Patch review
cover Patch review
Hello,
Some notable changes in this series:
* ptest-runner upgrade to try to decrease ptest AB-INT failures
* pseudo upgrade to maximize host distro compatibility
* GCC stable upgrade to 13.5
Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by end of day Friday, September 25.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/?#/builders/29/builds/4792
oe-selftest-fedora failed with 16206 – [scarthgap] AB-INT: runtime_test.SystemTap.test_crosstap_* failures retried in https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/?#/builders/48/builds/4720
The following changes since commit 04f18f976b3809e195433b6b31a6121014bdc37c:
u-boot, u-boot-tools: Fix CVE-2026-46728 (2026-09-17 16:32:11 +0200)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut
for you to fetch changes up to 70778df2c2882f1abbdd4dd2f8d229ade720d8a4:
time64: enable 64-bit time/file-offset flags for 32-bit nativesdk (2026-09-23 01:10:36 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Adarsh Jagadish Kamini (1):
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-33845
Daniel Turull (1):
improve_kernel_cve_report: validate that cve details field exists
Darsh Kelaiya (1):
python3-git: fix CVE-2026-42215
Devansh Patel (3):
python3-mako: correct CVE_PRODUCT mapping
curl: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-8458
vim: Fix CVE-2026-52858 regression
Hemanth Kumar M D (1):
gcc: Upgrade to GCC 13.5
Hetvi Thakar (4):
python3-pip: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2018-20225
python3-ply: set status for CVE-2025-56005
python3-pip: Fix CVE-2026-13346
wget: Fix CVE-2026-58470
Hiago De Franco (1):
improve_kernel_cve_report: fix backported-patch check
Hitendra Prajapati (5):
vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73072
vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73073
vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73074
vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73077
vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73078
Jaipaul Cheernam (2):
ca-certificates: upgrade 20260601 -> 20260816
perl: Fix CVE-2026-19487
Jakub Szczudlo (Nokia) (1):
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-5419
Kyungjik Min (1):
rootfs.py: fix run-postinsts removal on multilib images
Peter Marko (5):
cpio: patch CVE-2026-66485
cpio: patch CVE-2026-66484
golang: fix homepage
python3-certifi: fix homepage
libslirp: patch CVE-2026-9539
Peter Tatrai (2):
testimage: avoid symlinking missing qemu boot log
time64: enable 64-bit time/file-offset flags for 32-bit nativesdk
Richard Purdie (5):
wireless-regdb: upgrade 2026.05.30 -> 2026.09.03
ptest-runner: Upgrade 2.5.0 -> 2.5.1
pseudo: Add in openat2, exec and linkat fixes
pseudo: Update to 1.9.10
pseudo: 1.9.10 -> 1.9.11
Siddharth Doshi (3):
curl: Security Fix for CVE-2026-13608
curl: Security Fix for CVE-2026-18924
curl: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-82209
Stefano Tondo (1):
spdx30_tasks: Fix SPDX_CUSTOM_ANNOTATION_VARS implementation
Vijay Anusuri (7):
kbd: Fix CVE-2026-72693
libxfont: Fix CVE-2026-56001
libxfont: Fix CVE-2026-56002
libxfont: Fix CVE-2026-56003
python3-cryptography: Fix CVE-2026-34073
python3-cryptography: Fix CVE-2026-69248
python3-cryptography: Fix CVE-2026-69249
Wang Mingyu (1):
ptest-runner: upgrade 2.4.5 -> 2.4.5.1
Yoann Congal (3):
scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 5.0.20
python3: skip ptest incompatible with ptest-runner >= 2.5.0
ptest-runner: Upgrade 2.4.5.1 -> 2.5.0
meta/classes-recipe/testimage.bbclass | 5 +-
meta/conf/distro/include/maintainers.inc | 2 +-
meta/conf/distro/include/time64.inc | 17 +
meta/lib/oe/rootfs.py | 3 +-
meta/lib/oe/spdx30_tasks.py | 4 +-
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/spdx.py | 74 ++++
.../slirp/libslirp/CVE-2026-9539.patch | 122 ++++++
.../slirp/libslirp_git.bb | 5 +-
.../recipes-core/kbd/kbd/CVE-2026-72693.patch | 155 ++++++++
meta/recipes-core/kbd/kbd_2.6.4.bb | 1 +
.../gcc/{gcc-13.4.inc => gcc-13.5.inc} | 9 +-
...ian_13.4.bb => gcc-cross-canadian_13.5.bb} | 0
.../{gcc-cross_13.4.bb => gcc-cross_13.5.bb} | 0
...-crosssdk_13.4.bb => gcc-crosssdk_13.5.bb} | 0
...cc-runtime_13.4.bb => gcc-runtime_13.5.bb} | 0
...itizers_13.4.bb => gcc-sanitizers_13.5.bb} | 0
...{gcc-source_13.4.bb => gcc-source_13.5.bb} | 0
...dy-Make-it-buildable-by-C-11-to-C-26.patch | 257 -------------
...build-Remove-INCLUDE_MEMORY-PR117737.patch | 46 ---
...am-include-above-safe-ctype.h-PR1177.patch | 54 ---
.../gcc/{gcc_13.4.bb => gcc_13.5.bb} | 0
...initial_13.4.bb => libgcc-initial_13.5.bb} | 0
.../gcc/{libgcc_13.4.bb => libgcc_13.5.bb} | 0
...ibgfortran_13.4.bb => libgfortran_13.5.bb} | 0
.../go/go-binary-native_1.22.12.bb | 2 +-
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-common.inc | 2 +-
.../perl/files/CVE-2026-19487.patch | 66 ++++
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.38.4.bb | 1 +
meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb | 4 +-
.../python/python3-certifi_2024.2.2.bb | 2 +-
.../python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-34073.patch | 167 +++++++++
.../python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69248.patch | 299 +++++++++++++++
.../python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69249.patch | 354 ++++++++++++++++++
.../python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb | 3 +
.../python3-git/CVE-2026-42215_p1.patch | 61 +++
.../python3-git/CVE-2026-42215_p2.patch | 47 +++
.../python/python3-git_3.1.42.bb | 2 +
.../python/python3-mako_1.3.2.bb | 2 +
.../python/python3-pip/CVE-2026-13346.patch | 223 +++++++++++
.../python/python3-pip_24.0.bb | 2 +
.../python/python3-ply_3.11.bb | 1 +
.../python/python3_3.12.14.bb | 6 +
meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.15.bb | 2 +
.../cpio/files/CVE-2026-66484.patch | 28 ++
.../cpio/files/CVE-2026-66485.patch | 210 +++++++++++
.../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58470-regression.patch | 48 +++
.../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58470.patch | 79 ++++
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb | 2 +
.../xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56001.patch | 87 +++++
.../xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56002.patch | 150 ++++++++
.../xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56003.patch | 114 ++++++
.../xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb | 5 +
....05.30.bb => wireless-regdb_2026.09.03.bb} | 2 +-
...ertdata2pem.py-print-a-warning-for-e.patch | 6 +-
...icates-don-t-use-Debianisms-in-run-p.patch | 2 +-
...icates-use-relative-symlinks-from-ET.patch | 2 +-
...0260601.bb => ca-certificates_20260816.bb} | 2 +-
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-13608.patch | 48 +++
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch | 39 ++
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 5 +-
.../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-33845.patch | 190 ++++++++++
.../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5419.patch | 247 ++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.4.bb | 2 +
...-runner_2.4.5.bb => ptest-runner_2.5.1.bb} | 3 +-
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-52858-regression.patch | 94 +++++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-73072.patch | 64 ++++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-73073.patch | 89 +++++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-73074.patch | 101 +++++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-73077.patch | 96 +++++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-73078.patch | 94 +++++
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 6 +
scripts/contrib/improve_kernel_cve_report.py | 4 +-
scripts/install-buildtools | 4 +-
73 files changed, 3434 insertions(+), 389 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/slirp/libslirp/CVE-2026-9539.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/kbd/kbd/CVE-2026-72693.patch
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-13.4.inc => gcc-13.5.inc} (93%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-cross-canadian_13.4.bb => gcc-cross-canadian_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-cross_13.4.bb => gcc-cross_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-crosssdk_13.4.bb => gcc-crosssdk_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-runtime_13.4.bb => gcc-runtime_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-sanitizers_13.4.bb => gcc-sanitizers_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-source_13.4.bb => gcc-source_13.5.bb} (100%)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0028-libcody-Make-it-buildable-by-C-11-to-C-26.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0029-build-Remove-INCLUDE_MEMORY-PR117737.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0030-build-Move-sstream-include-above-safe-ctype.h-PR1177.patch
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc_13.4.bb => gcc_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{libgcc-initial_13.4.bb => libgcc-initial_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{libgcc_13.4.bb => libgcc_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{libgfortran_13.4.bb => libgfortran_13.5.bb} (100%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-19487.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-34073.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69248.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69249.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-git/CVE-2026-42215_p1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-git/CVE-2026-42215_p2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pip/CVE-2026-13346.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/cpio/files/CVE-2026-66484.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/cpio/files/CVE-2026-66485.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58470-regression.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58470.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56001.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56002.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56003.patch
rename meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/{wireless-regdb_2026.05.30.bb => wireless-regdb_2026.09.03.bb} (94%)
rename meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/{ca-certificates_20260601.bb => ca-certificates_20260816.bb} (97%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-13608.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-33845.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5419.patch
rename meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/{ptest-runner_2.4.5.bb => ptest-runner_2.5.1.bb} (94%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-52858-regression.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73072.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73073.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73074.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73077.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73078.patchPATCH 1/48 wireless-regdb: upgrade 2026.05.30 -> 2026.09.03
From: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
---
...ireless-regdb_2026.05.30.bb => wireless-regdb_2026.09.03.bb} | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/{wireless-regdb_2026.05.30.bb => wireless-regdb_2026.09.03.bb} (94%)meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2026.09.03.bb renamed from meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2026.05.30.bb +1 -1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ LICENSE = "ISC" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=07c4f6dea3845b02a18dc00c8c87699c" SRC_URI = "https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "8a27bfc081bafed8c24dd70fab0d96f098e5a0bfcd08d3da672595f225ab8993" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b22e0901227b820cd1c280abe681a15b773a5103a5e10dc442e94ebb34cbf58d" inherit bin_package allarch
PATCH 2/48 ca-certificates: upgrade 20260601 -> 20260816
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]>
Source: debian/changelog
ca-certificates (20260816) unstable; urgency=medium
* Update Mozilla certificate authority bundle to version 2.90 The following certificate authorities were added (+):
+ "SECOM TLS ECC Root CA 2024"
+ "SECOM TLS RSA Root CA 2024"
+ "Telia EC TLS Root CA v3"
+ "Telia RSA TLS Root CA v3"
The following certificate authorities were removed (-):
- "Atos TrustedRoot 2011"
- "Entrust Root Certification Authority"
- "SecureSign Root CA12"
- "ePKI Root Certification Authority"
-- Julien Cristau <[email protected]> Sun, 16 Aug 2026 23:04:36 +0200
---
...vert-mozilla-certdata2pem.py-print-a-warning-for-e.patch | 6 +++---
...date-ca-certificates-don-t-use-Debianisms-in-run-p.patch | 2 +-
...date-ca-certificates-use-relative-symlinks-from-ET.patch | 2 +-
...certificates_20260601.bb => ca-certificates_20260816.bb} | 2 +-
4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
rename meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/{ca-certificates_20260601.bb => ca-certificates_20260816.bb} (97%)meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/0001-Revert-mozilla-certdata2pem.py-print-a-warning-for-e.patch +3 -3
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 743774cd53ed1c45bb660eddacf6dadb5ee3e145 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 8ea56b7d5eadb04309dc3cf1e6b0d94d1d053d80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]> Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 12:05:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Revert "mozilla/certdata2pem.py: print a warning for expired
@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]> 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog -index dbe3e9c..496e05d 100644 +index 7ad495f..058ef5e 100644 --- a/debian/changelog +++ b/debian/changelog -@@ -156,7 +156,6 @@ ca-certificates (20211004) unstable; urgency=low +@@ -234,7 +234,6 @@ ca-certificates (20211004) unstable; urgency=low - "Trustis FPS Root CA" - "Staat der Nederlanden Root CA - G3" * Blacklist expired root certificate "DST Root CA X3" (closes: #995432)
meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/0001-update-ca-certificates-don-t-use-Debianisms-in-run-p.patch +1 -1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From 63086d41f76b1c3357e23c6509df72d3f75af20c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From bab2e13b69af12c1864cccf371ebc4ef57a6fec2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ross Burton <[email protected]> Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2015 15:19:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] ca-certificates: remove Debianism in run-parts invocation
meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/0003-update-ca-certificates-use-relative-symlinks-from-ET.patch +1 -1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -From a69933f96a8675369de702bdb55e57dc21f65e7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From 8a5b4e2dd1479de0338db7a7234d037ef0f71c2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Draszik?= <[email protected]> Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 16:45:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] update-ca-certificates: use relative symlinks from
meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates_20260816.bb renamed from meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates_20260601.bb +1 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ DEPENDS:class-nativesdk = "openssl-native" # Need rehash from openssl and run-parts from debianutils PACKAGE_WRITE_DEPS += "openssl-native debianutils-native" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7ab6301f7f34eef90a4d278647c260bc0762e0e14561f4649854cf4b0d4bea21" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d939bcdd0cb058712cf4175bac76997676eb8b68fe9473765e1b40fb3d5b186a" SRC_URI = "${DEBIAN_MIRROR}/main/c/ca-certificates/${BPN}_${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0001-update-ca-certificates-don-t-use-Debianisms-in-run-p.patch \ file://0003-update-ca-certificates-use-relative-symlinks-from-ET.patch \
PATCH 3/48 testimage: avoid symlinking missing qemu boot log
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Tatrai <[email protected]>
When qemu test runs only produce suffixed bootlog variants, the base bootlog path may not exist. os.symlink() creates a dangling symlink in the oeqa result log directory.
Avoid advertising a boot log in the collected test results when that path does not exist. Guard the symlink creation and log a note instead.
This is a partial backport of master commit 7a6596925cb0eb8dd48a0362a51875cdd60152bc. Only the symlink guard is picked here; the bootlog variant globbing from master is not applicable to scarthgap.
--- meta/classes-recipe/testimage.bbclass | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/classes-recipe/testimage.bbclass +4 -1
@@ -395,7 +395,10 @@ def testimage_main(d): # Copy additional logs to tmp/log/oeqa so it's easier to find them targetdir = os.path.join(get_json_result_dir(d), d.getVar("PN")) os.makedirs(targetdir, exist_ok=True) - os.symlink(bootlog, os.path.join(targetdir, os.path.basename(bootlog))) + if os.path.exists(bootlog): + os.symlink(bootlog, os.path.join(targetdir, os.path.basename(bootlog))) + else: + bb.note("testimage: boot log not found at %s" % bootlog) os.symlink(d.getVar("BB_LOGFILE"), os.path.join(targetdir, os.path.basename(d.getVar("BB_LOGFILE") + "." + d.getVar('DATETIME')))) if not results or not complete:
PATCH 4/48 python3-pip: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2018-20225
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
Analysis:
- NVD marks CVE-2018-20225 as disputed. [1]
- pip searches all configured package indexes without priority and selects the highest matching version. --extra-index-url adds an equal-priority package source. [2]
- Exploitation requires use of --extra-index-url and an attacker-published, higher-version package with the name of a private package. [1]
- Upstream closed the related report as not planned, and Red Hat classified the issue as WONTFIX because this behavior is intentional. [3][4]
- Record the disputed status; no source patch is available.
Reference:
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20225
[2] https://pip.pypa.io/en/stable/cli/pip_install/
[3] https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12874
[4] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1835736
--- meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pip_24.0.bb | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pip_24.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ do_install:append() { } CVE_PRODUCT = "pypa:pip" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2018-20225] = "disputed: Exploitation requires use of --extra-index-url with a private package not present on the primary public index; pip intentionally selects the highest version across configured indexes" do_install:append(){ # pip vendors distlib which ships Windows launcher templates (*.exe).
PATCH 5/48 python3-ply: set status for CVE-2025-56005
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
PLY 3.11 contains the picklefile parameter described by CVE-2025-56005, but exploitation requires an application to explicitly pass an attacker-controlled pickle file to yacc().
No OE-Core consumer uses this parameter. Ubuntu ignores the issue for the same reason [1], and NVD records the CVE as disputed [2].
[1] https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2025-56005
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56005
--- meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-ply_3.11.bb | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-ply_3.11.bb +1 -0
@@ -16,5 +16,6 @@ RDEPENDS:${PN}:class-target += "\ " CVE_PRODUCT = "dabeaz:ply" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-56005] = "disputed: Exploitation requires application-specific use of PLY's picklefile parameter with attacker-controlled pickle data" BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
PATCH 6/48 kbd: Fix CVE-2026-72693
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
Pick patch according to [1]
[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-72693
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72693
[3] https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-72693
--- .../recipes-core/kbd/kbd/CVE-2026-72693.patch | 155 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/kbd/kbd_2.6.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 156 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/kbd/kbd/CVE-2026-72693.patch
meta/recipes-core/kbd/kbd/CVE-2026-72693.patch new file +155 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +From 78d5ae119742e87baa7dbe0f5c4107e7533fd698 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alexey Gladkov <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 12 May 2026 10:20:50 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] openvt: make -u process matching more conservative + +The -u mode relies on the current VT owner to decide which user should +be used for the new login session. Make that check stricter by requiring +a matching process owner and controlling terminal instead of relying on +the ownership of an inherited file descriptor. + +Also reject root as a pre-authenticated target and document the tighter +behavior in the man page. + +Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/legionus/kbd/commit/78d5ae119742e87baa7dbe0f5c4107e7533fd698] +CVE: CVE-2026-72693 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + docs/man/man1/openvt.1 | 10 +++++++ + src/openvt.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/docs/man/man1/openvt.1 b/docs/man/man1/openvt.1 +index 79bfe3f..074de96 100644 +--- a/docs/man/man1/openvt.1 ++++ b/docs/man/man1/openvt.1 +@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ will be made the new current VT. + .I "\-u, \-\-user" + Figure out the owner of the current VT, and run login as that user. + Suitable to be called by init. Shouldn't be used with \fI\-c\fR or \fI\-l\fR. ++This option refuses to pre-authenticate root and requires a process owned by ++the VT owner whose controlling terminal is the current VT. + .TP + .I "\-l, \-\-login" + Make the command a login shell. A \- is prepended to the name of the command +@@ -64,6 +66,14 @@ If + is compiled with a getopt_long() and you wish to set + options to the command to be run, then you must supply + the end of options \-\- flag before the command. ++.PP ++The ++.B \-u ++option uses ++.BR "login -f" ++and therefore bypasses normal password authentication for the detected user. ++It is intended only for controlled init or keyboard-request configurations. ++Use a normal authenticated login command when authentication is required. + .SH EXAMPLES + .B openvt + can be used to start a shell on the next free VT, by using the command: +diff --git a/src/openvt.c b/src/openvt.c +index 5980361..b8436fe 100644 +--- a/src/openvt.c ++++ b/src/openvt.c +@@ -78,6 +78,51 @@ usage(int rc, const struct kbd_help *options) + exit(rc); + } + ++static int ++proc_pid_stat(const char *pid, uid_t *uid, dev_t *tty) ++{ ++ char filename[NAME_MAX + 12]; ++ char line[BUFSIZ]; ++ char *lp, *rp; ++ FILE *fp; ++ struct stat st; ++ long tty_nr; ++ ++ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "/proc/%s/stat", pid); ++ fp = fopen(filename, "r"); ++ if (!fp) ++ return -1; ++ ++ if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st)) { ++ fclose(fp); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp)) { ++ fclose(fp); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ fclose(fp); ++ ++ rp = strrchr(line, ')'); ++ if (!rp) ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* ++ * /proc/<pid>/stat fields after comm are: ++ * state ppid pgrp session tty_nr ... ++ */ ++ if (!rp || sscanf(rp + 1, " %*c %*d %*d %*d %ld", &tty_nr) != 1) ++ return -1; ++ ++ if (tty_nr <= 0) ++ return -1; ++ ++ *uid = st.st_uid; ++ *tty = (dev_t) tty_nr; ++ return 0; ++} ++ + /* + * Support for Spawn_Console: openvt running from init + * added by Joshua Spoerri, Thu Jul 18 21:13:16 EDT 1996 +@@ -109,8 +154,7 @@ authenticate_user(int curvt) + DIR *dp; + struct dirent *dentp; + struct stat buf; +- dev_t console_dev; +- ino_t console_ino; ++ dev_t console_rdev; + uid_t console_uid; + char filename[NAME_MAX + 12]; + struct passwd *pwnam; +@@ -130,10 +174,12 @@ authenticate_user(int curvt) + kbd_error(EXIT_FAILURE, errsv, "%s", filename); + } + } +- console_dev = buf.st_dev; +- console_ino = buf.st_ino; ++ console_rdev = buf.st_rdev; + console_uid = buf.st_uid; + ++ if (console_uid == 0) ++ kbd_error(EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("Refusing to pre-authenticate root on current tty.")); ++ + /* get the owner of current tty */ + if (!(pwnam = getpwuid(console_uid))) + kbd_error(EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "getpwuid"); +@@ -141,12 +187,16 @@ authenticate_user(int curvt) + /* check to make sure that user has a process on that tty */ + /* this will fail for example when X is running on the tty */ + while ((dentp = readdir(dp))) { +- sprintf(filename, "/proc/%s/fd/0", dentp->d_name); ++ uid_t proc_uid; ++ dev_t proc_tty; ++ ++ if (dentp->d_name[0] < '0' || dentp->d_name[0] > '9') ++ continue; + +- if (stat(filename, &buf)) ++ if (proc_pid_stat(dentp->d_name, &proc_uid, &proc_tty) < 0) + continue; + +- if (buf.st_dev == console_dev && buf.st_ino == console_ino && buf.st_uid == console_uid) ++ if (proc_uid == console_uid && proc_tty == console_rdev) + goto got_a_process; + } + +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-core/kbd/kbd_2.6.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ RCONFLICTS:${PN} = "console-tools" SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/utils/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz \ file://0001-Remove-non-free-Agafari-fonts.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-72693.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "519f8d087aecca7e0a33cd084bef92c066eb19731666653dcc70c9d71aa40926"
PATCH 7/48 gnutls: fix CVE-2026-33845
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <[email protected]>
Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-33845.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33845
Upstream fix:
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/e5b72c53c7d789d19d1d1cd10b275e87d0415413
--- .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-33845.patch | 190 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 191 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-33845.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-33845.patch new file +190 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +From d217d233d3eb5566a911dad11b639552d63acfac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 08:54:58 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] buffers: switch from end_offset over to frag_length + +Instead of maintaining an inclusive [start_offset, end_offset] range +when reassembling DTLS handshake, +track start_offset and a relative frag_length instead. + +You'd think it'd be a no-op, but it fixes: + +* 0-length fragments triggering completion if message was 1 byte long +* a remotely triggerable underflow and an ensuing heap overrun + +Reported-by: Joshua Rogers of AISLE Research Team <[email protected]> +Fixes: #1811 +Fixes: CVE-2026-33845 +Fixes: GNUTLS-SA-2026-04-29-3 +CVSS: 7.5 High CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H +Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-33845 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/e5b72c53c7d789d19d1d1cd10b275e87d0415413] + +Backport notes: adapted to the stable branch, no logic changes. +- lib/buffers.c: the local fragment-size variable is named frag_size here, + not frag_length as upstream; renamed accordingly. +- lib/buffers.c: merge_handshake_packet() has no recv_buf alias in this + branch, so recv_buf[pos] was expanded to + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos], which changes line wrapping. +- lib/gnutls_int.h: applies cleanly + +Assisted-by: kiro:claude-sonnet-4.6 +Signed-off-by: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <[email protected]> +--- + lib/buffers.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- + lib/gnutls_int.h | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/buffers.c b/lib/buffers.c +index 672380b05..ad59e4f14 100644 +--- a/lib/buffers.c ++++ b/lib/buffers.c +@@ -923,10 +923,7 @@ static int parse_handshake_header(gnutls_session_t session, mbuffer_st *bufel, + } + data_size = _mbuffer_get_udata_size(bufel) - handshake_header_size; + +- if (frag_size > 0) +- hsk->end_offset = hsk->start_offset + frag_size - 1; +- else +- hsk->end_offset = 0; ++ hsk->frag_length = frag_size; + + _gnutls_handshake_log( + "HSK[%p]: %s (%u) was received. Length %d[%d], frag offset %d, frag length: %d, sequence: %d\n", +@@ -940,9 +937,11 @@ static int parse_handshake_header(gnutls_session_t session, mbuffer_st *bufel, + + if (hsk->length > 0 && + (frag_size > data_size || +- (frag_size > 0 && hsk->end_offset >= hsk->length))) { ++ (frag_size > 0 && ++ hsk->start_offset + frag_size > hsk->length))) { + return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH); +- } else if (hsk->length == 0 && hsk->end_offset != 0 && ++ } else if (hsk->length == 0 && ++ hsk->start_offset + frag_size != hsk->start_offset && + hsk->start_offset != 0) + return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH); + +@@ -991,11 +990,10 @@ static int merge_handshake_packet(gnutls_session_t session, + hsk->data.length = hsk->length; + } + +- if (hsk->length > 0 && hsk->end_offset > 0 && +- hsk->end_offset - hsk->start_offset + 1 != hsk->length) { ++ if (hsk->length > 0 && hsk->frag_length > 0 && ++ hsk->frag_length != hsk->length) { + memmove(&hsk->data.data[hsk->start_offset], +- hsk->data.data, +- hsk->end_offset - hsk->start_offset + 1); ++ hsk->data.data, hsk->frag_length); + } + + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer_size++; +@@ -1012,7 +1010,7 @@ static int merge_handshake_packet(gnutls_session_t session, + if (hsk->start_offset < + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] + .start_offset && +- hsk->end_offset + 1 >= ++ hsk->start_offset + hsk->frag_length >= + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] + .start_offset) { + memcpy(&session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] +@@ -1021,28 +1019,36 @@ static int merge_handshake_packet(gnutls_session_t session, + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] + .start_offset = hsk->start_offset; + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] +- .end_offset = MIN( +- hsk->end_offset, ++ .frag_length = MIN( ++ hsk->frag_length, + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] +- .end_offset); +- } else if (hsk->end_offset > ++ .frag_length); ++ } else if (hsk->start_offset + hsk->frag_length > + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] +- .end_offset && ++ .start_offset + ++ session->internals ++ .handshake_recv_buffer[pos] ++ .frag_length && + hsk->start_offset <= + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] +- .end_offset + +- 1) { ++ .start_offset + ++ session->internals ++ .handshake_recv_buffer[pos] ++ .frag_length) { + memcpy(&session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] + .data.data[hsk->start_offset], + hsk->data.data, hsk->data.length); + +- session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] +- .end_offset = hsk->end_offset; + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] + .start_offset = MIN( + hsk->start_offset, + session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] + .start_offset); ++ session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] ++ .frag_length = ++ hsk->start_offset + hsk->frag_length - ++ session->internals.handshake_recv_buffer[pos] ++ .start_offset; + } + _gnutls_handshake_buffer_clear(hsk); + } +@@ -1102,8 +1108,8 @@ static int get_last_packet(gnutls_session_t session, + } + + else if ((recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].start_offset == 0 && +- recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].end_offset == +- recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].length - 1) || ++ recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].frag_length == ++ recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].length) || + recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].length == 0) { + session->internals.dtls.hsk_read_seq++; + _gnutls_handshake_buffer_move(hsk, +@@ -1114,8 +1120,9 @@ static int get_last_packet(gnutls_session_t session, + /* if we don't have a complete handshake message, but we + * have queued data waiting, try again to reconstruct the + * handshake packet, using the queued */ +- if (recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].end_offset != +- recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].length - 1 && ++ if ((recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].start_offset + ++ recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].frag_length) != ++ recv_buf[LAST_ELEMENT].length && + record_check_unprocessed(session) > 0) + return gnutls_assert_val( + GNUTLS_E_INT_CHECK_AGAIN); +@@ -1302,9 +1309,7 @@ int _gnutls_parse_record_buffered_msgs(gnutls_session_t session) + &session->internals.record_buffer, + bufel, ret); + +- data_size = MIN(tmp.length, +- tmp.end_offset - +- tmp.start_offset + 1); ++ data_size = MIN(tmp.length, tmp.frag_length); + + ret = _gnutls_buffer_append_data( + &tmp.data, +diff --git a/lib/gnutls_int.h b/lib/gnutls_int.h +index 8cf9a8715..689dcdc41 100644 +--- a/lib/gnutls_int.h ++++ b/lib/gnutls_int.h +@@ -479,10 +479,10 @@ typedef struct { + uint16_t sequence; + + /* indicate whether that message is complete. +- * complete means start_offset == 0 and end_offset == length ++ * complete means start_offset == 0 and frag_length == length + */ + uint32_t start_offset; +- uint32_t end_offset; ++ uint32_t frag_length; /* used exclusively in DTLS reassembly */ + + uint8_t header[MAX_HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE]; + int header_size;
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar file://CVE-2026-42011_p1.patch \ file://CVE-2026-42011_p2.patch \ file://CVE-2026-33846.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-33845.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2bea4e154794f3f00180fa2a5c51fe8b005ac7a31cd58bd44cdfa7f36ebc3a9b"
PATCH 8/48 python3-mako: correct CVE_PRODUCT mapping
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
The inherited "python:Mako" mapping is not used for the packaged Mako source and causes its vulnerability records to be missed.
Use "makotemplates:mako" for its historical NVD configuration identity and "sqlalchemy:mako" for the current NVD dictionary CPE, NVD configuration, and CNA affected-data identity.
Backport note: this applies the metadata to Scarthgap Mako 1.3.2 rather than master 1.4.1; the older release exposes applicable unpatched records.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-mako_1.3.2.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-mako_1.3.2.bb +2 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-41205.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2a0c8ad7f6274271b3bb7467dd37cf9cc6dab4bc19cb69a4ef10669402de698e" +CVE_PRODUCT = "makotemplates:mako sqlalchemy:mako" + RDEPENDS:${PN} = "python3-html \ python3-markupsafe \ python3-netclient \
PATCH 9/48 python3-pip: Fix CVE-2026-13346
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2], using the commit shown in [1].
[1] https://github.com/pypa/pip/commit/10dfb6b90054
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13346
--- .../python/python3-pip/CVE-2026-13346.patch | 223 ++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-pip_24.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 224 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pip/CVE-2026-13346.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pip/CVE-2026-13346.patch new file +223 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +From e743e63ca083402fe0a344c4837cc6acf3081987 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Damian Shaw <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 21:52:39 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix Link.filename decoding URL path twice (#14110) + +Link already percent-decodes the URL path into `self._path`, but +`Link.filename` decoded the basename again, so a doubly-encoded +separator was decoded twice: `%252F` became `%2F` in `__init__`, then +`/` in `filename`, turning the single component `a%2Fb.whl` into +`a/b.whl`. + +Drop the second decode, and add a `join_within_directory` helper so the +download-path joins treat the name as a single path component. + +CVE: CVE-2026-13346 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pypa/pip/commit/10dfb6b9005484578b386f64b9f36982e3dc6679] + +Backport Changes: +- Adapted imports and download call sites to pip 24.0. +- Secured pip 24.0 separate BatchDownloader path. +- Omitted tests absent from the pip 24.0 source archive. + +(cherry picked from commit 10dfb6b9005484578b386f64b9f36982e3dc6679) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + news/14110.bugfix.rst | 1 + + src/pip/_internal/models/link.py | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++----- + src/pip/_internal/network/download.py | 20 +++++--- + src/pip/_internal/operations/prepare.py | 6 +-- + 4 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 news/14110.bugfix.rst + +diff --git a/news/14110.bugfix.rst b/news/14110.bugfix.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000..f7d4f7888 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/news/14110.bugfix.rst +@@ -0,0 +1 @@ ++Fix ``Link.filename`` decoding the URL path twice. +diff --git a/src/pip/_internal/models/link.py b/src/pip/_internal/models/link.py +index 73041b864..e4bd559bf 100644 +--- a/src/pip/_internal/models/link.py ++++ b/src/pip/_internal/models/link.py +@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from typing import ( + List, + Mapping, + NamedTuple, ++ NewType, + Optional, + Tuple, + Union, +@@ -36,6 +37,49 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING: + logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) + + ++# A single path component: percent-decoded once and reduced to a basename, so it ++# contains no path separator and is not a ``.`` or ``..`` reference. The empty ++# string means "no component". ++PathComponent = NewType("PathComponent", str) ++ ++ ++def _to_path_component(name: str) -> PathComponent: ++ """Reduce ``name`` to a single path component, or ``""`` if it has none. ++ ++ ``os.path.basename`` drops any directory part, drive letter, or separator; ++ a ``.``, ``..``, or empty result is not a component and becomes ``""``. ++ """ ++ name = os.path.basename(name) ++ if name in ("", os.curdir, os.pardir): ++ return PathComponent("") ++ ++ return PathComponent(name) ++ ++ ++def as_path_component(name: str) -> PathComponent: ++ """Like ``_to_path_component`` but reject the empty result. ++ ++ Use where a file is about to be written, so a missing name is an error ++ rather than a silent fallback to the directory itself. ++ """ ++ component = _to_path_component(name) ++ if not component: ++ raise ValueError(f"Unexpected file name derived from URL: {name!r}") ++ ++ return component ++ ++ ++def join_within_directory(directory: str, component: PathComponent) -> str: ++ """Join a single path ``component`` onto ``directory``. ++ ++ ``component`` is a :data:`PathComponent`, so by type it has no separator and ++ is not a ``.`` or ``..`` reference; the result can never escape ``directory``. ++ Requiring ``PathComponent`` rather than ``str`` lets the type checker enforce ++ at the call site that the name was reduced to a safe component beforehand. ++ """ ++ return os.path.join(directory, component) ++ ++ + # Order matters, earlier hashes have a precedence over later hashes for what + # we will pick to use. + _SUPPORTED_HASHES = ("sha512", "sha384", "sha256", "sha224", "sha1", "md5") +@@ -380,18 +424,13 @@ class Link(KeyBasedCompareMixin): + return self._url + + @property +- def filename(self) -> str: +- path = self.path.rstrip("/") +- name = posixpath.basename(path) +- if not name: +- # Make sure we don't leak auth information if the netloc +- # includes a username and password. +- netloc, user_pass = split_auth_from_netloc(self.netloc) +- return netloc +- +- name = urllib.parse.unquote(name) +- assert name, f"URL {self._url!r} produced no filename" +- return name ++ def filename(self) -> PathComponent: ++ name = _to_path_component(posixpath.basename(self.path.rstrip("/"))) ++ if name: ++ return name ++ ++ # No component in the path; fall back to the netloc, dropping any auth. ++ return _to_path_component(split_auth_from_netloc(self.netloc)[0]) + + @property + def file_path(self) -> str: +diff --git a/src/pip/_internal/network/download.py b/src/pip/_internal/network/download.py +index d1d43541e..3aec97e84 100644 +--- a/src/pip/_internal/network/download.py ++++ b/src/pip/_internal/network/download.py +@@ -11,7 +11,12 @@ from pip._vendor.requests.models import CONTENT_CHUNK_SIZE, Response + from pip._internal.cli.progress_bars import get_download_progress_renderer + from pip._internal.exceptions import NetworkConnectionError + from pip._internal.models.index import PyPI +-from pip._internal.models.link import Link ++from pip._internal.models.link import ( ++ Link, ++ PathComponent, ++ as_path_component, ++ join_within_directory, ++) + from pip._internal.network.cache import is_from_cache + from pip._internal.network.session import PipSession + from pip._internal.network.utils import HEADERS, raise_for_status, response_chunks +@@ -91,11 +96,14 @@ def parse_content_disposition(content_disposition: str, default_filename: str) - + return filename or default_filename + + +-def _get_http_response_filename(resp: Response, link: Link) -> str: ++def _get_http_response_filename(resp: Response, link: Link) -> PathComponent: + """Get an ideal filename from the given HTTP response, falling back to + the link filename if not provided. ++ ++ The result is validated as a single path component, so it can be joined onto ++ a download directory without escaping it. + """ +- filename = link.filename # fallback ++ filename: str = link.filename # fallback + # Have a look at the Content-Disposition header for a better guess + content_disposition = resp.headers.get("content-disposition") + if content_disposition: +@@ -109,7 +117,7 @@ def _get_http_response_filename(resp: Response, link: Link) -> str: + ext = os.path.splitext(resp.url)[1] + if ext: + filename += ext +- return filename ++ return as_path_component(filename) + + + def _http_get_download(session: PipSession, link: Link) -> Response: +@@ -140,7 +148,7 @@ class Downloader: + raise + + filename = _get_http_response_filename(resp, link) +- filepath = os.path.join(location, filename) ++ filepath = join_within_directory(location, filename) + + chunks = _prepare_download(resp, link, self._progress_bar) + with open(filepath, "wb") as content_file: +@@ -176,7 +184,7 @@ class BatchDownloader: + raise + + filename = _get_http_response_filename(resp, link) +- filepath = os.path.join(location, filename) ++ filepath = join_within_directory(location, filename) + + chunks = _prepare_download(resp, link, self._progress_bar) + with open(filepath, "wb") as content_file: +diff --git a/src/pip/_internal/operations/prepare.py b/src/pip/_internal/operations/prepare.py +index 956717d1e..0a9b39332 100644 +--- a/src/pip/_internal/operations/prepare.py ++++ b/src/pip/_internal/operations/prepare.py +@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ from pip._internal.exceptions import ( + from pip._internal.index.package_finder import PackageFinder + from pip._internal.metadata import BaseDistribution, get_metadata_distribution + from pip._internal.models.direct_url import ArchiveInfo +-from pip._internal.models.link import Link ++from pip._internal.models.link import Link, join_within_directory + from pip._internal.models.wheel import Wheel + from pip._internal.network.download import BatchDownloader, Downloader + from pip._internal.network.lazy_wheel import ( +@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ def _check_download_dir( + """Check download_dir for previously downloaded file with correct hash + If a correct file is found return its path else None + """ +- download_path = os.path.join(download_dir, link.filename) ++ download_path = join_within_directory(download_dir, link.filename) + + if not os.path.exists(download_path): + return None +@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ class RequirementPreparer: + # No distribution was downloaded for this requirement. + return + +- download_location = os.path.join(self.download_dir, link.filename) ++ download_location = join_within_directory(self.download_dir, link.filename) + if not os.path.exists(download_location): + shutil.copy(req.local_file_path, download_location) + download_path = display_path(download_location) +-- +2.35.6 +
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-pip_24.0.bb +1 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://no_shebang_mangling.patch \ file://CVE-2026-8643.patch \ file://CVE-2026-8643-regression_p1.patch \ file://CVE-2026-8643-regression_p2.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-13346.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ea9bd1a847e8c5774a5777bb398c19e80bcd4e2aa16a4b301b718fe6f593aba2"
PATCH 10/48 perl: Fix CVE-2026-19487
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]>
Backport fix for CVE-2026-19487 - AHO-CORASICK regex engine bug
Includes 5 regression test cases in t/re/re_tests.
Tested by running re/pat.t on qemux86-64 target:
1267/1267 tests passed (only pre-existing TODOs as expected failures).
NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19487
Upstream-commit: https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/1a21abacaf6f684928bae8baaa153733c8c238eb
--- .../perl/files/CVE-2026-19487.patch | 66 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.38.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-19487.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2026-19487.patch new file +66 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From 46014ec220989897d7ea53ccc780cea767cc0862 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yves Orton <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2025 10:06:10 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] regexec.c - Fix GH 22892 - AHO-CORASICK edge case issue + +In some circumstances the AHO-CORASICK logic wasn't matching properly +when there were two possibilities whose proper prefix matches a proper +suffix of a third possibilty, and one of those possibilities was shorter +than the other. + +This was because we were NOT resetting the 'failed' flag properly. +This bug must be rare because it took more than a decade for anyone +to notice. + +This patch fixes the problem by resetting the failed flag after a +successful transition. + +A good example of this problem is as follows: + + "ABCDE" =~ m/ABCF|BCDE|C/ + +This should match 'BCDE' and not 'C'. Because of the flag issue we were +matching 'C' instead. + +This fixes https://github.com/Perl/perl5/issues/22892 + +Note: t/re/re_tests hunk adjusted for 5.38.4 context (line numbers and +surrounding test data differ from upstream which targets a newer perl). + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/1a21abacaf6f684928bae8baaa153733c8c238eb] +CVE: CVE-2026-19487 +Signed-off-by: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]> +--- + regexec.c | 1 + + t/re/re_tests | 6 ++++++ + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/regexec.c b/regexec.c +index e96b622..1eb59bb 100644 +--- a/regexec.c ++++ b/regexec.c +@@ -3406,6 +3406,7 @@ S_find_byclass(pTHX_ regexp * prog, const regnode *c, char *s, + { + DEBUG_TRIE_EXECUTE_r( + Perl_re_printf( aTHX_ " - legal\n")); ++ failed = 0; + state = tmp; + break; + } +diff --git a/t/re/re_tests b/t/re/re_tests +index 10da625..eefa579 100644 +--- a/t/re/re_tests ++++ b/t/re/re_tests +@@ -2157,6 +2157,12 @@ AB\s+\x{100} AB \x{100}X y - - + /^(xa|(?:[Z=])*\1a){2}$/ xa=xaaa n - - # GH 10073 - RT72020 + /^(xa|(?:[Z=]|zzzz)*\1a){2}$/ xa=xaaa n - - # GH 10073 - RT72020 + ++ABCF|BCDE|C ABCDEX y $& BCDE - # GH 22892 - AHO-CORASICK bug ++ABCF|BCDE|C ABCDX y $& C - # GH 22892 - AHO-CORASICK bug ++ABCF|BCDE|C(G) ABCDE y $& BCDE - # GH 22892 - AHO-CORASICK bug ++ABCF|BCDE|C[Gg] ABCDE y $& BCDE - # GH 22892 - AHO-CORASICK bug ++ABCF|BCD[Ee]|C[Gg] ABCDE y $& BCDE - # GH 22892 - AHO-CORASICK bug ++ + # Keep these lines at the end of the file + # pat string y/n/etc expr expected-expr skip-reason comment + # vim: softtabstop=0 noexpandtab
meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.38.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.cpan.org/src/5.0/perl-${PV}.tar.gz;name=perl \ file://CVE-2026-57432-01.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57432-02.patch \ file://CVE-2025-40909.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-19487.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \ file://perl-configpm-switch.patch \
PATCH 11/48 vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73072
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Pick the patch from [1], also referenced in the NVD report [2].
[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/05c41c922309c7a11b6ec2f124be66551c90d66a
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73072
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-73072.patch | 64 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73072.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73072.patch new file +64 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From 05c41c922309c7a11b6ec2f124be66551c90d66a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2026 00:58:37 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0846: [security]: heap buffer overflow in + set_sofo() + +Problem: [security]: heap buffer overflow in set_sofo() + (Yazan Balawneh) +Solution: Reset sl_sal_first (Yasuhiro Matsumoto). + +A crafted spell file with an empty SN_SAL section before an SN_SOFO +section reaches set_sofo() with sl_sal_first[] already set to -1 by +set_sal_first(). The counting loop then under-counts colliding +multi-byte "from" characters, allocates an undersized list and writes +past its end. + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-9jqx-hgpr-6v64 + +Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-73072 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/05c41c922309c7a11b6ec2f124be66551c90d66a] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + src/spellfile.c | 4 +++- + src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim | 5 +++++ + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/spellfile.c b/src/spellfile.c +index b3ee9c0d63..a9f7e83752 100644 +--- a/src/spellfile.c ++++ b/src/spellfile.c +@@ -1433,7 +1433,9 @@ set_sofo(slang_T *lp, char_u *from, char_u *to) + gap->ga_len = 256; + + // First count the number of items for each list. Temporarily use +- // sl_sal_first[] for this. ++ // sl_sal_first[] for this. Reset it first: a preceding SN_SAL section ++ // may have set the entries to -1 via set_sal_first(). ++ vim_memset(lp->sl_sal_first, 0, sizeof(salfirst_T) * 256); + for (p = from, s = to; *p != NUL && *s != NUL; ) + { + c = mb_cptr2char_adv(&p); +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +index 3a93883b4d..0b0cf42066 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_spellfile.vim +@@ -319,6 +319,11 @@ func Test_spellfile_format_error() + " SN_SOFO: multi-byte characters in sofofrom and sofoto + call Spellfile_Test(0z0600000000080002CF810002CF82FF000000000000000000000000, '') + ++ " SN_SAL (empty) followed by SN_SOFO with two multi-byte 'from' characters ++ " sharing the same low byte. A preceding SN_SAL poisons sl_sal_first[], so ++ " without a reset set_sofo() under-counts and writes out of bounds. ++ call Spellfile_Test(0z05000000000300000006000000000A0004CAABCEAB00024142FF000000000000000000000000, '') ++ + " SN_COMPOUND: compmax is less than 2 + call Spellfile_Test(0z08000000000101, 'E759:') + +-- +2.34.1 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-59857.patch \ file://CVE-2026-59858.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57456.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-73072.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 12/48 vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73073
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Pick the patch from [1], also referenced in the NVD report [2].
[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/2f628d8104958fa7421664f792ca6d4f7a39a10f
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73073
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-73073.patch | 89 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73073.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73073.patch new file +89 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +From 2f628d8104958fa7421664f792ca6d4f7a39a10f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 09:11:42 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0845: [security]: arbitrary Ex command execution + during C omni-completion + +Problem: [security]: arbitrary Ex command execution during C + omni-completion (Threonine) +Solution: Match tags typeref literally to block Ex command injection + (Yasuhiro Matsumoto). + +Escaping only "/" and "\" left the typeref able to break out of the +:vimgrep pattern without a "/": an unclosed "[" makes vimgrep's pattern +skipping fail, and the parser then treats a following "|" as a command +separator, so the tag value runs as Ex commands during C omni-completion. +Match the field literally with \V so no regex metacharacter can affect +pattern parsing. + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-cx73-phcg-3j5g + +Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-73073 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/2f628d8104958fa7421664f792ca6d4f7a39a10f] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim | 5 ++++- + src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim b/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim +index 248d6f2e60..5a48581dcf 100644 +--- a/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim ++++ b/runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim +@@ -592,8 +592,11 @@ def StructMembers( # {{{1 + if complete_check() + return [] + endif ++ # Match "typename" literally (\V): escaping alone is not enough, as e.g. ++ # an unclosed "[" makes vimgrep's pattern skipping fail and the rest of ++ # the tag value is then parsed as Ex commands. + execute 'silent! keepjumps noautocmd ' +- .. n .. 'vimgrep ' .. '/\t' .. escape(typename, '/\') .. '\(\t\|$\)/j ' ++ .. n .. 'vimgrep ' .. '/\t\V' .. escape(typename, '/\') .. '\m\(\t\|$\)/j ' + .. fnames + + qflist = getqflist() +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim b/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim +index a635bd50bd..c1754d17c1 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_plugin_ccomplete.vim +@@ -31,6 +31,32 @@ func Test_ccomplete_no_exec_via_typeref() + unlet! g:ccomplete_injected + endfunc + ++" Escaping "/" and "\" is not enough: with no "/" in the payload, an unclosed ++" "[" makes vimgrep's pattern skipping fail, and the command parser then treats ++" the first "|" as a command separator. The typeref must be matched literally. ++func Test_ccomplete_no_exec_via_typeref_bracket() ++ CheckUnix ++ let sentinel = tempname() ++ call delete(sentinel) ++ let tagsfile = s:WriteTags([ ++ \ "myvar\tmain.c\t/^x$/;\"\tv\ttyperef:struct:[|call system('touch " .. sentinel .. "')|####", ++ \ ]) ++ ++ let save_tags = &tags ++ let &tags = tagsfile ++ ++ new ++ call ccomplete#Complete(1, '') ++ call ccomplete#Complete(0, 'myvar.x') ++ ++ call assert_false(filereadable(sentinel), ++ \ 'typeref field was executed as an Ex command during omni-completion') ++ ++ bwipe! ++ let &tags = save_tags ++ call delete(sentinel) ++endfunc ++ + " A legitimate typeref must still drive struct-member completion: escaping the + " field value must not break the normal path. + func Test_ccomplete_typeref_completion_still_works() +-- +2.50.1 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-59858.patch \ file://CVE-2026-57456.patch \ file://CVE-2026-73072.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-73073.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 13/48 vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73074
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Pick the patch from [1], also referenced in the NVD report [2].
[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/a9336b476fd1a182e3f79b5f83c0ffb04f8a922b
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73074
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-73074.patch | 101 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 102 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73074.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73074.patch new file +101 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +From a9336b476fd1a182e3f79b5f83c0ffb04f8a922b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:14:13 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0841: [security]: heap overflow when adding > 65535 + text properties + +Problem: [security]: heap overflow when adding > 65535 text properties + (Wang1rrr). +Solution: Verify that the number of text properties falls within the + limit (Yasuhiro Matsumoto). + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-hm4g-pjfx-m27j + +Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-73074 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/a9336b476fd1a182e3f79b5f83c0ffb04f8a922b] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + src/errors.h | 4 ++++ + src/po/vim.pot | 3 +++ + src/testdir/test_textprop.vim | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + src/textprop.c | 7 +++++++ + 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/errors.h b/src/errors.h +index 01ed16a035..5354e85f25 100644 +--- a/src/errors.h ++++ b/src/errors.h +@@ -3795,3 +3795,7 @@ EXTERN char e_socket_server_failed_connecting[] + EXTERN char e_socket_server_unavailable[] + INIT(= N_("E1567: Cannot start socket server, socket path is unavailable")); + #endif ++#ifdef FEAT_PROP_POPUP ++EXTERN char e_too_many_text_properties_on_a_single_line[] ++ INIT(= N_("E1580: Too many text properties on a single line")); ++#endif +diff --git a/src/po/vim.pot b/src/po/vim.pot +index be79cf0dab..100344e270 100644 +--- a/src/po/vim.pot ++++ b/src/po/vim.pot +@@ -8838,6 +8838,9 @@ msgstr "" + msgid "E1567: Cannot start socket server, socket path is unavailable" + msgstr "" + ++msgid "E1580: Too many text properties on a single line" ++msgstr "" ++ + #. type of cmdline window or 0 + #. result of cmdline window or 0 + #. buffer of cmdline window or NULL +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_textprop.vim b/src/testdir/test_textprop.vim +index b5c9f63f65..5a69ca75e7 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_textprop.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_textprop.vim +@@ -4781,4 +4781,22 @@ func Test_textprop_materialize_list() + call assert_equal([], prop_list(1, #{ids: 3->range()})) + endfunc + ++" Adding more than 65535 text properties to one line must be rejected instead ++" of wrapping the uint16_t property count and overflowing the allocation. ++func Test_prop_add_over_uint16_max() ++ CheckNotAsan ++ CheckNotValgrind ++ new ++ call setline(1, 'x') ++ call prop_type_add('overflow', {}) ++ for _ in range(0xffff) ++ call prop_add(1, 1, {'type': 'overflow', 'length': 0}) ++ endfor ++ call assert_equal(0xffff, prop_list(1)->len()) ++ call assert_fails("call prop_add(1, 1, {'type': 'overflow', 'length': 0})", 'E1580:') ++ call assert_equal(0xffff, prop_list(1)->len()) ++ call prop_type_delete('overflow') ++ bwipe! ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +diff --git a/src/textprop.c b/src/textprop.c +index a06605d3dd..1f06615dbc 100644 +--- a/src/textprop.c ++++ b/src/textprop.c +@@ -240,6 +240,13 @@ prop_add_one( + proplen = get_text_props(buf, lnum, &props, TRUE); + textlen = buf->b_ml.ml_line_len - proplen * sizeof(textprop_T); + ++ // prop_count is a uint16_t; stop before proplen + 1 wraps to zero. ++ if (proplen >= 0xffff) ++ { ++ emsg(_(e_too_many_text_properties_on_a_single_line)); ++ goto theend; ++ } ++ + if (lnum == start_lnum) + col = start_col; + else +-- +2.50.1 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-57456.patch \ file://CVE-2026-73072.patch \ file://CVE-2026-73073.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-73074.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 14/48 vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73077
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Pick the patch from [1], also referenced in the NVD report [2].
[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c5a82fe013e73c98004ad7cd4f906b1ad1ed610e
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73077
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-73077.patch | 96 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 97 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73077.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73077.patch new file +96 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From c5a82fe013e73c98004ad7cd4f906b1ad1ed610e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2026 19:13:15 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0839: [security]: arbitrary code execution via + keyword lookup + +Problem: [security]: arbitrary code execution via keyword lookup in + sh.vim, zsh.vim and ps1.vim filetype plugin + (manus-use) +Solution: For powershell, quote the commands using single quotes, for + sh/zsh pass the argument as a separate list item to term_start()/system() + (Yasuhiro Matsumoto). + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-r5v6-q6j8-8qw2 + +Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-73077 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c5a82fe013e73c98004ad7cd4f906b1ad1ed610e] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/ftplugin/ps1.vim | 5 +++-- + runtime/ftplugin/sh.vim | 5 +++-- + runtime/ftplugin/zsh.vim | 6 +++--- + 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/ftplugin/ps1.vim b/runtime/ftplugin/ps1.vim +index f1fe78df4c..9ff764a282 100644 +--- a/runtime/ftplugin/ps1.vim ++++ b/runtime/ftplugin/ps1.vim +@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ + " 2024 May 23 by Riley Bruins <[email protected]> ('commentstring') + " 2024 Sep 19 by Konfekt (simplify keywordprg #15696) + " 2025 Jul 22 by phanium (use :hor term #17822) ++" 2026 Jul 10 by Vim Project (quote K argument, prevent command injection) + + " Only do this when not done yet for this buffer + if exists("b:did_ftplugin") | finish | endif +@@ -52,9 +53,9 @@ endif + + if exists('s:pwsh_cmd') + if exists(':terminal') == 2 +- command! -buffer -nargs=1 GetHelp silent exe 'hor term ' . s:pwsh_cmd . ' -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -Command Get-Help -Full "<args>"' . (executable('less') ? ' | less' : '') ++ command! -buffer -nargs=1 GetHelp call term_start([s:pwsh_cmd, '-NoLogo', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-ExecutionPolicy', 'RemoteSigned', '-Command', "Get-Help -Full '" . substitute(<q-args>, "'", "''", 'g') . "'" . (executable('less') ? ' | less' : '')]) + else +- command! -buffer -nargs=1 GetHelp echo system(s:pwsh_cmd . ' -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -Command Get-Help -Full <args>') ++ command! -buffer -nargs=1 GetHelp echo system([s:pwsh_cmd, '-NoLogo', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-ExecutionPolicy', 'RemoteSigned', '-Command', "Get-Help -Full '" . substitute(<q-args>, "'", "''", 'g') . "'"]) + endif + setlocal keywordprg=:GetHelp + let b:undo_ftplugin ..= " | setl kp< | sil! delc -buffer GetHelp" +diff --git a/runtime/ftplugin/sh.vim b/runtime/ftplugin/sh.vim +index 18cd219cdc..45e6f44fcf 100644 +--- a/runtime/ftplugin/sh.vim ++++ b/runtime/ftplugin/sh.vim +@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ + " 2024 Dec 29 by Vim Project (improve setting shellcheck compiler) + " 2025 Mar 09 by Vim Project (set b:match_skip) + " 2025 Jul 22 by phanium (use :hor term #17822) ++" 2026 Jul 10 by Vim Project (pass K argument as a list, prevent shell injection) + + if exists("b:did_ftplugin") + finish +@@ -54,9 +55,9 @@ let s:is_kornshell = get(b:, "is_kornshell", get(g:, "is_kornshell", 0)) + + if s:is_bash + if exists(':terminal') == 2 +- command! -buffer -nargs=1 ShKeywordPrg silent exe ':hor term bash -c "help "<args>" 2>/dev/null || man "<args>""' ++ command! -buffer -nargs=1 ShKeywordPrg call term_start(['bash', '-c', 'help "$1" 2>/dev/null || man "$1"', '--', <q-args>]) + else +- command! -buffer -nargs=1 ShKeywordPrg echo system('bash -c "help <args>" 2>/dev/null || MANPAGER= man "<args>"') ++ command! -buffer -nargs=1 ShKeywordPrg echo system(['bash', '-c', 'help "$1" 2>/dev/null || MANPAGER= man "$1"', '--', <q-args>]) + endif + setlocal keywordprg=:ShKeywordPrg + let b:undo_ftplugin ..= " | setl kp< | sil! delc -buffer ShKeywordPrg" +diff --git a/runtime/ftplugin/zsh.vim b/runtime/ftplugin/zsh.vim +index 65e9f377bf..8ee71c4e17 100644 +--- a/runtime/ftplugin/zsh.vim ++++ b/runtime/ftplugin/zsh.vim +@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ let b:undo_ftplugin = "setl com< cms< fo< " + + if executable('zsh') && &shell !~# '/\%(nologin\|false\)$' + if exists(':terminal') == 2 +- command! -buffer -nargs=1 ZshKeywordPrg silent exe ':hor term zsh -c "autoload -Uz run-help; run-help <args>"' +- else +- command! -buffer -nargs=1 ZshKeywordPrg echo system('MANPAGER= zsh -c "autoload -Uz run-help; run-help <args> 2>/dev/null"') ++ command! -buffer -nargs=1 ZshKeywordPrg call term_start(['zsh', '-c', 'autoload -Uz run-help; run-help "$1"', '--', <q-args>]) ++ elseif has("patch-9.2.0250") ++ command! -buffer -nargs=1 ZshKeywordPrg echo system(['zsh', '-c', 'autoload -Uz run-help; MANPAGER= run-help "$1" 2>/dev/null', '--', <q-args>]) + endif + setlocal keywordprg=:ZshKeywordPrg + let b:undo_ftplugin .= '| setl keywordprg< | sil! delc -buffer ZshKeywordPrg' +-- +2.50.1 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-73072.patch \ file://CVE-2026-73073.patch \ file://CVE-2026-73074.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-73077.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 15/48 vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73078
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Pick the patch from [1], also referenced in the NVD report [2].
[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/29c6fd090d4520592f8be7d9ec81190edf25ef69
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73078
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-73078.patch | 94 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 95 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73078.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73078.patch new file +94 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 29c6fd090d4520592f8be7d9ec81190edf25ef69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 13:54:03 +0900 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0840: [security]: code injection in netrw via + bookmarks + +Problem: [security]: code injection in netrw via bookmarks and history + (David Carliez) +Solution: Escape the '|' explicitly (Yasuhiro Matsumoto) + +The bookmark and history menu builders interpolate paths into :execute'd +:menu commands using g:netrw_menu_escape, which did not escape the Ex +command separator '|'. A crafted path could break out of the :menu command +and run arbitrary Ex/shell commands when the menu was built or triggered. + +Add '|' to g:netrw_menu_escape for the menu names, escape the :e right-hand +side with fnameescape(), and quote the netrw#MakeTgt() argument with +string() instead of raw single-quote interpolation. + +Github Security Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-rcr7-f3wr-22r2 + +Signed-off-by: Yasuhiro Matsumoto <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-73078 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/29c6fd090d4520592f8be7d9ec81190edf25ef69] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim | 16 +++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +index 49ccebc07a..a3198dc689 100644 +--- a/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim ++++ b/runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim +@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ if has("win32") + else + call s:NetrwInit("g:netrw_glob_escape",'*[]?`{~$\') + endif +-call s:NetrwInit("g:netrw_menu_escape",'.&? \') ++call s:NetrwInit("g:netrw_menu_escape",'.&? \|') + call s:NetrwInit("s:netrw_map_escape","<|\n\r\\\<C-V>\"") + if has("gui_running") && (&enc == 'utf-8' || &enc == 'utf-16' || &enc == 'ucs-4') + let s:treedepthstring= "│ " +@@ -3734,13 +3734,14 @@ function s:NetrwBookmarkMenu() + if exists("g:netrw_bookmarklist") && g:netrw_bookmarklist != [] && g:netrw_dirhistmax > 0 + let cnt= 1 + for bmd in g:netrw_bookmarklist +- let bmd= escape(bmd,g:netrw_menu_escape) ++ let ebmd= escape(bmd,g:netrw_menu_escape) ++ let fbmd= escape(fnameescape(bmd),'|') + + " show bookmarks for goto menu +- exe 'sil! menu '.g:NetrwMenuPriority.".2.".cnt." ".g:NetrwTopLvlMenu.'Bookmarks.'.bmd.' :e '.bmd."\<cr>" ++ exe 'sil! menu '.g:NetrwMenuPriority.".2.".cnt." ".g:NetrwTopLvlMenu.'Bookmarks.'.ebmd.' :e '.fbmd."\<cr>" + + " show bookmarks for deletion menu +- exe 'sil! menu '.g:NetrwMenuPriority.".8.2.".cnt." ".g:NetrwTopLvlMenu.'Bookmarks\ and\ History.Bookmark\ Delete.'.bmd.' '.cnt."mB" ++ exe 'sil! menu '.g:NetrwMenuPriority.".8.2.".cnt." ".g:NetrwTopLvlMenu.'Bookmarks\ and\ History.Bookmark\ Delete.'.ebmd.' '.cnt."mB" + let cnt= cnt + 1 + endfor + +@@ -3756,7 +3757,8 @@ function s:NetrwBookmarkMenu() + let priority = g:netrw_dirhistcnt + histcnt + if exists("g:netrw_dirhist_{cnt}") + let histdir= escape(g:netrw_dirhist_{cnt},g:netrw_menu_escape) +- exe 'sil! menu '.g:NetrwMenuPriority.".3.".priority." ".g:NetrwTopLvlMenu.'History.'.histdir.' :e '.histdir."\<cr>" ++ let ehistdir= escape(fnameescape(g:netrw_dirhist_{cnt}),'|') ++ exe 'sil! menu '.g:NetrwMenuPriority.".3.".priority." ".g:NetrwTopLvlMenu.'History.'.histdir.' :e '.ehistdir."\<cr>" + endif + let first = 0 + let cnt = ( cnt - 1 ) % g:netrw_dirhistmax +@@ -7104,7 +7106,7 @@ function s:NetrwTgtMenu() + let tgtdict[bmd]= cnt + let ebmd= escape(bmd,g:netrw_menu_escape) + " show bookmarks for goto menu +- exe 'sil! menu <silent> '.g:NetrwMenuPriority.".19.1.".cnt." ".g:NetrwTopLvlMenu.'Targets.'.ebmd." :call netrw#MakeTgt('".bmd."')\<cr>" ++ exe 'sil! menu <silent> '.g:NetrwMenuPriority.".19.1.".cnt." ".g:NetrwTopLvlMenu.'Targets.'.ebmd." :call netrw#MakeTgt(".escape(string(bmd),'|').")\<cr>" + let cnt= cnt + 1 + endfor + endif +@@ -7122,7 +7124,7 @@ function s:NetrwTgtMenu() + endif + let tgtdict[histentry] = histcnt + let ehistentry = escape(histentry,g:netrw_menu_escape) +- exe 'sil! menu <silent> '.g:NetrwMenuPriority.".19.2.".priority." ".g:NetrwTopLvlMenu.'Targets.'.ehistentry." :call netrw#MakeTgt('".histentry."')\<cr>" ++ exe 'sil! menu <silent> '.g:NetrwMenuPriority.".19.2.".priority." ".g:NetrwTopLvlMenu.'Targets.'.ehistentry." :call netrw#MakeTgt(".escape(string(histentry),'|').")\<cr>" + endif + let histcnt = histcnt + 1 + endwhile +-- +2.50.1 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-73073.patch \ file://CVE-2026-73074.patch \ file://CVE-2026-73077.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-73078.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 16/48 cpio: patch CVE-2026-66485
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Pick patch mentioned in NVD CVE description.
(From OE-Core rev: c105fbf82e2f50b05dc680e0601bf0ea3198e58c)
--- meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.15.bb | 1 + .../cpio/files/CVE-2026-66485.patch | 210 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 211 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/cpio/files/CVE-2026-66485.patch
meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.15.bb +1 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=f27defe1e96c2e1ecd4e0c9be8967949" SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/cpio/cpio-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://run-ptest \ file://test.sh \ + file://CVE-2026-66485.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "efa50ef983137eefc0a02fdb51509d624b5e3295c980aa127ceee4183455499e"
meta/recipes-extended/cpio/files/CVE-2026-66485.patch new file +210 -0
210 lines not on this page · raw message
PATCH 17/48 cpio: patch CVE-2026-66484
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Pick patch mentioned in NVD CVE description.
(From OE-Core rev: a49025d54fe7723df999710e7a385aaeb42303a2)
--- meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.15.bb | 1 + .../cpio/files/CVE-2026-66484.patch | 28 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/cpio/files/CVE-2026-66484.patch
meta/recipes-extended/cpio/cpio_2.15.bb +1 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/cpio/cpio-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://run-ptest \ file://test.sh \ file://CVE-2026-66485.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-66484.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "efa50ef983137eefc0a02fdb51509d624b5e3295c980aa127ceee4183455499e"
meta/recipes-extended/cpio/files/CVE-2026-66484.patch new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From e2b9cbdd3354d2b1569b7390d1bc15c1930559ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sergey Poznyakoff <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2026 15:55:46 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] The --no-absolute-filenames option affects hard link targets + too. + +* src/tar.c (stash_tar_linkname): Apply cpio_safer_name_suffix. + +CVE: CVE-2026-66484 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/cpio.git/commit/?id=e2b9cbdd3354d2b1569b7390d1bc15c1930559ad] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + src/tar.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/tar.c b/src/tar.c +index 493f299..a1fc60a 100644 +--- a/src/tar.c ++++ b/src/tar.c +@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ stash_tar_linkname (char *linkname) + + strncpy (hold_tar_linkname, linkname, TARLINKNAMESIZE); + hold_tar_linkname[TARLINKNAMESIZE] = '\0'; ++ cpio_safer_name_suffix (hold_tar_linkname, true, !no_abs_paths_flag, ++ false); + return hold_tar_linkname; + } +
PATCH 18/48 wget: Fix CVE-2026-58470
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2],
using the commit shown in [1].
It also includes the upstream regression patch from commit
shown in [3] which changes all three Content-Range conversions to strtoll().
[1] https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/43d3ba9336bc94937e6fae2365c6ffd30c34ffcf
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58470
[3] https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/01ff771caac1958662ca8665eed2021ec386a7af
--- .../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58470-regression.patch | 48 +++++++++++ .../wget/wget/CVE-2026-58470.patch | 79 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 129 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58470-regression.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58470.patch
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58470-regression.patch new file +48 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 01ff771caac1958662ca8665eed2021ec386a7af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Tim=20R=C3=BChsen?= <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2026 19:45:21 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] * src/http.c (parse_content_range): Use strtoll instead of + strtol. + +CVE: CVE-2026-58470 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnuwget/wget/-/commit/01ff771caac1958662ca8665eed2021ec386a7af] + +(cherry picked from commit 01ff771caac1958662ca8665eed2021ec386a7af) +Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]> +--- + src/http.c | 6 +++--- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/http.c b/src/http.c +index e5e75ee695..8170a43c27 100644 +--- a/src/http.c ++++ b/src/http.c +@@ -949,7 +949,7 @@ parse_content_range (const char *hdr, wgint *first_byte_ptr, + return false; + + errno = 0; +- num = strtol(hdr, &end, 10); ++ num = strtoll(hdr, &end, 10); + if (errno == ERANGE) + return false; + hdr = end; +@@ -959,7 +959,7 @@ parse_content_range (const char *hdr, wgint *first_byte_ptr, + *first_byte_ptr = num; + + errno = 0; +- num = strtol(hdr, &end, 10); ++ num = strtoll(hdr, &end, 10); + if (errno == ERANGE) + return false; + hdr = end; +@@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ parse_content_range (const char *hdr, wgint *first_byte_ptr, + else + { + errno = 0; +- num = strtol(hdr, NULL, 10); ++ num = strtoll(hdr, NULL, 10); + if (errno == ERANGE) + return false; + } +-- +2.35.6
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-58470.patch new file +79 -0
79 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.21.4.bb +2 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/wget/wget-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2026-58471.patch \ file://CVE-2026-58472.patch \ file://CVE-2026-58472-regression.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-58470.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-58470-regression.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "81542f5cefb8faacc39bbbc6c82ded80e3e4a88505ae72ea51df27525bcde04c"
PATCH 19/48 gnutls: fix CVE-2026-5419
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Jakub Szczudlo (Nokia) <[email protected]>
Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-5419.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5419
Upstream fix:
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/1e627aa5ad95c6dc0518d94e9a009997b081a1ab
Tested with ptest
--- .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5419.patch | 247 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 248 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5419.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5419.patch new file +247 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +From 0ff1cf201404afc6b227f9ddfea376866770a9d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 09:16:30 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnutls_cipher_decrypt3: make PKCS#7 unpadding branch free + +This tries to make the logic of PKCS#7 padding removal constant-time, +by removing potential branching operations. + +CVE: CVE-2026-5419 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/1e627aa5ad95c6dc0518d94e9a009997b081a1ab] + +Backport Changes: +- Adjusted the upstream hunk to match the GnuTLS 3.8.4 code layout. +- Drop .gitignore from the backport. + +Reported-by: Doria Tang of Stony Brook University +Fixes: #1815 +Fixes: CVE-2026-5419 +Fixes: GNUTLS-SA-2026-04-29-13 +CVSS: 3.7 Low CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N +Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Jakub Szczudlo <[email protected]> + +--- + lib/crypto-api.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++------ + lib/libgnutls.map | 2 + + tests/Makefile.am | 2 +- + tests/pkcs7-pad.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tests/pkcs7-pad.c + +diff --git a/lib/crypto-api.c b/lib/crypto-api.c +index bb5c3ec..7ae0ef2 100644 +--- a/lib/crypto-api.c ++++ b/lib/crypto-api.c +@@ -497,6 +497,38 @@ error: + } + return ret; + } ++/* If succeeds, returns the number of padding bytes to be removed; ++ * zero otherwise. ++ */ ++unsigned int _gnutls_pkcs7_unpad(const uint8_t *block, unsigned int block_size) ++{ ++ uint8_t padding = block[block_size - 1]; ++ volatile unsigned int mask = ~0; ++ volatile unsigned int count = 0; ++ ++ /* Count consecutive PADDING bytes from the end, in a ++ * constant-time manner. ++ */ ++ for (size_t i = block_size; i > 0; i--) { ++ volatile unsigned int mask2; ++ ++ mask2 = -(unsigned int)(block[i - 1] == padding); ++ mask2 &= -(unsigned int)(count < padding); ++ ++ /* MASK is initially ~0 and will be flipped to 0 upon first ++ * non-padding bytes. ++ */ ++ mask &= mask2; ++ count += 1 & mask; ++ } ++ ++ /* PADDING == 0 is effectively excluded here, given COUNT ++ * will never be 0. ++ */ ++ mask = -(unsigned int)(count <= block_size); ++ mask &= -(unsigned int)(count == padding); ++ return count & mask; ++} + + /** + * gnutls_cipher_decrypt3: +@@ -532,22 +564,17 @@ int gnutls_cipher_decrypt3(gnutls_cipher_hd_t handle, const void *ctext, + if (_gnutls_cipher_type(h->ctx_enc.e) == CIPHER_BLOCK && + (flags & GNUTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)) { + uint8_t *p = ptext; +- uint8_t padding = p[*ptext_len - 1]; +- if (!padding || +- padding > _gnutls_cipher_get_block_size(h->ctx_enc.e)) { +- return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED); +- } +- /* Check that the prior bytes are all PADDING */ +- for (size_t i = *ptext_len - padding; i < *ptext_len; i++) { +- if (padding != p[*ptext_len - 1]) { +- return gnutls_assert_val( +- GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED); +- } +- } ++ size_t block_size = _gnutls_cipher_get_block_size(h->ctx_enc.e); ++ uint8_t *block = &p[*ptext_len - block_size]; ++ unsigned int padding = _gnutls_pkcs7_unpad(block, block_size); ++ volatile unsigned int mask; ++ ++ mask = -(unsigned int)(padding == 0); ++ ret = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED & mask; + *ptext_len -= padding; + } + +- return 0; ++ return ret; + } + + /** +diff --git a/lib/libgnutls.map b/lib/libgnutls.map +index b02babf..f269ff2 100644 +--- a/lib/libgnutls.map ++++ b/lib/libgnutls.map +@@ -1551,4 +1551,6 @@ GNUTLS_PRIVATE_3_4 { + _gnutls_pathbuf_append; + _gnutls_pathbuf_truncate; + _gnutls_pathbuf_deinit; ++ # needed by tests/pkcs7-pad ++ _gnutls_pkcs7_unpad; + } GNUTLS_3_4; +diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am +index f227e92..32c5335 100644 +--- a/tests/Makefile.am ++++ b/tests/Makefile.am +@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ ctests += mini-record-2 simple gnutls_hmac_fast set_pkcs12_cred cert certuniquei + x509cert-dntypes id-on-xmppAddr tls13-compat-mode ciphersuite-name \ + x509-upnconstraint xts-key-check cipher-padding pkcs7-verify-double-free \ + fips-rsa-sizes tls12-rehandshake-ticket pathbuf tls-force-ems \ +- psk-importer privkey-derive dh-compute2 ecdh-compute2 ++ psk-importer privkey-derive dh-compute2 ecdh-compute2 pkcs7-pad + + ctests += tls-channel-binding + +diff --git a/tests/pkcs7-pad.c b/tests/pkcs7-pad.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..d4c3798 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/pkcs7-pad.c +@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2026 Red Hat, Inc. ++ * ++ * This file is part of GnuTLS. ++ * ++ * GnuTLS is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it ++ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by ++ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or ++ * (at your option) any later version. ++ * ++ * GnuTLS is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but ++ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of ++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU ++ * General Public License for more details. ++ * ++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License ++ * along with GnuTLS. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. ++ */ ++ ++/* Test that _gnutls_pkcs7_unpad is branch-free, using valgrind */ ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H ++#include "config.h" ++#endif ++ ++#include <stdint.h> ++#include <string.h> ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_VALGRIND_MEMCHECK_H ++#include <valgrind/memcheck.h> ++#endif ++ ++#include "utils.h" ++ ++static inline void _gnutls_memory_mark_undefined(void *addr, size_t size) ++{ ++#ifdef HAVE_VALGRIND_MEMCHECK_H ++ if (RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) ++ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(addr, size); ++#endif ++} ++ ++static inline void _gnutls_memory_mark_defined(void *addr, size_t size) ++{ ++#ifdef HAVE_VALGRIND_MEMCHECK_H ++ if (RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) ++ VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(addr, size); ++#endif ++} ++ ++extern unsigned int _gnutls_pkcs7_unpad(const uint8_t *block, ++ unsigned int block_size); ++ ++static unsigned int wrap_pkcs7_unpad(uint8_t *block, unsigned int block_size) ++{ ++ unsigned int padding; ++ ++ _gnutls_memory_mark_undefined(block, block_size); ++ ++ padding = _gnutls_pkcs7_unpad(block, block_size); ++ ++ _gnutls_memory_mark_defined(block, block_size); ++ _gnutls_memory_mark_defined(&padding, sizeof(padding)); ++ ++ return padding; ++} ++ ++#define PAD 5 ++ ++void doit(void) ++{ ++ uint8_t block[16]; ++ unsigned int padding; ++ ++ memset(block, 0xFF, sizeof(block)); ++ memset(&block[sizeof(block) - PAD], PAD, PAD); ++ ++ padding = wrap_pkcs7_unpad(block, sizeof(block)); ++ if (padding != PAD) ++ fail("padding should be %d\n", PAD); ++ ++ /* The last padding byte exceeds the block size */ ++ block[sizeof(block) - 1] = sizeof(block) + 1; ++ padding = wrap_pkcs7_unpad(block, sizeof(block)); ++ if (padding != 0) ++ fail("padding should be 0\n"); ++ block[sizeof(block) - 1] = PAD; ++ ++ /* The last padding byte is zero */ ++ block[sizeof(block) - 1] = 0; ++ padding = wrap_pkcs7_unpad(block, sizeof(block)); ++ if (padding != 0) ++ fail("padding should be 0\n"); ++ block[sizeof(block) - 1] = PAD; ++ ++ /* The first padding byte is invalid */ ++ block[sizeof(block) - PAD] = PAD + 1; ++ padding = wrap_pkcs7_unpad(block, sizeof(block)); ++ if (padding != 0) ++ fail("padding should be 0\n"); ++ block[sizeof(block) - PAD] = PAD; ++ ++ /* The byte before the first padding equals to PAD */ ++ block[sizeof(block) - PAD - 1] = PAD; ++ padding = wrap_pkcs7_unpad(block, sizeof(block)); ++ if (padding != PAD) ++ fail("padding should be %d\n", PAD); ++ block[sizeof(block) - PAD - 1] = 0xFF; ++} +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar file://CVE-2026-42011_p2.patch \ file://CVE-2026-33846.patch \ file://CVE-2026-33845.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-5419.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2bea4e154794f3f00180fa2a5c51fe8b005ac7a31cd58bd44cdfa7f36ebc3a9b"
PATCH 20/48 curl: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-8458
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
CVE-2026-8458 allows a Negotiate-authenticated connection to be incorrectly reused for a request using a different SASL service name.
Scarthgap uses curl 8.7.1, which is within the affected version range. The vulnerable code path on Linux requires both Negotiate authentication and GSSAPI support, represented by the negotiate-auth and krb5 PACKAGECONFIG options.
The upstream fix [1] stores the SASL service name in struct Curl_creds and includes it in connection-reuse comparisons. However, struct Curl_creds was introduced by the credential-management rework in [2], after curl 8.7.1. Therefore, the security fix cannot be cleanly backported without introducing a substantial credential-management refactor.
Use a conditional CVE_STATUS as the least invasive solution. Report the CVE as unpatched when both krb5 and negotiate-auth are enabled. Otherwise, mark it not-applicable-config because the vulnerable GSSAPI-backed Negotiate implementation is not built. The default Scarthgap configuration enables negotiate-auth but does not enable krb5.
References:
[1] https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/5e99b73cf441d9c369768b9cd48b5389b9a2503d
[2] https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/8f71d0fde515aa4c68002477356c35bd79927729
[3] https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2026-8458.html
--- meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-0725] = "not-applicable-config: gzip decompression of conten CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-5025] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'openssl', 'not-applicable-config: applicable only with wolfssl','unpatched',d)}" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-10966] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'openssl', 'not-applicable-config: applicable only with wolfssl','unpatched',d)}" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-10536] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'nghttp2', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: applicable only with HTTP/2', d)}" +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-8458] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'krb5 negotiate-auth', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: applicable only with GSS-API-backed Negotiate authentication', d)}" inherit autotools pkgconfig binconfig multilib_header ptest
PATCH 21/48 vim: Fix CVE-2026-52858 regression
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Devansh Patel <[email protected]>
This patch fixes a regression introduced by the CVE-2026-52858 fix already carried by OE-Core in commit [1]. The original security fix added the g:pythoncomplete_allow_import opt-in, but the documented behavior was broken because vim was not imported in the completion class scope. This patch applies upstream Vim patch 9.2.0568 to restore that behavior.
[1] https://github.com/openembedded/openembedded-core/commit/1c08fa48b6765ace24a261ecf43f871e850cee88
[2] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/4b850457e12e1a678dd209f2868154f7553cbf8d
[3] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/868ad62cb8bf8038322eab2badd31bd98b02b9df
[4] https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-52mc-rq6p-rc7c
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-52858-regression.patch | 94 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 95 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-52858-regression.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-52858-regression.patch new file +94 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 8075209bb1e721ca89c2e7fd5d216d7fe2bd3ea6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: thinca <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 12:33:07 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0568: pythoncomplete: g:pythoncomplete_allow_import + had no effect + +Problem: The security patch 9.2.0561 added a vim.eval() call inside + Completer.evalsource() to honor g:pythoncomplete_allow_import. + But the 'vim' module is only imported inside the outer + vimcomplete() / vimpy3complete() function, not at the script's + top level, so referring to it from a Completer method raises + NameError. The surrounding bare 'except' silently swallows + the error and leaves allow_imports at 0, meaning the opt-in + never takes effect -- 'import os' (and any other + buffer-level import) is always skipped, no candidates are + produced for 'os.<...>' and + Test_popup_and_preview_autocommand() fails on the Windows + CI matrix (Linux skips the test because Python 2 is absent). +Solution: Re-import 'vim' at the top of evalsource() in both + pythoncomplete.vim and python3complete.vim so the eval reads + the global, and set g:pythoncomplete_allow_import = 1 in the + test (it is the opt-in intended for callers that trust the + buffer contents) (thinca). + +closes: #20386 + +CVE: CVE-2026-52858 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/868ad62cb8bf8038322eab2badd31bd98b02b9df] + +Backport Changes: +- Omitted src/version.c because the Scarthgap recipe remains at Vim 9.1.1683; + the upstream version-table hunk targets Vim 9.2 and conflicted during + cherry-pick, while the runtime and test changes applied unchanged. + +Signed-off-by: thinca <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit 868ad62cb8bf8038322eab2badd31bd98b02b9df) +Signed-off-by: Devansh Patel <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim | 3 +++ + runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim | 3 +++ + src/testdir/test_popup.vim | 4 ++++ + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim b/runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim +index a0314242b..bdabf62c8 100644 +--- a/runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim ++++ b/runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim +@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ class Completer(object): + self.parser = PyParser() + + def evalsource(self,text,line=0): ++ # vim is imported locally in vimpy3complete(); re-import here so the ++ # vim.eval() below works (otherwise NameError, silently caught). ++ import vim + sc = self.parser.parse(text,line) + try: allow_imports = int( + vim.eval("get(g:, 'pythoncomplete_allow_import', 0)")) +diff --git a/runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim b/runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim +index 39b1efd29..761488244 100644 +--- a/runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim ++++ b/runtime/autoload/pythoncomplete.vim +@@ -172,6 +172,9 @@ class Completer(object): + self.parser = PyParser() + + def evalsource(self,text,line=0): ++ # vim is imported locally in vimcomplete(); re-import here so the ++ # vim.eval() below works (otherwise NameError, silently caught). ++ import vim + sc = self.parser.parse(text,line) + try: allow_imports = int( + vim.eval("get(g:, 'pythoncomplete_allow_import', 0)")) +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_popup.vim b/src/testdir/test_popup.vim +index fac2a7592..55c2f232d 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_popup.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_popup.vim +@@ -723,6 +723,9 @@ func Test_popup_and_preview_autocommand() + au! + au BufAdd * nested tab sball + augroup END ++ " Let pythoncomplete follow the buffer's 'import os' (off by default ++ " since v9.2.0561) so 'os.' can be completed. ++ let g:pythoncomplete_allow_import = 1 + set omnifunc=pythoncomplete#Complete + call setline(1, 'import os') + " make the line long +@@ -745,6 +748,7 @@ func Test_popup_and_preview_autocommand() + augroup END + augroup! MyBufAdd + bw! ++ unlet g:pythoncomplete_allow_import + endfunc + + func s:run_popup_and_previewwindow_dump(lines, dumpfile)
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-46483.patch \ file://CVE-2026-28420.patch \ file://CVE-2026-52858.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-52858-regression.patch \ file://CVE-2026-52859.patch \ file://CVE-2026-52860.patch \ file://CVE-2026-28422.patch \
PATCH 22/48 improve_kernel_cve_report: validate that cve details field exists
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Daniel Turull <[email protected]>
Check if the cve information has the details field to avoid crashing
--- scripts/contrib/improve_kernel_cve_report.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/contrib/improve_kernel_cve_report.py +1 -1
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ def cve_update(cve_data, cve, entry): if entry['status'] == "Unpatched" and cve_data[cve]['status'] == "Patched": # Backported-patch (e.g. vendor kernel repo with cherry-picked CVE patch) # has priority over unpatch from CNA - if cve_data[cve]['detail'] == "backported-patch": + if "detail" in cve_data and cve_data[cve]['detail'] == "backported-patch": return logging.warning("CVE entry %s update from Patched to Unpatched from the scan result", cve) cve_data[cve] = copy_data(cve_data[cve], entry)
PATCH 23/48 improve_kernel_cve_report: fix backported-patch check
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hiago De Franco <[email protected]>
The guard added in 80ff4903ea tests "detail" in cve_data, but cve_data is keyed by CVE id, so it asks whether a CVE literally named "detail" was scanned. That is never true, the condition short-circuits, and the guard never runs: a CVE_STATUS[CVE-...] = "backported-patch" set for a vendor cherry-picked patch is silently overwritten to Unpatched by the CNA.
Use .get() on the entry instead. Guard the fallthrough warning the same way, it makes the same assumption.
Tested against a qemuarm64 linux-yocto report (6.6.142+git, 16221 entries, 4313 of them with no detail). Current master and this version produce identical output, 18773 entries with no difference. Adding CVE_STATUS[CVE-2024-42067] = "backported-patch" to that report then makes the only difference between them: master overwrites it to Unpatched, this version keeps it Patched. The pre-80ff4903ea code aborts on the same report with "KeyError: 'detail'".
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
--- scripts/contrib/improve_kernel_cve_report.py | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
scripts/contrib/improve_kernel_cve_report.py +2 -2
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ def cve_update(cve_data, cve, entry): if entry['status'] == "Unpatched" and cve_data[cve]['status'] == "Patched": # Backported-patch (e.g. vendor kernel repo with cherry-picked CVE patch) # has priority over unpatch from CNA - if "detail" in cve_data and cve_data[cve]['detail'] == "backported-patch": + if cve_data[cve].get('detail') == "backported-patch": return logging.warning("CVE entry %s update from Patched to Unpatched from the scan result", cve) cve_data[cve] = copy_data(cve_data[cve], entry)
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ def cve_update(cve_data, cve, entry): logging.debug("CVE entry %s updated from Unpatched to Ignored", cve) return logging.warning("Unhandled CVE entry update for %s %s from %s %s to %s", - cve, cve_data[cve]['status'], cve_data[cve]['detail'], entry['status'], entry['detail']) + cve, cve_data[cve]['status'], cve_data[cve].get('detail'), entry['status'], entry['detail']) def main(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
PATCH 24/48 libxfont: Fix CVE-2026-56001
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
Pick patch according to [2]
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56001
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-56001
--- .../xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56001.patch | 87 +++++++++++++++++++ .../xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb | 3 + 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56001.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56001.patch new file +87 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +From be0b08e2d354138d3222b4490e2a77c6ee42f778 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 16:46:10 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] bitscale: fix integer overflow in BitmapScaleBitmaps + bytestoalloc + +bytestoalloc is declared as unsigned int (32-bit). When the sum of +per-glyph byte counts exceeds 2^32, the value wraps around and calloc() +allocates a buffer that is too small. The subsequent ScaleBitmap loop +then writes past the end of the allocated buffer. + +Change bytestoalloc from unsigned int to size_t to match the actual +allocation size type, and add an explicit overflow check in the +accumulation loop to bail out if the total would exceed SIZE_MAX. + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Anonymous working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative + +CVE-2026-56001/ZDI-CAN-30558 + +Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> +Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/merge_requests/34> + +Note: 'SIZE_MAX' is defined in header '<stdint.h>'. Add '#include +<stdint.h>' to fix build failure. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian libxfont1 1.5.2-4+deb9u1 +Upstream commit https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/commit/be0b08e2d354138d3222b4490e2a77c6ee42f778] +CVE: CVE-2026-56001 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + src/bitmap/bitscale.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/bitmap/bitscale.c b/src/bitmap/bitscale.c +index 13ed924..32144d6 100644 +--- a/src/bitmap/bitscale.c ++++ b/src/bitmap/bitscale.c +@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ from The Open Group. + #include <X11/fonts/bitmap.h> + #include <X11/fonts/fontutil.h> + #include <math.h> ++#include <stdint.h> + + #ifndef MAX + #define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b)) ? a : b) +@@ -1459,7 +1460,7 @@ BitmapScaleBitmaps(FontPtr pf, /* scaled font */ + opci; + FontInfoPtr pfi; + int glyph; +- unsigned bytestoalloc = 0; ++ size_t bytestoalloc = 0; + int firstCol, lastCol, firstRow, lastRow; + + double xform[4], inv_xform[4]; +@@ -1486,8 +1487,25 @@ BitmapScaleBitmaps(FontPtr pf, /* scaled font */ + glyph = pf->glyph; + for (i = 0; i < nchars; i++) + { +- if ((pci = ACCESSENCODING(bitmapFont->encoding, i))) +- bytestoalloc += BYTES_FOR_GLYPH(pci, glyph); ++ if ((pci = ACCESSENCODING(bitmapFont->encoding, i))) { ++ size_t glyphsize = BYTES_FOR_GLYPH(pci, glyph); ++ if (bytestoalloc > SIZE_MAX - glyphsize) { ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "Error: bitmap allocation overflow for scaled font\n"); ++ goto bail; ++ } ++ bytestoalloc += glyphsize; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* Reject unreasonably large bitmap allocations that could result ++ * from malicious fonts with extreme scale factors. 256 MiB is ++ * far beyond any legitimate scaled bitmap font. */ ++#define BITMAP_SCALE_MAX_ALLOC (256 * 1024 * 1024) ++ if (bytestoalloc > BITMAP_SCALE_MAX_ALLOC) { ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "Error: scaled bitmap size %zu exceeds limit\n", bytestoalloc); ++ goto bail; + } + + /* Do we add the font malloc stuff for VALUE ADDED ? */ +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb +3 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ XORG_EXT = "tar.bz2" BBCLASSEXTEND = "native" +SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-56001.patch \ + " + SRC_URI[md5sum] = "16eaf156edd79b68038b6a7c44aa9e9b" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1a7f7490774c87f2052d146d1e0e64518d32e6848184a18654e8d0bb57883242"
PATCH 25/48 libxfont: Fix CVE-2026-56002
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
Pick patch according to [2]
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56002
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-56002
--- .../xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56002.patch | 150 ++++++++++++++++++ .../xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56002.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56002.patch new file +150 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +From b4389e0b1d84a690b819bb27b1439968811a3674 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 16:48:40 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] pcfread: validate bitmap sizes and offsets against per-glyph + metrics + +pcfReadFont() uses bitmapSizes[] read directly from the PCF file to +allocate the repadded bitmap buffer. However, per-glyph metrics (also +from the file) control how much data RepadBitmap() writes. A malicious +PCF font can declare a small bitmapSizes[] value while having per-glyph +metrics that require more space, causing a heap buffer overflow. + +A similar issue happens with the encoding offsets: pcfReadFont reads +encoding offsets from the PCF file and uses them to index into the +metrics array without bounds checking. A crafted font can set an +encoding offset larger than nmetrics, causing an out-of-bounds pointer +that is later dereferenced when glyphs are accessed through the encoding +table. + +And the no-repad bitmap path (when PCF_GLYPH_PAD matches the requested +glyph pad) only validated that each glyph's offset was within the bitmap +buffer, but did not check that the full glyph extent (offset + +BYTES_PER_ROW * height) fits within the buffer. A crafted font with a +glyph offset near the end of a small bitmap buffer but large glyph +metrics causes a heap buffer over-read when the glyph is later rendered. + +This vulnerability was discovered by: + Anonymous working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative + +CVE-2026-56002/ZDI-CAN-30559 + +Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> +Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/merge_requests/34> + +Note: 'INT_MAX' is defined in header '<limits.h>'. Add '#include +<limits.h>' to fix build failure. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian libxfont1 1.5.2-4+deb9u1 +Upstream commit https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/commit/b4389e0b1d84a690b819bb27b1439968811a3674] +CVE: CVE-2026-56002 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + src/bitmap/pcfread.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/bitmap/pcfread.c b/src/bitmap/pcfread.c +index 4a372c5..0cc9777 100644 +--- a/src/bitmap/pcfread.c ++++ b/src/bitmap/pcfread.c +@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ from The Open Group. + #include <stdarg.h> + #include <stdint.h> + #include <string.h> ++#include <limits.h> + + void + pcfError(const char* message, ...) +@@ -529,25 +530,74 @@ pcfReadFont(FontPtr pFont, FontFilePtr file, + int old, + new; + xCharInfo *metric; ++ int srcPad = PCF_GLYPH_PAD(format); + +- sizepadbitmaps = bitmapSizes[PCF_SIZE_TO_INDEX(glyph)]; +- padbitmaps = malloc(sizepadbitmaps); ++ /* Compute the actual required size from per-glyph metrics instead ++ * of trusting the file's bitmapSizes[] value, which may be smaller ++ * than the actual data written by RepadBitmap. */ ++ sizepadbitmaps = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < nbitmaps; i++) { ++ int w, h, glyphBytes; ++ metric = &metrics[i].metrics; ++ w = metric->rightSideBearing - metric->leftSideBearing; ++ h = metric->ascent + metric->descent; ++ glyphBytes = BYTES_PER_ROW(w, glyph) * h; ++ if (glyphBytes < 0 || (glyphBytes > 0 && sizepadbitmaps > INT_MAX - glyphBytes)) { ++ pcfError("pcfReadFont(): bitmap size overflow\n"); ++ goto Bail; ++ } ++ sizepadbitmaps += glyphBytes; ++ } ++ padbitmaps = malloc(sizepadbitmaps ? sizepadbitmaps : 1); + if (!padbitmaps) { + pcfError("pcfReadFont(): Couldn't allocate padbitmaps (%d)\n", sizepadbitmaps); + goto Bail; + } + new = 0; + for (i = 0; i < nbitmaps; i++) { ++ int srcGlyphBytes; ++ + old = offsets[i]; + metric = &metrics[i].metrics; ++ ++ /* Validate source offset and source glyph size against the ++ * source bitmap buffer to prevent out-of-bounds reads. */ ++ srcGlyphBytes = BYTES_PER_ROW( ++ metric->rightSideBearing - metric->leftSideBearing, ++ srcPad) * (metric->ascent + metric->descent); ++ if (old < 0 || old > sizebitmaps || ++ srcGlyphBytes < 0 || srcGlyphBytes > sizebitmaps - old) { ++ pcfError("pcfReadFont(): bitmap offset/size out of bounds\n"); ++ free(padbitmaps); ++ goto Bail; ++ } ++ + offsets[i] = new; + new += RepadBitmap(bitmaps + old, padbitmaps + new, +- PCF_GLYPH_PAD(format), glyph, ++ srcPad, glyph, + metric->rightSideBearing - metric->leftSideBearing, + metric->ascent + metric->descent); + } + free(bitmaps); + bitmaps = padbitmaps; ++ } else { ++ /* Validate offsets and full glyph extents against bitmap buffer */ ++ for (i = 0; i < nbitmaps; i++) { ++ int glyphBytes; ++ xCharInfo *metric = &metrics[i].metrics; ++ ++ glyphBytes = BYTES_PER_ROW( ++ metric->rightSideBearing - metric->leftSideBearing, ++ glyph) * (metric->ascent + metric->descent); ++ if (offsets[i] >= (CARD32)sizebitmaps || ++ glyphBytes < 0 || ++ glyphBytes > sizebitmaps - (int)offsets[i]) { ++ pcfError("pcfReadFont(): bitmap offset/size out of bounds " ++ "(offset %u, size %d, total %d)\n", ++ offsets[i], glyphBytes, sizebitmaps); ++ goto Bail; ++ } ++ } + } + for (i = 0; i < nbitmaps; i++) + metrics[i].bits = bitmaps + offsets[i]; +@@ -622,6 +672,10 @@ pcfReadFont(FontPtr pFont, FontFilePtr file, + if (IS_EOF(file)) goto Bail; + if (encodingOffset == 0xFFFF) { + pFont->info.allExist = FALSE; ++ } else if (encodingOffset >= nmetrics) { ++ pcfError("pcfReadFont(): encoding offset %d out of range (nmetrics=%d)\n", ++ encodingOffset, nmetrics); ++ goto Bail; + } else { + if(!encoding[SEGMENT_MAJOR(i)]) { + encoding[SEGMENT_MAJOR(i)]= +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ XORG_EXT = "tar.bz2" BBCLASSEXTEND = "native" SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-56001.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-56002.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "16eaf156edd79b68038b6a7c44aa9e9b"
PATCH 26/48 libxfont: Fix CVE-2026-56003
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
Pick patch according to [2]
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56003
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-56003
--- .../xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56003.patch | 114 ++++++++++++++++++ .../xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56003.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56003.patch new file +114 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +From dff957a5158da038a282a59a31fe736702732939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 16:49:55 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH] bitscale: add bounds check to computeProps for property + buffer + +ComputeScaledProperties allocates a fixed-size property buffer of 70 +slots. computeProps iterates the source font's properties and writes 1 +slot for unscaled properties or 2 slots for scaledX/scaledY properties, +with no bounds check. A malicious font with many duplicate properties +matching fontPropTable entries can overflow the allocated buffer. + +Fix this by passing the remaining buffer capacity to computeProps and +checking it before each write. Properties that would exceed the buffer +are silently skipped. + +The function is also restructured to handle the buffer writes for +scaledX/scaledY inside the switch cases directly, rather than in a +separate block after the switch. This makes the control flow clearer and +ensures the bounds check covers all writes. + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Anonymous working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative + +CVE-2026-56003/ZDI-CAN-30560 + +Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 +Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]> +Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/merge_requests/34> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/commit/dff957a5158da038a282a59a31fe736702732939] +CVE: CVE-2026-56003 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + src/bitmap/bitscale.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------- + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/bitmap/bitscale.c b/src/bitmap/bitscale.c +index 32144d6..2affc11 100644 +--- a/src/bitmap/bitscale.c ++++ b/src/bitmap/bitscale.c +@@ -513,7 +513,8 @@ static int + computeProps(FontPropPtr pf, char *wasStringProp, + FontPropPtr npf, char *isStringProp, + unsigned int nprops, double xfactor, double yfactor, +- double sXfactor, double sYfactor) ++ double sXfactor, double sYfactor, ++ int maxprops) + { + int n; + int count; +@@ -528,14 +529,26 @@ computeProps(FontPropPtr pf, char *wasStringProp, + + switch (t->type) { + case scaledX: +- npf->value = doround(xfactor * (double)pf->value); +- rawfactor = sXfactor; +- break; + case scaledY: +- npf->value = doround(yfactor * (double)pf->value); +- rawfactor = sYfactor; ++ if (count + 2 > maxprops) ++ continue; ++ npf->value = (t->type == scaledX) ++ ? doround(xfactor * (double)pf->value) ++ : doround(yfactor * (double)pf->value); ++ rawfactor = (t->type == scaledX) ? sXfactor : sYfactor; ++ npf->name = pf->name; ++ npf++; ++ count++; ++ npf->value = doround(rawfactor * (double)pf->value); ++ npf->name = rawFontPropTable[t - fontPropTable].atom; ++ npf++; ++ count++; ++ *isStringProp++ = *wasStringProp; ++ *isStringProp++ = *wasStringProp; + break; + case unscaled: ++ if (count + 1 > maxprops) ++ continue; + npf->value = pf->value; + npf->name = pf->name; + npf++; +@@ -545,18 +558,6 @@ computeProps(FontPropPtr pf, char *wasStringProp, + default: + break; + } +- if (t->type != unscaled) +- { +- npf->name = pf->name; +- npf++; +- count++; +- npf->value = doround(rawfactor * (double)pf->value); +- npf->name = rawFontPropTable[t - fontPropTable].atom; +- npf++; +- count++; +- *isStringProp++ = *wasStringProp; +- *isStringProp++ = *wasStringProp; +- } + } + return count; + } +@@ -671,7 +672,7 @@ ComputeScaledProperties(FontInfoPtr sourceFontInfo, /* the font to be scaled */ + n = NPROPS; + n += computeProps(sourceFontInfo->props, sourceFontInfo->isStringProp, + fp, isStringProp, sourceFontInfo->nprops, dx, dy, +- sdx, sdy); ++ sdx, sdy, nProps - NPROPS); + return n; + } + +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ BBCLASSEXTEND = "native" SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-56001.patch \ file://CVE-2026-56002.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-56003.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "16eaf156edd79b68038b6a7c44aa9e9b"
PATCH 27/48 golang: fix homepage
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Leading space leads to SPDX document validation errors in some tools.
Example:
SchemaError: \" http://golang.org/\" is not valid under any of the schemas listed in the 'anyOf' keyword
(components -> ... -> externalReferences -> 0 -> url)
(From OE-Core rev: cbf36f436b477d81b58ff605846a2482308aefa)
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-binary-native_1.22.12.bb | 2 +- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-common.inc | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-binary-native_1.22.12.bb +1 -1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # This recipe is for bootstrapping our go-cross from a prebuilt binary of Go from golang.org. SUMMARY = "Go programming language compiler (upstream binary for bootstrap)" -HOMEPAGE = " http://golang.org/" +HOMEPAGE = "http://golang.org/" LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=5d4950ecb7b26d2c5e4e7b4e0dd74707"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-common.inc +1 -1
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ DESCRIPTION = " The Go programming language is an open source project to make \ fast, statically typed, compiled language that feels like a\ dynamically typed, interpreted language." -HOMEPAGE = " http://golang.org/" +HOMEPAGE = "http://golang.org/" LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause" inherit goarch
PATCH 28/48 python3-certifi: fix homepage
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Leading space leads to SPDX document validation errors in some tools.
Example:
SchemaError: \" http://certifi.io/\" is not valid under any of the schemas listed in the 'anyOf' keyword
(components -> ... -> externalReferences -> 0 -> url)
(From OE-Core rev: ee556d1e1cc16327e0a11207e90ac61d9f1577f3)
--- meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-certifi_2024.2.2.bb | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-certifi_2024.2.2.bb +1 -1
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ SUMMARY = "Python package for providing Mozilla's CA Bundle." DESCRIPTION = "This installable Python package contains a CA Bundle that you can reference in your \ Python code. This is useful for verifying HTTP requests, for example. This is the same CA Bundle \ which ships with the Requests codebase, and is derived from Mozilla Firefox's canonical set." -HOMEPAGE = " http://certifi.io/" +HOMEPAGE = "http://certifi.io/" LICENSE = "ISC" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=11618cb6a975948679286b1211bd573c"
PATCH 29/48 gcc: Upgrade to GCC 13.5
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hemanth Kumar M D <[email protected]>
This is a bugfix release in GCC-13 release series with 266 bugfixes
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/buglist.cgi?bug_status=RESOLVED&resolution=FIXED&target_milestone=13.5
Docs: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/13.5.0/
Dropped the following patches:
0028-libcody-Make-it-buildable-by-C-11-to-C-26.patch
https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/commit/51b9a0f7dfd2441a30e0ebfd4b30f18f86b4ea54
0029-build-Remove-INCLUDE_MEMORY-PR117737.patch
https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/commit/9239757a9c6e3a6e8d94d56803329d556ec914d7
0030-build-Move-sstream-include-above-safe-ctype.h-PR1177.patch
https://github.com/gcc-mirror/gcc/commit/9239757a9c6e3a6e8d94d56803329d556ec914d7
GCC 13.4 GCC 13.5 Diff
No. of expected passes 179388 179928 +540 No. of unexpected failures 26 27 +1 No. of expected failures 1416 1416 0 No. of unsupported tests 2230 2241 +11
---
meta/conf/distro/include/maintainers.inc | 2 +-
.../gcc/{gcc-13.4.inc => gcc-13.5.inc} | 9 +-
...ian_13.4.bb => gcc-cross-canadian_13.5.bb} | 0
.../{gcc-cross_13.4.bb => gcc-cross_13.5.bb} | 0
...-crosssdk_13.4.bb => gcc-crosssdk_13.5.bb} | 0
...cc-runtime_13.4.bb => gcc-runtime_13.5.bb} | 0
...itizers_13.4.bb => gcc-sanitizers_13.5.bb} | 0
...{gcc-source_13.4.bb => gcc-source_13.5.bb} | 0
...dy-Make-it-buildable-by-C-11-to-C-26.patch | 257 ------------------
...build-Remove-INCLUDE_MEMORY-PR117737.patch | 46 ----
...am-include-above-safe-ctype.h-PR1177.patch | 54 ----
.../gcc/{gcc_13.4.bb => gcc_13.5.bb} | 0
...initial_13.4.bb => libgcc-initial_13.5.bb} | 0
.../gcc/{libgcc_13.4.bb => libgcc_13.5.bb} | 0
...ibgfortran_13.4.bb => libgfortran_13.5.bb} | 0
15 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 364 deletions(-)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-13.4.inc => gcc-13.5.inc} (93%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-cross-canadian_13.4.bb => gcc-cross-canadian_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-cross_13.4.bb => gcc-cross_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-crosssdk_13.4.bb => gcc-crosssdk_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-runtime_13.4.bb => gcc-runtime_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-sanitizers_13.4.bb => gcc-sanitizers_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc-source_13.4.bb => gcc-source_13.5.bb} (100%)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0028-libcody-Make-it-buildable-by-C-11-to-C-26.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0029-build-Remove-INCLUDE_MEMORY-PR117737.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0030-build-Move-sstream-include-above-safe-ctype.h-PR1177.patch
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{gcc_13.4.bb => gcc_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{libgcc-initial_13.4.bb => libgcc-initial_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{libgcc_13.4.bb => libgcc_13.5.bb} (100%)
rename meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/{libgfortran_13.4.bb => libgfortran_13.5.bb} (100%)meta/conf/distro/include/maintainers.inc +1 -1
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ RECIPE_MAINTAINER:pn-gcc-cross-canadian-${TRANSLATED_TARGET_ARCH} = "Khem Raj <r RECIPE_MAINTAINER:pn-gcc-crosssdk-${SDK_SYS} = "Khem Raj <[email protected]>" RECIPE_MAINTAINER:pn-gcc-runtime = "Khem Raj <[email protected]>" RECIPE_MAINTAINER:pn-gcc-sanitizers = "Khem Raj <[email protected]>" -RECIPE_MAINTAINER:pn-gcc-source-13.4.0 = "Khem Raj <[email protected]>" +RECIPE_MAINTAINER:pn-gcc-source-13.5.0 = "Khem Raj <[email protected]>" RECIPE_MAINTAINER:pn-gconf = "Ross Burton <[email protected]>" RECIPE_MAINTAINER:pn-gcr = "Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]>" RECIPE_MAINTAINER:pn-gdb = "Khem Raj <[email protected]>"
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-13.5.inc renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-13.4.inc +3 -6
@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ require gcc-common.inc # Third digit in PV should be incremented after a minor release -PV = "13.4.0" +PV = "13.5.0" # BINV should be incremented to a revision after a minor gcc release -BINV = "13.4.0" +BINV = "13.5.0" FILESEXTRAPATHS =. "${FILE_DIRNAME}/gcc:${FILE_DIRNAME}/gcc/backport:"
@@ -66,11 +66,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${BASEURI} \ file://0024-Avoid-hardcoded-build-paths-into-ppc-libgcc.patch \ file://0025-gcc-testsuite-tweaks-for-mips-OE.patch \ file://0027-Fix-gcc-vect-module-testcases.patch \ - file://0028-libcody-Make-it-buildable-by-C-11-to-C-26.patch \ - file://0029-build-Remove-INCLUDE_MEMORY-PR117737.patch \ - file://0030-build-Move-sstream-include-above-safe-ctype.h-PR1177.patch \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9c4ce6dbb040568fdc545588ac03c5cbc95a8dbf0c7aa490170843afb59ca8f5" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ec3df0015ed01411f91f9a9cd5b4da3070eb1222b02fadf4133c30c090399855" S = "${TMPDIR}/work-shared/gcc-${PV}-${PR}/${SOURCEDIR}" B = "${WORKDIR}/gcc-${PV}/build.${HOST_SYS}.${TARGET_SYS}"
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-cross-canadian_13.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-cross-canadian_13.4.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-cross_13.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-cross_13.4.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-crosssdk_13.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-crosssdk_13.4.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-runtime_13.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-runtime_13.4.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-sanitizers_13.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-sanitizers_13.4.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-source_13.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-source_13.4.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0028-libcody-Make-it-buildable-by-C-11-to-C-26.patch deleted +0 -257
257 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0029-build-Remove-INCLUDE_MEMORY-PR117737.patch deleted +0 -46
46 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0030-build-Move-sstream-include-above-safe-ctype.h-PR1177.patch deleted +0 -54
54 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc_13.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc_13.4.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/libgcc-initial_13.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/libgcc-initial_13.4.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/libgcc_13.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/libgcc_13.4.bb +0 -0
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/libgfortran_13.5.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/libgfortran_13.4.bb +0 -0
PATCH 30/48 python3-git: fix CVE-2026-42215
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]>
This patch applies the upstream 3.1.47 backport for CVE-2026-42215. The upstream fix merge is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2]. The individual backported commits are referenced in [3] and [4].
[1] https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/0f68db0710f9125762fca5dbc2328593537ae923
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42215
[3] https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/142195888e713542189533a52cdfc333f05c3af6
[4] https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/43d92dec4683568d11495956dd556161f17c3ea8
--- .../python3-git/CVE-2026-42215_p1.patch | 61 +++++++++++++++++++ .../python3-git/CVE-2026-42215_p2.patch | 47 ++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-git_3.1.42.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 110 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-git/CVE-2026-42215_p1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-git/CVE-2026-42215_p2.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-git/CVE-2026-42215_p1.patch new file +61 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +From 341a49149a37762e12b10eb70605b54f4abfb54d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: w <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 23:29:50 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Block unsafe underscored git kwargs / Fix for + GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4 + +CVE: CVE-2026-42215 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/142195888e713542189533a52cdfc333f05c3af6] + +Backport Changes: +- Omit regression tests because the Scarthgap PyPI source + archive does not include the upstream test suite. + +(cherry picked from commit 142195888e713542189533a52cdfc333f05c3af6) +Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]> +--- + git/cmd.py | 21 +++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/git/cmd.py b/git/cmd.py +index f58e6df5..874acb43 100644 +--- a/git/cmd.py ++++ b/git/cmd.py +@@ -540,6 +540,12 @@ class Git(LazyMixin): + f"The `{protocol}::` protocol looks suspicious, use `allow_unsafe_protocols=True` to allow it." + ) + ++ @classmethod ++ def _canonicalize_option_name(cls, option: str) -> str: ++ """Normalize an option or kwarg name for unsafe-option checks.""" ++ option_name = option.lstrip("-").split("=", 1)[0].split(None, 1)[0] ++ return dashify(option_name) ++ + @classmethod + def check_unsafe_options(cls, options: List[str], unsafe_options: List[str]) -> None: + """Check for unsafe options. +@@ -547,15 +553,14 @@ class Git(LazyMixin): + Some options that are passed to `git <command>` can be used to execute + arbitrary commands, this are blocked by default. + """ +- # Options can be of the form `foo` or `--foo bar` `--foo=bar`, +- # so we need to check if they start with "--foo" or if they are equal to "foo". +- bare_unsafe_options = [option.lstrip("-") for option in unsafe_options] ++ # Options can be of the form `foo`, `--foo`, `--foo bar`, or `--foo=bar`. ++ canonical_unsafe_options = {cls._canonicalize_option_name(option): option for option in unsafe_options} + for option in options: +- for unsafe_option, bare_option in zip(unsafe_options, bare_unsafe_options): +- if option.startswith(unsafe_option) or option == bare_option: +- raise UnsafeOptionError( +- f"{unsafe_option} is not allowed, use `allow_unsafe_options=True` to allow it." +- ) ++ unsafe_option = canonical_unsafe_options.get(cls._canonicalize_option_name(option)) ++ if unsafe_option is not None: ++ raise UnsafeOptionError( ++ f"{unsafe_option} is not allowed, use `allow_unsafe_options=True` to allow it." ++ ) + + class AutoInterrupt: + """Process wrapper that terminates the wrapped process on finalization. +-- +2.35.6
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-git/CVE-2026-42215_p2.patch new file +47 -0
47 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-git_3.1.42.bb +2 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-42284.patch \ file://CVE-2026-44243_p2.patch \ file://CVE-2026-44244_p1.patch \ file://CVE-2026-44244_p2.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-42215_p1.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-42215_p2.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "2d99869e0fef71a73cbd242528105af1d6c1b108c60dfabd994bf292f76c3ceb"
PATCH 31/48 scripts/install-buildtools: Update to 5.0.20
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Update to the 5.0.20 release of the 5.0 series for buildtools
--- scripts/install-buildtools | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
scripts/install-buildtools +2 -2
@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ logger = scriptutils.logger_create(PROGNAME, stream=sys.stdout) DEFAULT_INSTALL_DIR = os.path.join(os.path.split(scripts_path)[0],'buildtools') DEFAULT_BASE_URL = 'https://downloads.yoctoproject.org/releases/yocto' -DEFAULT_RELEASE = 'yocto-5.0.19' -DEFAULT_INSTALLER_VERSION = '5.0.19' +DEFAULT_RELEASE = 'yocto-5.0.20' +DEFAULT_INSTALLER_VERSION = '5.0.20' DEFAULT_BUILDDATE = '202110XX' # Python version sanity check
PATCH 32/48 spdx30_tasks: Fix SPDX_CUSTOM_ANNOTATION_VARS implementation
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Stefano Tondo <[email protected]>
Fix incorrect function call when processing SPDX_CUSTOM_ANNOTATION_VARS. The code was calling new_annotation() as a standalone function, but it should be called as a method on the build_objset object.
Error:
new_annotation(d, build_objset, build, ...)
Corrected to:
build_objset.new_annotation(d, build_objset, build, ...)
This bug would cause a NameError at runtime if SPDX_CUSTOM_ANNOTATION_VARS was set to a non-empty value, preventing SPDX document generation.
The fix aligns with how new_annotation() is called elsewhere in the codebase and matches the SBOMObjset class method signature.
[YC:
]
--- meta/lib/oe/spdx30_tasks.py | 4 +- meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/spdx.py | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
meta/lib/oe/spdx30_tasks.py +1 -3
@@ -517,9 +517,7 @@ def create_spdx(d): build_objset.set_is_native(is_native) for var in (d.getVar("SPDX_CUSTOM_ANNOTATION_VARS") or "").split(): - new_annotation( - d, - build_objset, + build_objset.new_annotation( build, "%s=%s" % (var, d.getVar(var)), oe.spdx30.AnnotationType.other,
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/spdx.py +74 -0
77 lines not on this page · raw message
PATCH 33/48 python3: skip ptest incompatible with ptest-runner >= 2.5.0
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
With ptest-runner >= 2.5.0, ptests run with PYTHONUNBUFFERED="1" envvar to unbuffer the python output (to fix AB-INT timeout issues). A python3 test, "test_cmd_line.test_non_interactive_output_buffering", expects buffered output and fails on unbuffered output, skip it. See https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/128377.
Note: upstream fix also skip it on PYTHONUNBUFFERED!=0:
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/30268b5d2fbb1a5e6c876f0cdc4cbdb5d93315e6
--- meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.12.14.bb | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.12.14.bb +6 -0
@@ -260,6 +260,12 @@ SKIPPED_TESTS = " \ --ignore test.test_tracemalloc.TestCAPI.test_tracemalloc_track_race \ " +# With ptest-runner >= 2.5.0, ptests run with PYTHONUNBUFFERED="1" envvar. +# test_cmd_line.test_non_interactive_output_buffering expects buffered ouput, +# skip it. +# See: https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/128377 +SKIPPED_TESTS += "--ignore test.test_cmd_line.CmdLineTest.test_non_interactive_output_buffering" + SKIPPED_TESTS:append:class-target:libc-musl = " \ -x test__locale \ -x test_c_locale_coercion \
PATCH 34/48 ptest-runner: upgrade 2.4.5 -> 2.4.5.1
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Wang Mingyu <[email protected]>
This is 2 commits squashed:
| ptest-runner: upgrade 2.4.5 -> 2.5.1 | | Signed-off-by: Wang Mingyu <[email protected]> | Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <[email protected]> | Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <[email protected]> | (cherry picked from commit d4497ba3fed93807f59c00925056aa21e72c2189)
|ptest-runner: correct PV from 2.5.1 to 2.4.5.1 | |2.4.5.1 is an actual version, 2.5.1 was a typo mistake. |That merged less than an hour ago, so no one should |trip over version going backwards hopefully. | |Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]> |Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <[email protected]> |(cherry picked from commit d5e0f51bccae7410b10c98a93fa5853155c2f59e)
Changelog: https://git.yoctoproject.org/ptest-runner2/log/?h=v2.4.5.1
* Makefile: use pkg-config to obtain libcheck flags
* Makefile: remove redundant rule
* README.md: Add my cc to be aware of patches
* README: Update mailing list address for patches + add git command
---
.../{ptest-runner_2.4.5.bb => ptest-runner_2.4.5.1.bb} | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
rename meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/{ptest-runner_2.4.5.bb => ptest-runner_2.4.5.1.bb} (94%)meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/ptest-runner_2.4.5.1.bb renamed from meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/ptest-runner_2.4.5.bb +1 -2
@@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/ptest-runner2/about/" LICENSE = "GPL-2.0-or-later" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=751419260aa954499f7abaabaa882bbe" -SRCREV = "aea9f42f87f2a78a973ae22cade8e45259f754e1" -PV .= "+git" +SRCREV = "c99e8c2737ff802f110612cc2d90c60233c33255" SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/ptest-runner2;branch=master;protocol=https \ "
PATCH 35/48 ptest-runner: Upgrade 2.4.5.1 -> 2.5.0
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Yoann Congal <[email protected]>
Changelog:
- utils.c: Fix dirname() handling in run_ptests()
- ptest-runner-collect-system-data: add info to logs
- main.c: Set PYTHONUNBUFFERED in the environment
- utils.c: print a message when a timeout occurs
- main.c: Add print_helptext() for detailed help
- main.print_usage: Remove unused argument list of -l
---
.../{ptest-runner_2.4.5.1.bb => ptest-runner_2.5.0.bb} | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/{ptest-runner_2.4.5.1.bb => ptest-runner_2.5.0.bb} (95%)meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/ptest-runner_2.5.0.bb renamed from meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/ptest-runner_2.4.5.1.bb +1 -1
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/ptest-runner2/about/" LICENSE = "GPL-2.0-or-later" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=751419260aa954499f7abaabaa882bbe" -SRCREV = "c99e8c2737ff802f110612cc2d90c60233c33255" +SRCREV = "7429fdd52abb5b08a9e8acef14b1bc4604f09c8f" SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/ptest-runner2;branch=master;protocol=https \ "
PATCH 36/48 ptest-runner: Upgrade 2.5.0 -> 2.5.1
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Pull in buffering fix:
"""
When running slow ptests, we can see an issue where the tests are writing output but it doesn't make it to the process (e.g. ssh connection) running ptest-runner.
The issue is that the standard buffering for non-interactive terminals is 8kb and some ptests don't output enough data to trigger a write. This can lead to the controlling connection timing out.
This change forces the output streams to be line buffered in all cases. Most ptest output would contain newlines so this should work well. stderr can be unbuffered by default but making it consistent here seems the best approach.
Testing with this change on slow ptest runs (e.g. qemu emulated) showed much more consistent data with this change.
"""
---
.../{ptest-runner_2.5.0.bb => ptest-runner_2.5.1.bb} | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/{ptest-runner_2.5.0.bb => ptest-runner_2.5.1.bb} (95%)meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/ptest-runner_2.5.1.bb renamed from meta/recipes-support/ptest-runner/ptest-runner_2.5.0.bb +1 -1
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://git.yoctoproject.org/cgit/cgit.cgi/ptest-runner2/about/" LICENSE = "GPL-2.0-or-later" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=751419260aa954499f7abaabaa882bbe" -SRCREV = "7429fdd52abb5b08a9e8acef14b1bc4604f09c8f" +SRCREV = "afe64efbb3f028e898fa9a5efcdc3010ebdf283c" SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/ptest-runner2;branch=master;protocol=https \ "
PATCH 37/48 pseudo: Add in openat2, exec and linkat fixes
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Pull in:
* linkat: Fix AT_EMPTY_PATH handling
* makewrappers/openat2: Add noignore_path option
* pseudo_util: Correctly free memory allocated by pseudo_setupenvp
* exec*: Replace bash workaround to avoid memory corruption
* pseudo_util: Clean up memory handling for setupenvp results
* pseudo_util: Avoid a memory leak in pseudo_dropenv()
* pseudo_util: Ensure pseudo_setupenvp handles memory consistently
* pseudo_util: Avoid accidental free calls for without_libpseudo()
* pseudo.h: Avoid accessing unallocated memory
[YOCTO #16316]
--- meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb +2 -2
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \ file://older-glibc-symbols.patch" SRC_URI[prebuilt.sha256sum] = "ed9f456856e9d86359f169f46a70ad7be4190d6040282b84c8d97b99072485aa" -SRCREV = "823895ba708c63f6ae4dcbfc266210f26c02c698" +SRCREV = "ca47829825f297d7bf83665c0541a9de4aa78009" S = "${WORKDIR}/git" -PV = "1.9.8" +PV = "1.9.8+git" # largefile and 64bit time_t support adds these macros via compiler flags globally # remove them for pseudo since pseudo intercepts some of the functions which will be
PATCH 38/48 pseudo: Update to 1.9.10
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Pulls in various important fixes:
Makefile.in: Bump to 1.9.10
test: various: Move to makefile compilation
test-bash-exec-env: Add bash env test case test/test-openat2-func.c: Remove unusuaed saved_errno pseudo_util.c: strchr now returns const charpseudo_client: remove the unused pseudo_prefix_dir_fdpseudo_client: step around all of pseudo's own fds in closefrompseudo_client: step fully past pseudo's own fds when computing startfd
makewrappers: Avoid efault workaround if using AT_EMPTY_PATH ports/linux/guts: Add __open64_2 wrapper
Makefile.in: Bump to 1.9.9
--- meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb +2 -2
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \ file://older-glibc-symbols.patch" SRC_URI[prebuilt.sha256sum] = "ed9f456856e9d86359f169f46a70ad7be4190d6040282b84c8d97b99072485aa" -SRCREV = "ca47829825f297d7bf83665c0541a9de4aa78009" +SRCREV = "2a5521e9573049864e07907415f1fee28232d90c" S = "${WORKDIR}/git" -PV = "1.9.8+git" +PV = "1.9.10" # largefile and 64bit time_t support adds these macros via compiler flags globally # remove them for pseudo since pseudo intercepts some of the functions which will be
PATCH 39/48 pseudo: 1.9.10 -> 1.9.11
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Adds suport for a working close_range() intercept.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb +2 -2
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \ file://older-glibc-symbols.patch" SRC_URI[prebuilt.sha256sum] = "ed9f456856e9d86359f169f46a70ad7be4190d6040282b84c8d97b99072485aa" -SRCREV = "2a5521e9573049864e07907415f1fee28232d90c" +SRCREV = "ba8887e5f1e922f866681ec7dec1a00b602a9328" S = "${WORKDIR}/git" -PV = "1.9.10" +PV = "1.9.11" # largefile and 64bit time_t support adds these macros via compiler flags globally # remove them for pseudo since pseudo intercepts some of the functions which will be
PATCH 40/48 libslirp: patch CVE-2026-9539
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Pick patch from NVD report.
--- .../slirp/libslirp/CVE-2026-9539.patch | 122 ++++++++++++++++++ .../slirp/libslirp_git.bb | 5 +- 2 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/slirp/libslirp/CVE-2026-9539.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/slirp/libslirp/CVE-2026-9539.patch new file +122 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +From 927bca7344e31fd58e2f7afaca784aad4400eb84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Samuel Thibault <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 23 May 2026 22:06:59 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] oob: cap urgent data count to what is actually available + +so_urgc is provided by the guest sender, so can arbitrary and beyond +what we actually have. Worse, this can lead to an sb_cc integer +underflow leading to leaking gigabytes of data. + +Fixes #93 + +Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-9539 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/slirp/libslirp/-/commit/927bca7344e31fd58e2f7afaca784aad4400eb84] +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + src/socket.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/socket.c b/src/socket.c +index 77c5cf6..c491d0f 100644 +--- a/src/socket.c ++++ b/src/socket.c +@@ -337,7 +337,8 @@ int sorecvoob(struct socket *so) + int sosendoob(struct socket *so) + { + struct sbuf *sb = &so->so_rcv; +- char buff[2048]; /* XXX Shouldn't be sending more oob data than this */ ++ uint32_t urgc = so->so_urgc; ++ char buff[2048]; + + int n; + +@@ -345,12 +346,15 @@ int sosendoob(struct socket *so) + DEBUG_ARG("so = %p", so); + DEBUG_ARG("sb->sb_cc = %d", sb->sb_cc); + +- if (so->so_urgc > sizeof(buff)) +- so->so_urgc = sizeof(buff); /* XXXX */ ++ if (urgc > sizeof(buff)) ++ urgc = sizeof(buff); ++ ++ if (urgc > sb->sb_cc) ++ urgc = sb->sb_cc; + + if (sb->sb_rptr < sb->sb_wptr) { + /* We can send it directly */ +- n = slirp_send(so, sb->sb_rptr, so->so_urgc, ++ n = slirp_send(so, sb->sb_rptr, urgc, + (MSG_OOB)); /* |MSG_DONTWAIT)); */ + } else { + /* +@@ -358,7 +362,6 @@ int sosendoob(struct socket *so) + * we must copy all data to a linear buffer then + * send it all + */ +- uint32_t urgc = so->so_urgc; /* Amount of room left in buff */ + int len = (sb->sb_data + sb->sb_datalen) - sb->sb_rptr; + if (len > urgc) { + len = urgc; +@@ -403,7 +406,7 @@ int sosendoob(struct socket *so) + */ + int sowrite(struct socket *so) + { +- int n, nn; ++ int n, nn, noob = 0; + struct sbuf *sb = &so->so_rcv; + int len = sb->sb_cc; + struct iovec iov[2]; +@@ -413,16 +416,20 @@ int sowrite(struct socket *so) + + if (so->so_urgc) { + uint32_t expected = so->so_urgc; +- if (sosendoob(so) < expected) { +- /* Treat a short write as a fatal error too, +- * rather than continuing on and sending the urgent +- * data as if it were non-urgent and leaving the +- * so_urgc count wrong. +- */ ++ int noob = sosendoob(so); ++ ++ if (noob <= 0) + goto err_disconnected; +- } ++ ++ if (noob < expected) ++ /* Short write: either we have not yet received all ++ * urgent data, or the socket buffers are full. Leave ++ * it for later when we have data or have room. */ ++ return noob; ++ + if (sb->sb_cc == 0) +- return 0; ++ /* Nothing left to write actually */ ++ return noob; + } + + /* +@@ -453,12 +460,11 @@ int sowrite(struct socket *so) + } else + n = 1; + } +- /* Check if there's urgent data to send, and if so, send it */ + + nn = slirp_send(so, iov[0].iov_base, iov[0].iov_len, 0); + /* This should never happen, but people tell me it does *shrug* */ + if (nn < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) +- return 0; ++ return noob; + + if (nn <= 0) { + goto err_disconnected; +@@ -485,7 +491,7 @@ int sowrite(struct socket *so) + if ((so->so_state & SS_FWDRAIN) && sb->sb_cc == 0) + sofcantsendmore(so); + +- return nn; ++ return noob + nn; + + err_disconnected: + DEBUG_MISC(" --- sowrite disconnected, so->so_state = %x, errno = %d",
meta/recipes-connectivity/slirp/libslirp_git.bb +4 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@ HOMEPAGE = "https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/slirp/libslirp" LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause & MIT" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYRIGHT;md5=bca0186b14e6b05e338e729f106db727" -SRC_URI = "git://gitlab.freedesktop.org/slirp/libslirp.git;protocol=https;branch=master" +SRC_URI = "\ + git://gitlab.freedesktop.org/slirp/libslirp.git;protocol=https;branch=master \ + file://CVE-2026-9539.patch \ +" SRCREV = "3ad1710a96678fe79066b1469cead4058713a1d9" PV = "4.7.0" S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
PATCH 41/48 rootfs.py: fix run-postinsts removal on multilib images
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Kyungjik Min <[email protected]>
ROOTFS_BOOTSTRAP_INSTALL in image.bbclass unconditionally stages run-postinsts into every image. When no delayed postinsts remain, _uninstall_unneeded() is supposed to remove it again, but the removal call used the bare "run-postinsts" package name without applying MLPREFIX.
On a multilib image (e.g. lib32-core-image-minimal), the package that is actually installed is lib32-run-postinsts, so the unprefixed removal silently matches nothing and run-postinsts leaks into the final image manifest, along with its now-pointless init script / systemd unit.
Expand MLPREFIX before removing the package, matching the pattern already used elsewhere in oe-core (e.g. oe/package.py) for package-name lookups that need to work across multilib variants.
--- meta/lib/oe/rootfs.py | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/lib/oe/rootfs.py +2 -1
@@ -266,7 +266,8 @@ class Rootfs(object, metaclass=ABCMeta): delayed_postinsts = self._get_delayed_postinsts() if delayed_postinsts is None: if os.path.exists(self.d.expand("${IMAGE_ROOTFS}${sysconfdir}/init.d/run-postinsts")) or os.path.exists(self.d.expand("${IMAGE_ROOTFS}${systemd_system_unitdir}/run-postinsts.service")): - self.pm.remove(["run-postinsts"]) + mlprefix = self.d.getVar('MLPREFIX') or "" + self.pm.remove([mlprefix + "run-postinsts"]) image_rorfs = bb.utils.contains("IMAGE_FEATURES", "read-only-rootfs", True, False, self.d) and \
PATCH 42/48 python3-cryptography: Fix CVE-2026-34073
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
Pick patch according to [2]
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-34073
[2] https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2026-34073
--- .../python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-34073.patch | 167 ++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 168 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-34073.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-34073.patch new file +167 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +From 6d97887956a05b3aaed262793710f07568026b72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: William Woodruff <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 18:52:17 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Further restrict DNS wildcards in name constraint matching + (#14542) + +* Further restruct DNS wildcards in name constraint matching + +Signed-off-by: William Woodruff <[email protected]> + +* Bump limbo + +Signed-off-by: William Woodruff <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from suse https://download.opensuse.org/distribution/leap-micro/6.1/product/repo/openSUSE-Leap-Micro-6.1-x86_64-Source/src/python-cryptography-42.0.4-slfo.1.1_6.1.src.rpm +Upstream commit https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/6d97887956a05b3aaed262793710f07568026b72] +CVE: CVE-2026-34073 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + .../cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs | 5 +- + .../src/types.rs | 89 ++++++++++++------- + 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs +index 5ded892..f49f618 100644 +--- a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs ++++ b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs +@@ -20,11 +20,12 @@ use cryptography_x509::{ + oid::{NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID, SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME_OID}, + }; + ++use types::{DNSPattern}; ++ + use crate::certificate::cert_is_self_issued; + use crate::ops::{CryptoOps, VerificationCertificate}; + use crate::policy::Policy; + use crate::trust_store::Store; +-use crate::types::DNSName; + use crate::types::{DNSConstraint, IPAddress, IPConstraint}; + use crate::ApplyNameConstraintStatus::{Applied, Skipped}; + +@@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ impl<'a, 'chain> NameChain<'a, 'chain> { + + match (constraint, san) { + (GeneralName::DNSName(pattern), GeneralName::DNSName(name)) => { +- match (DNSConstraint::new(pattern.0), DNSName::new(name.0)) { ++ match (DNSConstraint::new(pattern.0), DNSPattern::new(name.0)) { + (Some(pattern), Some(name)) => Ok(Applied(pattern.matches(&name))), + (_, None) => Err(ValidationError::Other(format!( + "unsatisfiable DNS name constraint: malformed SAN {}", +diff --git a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs +index f564715..d82936e 100644 +--- a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs ++++ b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs +@@ -129,35 +129,45 @@ impl<'a> DNSConstraint<'a> { + DNSName::new(pattern).map(Self) + } + +- /// Returns true if this `DNSConstraint` matches the given name. ++ /// Returns true if this `DNSConstraint` matches the given `DNSPattern`. + /// + /// Constraint matching is defined by RFC 5280: any DNS name that can + /// be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the left-hand + /// side of the name satisfies the name constraint. + /// +- /// ```rust +- /// # use cryptography_x509_verification::types::{DNSConstraint, DNSName}; +- /// let example_com = DNSName::new("example.com").unwrap(); +- /// let badexample_com = DNSName::new("badexample.com").unwrap(); +- /// let foo_example_com = DNSName::new("foo.example.com").unwrap(); +- /// assert!(DNSConstraint::new(example_com.as_str()).unwrap().matches(&example_com)); +- /// assert!(DNSConstraint::new(example_com.as_str()).unwrap().matches(&foo_example_com)); +- /// assert!(!DNSConstraint::new(example_com.as_str()).unwrap().matches(&badexample_com)); +- /// ``` +- pub fn matches(&self, name: &DNSName<'_>) -> bool { +- // NOTE: This may seem like an obtuse way to perform label matching, +- // but it saves us a few allocations: doing a substring check instead +- // would require us to clone each string and do case normalization. +- // Note also that we check the length in advance: Rust's zip +- // implementation terminates with the shorter iterator, so we need +- // to first check that the candidate name is at least as long as +- // the constraint it's matching against. +- name.as_str().len() >= self.0.as_str().len() +- && self +- .0 +- .rlabels() +- .zip(name.rlabels()) +- .all(|(a, o)| a.eq_ignore_ascii_case(o)) ++ /// On top of what RFC 5280 specifies, we define behavior for wildcard ++ /// patterns (which are not covered by RFC 5280): a wildcard pattern ++ /// matches a constraint if the pattern matches the constraint's inner name, ++ /// _or_ if the pattern's inner name matches the constraint. ++ /// This allows us to reject DNS names like `*.example.com` when ++ /// the constraint is `example.com` or `bar.example.com`. ++ pub fn matches(&self, name: &DNSPattern<'_>) -> bool { ++ match name { ++ DNSPattern::Exact(name) => { ++ // NOTE: This may seem like an obtuse way to perform label matching, ++ // but it saves us a few allocations: doing a substring check instead ++ // would require us to clone each string and do case normalization. ++ // Note also that we check the length in advance: Rust's zip ++ // implementation terminates with the shorter iterator, so we need ++ // to first check that the candidate name is at least as long as ++ // the constraint it's matching against. ++ name.as_str().len() >= self.0.as_str().len() ++ && self ++ .0 ++ .rlabels() ++ .zip(name.rlabels()) ++ .all(|(a, o)| a.eq_ignore_ascii_case(o)) ++ } ++ DNSPattern::Wildcard(inner) => { ++ // NOTE: This check is not as simple as a single pattern match, ++ // since we need two subtly distinct cases here: ++ // 1. Constraint `bar.example.com` on `*.example.com` ++ // 2. Constraint `example.com` on `*.example.com` ++ // The first cases is handled by `DNSPattern::matches`, and the second is handled ++ // by `DNSConstraint::matches`. ++ name.matches(&self.0) || self.matches(&DNSPattern::Exact(inner.clone())) ++ } ++ } + } + } + +@@ -456,14 +466,33 @@ mod tests { + let example_com = DNSConstraint::new("example.com").unwrap(); + + // Exact domain and arbitrary subdomains match. +- assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSName::new("example.com").unwrap())); +- assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSName::new("foo.example.com").unwrap())); +- assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSName::new("foo.bar.baz.quux.example.com").unwrap())); ++ assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("example.com").unwrap())); ++ assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("foo.example.com").unwrap())); ++ assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("foo.bar.baz.quux.example.com").unwrap())); + + // Parent domains, distinct domains, and substring domains do not match. +- assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSName::new("com").unwrap())); +- assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSName::new("badexample.com").unwrap())); +- assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSName::new("wrong.com").unwrap())); ++ assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("com").unwrap())); ++ assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("badexample.com").unwrap())); ++ assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("wrong.com").unwrap())); ++ } ++ ++ #[test] ++ fn test_dnsconstraint_matches_wildcard() { ++ let com = DNSConstraint::new("com").unwrap(); ++ let example_com = DNSConstraint::new("example.com").unwrap(); ++ let bar_example_com = DNSConstraint::new("bar.example.com").unwrap(); ++ let baz_bar_example_com = DNSConstraint::new("baz.bar.example.com").unwrap(); ++ let any_example_com = DNSPattern::new("*.example.com").unwrap(); ++ ++ assert!(com.matches(&any_example_com)); ++ assert!(example_com.matches(&any_example_com)); ++ assert!(bar_example_com.matches(&any_example_com)); ++ ++ // A constraint on `baz.bar.example.com` doesn't match `*.example.com`, ++ // since `baz.bar.example.com` matches zero or more sublabels of ++ // `baz.bar.example.com` while `*.example.com` matches exactly one ++ // sublabel of `example.com`. ++ assert!(!baz_bar_example_com.matches(&any_example_com)); + } + + #[test] +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6fe07eec95dfd477eb9530aef5bead34fec819b3aaf6c5bd6d20565da6 SRC_URI += "file://0001-pyproject.toml-remove-benchmark-disable-option.patch \ file://CVE-2026-26007.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-34073.patch \ file://check-memfree.py \ file://run-ptest \ "
PATCH 43/48 python3-cryptography: Fix CVE-2026-69248
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
Pick patch according to [2]
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-69248
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-69248
--- .../python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69248.patch | 299 ++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 300 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69248.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69248.patch new file +299 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +From 4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: William Woodruff <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 20:44:05 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] x509: distinguish NC kinds when evaluating wildcard DNS SANs + (#14888) + +* x509: distinguish NC kinds when evaluating wildcard DNS SANs + +* Bump x509-limbo + +Note: SUSE patch CVE-2026-69248-distingush-nc-kinds-wildcard-sans.patch was adapted to our version where required. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from suse https://download.opensuse.org/distribution/leap-micro/6.1/product/repo/openSUSE-Leap-Micro-6.1-x86_64-Source/src/python-cryptography-42.0.4-slfo.1.1_6.1.src.rpm +Upstream commit https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4d035a4225965edeffd312079a510ef25fcfdcb2] +CVE: CVE-2026-69248 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + .../cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs | 37 +++- + .../src/types.rs | 165 ++++++++++++------ + 2 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs +index f49f618..a505349 100644 +--- a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs ++++ b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs +@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ impl<'a, 'chain> NameChain<'a, 'chain> { + + fn evaluate_single_constraint( + &self, ++ kind: SubtreeKind, + constraint: &GeneralName<'chain>, + san: &GeneralName<'chain>, + budget: &mut Budget, +@@ -109,8 +110,18 @@ impl<'a, 'chain> NameChain<'a, 'chain> { + + match (constraint, san) { + (GeneralName::DNSName(pattern), GeneralName::DNSName(name)) => { ++ // NOTE: A DNS SAN can be a wildcard pattern (e.g. `*.foo.com`) ++ // rather than an ordinary DNS name. A wildcard represents a ++ // *set* of names, so the check depends on which subtree we're ++ // evaluating: a `permittedSubtrees` constraint must contain ++ // *every* name the wildcard can expand to, whereas an ++ // `excludedSubtrees` constraint matches if it overlaps the ++ // wildcard at all. We dispatch on `kind` accordingly. + match (DNSConstraint::new(pattern.0), DNSPattern::new(name.0)) { +- (Some(pattern), Some(name)) => Ok(Applied(pattern.matches(&name))), ++ (Some(pattern), Some(name)) => Ok(Applied(match kind { ++ SubtreeKind::Permitted => pattern.permits(&name), ++ SubtreeKind::Excluded => pattern.excludes(&name), ++ })), + (_, None) => Err(ValidationError::Other(format!( + "unsatisfiable DNS name constraint: malformed SAN {}", + name.0 +@@ -155,7 +166,12 @@ impl<'a, 'chain> NameChain<'a, 'chain> { + let mut permit = true; + if let Some(permitted_subtrees) = &constraints.permitted_subtrees { + for p in permitted_subtrees.unwrap_read().clone() { +- let status = self.evaluate_single_constraint(&p.base, &san, budget)?; ++ let status = self.evaluate_single_constraint( ++ SubtreeKind::Permitted, ++ &p.base, ++ &san, ++ budget, ++ )?; + if status.is_applied() { + permit = status.is_match(); + if permit { +@@ -173,7 +189,12 @@ impl<'a, 'chain> NameChain<'a, 'chain> { + + if let Some(excluded_subtrees) = &constraints.excluded_subtrees { + for e in excluded_subtrees.unwrap_read().clone() { +- let status = self.evaluate_single_constraint(&e.base, &san, budget)?; ++ let status = self.evaluate_single_constraint( ++ SubtreeKind::Excluded, ++ &e.base, ++ &san, ++ budget, ++ )?; + if status.is_match() { + return Err(ValidationError::Other( + "excluded name constraint matched SAN".into(), +@@ -207,6 +228,16 @@ struct ChainBuilder<'a, 'chain, B: CryptoOps> { + store: &'a Store<'chain, B>, + } + ++/// Identifies which kind of name constraint subtree a SAN is being evaluated ++/// against. The two subtree kinds use different matching semantics for ++/// wildcard DNS SANs (containment vs. overlap); see [`DNSConstraint::permits`] ++/// and [`DNSConstraint::excludes`]. ++#[derive(Clone, Copy)] ++enum SubtreeKind { ++ Permitted, ++ Excluded, ++} ++ + // When applying a name constraint, we need to distinguish between a few different scenarios: + // * `Applied(true)`: The name constraint is the same type as the SAN and matches. + // * `Applied(false)`: The name constraint is the same type as the SAN and does not match. +diff --git a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs +index d82936e..c0b72e3 100644 +--- a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs ++++ b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/types.rs +@@ -129,44 +129,69 @@ impl<'a> DNSConstraint<'a> { + DNSName::new(pattern).map(Self) + } + +- /// Returns true if this `DNSConstraint` matches the given `DNSPattern`. ++ /// Returns true if the given exact `DNSName` falls within this ++ /// constraint's subtree. + /// +- /// Constraint matching is defined by RFC 5280: any DNS name that can +- /// be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the left-hand +- /// side of the name satisfies the name constraint. ++ /// Per RFC 5280, a name satisfies the constraint if it can be constructed ++ /// by adding zero or more labels to the left-hand side of the constraint's ++ /// name (i.e. it is the constraint's name, or a subdomain of it). ++ fn contains(&self, name: &DNSName<'_>) -> bool { ++ // NOTE: This may seem like an obtuse way to perform label matching, ++ // but it saves us a few allocations: doing a substring check instead ++ // would require us to clone each string and do case normalization. ++ // Note also that we check the length in advance: Rust's zip ++ // implementation terminates with the shorter iterator, so we need ++ // to first check that the candidate name is at least as long as ++ // the constraint it's matching against. ++ name.as_str().len() >= self.0.as_str().len() ++ && self ++ .0 ++ .rlabels() ++ .zip(name.rlabels()) ++ .all(|(a, o)| a.eq_ignore_ascii_case(o)) ++ } ++ ++ /// Returns true if the given `DNSPattern` is permitted by this constraint, ++ /// for use with a `permittedSubtrees` name constraint. + /// +- /// On top of what RFC 5280 specifies, we define behavior for wildcard +- /// patterns (which are not covered by RFC 5280): a wildcard pattern +- /// matches a constraint if the pattern matches the constraint's inner name, +- /// _or_ if the pattern's inner name matches the constraint. +- /// This allows us to reject DNS names like `*.example.com` when +- /// the constraint is `example.com` or `bar.example.com`. +- pub fn matches(&self, name: &DNSPattern<'_>) -> bool { +- match name { +- DNSPattern::Exact(name) => { +- // NOTE: This may seem like an obtuse way to perform label matching, +- // but it saves us a few allocations: doing a substring check instead +- // would require us to clone each string and do case normalization. +- // Note also that we check the length in advance: Rust's zip +- // implementation terminates with the shorter iterator, so we need +- // to first check that the candidate name is at least as long as +- // the constraint it's matching against. +- name.as_str().len() >= self.0.as_str().len() +- && self +- .0 +- .rlabels() +- .zip(name.rlabels()) +- .all(|(a, o)| a.eq_ignore_ascii_case(o)) +- } +- DNSPattern::Wildcard(inner) => { +- // NOTE: This check is not as simple as a single pattern match, +- // since we need two subtly distinct cases here: +- // 1. Constraint `bar.example.com` on `*.example.com` +- // 2. Constraint `example.com` on `*.example.com` +- // The first cases is handled by `DNSPattern::matches`, and the second is handled +- // by `DNSConstraint::matches`. +- name.matches(&self.0) || self.matches(&DNSPattern::Exact(inner.clone())) +- } ++ /// A pattern is permitted only if *every* name it can represent falls ++ /// within the constraint's subtree. An exact name is permitted by ordinary ++ /// subtree containment (per RFC 5280). ++ /// ++ /// Wildcard patterns are not covered by RFC 5280; we define their behavior ++ /// here. A wildcard pattern `*.X` is permitted only if its base name `X` ++ /// itself falls within the constraint's subtree. This is stricter than ++ /// mere overlap: `*.example.com` is *not* permitted by `foo.example.com`, ++ /// since it can also expand to a sibling such as `bar.example.com` that ++ /// lies outside the permitted subtree. ++ pub fn permits(&self, pattern: &DNSPattern<'_>) -> bool { ++ match pattern { ++ DNSPattern::Exact(name) => self.contains(name), ++ DNSPattern::Wildcard(base) => self.contains(base), ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /// Returns true if the given `DNSPattern` is excluded by this constraint, ++ /// for use with an `excludedSubtrees` name constraint. ++ /// ++ /// A pattern is excluded if *any* name it can represent falls within the ++ /// constraint's subtree. An exact name is excluded by ordinary subtree ++ /// containment (per RFC 5280). ++ /// ++ /// Wildcard patterns are not covered by RFC 5280; we define their behavior ++ /// here. A wildcard pattern `*.X` is excluded if it overlaps the subtree ++ /// at all, which happens in two subtly distinct cases: ++ /// ++ /// 1. The constraint is more specific than the wildcard, e.g. constraint ++ /// `bar.example.com` and pattern `*.example.com` (which can expand to ++ /// `bar.example.com`). This is handled by `DNSPattern::matches`. ++ /// 2. The wildcard's base name falls within the subtree, e.g. constraint ++ /// `example.com` and pattern `*.example.com`. This is handled by ++ /// `DNSConstraint::contains`. ++ pub fn excludes(&self, pattern: &DNSPattern<'_>) -> bool { ++ match pattern { ++ DNSPattern::Exact(name) => self.contains(name), ++ DNSPattern::Wildcard(base) => pattern.matches(&self.0) || self.contains(base), + } + } + } +@@ -462,37 +487,69 @@ mod tests { + } + + #[test] +- fn test_dnsconstraint_matches() { ++ fn test_dnsconstraint_exact() { + let example_com = DNSConstraint::new("example.com").unwrap(); + +- // Exact domain and arbitrary subdomains match. +- assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("example.com").unwrap())); +- assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("foo.example.com").unwrap())); +- assert!(example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("foo.bar.baz.quux.example.com").unwrap())); ++ // For exact patterns, `permits` and `excludes` behave identically: ++ // the pattern must fall within the constraint's subtree. ++ for permitted in [ ++ "example.com", ++ "foo.example.com", ++ "foo.bar.baz.quux.example.com", ++ ] { ++ let pattern = DNSPattern::new(permitted).unwrap(); ++ assert!(example_com.permits(&pattern)); ++ assert!(example_com.excludes(&pattern)); ++ } + + // Parent domains, distinct domains, and substring domains do not match. +- assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("com").unwrap())); +- assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("badexample.com").unwrap())); +- assert!(!example_com.matches(&DNSPattern::new("wrong.com").unwrap())); ++ for rejected in ["com", "badexample.com", "wrong.com"] { ++ let pattern = DNSPattern::new(rejected).unwrap(); ++ assert!(!example_com.permits(&pattern)); ++ assert!(!example_com.excludes(&pattern)); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ #[test] ++ fn test_dnsconstraint_permits_wildcard() { ++ let com = DNSConstraint::new("com").unwrap(); ++ let example_com = DNSConstraint::new("example.com").unwrap(); ++ let foo_example_com = DNSConstraint::new("foo.example.com").unwrap(); ++ let any_example_com = DNSPattern::new("*.example.com").unwrap(); ++ ++ // A wildcard `*.example.com` is permitted only by constraints whose ++ // subtree contains *every* name the wildcard can expand to, i.e. those ++ // that contain `example.com` itself. ++ assert!(com.permits(&any_example_com)); ++ assert!(example_com.permits(&any_example_com)); ++ ++ // A constraint more specific than the wildcard's base does *not* ++ // permit it: the wildcard can expand to siblings outside the subtree ++ // (e.g. `*.example.com` can be `bar.example.com`, which lies outside ++ // `foo.example.com`). ++ assert!(!foo_example_com.permits(&any_example_com)); + } + + #[test] +- fn test_dnsconstraint_matches_wildcard() { ++ fn test_dnsconstraint_excludes_wildcard() { + let com = DNSConstraint::new("com").unwrap(); + let example_com = DNSConstraint::new("example.com").unwrap(); + let bar_example_com = DNSConstraint::new("bar.example.com").unwrap(); + let baz_bar_example_com = DNSConstraint::new("baz.bar.example.com").unwrap(); + let any_example_com = DNSPattern::new("*.example.com").unwrap(); + +- assert!(com.matches(&any_example_com)); +- assert!(example_com.matches(&any_example_com)); +- assert!(bar_example_com.matches(&any_example_com)); +- +- // A constraint on `baz.bar.example.com` doesn't match `*.example.com`, +- // since `baz.bar.example.com` matches zero or more sublabels of +- // `baz.bar.example.com` while `*.example.com` matches exactly one +- // sublabel of `example.com`. +- assert!(!baz_bar_example_com.matches(&any_example_com)); ++ // A wildcard `*.example.com` is excluded by any constraint whose ++ // subtree it overlaps, including constraints more specific than the ++ // wildcard's base. ++ assert!(com.excludes(&any_example_com)); ++ assert!(example_com.excludes(&any_example_com)); ++ assert!(bar_example_com.excludes(&any_example_com)); ++ ++ // A constraint on `baz.bar.example.com` doesn't overlap ++ // `*.example.com`, since `baz.bar.example.com` matches zero or more ++ // sublabels of `baz.bar.example.com` while `*.example.com` matches ++ // exactly one sublabel of `example.com`. ++ assert!(!baz_bar_example_com.excludes(&any_example_com)); + } + + #[test] +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb +1 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6fe07eec95dfd477eb9530aef5bead34fec819b3aaf6c5bd6d20565da6 SRC_URI += "file://0001-pyproject.toml-remove-benchmark-disable-option.patch \ file://CVE-2026-26007.patch \ file://CVE-2026-34073.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-69248.patch \ file://check-memfree.py \ file://run-ptest \ "
PATCH 44/48 python3-cryptography: Fix CVE-2026-69249
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
Pick patch according to [2]
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-69249
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-69249
--- .../python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69249.patch | 354 ++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 355 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69249.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography/CVE-2026-69249.patch new file +354 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@ +From 4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: William Woodruff <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2026 23:30:03 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Add a signature validation budget during path construction + (#14960) + +* Add a signature validation budget during path construction + +This extends our existing NC budget check to include a budget +for signature validations. If a path construction exceeds the +budget by performing more than the allowed number of signature +validation steps, the entire construction fails. + +For now, our budget is 128 signature validations. This is +consistent with (higher than) Go and rustls-webpki, which +both set a limit of 100. Like Go, we attempt to make the "best" +use of our signature budget by ordering by likelihood, using +AKI/SKI match as the strongest signal of fitness. + +* Bump limbo + +* Temporary commit + +* Revert "Temporary commit" + +This reverts commit bcdb6808562a8b8f484f85d21cb201cfdb2bbbd7. + +* Fudge a coverage test into place + +* Coverage for the coverage god + +Note: SUSE patch CVE-2026-69249-signature-validation-budget.patch was adapted to our codebase where required. The budget-handling hunks that are not present in the backported patch are already available in our existing codebase, so those changes were not applied again. + +Additionally, add tests for the ValidationError Display implementation +to align with corresponding upstream commit. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from suse https://download.opensuse.org/distribution/leap-micro/6.1/product/repo/openSUSE-Leap-Micro-6.1-x86_64-Source/src/python-cryptography-42.0.4-slfo.1.1_6.1.src.rpm +Upstream commit https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/4a12cf49675a184e47f912b00b04f3a629283582] +CVE: CVE-2026-69249 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + .../cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs | 209 +++++++++++++++++- + .../src/policy/mod.rs | 8 +- + 2 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs +index a505349..334eed4 100644 +--- a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs ++++ b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/lib.rs +@@ -15,9 +15,12 @@ use std::vec; + + use cryptography_x509::extensions::{DuplicateExtensionsError, Extensions}; + use cryptography_x509::{ +- extensions::{NameConstraints, SubjectAlternativeName}, ++ extensions::{AuthorityKeyIdentifier, NameConstraints, SubjectAlternativeName}, + name::GeneralName, +- oid::{NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID, SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME_OID}, ++}; ++use cryptography_x509::oid::{ ++ AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_OID, NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID, SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME_OID, ++ SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_OID, + }; + + use types::{DNSPattern}; +@@ -40,15 +43,23 @@ pub enum ValidationError { + + struct Budget { + name_constraint_checks: usize, ++ signature_checks: usize, + } + + impl Budget { +- // Same limit as other validators ++ // The maximum number of name constraint checks performed when attempting ++ // path construction. This is the same limit as other validators. + const DEFAULT_NAME_CONSTRAINT_CHECK_LIMIT: usize = 1 << 20; + ++ // The maximum number of signature verifications performed when attempting ++ // path construction. The is similar to other validators: ++ // both Go and rustls-webpki pick 100. ++ const DEFAULT_SIGNATURE_CHECK_LIMIT: usize = 1 << 7; ++ + fn new() -> Budget { + Budget { + name_constraint_checks: Self::DEFAULT_NAME_CONSTRAINT_CHECK_LIMIT, ++ signature_checks: Self::DEFAULT_SIGNATURE_CHECK_LIMIT, + } + } + +@@ -61,6 +72,15 @@ impl Budget { + ))?; + Ok(()) + } ++ ++ fn signature_check(&mut self) -> Result<(), ValidationError> { ++ self.signature_checks = self.signature_checks.checked_sub(1).ok_or_else(|| { ++ ValidationError::FatalError( ++ "Exceeded maximum signature check limit", ++ ) ++ })?; ++ Ok(()) ++ } + } + + impl From<asn1::ParseError> for ValidationError { +@@ -270,18 +290,57 @@ impl<'a, 'chain, B: CryptoOps> ChainBuilder<'a, 'chain, B> { + } + } + ++ /// Identify and return potential issuers for `cert`, considering ++ /// candidates from both the trusted store and untrusted intermediate set. ++ /// Trusted candidates are returned before untrusted intermediate ++ /// candidates, and both groups are opportunisitically ordered by ++ /// "likeliness" in terms of AKI/SKI match. + fn potential_issuers( + &'a self, + cert: &'a VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>, +- ) -> impl Iterator<Item = &'a VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>> + '_ { +- // TODO: Optimizations: +- // * Search by AKI and other identifiers? +- self.store ++ cert_extensions: &Extensions<'chain>, ++ ) -> Vec<&'a VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>> { ++ let mut candidates: Vec<&'a VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>> = self ++ .store + .get_by_subject(&cert.certificate().tbs_cert.issuer) + .iter() + .chain(self.intermediates.iter().filter(|&candidate| { + candidate.certificate().subject() == cert.certificate().issuer() + })) ++ .collect(); ++ ++ let want_kid: Option<&[u8]> = cert_extensions ++ .get_extension(&AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_OID) ++ .and_then(|ext| ext.value::<AuthorityKeyIdentifier<'_>>().ok()) ++ .and_then(|aki| aki.key_identifier); ++ ++ // This mirrors Go's `findPotentialParents`: we have a global ++ // signature budget, so we want to bucket candidates by likeliness ++ // to avoid wasting budget on (potentially adversarial) name collisions. ++ // ++ // Observe that we use a stable sort to preserve trusted candidates ++ // before untrusted candidates in each likeliness bucket. In other ++ // words, we always try a likely trusted candidate over an equally ++ // likely untrusted one. ++ // ++ // See: <https://github.com/golang/go/blob/d00c67f297e/src/crypto/x509/cert_pool.go#L136> ++ candidates.sort_by_key(|candidate| { ++ let have_kid: Option<&[u8]> = ++ candidate.certificate().extensions().ok().and_then(|exts| { ++ exts.get_extension(&SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_OID) ++ .and_then(|ext| ext.value::<&[u8]>().ok()) ++ }); ++ ++ match (want_kid, have_kid) { ++ // cert AKID matches candidate SKID, highest likelihood. ++ (Some(want), Some(have)) if want == have => 0, ++ // cert AKID and candidate SKID don't match, lowest likelihood. ++ (Some(_), Some(_)) => 2, ++ // cert AKID and/or candidate SKID is not present, medium likelihood. ++ _ => 1u8, ++ } ++ }); ++ candidates + } + + fn build_chain_inner( +@@ -314,7 +373,8 @@ impl<'a, 'chain, B: CryptoOps> ChainBuilder<'a, 'chain, B> { + // Otherwise, we collect a list of potential issuers for this cert, + // and continue with the first that verifies. + let mut last_err: Option<ValidationError> = None; +- for issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert) { ++ for issuing_cert_candidate in self.potential_issuers(working_cert, working_cert_extensions) ++ { + // A candidate issuer is said to verify if it both + // signs for the working certificate and conforms to the + // policy. +@@ -324,6 +384,7 @@ impl<'a, 'chain, B: CryptoOps> ChainBuilder<'a, 'chain, B> { + working_cert.certificate(), + current_depth, + &issuer_extensions, ++ budget, + ) { + Ok(_) => { + match self.build_chain_inner( +@@ -417,3 +478,135 @@ impl<'a, 'chain, B: CryptoOps> ChainBuilder<'a, 'chain, B> { + Ok(chain) + } + } ++ ++#[cfg(test)] ++mod tests { ++ use asn1::ParseError; ++ use cryptography_x509::certificate::Certificate; ++ use cryptography_x509::oid::SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME_OID; ++ ++ use crate::certificate::tests::PublicKeyErrorOps; ++ use crate::ops::{CryptoOps, VerificationCertificate}; ++ use crate::policy::{Policy, PolicyDefinition, Subject}; ++ use crate::trust_store::Store; ++ use crate::types::DNSName; ++ use crate::{Budget, ChainBuilder, NameChain, ValidationError}; ++ ++ #[test] ++ fn test_validationerror_display() { ++ let err = ValidationError::Malformed( ++ ParseError::new(asn1::ParseErrorKind::InvalidLength), ++ ); ++ assert_eq!(err.to_string(), "ASN.1 parsing error: invalid length"); ++ ++ let err = ValidationError::ExtensionError{ ++ oid: SUBJECT_ALTERNATIVE_NAME_OID, ++ reason: "duplicate extension", ++ }; ++ assert_eq!( ++ err.to_string(), ++ "invalid extension: 2.5.29.17: duplicate extension" ++ ); ++ ++ let err = ValidationError::FatalError("oops"); ++ assert_eq!(err.to_string(), "fatal error: oops"); ++ } ++ ++ /// A `CryptoOps` whose public key extraction and signature verification ++ /// always succeed, so that `valid_issuer` can be driven to completion ++ /// without real cryptographic material. ++ struct NullOps; ++ ++ impl CryptoOps for NullOps { ++ type Key = (); ++ type Err = (); ++ type CertificateExtra = (); ++ type PolicyExtra = (); ++ ++ fn public_key(&self, _cert: &Certificate<'_>) -> Result<Self::Key, Self::Err> { ++ Ok(()) ++ } ++ ++ fn verify_signed_by( ++ &self, ++ _cert: &Certificate<'_>, ++ _key: &Self::Key, ++ ) -> Result<(), Self::Err> { ++ Ok(()) ++ } ++ ++ fn clone_public_key(_key: &Self::Key) -> Self::Key {} ++ ++ fn clone_extra(_extra: &Self::CertificateExtra) -> Self::CertificateExtra {} ++ } ++ ++ #[test] ++ fn test_clone() { ++ assert_eq!(NullOps::clone_public_key(&()), ()); ++ assert_eq!(NullOps::clone_extra(&()), ()); ++ } ++ ++ // A self-issued ("looping") CA certificate that is its own issuer. ++ fn looping_ca_pem() -> pem::Pem { ++ pem::parse( ++ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- ++MIIBcjCCARmgAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAhMR8wHQYDVQQDDBZsb29waW5n ++IHNlbGYtc2lnbmVkIENBMB4XDTIzMTIzMTAwMDAwMFoXDTI0MDEzMTAwMDAwMFow ++ITEfMB0GA1UEAwwWbG9vcGluZyBzZWxmLXNpZ25lZCBDQTBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEG ++CCqGSM49AwEHA0IABKAoXUGnHdfXJbSXjRjeW+PCVHmlo4KEki69N5pJUA0QyQMR ++v9ySOMnWf3Ea7TR4g3zdguwTP7LdpSku3uR1QkmjQjBAMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMB ++Af8wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgGGMB0GA1UdDgQWBBR23MGdG1Ma9iR+3CxKTafD/OE0 ++dTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiA4RCr07KfZdM16VfGNZAQFjvC60SWIU3RRVY/L ++qolIOwIgCaIgj9ipK0Q0p+45UJiq+L/ncrxsweJkFq/UYubzhX0= ++-----END CERTIFICATE-----", ++ ) ++ .unwrap() ++ } ++ ++ /// Exercises our pathlen overflow error scenario. ++ /// ++ /// This condition is logically unreachable from Python, since ++ /// we unconditionally limit signature checks to a number smaller ++ /// than `u8::MAX`, meaning that we always exhaust the signature budget ++ /// before potentially exhausting the pathlen budget. ++ /// ++ /// To test that directly, we manually lift the signature budget ++ /// and start our pathlen state right at `u8::MAX`, guaranteeing ++ /// an overflow on the immediate chain building step. ++ #[test] ++ fn test_build_chain_inner_depth_overflow() { ++ let pem = looping_ca_pem(); ++ let ca = asn1::parse_single::<Certificate<'_>>(pem.contents()).unwrap(); ++ let ca_exts = ca.extensions().ok().unwrap(); ++ ++ // The same self-issued CA is both the working certificate and its own ++ // (only) candidate issuer, so the search recurses on itself. ++ let working = VerificationCertificate::<NullOps>::new(&ca, ()); ++ let intermediates = [VerificationCertificate::<NullOps>::new(&ca, ())]; ++ let store: Store<'_, NullOps> = Store::new([]); ++ ++ let subject = Subject::DNS(DNSName::new("example.com").unwrap()); ++ let time = asn1::DateTime::new(2024, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0).unwrap(); ++ let policy_def = ++ PolicyDefinition::server(NullOps, subject, time, Some(u8::MAX), None, None).unwrap(); ++ let policy = Policy::new(&policy_def, ()); ++ ++ let builder = ChainBuilder::new(&intermediates, &policy, &store); ++ let mut budget = Budget { ++ name_constraint_checks: usize::MAX, ++ signature_checks: usize::MAX, ++ }; ++ ++ let name_chain = NameChain::new::<NullOps>(None, &ca_exts, false) ++ .ok() ++ .unwrap(); ++ let err = builder ++ .build_chain_inner(&working, u8::MAX, &ca_exts, name_chain, &mut budget) ++ .unwrap_err(); ++ ++ assert!(matches!( ++ err.kind, ++ ValidationError::Other(msg) if msg.contains("current depth calculation overflowed") ++ )); ++ } ++} +diff --git a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/policy/mod.rs b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/policy/mod.rs +index d5a199d..5bdc8d5 100644 +--- a/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/policy/mod.rs ++++ b/src/rust/cryptography-x509-verification/src/policy/mod.rs +@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ use once_cell::sync::Lazy; + use crate::ops::CryptoOps; + use crate::policy::extension::{ca, common, ee, Criticality, ExtensionPolicy, ExtensionValidator}; + use crate::types::{DNSName, DNSPattern, IPAddress}; +-use crate::{ValidationError, VerificationCertificate}; ++use crate::{Budget, ValidationError, VerificationCertificate}; + + // SubjectPublicKeyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier constants, as defined in CA/B 7.1.3.1. + +@@ -463,10 +463,16 @@ impl<'a, B: CryptoOps> Policy<'a, B> { + child: &Certificate<'_>, + current_depth: u8, + issuer_extensions: &Extensions<'_>, ++ budget: &mut Budget, + ) -> Result<(), ValidationError> { + // The issuer needs to be a valid CA at the current depth. + self.permits_ca(issuer.certificate(), current_depth, issuer_extensions)?; + ++ // Charge the (potentially expensive) signature verification against the ++ // budget before performing it, bounding the total work an attacker can ++ // force during chain building. ++ budget.signature_check()?; ++ + // CA/B 7.1.3.1 SubjectPublicKeyInfo + // NOTE: We check the issuer's SPKI here, since the issuer is + // definitionally a CA and thus subject to CABF key requirements. +-- +2.43.0 +
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb +1 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://0001-pyproject.toml-remove-benchmark-disable-option.patch \ file://CVE-2026-26007.patch \ file://CVE-2026-34073.patch \ file://CVE-2026-69248.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-69249.patch \ file://check-memfree.py \ file://run-ptest \ "
PATCH 45/48 curl: Security Fix for CVE-2026-13608
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
[1] https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2026-13608.html
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-13608
--- .../curl/curl/CVE-2026-13608.patch | 48 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-13608.patch
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-13608.patch new file +48 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 25df759f0f0c1aeaee066a4502bb36a8a86fb22e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 10:44:47 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/5] openldap: handle Curl_sasl_continue() returns better + +Similar to how it gets treated already in other protocol handlers. + +Follow-up to eeca818b1e8d1e61c2d4 + +Reported-by: Eunsoo Kim +Closes #22213 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/ea71c3b6b60e563651ea8596a975aef0c8199519] +CVE: CVE-2026-13608 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + lib/openldap.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/openldap.c b/lib/openldap.c +index 47266f6..b566d1a 100644 +--- a/lib/openldap.c ++++ b/lib/openldap.c +@@ -682,8 +682,19 @@ static CURLcode oldap_state_sasl_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, + } + else { + result = Curl_sasl_continue(&li->sasl, data, code, &progress); +- if(!result && progress != SASL_INPROGRESS) +- oldap_state(data, OLDAP_STOP); ++ if(!result) { ++ switch(progress) { ++ case SASL_DONE: ++ oldap_state(data, li, OLDAP_STOP); /* Authenticated */ ++ break; ++ case SASL_IDLE: /* No mechanism left after cancellation */ ++ failf(data, "Authentication cancelled"); ++ result = CURLE_LOGIN_DENIED; ++ break; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ } + } + + if(li->servercred) +-- +2.34.1 +
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \ file://CVE-2026-5545.patch \ file://CVE-2026-6253.patch \ file://CVE-2026-4873.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-13608.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
PATCH 46/48 curl: Security Fix for CVE-2026-18924
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
[1] https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2026-18924.html
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-18924
--- .../curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 90325ff0444cbdff368bda5d26d6405a0bb6ee43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:02:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] http2: make server push transfers inherit share from parent + +Reported-by: Stephan Zeisberg +Closes #22488 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/90325ff0444cbdff368bda5d26d6405a0bb6ee43] +CVE: CVE-2026-18924 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + lib/http2.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/http2.c b/lib/http2.c +index 99d7f3b..e6305c9 100644 +--- a/lib/http2.c ++++ b/lib/http2.c +@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ + #include "transfer.h" + #include "dynbuf.h" + #include "headers.h" ++#include "curl_share.h" + /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ + #include "curl_printf.h" + #include "curl_memory.h" +@@ -776,6 +777,8 @@ static struct Curl_easy *h2_duphandle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + second->req.p.http = http; + http2_data_setup(cf, second, &second_stream); + second->state.priority.weight = data->state.priority.weight; ++ if(data->share) ++ (void)Curl_share_easy_link(second, data->share); + } + } + return second; +-- +2.34.1 +
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb +1 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \ file://CVE-2026-6253.patch \ file://CVE-2026-4873.patch \ file://CVE-2026-13608.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-18924.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
Re: [OE-core][scarthgap 46/48] curl: Security Fix for CVE-2026-18924
This breaks the build when nthttp2 PACKAGECONFIG is enabled, because curl_share.h included here was renamed from share.h in newer curl 8.22:
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/3887069c661b40e76b053a4867eb565d4761ab3e
8.7.1 version in scarthgap fails with:curl-8.7.1/lib/http2.c:50:10: fatal error: 'curl_share.h' file not found
Using share.h instead of curl_share.h fixes the include, but then it fails with curl-8.7.1/lib/http2.c:781:15: error: call to undeclared function 'Curl_share_easy_link'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
Curl_share_easy_link was added in 8.20 with:
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/82009c4220774417c821496affa4aa834c028b68
and that will be a bit more difficult to backport.
Please drop this one from the PR until it's resolved.
Cheers,
Quoted 82 lines · Yoann Congal via lists.openembedded.org
From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
[1] https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2026-18924.html
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-18924Signed-off-by Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Yoann Congal <[email protected]>--- .../curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patchmeta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch new file +39
-0@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 90325ff0444cbdff368bda5d26d6405a0bb6ee43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:02:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] http2: make server push transfers inherit share from parent + +Reported-by: Stephan Zeisberg +Closes #22488 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/90325ff0444cbdff368bda5d26d6405a0bb6ee43] +CVE: CVE-2026-18924 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + lib/http2.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/http2.c b/lib/http2.c +index 99d7f3b..e6305c9 100644 +--- a/lib/http2.c ++++ b/lib/http2.c +@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ + #include "transfer.h" + #include "dynbuf.h" + #include "headers.h" ++#include "curl_share.h" + /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ + #include "curl_printf.h" + #include "curl_memory.h" +@@ -776,6 +777,8 @@ static struct Curl_easy *h2_duphandle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + second->req.p.http = http; + http2_data_setup(cf, second, &second_stream); + second->state.priority.weight = data->state.priority.weight; ++ if(data->share) ++ (void)Curl_share_easy_link(second, data->share); + } + } + return second; +-- +2.34.1 +meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb +1
-1@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \ file://CVE-2026-6253.patch \ file://CVE-2026-4873.patch \ file://CVE-2026-13608.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-18924.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \ -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-Links: You receive all messages sent to this group.
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Re: [OE-core][scarthgap 46/48] curl: Security Fix for CVE-2026-18924
Quoted 64 lines · Martin Jansa
This breaks the build when nthttp2 PACKAGECONFIG is enabled, because
curl_share.hincluded here was renamed fromshare.hin newer curl 8.22:
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/3887069c661b40e76b053a4867eb565d4761ab3e
8.7.1 version in scarthgap fails with:curl-8.7.1/lib/http2.c:50:10: fatal error: 'curl_share.h' file not foundUsing
share.hinstead ofcurl_share.hfixes the include, but then it fails withcurl-8.7.1/lib/http2.c:781:15: error: call to undeclared function 'Curl_share_easy_link'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
Curl_share_easy_linkwas added in 8.20 with:
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/82009c4220774417c821496affa4aa834c028b68
and that will be a bit more difficult to backport.Please drop this one from the PR until it's resolved.
Cheers,
Quoted 41 lines · Yoann Congal via lists.openembedded.org
From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Picking patch as per [1], and same patch is mentioned in [2]
[1] https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2026-18924.html
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-18924Signed-off-by Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Yoann Congal <[email protected]>--- .../curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patchmeta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch new file +19
-0@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 90325ff0444cbdff368bda5d26d6405a0bb6ee43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:02:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] http2: make server push transfers inherit share from parent + +Reported-by: Stephan Zeisberg +Closes #22488 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/90325ff0444cbdff368bda5d26d6405a0bb6ee43] +CVE: CVE-2026-18924 +Signed-off-by: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]> +--- + lib/http2.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/http2.c b/lib/http2.c +index 99d7f3b..e6305c9 100644 +--- a/lib/http2.c ++++ b/lib/http2.c
Quoted 8 lines
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch line 27
Quoted 8 lines
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch new file +8
-0+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ + #include "transfer.h" + #include "dynbuf.h" + #include "headers.h" ++#include "curl_share.h" + /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ + #include "curl_printf.h" + #include "curl_memory.h"
Ok, dropped. Nice catch.
Thanks!
Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal Smile ECS
PATCH 47/48 curl: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-82209
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>
Analysis:
- The problem only exists when curl is built with libpsl support enabled.[1]
- The recipe is built with "--without-libpsl" option.
- Hence, ignoring the CVE for this recipe.
Reference:
[1] https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2026-82209.html
--- meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb +1 -1
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-5025] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'openssl', 'n CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-10966] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'openssl', 'not-applicable-config: applicable only with wolfssl','unpatched',d)}" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-10536] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'nghttp2', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: applicable only with HTTP/2', d)}" CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-8458] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'krb5 negotiate-auth', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: applicable only with GSS-API-backed Negotiate authentication', d)}" - +CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-82209] = "not-applicable-config: public suffix list support is disabled by the recipe with --without-libpsl" inherit autotools pkgconfig binconfig multilib_header ptest
PATCH 48/48 time64: enable 64-bit time/file-offset flags for 32-bit nativesdk
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Tatrai <[email protected]>
When SDKMACHINE is set to i686 or i586, nativesdk binaries are compiled as 32-bit. Without -D_TIME_BITS=64 and -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64, stat() and time-related syscalls use 32-bit types, causing EOVERFLOW on filesystems with large inode numbers (e.g. container overlay filesystems) and Y2038 issues.
Add SDK_CC_ARCH appends for class-nativesdk:i686 and class-nativesdk:i586 using GLIBC_64BIT_TIME_FLAGS, mirroring how target architectures are handled.
The existing GLIBC_64BIT_TIME_FLAGS:pn-glibc override only matches the target recipe, not the class extended nativesdk-glibc, so an additional pn-nativesdk-glibc override is needed here. This is required on scarthgap but not on master/wrynose, because scarthgap carries glibc 2.39, which predates glibc commit a4ed0471d717 ("Always define __USE_TIME_BITS64 when 64 bit time_t is used"). In 2.39 the header redirect turns sigtimedwait into an alias of __sigtimedwait64, which then collides with glibc's own weak_alias() and fails to assemble:
Error: symbol '__sigtimedwait64' is already defined
Also exclude nativesdk-mingw-w64-runtime. The MinGW runtime provides the Windows CRT rather than glibc, and _FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 changes its stat declarations. That causes conflicting declarations for wstat when building the CRT itself.
--- meta/conf/distro/include/time64.inc | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
meta/conf/distro/include/time64.inc +17 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,23 @@ GLIBC_64BIT_TIME_FLAGS:pn-pulseaudio = "" # libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform_limits_posix.cpp GLIBC_64BIT_TIME_FLAGS:pn-gcc-sanitizers = "" +# Apply the same flags to nativesdk packages when building for a 32-bit SDK +# host (i686, i586). +SDK_CC_ARCH:append:class-nativesdk:i686 = "${GLIBC_64BIT_TIME_FLAGS}" +SDK_CC_ARCH:append:class-nativesdk:i586 = "${GLIBC_64BIT_TIME_FLAGS}" + +# Recipes which implement or wrap the libc APIs themselves must not be built +# with these flags, as the redirections glibc performs would collide with the +# symbols the recipes define (e.g. "symbol '__sigtimedwait64' is already +# defined" in nativesdk-glibc, or duplicate creat64/fopen64 in +# nativesdk-pseudo). The pn- overrides above only match the target recipes, so +# the class extended variants have to be listed separately. +GLIBC_64BIT_TIME_FLAGS:pn-nativesdk-glibc = "" +GLIBC_64BIT_TIME_FLAGS:pn-nativesdk-pseudo = "" +# The MinGW runtime provides the Windows CRT rather than glibc. These flags +# change its stat declarations and cause conflicting types in the CRT sources. +GLIBC_64BIT_TIME_FLAGS:pn-nativesdk-mingw-w64-runtime = "" + # Caused by the flags exceptions above INSANE_SKIP:append:pn-gcc-sanitizers = " 32bit-time" INSANE_SKIP:append:pn-glibc = " 32bit-time"