name=glibc \ file://0022-Avoid-hardcoded-build-time-paths-in-the-output-binar.patch \ file://0023-qemu-stale-process.patch \ file://0001-stdlib-Add-single-threaded-fast-path-to-rand.patch \ + file://0024-CVE-2026-5435.patch \ " S = "${WORKDIR}/git" B = "${WORKDIR}/build-${TARGET_SYS}"
PATCH 3/27 systemd: Fix CVE-2026-29111
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]>
Backport patches from upstream systemd to fix CVE-2026-29111, where systemd (as PID 1) hits an assert and freezes execution when an unprivileged IPC API call is made with spurious data.
Pick patches from [1], [2], [3] and [4] as referenced in [5].
Note: As scarthgap is using 255 version picked fixes from 257
[1] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/20021e7686426052e3a7505425d7e12085feb2a6
[2] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/7ac3220213690e8a8d6d2a6e81e43bd1dce01d69
[3] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/21167006574d6b83813c7596759b474f56562412
[4] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/54588d2dedff54bfb6036670820650e4ea74628f
[5] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-29111
--- .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-01.patch | 170 ++++++++++++++++++ .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-02.patch | 85 +++++++++ .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-03.patch | 106 +++++++++++ .../systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-04.patch | 35 ++++ meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_255.21.bb | 4 + 5 files changed, 400 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-02.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-03.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-04.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-01.patch new file +170 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +From 284fd279f9e9c199982aea51aee59a02e90a2eda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lennart Poettering <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 19 May 2025 12:58:52 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] path-util: add flavour of path_startswith() that leaves a + leading slash in place + +(cherry picked from commit ee19edbb9f3455db3f750089082f3e5a925e3a0c) + +Note: The test uses assert_se(streq_ptr()) instead of the upstream +ASSERT_STREQ() macro because ASSERT_STREQ was introduced in systemd v256 +and is not available in v255. + +CVE: CVE-2026-29111 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/20021e7686426052e3a7505425d7e12085feb2a6] +Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]> +--- + src/basic/fs-util.c | 2 +- + src/basic/mkdir.c | 2 +- + src/basic/path-util.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + src/basic/path-util.h | 10 ++++++++-- + src/test/test-path-util.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ + 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/basic/fs-util.c b/src/basic/fs-util.c +index 5bc7d2f95b..4633a5cd72 100644 +--- a/src/basic/fs-util.c ++++ b/src/basic/fs-util.c +@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ int rmdir_parents(const char *path, const char *stop) { + assert(*slash == '/'); + *slash = '\0'; + +- if (path_startswith_full(stop, p, /* accept_dot_dot= */ false)) ++ if (path_startswith_full(stop, p, /* flags= */ 0)) + return 0; + + if (rmdir(p) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) +diff --git a/src/basic/mkdir.c b/src/basic/mkdir.c +index c770e5ed32..7bc73361a5 100644 +--- a/src/basic/mkdir.c ++++ b/src/basic/mkdir.c +@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int mkdir_parents_internal(const char *prefix, const char *path, mode_t mode, ui + assert(_mkdirat != mkdirat); + + if (prefix) { +- p = path_startswith_full(path, prefix, /* accept_dot_dot= */ false); ++ p = path_startswith_full(path, prefix, /* flags= */ 0); + if (!p) + return -ENOTDIR; + } else +diff --git a/src/basic/path-util.c b/src/basic/path-util.c +index 6810bf66aa..e73f5d708e 100644 +--- a/src/basic/path-util.c ++++ b/src/basic/path-util.c +@@ -403,8 +403,8 @@ char* path_simplify_full(char *path, PathSimplifyFlags flags) { + return path; + } + +-char* path_startswith_full(const char *path, const char *prefix, bool accept_dot_dot) { +- assert(path); ++char* path_startswith_full(const char *original_path, const char *prefix, PathStartWithFlags flags) { ++ assert(original_path); + assert(prefix); + + /* Returns a pointer to the start of the first component after the parts matched by +@@ -417,28 +417,45 @@ char* path_startswith_full(const char *path, const char *prefix, bool accept_dot + * Returns NULL otherwise. + */ + ++ const char *path = original_path; ++ + if ((path[0] == '/') != (prefix[0] == '/')) + return NULL; + + for (;;) { + const char *p, *q; +- int r, k; ++ int m, n; + +- r = path_find_first_component(&path, accept_dot_dot, &p); +- if (r < 0) ++ m = path_find_first_component(&path, FLAGS_SET(flags, PATH_STARTSWITH_ACCEPT_DOT_DOT), &p); ++ if (m < 0) + return NULL; + +- k = path_find_first_component(&prefix, accept_dot_dot, &q); +- if (k < 0) ++ n = path_find_first_component(&prefix, FLAGS_SET(flags, PATH_STARTSWITH_ACCEPT_DOT_DOT), &q); ++ if (n < 0) + return NULL; + +- if (k == 0) +- return (char*) (p ?: path); ++ if (n == 0) { ++ if (!p) ++ p = path; ++ ++ if (FLAGS_SET(flags, PATH_STARTSWITH_RETURN_LEADING_SLASH)) { ++ ++ if (p <= original_path) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ p--; ++ ++ if (*p != '/') ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (char*) p; ++ } + +- if (r != k) ++ if (m != n) + return NULL; + +- if (!strneq(p, q, r)) ++ if (!strneq(p, q, m)) + return NULL; + } + } +diff --git a/src/basic/path-util.h b/src/basic/path-util.h +index 6d943e967f..e0ec05f4db 100644 +--- a/src/basic/path-util.h ++++ b/src/basic/path-util.h +@@ -53,9 +53,15 @@ int safe_getcwd(char **ret); + int path_make_absolute_cwd(const char *p, char **ret); + int path_make_relative(const char *from, const char *to, char **ret); + int path_make_relative_parent(const char *from_child, const char *to, char **ret); +-char* path_startswith_full(const char *path, const char *prefix, bool accept_dot_dot) _pure_; ++ ++typedef enum PathStartWithFlags { ++ PATH_STARTSWITH_ACCEPT_DOT_DOT = 1U << 0, ++ PATH_STARTSWITH_RETURN_LEADING_SLASH = 1U << 1, ++} PathStartWithFlags; ++ ++char* path_startswith_full(const char *path, const char *prefix, PathStartWithFlags flags) _pure_; + static inline char* path_startswith(const char *path, const char *prefix) { +- return path_startswith_full(path, prefix, true); ++ return path_startswith_full(path, prefix, PATH_STARTSWITH_ACCEPT_DOT_DOT); + } + + int path_compare(const char *a, const char *b) _pure_; +diff --git a/src/test/test-path-util.c b/src/test/test-path-util.c +index f5a425689a..71056b08c1 100644 +--- a/src/test/test-path-util.c ++++ b/src/test/test-path-util.c +@@ -754,6 +754,22 @@ TEST(path_startswith) { + test_path_startswith_one("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/fo", NULL, NULL); + } + ++static void test_path_startswith_return_leading_slash_one(const char *path, const char *prefix, const char *expected) { ++ const char *p; ++ ++ log_debug("/* %s(%s, %s) */", __func__, path, prefix); ++ ++ p = path_startswith_full(path, prefix, PATH_STARTSWITH_RETURN_LEADING_SLASH); ++ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, expected)); ++} ++ ++TEST(path_startswith_return_leading_slash) { ++ test_path_startswith_return_leading_slash_one("/foo/bar", "/", "/foo/bar"); ++ test_path_startswith_return_leading_slash_one("/foo/bar", "/foo", "/bar"); ++ test_path_startswith_return_leading_slash_one("/foo/bar", "/foo/bar", NULL); ++ test_path_startswith_return_leading_slash_one("/foo/bar/", "/foo/bar", "/"); ++} ++ + static void test_prefix_root_one(const char *r, const char *p, const char *expected) { + _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; + const char *t; +-- +2.43.0
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-02.patch new file +85 -0
85 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-03.patch new file +106 -0
106 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/CVE-2026-29111-04.patch new file +35 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 0d2c41d0f024088a275ac0c02d50205c800dec8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mike Yuan <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2026 11:06:34 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] core: validate input cgroup path more prudently + +(cherry picked from commit efa6ba2ab625aaa160ac435a09e6482fc63bdbe8) +(cherry picked from commit 3cee294fe8cf4fa0eff933ab21416d099942cabd) +(cherry picked from commit 1d22f706bd04f45f8422e17fbde3f56ece17758a) + +CVE: CVE-2026-29111 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/54588d2dedff54bfb6036670820650e4ea74628f] +Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]> +--- + src/core/dbus-manager.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/core/dbus-manager.c b/src/core/dbus-manager.c +index c7372ca033..cb84ba9866 100644 +--- a/src/core/dbus-manager.c ++++ b/src/core/dbus-manager.c +@@ -646,6 +646,12 @@ static int method_get_unit_by_control_group(sd_bus_message *message, void *userd + if (r < 0) + return r; + ++ if (!path_is_absolute(cgroup)) ++ return sd_bus_error_setf(error, SD_BUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "Control group path is not absolute: %s", cgroup); ++ ++ if (!path_is_normalized(cgroup)) ++ return sd_bus_error_setf(error, SD_BUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "Control group path is not normalized: %s", cgroup); ++ + u = manager_get_unit_by_cgroup(m, cgroup); + if (!u) + return sd_bus_error_setf(error, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_UNIT, +-- +2.43.0
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_255.21.bb +4 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ SRC_URI += " \ file://CVE-2026-40225-02.patch \ file://CVE-2026-40226-01.patch \ file://CVE-2026-40226-02.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-29111-01.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-29111-02.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-29111-03.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-29111-04.patch \ " # patches needed by musl
PATCH 4/27 python3-pyasn1: Fix CVE-2026-59886
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Emily Vekariya <[email protected]>
The univ.Real type converts its mantissa, base, and exponent to a Python float using exact big-integer exponentiation. A BER, CER, or DER encoded REAL value only a few bytes long can carry a very large exponent, causing float conversion through prettyPrint(), str(), comparison, arithmetic, int(), or an explicit float() call to consume excessive CPU and memory and hang applications that decode untrusted ASN.1 data and then print, log, or compare the decoded objects.
scarthgap ships pyasn1 0.5.1, which is affected as the issue is present in all versions before 0.6.4.
Pick the upstream patch [1] as mentioned in [2].
[1] https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1/commit/e60c691cb91addb8fcefa2f537e85ede6fb1e886
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59886
--- .../recipes-devtools/python/python-pyasn1.inc | 1 + .../python3-pyasn1/CVE-2026-59886.patch | 252 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 253 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pyasn1/CVE-2026-59886.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python-pyasn1.inc +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ inherit ptest SRC_URI += " \ file://run-ptest \ file://CVE-2026-23490.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59886.patch \ " RDEPENDS:${PN}-ptest += " \
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pyasn1/CVE-2026-59886.patch new file +252 -0
252 lines not on this page · raw message
PATCH 5/27 python3-pyasn1: Fix CVE-2026-59884
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Emily Vekariya <[email protected]>
The BER decoder shared by the CER and DER codecs parses long-form tags by accumulating continuation octets without an upper bound on the tag ID size. A crafted input can force construction of an arbitrarily large integer with CPU cost growing quadratically, and can trigger unhandled ValueError exceptions in the Python 3.11+ error formatting paths. Any application decoding untrusted BER, CER, or DER input is affected.
scarthgap ships pyasn1 0.5.1, which is affected as the issue is present in all versions before 0.6.4.
Pick the upstream patch [1] as mentioned in [2].
[1] https://github.com/pyasn1/pyasn1/commit/628e36ecbb5277a3f01572ce418ef54271b165a5
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59884
--- .../recipes-devtools/python/python-pyasn1.inc | 1 + .../python3-pyasn1/CVE-2026-59884.patch | 245 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 246 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pyasn1/CVE-2026-59884.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python-pyasn1.inc +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI += " \ file://run-ptest \ file://CVE-2026-23490.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59886.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59884.patch \ " RDEPENDS:${PN}-ptest += " \
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pyasn1/CVE-2026-59884.patch new file +245 -0
245 lines not on this page · raw message
PATCH 6/27 python3: upgrade 3.12.13 -> 3.12.14
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
This is a security release of Python 3.12
Release information: [1]
* drop CVE patches included in this release
* refresh all remaining patches via devtool
* remove some tab style in SRC_URI.
* add CVE_STATUS entries for CVEs fixed in this release but still reported as Unpatched by cve-check (including 2 fixed already in previous release)
[1] https://www.python.org/downloads/release/python-31214/
---
...shebang-overflow-on-python-config.py.patch | 2 +-
...-qemu-wrapper-when-gathering-profile.patch | 2 +-
...e-treat-overflow-in-UID-GID-as-failu.patch | 2 +-
.../python/python3/CVE-2025-13462.patch | 142 ----------------
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-11940.patch | 66 --------
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-11972.patch | 60 -------
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-1502.patch | 113 -------------
.../python3/CVE-2026-3644_CVE-2026-0672.patch | 154 -----------------
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-4224.patch | 121 -------------
.../python3/CVE-2026-4519_CVE-2026-4786.patch | 66 --------
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_p1.patch | 107 ------------
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_p2.patch | 159 ------------------
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-6100.patch | 75 ---------
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-7210.patch | 148 ----------------
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-9669.patch | 96 -----------
.../python/python3/makerace.patch | 2 +-
...{python3_3.12.13.bb => python3_3.12.14.bb} | 24 +--
17 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1326 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2025-13462.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-11940.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-11972.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-1502.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-3644_CVE-2026-0672.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4224.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_CVE-2026-4786.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_p1.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_p2.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-6100.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-7210.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-9669.patch
rename meta/recipes-devtools/python/{python3_3.12.13.bb => python3_3.12.14.bb} (96%)meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/0001-Avoid-shebang-overflow-on-python-config.py.patch +1 -1
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ diff --git a/Makefile.pre.in b/Makefile.pre.in index 2d235d2..1ac2263 100644 --- a/Makefile.pre.in +++ b/Makefile.pre.in -@@ -2356,6 +2356,8 @@ python-config: $(srcdir)/Misc/python-config.in Misc/python-config.sh +@@ -2361,6 +2361,8 @@ python-config: $(srcdir)/Misc/python-config.in Misc/python-config.sh @ # Substitution happens here, as the completely-expanded BINDIR @ # is not available in configure sed -e "s,@EXENAME@,$(EXENAME)," < $(srcdir)/Misc/python-config.in >python-config.py
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/0001-Makefile.pre-use-qemu-wrapper-when-gathering-profile.patch +1 -1
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ diff --git a/Makefile.pre.in b/Makefile.pre.in index 083f4c7..dce36a5 100644 --- a/Makefile.pre.in +++ b/Makefile.pre.in -@@ -660,8 +660,7 @@ profile-run-stamp: +@@ -663,8 +663,7 @@ profile-run-stamp: # enabled. $(MAKE) profile-gen-stamp # Next, run the profile task to generate the profile information.
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/0001-gh-107811-tarfile-treat-overflow-in-UID-GID-as-failu.patch +1 -1
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py index 0a0f31e..4dfb67d 100755 --- a/Lib/tarfile.py +++ b/Lib/tarfile.py -@@ -2688,7 +2688,8 @@ class TarFile(object): +@@ -2721,7 +2721,8 @@ class TarFile(object): os.lchown(targetpath, u, g) else: os.chown(targetpath, u, g)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2025-13462.patch deleted +0 -142
142 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-11940.patch deleted +0 -66
66 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-11972.patch deleted +0 -60
60 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-1502.patch deleted +0 -113
113 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-3644_CVE-2026-0672.patch deleted +0 -154
154 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4224.patch deleted +0 -121
121 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_CVE-2026-4786.patch deleted +0 -66
66 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_p1.patch deleted +0 -107
107 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4519_p2.patch deleted +0 -159
159 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-6100.patch deleted +0 -75
75 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-7210.patch deleted +0 -148
148 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-9669.patch deleted +0 -96
96 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/makerace.patch +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ diff --git a/Makefile.pre.in b/Makefile.pre.in index dce36a5..2d235d2 100644 --- a/Makefile.pre.in +++ b/Makefile.pre.in -@@ -2267,7 +2267,7 @@ COMPILEALL_OPTS=-j0 +@@ -2272,7 +2272,7 @@ COMPILEALL_OPTS=-j0 TEST_MODULES=@TEST_MODULES@ .PHONY: libinstall
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.12.14.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.12.13.bb +9 -15
@@ -31,30 +31,18 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0001-test_storlines-skip-due-to-load-variability.patch \ file://0001-test_shutdown-skip-problematic-test.patch \ file://0001-gh-107811-tarfile-treat-overflow-in-UID-GID-as-failu.patch \ - file://0001-test_deadlock-skip-problematic-test.patch \ - file://0001-test_active_children-skip-problematic-test.patch \ + file://0001-test_deadlock-skip-problematic-test.patch \ + file://0001-test_active_children-skip-problematic-test.patch \ file://0001-test_readline-skip-limited-history-test.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-1502.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-6100.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-3644_CVE-2026-0672.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-4519_p1.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-4519_p2.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-4519_CVE-2026-4786.patch \ file://CVE-2026-6019_p1.patch \ file://CVE-2026-6019_p2.patch \ - file://CVE-2025-13462.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-4224.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-11940.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-11972.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-9669.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-7210.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \ file://0001-Lib-sysconfig.py-use-prefix-value-from-build-configu.patch \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c08bc65a81971c1dd5783182826503369466c7e67374d1646519adf05207b684" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "5c8462af5790baf43a321a1559dbe0db06d1be4300fb85fb53c40060668e548a" # exclude pre-releases for both python 2.x and 3.x UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "[Pp]ython-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+).tar"
@@ -69,6 +57,12 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-26488] = "not-applicable-platform: Issue only applies on Win CVE_STATUS[CVE-2015-20107] = "upstream-wontfix: The mailcap module is insecure by design, so this can't be fixed in a meaningful way" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-36632] = "disputed: Not an issue, in fact expected behaviour" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3087] = "not-applicable-platform: Issue only applies on Windows" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-12084] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed in v3.12.13" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-13462] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed in v3.12.14" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-13837] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed in v3.12.13" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3644] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed in v3.12.14" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-4519] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed in v3.12.14" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-7210] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed in v3.12.14" PYTHON_MAJMIN = "3.12"
PATCH 7/27 systemd: upgrade 255.21 -> 255.22
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Full changelog (36 commits):
* https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable/compare/v255.21...v255.22
---
...temd-boot-native_255.21.bb => systemd-boot-native_255.22.bb} | 0
.../systemd/{systemd-boot_255.21.bb => systemd-boot_255.22.bb} | 0
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd.inc | 2 +-
.../systemd/{systemd_255.21.bb => systemd_255.22.bb} | 0
4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename meta/recipes-core/systemd/{systemd-boot-native_255.21.bb => systemd-boot-native_255.22.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-core/systemd/{systemd-boot_255.21.bb => systemd-boot_255.22.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-core/systemd/{systemd_255.21.bb => systemd_255.22.bb} (100%)meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd-boot-native_255.22.bb renamed from meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd-boot-native_255.21.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd-boot_255.22.bb renamed from meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd-boot_255.21.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd.inc +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ LICENSE:libsystemd = "LGPL-2.1-or-later" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE.GPL2;md5=751419260aa954499f7abaabaa882bbe \ file://LICENSE.LGPL2.1;md5=4fbd65380cdd255951079008b364516c" -SRCREV = "70500d37992a01d3275b1c414c3ed161d6f91f9e" +SRCREV = "356c54394add8c6a1d52773852c23656590dc33b" SRCBRANCH = "v255-stable" SRC_URI = "git://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable.git;protocol=https;branch=${SRCBRANCH}"
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_255.22.bb renamed from meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_255.21.bb +0 -0
PATCH 8/27 libarchive: handle CVE-2026-5121
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Cherry-pick patch for this CVE mentioned in [1].
Since the actual code change is already included in previous patch for CVE-2026-4426, add reference to CVE-2026-5121 to that patch and keep the remaining part (test) as CVE-2026-5121-02.patch.
[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-5121
---
...atch => CVE-2026-4426_CVE-2026-5121.patch} | 1 +
.../libarchive/CVE-2026-5121-02.patch | 1270 +++++++++++++++++
.../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb | 3 +-
3 files changed, 1273 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/{CVE-2026-4426.patch => CVE-2026-4426_CVE-2026-5121.patch} (99%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-5121-02.patchmeta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426_CVE-2026-5121.patch renamed from meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ decompression path from executing. Found by fuzzing with ASAN/UBSAN. CVE: CVE-2026-4426 +CVE: CVE-2026-5121 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/c3cb1c568ebf9e8f7f478cfc0356ae54e99712b0] Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> ---
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-5121-02.patch new file +1270 -0
1,270 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb +2 -1
@@ -46,9 +46,10 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-60753-02.patch \ file://CVE-2026-4111-1.patch \ file://CVE-2026-4111-2.patch \ - file://CVE-2026-4426.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-4426_CVE-2026-5121.patch \ file://CVE-2026-4424-1.patch \ file://CVE-2026-4424-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-5121-02.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
PATCH 9/27 libarchive: patch CVE-2026-5745
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Pick patch per [1].
[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-5745
--- .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-5745.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-5745.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-5745.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 5f7025543205106d64081cbafd8c345bf859b86f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tim Kientzle <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2026 21:04:59 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Merge pull request #2905 from Patsakas/Patsakas-fix-acl-bug + +Fix NULL pointer increment in archive_acl_from_text_nl + +(Not a security issue, and arguably not really even a bug, but easy to fix regardless.) + +(cherry picked from commit 0b0b888f86b46e3b279f5f7c6eef0479f35978ee) + +CVE: CVE-2026-5745 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/5f7025543205106d64081cbafd8c345bf859b86f] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + libarchive/archive_acl.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_acl.c b/libarchive/archive_acl.c +index ab601833..14a107a4 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_acl.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_acl.c +@@ -1718,7 +1718,6 @@ archive_acl_from_text_nl(struct archive_acl *acl, const char *text, + + tag = 0; + s = field[n].start; +- st = field[n].start + 1; + len = field[n].end - field[n].start; + + if (len == 0) { +@@ -1726,6 +1725,8 @@ archive_acl_from_text_nl(struct archive_acl *acl, const char *text, + continue; + } + ++ st = s + 1; ++ + switch (*s) { + case 'u': + if (len == 1 || (len == 4
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb +1 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2026-4424-1.patch \ file://CVE-2026-4424-2.patch \ file://CVE-2026-5121-02.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-5745.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
PATCH 10/27 gnutls: set status for CVE-2026-1584
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Set status per [1].
[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-1584
--- meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.4.bb | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -129,3 +129,4 @@ pkg_postinst_ontarget:${PN}-fips () { } CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3832] = "fixed-version: vulnerable multi-record OCSP response handling was introduced in 3.8.8 and is not present in 3.8.4" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-1584] = "fixed-version: vulnerable code not present, introduced with 3.8.11"
PATCH 11/27 perl: fix CVE-2026-13221
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [1], using the commit shown in [2].
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13221
[2] https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/03f74bbbd3a68350d926ee93d56ee4808c28c4c7
--- .../perl/files/CVE-2026-13221.patch | 75 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.38.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-13221.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-13221.patch new file +75 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From 03f74bbbd3a68350d926ee93d56ee4808c28c4c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Karl Williamson <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2026 10:13:49 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] regcomp_study: Don't create a trie that would overflow + +This addresses GH #23388 + +The design of the trie compiling code is to batch extra long tries into +smaller chunks that fit into whatever limitations there are. However, +this ticket shows that that isn't always being done. + +In this case, a bunch of branches that have TAIL operands can be +combined together, and the final TAIL is used. And the code requires +that the delta between the first branch and this final TAIL fit into a +16-bit field. That is the root cause of this bug. + +I'm not familiar enough with the trie construction code to easily +understand why the final tail needs to be used here. So this patch +simply doesn't optimize a sequence of branches into a trie that would +overflow. + +This could be revisited by someone who knows more about this than I, or +earlier in the development cycle. + +CVE: CVE-2026-13221 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/03f74bbbd3a68350d926ee93d56ee4808c28c4c7] +Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]> +--- + regcomp_study.c | 10 ++++++++++ + t/re/pat_advanced.t | 9 +++++++++ + 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/regcomp_study.c b/regcomp_study.c +index db7ab3a409..a1b2c3d4e5 100644 +--- a/regcomp_study.c ++++ b/regcomp_study.c +@@ -1933,6 +1933,16 @@ Perl_study_chunk(pTHX_ + tail = regnext( tail ); + } + ++ /* The code below currently saves the difference from ++ * start to finish in a 16-bit field, causing ++ * GH #23388. This defeats the design of batching ++ * tries into chunks that each fit. khw thinks it is ++ * too late in the 5.44 cycle to relook at the design, ++ * so for now anyway, don't make a trie that would ++ * overflow */ ++ if (tail - startbranch >= U16_MAX) { ++ continue; ++ } + + DEBUG_TRIE_COMPILE_r({ + regprop(RExC_rx, RExC_mysv, tail, NULL, pRExC_state); +diff --git a/t/re/pat_advanced.t b/t/re/pat_advanced.t +index 398680838d..c9e389ecb3 100644 +--- a/t/re/pat_advanced.t ++++ b/t/re/pat_advanced.t +@@ -4898,6 +4898,15 @@ EOF_DEBUG_OUT + $x =~ s/^[\x{0301}\x{030C}]+//; + } + ++ { # GH #23388 ++ fresh_perl_is(<<~'PROG', , "", {}, "Avoid trie overflow"); ++ my $x = join "|", "aaa".."mzz"; ++ my $y = join "|", "naa".."zzz"; ++ use re 'Debug'; ++ "fnord" =~ m/(?:$x)|(?:$y)/; ++ PROG ++ } ++ + + # !!! NOTE that tests that aren't at all likely to crash perl should go + # a ways above, above these last ones. There's a comment there that, like +-- +2.43.0
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.38.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.cpan.org/src/5.0/perl-${PV}.tar.gz;name=perl \ file://0001-Fix-intermittent-failure-of-test-t-op-sigsystem.t.patch \ file://CVE-2026-8376-01.patch \ file://CVE-2026-8376-02.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-13221.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \ file://perl-configpm-switch.patch \
PATCH 12/27 perl: fix CVE-2026-57432
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [1], using the commits shown in [2] and [3].
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57432
[2] https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/5f7eb6bbbe0510964e3fb1d6bb691e5445913e55
[3] https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/40754edc72dd3e513d758153c0e2f0215897740e
--- .../perl/files/CVE-2026-57432-01.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++ .../perl/files/CVE-2026-57432-02.patch | 34 ++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.38.4.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-57432-01.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-57432-02.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-57432-01.patch new file +52 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 5f7eb6bbbe0510964e3fb1d6bb691e5445913e55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Paul \"LeoNerd\" Evans" <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 9 May 2026 17:18:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] pp_pack.c: Avoid ssize_t overflow when calculating the size + of a structure + +If the user has requested a size that would overflow a SSize_t, then the +only sensible thing to do is throw an exception, because the structure +this implies couldn't possibly fit into memory anyway. + +CVE: CVE-2026-57432 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/5f7eb6bbbe0510964e3fb1d6bb691e5445913e55] +Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]> +--- + pod/perldiag.pod | 6 ++++++ + pp_pack.c | 4 ++++ + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/pod/perldiag.pod b/pod/perldiag.pod +index 841e22d580..d9231077363d 100644 +--- a/pod/perldiag.pod ++++ b/pod/perldiag.pod +@@ -4880,6 +4880,12 @@ mixed-case attribute name, instead. See L<attributes>. + (F) You can't specify a repeat count so large that it overflows your + signed integers. See L<perlfunc/pack>. + ++=item Pack template structure size is too large ++ ++(F) You called C<pack> or C<unpack> to operate on a structure, whose ++computed size is too large to fit in memory. This usually happens as a ++result of embedding a large number as the repeat count for an item. ++ + =item page overflow + + (W io) A single call to write() produced more lines than can fit on a +diff --git a/pp_pack.c b/pp_pack.c +index b5c0b261ef..6075e83aac 100644 +--- a/pp_pack.c ++++ b/pp_pack.c +@@ -528,6 +528,10 @@ S_measure_struct(pTHX_ tempsym_t* symptr) + break; + } + } ++ if ((size > 0) && ++ ((len > SSize_t_MAX / size) || /* detect overflow of len * size */ ++ (len * size > SSize_t_MAX - total))) /* detect overflow of total + len * size */ ++ croak("Pack template structure size is too large"); + total += len * size; + } + return total; +-- +2.43.0
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-57432-02.patch new file +34 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 40754edc72dd3e513d758153c0e2f0215897740e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Paul \"LeoNerd\" Evans" <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 12:25:33 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] pp_pack.c: Avoid some other potential overflows when + calculating sizes + +CVE: CVE-2026-57432 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/40754edc72dd3e513d758153c0e2f0215897740e] +Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]> +--- + pp_pack.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/pp_pack.c b/pp_pack.c +index 6075e83aac..b2019902203a 100644 +--- a/pp_pack.c ++++ b/pp_pack.c +@@ -515,12 +515,12 @@ S_measure_struct(pTHX_ tempsym_t* symptr) + break; + case 'B': + case 'b': +- len = (len + 7)/8; ++ len = (len / 8) + !!(len % 8); + size = 1; + break; + case 'H': + case 'h': +- len = (len + 1)/2; ++ len = (len / 2) + !!(len % 2); + size = 1; + break; + +-- +2.43.0
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.38.4.bb +2 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.cpan.org/src/5.0/perl-${PV}.tar.gz;name=perl \ file://CVE-2026-8376-01.patch \ file://CVE-2026-8376-02.patch \ file://CVE-2026-13221.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-57432-01.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-57432-02.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \ file://perl-configpm-switch.patch \
PATCH 13/27 perl: fix CVE-2025-40909
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [1], using the commit shown in [2].
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40909
[2] https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/918bfff86ca8d6d4e4ec5b30994451e0bd74aba9
[YC: CVE-2025-40909.patch is not merged on a main branch but was provided by upstream to facilitate backport (Thanks!)
https://github.com/Perl/perl5/issues/23010#issuecomment-2919448987
]
--- .../perl-cross/files/CVE-2025-40909-dep.patch | 25 ++ .../perl-cross/perlcross_1.6.2.bb | 1 + .../perl/files/CVE-2025-40909.patch | 412 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.38.4.bb | 1 + 4 files changed, 439 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl-cross/files/CVE-2025-40909-dep.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2025-40909.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/perl-cross/files/CVE-2025-40909-dep.patch new file +25 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +From f702c387e6940fab3801d7562a668b974a2b3a8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Audrey Dutcher <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 30 May 2025 12:29:54 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] add d_fdopendir configuration + +Upstream-Status: Submitted [https://github.com/arsv/perl-cross/pull/159] +Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]> +--- + cnf/configure_func.sh | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/cnf/configure_func.sh b/cnf/configure_func.sh +index 4c13e4c..b24fe03 100644 +--- a/cnf/configure_func.sh ++++ b/cnf/configure_func.sh +@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ checkfunc d_fchmodat 'fchmodat' "0,NULL,0,0" 'unistd.h sys/stat.h' + checkfunc d_fchown 'fchown' "0,0,0" 'unistd.h' + checkfunc d_fcntl 'fcntl' "0,0" 'unistd.h fcntl.h' + checkfunc d_fdclose 'fdclose' "NULL,NULL" 'stdio.h' ++checkfunc d_fdopendir 'fdopendir' "0" 'dirent.h' + checkfunc d_ffs 'ffs' "0" 'strings.h' + checkfunc d_ffsl 'ffsl' "0" 'strings.h' + checkfunc d_fgetpos 'fgetpos' "NULL, 0" 'stdio.h' +-- +2.43.0
meta/recipes-devtools/perl-cross/perlcross_1.6.2.bb +1 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/${PV}/perl-cross-${PV}.tar.gz;name=perl-c file://0001-perl-cross-add-LDFLAGS-when-linking-libperl.patch \ file://determinism.patch \ file://0001-Makefile-check-the-file-if-patched-or-not.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-40909-dep.patch \ " GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/arsv/perl-cross/releases/"
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2025-40909.patch new file +412 -0
412 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.38.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.cpan.org/src/5.0/perl-${PV}.tar.gz;name=perl \ file://CVE-2026-13221.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57432-01.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57432-02.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-40909.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \ file://perl-configpm-switch.patch \
PATCH 14/27 wget: Fix CVE-2026-58469
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
It also includes the upstream follow-up fixes referenced in [3] and [4]. These correct the trailing whitespace check introduced by the original fix and add the required <ctype.h> include for isspace().
[1] https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/37a40fcb450153f69537c7cbc2a7a4fb0b6f7826
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58469
[3] https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/7b1cdecc49bc77bde220fc575c8a00386c3f3bcf
[4] https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/82d945ff5dc9942b78b2bf736aac298c24fe00a1
--- .../wget/CVE-2026-58469-regression_p1.patch | 39 ++++++++++++++ .../wget/CVE-2026-58469-regression_p2.patch | 26 +++++++++ .../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469.patch | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb | 3 ++ 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469-regression_p1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469-regression_p2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469.patch
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469-regression_p1.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From be4edfe6d30a9db8e51215f0232d31eb92d502ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: ChenYanpan <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 12:09:55 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] * src/metalink.c (clean_metalink_string): Fix inverted + trailing-space check + +37a40fcb added an `end > beg' bound guard to prevent a buffer +underflow, but accidentally flipped the condition from `isspace' to +`!isspace'. The loop therefore walked back over non-space characters +instead of trailing whitespace, collapsing any string without a +trailing newline to "". Every Metalink/HTTP resource URL was wiped, +so wget could not follow any mirror and +testenv/Test-metalink-http.py failed ("Expected file test.meta not +found"). Restore the `isspace' condition. + +Copyright-paperwork-exempt: Yes + +CVE: CVE-2026-58469 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/7b1cdecc49bc77bde220fc575c8a00386c3f3bcf] + +(cherry picked from commit 7b1cdecc49bc77bde220fc575c8a00386c3f3bcf) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + src/metalink.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/metalink.c b/src/metalink.c +index 10d58cf7..9f969a60 100644 +--- a/src/metalink.c ++++ b/src/metalink.c +@@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ clean_metalink_string (char **str) + /* If we are at the end of the string, search the first legit + character going backward. */ + if (*end == '\0') +- while (end > beg && !isspace(*(end - 1))) ++ while (end > beg && isspace(*(end - 1))) + end--; + + new = xmemdup0 (beg, end - beg);
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469-regression_p2.patch new file +26 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +From aa412523158313619dd04d49b6f769d639e7dcc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20R=C3=BChsen?= <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 14:50:40 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] * src/metalink.c: Include ctype.h + +CVE: CVE-2026-58469 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/82d945ff5dc9942b78b2bf736aac298c24fe00a1] + +(cherry picked from commit 82d945ff5dc9942b78b2bf736aac298c24fe00a1) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + src/metalink.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/src/metalink.c b/src/metalink.c +index 9f969a60..16933be4 100644 +--- a/src/metalink.c ++++ b/src/metalink.c +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ as that of the covered work. */ + #include "c-strcase.h" + #include <errno.h> + #include <unistd.h> /* For unlink. */ ++#include <ctype.h> + #include <metalink/metalink_parser.h> + #ifdef HAVE_GPGME + #include <gpgme.h>
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58469.patch new file +53 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb +3 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/wget/wget-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0002-improve-reproducibility.patch \ file://CVE-2024-38428.patch \ file://CVE-2024-10524.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-58469.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-58469-regression_p1.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-58469-regression_p2.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "81542f5cefb8faacc39bbbc6c82ded80e3e4a88505ae72ea51df27525bcde04c"
PATCH 15/27 wget: Fix CVE-2026-58471
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/c2640fe5171c59f87c58dc9fcb195b2d18b010ee
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58471
--- .../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58471.patch | 71 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58471.patch
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58471.patch new file +71 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From f419222cc7e02dea2da104b4fb5a997019bab9a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Arkadi Vainbrand <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2026 12:22:04 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer size handling in filename conversion + +* src/url.c (convert_fname): Fix buffer overflow. + +Copyright-paperwork-exempt: Yes + +CVE: CVE-2026-58471 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/c2640fe5171c59f87c58dc9fcb195b2d18b010ee] + +Signed-off-by: Arkadi Vainbrand <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit c2640fe5171c59f87c58dc9fcb195b2d18b010ee) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + src/url.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/url.c b/src/url.c +index 68688256..6a9efe88 100644 +--- a/src/url.c ++++ b/src/url.c +@@ -1603,7 +1603,7 @@ convert_fname (char *fname) + const char *from_encoding = opt.encoding_remote; + const char *to_encoding = opt.locale; + iconv_t cd; +- size_t len, done, inlen, outlen; ++ size_t len, inlen, outlen; + char *s; + const char *orig_fname; + +@@ -1625,7 +1625,6 @@ convert_fname (char *fname) + inlen = strlen (fname); + len = outlen = inlen * 2; + converted_fname = s = xmalloc (outlen + 1); +- done = 0; + + for (;;) + { +@@ -1633,7 +1632,7 @@ convert_fname (char *fname) + if (iconv (cd, (ICONV_CONST char **) &fname, &inlen, &s, &outlen) == 0 + && iconv (cd, NULL, NULL, &s, &outlen) == 0) + { +- *(converted_fname + len - outlen - done) = '\0'; ++ *s = '\0'; + iconv_close (cd); + DEBUGP (("Converted file name '%s' (%s) -> '%s' (%s)\n", + orig_fname, from_encoding, converted_fname, to_encoding)); +@@ -1656,10 +1655,17 @@ convert_fname (char *fname) + } + else if (errno == E2BIG) /* Output buffer full */ + { +- done = len; +- len = outlen = done + inlen * 2; +- converted_fname = xrealloc (converted_fname, outlen + 1); +- s = converted_fname + done; ++ size_t used = s - converted_fname; ++ size_t newlen = used + inlen * 2 + 1; ++ ++ /* Ensure we actually grow the buffer */ ++ if (newlen <= len) ++ newlen = len * 2; ++ ++ converted_fname = xrealloc (converted_fname, newlen + 1); ++ len = newlen; ++ s = converted_fname + used; ++ outlen = len - used; + } + else /* Weird, we got an unspecified error */ + {
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/wget/wget-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2026-58469.patch \ file://CVE-2026-58469-regression_p1.patch \ file://CVE-2026-58469-regression_p2.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-58471.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "81542f5cefb8faacc39bbbc6c82ded80e3e4a88505ae72ea51df27525bcde04c"
PATCH 16/27 wget: Fix CVE-2026-58472
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
Apply the upstream fix referenced in [2] using the commit listed in [1].
Also include the upstream follow-up commit [3], which fixes encoded entity length handling and adds regression tests.
[1] https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/dd692d9cea5335b181d877ae917fe6e75587a812
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58472
[3] https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/f76978a51ba9365e7ecaed96c1cfb73197a38ca2
--- .../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58472-regression.patch | 236 ++++++++++++++++++ .../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58472.patch | 77 ++++++ meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 315 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58472-regression.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58472.patch
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58472-regression.patch new file +236 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +From 6ab6b6d2fc2ed5e4cbb4908b9ad282110f30a688 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20R=C3=BChsen?= <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 13:13:07 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Regression: Fix buffer overflow in html_quote_string() + +The regression has been introduced in commit dd692d9 and +is not part of any release. + +The tests allow the address sanitizer to find the issue. + +* src/convert.c: Fix string size calculation. +* tests/unit-tests.c: Added tests including tests for html_quote_string(). +* tests/unit-tests.h: Add definitions for the test functions. + +Reported-by: Trung Nguyen <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-58472 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/f76978a51ba9365e7ecaed96c1cfb73197a38ca2] + +(cherry picked from commit f76978a51ba9365e7ecaed96c1cfb73197a38ca2) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + src/convert.c | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + tests/unit-tests.c | 4 ++ + tests/unit-tests.h | 4 ++ + 3 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/convert.c b/src/convert.c +index 51636340..4dae497c 100644 +--- a/src/convert.c ++++ b/src/convert.c +@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@ as that of the covered work. */ + #include "css-url.h" + #include "iri.h" + #include "xstrndup.h" ++#ifdef TESTING ++#include "../tests/unit-tests.h" ++#endif + + static struct hash_table *dl_file_url_map; + struct hash_table *dl_url_file_map; +@@ -1177,13 +1180,13 @@ html_quote_string (const char *s) + for (i = 0; *s; s++) + { + if (*s == '&') +- ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 4, &i); /* `amp;' */ ++ ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 4 + 1, &i); /* `amp;' */ + else if (*s == '<' || *s == '>') +- ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 3, &i); /* `lt;' and `gt;' */ ++ ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 3 + 1, &i); /* `lt;' and `gt;' */ + else if (*s == '\"') +- ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 5, &i); /* `quot;' */ ++ ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 5 + 1, &i); /* `quot;' */ + else if (*s == ' ') +- ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 4, &i); /* #32; */ ++ ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 4 + 1, &i); /* #32; */ + else + ok = INT_ADD_OK (i, 1, &i); + +@@ -1242,6 +1245,143 @@ html_quote_string (const char *s) + return res; + } + ++#ifdef TESTING ++ ++const char * ++test_construct_relative (void) ++{ ++ static const struct { ++ const char *basefile; ++ const char *linkfile; ++ const char *expected; ++ } test_array[] = { ++ { "foo", "bar", "bar" }, ++ { "A/foo", "A/bar", "bar" }, ++ { "A/foo", "A/B/bar", "B/bar" }, ++ { "A/X/foo", "A/Y/bar", "../Y/bar" }, ++ { "X/", "Y/bar", "../Y/bar" }, ++ { "/foo", "/bar", "bar" }, ++ { "/a/b/c", "/a/b/d", "d" }, ++ { "/a/b/c", "/a/b/c/d", "c/d" }, ++ { "/a/b/c", "/a/b/c/d/e", "c/d/e" }, ++ { "/a/b/c", "/x/y/z", "../../x/y/z" }, ++ { "a/b", "c/d", "../c/d" }, ++ { "./foo", "./bar", "bar" }, ++ }; ++ ++ for (unsigned i = 0; i < countof (test_array); ++i) ++ { ++ char *result = construct_relative (test_array[i].basefile, ++ test_array[i].linkfile); ++ mu_assert ("test_construct_relative: wrong result", ++ strcmp (result, test_array[i].expected) == 0); ++ xfree (result); ++ } ++ ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++const char * ++test_match_except_index (void) ++{ ++ static const struct { ++ const char *s1; ++ const char *s2; ++ bool expected; ++ } test_array[] = { ++ { "foo/index.html", "foo/", true }, ++ { "foo/", "foo/index.html", true }, ++ { "foo", "foo/index.html", true }, ++ { "foo", "foo/", true }, ++ { "foo", "foo", true }, ++ { "/foo/index.html", "/foo/", true }, ++ { "/foo/", "/foo/index.html", true }, ++ { "/foo", "/foo/index.html", true }, ++ { "/foo", "/foo/", true }, ++ { "foo/bar", "foo/qux", false }, ++ { "foo/bar", "bar/foo", false }, ++ }; ++ ++ for (unsigned i = 0; i < countof (test_array); ++i) ++ { ++ bool result = match_except_index (test_array[i].s1, test_array[i].s2); ++ mu_assert ("test_match_except_index: wrong result", ++ result == test_array[i].expected); ++ } ++ ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++const char * ++test_find_fragment (void) ++{ ++ static const struct { ++ const char *input; ++ int size; ++ bool has_fragment; ++ const char *fragment; ++ } test_array[] = { ++ { "http://example.com#section", 26, true, "#section" }, ++ { "http://example.com", 18, false, NULL }, ++ { "http://example.com?a=1#frag", 24, true, "#frag" }, ++ { "http://example.com?a=1%26#frag", 28, true, "#frag" }, ++ { "http://example.com?a=1&b=2#frag", 30, true, "#frag" }, ++ { "a#b", 3, true, "#b" }, ++ { "a", 1, false, NULL }, ++ }; ++ const char *bp, *ep; ++ ++ for (unsigned i = 0; i < countof (test_array); ++i) ++ { ++ bool result = find_fragment (test_array[i].input, ++ test_array[i].size, &bp, &ep); ++ mu_assert ("test_find_fragment: wrong result", ++ result == test_array[i].has_fragment); ++ if (test_array[i].has_fragment) ++ { ++ mu_assert ("test_find_fragment: wrong fragment", bp != NULL); ++ mu_assert ("test_find_fragment: fragment mismatch", ++ strncmp (bp, test_array[i].fragment, ++ strlen (test_array[i].fragment)) == 0 && ++ ep == test_array[i].input + test_array[i].size); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++const char * ++test_html_quote_string (void) ++{ ++ static const struct { ++ const char *input; ++ const char *expected; ++ } test_array[] = { ++ { "hello", "hello" }, ++ { "a&b", "a&b" }, ++ { "<tag>", "<tag>" }, ++ { "\"quote\"", ""quote"" }, ++ { "space here", "space here" }, ++ { "&<>\" ", "&<>" " }, ++ { "no special", "no special" }, ++ { "&&&&", "&&&&" }, ++ { "<<>>", "<<>>" }, ++ { "" , "" }, ++ }; ++ ++ for (unsigned i = 0; i < countof (test_array); ++i) ++ { ++ char *result = html_quote_string (test_array[i].input); ++ mu_assert ("test_html_quote_string: wrong result", ++ strcmp (result, test_array[i].expected) == 0); ++ xfree (result); ++ } ++ ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++#endif /* TESTING */ ++ + /* + * vim: et ts=2 sw=2 + */ +diff --git a/tests/unit-tests.c b/tests/unit-tests.c +index 085a0321..f92d72b4 100644 +--- a/tests/unit-tests.c ++++ b/tests/unit-tests.c +@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ all_tests(void) + mu_run_test (test_hsts_read_database); + #endif + mu_run_test (test_parse_netrc); ++ mu_run_test (test_construct_relative); ++ mu_run_test (test_match_except_index); ++ mu_run_test (test_find_fragment); ++ mu_run_test (test_html_quote_string); + + return NULL; + } +diff --git a/tests/unit-tests.h b/tests/unit-tests.h +index 16573b1c..7542660b 100644 +--- a/tests/unit-tests.h ++++ b/tests/unit-tests.h +@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ const char *test_hsts_url_rewrite_superdomain(void); + const char *test_hsts_url_rewrite_congruent(void); + const char *test_hsts_read_database(void); + const char *test_parse_netrc(void); ++const char *test_construct_relative(void); ++const char *test_match_except_index(void); ++const char *test_find_fragment(void); ++const char *test_html_quote_string(void); + + #endif /* TEST_H */ + +-- +2.35.6 +
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58472.patch new file +77 -0
77 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb +2 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/wget/wget-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2026-58469-regression_p1.patch \ file://CVE-2026-58469-regression_p2.patch \ file://CVE-2026-58471.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-58472.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-58472-regression.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "81542f5cefb8faacc39bbbc6c82ded80e3e4a88505ae72ea51df27525bcde04c"
PATCH 17/27 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55693
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55693
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55693
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-55693.patch | 88 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55693.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55693.patch new file +88 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +From 315b35adb406138c962bcc653db95acc3c87c8ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 19:39:08 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 09/17] patch 9.2.0653: [security]: out-of-bounds write in + tree_count_words() + +Problem: [security]: a crafted spell file can drive tree_count_words() + past the end of its MAXWLEN-sized depth arrays; the descent + loop has no depth bound. +Solution: only descend while depth < MAXWLEN - 1, as the sibling trie + walkers already do; apply the same guard to sug_filltree(). + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-wgh4-64f7-q3jq + +Supported by AI. + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/a80874d9b84a01040e3d1aef2d4a59e1934dafb7] +CVE: CVE-2026-55693 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/spellfile.c | 4 ++-- + src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/spellfile.c b/src/spellfile.c +index 0b9536dc16..0010d9aa27 100644 +--- a/src/spellfile.c ++++ b/src/spellfile.c +@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ tree_count_words(char_u *byts, idx_T *idxs) + ++curi[depth]; + } + } +- else ++ else if (depth < MAXWLEN - 1) + { + // Normal char, go one level deeper to count the words. + ++depth; +@@ -5648,7 +5648,7 @@ sug_filltree(spellinfo_T *spin, slang_T *slang) + ++curi[depth]; + } + } +- else ++ else if (depth < MAXWLEN - 1) + { + // Normal char, go one level deeper. + tword[depth++] = c; +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +index b72974ed07..e5f8c5778f 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +@@ -1166,4 +1166,31 @@ func Test_mkspell_empty_dic() + endfunc + + ++func Test_spell_sug_tree_count_words_overflow() ++ " A crafted .spl/.sug pair with a BY_INDEX self-cycle in the fold word tree ++ " parses cleanly (shared refs aren't recursed, so read_tree_node()'s depth ++ " cap never trips), but drove tree_count_words() past its MAXWLEN-sized depth ++ " arrays -> stack out-of-bounds write. The walk only happens when ++ " spellsuggest() loads the matching .sug. Reaching the assert == no OOB. ++ call mkdir('Xrtp/spell', 'pR') ++ " VIMspell + v50, SN_SUGFILE(ts), SN_END, LWORDTREE{node:1,BY_INDEX->0,'A'}, ++ " empty KWORDTREE/PREFIXTREE ++ let spl = eval('0z56494D7370656C6C320B0000000008000000001234' ++ \ .. '5678FF000000020101000000410000000000000000') ++ " VIMsug + v1, matching ts, SUGWORDTREE word "a", empty SUGTABLE ++ let sug = 0z56494D737567010000000012345678000000040161010000000000 ++ call writefile(spl, 'Xrtp/spell/xx.utf-8.spl', 'b') ++ call writefile(sug, 'Xrtp/spell/xx.utf-8.sug', 'b') ++ ++ new ++ set runtimepath+=./Xrtp ++ set spelllang=xx ++ set spell ++ " Unpatched: OOB write here (ASan abort, or crash). Patched: returns a list. ++ call assert_equal(v:t_list, type(spellsuggest('helloo'))) ++ ++ set spell& spelllang& runtimepath& ++ bwipe! ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-43961.patch \ file://CVE-2026-47162.patch \ file://CVE-2026-47167.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-55693.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 18/27 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55892
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55892
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55892
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-55892.patch | 81 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 82 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55892.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55892.patch new file +81 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From f0df4a48a426bd67c0c2f5ad536000a4368cd4c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 20:32:21 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 10/17] patch 9.2.0662: [security] Stack out-of-bounds write in + dump_prefixes() + +Problem: [security]: a crafted spell file with a self-referential + BY_INDEX node in the prefix tree can drive dump_prefixes() + past the end of its MAXWLEN-sized depth arrays on :spelldump + (cipher-creator) +Solution: only descend while depth < MAXWLEN - 1, as the sibling trie + walkers already do (Yasuhiro Matsumoto) + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-qm9w-fmpj-879h + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/8325b193bba5f01e7a7d8241fc8633d93dff996b] +CVE: CVE-2026-55892 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/spell.c | 2 +- + src/testdir/test_spell.vim | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/spell.c b/src/spell.c +index 2281986435..6ef3fa899b 100644 +--- a/src/spell.c ++++ b/src/spell.c +@@ -4328,7 +4328,7 @@ dump_prefixes( + } + } + } +- else ++ else if (depth < MAXWLEN - 1) + { + // Normal char, go one level deeper. + prefix[depth++] = c; +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spell.vim b/src/testdir/test_spell.vim +index 170ea57926..2a3f0e3696 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_spell.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_spell.vim +@@ -1567,4 +1567,31 @@ let g:test_data_aff_sal = [ + \"SAL Z S", + \ ] + ++" A crafted .spl with a self-referential BY_INDEX node in the PREFIXTREE drove ++" dump_prefixes() past its MAXWLEN-sized depth arrays (stack out-of-bounds ++" write). The tree parses cleanly (shared refs aren't recursed); the walk ++" happens on :spelldump. Reaching the assert means no OOB. Same class as the ++" tree_count_words() fix (9.2.0653). ++func Test_spelldump_prefixtree_overflow() ++ CheckUnix ++ call mkdir('Xrtp/spell', 'pR') ++ " VIMspell + v50, SN_PREFCOND(prefixcnt=1), SN_END, ++ " LWORDTREE word "a" with affixID=1 (so dump_prefixes runs), ++ " empty KWORDTREE, PREFIXTREE child BY_INDEX -> nodeidx 0 (self-cycle), 'A' ++ let spl = eval('0z56494D7370656C6C32030000000003000100FF00000004' ++ \ .. '0161010220010000000000000002010100000041') ++ call writefile(spl, 'Xrtp/spell/xx.utf-8.spl', 'b') ++ ++ new ++ set runtimepath+=./Xrtp ++ set spelllang=xx ++ set spell ++ spelldump ++ call assert_true(line('$') > 1) ++ ++ set spell& spelllang& runtimepath& ++ bwipe! ++ bwipe! ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-47162.patch \ file://CVE-2026-47167.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55693.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-55892.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 19/27 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-55895
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55895
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55895
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-55895.patch new file +53 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 0d286458d71ff7b4d759621dd9a567aa9354819a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 21:00:28 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 11/17] patch 9.2.0663: [security]: runtime(netrw): code + injection in local file deletion + +Problem: [security]: s:NetrwLocalRmFile() escapes only the backslash in + the file name before passing it to :execute, so a name + containing "|" injects arbitrary Ex commands when the file is + deleted (cipher-creator) +Solution: Use fnameescape() to correctly escape the file name + (Yasuhiro Matsumoto). + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-vhh8-v6wx-hjjh + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/55bc757a5d436e59d50fe43f7cda94b118f86cb2] +CVE: CVE-2026-55895 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +index 9014ca339b..af43f469d1 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +@@ -3025,7 +3025,7 @@ function s:NetrwBrowse(islocal,dirname) + elseif !a:islocal && dirname !~ '[\/]$' && dirname !~ '^"' + " s:NetrwBrowse : remote regular file handler {{{3 + if bufname(dirname) != "" +- exe "NetrwKeepj b ".bufname(dirname) ++ exe "NetrwKeepj b ".fnameescape(bufname(dirname)) + else + " attempt transfer of remote regular file + +@@ -8737,7 +8737,7 @@ function s:NetrwLocalRmFile(path, fname, all) + call netrw#msg#Notify('ERROR', printf("unable to delete <%s>!", rmfile)) + else + " Remove file only if there are no pending changes +- execute printf('silent! bwipeout %s', rmfile) ++ execute printf('silent! bwipeout %s', fnameescape(rmfile)) + endif + + elseif dir && (all || empty(ok)) +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-47167.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55693.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55892.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-55895.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 20/27 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-57452
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57452
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-57452
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-57452.patch | 76 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57452.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57452.patch new file +76 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +From c8777cec25dcfae89c42e9aff51af61f71c5745f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 18:41:16 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0671: [security]: possible out-of-bounds read with + sodium encrypted files + +Problem: [security]: possible out-of-bounds read with sodium encrypted + files (cipher-creator) +Solution: Verify that there is enough space before calling + crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_pull() + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-c4j9-wr9j-4486 + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c8777cec25dcfae89c42e9aff51af61f71c5745f] +CVE: CVE-2026-57452 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/crypt.c | 3 ++- + src/testdir/test_crypt.vim | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/crypt.c b/src/crypt.c +index 55edd6c6de..a11d204e5e 100644 +--- a/src/crypt.c ++++ b/src/crypt.c +@@ -1257,7 +1257,8 @@ crypt_sodium_buffer_decode( + + if (sod_st->count == 0) + { +- if (crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_pull(&sod_st->state, ++ if (len < crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_HEADERBYTES || ++ crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_init_pull(&sod_st->state, + from, sod_st->key) != 0) + { + emsg(_(e_libsodium_decryption_failed_header_incomplete)); +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_crypt.vim b/src/testdir/test_crypt.vim +index 4a96c30702..151a4dea17 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_crypt.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_crypt.vim +@@ -459,4 +459,28 @@ func Test_crypt_set_key_disallow_append_subtract() + bwipe! + endfunc + ++func Test_crypt_sodium_short_body() ++ CheckFeature sodium ++ " A VimCrypt~04! file with a complete 36-byte header (12 magic + 16 salt + ++ " 8 seed) but a body shorter than one secretstream header (24 bytes) used to ++ " underflow the body length and crash with a wild out-of-bounds read in ++ " crypto_secretstream_xchacha20poly1305_pull(). It must now fail cleanly. ++ " Bytes: "VimCrypt~04!" + 16 salt + 8 seed + 8-byte body = 44 bytes. ++ call writefile(0z56696D43727970747E303421 ++ \ + 0zA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF ++ \ + 0zB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7 ++ \ + 0z0000000000000000, 'Xtest_sodium_short') ++ ++ let v:errmsg = '' ++ try ++ call feedkeys(":split Xtest_sodium_short\<CR>foobar\<CR>", "xt") ++ catch /^Vim\%((\S\+)\)\=:E1198:/ ++ " no-op ++ endtry ++ ++ bwipe! ++ call delete('Xtest_sodium_short') ++ set key= ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-55693.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55892.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55895.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-57452.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 21/27 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-57455
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57455
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-57455
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-57455.patch | 72 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57455.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57455.patch new file +72 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +From 497d2fb19b2af9bccf139bb910e4f91b583e769d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 19:20:03 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 13/17] patch 9.2.0698: [security]: Out-of-bounds write with + soundfold() + +Problem: [security]: Out-of-bounds write with soundfold() + (cipher-creator) +Solution: Add an abort condition to the for loop to validate the buffer + size. + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-q8mh-6qm3-25g4 + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/497f931f85339d175d7f69588dd249e8ccfed41b] +CVE: CVE-2026-57455 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/spell.c | 2 +- + src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/spell.c b/src/spell.c +index 6ef3fa899b..a7909ef46e 100644 +--- a/src/spell.c ++++ b/src/spell.c +@@ -3273,7 +3273,7 @@ spell_soundfold_sofo(slang_T *slang, char_u *inword, char_u *res) + else + { + // The sl_sal_first[] table contains the translation. +- for (s = inword; (c = *s) != NUL; ++s) ++ for (s = inword; (c = *s) != NUL && ri < MAXWLEN - 1; ++s) + { + if (VIM_ISWHITE(c)) + c = ' '; +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +index e5f8c5778f..d04d024911 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +@@ -1193,4 +1193,25 @@ func Test_spell_sug_tree_count_words_overflow() + bwipe! + endfunc + ++" A word longer than MAXWLEN must not overflow the soundfold result buffer in ++" the single-byte SOFO branch of spell_soundfold_sofo(). ++func Test_soundfold_overflow() ++ let _enc=&enc ++ set enc=latin1 ++ call writefile(['SOFOFROM ab', 'SOFOTO xy'], 'Xtest.aff', 'D') ++ call writefile(['1', 'foo'], 'Xtest.dic', 'D') ++ mkspell! Xtest Xtest ++ defer delete('Xtest.latin1.spl') ++ defer delete('Xtest.latin1.sug') ++ setl spelllang=Xtest.latin1.spl spell ++ ++ " Before the fix the copy loop wrote one byte per input byte into a ++ " MAXWLEN (254) stack buffer with no upper bound, smashing the stack. ++ let sound = soundfold(repeat('ab', 300)) ++ call assert_true(strlen(sound) < 254, 'soundfold result exceeds MAXWLEN') ++ ++ set spell& spelllang& ++ let &enc = _enc ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-55892.patch \ file://CVE-2026-55895.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57452.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-57455.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 22/27 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59856
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59856
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-59856
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-59856.patch | 103 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 104 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59856.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59856.patch new file +103 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +From 43afc581a37a35762dd0ef292f038b9dc5680a24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 20:07:01 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0736: potential command execution in PHP + omni-completion + +Problem: With PHP omni-completion, a crafted file can potentially + execute arbitrary commands when completing a class member. +Solution: Quote the class name before inserting it into the search() + pattern run via win_execute(). + +Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/43afc581a37a35762dd0ef292f038b9dc5680a24] +CVE: CVE-2026-59856 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim | 3 ++- + src/testdir/Make_all.mak | 2 ++ + src/testdir/test_plugin_phpcomplete.vim | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 src/testdir/test_plugin_phpcomplete.vim + +diff --git a/runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim b/runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim +index 5b4263ae45..93f7d8b450 100644 +--- a/runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim ++++ b/runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim +@@ -2082,7 +2082,8 @@ function! phpcomplete#GetClassContentsStructure(file_path, file_lines, class_nam + let result = [] + let popup_id = popup_create(a:file_lines, {'hidden': v:true}) + +- call win_execute(popup_id, 'call search(''\c\(class\|interface\|trait\)\_s\+'.a:class_name.'\(\>\|$\)'')') ++ call win_execute(popup_id, 'call search(' ++ \ . string('\c\(class\|interface\|trait\)\_s\+' . a:class_name . '\(\>\|$\)') . ')') + call win_execute(popup_id, "let cfline = line('.')") + call win_execute(popup_id, "call search('{')") + call win_execute(popup_id, "let endline = line('.')") +diff --git a/src/testdir/Make_all.mak b/src/testdir/Make_all.mak +index 0d4aeb0432..7d57b2e727 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/Make_all.mak ++++ b/src/testdir/Make_all.mak +@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ NEW_TESTS = \ + test_plugin_man \ + test_plugin_matchparen \ + test_plugin_python3complete \ ++ test_plugin_phpcomplete \ + test_plugin_tar \ + test_plugin_termdebug \ + test_plugin_tohtml \ +@@ -522,6 +523,7 @@ NEW_TESTS_RES = \ + test_plugin_man.res \ + test_plugin_matchparen.res \ + test_plugin_python3complete.res \ ++ test_plugin_phpcomplete.res \ + test_plugin_tar.res \ + test_plugin_termdebug.res \ + test_plugin_tohtml.res \ + +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_plugin_phpcomplete.vim b/src/testdir/test_plugin_phpcomplete.vim +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..7f66be47b7 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/testdir/test_plugin_phpcomplete.vim +@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ ++" Tests for the PHP omni-completion plugin (runtime/autoload/phpcomplete.vim). ++ ++" A buffer class name is interpolated into a search() pattern run via ++" win_execute(). Without escaping, "'" closes the string and "|" starts a new ++" Ex command, so the name runs as an Ex command during completion. ++func Test_phpcomplete_no_exec_via_class_name() ++ unlet! g:phpcomplete_injected ++ let lines = ['<?php', 'class x {}', ''] ++ let payload = "x')|let g:phpcomplete_injected = 1|call search('" ++ ++ try ++ call phpcomplete#GetClassContentsStructure('x.php', lines, payload) ++ catch ++ endtry ++ ++ call assert_false(exists('g:phpcomplete_injected'), ++ \ 'class name was executed as an Ex command during completion') ++ ++ unlet! g:phpcomplete_injected ++endfunc ++ ++func Test_phpcomplete_class_lookup_still_works() ++ let lines = ['<?php', 'class Foo {', ' public $bar;', '}', ''] ++ let result = phpcomplete#GetClassContentsStructure('Foo.php', lines, 'Foo') ++ ++ call assert_equal(type([]), type(result), ++ \ 'GetClassContentsStructure did not return a list') ++ call assert_true(len(result) > 0, 'no class structure returned') ++ call assert_match('class Foo', result[0].content, ++ \ 'class body missing from returned content') ++ call assert_match('bar', result[0].content, ++ \ 'class member missing from returned content') ++endfunc ++ ++" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-55895.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57452.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57455.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59856.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 23/27 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59857
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59857
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-59857
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-59857.patch | 110 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 111 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59857.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59857.patch new file +110 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +From 48287480f53acfb5e6f9172e571ed2f0508dfab2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 13:00:36 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH 16/17] patch 9.2.0725: [security]: Stack out-of-bounds write + in spell_soundfold_sal() + +Problem: [security]: A crafted spell file with non-collapsing SAL rules + can make soundfold() write one byte past the end of the + MAXWLEN result buffer. This is the same class of + out-of-bounds write as GHSA-q8mh-6qm3-25g4 (fixed in 9.2.0698 + for the SOFO branch), found while auditing the surrounding + code. +Solution: Bound the single-byte SAL result writes and the terminating + NUL to MAXWLEN - 1, matching the SOFO branch. + +The single-byte branch of spell_soundfold_sal() guarded its writes with +"reslen < MAXWLEN", allowing reslen to reach MAXWLEN (254). The trailing +"res[reslen] = NUL" then wrote at index 254 of the 254-byte stack buffer +res[MAXWLEN], an off-by-one out-of-bounds write. Input is case-folded to +about 253 characters, so a 253-character argument together with a SAL map +that does not collapse (collapse_result false) reaches the boundary. + +Related to previous issue +[GHSA-q8mh-6qm3-25g4](https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-q8mh-6qm3-25g4) +(9.2.0698) + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-m3hf-xcm3-xhm2 + +Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/d22ff1c955ff87e8273210eae125aab0e85b6c30] +CVE: CVE-2026-59857 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + src/spell.c | 6 +++--- + src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/spell.c b/src/spell.c +index a7909ef46e..05d6f0159d 100644 +--- a/src/spell.c ++++ b/src/spell.c +@@ -3516,7 +3516,7 @@ spell_soundfold_sal(slang_T *slang, char_u *inword, char_u *res) + // no '<' rule used + i += k - 1; + z = 0; +- while (*s != NUL && s[1] != NUL && reslen < MAXWLEN) ++ while (*s != NUL && s[1] != NUL && reslen < MAXWLEN - 1) + { + if (reslen == 0 || res[reslen - 1] != *s) + res[reslen++] = *s; +@@ -3526,7 +3526,7 @@ spell_soundfold_sal(slang_T *slang, char_u *inword, char_u *res) + c = *s; + if (strstr((char *)pf, "^^") != NULL) + { +- if (c != NUL) ++ if (c != NUL && reslen < MAXWLEN - 1) + res[reslen++] = c; + STRMOVE(word, word + i + 1); + i = 0; +@@ -3545,7 +3545,7 @@ spell_soundfold_sal(slang_T *slang, char_u *inword, char_u *res) + + if (z0 == 0) + { +- if (k && !p0 && reslen < MAXWLEN && c != NUL ++ if (k && !p0 && reslen < MAXWLEN - 1 && c != NUL + && (!slang->sl_collapse || reslen == 0 + || res[reslen - 1] != c)) + // condense only double letters +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +index d04d024911..c8c7ac2642 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +@@ -383,6 +383,30 @@ func Test_spellfile_format_error() + let &rtp = save_rtp + endfunc + ++" An over-length soundfold() argument must not overflow the MAXWLEN result ++" buffer in the single-byte branch of spell_soundfold_sal(). ++func Test_spellfile_soundfold_sal_overflow() ++ let save_enc = &encoding ++ set encoding=latin1 ++ " A SAL map that appends without collapsing, so the result is not shorter ++ " than the input. ++ call writefile(['SET ISO8859-1', 'SAL collapse_result false', ++ \ 'SAL a aaaa', 'SAL b bbbb'], 'Xsal.aff') ++ call writefile(['2', 'hello', 'world'], 'Xsal.dic') ++ mkspell! Xsal Xsal ++ set spl=Xsal.latin1.spl spell ++ ++ " 253 input characters hit the buffer boundary; the result must not exceed ++ " MAXWLEN - 1. ++ call assert_true(strlen(soundfold(repeat('a', 253))) <= 253) ++ ++ set nospell spl& spelllang& ++ call delete('Xsal.aff') ++ call delete('Xsal.dic') ++ call delete('Xsal.latin1.spl') ++ let &encoding = save_enc ++endfunc ++ + " Test for format errors in suggest file + func Test_sugfile_format_error() + let save_rtp = &rtp +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-57452.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57455.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59856.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59857.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 24/27 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-59858
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59858
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-59858
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch | 134 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-59858.patch new file +134 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +From 6b611b0d15603c52ebdad17172b0232b4f65704e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 15:41:24 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0735: [security]: arbitrary Ex command execution + during C omni-completion + +Problem: [security]: With C omni-completion, a crafted tags file can execute + arbitrary Ex commands when completing a struct/union member + (cipher-creator) +Solution: Escape the type field before inserting it into the :vimgrep + pattern so it cannot close the pattern and start a new command + (Hirohito Higashi). + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-mf92-v4xw-j45x + +Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>" +Signed-off-by: Hirohito Higashi <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/6b611b0d15603c52ebdad17172b0232b4f65704e] +CVE: CVE-2026-59858 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim | 2 +- + src/testdir/Make_all.mak | 2 + + src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + create mode 100644 src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim + +diff --git a/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim b/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim +index cb4bb2c167..248d6f2e60 100644 +--- a/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim ++++ b/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim +@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ def StructMembers( # {{{1 + return [] + endif + execute 'silent! keepjumps noautocmd ' +- .. n .. 'vimgrep ' .. '/\t' .. typename .. '\(\t\|$\)/j ' ++ .. n .. 'vimgrep ' .. '/\t' .. escape(typename, '/\') .. '\(\t\|$\)/j ' + .. fnames + + qflist = getqflist() +diff --git a/src/testdir/Make_all.mak b/src/testdir/Make_all.mak +index 7d57b2e727..681e9b3b2a 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/Make_all.mak ++++ b/src/testdir/Make_all.mak +@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ NEW_TESTS = \ + test_partial \ + test_paste \ + test_perl \ ++ test_plugin_ccomplete \ + test_plugin_comment \ + test_plugin_glvs \ + test_plugin_helptoc \ +@@ -516,6 +517,7 @@ NEW_TESTS_RES = \ + test_partial.res \ + test_paste.res \ + test_perl.res \ ++ test_plugin_ccomplete.res \ + test_plugin_comment.res \ + test_plugin_glvs.res \ + test_plugin_helptoc.res \ +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim b/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000..a635bd50bd +--- /dev/null ++++ b/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim +@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ ++" Tests for the C omni-completion plugin (runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim). ++ ++func s:WriteTags(lines) ++ " Mark unsorted so lookup is a linear scan regardless of entry order. ++ let tagsfile = tempname() ++ call writefile(["!_TAG_FILE_SORTED\t0\t/0/"] + a:lines, tagsfile) ++ return tagsfile ++endfunc ++ ++" A crafted typeref field is interpolated into the :vimgrep pattern in ++" StructMembers(). Without escaping, "/" closes the pattern and "|" starts a ++" new Ex command, so the field runs as an Ex command during completion. ++func Test_ccomplete_no_exec_via_typeref() ++ unlet! g:ccomplete_injected ++ let tagsfile = s:WriteTags([ ++ \ "myvar\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tv\ttyperef:x/|let g:ccomplete_injected = 1|\"", ++ \ ]) ++ ++ let save_tags = &tags ++ let &tags = tagsfile ++ ++ new ++ call ccomplete#Complete(1, '') ++ call ccomplete#Complete(0, 'myvar.x') ++ ++ call assert_false(exists('g:ccomplete_injected'), ++ \ 'typeref field was executed as an Ex command during omni-completion') ++ ++ bwipe! ++ let &tags = save_tags ++ unlet! g:ccomplete_injected ++endfunc ++ ++" A legitimate typeref must still drive struct-member completion: escaping the ++" field value must not break the normal path. ++func Test_ccomplete_typeref_completion_still_works() ++ let tagsfile = s:WriteTags([ ++ \ "myvar\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tv\ttyperef:struct:mystruct", ++ \ "alpha\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tm\tstruct:mystruct", ++ \ "beta\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tm\tstruct:mystruct", ++ \ ]) ++ ++ let save_tags = &tags ++ let &tags = tagsfile ++ ++ new ++ call ccomplete#Complete(1, '') ++ let items = ccomplete#Complete(0, 'myvar.') ++ ++ call assert_equal(type([]), type(items), ++ \ 'ccomplete#Complete did not return a list') ++ let names = map(copy(items), 'v:val.word') ++ call assert_true(index(names, 'alpha') >= 0, ++ \ 'struct member "alpha" missing from completion: ' . string(names)) ++ call assert_true(index(names, 'beta') >= 0, ++ \ 'struct member "beta" missing from completion: ' . string(names)) ++ ++ bwipe! ++ let &tags = save_tags ++endfunc ++ ++" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-57455.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59856.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59857.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-59858.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 25/27 vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-57456
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
References:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57456
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-57456
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-57456.patch | 90 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57456.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-57456.patch new file +90 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From 911e10a2e8e677c3982d392e185b7d9b3e574401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 19:50:56 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 14/17] patch 9.2.0699: [security]: possible code execution + with python complete + +Problem: [security]: possible code execution with python complete + (morningbread) +Solution: Use repr() to quote the doc strings correctly + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-ppj8-wqjf-6fp3 + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/cce141c42740f122dd8486ae04e21c2a81016ba8] +CVE: CVE-2026-57456 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim | 6 +++--- + runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim | 6 +++--- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim b/runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim +index 56ee636b8d..e7cd149cdd 100644 +--- a/runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim ++++ b/runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim +@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ class Scope(object): + + def get_code(self): + str = "" +- if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += '"""'+self.docstr+'"""\n' ++ if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += repr(self.docstr)+'\n' + str += 'class _PyCmplNoType:\n def __getattr__(self,name):\n return None\n' + for sub in self.subscopes: + str += sub.get_code() +@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ class Class(Scope): + if _DOTTED_NAME_RE.match(s.strip())] + if len(safe_supers) > 0: str += '(%s)' % ','.join(safe_supers) + str += ':\n' +- if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += self.childindent()+'"""'+self.docstr+'"""\n' ++ if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += self.childindent()+repr(self.docstr)+'\n' + if len(self.subscopes) > 0: + for s in self.subscopes: str += s.get_code() + else: +@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ class Function(Scope): + safe_params = [p for p in safe_params if p] + str = "%sdef %s(%s):\n" % \ + (self.currentindent(),self.name,','.join(safe_params)) +- if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += self.childindent()+'"""'+self.docstr+'"""\n' ++ if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += self.childindent()+repr(self.docstr)+'\n' + str += "%spass\n" % self.childindent() + return str + +diff --git a/runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim b/runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim +index 0f41405c0e..abef32faf2 100644 +--- a/runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim ++++ b/runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim +@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ class Scope(object): + + def get_code(self): + str = "" +- if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += '"""'+self.docstr+'"""\n' ++ if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += repr(self.docstr)+'\n' + str += 'class _PyCmplNoType:\n def __getattr__(self,name):\n return None\n' + for sub in self.subscopes: + str += sub.get_code() +@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ class Class(Scope): + if _DOTTED_NAME_RE.match(s.strip())] + if len(safe_supers) > 0: str += '(%s)' % ','.join(safe_supers) + str += ':\n' +- if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += self.childindent()+'"""'+self.docstr+'"""\n' ++ if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += self.childindent()+repr(self.docstr)+'\n' + if len(self.subscopes) > 0: + for s in self.subscopes: str += s.get_code() + else: +@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ class Function(Scope): + safe_params = [p for p in safe_params if p] + str = "%sdef %s(%s):\n" % \ + (self.currentindent(),self.name,','.join(safe_params)) +- if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += self.childindent()+'"""'+self.docstr+'"""\n' ++ if len(self.docstr) > 0: str += self.childindent()+repr(self.docstr)+'\n' + str += "%spass\n" % self.childindent() + return str + +-- +2.44.4 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-59856.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59857.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59858.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-57456.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 26/27 patch: Fix CVE-2026-56289
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix referenced by NVD in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=faba04ef4f2b410257f76c1b9dc85e350929c4b9
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56289
--- .../patch/patch/CVE-2026-56289.patch | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch_2.7.6.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2026-56289.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2026-56289.patch new file +36 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From a40c835ab06314526d623e62ae27830d0ad88752 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Eggert <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 13:16:10 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?Don=E2=80=99t=20infloop=20on=20null=20ranges?= +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Problem reported by Michał Majchrowicz. +* src/patch.c (locate_hunk): Don’t attempt to optimize +matches of a null range. Instead, apply all the checks +we apply to non-null ranges. + +CVE: CVE-2026-56289 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=faba04ef4f2b410257f76c1b9dc85e350929c4b9] + +(cherry picked from commit faba04ef4f2b410257f76c1b9dc85e350929c4b9) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + src/patch.c | 3 --- + 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/patch.c b/src/patch.c +index b348b5c..0e8d5c9 100644 +--- a/src/patch.c ++++ b/src/patch.c +@@ -1146,9 +1146,6 @@ locate_hunk (lin fuzz) + lin max_offset = MAX(max_pos_offset, max_neg_offset); + lin min_offset; + +- if (!pat_lines) /* null range matches always */ +- return first_guess; +- + /* Do not try lines <= 0. */ + if (first_guess <= max_neg_offset) + max_neg_offset = first_guess - 1;
meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch_2.7.6.bb +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-Unset-need_charset_alias-when-building-for-musl.patch \ file://0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-ed-style-patch.patch \ file://0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-multi-file-ed.patch \ file://CVE-2019-20633.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-56289.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4c68cee989d83c87b00a3860bcd05600"
PATCH 27/27 patch: Fix CVE-2026-56288
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix referenced by NVD in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=e6d6a4e021660679d7fc9150f981d4920f722313
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56288
--- .../patch/patch/CVE-2026-56288.patch | 75 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch_2.7.6.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2026-56288.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch/CVE-2026-56288.patch new file +75 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From f98fd4b5f696d1fcc9d86f81555370cf4b21150f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paul Eggert <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 10:05:02 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid null pointer derefence with bad hunks +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Problem reported by Michał Majchrowicz. +* src/pch.c (another_hunk): Keep chars_read positive +even with malformed hunks. + +CVE: CVE-2026-56288 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/patch.git/commit/?id=e6d6a4e021660679d7fc9150f981d4920f722313] + +(cherry picked from commit e6d6a4e021660679d7fc9150f981d4920f722313) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + src/pch.c | 15 ++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/pch.c b/src/pch.c +index 6f9f36f..0a31f72 100644 +--- a/src/pch.c ++++ b/src/pch.c +@@ -1728,7 +1728,8 @@ another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev) + p_end = filldst-1; + malformed (); + } +- chars_read -= fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line (); ++ chars_read -= (1 < chars_read && fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines ++ && incomplete_line ()); + p_Char[fillsrc] = ch; + p_line[fillsrc] = s; + p_len[fillsrc++] = chars_read; +@@ -1745,7 +1746,8 @@ another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev) + malformed (); + } + context++; +- chars_read -= fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line (); ++ chars_read -= (1 < chars_read && fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines ++ && incomplete_line ()); + p_Char[fillsrc] = ch; + p_line[fillsrc] = s; + p_len[fillsrc++] = chars_read; +@@ -1765,7 +1767,8 @@ another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev) + p_end = fillsrc-1; + malformed (); + } +- chars_read -= filldst == p_end && incomplete_line (); ++ chars_read -= (1 < chars_read && filldst == p_end ++ && incomplete_line ()); + p_Char[filldst] = ch; + p_line[filldst] = s; + p_len[filldst++] = chars_read; +@@ -1852,7 +1855,8 @@ another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev) + if (buf[0] != '<' || (buf[1] != ' ' && buf[1] != '\t')) + fatal ("'<' followed by space or tab expected at line %s of patch", + format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line)); +- chars_read -= 2 + (i == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ()); ++ chars_read -= 2 + (3 < chars_read && i == p_ptrn_lines ++ && incomplete_line ()); + p_len[i] = chars_read; + p_line[i] = savebuf (buf + 2, chars_read); + if (chars_read && ! p_line[i]) { +@@ -1897,7 +1901,8 @@ another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev) + if (buf[0] != '>' || (buf[1] != ' ' && buf[1] != '\t')) + fatal ("'>' followed by space or tab expected at line %s of patch", + format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line)); +- chars_read -= 2 + (i == p_end && incomplete_line ()); ++ chars_read -= 2 + (3 < chars_read && i == p_end ++ && incomplete_line ()); + p_len[i] = chars_read; + p_line[i] = savebuf (buf + 2, chars_read); + if (chars_read && ! p_line[i]) {
meta/recipes-devtools/patch/patch_2.7.6.bb +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-Unset-need_charset_alias-when-building-for-musl.patch \ file://0001-Don-t-leak-temporary-file-on-failed-multi-file-ed.patch \ file://CVE-2019-20633.patch \ file://CVE-2026-56289.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-56288.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4c68cee989d83c87b00a3860bcd05600"