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PATCH In review Yoann Congal 2 participants 64 messages Oct 11 – Oct 12 RISC-V

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Please review this set of changes for wrynose and have comments back by end of day Tuesday, October 13.

Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/?#/builders/29/builds/4907
qemuarm-tc failed due to disk space issue on the autobuilder worker. Retried in https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/?#/builders/42/builds/4782

The following changes since commit 0f03c732a0a2d0506b41b1abe60b3f368b2300dc:

build-appliance-image: Update to wrynose head revisions (2026-09-30 11:06:32 +0100)

are available in the Git repository at:

https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/wrynose-review
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/wrynose-review

for you to fetch changes up to d1d174cf7d58aae5f00281aafcebc2fe11e41200:

libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-103111 (2026-10-10 23:41:04 +0200)

----------------------------------------------------------------

Alexander Kanavin (1):
tzcode/tzdata: fix upstream version check

Babanpreet Singh (2):
devtool: standard: fix update-recipe/finish --initial-rev override oeqa/selftest/devtool: cover update-recipe --initial-rev

Bhavesh R Maheshwari (2):
ffmpeg: Fix for CVE-2026-66036
ffmpeg: Fix for CVE-2026-66041

Darsh Kelaiya (1):
python3-click: depend on python3-shell for shlex

Deepesh Varatharajan (1):
glibc: stable 2.43 branch updates to 9cda6fc96ab

Frieder Schrempf (1):
weston: fix VNC backend build with aml 1.0

Ghanshyam Banait (1):
wget: fix CVE-2026-15146

Harish Sadineni (2):
glibc: stable 2.43 branch updates to 562cd7badd qemuriscv.inc: default to fw_dynamic.elf as QEMU BIOS

Hetvi Thakar (5):
openssh: fix CVE-2026-73283
openssh: fix CVE-2026-73282
openssh: fix CVE-2026-73281
vim: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-51400
vim: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-51401

Jaipaul Cheernam (1):
bind: upgrade 9.20.26 -> 9.20.27

Jakub Szczudlo (Nokia) (5):
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42012
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42013
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42014
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42015
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-5260

Lucas Stach (1):
barebox: upgrade 2026.04.0 -> 2026.04.2

Peter Marko (32):
glibc: set status for CVE-2011-0536 and CVE-2025-0577
gnutls: set status for CVE-2023-0361
libarchive: set status for CVE-2026-4424
nfs-utils: set status for CVE-2025-12801
openssl: set status for CVE-2015-3216
ovmf: set status of CVE-2017-5731 and CVE-2019-14584
ppp: set status for CVE-2020-15704
pulseaudio: set status for CVE-2020-15710 and CVE-2020-16123
graphene: set status for CVE-2026-81281
openssh: set status for CVE-2026-55655
openssh: set status for CVE-2026-55654
xserver-xorg: set status for CVE-2026-55999 and CVE-2026-56000
openssl: upgrade 3.5.8 -> 3.5.9
glibc: set status for CVE-2026-86805 and CVE-2026-95818
libpng: upgrade 1.6.56 -> 1.6.58
libpng: upgrade 1.6.58 -> 1.6.59
util-linux(-uuid): upgrade 2.41.5 -> 2.41.6
libsolv: patch CVE-2026-48863
expat: patch CVE-2026-66046 and CVE-2026-76641
expat: patch CVE-2026-76956
expat: patch CVE-2026-76957
expat: patch CVE-2026-93990
alsa-lib: patch CVE-2026-90781
go: upgrade 1.26.8 -> 1.26.9
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89162
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89161
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89156
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89157
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89160
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89158
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-86145
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-103111

Peter Tatrai (1):
systemd: fix mDNS hostname changes

Richard Purdie (1):
bind: upgrade 9.20.27 -> 9.20.29

Ross Burton (2):
gstreamer: skip test_queue:test_leaky_downstream test as it's flakey
libaio: update SRC_URI

Vijay Anusuri (1):
tzdata/tzcode-native: upgrade 2026c -> 2026d

 meta/conf/machine/include/riscv/qemuriscv.inc |   5 +-
 meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py       |  22 +
 meta/recipes-bsp/barebox/barebox-common.inc   |   4 +-
 ...1-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch |   2 +-
 ...kport-ax_prog_cc_for_build.m4-macros.patch |   2 +-
 ...d-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch |   4 +-
 ...ching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch |   4 +-
 .../recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/conf.patch |   2 +-
 ...t.d-add-support-for-read-only-rootfs.patch |   2 +-
 .../bind/make-etc-initd-bind-stop-work.patch  |   2 +-
 .../bind/{bind_9.20.26.bb => bind_9.20.29.bb} |   2 +-
 .../nfs-utils/nfs-utils_2.8.7.bb              |   2 +
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73281.patch      |  80 +++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73282.patch      |  80 +++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73283.patch      |  42 ++
 .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb                 |   5 +
 .../{openssl_3.5.8.bb => openssl_3.5.9.bb}    |   4 +-
 meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp_2.5.2.bb    |   1 +
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-01.patch       | 107 ++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-02.patch       |  90 +++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76641.patch          | 160 ++++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76956.patch          |  26 +
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-01.patch       | 121 ++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-02.patch       |  85 +++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-01.patch       | 191 +++++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-02.patch       | 328 +++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.8.3.bb        |   8 +
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc     |   2 +-
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.43.bb         |   5 +
 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb            |   2 +
 ...use-traffic-from-the-local-host-only.patch |  61 +++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_259.5.bb    |   1 +
 ...2.41.5.bb => util-linux-libuuid_2.41.6.bb} |   0
 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux.inc   |   5 +-
 ...sing-fileutils.h-include-to-hook_idm.patch |  38 ++
 .../util-linux/CVE-2026-78408.patch           |  75 +++
 .../util-linux/CVE-2026-78410.patch           | 115 ++++
 ...l-linux_2.41.5.bb => util-linux_2.41.6.bb} |   0
 .../go/{go-1.26.8.inc => go-1.26.9.inc}       |   2 +-
 ...e_1.26.8.bb => go-binary-native_1.26.9.bb} |   6 +-
 ..._1.26.8.bb => go-cross-canadian_1.26.9.bb} |   0
 ...{go-cross_1.26.8.bb => go-cross_1.26.9.bb} |   0
 ...osssdk_1.26.8.bb => go-crosssdk_1.26.9.bb} |   0
 ...runtime_1.26.8.bb => go-runtime_1.26.9.bb} |   0
 ...ent-based-hash-generation-less-pedan.patch |   8 +-
 ...3-ld-add-soname-to-shareable-objects.patch |   6 +-
 ...d-go-make-GOROOT-precious-by-default.patch |   2 +-
 ...ut-build-specific-paths-from-linker-.patch |   4 +-
 .../go/{go_1.26.8.bb => go_1.26.9.bb}         |   0
 .../python/python3-click_8.3.3.bb             |   1 +
 .../recipes-extended/libaio/libaio_0.3.113.bb |   2 +-
 .../libarchive/libarchive_3.8.7.bb            |   1 +
 .../libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-48863.patch      |  25 +
 .../libsolv/libsolv_0.7.36.bb                 |   1 +
 meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc   |   8 +-
 .../wget/wget/CVE-2026-15146.patch            | 126 +++++
 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.25.0.bb     |   1 +
 .../graphene/graphene_1.10.8.bb               |   1 +
 .../weston/0001-backend-vnc-Use-aml-v1.patch  |  24 +
 .../recipes-graphics/wayland/weston_15.0.0.bb |   3 +-
 .../xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg.inc             |   2 +
 .../alsa/alsa-lib/CVE-2026-90781.patch        |  41 ++
 .../alsa/alsa-lib_1.2.15.3.bb                 |   1 +
 .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p1.patch     | 120 ++++
 .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p2.patch     |  71 +++
 .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66041.patch        |  60 ++
 .../recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_8.0.3.bb |   3 +
 .../gstreamer/gstreamer1.0/run-ptest          |   3 +
 .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p1.patch      | 518 ------------------
 .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p2.patch      | 481 ----------------
 .../{libpng_1.6.56.bb => libpng_1.6.59.bb}    |   7 +-
 .../pulseaudio/pulseaudio.inc                 |   2 +
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre1.patch   |  69 +++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre2.patch   | 161 ++++++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012.patch        |  48 ++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013-pre1.patch   |  56 ++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013.patch        |  74 +++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42014.patch        |  60 ++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42015.patch        |  43 ++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p1.patch      |  69 +++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p2.patch      |  33 ++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb  |  10 +
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-103111.patch    | 111 ++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-86145.patch     | 158 ++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89156.patch     | 275 ++++++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89157.patch     |  61 +++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89158.patch     | 208 +++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89160.patch     | 225 ++++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89161.patch     | 221 ++++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89162.patch     |  88 +++
 .../recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb |   8 +
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc              |   3 +
 scripts/lib/devtool/standard.py               |   4 +
 93 files changed, 4160 insertions(+), 1040 deletions(-)
 rename meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/{bind_9.20.26.bb => bind_9.20.29.bb} (97%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73281.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73282.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73283.patch
 rename meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/{openssl_3.5.8.bb => openssl_3.5.9.bb} (98%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76641.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76956.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-Revert-resolve-refuse-traffic-from-the-local-host-only.patch
 rename meta/recipes-core/util-linux/{util-linux-libuuid_2.41.5.bb => util-linux-libuuid_2.41.6.bb} (100%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/0001-libmount-add-missing-fileutils.h-include-to-hook_idm.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2026-78408.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2026-78410.patch
 rename meta/recipes-core/util-linux/{util-linux_2.41.5.bb => util-linux_2.41.6.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-1.26.8.inc => go-1.26.9.inc} (90%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-binary-native_1.26.8.bb => go-binary-native_1.26.9.bb} (80%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-cross-canadian_1.26.8.bb => go-cross-canadian_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-cross_1.26.8.bb => go-cross_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-crosssdk_1.26.8.bb => go-crosssdk_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-runtime_1.26.8.bb => go-runtime_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go_1.26.8.bb => go_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-48863.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-15146.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/wayland/weston/0001-backend-vnc-Use-aml-v1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/alsa/alsa-lib/CVE-2026-90781.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66041.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p1.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p2.patch
 rename meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/{libpng_1.6.56.bb => libpng_1.6.59.bb} (94%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013-pre1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42014.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42015.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-103111.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-86145.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89156.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89157.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89158.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89160.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89161.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89162.patch
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/60 glibc: set status for CVE-2011-0536 and CVE-2025-0577

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

New version of sbom-cve-check makes more torough version validation and version strings with distro specific suffix is no longer accepted, thus leaving some CVEs without version to compare (no-version-ranges).

* CVE-2011-0536: CVE desciption says it's related to RedHat patches
* CVE-2025-0577: [1] linked CVE report says it's related to RedHat patches and no upstream release is impacted

[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2338871

(From OE-Core rev: 85babe3703588b00a03f7087c54440243a993ee5)

---
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.43.bb | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.43.bb +3 -0
index 9f3a3814d0a..5c21223b55f 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-1010025] = "disputed: \
 Allows for ASLR bypass so can bypass some hardening, not an exploit in itself, may allow \
 easier access for another. 'ASLR bypass itself is not a vulnerability.'"
 
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2011-0536] = "not-applicable-platform: specific to RHEL patches"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-0577] = "not-applicable-platform: specific to RHEL patches"
+
 CVE_STATUS_GROUPS += "CVE_STATUS_STABLE_BACKPORTS"
 CVE_STATUS_STABLE_BACKPORTS = "CVE-2025-15281 CVE-2026-0861 CVE-2026-0915 CVE-2026-4437 CVE-2026-4438 \
     CVE-2026-4046 \
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/60 gnutls: set status for CVE-2023-0361

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

New version of sbom-cve-check makes more torough version validation and version strings with distro specific suffix is no longer accepted, thus leaving some CVEs without version to compare (no-version-ranges).

Per [1] this CVE was fixed in v3.8.0.

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-0361

(From OE-Core rev: 9d9b944d390efdf45196e53e4283e3ec2acfd0fd)

---
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb +1 -0
index 538fd9c9e0d..92854eeaf9c 100644
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ pkg_postinst_ontarget:${PN}-fips () {
     fi
 }
 
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-0361] = "fixed-version: fixed in version 3.8.0"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-32989] = "fixed-version: fixed in version 3.8.10"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-32990] = "fixed-version: fixed in version 3.8.10"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-1584] = "fixed-version: fixed in version 3.8.12"
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/60 libarchive: set status for CVE-2026-4424

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

New version of sbom-cve-check makes more torough version validation and version strings with distro specific suffix is no longer accepted, thus leaving some CVEs without version to compare (no-version-ranges).

These are RedHat CVEs listing version-less or distro versions.

Release 3.8.7 notes [1] contain reference to pull [2] from NVD report.

[1] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/releases/tag/v3.8.7
[2] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/2898

(From OE-Core rev: 4359d85f9dcb0a6d188859f1ae0200352668b9cc)

---
 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.8.7.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.8.7.bb +1 -0
index afc06f85d4c..c0a29211434 100644
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ do_install_ptest() {
 
 RDEPENDS:${PN}-ptest += "bsdtar bsdcpio"
 
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-4424] = "fixed-version: fixed since 3.8.7"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-4426] = "fixed-version: fixed since 3.8.7"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-5121] = "fixed-version: fixed since 3.8.7"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-5745] = "fixed-version: fixed since 3.8.6"
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/60 nfs-utils: set status for CVE-2025-12801

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

New version of sbom-cve-check makes more torough version validation and version strings with distro specific suffix is no longer accepted, thus leaving some CVEs without version to compare (no-version-ranges).

This is RedHat version-less CVE.

(From OE-Core rev: 2bb062e403c7093734de6467c49503a7d8970d9e)

---
 meta/recipes-connectivity/nfs-utils/nfs-utils_2.8.7.bb | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/nfs-utils/nfs-utils_2.8.7.bb +2 -0
index 7693a88682f..a5ebf7043e7 100644
@@ -147,3 +147,5 @@ do_install:append () {
 	chown -R rpcuser:rpcuser ${D}${localstatedir}/lib/nfs/statd
 	chmod 0644 ${D}${localstatedir}/lib/nfs/statd/state
 }
+
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-12801] = "fixed-version: Fixed since v2.8.6"
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/60 openssl: set status for CVE-2015-3216

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

New version of sbom-cve-check makes more torough version validation and version strings with distro specific suffix is no longer accepted, thus leaving some CVEs without version to compare (no-version-ranges).

Per [1] this fffects Red Hat specific patch.

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2015-3216

(From OE-Core rev: 0353d7f67e6fedfc10e9ca56a6bf5f3ca9e215e8)

---
 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.5.8.bb | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.5.8.bb +2 -0
index d8cae41291a..71446e62e31 100644
@@ -301,3 +301,5 @@ INSANE_SKIP:${PN} = "already-stripped"
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
 
 CVE_PRODUCT = "openssl:openssl"
+
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2015-3216] = "not-applicable-platform: specific to RHEL patches"
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/60 ovmf: set status of CVE-2017-5731 and CVE-2019-14584

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

New version of sbom-cve-check makes more torough version validation and version strings with distro specific suffix is no longer accepted, thus leaving some CVEs without version to compare (no-version-ranges).

OVMF has a generic problem that version is encoded in different ways. Both CVE have their fixed version in NVD CVE reports encoded as YYYY-MM-DD...

CVE-2017-5731 additionally predates tags in vurrent git repository.

(From OE-Core rev: 1ac5e07968d2dc23343ca3a7c1eab7c3788fff41)

---
 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb +2 -0
index 01f840c2154..cd6a40a9d07 100644
@@ -40,11 +40,13 @@ CVE_VERSION = "${@d.getVar('PV').split('stable')[1]}"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2014-8271] = "fixed-version: Fixed in svn_16280, which is an unusual versioning breaking version comparison."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2014-4859] = "fixed-version: The CPE in the NVD database doesn't reflect correctly the vulnerable versions."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2014-4860] = "fixed-version: The CPE in the NVD database doesn't reflect correctly the vulnerable versions."
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2017-5731] = "fixed-version: fixed since 2017-11-07"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14553] = "fixed-version: The CPE in the NVD database doesn't reflect correctly the vulnerable versions."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14559] = "fixed-version: The CPE in the NVD database doesn't reflect correctly the vulnerable versions."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14562] = "fixed-version: The CPE in the NVD database doesn't reflect correctly the vulnerable versions."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14563] = "fixed-version: The CPE in the NVD database doesn't reflect correctly the vulnerable versions."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14575] = "fixed-version: The CPE in the NVD database doesn't reflect correctly the vulnerable versions."
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14584] = "fixed-version: fixed since edk2-stables202011"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14586] = "fixed-version: The CPE in the NVD database doesn't reflect correctly the vulnerable versions."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14587] = "fixed-version: The CPE in the NVD database doesn't reflect correctly the vulnerable versions."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2024-1298] = "fixed-version: fixed since edk2-stable202405"
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/60 ppp: set status for CVE-2020-15704

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

New version of sbom-cve-check makes more torough version validation and version strings with distro specific suffix is no longer accepted, thus leaving some CVEs without version to compare (no-version-ranges).

Per [1] this is Ubuntu-specific issue.

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-15704

(From OE-Core rev: 1f875a76c3b5aca955f705163b07dd1fe20373be)

---
 meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp_2.5.2.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp_2.5.2.bb +1 -0
index 37e223b4abe..698d6930ebe 100644
@@ -79,3 +79,4 @@ SUMMARY:${PN}-password = "Plugin for PPP to get passwords via a pipe"
 SUMMARY:${PN}-l2tp     = "Plugin for PPP for l2tp support"
 SUMMARY:${PN}-tools    = "Additional tools for the PPP package"
 
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2020-15704] = "not-applicable-platform: specific to Ubuntu"
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/60 pulseaudio: set status for CVE-2020-15710 and CVE-2020-16123

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

New version of sbom-cve-check makes more torough version validation and version strings with distro specific suffix is no longer accepted, thus leaving some CVEs without version to compare (no-version-ranges).

Per [1] and [2] these are Ubuntu specific CVEs.

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-15710
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2020-16123

(From OE-Core rev: d202f8cb555f04eda34eb2793c5802aac43f58cc)

---
 meta/recipes-multimedia/pulseaudio/pulseaudio.inc | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-multimedia/pulseaudio/pulseaudio.inc +2 -0
index a8a5a1e074c..1df24bf04ba 100644
@@ -297,4 +297,6 @@ RDEPENDS:pulseaudio-server += "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'x11', \
                                   bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'systemd', 'pulseaudio-module-systemd-login', 'pulseaudio-module-console-kit', d), \
                                   '', d)}"
 
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2020-15710] = "not-applicable-platform: specific to Ubuntu"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2020-16123] = "not-applicable-platform: specific to Ubuntu"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2024-11586] = "not-applicable-platform: specific to Ubuntu 16.04"
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/60 tzcode/tzdata: fix upstream version check

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Alexander Kanavin <[email protected]>

The webpage no longer lists tarballs directly, but the actual directory with them can again be listed.

(cherry picked from commit 1486d28e70af2e297ac0a9650e782481beaa16bb)
---
 meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc +0 -2
index 47f9ac2855f..a09da2617f4 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,5 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzcode${PV}.tar.gz
 
 S = "${UNPACKDIR}/tz"
 
-UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://www.iana.org/time-zones"
-
 SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "b1cffc3ace4c4c7cd0efba2f7add86ec3d0b79da48bcf03582671fd3c8feace8"
 SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "e4a178a4477f3d0ea77cc31828ff72aa38feff8d61aa13e7e99e142e9d902be4"
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/60 tzdata/tzcode-native: upgrade 2026c -> 2026d

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>

Briefly:
Canada’s Northwest Territories moved to permanent -06 on 2026-08-21. Obsolescent settings like TZ="EST5EDT" now conform better to POSIX. Fix security, performance and porting bugs in zic and localtime.

Changes to future timestamps

Canada’s Northwest Territories will not fall back on 2026-11-01 and will stay on -06 year-round, matching Alberta’s recent change. Model this with its traditional abbreviation CST. Although the change to permanent -06 legally took place on 2026-08-21, temporarily model the change to occur on 2026-11-01 at 02:00 for the same reason as other recent temporary hacks. (Caution:
see “NOTE FOR 2026b TEMPORARY HACK FOR CLDR AND CANADA” below.) This affects only America/Inuvik as the rest of the territory is covered by America/Edmonton, for which the equivalent change was released in 2026c.

Changes to past timestamps

Colombia’s 1992-05-02 spring forward was at 00:00, not 24:00.

Iran’s 1979-05-26 spring forward was at 00:00, not 24:00. (Thanks to N.F. Hase.)

The backward-compatibility names EST5EDT, CST6CDT, MST7MDT, and PST8PDT now conform better to POSIX. For example, EST5EDT now always uses the abbreviation "EST" for standard time (now always 5 hours behind UT) and "EDT" for daylight saving time, whereas it formerly had different UT offsets before standard time was introduced and sometimes used abbreviations like "LMT", "EWT" and "EPT", all contrary to POSIX. Also, though not required by POSIX these names now use US federal rules rather than rules of places like New York, reverting to 2024a behavior. This change affects only timestamps before 1966-10-30 at 01:00 standard time.

Other data changes

The temporary hacks used for North American timekeeping changes now work around a libstdc++ std::chrono bug in GCC 14.1-14.4, 15.1-15.2, and 16.1; see GCC bug 124851. This data change does not affect TZif files or timestamps. The change does not work around the related but less serious GCC bugs 116110 and 124513. These GCC bugs are all fixed in GCC 16.2.

Changes to code

zic now rejects Link targets that would have invalid names, and more efficiently processes Expires, Leap and Rule lines with years far in the past or future. (Thanks to Darren Carreras.)

zic now ports to systems that report lack of link support via EINVAL, ENOSYS or EPERM errno values. (Thanks to Tom Lane.)

When tzset and related functions encounter a TZif file that is too large for them, they now consistently fail instead of sometimes silently ignoring excess parts of the file.

localtime-related functions no longer mishandle extreme timestamps when given TZif files holding some unlikely timezone histories. (Problem reported by David Sarkisyan.)

localtime-related functions no longer check the values of TZif files’ standard/wall and UT/local indicators, which these functions have not used since 2026a’s removal of the old posixrules feature.

tzcode has been ported to Haiku.

localtime.c now works again by default on AIX and DragonFly BSD.

zic now rejects ‘:’ and ‘\’ in Zone and Link names when running on Microsoft Windows. (Problem reported by David Diaz.)

Changes to documentation

URLs for release tarballs in tz-link.html have been updated to reflect their new canonical URLs on data.iana.org.

Ref: https://www.iana.org/time-zones/releases/2026d

(cherry picked from commit 400938b8ca41654fbda6c34c6eb8c12aec1f43b0)
---
 meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc +3 -3
index a09da2617f4..6a65f2deb22 100644
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ SECTION = "base"
 LICENSE = "PD & BSD-3-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=c679c9d6b02bc2757b3eaf8f53c43fba"
 
-PV = "2026c"
+PV = "2026d"
 
 SRC_URI = "http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzcode${PV}.tar.gz;name=tzcode;subdir=tz \
            http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzdata${PV}.tar.gz;name=tzdata;subdir=tz \
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzcode${PV}.tar.gz
 
 S = "${UNPACKDIR}/tz"
 
-SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "b1cffc3ace4c4c7cd0efba2f7add86ec3d0b79da48bcf03582671fd3c8feace8"
-SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "e4a178a4477f3d0ea77cc31828ff72aa38feff8d61aa13e7e99e142e9d902be4"
+SRC_URI[tzcode.sha256sum] = "2f5c9f7fe29e6b8cb863583667884b8ce17b0a485355a054b591c6bdfcd81791"
+SRC_URI[tzdata.sha256sum] = "0cb2aa8e333c3dc049badc42a0c61f21987b8cd44e107fa900bad764aacc7767"
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/60 bind: upgrade 9.20.26 -> 9.20.27

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Jaipaul Cheernam <[email protected]>

ChangeLog: https://bind9.readthedocs.io/en/stable/changelog.html#bind-9-20-27

(cherry picked from commit 6de1243270216428d7eefdbc0ea5657e0aeb3a48)
---
 .../bind/bind/0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch   | 2 +-
 .../0001-m4-Backport-ax_prog_cc_for_build.m4-macros.patch     | 2 +-
 ...0001-named-lwresd-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch | 4 ++--
 ...bind-ensure-searching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch | 4 ++--
 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/conf.patch                | 2 +-
 .../bind/bind/init.d-add-support-for-read-only-rootfs.patch   | 2 +-
 .../bind/bind/make-etc-initd-bind-stop-work.patch             | 2 +-
 .../bind/{bind_9.20.26.bb => bind_9.20.27.bb}                 | 2 +-
 8 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
 rename meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/{bind_9.20.26.bb => bind_9.20.27.bb} (97%)
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch +1 -1
index 7ed4c5fd2f9..30da1e9fd3e 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From a67ac281cd86d8d9ca27e64a5944deb5578e5087 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 7682cbc2fa624fbeeb088736e154090d92c8b524 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Chen Qi <[email protected]>
 Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:55:09 +0800
 Subject: [PATCH] avoid start failure with bind user
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/0001-m4-Backport-ax_prog_cc_for_build.m4-macros.patch +1 -1
index da4cdef696e..f1d8a8e5691 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 16608520c9d946223404165732eacd79b59de471 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From a633e336c248ceab41d3182848b65c95e90ef88c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
 Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:33:49 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] m4: Backport ax_prog_cc_for_build.m4 macros
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/0001-named-lwresd-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch +2 -2
index 07acce9cba0..da4057064e1 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From d925183807ae182cf332124ff5a617d257e184f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 4b870f60338fe45e036b8a76d47f053338920048 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
 Date: Mon, 27 Aug 2018 21:24:20 +0800
 Subject: [PATCH] `named/lwresd -V' and start log hide build options
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index af020f0..f461229 100644
+index 56bca5b..4fd62ed 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
 @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ AC_DEFINE([PACKAGE_VERSION_EXTRA], ["][bind_VERSION_EXTRA]["], [BIND 9 Extra par
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-ensure-searching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch +2 -2
index 4e90e972715..9adc101247e 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From af229781e60d6779c76d5a61d26a4597b2a42f6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f3736e5535236cf978fd368b6905098ff6e4fd84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>
 Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2015 11:22:00 -0400
 Subject: [PATCH] bind: ensure searching for json headers searches sysroot
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index f47ce7b..af020f0 100644
+index c06a0d7..56bca5b 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
 @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ AS_CASE([$with_lmdb],
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/conf.patch +1 -1
index 3425742d1ba..803456c0b33 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From bde3a4cb010f459a9ef92817c7e6e6e2d871794a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 450187e8feac041de02afd4c0c9039cc41e04cb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Qing He <[email protected]>
 Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2010 13:35:42 +0800
 Subject: [PATCH] bind: add new recipe
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/init.d-add-support-for-read-only-rootfs.patch +1 -1
index 9b55afb5d3b..a2c1fbb8f70 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 8876e722beda701a0de021360ff381347120c6ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 582334d31432969be7e10906de7540f1dc64b17e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Chen Qi <[email protected]>
 Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 02:34:41 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] init.d: add support for read-only rootfs
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/make-etc-initd-bind-stop-work.patch +1 -1
index 33d5d34f158..dc1f8f5a9a6 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 26c988eee9d2eae7c7dec8c529176352017b2ce1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 50601a7ee8fd19ddbe9a592c57ae6197782d4c2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Roy Li <[email protected]>
 Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2012 02:27:54 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] bind: make "/etc/init.d/bind stop" work
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.20.27.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.20.26.bb +1 -1
similarity index 97%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.20.26.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.20.27.bb
index fe2ae3f002f..6d2b88e0123 100644
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
 		   file://0001-m4-Backport-ax_prog_cc_for_build.m4-macros.patch \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "55248def0f870c4c46b3de72978ea972615131516663188a4564dca1d20bf350"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "145ab7a50b33a06d9d488b5e668c887e754f42acf8954e2b5dc7e238b080e4a0"
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/"
 # follow the ESV versions divisible by 2
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/60 bind: upgrade 9.20.27 -> 9.20.29

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>

BIND 9.20.28
------------

The BIND 9.20.28 release was withdrawn after the discovery of a regression in it during pre-release testing.

BIND 9.20.29
------------

Security Fixes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- [CVE-2026-19668] Prevent excessive CPU use validating crafted DNSSEC responses. ``a0a61dba9e``

- [CVE-2026-19033] Require a TSIG on every message of incoming zone transfers. ``9404cd2b8c``

- [CVE-2026-77119] Prevent a DNSSEC downgrade of secure delegations via unrelated NSEC3. ``3bed9c8e9e``

- [CVE-2026-19941] Prevent forged DNSSEC-validated NXDOMAIN responses. ``a36bf58daf``

- [CVE-2026-19666] DNS64 with break-dnssec could cause an assertion failure. ``4cec4965c4``

- [CVE-2026-19667] Reject negative cache records that do not fit in a dns_rdata_t. ``dbf08c8581``

- [CVE-2026-19662] Prevent resolver crash with cached DNSSEC proofs. ``c884cc1ba0``

- [CVE-2026-75029] Discard repeated SOA, CNAME, and DNAME records when parsing DNS messages. ``0d630758c2``

- [CVE-2026-77692] Fix an unauthenticated crash on HTTPS using SIG(0) ``5a24401c5c``

- [CVE-2026-81736] Cached HTTPS/SVCB aliases could exhaust resolver CPU. ``20bbb1639a``

- [CVE-2026-76163] Prevent TKEY queries from terminating named without global options. ``7645138538``

- [CVE-2026-78301] Out-of-zone records in a zone database could be served as authoritative. ``72a10c3a0b``

- [CVE-2026-80274] Crash on wildcard answers carrying both NSEC and NSEC3 proofs. ``0e44451b1a``

- [CVE-2026-81563] Following HTTPS/SVCB aliases could leak resolver cache memory. ``3162df369e``

New Features
~~~~~~~~~~~~

- Add an agent skill for the isc_job/isc_async/isc_work APIs. ``fe32990b06``

Removed Features
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- Remove unused closest encloser proof caching. ``abd8b5bfd8``

Feature Changes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

- Reject oversized and malformed DNSKEY records up front. ``6c22109924``

Bug Fixes
~~~~~~~~~

- Prevent a crash when using both dns64 and filter-a. ``bce5d10d18``

- Fix update-policy grant external address passing. ``b1e955c326``

- Missing required NSEC3 for delegation not detected. ``e84ed2e9d7``

- Tighten EUI48 and EUI48 text parsing. ``ff50f2cdf1``

- GeoIP ACL state can be stale or wrong after reload. ``63baf425b3``

- Honor DNSSEC policy key tag ranges. ``b82e5834b7``

- Fix double free in mdig when EDNS options are specified. ``af5bd0b0ff``

- Fix a crash when an IXFR falls back to AXFR with updates still pending. ``e34062bc7e``

- Fix DS requests to parental agents over TLS. ``55830d30f6``

- Fix a crash when resolving names below a cached DNAME. ``b94e940f52``

- Rndc-confgen -q (quiet) option is documented but doesn't work. ``7e4a7ca1a7``

- Enforce query ACLs for redirect zones and searched DLZs. ``bc69876b2e``

- Check "asnum" validity in GeoIP ACLs. ``28c2bfdc7b``

- Prevent crashes while reporting DNSSEC signing statistics. ``c190514f0a``

- Fix various nits in the netmgr code. ``c28cdad51b``

The MR consists of couple of small fixes and uncaught errors in the Network Manager. :gl:#6257 :gl:!12576

- Fix a crash on remote-servers lists that reference themselves. ``aaae614f9d``

- A record from outside a response policy zone could stop named. ``d135513b37``

- "rndc flushtree ." failed to flush the cache. ``96e8b585ed``

- Invalid key-store configuration could abort the DNSSEC tools. ``1d796ab072``

- NSEC signature set could bypass the secure-delegation check. ``c966177f6c``

- Fix a possible nsupdate issue when using GSS-TSIG. ``4ddcab2d3c``

- Fix isccc_alist_define error paths. ``af1349552a``

- Check for empty 'endpoints' list. ``23f58af443``

- Named could crash with a single-element geoip sortlist. ``0e996a4d3b``

- Prevent out-of-bailiwick CNAMEs from evicting cached records. ``cdedd4acd5``

- Restore periodic cleanup of stale resolver address data. ``356f4013f8``

- Fix named-checkconf/named crash with malformed key name. ``9f218f6aaf``

- Fix -Wformat-truncation warning in totext_in_wks() ``f97c2bea40``

- Fix off-by-one errors caused by magic hardcoded values. ``726c6cb795``

- Hmac_verify() now accepts truncated HMACs only when requested. ``c81b111496``

- Prevent resolver crashes while processing DNS over TCP. ``81b3b6d89f``

(cherry picked from commit c366449b3b6cb47dc418cf65340a35ea3a047621)
---
 .../bind/bind/0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch   | 2 +-
 .../0001-m4-Backport-ax_prog_cc_for_build.m4-macros.patch     | 2 +-
 ...0001-named-lwresd-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch | 4 ++--
 ...bind-ensure-searching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch | 4 ++--
 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/conf.patch                | 2 +-
 .../bind/bind/init.d-add-support-for-read-only-rootfs.patch   | 2 +-
 .../bind/bind/make-etc-initd-bind-stop-work.patch             | 2 +-
 .../bind/{bind_9.20.27.bb => bind_9.20.29.bb}                 | 2 +-
 8 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
 rename meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/{bind_9.20.27.bb => bind_9.20.29.bb} (97%)
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch +1 -1
index 30da1e9fd3e..15796a15fba 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 7682cbc2fa624fbeeb088736e154090d92c8b524 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 95141cf9494292fc5645165ef3d5e9e2ed2208c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Chen Qi <[email protected]>
 Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2018 16:55:09 +0800
 Subject: [PATCH] avoid start failure with bind user
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/0001-m4-Backport-ax_prog_cc_for_build.m4-macros.patch +1 -1
index f1d8a8e5691..99e781799da 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From a633e336c248ceab41d3182848b65c95e90ef88c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 06e9624eb7e474a08ed7e1a456bfe9759ba211da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Khem Raj <[email protected]>
 Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 23:33:49 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] m4: Backport ax_prog_cc_for_build.m4 macros
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/0001-named-lwresd-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch +2 -2
index da4057064e1..80a4f2abded 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 4b870f60338fe45e036b8a76d47f053338920048 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f28920a59b658fcda24efde1c45322f785a0b0fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]>
 Date: Mon, 27 Aug 2018 21:24:20 +0800
 Subject: [PATCH] `named/lwresd -V' and start log hide build options
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <[email protected]>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 56bca5b..4fd62ed 100644
+index 0bc3965..e1c2b12 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
 @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ AC_DEFINE([PACKAGE_VERSION_EXTRA], ["][bind_VERSION_EXTRA]["], [BIND 9 Extra par
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/bind-ensure-searching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch +2 -2
index 9adc101247e..323985a4025 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From f3736e5535236cf978fd368b6905098ff6e4fd84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From f003f396067e6cc1e2ec609b296bb642b8ddf47b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>
 Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2015 11:22:00 -0400
 Subject: [PATCH] bind: ensure searching for json headers searches sysroot
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index c06a0d7..56bca5b 100644
+index 26c442a..0bc3965 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
 @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ AS_CASE([$with_lmdb],
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/conf.patch +1 -1
index 803456c0b33..28ee4ae74d3 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 450187e8feac041de02afd4c0c9039cc41e04cb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 5fc3dfd3f994b5fd97e97837eee2ad808cd8af93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Qing He <[email protected]>
 Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2010 13:35:42 +0800
 Subject: [PATCH] bind: add new recipe
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/init.d-add-support-for-read-only-rootfs.patch +1 -1
index a2c1fbb8f70..b373251c47e 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 582334d31432969be7e10906de7540f1dc64b17e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 42c109317070d19fda70635b7043cbc6f9ec36ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Chen Qi <[email protected]>
 Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 02:34:41 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] init.d: add support for read-only rootfs
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/make-etc-initd-bind-stop-work.patch +1 -1
index dc1f8f5a9a6..74cf947787a 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-From 50601a7ee8fd19ddbe9a592c57ae6197782d4c2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 2e1314f2e71be15704ba18756250185b36a5c0da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Roy Li <[email protected]>
 Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2012 02:27:54 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] bind: make "/etc/init.d/bind stop" work
meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.20.29.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.20.27.bb +1 -1
similarity index 97%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.20.27.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.20.29.bb
index 6d2b88e0123..5ce94d597b4 100644
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
 		   file://0001-m4-Backport-ax_prog_cc_for_build.m4-macros.patch \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "145ab7a50b33a06d9d488b5e668c887e754f42acf8954e2b5dc7e238b080e4a0"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "587029508b3b1b43229fae416c97e5543aba45809cefaca98a5004a02a5736c1"
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/"
 # follow the ESV versions divisible by 2
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/60 graphene: set status for CVE-2026-81281

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Per description in [1] and also per [2] this is CVE is for WordPress theme.

[1] https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/81xxx/CVE-2026-81281.json
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-81281

(From OE-Core rev: 41cfe5df728cfeef3adac69f0bbdace70c339e78)

---
 meta/recipes-graphics/graphene/graphene_1.10.8.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-graphics/graphene/graphene_1.10.8.bb +1 -0
index 7aa72b4a78f..0d526d3d76f 100644
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ FILES:${PN} += "${libdir}/graphene-1.0"
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
 
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2024-1984] = "cpe-incorrect: issue in a WordPress theme"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-81281] = "cpe-incorrect: issue in a WordPress theme"
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/60 openssh: set status for CVE-2026-55655

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Per [1] and [2] this this is only problem in RedHet patches.

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55655
[2] https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-55655

(From OE-Core rev: 9ea8649149e711668b85c7e35cb7c259437e8c0e)

---
 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
index e6bc9e9a5b6..9793e3fa6dc 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-51767] = "upstream-wontfix: It was demonstrated on modified
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3497] = "not-applicable-platform: Only affects GSSAPI Key Exchange patches used by some Linux distributions and does not exist in upstream openssh."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55653] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL FIPS patches."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-59998] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is disabled in the default OpenSSH configuration', d)}"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55655] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL patches."
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd"
 
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/60 openssh: set status for CVE-2026-55654

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Per desctiption in [1] (which is different than description in [2]), this is RedHat patches.
Also [3] suggests this.

[1] https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/blob/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55654.json
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55654
[3] https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-55654

(From OE-Core rev: 389919ea7927962a61a5aaa7b641c5b60af560e0)

---
 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
index 9793e3fa6dc..c53100cd99f 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2023-51767] = "upstream-wontfix: It was demonstrated on modified
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-3497] = "not-applicable-platform: Only affects GSSAPI Key Exchange patches used by some Linux distributions and does not exist in upstream openssh."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55653] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL FIPS patches."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-59998] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'kerberos', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSSAPI/Kerberos support is disabled in the default OpenSSH configuration', d)}"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55654] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL patches."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55655] = "not-applicable-platform: Only applies to RHEL patches."
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd"
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/60 xserver-xorg: set status for CVE-2026-55999 and CVE-2026-56000

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Per [1], CVE-2026-55999 was fixed by [2] which was backported as [3]. Per [4], CVE-2026-56000 was fixed by [5] which was backported as [6].

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-55999
[2] https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/fbf7bac22e2c6bd627fb042742a23318263edae1
[3] https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/0f1f4bcbfb1f23b800dfe386782d3a0f05b6756f
[4] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-56000
[5] https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/2779affbdb4354e894f490e56f962527d6125043
[6] https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/commit/d6d96084f305a142eb3db7f720d7edd21e4c98b4

cvelistV5 has correct version identification, so CNA (SUSE) has it correct, too.
NVD however shows non-existing version 21.2.24 (probably from CVE description), so it's showing up in reports as unfixed.

(From OE-Core rev: b6ab21c7e75acb65a3993565929be9c72f4a3d39)

---
 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg.inc | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg.inc +2 -0
index 782c1f76ca4..419e539a541 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ available for this flaw."
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2022-3553] = "cpe-incorrect: This is specific to XQuartz, which is the macOS X server port"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-34000] = "fixed-version: fixed since v21.1.22"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-34002] = "fixed-version: fixed since v21.1.22"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-55999] = "fixed-version: fixed since v21.1.24"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-56000] = "fixed-version: fixed since v21.1.24"
 
 S = "${UNPACKDIR}/${XORG_PN}-${PV}"
 
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/60 openssh: fix CVE-2026-73283

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream fix that makes the authorized_keys restrict keyword apply to tunnel forwarding. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d322f2ccf7da095ce94d1d99cb563246f61487b
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73283

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73283.patch      | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb                 |  1 +
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73283.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73283.patch new file +42 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d2660149e31
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From d322f2ccf7da095ce94d1d99cb563246f61487b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 01:05:05 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: make authorized_keys "restrict" keyword apply
+ correctly
+
+to tunnel forwarding (which is administratively disabled by default).
+
+Reported by Erichen, Institute of Computing Technology,
+Chinese Academy of Sciences
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b3cc987a64749c94b20e12755db32a83f8f01e6
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-73283
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/d322f2ccf7da095ce94d1d99cb563246f61487b]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk and retained the Wrynose
+  OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision.
+
+(cherry picked from commit d322f2ccf7da095ce94d1d99cb563246f61487b)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ serverloop.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index 8e63480ec..9d8a3429 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
++++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -523,7 +523,8 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
+ 		return NULL;
+ 	}
+-	if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0 || options.disable_forwarding) {
++	if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0 || options.disable_forwarding ||
++	    auth_opts->restricted) {
+ 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device "
+ 		    "forwarding");
+ 		return NULL;
+-- 
+2.43.0
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
index c53100cd99f..e3c8c1944d0 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta
            file://CVE-2026-60001.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60002.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60000.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
 
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/60 openssh: fix CVE-2026-73282

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream fix that tracks pending remote-forward requests by index instead of retaining a pointer that realloc may invalidate. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/9910d5ef53124ce1157d57bc11e222658aa41299
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73282

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73282.patch      | 80 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb                 |  1 +
 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73282.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73282.patch new file +80 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f5b4762e511
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From 9910d5ef53124ce1157d57bc11e222658aa41299 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 05:03:56 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: avoid potential realloc use-after-free in the
+ client if a
+
+remote forwarding is added via the local session multiplexing socket while a
+remote forwarding open request is pending with the server.
+
+Report and fix from Brian Mingus of Cognatory
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7888d566576386d0e96859f9ec7310a1e2d3609
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-73282
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/9910d5ef53124ce1157d57bc11e222658aa41299]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk and retained the Wrynose
+  OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 9910d5ef53124ce1157d57bc11e222658aa41299)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ ssh.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index d030b548..e9f99c43 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -1899,14 +1899,24 @@
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++struct rfwd_confirm_ctx {
++	int fid;
++};
++
+ /* Callback for remote forward global requests */
+ static void
+ ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, uint32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+ {
+-	struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt;
++	struct rfwd_confirm_ctx *rctx = (struct rfwd_confirm_ctx *)ctxt;
++	struct Forward *rfwd;
+ 	u_int port;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	if (rctx->fid < 0 || rctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards)
++		fatal_f("invalid forwarding ID %d", rctx->fid);
++	rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[rctx->fid];
++	freezero(rctx, sizeof(*rctx));
++
+ 	/* XXX verbose() on failure? */
+ 	debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d",
+ 	    type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
+@@ -2084,6 +2094,8 @@
+ 
+ 	/* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
++		struct rfwd_confirm_ctx *rctx;
++
+ 		debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
+ 		    "local address %.200s:%d",
+ 		    (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
+@@ -2098,9 +2110,10 @@
+ 		if ((options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
+ 		    channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh,
+ 		    &options.remote_forwards[i])) >= 0) {
++			rctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*rctx));
++			rctx->fid = i;
+ 			client_register_global_confirm(
+-			    ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
+-			    &options.remote_forwards[i]);
++			    ssh_confirm_remote_forward, rctx);
+ 			forward_confirms_pending++;
+ 		} else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+ 			fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
+-- 
+2.43.0
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
index e3c8c1944d0..c92b059a052 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta
            file://CVE-2026-60002.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-60000.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
 
#19 lore raw

PATCH 19/60 openssh: fix CVE-2026-73281

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

This patch applies the upstream fix that permits session-bind requests while the agent is locked so forwarded sessions remain classified as remote. The upstream fix commit is referenced in [1], and the public CVE advisory is referenced in [2].

[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/6a57081dc35acf3ee298108d4bc3580489608d5
[2] https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73281

---
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73281.patch      | 80 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb                 |  1 +
 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73281.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73281.patch new file +80 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..6dbe7b33ff3
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From 6a57081dc35acf3ee298108d4bc3580489608d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 05:18:05 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Allow [email protected] requests when the
+ agent is
+
+locked, otherwise forwarding sessions established with an agent was locked
+will be treated as local, rather than remote.
+
+Reported by sn0x-sharma
+
+OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 524f210c6f2b3a06e0a2f6d0af5188a9a75fa2c7
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-73281
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/6a57081dc35acf3ee298108d4bc3580489608d5]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Omitted the upstream OpenBSD revision-only hunk and retained the Wrynose
+  OpenSSH 10.3p1 revision.
+- OpenSSH 10.3p1 lacks the later `replied` result tracking in
+  process_extension(), so retained `success = process_ext_query(e)`.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 6a57081dc35acf3ee298108d4bc3580489608d5)
+Signed-off-by: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>
+---
+ ssh-agent.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 5fc73d69..1604f540 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1795,12 +1795,22 @@
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (strcmp(name, "query") == 0)
+-		success = process_ext_query(e);
+-	else if (strcmp(name, "[email protected]") == 0)
++	/*
++	 * This function can be called while the agent is locked to allow
++	 * session binds to be processed for new channels.
++	 * Other operations should be refused when locked.
++	 */
++
++	if (strcmp(name, "[email protected]") == 0) {
+ 		success = process_ext_session_bind(e);
+-	else {
++	} else if (locked) {
++		debug_f("attempt to use extension \"%s\" while locked", name);
++		goto generic_fail;
++	} else if (strcmp(name, "query") == 0) {
++		success = process_ext_query(e);
++	} else {
+ 		debug_f("unsupported extension \"%s\"", name);
++ generic_fail:
+ 		free(name);
+ 		send_status(e, 0);
+ 		return;
+@@ -1857,14 +1867,17 @@
+ 	/* check whether agent is locked */
+ 	if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
+-		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+ 		switch (type) {
+ 		case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
+ 			/* send empty lists */
+ 			no_identities(e);
+ 			break;
++		case SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION:
++			process_extension(e);
++			break;
+ 		default:
+ 			/* send a fail message for all other request types */
+ 			send_status(e, 0);
+ 		}
++		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.43.0
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb +1 -0
index c92b059a052..a476645f40f 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.ta
            file://CVE-2026-60000.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73283.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-73282.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-73281.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "56682a36bb92dcf4b4f016fd8ec8e74059b79a8de25c15d670d731e7d18e45f4"
 
#20 lore raw

PATCH 20/60 vim: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-51400

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

Analysis:

- The vulnerable code for CVE-2026-51400 is in src/os_vms.c. [1]
- src/os_vms.c is VMS-specific and is not compiled for Linux builds.
- Record the not-applicable-platform status; no source patch is required.

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-51400

---
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +2 -0
index de639a65026..37c5cacaaaf 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https;tag=v${PV}
 PV .= ".0340"
 SRCREV = "6addd6c101117706bc9b3609d3a418e26e92618f"
 
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-51400] = "not-applicable-platform: Vulnerable code is in src/os_vms.c, which is not compiled for Linux builds."
+
 # Do not consider .z in x.y.z, as that is updated with every commit
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+\.\d+)\.0"
 # Ignore that the upstream version .z in x.y.z is always newer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 21/60 vim: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-51401

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Hetvi Thakar <[email protected]>

Analysis:

- The vulnerable code for CVE-2026-51401 is in src/os_vms.c. [1]
- src/os_vms.c is VMS-specific and is not compiled for Linux builds.
- Record the not-applicable-platform status; no source patch is required.

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-51401

---
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
index 37c5cacaaaf..3fbfd887a5f 100644
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ PV .= ".0340"
 SRCREV = "6addd6c101117706bc9b3609d3a418e26e92618f"
 
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-51400] = "not-applicable-platform: Vulnerable code is in src/os_vms.c, which is not compiled for Linux builds."
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-51401] = "not-applicable-platform: Vulnerable code is in src/os_vms.c, which is not compiled for Linux builds."
 
 # Do not consider .z in x.y.z, as that is updated with every commit
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "(?P<pver>\d+\.\d+)\.0"
#22 lore raw

PATCH 22/60 gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42012

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Jakub Szczudlo (Nokia) <[email protected]>

Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-42012.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42012

Upstream fix:
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/8dcc6a1f48945997666ac9f10896819edd01a03b

Tested with ptest
Pre patches taken from upstream so CVE fix will land cleanly

---
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre1.patch   |  69 ++++++++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre2.patch   | 161 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012.patch        |  48 ++++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb  |   3 +
 4 files changed, 281 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre1.patch new file +69 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9b2a5d16cab
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From 6133fb459b74a9dcfa2d0ff010a4e03c56822d39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2026 17:00:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x509/hostname-verify: refactor and simplify CN fallback logic
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+CVE: CVE-2026-42012
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/6133fb459b74a9dcfa2d0ff010a4e03c56822d39]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Szczudlo <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/x509/hostname-verify.c | 15 ++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/x509/hostname-verify.c b/lib/x509/hostname-verify.c
+--- a/lib/x509/hostname-verify.c
++++ b/lib/x509/hostname-verify.c
+@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ unsigned gnutls_x509_crt_check_ip(gnutls
+  * that we do not fallback to CN-ID if we encounter a supported name
+  * type.
+  */
+-#define IS_SAN_SUPPORTED(san) \
++#define PRECLUDES_CN_FALLBACK(san) \
+ 	(san == GNUTLS_SAN_DNSNAME || san == GNUTLS_SAN_IPADDRESS)
+ 
+ /**
+@@ -151,13 +151,12 @@ unsigned gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname2
+ {
+ 	char dnsname[MAX_CN];
+ 	size_t dnsnamesize;
+-	int found_dnsname = 0;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 	int i = 0;
+ 	struct in_addr ipv4;
+ 	char *p = NULL;
+ 	char *a_hostname;
+-	unsigned have_other_addresses = 0;
++	bool cn_fallback_allowed = true;
+ 	gnutls_datum_t out;
+ 
+ 	/* check whether @hostname is an ip address */
+@@ -213,9 +212,10 @@ hostname_fallback:
+ 		ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject_alt_name(cert, i, dnsname,
+ 							   &dnsnamesize, NULL);
+ 
+-		if (ret == GNUTLS_SAN_DNSNAME) {
+-			found_dnsname = 1;
++		if (PRECLUDES_CN_FALLBACK(ret))
++			cn_fallback_allowed = false;
+ 
++		if (ret == GNUTLS_SAN_DNSNAME) {
+ 			if (memchr(dnsname, '\0', dnsnamesize)) {
+ 				_gnutls_debug_log(
+ 					"certificate has %s with embedded null in name\n",
+@@ -236,13 +236,10 @@ hostname_fallback:
+ 				ret = 1;
+ 				goto cleanup;
+ 			}
+-		} else {
+-			if (IS_SAN_SUPPORTED(ret))
+-				have_other_addresses = 1;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (!have_other_addresses && !found_dnsname &&
++	if (cn_fallback_allowed &&
+ 	    _gnutls_check_key_purpose(cert, GNUTLS_KP_TLS_WWW_SERVER, 0) != 0) {
+ 		/* did not get the necessary extension, use CN instead, if the
+ 		 * certificate would have been acceptable for a TLS WWW server purpose.
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre2.patch new file +161 -0

161 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012.patch new file +48 -0

48 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb +3 -0
index 92854eeaf9c..fd332ee8c55 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-42010.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-33845.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-5419.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-42012-pre1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-42012-pre2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-42012.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a7b341421bfd459acf7a374ca4af3b9e06608dcd7bd792b2bf470bea012b8e51"
#23 lore raw

PATCH 23/60 gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42013

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Jakub Szczudlo (Nokia) <[email protected]>

Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-42013.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42013

Upstream fix:
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/29801bef00ecc0f23c0bac4cd333b269cd2c1af4

Tested with ptest
Pre patch taken from upstream so CVE fix will land cleanly

---
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013-pre1.patch   | 56 ++++++++++++++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013.patch        | 74 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb  |  2 +
 3 files changed, 132 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013-pre1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013-pre1.patch new file +56 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..53687cb53b9
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 3ee2cb707002f755e4bda3f75285caa0cb36c214 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:35:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] x509/email-verify: call fallback DN fallback
+
+A comment was inaccurately referring to DN email field fallback
+as CN fallback.
+Rename a few things as well to match x509/hostname-verify more closely.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+CVE: CVE-2026-42013
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/3ee2cb707002f755e4bda3f75285caa0cb36c214]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Szczudlo <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/x509/email-verify.c | 12 +++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/x509/email-verify.c b/lib/x509/email-verify.c
+index dbef0bb86e..3c22ffed37 100644
+--- a/lib/x509/email-verify.c
++++ b/lib/x509/email-verify.c
+@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ unsigned gnutls_x509_crt_check_email(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, const char *email,
+ {
+ 	char rfc822name[MAX_CN];
+ 	size_t rfc822namesize;
+-	int found_rfc822name = 0;
++	bool dn_fallback_allowed = true;
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 	int i = 0;
+ 	char *a_email;
+@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ unsigned gnutls_x509_crt_check_email(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, const char *email,
+ 			cert, i, rfc822name, &rfc822namesize, NULL);
+ 
+ 		if (ret == GNUTLS_SAN_RFC822NAME) {
+-			found_rfc822name = 1;
++			dn_fallback_allowed = false;
+ 
+ 			if (memchr(rfc822name, '\0', rfc822namesize)) {
+ 				_gnutls_debug_log(
+@@ -102,12 +102,10 @@ unsigned gnutls_x509_crt_check_email(gnutls_x509_crt_t cert, const char *email,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (!found_rfc822name) {
+-		/* did not get the necessary extension, use CN instead
+-		 */
++	if (dn_fallback_allowed) {
++		/* did not get the necessary extension, use DN email instead */
+ 
+-		/* enforce the RFC6125 (§1.8) requirement that only
+-		 * a single CN must be present */
++		/* only a single one must be present */
+ 		rfc822namesize = sizeof(rfc822name);
+ 		ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_dn_by_oid(cert,
+ 						    GNUTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, 1,
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013.patch new file +74 -0

74 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb +2 -0
index fd332ee8c55..b5b3736a773 100644
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-42012-pre1.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-42012-pre2.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-42012.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-42013-pre1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-42013.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a7b341421bfd459acf7a374ca4af3b9e06608dcd7bd792b2bf470bea012b8e51"
#24 lore raw

PATCH 24/60 gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42014

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Jakub Szczudlo (Nokia) <[email protected]>

Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-42014.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42014

Upstream fix:
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/3957f136e2ed23caf176a594b54b3827f5cef701

Tested with ptest

---
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42014.patch        | 60 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42014.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42014.patch new file +60 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..776733829ad
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 3957f136e2ed23caf176a594b54b3827f5cef701 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2026 18:19:06 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] pkcs11_write: fix UAF and leak in gnutls_pkcs11_token_set_pin
+
+Changing Security Officer PIN with gnutls_pkcs11_token_set_pin() with
+oldpin == NULL for a token that lacks a protected authentication path
+led to a use-after-free.
+
+Reported-by: Luigino Camastra and Joshua Rogers of AISLE Research Team
+Fixes: #1766
+Fixes: #1809
+Fixes: CVE-2026-42014
+Fixes: GNUTLS-SA-2026-04-29-9
+CVSS: 4.0 Medium CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-42014
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/3957f136e2ed23caf176a594b54b3827f5cef701]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Szczudlo <[email protected]>
+---
+diff --git a/lib/pkcs11_write.c b/lib/pkcs11_write.c
+index 64b85a2..1dff578 100644
+--- a/lib/pkcs11_write.c
++++ b/lib/pkcs11_write.c
+@@ -1266,10 +1266,9 @@ int gnutls_pkcs11_token_set_pin(const char *token_url, const char *oldpin,
+ 		ses_flags = SESSION_WRITE | SESSION_LOGIN;
+ 
+ 	ret = pkcs11_open_session(&sinfo, NULL, info, ses_flags);
+-	p11_kit_uri_free(info);
+-
+ 	if (ret < 0) {
+ 		gnutls_assert();
++		p11_kit_uri_free(info);
+ 		return ret;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1290,9 +1289,11 @@ int gnutls_pkcs11_token_set_pin(const char *token_url, const char *oldpin,
+ 		oldpin_size = L(oldpin);
+ 
+ 		if (!(sinfo.tinfo.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)) {
+-			if (newpin == NULL)
+-				return gnutls_assert_val(
++			if (newpin == NULL) {
++				ret = gnutls_assert_val(
+ 					GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST);
++				goto finish;
++			}
+ 
+ 			if (oldpin == NULL) {
+ 				struct pin_info_st pin_info;
+@@ -1324,6 +1325,7 @@ int gnutls_pkcs11_token_set_pin(const char *token_url, const char *oldpin,
+ 	ret = 0;
+ 
+ finish:
++	p11_kit_uri_free(info);
+ 	pkcs11_close_session(&sinfo);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb +1 -0
index b5b3736a773..f0fec16d039 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-42012.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-42013-pre1.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-42013.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-42014.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a7b341421bfd459acf7a374ca4af3b9e06608dcd7bd792b2bf470bea012b8e51"
#25 lore raw

PATCH 25/60 gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42015

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Jakub Szczudlo (Nokia) <[email protected]>

Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-42015.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42015

Upstream fix:
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/a3e7c50d3e1761e5ef1d4b225507cab8f2b2c3ca

Tested with ptest

---
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42015.patch        | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb  |  1 +
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42015.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42015.patch new file +43 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1a2065371d4
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From a3e7c50d3e1761e5ef1d4b225507cab8f2b2c3ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 22:42:20 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] x509/pkcs12_bag: fix off-by-one in bag element bounds check
+
+Appending elements to a PKCS#12 bag had a bounds check that
+prevented adding the 32nd element.
+On the other hand, it is possible to import one that already has 32.
+Subsequent appending then led to writing past the 32-element array,
+smashing its length.
+
+Tighten the check to reject any bag with 32 or more elements.
+
+We'll treat this vulnerability as a Low due to how contrived
+the requirements are: for the code to be vulnerable,
+it needs to append to an imported untrusted unencrypted PKCS#12 structure.
+
+Reported-by: Zou Dikai
+Fixes: #1840
+Fixes: CVE-2026-42015
+Fixes: GNUTLS-SA-2026-04-29-11
+CVSS: 6.1 Medium CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
+Severity: Low
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-42015
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/a3e7c50d3e1761e5ef1d4b225507cab8f2b2c3ca]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Szczudlo <[email protected]>
+---
+diff --git a/lib/x509/pkcs12_bag.c b/lib/x509/pkcs12_bag.c
+index 911aeff..3822861 100644
+--- a/lib/x509/pkcs12_bag.c
++++ b/lib/x509/pkcs12_bag.c
+@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ int gnutls_pkcs12_bag_set_data(gnutls_pkcs12_bag_t bag,
+ 		return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (bag->bag_elements == MAX_BAG_ELEMENTS - 1) {
++	if (bag->bag_elements >= MAX_BAG_ELEMENTS - 1) {
+ 		gnutls_assert();
+ 		/* bag is full */
+ 		return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb +1 -0
index f0fec16d039..c9ec3b08f96 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-42013-pre1.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-42013.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-42014.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-42015.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a7b341421bfd459acf7a374ca4af3b9e06608dcd7bd792b2bf470bea012b8e51"
#26 lore raw

PATCH 26/60 gnutls: fix CVE-2026-5260

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Jakub Szczudlo (Nokia) <[email protected]>

Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-5260.

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5260

Upstream fix:
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/77228f2d1ac207d2f894e5a168fbb47e5378e42f
https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/cf6bdc5e4df49e5583d3fb4d2296779785f10683

Tested with ptest

---
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p1.patch      | 69 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p2.patch      | 33 +++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb  |  2 +
 3 files changed, 104 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p2.patch
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p1.patch new file +69 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c5ab814031e
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From 77228f2d1ac207d2f894e5a168fbb47e5378e42f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 17:31:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] lib/auth/rsa: check that ciphertext matches the modulus size
+
+A client sending extremely short premaster secret as part of an
+RSA key exchange could've theoretically triggered a short heap overread
+to nowhere when the RSA key was backed with a PKCS#11 token.
+With this fix, the internal decryption function will not be called
+with an mismatching plaintext length specified, avoiding the overread.
+
+Reported-by: Joshua Rogers of AISLE Research Team <[email protected]>
+Fixes: #1814
+Fixes: CVE-2026-5260
+Fixes: GNUTLS-SA-2026-04-29-10
+CVSS: 5.9 Medium CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-5260
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/77228f2d1ac207d2f894e5a168fbb47e5378e42f]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Szczudlo <[email protected]>
+---
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+index 4d18132..496c378 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ static int proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t *data,
+ 	int ret, dsize;
+ 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+ 	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
++	unsigned int key_bits;
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
+ 	if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
+@@ -180,6 +181,10 @@ static int proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t *data,
+ 		}
+ 		ciphertext.size = dsize;
+ 	}
++	gnutls_privkey_get_pk_algorithm(session->internals.selected_key,
++					&key_bits);
++	if (ciphertext.size != (key_bits + 7) / 8)
++		return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ 
+ 	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+ 	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+index cc92b4a..dba4011 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa_psk.c
+@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ static int _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session,
+ 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+ 	gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t cred;
+ 	volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
++	unsigned int rsa_key_bits;
+ 
+ 	cred = (gnutls_psk_server_credentials_t)_gnutls_get_cred(
+ 		session, GNUTLS_CRD_PSK);
+@@ -313,6 +314,10 @@ static int _gnutls_proc_rsa_psk_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session,
+ 		return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
+ 	}
+ 	ciphertext.size = dsize;
++	gnutls_privkey_get_pk_algorithm(session->internals.selected_key,
++					&rsa_key_bits);
++	if (ciphertext.size != (rsa_key_bits + 7) / 8)
++		return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ 
+ 	ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+ 	ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p2.patch new file +33 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..67154164c52
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From cf6bdc5e4df49e5583d3fb4d2296779785f10683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 17:46:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] lib/pkcs11_privkey: guard against overreading on short
+ ciphertexts
+
+This is an alternative fix for the callee side.
+
+Reported-by: Joshua Rogers of AISLE Research Team <[email protected]>
+Fixes: #1814
+Fixes: CVE-2026-5260
+Fixes: GNUTLS-SA-2026-04-29-10
+CVSS: 5.9 Medium CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-5260
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/commit/cf6bdc5e4df49e5583d3fb4d2296779785f10683]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Szczudlo <[email protected]>
+---
+diff --git a/lib/pkcs11_privkey.c b/lib/pkcs11_privkey.c
+index 568474e..e133c49 100644
+--- a/lib/pkcs11_privkey.c
++++ b/lib/pkcs11_privkey.c
+@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ int _gnutls_pkcs11_privkey_decrypt_data2(gnutls_pkcs11_privkey_t key,
+ 	if (ret != 0)
+ 		return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_LOCKING_ERROR);
+ 
+-	buffer = gnutls_malloc(siglen);
++	buffer = gnutls_malloc(MAX((size_t)siglen, plaintext_size));
+ 	if (!buffer) {
+ 		gnutls_assert();
+ 		return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb +2 -0
index c9ec3b08f96..069e3f447b6 100644
@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v${SHRT_VER}/gnutls-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2026-42013.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-42014.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-42015.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-5260_p1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-5260_p2.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a7b341421bfd459acf7a374ca4af3b9e06608dcd7bd792b2bf470bea012b8e51"
#27 lore raw

PATCH 27/60 openssl: upgrade 3.5.8 -> 3.5.9

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Release information [1]:

OpenSSL 3.5.9 is a security patch release. The most severe CVE fixed in this release is High. This release incorporates the following bug fixes and mitigations:
* Fixed DTLS retransmissions of handshake messages from a stale buffer offset. (CVE-2026-84782)
* Fixed excessive memory allocation in relative CRLDP processing. (CVE-2026-35189)
* Fixed QUIC unvalidated amplification credit may be over-accounted. (CVE-2026-35191)
* Fixed potential CPU DoS via O(n^2) fragment reassembly in QUIC. (CVE-2026-42772)
* Fixed a timing side-channel in scalar multiplication for mon-NIST EC curves. (CVE-2026-54872)
* Fixed QUIC STREAM fragment metadata DoS. (CVE-2026-54873)
* Fixed non-constant-time SM2 scalar multiplication on ARM64 and RISC-V. (CVE-2026-54875)
* Fixed out-of-bounds access after SSL_set_SSL_CTX() during a handshake. (CVE-2026-72897)
* Fixed QUIC connection-level flow control was not enforced for streams. (CVE-2026-75804)
* Fixed a NULL pointer dereference in CMP client revocation response handling. (CVE-2026-75805)
* Fixed an unauthenticated and undersized DTLS 1.2 AEAD record causing DoS. (CVE-2026-75806)
* Fixed a timing side-channel in SM2 signature generation. (CVE-2026-77696)
* Fixed an unbounded RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID backlog in QUIC stack implementation. (CVE-2026-84784)
* Fixed a bug where EVP_DecryptFinal() incorrectly reported a stale success on AES-SIV authentication failure.

[1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/openssl-3.5/NEWS.md#major-changes-between-openssl-358-and-openssl-359-29-sep-2026

---
 .../openssl/{openssl_3.5.8.bb => openssl_3.5.9.bb}              | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 rename meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/{openssl_3.5.8.bb => openssl_3.5.9.bb} (99%)
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.5.9.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.5.8.bb +1 -1
similarity index 99%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.5.8.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.5.9.bb
index 71446e62e31..06e25a61587 100644
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
            file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a8f84a39918ec6415ce765d9b429d313ba97b8143169c172e734b9514464f5b2"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "603f5602e2eef00d77fbd429d34dcd5822bb301757a1bc9cdb24c670f1eb859a"
 
 inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest perlnative manpages
 MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"
#28 lore raw

PATCH 28/60 glibc: stable 2.43 branch updates to 9cda6fc96ab

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Deepesh Varatharajan <[email protected]>

Update SRCREV to pull the latest fixes from the upstream release/2.43/master branch, including fixes for the following CVEs:

CVE-2026-6368 CVE-2026-19499 CVE-2026-77117
CVE-2026-80489 CVE-2026-18374 CVE-2026-8674

Commits between the old SRCREV (1c9988e5254) and the new SRCREV (9cda6fc96ab):

9cda6fc96a stdlib: Don't call clearenv from __libc_setenv_freemem
d6c6dd71c6 resolv: Fix assertion failure on search list truncation [BZ 31026, CVE-2026-8674] 65f2295a98 zic: keep needed last transition to new type (bug 34618)
f8f3d451ba nptl: Skip pretty-printer tests without python3 [BZ #34507]
d9a8ff5c01 hesiod: use booleans in parser macro calls
1c1f5103a9 hesiod: fix swapped arguments in service parser
049168237f nss_files: use booleans in parser macro calls
0770e8b07c nss_files: fix swapped arguments in service parser
20b3e87176 libio: Add test for fopen with an empty ", ccs=" value [BZ #34574]
72351055c6 libio: Fix CVE-2026-18374 heap buffer overflow in ccs= handling
8dad0ee453 alpha: expect test-float32x-float64-div to fail
f024355965 alpha: add the denormal trap enable bit to FE_NOMASK_ENV
c4dac931ab alpha: Fix stack alignment in makecontext
76115597fe alpha: fix setrlimit compat symbol for negative rlim values besides -1 c29ca5d216 iconvdata: Test case for bug 34556, bug 34568
3ad1bbd8f9 iconvdata: EUC_JISX0213 decoding lacks pending character reset (CVE-2026-80489) 138c43f018 iconvdata: SHIFT_JISX0213 decoding lacks pending character reset (CVE-2026-77117) 713998bf00 stdlib: Fix right-justification in strfmon (bug 34510, CVE-2026-19499) 2a35bab35b posix: Remove unnecessary overflow check in wordexp (BZ 34090)
4964178b4d m68k: remove sysdeps/m68k/m680x0/fpu/w_fmod_compat.c (bug 34559)
0afa34adb0 misc: Fix out-of-bounds array write in tdelete (bug 34506)
7d26579873 malloc: Show hugetlb tunable default in --list-tunables
8017bcfc4d m68k: Fix fmod/fmodf infinite recursion (BZ 34508)
a388c4002d posix: Fix wordexp WRDE_APPEND to preserve state on non-NOSPACE errors (BZ 34090, CVE-2026-6368) bc95068f5f ppc64le: Restore optimized memchr for power10 [BZ #34300]

Testing Results:

+--------------+--------+--------+------+
| Result       | Before | After  | Diff |
+--------------+--------+--------+------+
| PASS         | 6592   | 6598   | +6   |
| XPASS        | 4      | 4      |  0   |
| FAIL         | 127    | 125    | -2   |
| XFAIL        | 16     | 16     |  0   |
| UNSUPPORTED  | 559    | 559    |  0   |
+--------------+--------+--------+------+

Changes in testcases: Before After

malloc/tst-malloc-too-large-malloc-check   FAIL     PASS
malloc/tst-malloc-too-large-mcheck         FAIL     PASS
iconvdata/tst-jisx0213-progress(NEW)         -      PASS
libio/tst-fopen-ccs-empty      (NEW)         -      PASS
posix/tst-wordexp-append       (NEW)         -      PASS
stdlib/tst-strfmon-bug34510    (NEW)         -      PASS
---
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc | 2 +-
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.43.bb     | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc +1 -1
index cf5a4440956..5f6863df160 100644
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 SRCBRANCH ?= "release/2.43/master"
 PV = "2.43+git"
-SRCREV_glibc ?= "1c9988e52540c844928c6d93ff45305adc2c24a0"
+SRCREV_glibc ?= "9cda6fc96abd035d9cbe68482138d4a78a51a7d5"
 SRCREV_localedef ?= "cba02c503d7c853a38ccfb83c57e343ca5ecd7e5"
 
 GLIBC_GIT_URI ?= "git://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git;protocol=https"
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.43.bb +1 -0
index 5c21223b55f..56942e86dcd 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ CVE_STATUS_GROUPS += "CVE_STATUS_STABLE_BACKPORTS"
 CVE_STATUS_STABLE_BACKPORTS = "CVE-2025-15281 CVE-2026-0861 CVE-2026-0915 CVE-2026-4437 CVE-2026-4438 \
     CVE-2026-4046 \
     CVE-2026-5435 CVE-2026-5450 CVE-2026-5928 CVE-2026-6238 CVE-2026-6791 \
+    CVE-2026-6368 CVE-2026-19499 CVE-2026-77117 CVE-2026-80489 CVE-2026-18374 CVE-2026-8674 \
 "
 CVE_STATUS_STABLE_BACKPORTS[status] = "cpe-stable-backport: fix available in used git hash"
 
#29 lore raw

PATCH 29/60 glibc: stable 2.43 branch updates to 562cd7badd

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Harish Sadineni <[email protected]>

Update SRCREV to pull the latest fixes from the upstream release/2.43/master branch, including fixes for the following CVEs:

CVE-2026-89092 CVE-2026-97399

Commits between the old SRCREV (9cda6fc96ab) and the new SRCREV (562cd7badd):

562cd7badd powerpc: Fix one byte overread in strncasecmp (bug 34683, CVE-2026-97399) 533e1c955c elf: Open the normalized $ORIGIN rpath in AT_SECURE programs (BZ 34360) 8305f5b8fa realloc: Fix mmap non-mremap reallocation case [BZ #34697] e51efbc44f CVE-2026-89092: nscd: replace alloca with malloc in aicache, hstcache

Testing Results:

+--------------+--------+--------+------+
| Result       | Before | After  | Diff |
+--------------+--------+--------+------+
| PASS         | 6601   | 6601   | +0   |
| XPASS        | 4      | 4      |  0   |
| FAIL         | 142    | 143    | +1   |
| XFAIL        | 16     | 16     |  0   |
| UNSUPPORTED  | 559    | 560    | +1   |
+--------------+--------+--------+------+
Changes in testcases:                     Before   After
elf/tst-dl-path-normalize                  ---     PASS
elf/tst-origin-secure                      ---     UNSUPPORTED
malloc/tst-malloc-too-large-malloc-check   PASS    FAIL
[YC: CVE-2026-19542 was fixed before this patch in the 2.43 branch ]
---
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc | 2 +-
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.43.bb     | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc +1 -1
index 5f6863df160..e8e6bb665ae 100644
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 SRCBRANCH ?= "release/2.43/master"
 PV = "2.43+git"
-SRCREV_glibc ?= "9cda6fc96abd035d9cbe68482138d4a78a51a7d5"
+SRCREV_glibc ?= "562cd7badd3f9edd74b68316439f910f6f7c4c1f"
 SRCREV_localedef ?= "cba02c503d7c853a38ccfb83c57e343ca5ecd7e5"
 
 GLIBC_GIT_URI ?= "git://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git;protocol=https"
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.43.bb +1 -0
index 56942e86dcd..3d642e6738d 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ CVE_STATUS_STABLE_BACKPORTS = "CVE-2025-15281 CVE-2026-0861 CVE-2026-0915 CVE-20
     CVE-2026-4046 \
     CVE-2026-5435 CVE-2026-5450 CVE-2026-5928 CVE-2026-6238 CVE-2026-6791 \
     CVE-2026-6368 CVE-2026-19499 CVE-2026-77117 CVE-2026-80489 CVE-2026-18374 CVE-2026-8674 \
+    CVE-2026-89092 CVE-2026-97399 CVE-2026-19542 \
 "
 CVE_STATUS_STABLE_BACKPORTS[status] = "cpe-stable-backport: fix available in used git hash"
 
#30 lore raw

PATCH 30/60 glibc: set status for CVE-2026-86805 and CVE-2026-95818

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

These CVEs are fixed in current hash with commit [1]. It is commit equivalent to [2] mentioned in [3] and [4].

[1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=533e1c955c7bb9b761749751ec743b46c6bd2238
[2] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=ed0c137b97eb940b4b64981e84ed806d3276edd9
[3] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=advisories/GLIBC-SA-2026-0022
[4] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=advisories/GLIBC-SA-2026-0023

---
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.43.bb | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.43.bb +1 -1
index 3d642e6738d..c962171cf3a 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ CVE_STATUS_STABLE_BACKPORTS = "CVE-2025-15281 CVE-2026-0861 CVE-2026-0915 CVE-20
     CVE-2026-4046 \
     CVE-2026-5435 CVE-2026-5450 CVE-2026-5928 CVE-2026-6238 CVE-2026-6791 \
     CVE-2026-6368 CVE-2026-19499 CVE-2026-77117 CVE-2026-80489 CVE-2026-18374 CVE-2026-8674 \
-    CVE-2026-89092 CVE-2026-97399 CVE-2026-19542 \
+    CVE-2026-89092 CVE-2026-97399 CVE-2026-19542 CVE-2026-86805 CVE-2026-95818 \
 "
 CVE_STATUS_STABLE_BACKPORTS[status] = "cpe-stable-backport: fix available in used git hash"
 
#31 lore raw

PATCH 31/60 devtool: standard: fix update-recipe/finish --initial-rev override

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Babanpreet Singh <[email protected]>

Since 900129cbdf ("devtool: add support for git submodules") the --initial-rev option of update-recipe and finish has been broken: the parse loop in _get_patchset_revs() deliberately skips the recorded "# initial_rev ." entry from the workspace bbappend when an override is passed, but the override value itself is never inserted into the initial_revs dict. For a recipe without submodules the dict therefore ends up empty and update-recipe/finish fails in patch mode with:

ERROR: Unable to find initial revision - please specify it with --initial-rev

i.e. passing --initial-rev produces the very error message that instructs the user to pass --initial-rev. Before 900129cbdf the passed value simply took precedence over the one recorded in the bbappend.

Seed initial_revs with the override before parsing so the option behaves as documented again; recorded values are still used for submodules and for the main repo when no override is given.

AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-fable-5)

(cherry picked from commit 62abb60b899e63ea6db5c745f4b1b6af0d4b40f1)
---
 scripts/lib/devtool/standard.py | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
scripts/lib/devtool/standard.py +4 -0
index 42fb13872d3..e2f5c28f8b6 100644
@@ -1200,6 +1200,10 @@ def _get_patchset_revs(srctree, recipe_path, initial_rev=None, force_patch_refre
     commits = {}
     patches = []
     initial_revs = {}
+    if initial_rev:
+        # A user-specified override applies to the main repo ("."); the
+        # parse loop below leaves it in place of the recorded value
+        initial_revs["."] = initial_rev
     with open(recipe_path, 'r') as f:
         for line in f:
             pattern = r'^#\s.*\s(.*):\s([0-9a-fA-F]+)$'
#32 lore raw

PATCH 32/60 oeqa/selftest/devtool: cover update-recipe --initial-rev

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Babanpreet Singh <[email protected]>

The --initial-rev option had no selftest coverage, which let the regression fixed by the previous commit go unnoticed since 2023. Extend test_devtool_update_recipe to run update-recipe twice more with --initial-rev: once with the recorded initial revision, which must produce the same result as not passing the option, and once with a revision in the middle of the local commits, which must export only the commits after it.

Without the fix in the previous commit, the first --initial-rev invocation fails with "Unable to find initial revision - please specify it with --initial-rev".

AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-fable-5)

(cherry picked from commit 171af3b2915dd076c8d1b205ff75eac1ebd5a586)
---
 meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py +22 -0
index 5ed69aee1b1..b485d752e7b 100644
@@ -1219,6 +1219,28 @@ class DevtoolUpdateTests(DevtoolBase):
         self._check_repo_status(os.path.dirname(recipefile), expected_status)
         result = runCmd(cleanup_cmd)
         self._check_repo_status(os.path.dirname(recipefile), [])
+        # Now try the same passing --initial-rev: the recorded initial
+        # revision must give the same result as not passing the option, and a
+        # later revision must export only the commits after it
+        result = runCmd('git rev-parse devtool-base', cwd=tempdir)
+        initial_rev = result.output.strip()
+        result = runCmd('devtool update-recipe --initial-rev %s %s' % (initial_rev, testrecipe))
+        result = runCmd('git add minicom', cwd=os.path.dirname(recipefile))
+        expected_status = [(' M', '.*/%s$' % os.path.basename(recipefile)),
+                           ('A ', '.*/0001-Change-the-README.patch$'),
+                           ('A ', '.*/0002-Add-a-new-file.patch$')]
+        self._check_repo_status(os.path.dirname(recipefile), expected_status)
+        result = runCmd(cleanup_cmd)
+        self._check_repo_status(os.path.dirname(recipefile), [])
+        result = runCmd('git rev-parse HEAD~1', cwd=tempdir)
+        midpoint_rev = result.output.strip()
+        result = runCmd('devtool update-recipe --initial-rev %s %s' % (midpoint_rev, testrecipe))
+        result = runCmd('git add minicom', cwd=os.path.dirname(recipefile))
+        expected_status = [(' M', '.*/%s$' % os.path.basename(recipefile)),
+                           ('A ', '.*/0001-Add-a-new-file.patch$')]
+        self._check_repo_status(os.path.dirname(recipefile), expected_status)
+        result = runCmd(cleanup_cmd)
+        self._check_repo_status(os.path.dirname(recipefile), [])
 
     def test_devtool_update_recipe_git(self):
         # Check preconditions
#33 lore raw

PATCH 33/60 barebox: upgrade 2026.04.0 -> 2026.04.2

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Lucas Stach <[email protected]>

Bump to the latest stable release, which includes a fix for a FIT image verification bypass, see:
https://github.com/barebox/barebox/security/advisories/GHSA-jhvm-7xq8-rvgm

Release: https://github.com/barebox/barebox/releases/tag/v2026.04.2

---
 meta/recipes-bsp/barebox/barebox-common.inc | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-bsp/barebox/barebox-common.inc +2 -2
index f736ca68e02..db7fb25e264 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@ SECTION = "bootloaders"
 
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=f5125d13e000b9ca1f0d3364286c4192"
 
-PV = "2026.04.0"
+PV = "2026.04.2"
 SRC_URI = "https://barebox.org/download/barebox-${PV}.tar.bz2"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "07fd3e3440c23e27d0094432f67827887fcc0e37d5fe24dc257c39b97c4294a0"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "aa575d3ca4e7a8abe6b9796d0ff1d1ace43f86e34c627cc055ddb0a7ebd9dbe2"
#34 lore raw

PATCH 34/60 python3-click: depend on python3-shell for shlex

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Darsh Kelaiya <[email protected]>

Click 8.3.3 imports shlex when loading _termui_impl. OE packages shlex.py in python3-shell, so add it to the main package's runtime dependencies. Confirmed module ownership in python3-manifest.json.

(cherry picked from commit 8dded0894fdb2c17ab8f8cb2f13f9f95638d493e)
[YC: updated Click version to match wrynose's ]
---
 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-click_8.3.3.bb | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-click_8.3.3.bb +1 -0
index 9e80f8aff0f..44612cb8f3e 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ CLEANBROKEN = "1"
 RDEPENDS:${PN} += "\
     python3-io \
     python3-threading \
+    python3-shell \
     "
 RDEPENDS:${PN}-ptest += "coreutils less"
 
#35 lore raw

PATCH 35/60 libpng: upgrade 1.6.56 -> 1.6.58

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Solves CVE-2026-34757 (in 1.6.57, as described in CVE description). Solves also regression of CVE-2026-33416 (in 1.56.58).

Explicit CVE_STATUS is needed to remove it from open CVE list.

(From OE-Core rev: 31725b7411be75c124385b7fdc778eda2cfe9f69)

This also removes CVE patch which was added on Wrynose branch meanwhile and is included in this release.

Also resolves conflict in CVE_STATUS added in opposite order.

Release notes:
* https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/blob/v1.6.57/CHANGES#L6371
* https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/blob/v1.6.58/CHANGES#L6382

---
 .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p1.patch      | 518 ------------------
 .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p2.patch      | 481 ----------------
 .../{libpng_1.6.56.bb => libpng_1.6.58.bb}    |   7 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1003 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p1.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p2.patch
 rename meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/{libpng_1.6.56.bb => libpng_1.6.58.bb} (94%)
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p1.patch deleted +0 -518
deleted file mode 100644
index 7b5ebb18b7e..00000000000
@@ -1,518 +0,0 @@
-From e621c40a46aa748608d5392f6a5c0278f77573d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Cosmin Truta <[email protected]>
-Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 17:35:30 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] fix: Handle self-referencing pointers in getter-to-setter
- aliasing
-
-Apply a robustness fix for a caller-side API usage pattern involving
-the getters and the setters for PLTE, tRNS, and hIST.
-
-Passing a pointer returned by the PLTE, tRNS, or hIST getters back
-into the corresponding setters used to cause the setters to read from
-a stale pointer. The fix consists in snapshotting the caller's data
-into a stack-local buffer before freeing the old internal storage.
-
-Fixes pnggroup/libpng#836
-
-Reported-by: Iv4n <[email protected]>
-CVE: CVE-2026-34757
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/commit/398cbe3df03f4e11bb031e07f416dfdde3684e8a]
-
-(cherry picked from commit 398cbe3df03f4e11bb031e07f416dfdde3684e8a)
-Signed-off-by: Deepak Rathore <[email protected]>
----
- CMakeLists.txt               |  12 ++
- Makefile.am                  |   9 +-
- contrib/libtests/pnggetset.c | 328 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- pngset.c                     |  29 +++-
- tests/pnggetset              |   5 +
- 5 files changed, 380 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 contrib/libtests/pnggetset.c
- create mode 100755 tests/pnggetset
-
-diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
-index fde2a323c..6401b7bd3 100644
---- a/CMakeLists.txt
-+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
-@@ -624,6 +624,9 @@ set(pngvalid_sources
- set(pngstest_sources
-     contrib/libtests/pngstest.c
- )
-+set(pnggetset_sources
-+    contrib/libtests/pnggetset.c
-+)
- set(pngunknown_sources
-     contrib/libtests/pngunknown.c
- )
-@@ -786,6 +789,15 @@ if(PNG_TESTS AND PNG_SHARED)
-                COMMAND pngtest
-                FILES "${TEST_PNG3_PNGS}")
- 
-+  # pnggetset test:
-+  # Getter-to-setter roundtrips for various chunk types.
-+  add_executable(pnggetset ${pnggetset_sources})
-+  target_link_libraries(pnggetset
-+                        PRIVATE png_shared)
-+
-+  png_add_test(NAME pnggetset
-+               COMMAND pnggetset)
-+
-   # pngvalid tests:
-   # Internal validation of standard and progressive reading,
-   # transforms, and gamma handling.
-diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
-index 88f7ab628..fa5bbeb61 100644
---- a/Makefile.am
-+++ b/Makefile.am
-@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I scripts/autoconf
- 
- # test programs - run on make check, make distcheck
- if ENABLE_TESTS
--check_PROGRAMS= pngtest pngunknown pngstest pngvalid pngimage pngcp
-+check_PROGRAMS= pngtest pnggetset pngunknown pngstest pngvalid pngimage pngcp
- if HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME
- check_PROGRAMS += timepng
- endif
-@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ if ENABLE_TESTS
- pngtest_SOURCES = pngtest.c
- pngtest_LDADD = libpng@PNGLIB_MAJOR@@[email protected]
- 
-+pnggetset_SOURCES = contrib/libtests/pnggetset.c
-+pnggetset_LDADD = libpng@PNGLIB_MAJOR@@[email protected]
-+
- pngvalid_SOURCES = contrib/libtests/pngvalid.c
- pngvalid_LDADD = libpng@PNGLIB_MAJOR@@[email protected]
- 
-@@ -73,6 +76,7 @@ endif
- if ENABLE_TESTS
- TESTS =\
-    tests/pngtest-all\
-+   tests/pnggetset\
-    tests/pngvalid-gamma-16-to-8\
-    tests/pngvalid-gamma-alpha-mode\
-    tests/pngvalid-gamma-background\
-@@ -303,9 +307,10 @@ $(srcdir)/scripts/pnglibconf.h.prebuilt:
- pngtest.o: pnglibconf.h
- 
- contrib/libtests/makepng.o: pnglibconf.h
-+contrib/libtests/pnggetset.o: pnglibconf.h
-+contrib/libtests/pngimage.o: pnglibconf.h
- contrib/libtests/pngstest.o: pnglibconf.h
- contrib/libtests/pngunknown.o: pnglibconf.h
--contrib/libtests/pngimage.o: pnglibconf.h
- contrib/libtests/pngvalid.o: pnglibconf.h
- contrib/libtests/readpng.o: pnglibconf.h
- contrib/libtests/tarith.o: pnglibconf.h
-diff --git a/contrib/libtests/pnggetset.c b/contrib/libtests/pnggetset.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..b42508094
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/contrib/libtests/pnggetset.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
-+/* pnggetset.c
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Cosmin Truta
-+ *
-+ * This code is released under the libpng license.
-+ * For conditions of distribution and use, see the disclaimer
-+ * and license in png.h
-+ *
-+ * Test the get-then-set roundtrip pattern for PLTE, tRNS, and hIST.
-+ *
-+ * Passing the internal pointer returned by a getter back into the
-+ * corresponding setter is a natural API usage pattern.  A previous
-+ * version had a use-after-free on this path because the setter freed
-+ * the internal buffer before copying from the caller-supplied pointer.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#if defined(HAVE_CONFIG_H) && !defined(PNG_NO_CONFIG_H)
-+#  include <config.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef PNG_FREESTANDING_TESTS
-+#  include <png.h>
-+#else
-+#  include "../../png.h"
-+#endif
-+
-+/* Test: get the PLTE, pass it straight back to set, verify roundtrip. */
-+static int
-+test_plte_roundtrip(void)
-+{
-+   png_structp png_ptr;
-+   png_infop info_ptr;
-+   png_color palette[4];
-+   png_colorp got_palette = NULL;
-+   int num_palette = 0;
-+   int i;
-+
-+   png_ptr = png_create_write_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
-+       NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+   if (png_ptr == NULL)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: png_create_write_struct failed\n");
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
-+   if (info_ptr == NULL)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: png_create_info_struct failed\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, NULL);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: libpng error in test_plte_roundtrip\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   /* Set up a palette-color image header. */
-+   png_set_IHDR(png_ptr, info_ptr, 1, 1, 8, PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE,
-+       PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
-+
-+   /* Populate with recognizable values. */
-+   for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-+   {
-+      palette[i].red   = (png_byte)(i * 10);
-+      palette[i].green = (png_byte)(i * 20);
-+      palette[i].blue  = (png_byte)(i * 30);
-+   }
-+   png_set_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, palette, 4);
-+
-+   /* Get the internal pointer and feed it straight back. */
-+   png_get_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, &got_palette, &num_palette);
-+   if (got_palette == NULL || num_palette != 4)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: png_get_PLTE returned unexpected values\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   /* This is the critical call: the pointer aliases info_ptr->palette. */
-+   png_set_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, got_palette, num_palette);
-+
-+   /* Verify the data survived the roundtrip. */
-+   got_palette = NULL;
-+   num_palette = 0;
-+   png_get_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, &got_palette, &num_palette);
-+   if (got_palette == NULL || num_palette != 4)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: PLTE lost after roundtrip\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+   for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-+   {
-+      if (got_palette[i].red   != (png_byte)(i * 10) ||
-+          got_palette[i].green != (png_byte)(i * 20) ||
-+          got_palette[i].blue  != (png_byte)(i * 30))
-+      {
-+         fprintf(stderr,
-+             "pnggetset: PLTE entry %d corrupted after roundtrip\n", i);
-+         png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+         return 1;
-+      }
-+   }
-+
-+   png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+   return 0;
-+}
-+
-+#ifdef PNG_hIST_SUPPORTED
-+/* Test: get the hIST, pass it straight back to set, verify roundtrip. */
-+static int
-+test_hist_roundtrip(void)
-+{
-+   png_structp png_ptr;
-+   png_infop info_ptr;
-+   png_color palette[4];
-+   png_uint_16 hist[4];
-+   png_uint_16p got_hist = NULL;
-+   int i;
-+
-+   png_ptr = png_create_write_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
-+       NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+   if (png_ptr == NULL)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: png_create_write_struct failed\n");
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
-+   if (info_ptr == NULL)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: png_create_info_struct failed\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, NULL);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: libpng error in test_hist_roundtrip\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   /* Set up a palette-color image header. */
-+   memset(palette, 0, sizeof palette);
-+   png_set_IHDR(png_ptr, info_ptr, 1, 1, 8, PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE,
-+       PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
-+   png_set_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, palette, 4);
-+
-+   /* Populate with recognizable values. */
-+   for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-+      hist[i] = (png_uint_16)(i * 100 + 42);
-+
-+   png_set_hIST(png_ptr, info_ptr, hist);
-+
-+   /* Get the internal pointer and feed it straight back. */
-+   if (png_get_hIST(png_ptr, info_ptr, &got_hist) == 0 || got_hist == NULL)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: png_get_hIST returned unexpected values\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   /* This is the critical call: the pointer aliases info_ptr->hist. */
-+   png_set_hIST(png_ptr, info_ptr, got_hist);
-+
-+   /* Verify the data survived the roundtrip. */
-+   got_hist = NULL;
-+   if (png_get_hIST(png_ptr, info_ptr, &got_hist) == 0 || got_hist == NULL)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: hIST lost after roundtrip\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+   for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-+   {
-+      if (got_hist[i] != (png_uint_16)(i * 100 + 42))
-+      {
-+         fprintf(stderr,
-+             "pnggetset: hIST entry %d corrupted after roundtrip\n", i);
-+         png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+         return 1;
-+      }
-+   }
-+
-+   png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+   return 0;
-+}
-+#endif /* PNG_hIST_SUPPORTED */
-+
-+#ifdef PNG_tRNS_SUPPORTED
-+/* Test: get the tRNS, pass it straight back to set, verify roundtrip. */
-+static int
-+test_trns_roundtrip(void)
-+{
-+   png_structp png_ptr;
-+   png_infop info_ptr;
-+   png_color palette[4];
-+   png_byte trans_alpha[4];
-+   png_color_16 trans_color;
-+   png_bytep got_alpha = NULL;
-+   png_color_16p got_color = NULL;
-+   int num_trans = 0;
-+   int i;
-+
-+   png_ptr = png_create_write_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
-+       NULL, NULL, NULL);
-+   if (png_ptr == NULL)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: png_create_write_struct failed\n");
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
-+   if (info_ptr == NULL)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: png_create_info_struct failed\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, NULL);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: libpng error in test_trns_roundtrip\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   /* Set up a palette-color image. */
-+   memset(palette, 0, sizeof palette);
-+   png_set_IHDR(png_ptr, info_ptr, 1, 1, 8, PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE,
-+       PNG_INTERLACE_NONE, PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
-+   png_set_PLTE(png_ptr, info_ptr, palette, 4);
-+
-+   /* Populate tRNS with recognizable values. */
-+   for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-+      trans_alpha[i] = (png_byte)(0xff - i * 0x11);
-+   memset(&trans_color, 0, sizeof trans_color);
-+
-+   png_set_tRNS(png_ptr, info_ptr, trans_alpha, 4, &trans_color);
-+
-+   /* Get the internal pointer and feed it straight back. */
-+   png_get_tRNS(png_ptr, info_ptr, &got_alpha, &num_trans, &got_color);
-+   if (got_alpha == NULL || num_trans != 4)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: png_get_tRNS returned unexpected values\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+
-+   /* This is the critical call: the pointer aliases info_ptr->trans_alpha. */
-+   png_set_tRNS(png_ptr, info_ptr, got_alpha, num_trans, got_color);
-+
-+   /* Verify the data survived the roundtrip. */
-+   got_alpha = NULL;
-+   num_trans = 0;
-+   png_get_tRNS(png_ptr, info_ptr, &got_alpha, &num_trans, &got_color);
-+   if (got_alpha == NULL || num_trans != 4)
-+   {
-+      fprintf(stderr, "pnggetset: tRNS lost after roundtrip\n");
-+      png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+      return 1;
-+   }
-+   for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-+   {
-+      if (got_alpha[i] != (png_byte)(0xff - i * 0x11))
-+      {
-+         fprintf(stderr,
-+             "pnggetset: tRNS entry %d corrupted after roundtrip\n", i);
-+         png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+         return 1;
-+      }
-+   }
-+
-+   png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
-+   return 0;
-+}
-+#endif /* PNG_tRNS_SUPPORTED */
-+
-+int
-+main(void)
-+{
-+   int result = 0;
-+
-+   printf("Testing PLTE get-then-set roundtrip... ");
-+   fflush(stdout);
-+   if (test_plte_roundtrip() != 0)
-+   {
-+      printf("FAIL\n");
-+      result = 1;
-+   }
-+   else
-+      printf("PASS\n");
-+
-+#ifdef PNG_hIST_SUPPORTED
-+   printf("Testing hIST get-then-set roundtrip... ");
-+   fflush(stdout);
-+   if (test_hist_roundtrip() != 0)
-+   {
-+      printf("FAIL\n");
-+      result = 1;
-+   }
-+   else
-+      printf("PASS\n");
-+#endif
-+
-+#ifdef PNG_tRNS_SUPPORTED
-+   printf("Testing tRNS get-then-set roundtrip... ");
-+   fflush(stdout);
-+   if (test_trns_roundtrip() != 0)
-+   {
-+      printf("FAIL\n");
-+      result = 1;
-+   }
-+   else
-+      printf("PASS\n");
-+#endif
-+
-+   return result;
-+}
-diff --git a/pngset.c b/pngset.c
-index b9ccb7fb1..a6f20123e 100644
---- a/pngset.c
-+++ b/pngset.c
-@@ -385,6 +385,7 @@ void PNGAPI
- png_set_hIST(png_const_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr,
-     png_const_uint_16p hist)
- {
-+   png_uint_16 safe_hist[PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH];
-    int i;
- 
-    png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "hIST");
-@@ -401,6 +402,13 @@ png_set_hIST(png_const_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr,
-       return;
-    }
- 
-+   /* Snapshot the caller's hist before freeing, in case it points to
-+    * info_ptr->hist (getter-to-setter aliasing).
-+    */
-+   memcpy(safe_hist, hist, (unsigned int)info_ptr->num_palette *
-+       (sizeof (png_uint_16)));
-+   hist = safe_hist;
-+
-    png_free_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_FREE_HIST, 0);
- 
-    /* Changed from info->num_palette to PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH in
-@@ -742,7 +750,7 @@ void PNGAPI
- png_set_PLTE(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr,
-     png_const_colorp palette, int num_palette)
- {
--
-+   png_color safe_palette[PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH];
-    png_uint_32 max_palette_length;
- 
-    png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "PLTE");
-@@ -776,6 +784,15 @@ png_set_PLTE(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr,
-       png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid palette");
-    }
- 
-+   /* Snapshot the caller's palette before freeing, in case it points to
-+    * info_ptr->palette (getter-to-setter aliasing).
-+    */
-+   if (num_palette > 0)
-+      memcpy(safe_palette, palette, (unsigned int)num_palette *
-+          (sizeof (png_color)));
-+
-+   palette = safe_palette;
-+
-    png_free_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_FREE_PLTE, 0);
- 
-    /* Changed in libpng-1.2.1 to allocate PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH instead
-@@ -1165,6 +1182,16 @@ png_set_tRNS(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr,
- 
-    if (trans_alpha != NULL)
-    {
-+       /* Snapshot the caller's trans_alpha before freeing, in case it
-+        * points to info_ptr->trans_alpha (getter-to-setter aliasing).
-+        */
-+       png_byte safe_trans[PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH];
-+
-+       if (num_trans > 0 && num_trans <= PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)
-+          memcpy(safe_trans, trans_alpha, (size_t)num_trans);
-+
-+       trans_alpha = safe_trans;
-+
-        png_free_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_FREE_TRNS, 0);
- 
-        if (num_trans > 0 && num_trans <= PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)
-diff --git a/tests/pnggetset b/tests/pnggetset
-new file mode 100755
-index 000000000..57ef731a5
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tests/pnggetset
-@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
-+#!/bin/sh
-+
-+# pnggetset test:
-+# Getter-to-setter roundtrips for various chunk types.
-+exec ./pnggetset
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p2.patch deleted +0 -481

481 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.58.bb renamed from meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.56.bb +3 -4
similarity index 94%
rename from meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.56.bb
rename to meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.58.bb
index 9a85d44f52b..6e4e5e9f387 100644
@@ -12,11 +12,9 @@ LIBV = "16"
 
 SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/${BP}.tar.xz \
            file://run-ptest \
-           file://CVE-2026-34757_p1.patch \
-           file://CVE-2026-34757_p2.patch \
-           "
+"
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f7d8bf1601b7804f583a254ab343a6549ca6cf27d255c302c47af2d9d36a6f18"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "28eb403f51f0f7405249132cecfe82ea5c0ef97f1b32c5a65828814ae0d34775"
 
 MIRRORS += "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/ ${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/older-releases/"
 
@@ -73,4 +71,5 @@ do_install_ptest() {
 
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native nativesdk"
 
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-34757] = "fixed-version: fixed since 1.6.57"
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-40930] = "cpe-incorrect: Yocto never included affected libpng-apng patch"
#36 lore raw

PATCH 36/60 libpng: upgrade 1.6.58 -> 1.6.59

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Release notes [1]:

Version 1.6.59 [September 28, 2026]
Fixed CVE-2026-46675 (medium severity):
Use-after-free of zlib input in png_read_end after incomplete zTXt, iTXt or iCCP decompression.
(Reported independently by Ze Sheng and <[email protected]>.)
Fixed a regression introduced in version 1.6.47 that caused libpng to reject
hIST chunks in their correct position, after PLTE. (Contributed by Yuki Sekiguchi.)
Prevented a double free of png_struct members after an allocation failure.
(Contributed by Anthony Hurtado.)
Applied fixes and updates to the CMake build.
Adopted the REUSE Specification for licensing the CI files.

Note: cmake is not used in Yocto build of libpng.

[1] https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/blob/v1.6.59/CHANGES#L6388

(cherry picked from commit 907c6fa2d0c4f8a8f765cde004c55fb2dd2c402d)
---
 .../libpng/{libpng_1.6.58.bb => libpng_1.6.59.bb}               | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 rename meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/{libpng_1.6.58.bb => libpng_1.6.59.bb} (97%)
meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.59.bb renamed from meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.58.bb +1 -1
similarity index 97%
rename from meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.58.bb
rename to meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/libpng_1.6.59.bb
index 6e4e5e9f387..21f3a8ff3b6 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/${BP}.tar.xz \
            file://run-ptest \
 "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "28eb403f51f0f7405249132cecfe82ea5c0ef97f1b32c5a65828814ae0d34775"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d80dd2a38a37f803cb9b6ac7b14bd6e74ddc3b654780a8380bdf93523fdb4389"
 
 MIRRORS += "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/ ${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/project/${BPN}/${BPN}${LIBV}/older-releases/"
 
#37 lore raw

Re: [OE-core][wrynose 36/60] libpng: upgrade 1.6.58 -> 1.6.59

Quoted 20 lines · Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Release notes [1]:

Version 1.6.59 [September 28, 2026]
Fixed CVE-2026-46675 (medium severity):
Use-after-free of zlib input in png_read_end after incomplete zTXt, iTXt or iCCP decompression.
(Reported independently by Ze Sheng and <[email protected]>.)
Fixed a regression introduced in version 1.6.47 that caused libpng to reject
hIST chunks in their correct position, after PLTE. (Contributed by Yuki Sekiguchi.)
Prevented a double free of png_struct members after an allocation failure.
(Contributed by Anthony Hurtado.)
Applied fixes and updates to the CMake build.
Adopted the REUSE Specification for licensing the CI files.

Note: cmake is not used in Yocto build of libpng.

Quoted 7 lines

[1] https://github.com/pnggroup/libpng/blob/v1.6.59/CHANGES#L6388

(cherry picked from commit 907c6fa2d0c4f8a8f765cde004c55fb2dd2c402d)

I have not done this upgrade on blacksail yet. This upgrade will have to wait the next cycle.

Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS
#38 lore raw

PATCH 37/60 util-linux(-uuid): upgrade 2.41.5 -> 2.41.6

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Backported a patche from v2.41 branch to fix build. Also backported patch to fix CVE fixes regressions.

Release notes [1]:

Security fixes:

CVE-2026-76642 - mount(8) post-mount hooks execute after helper failure.
When an external mount.<type> helper exits nonzero, post-mount hooks (X-mount.idmap, X-mount.owner/group/mode) still execute as if the mount had succeeded, allowing privileged operations on the pre-existing target filesystem.

CVE-2026-78410 - mount(8) TOCTOU race on source path.
In restricted (SUID, non-root) mode, the source path is canonicalized with realpath() as euid=0, following symlinks through user-writable directories. Additionally, open_tree() follows symlinks in intermediate path components. A local attacker can redirect a privileged mount or post-mount ownership change to an arbitrary path.

CVE-2026-78408 - nsenter(1), unshare(1) file descriptor leak.
File descriptors in nsenter and unshare were not created with O_CLOEXEC, potentially leaking them across exec. Added O_CLOEXEC as defense in depth.

wall(1), write(1) - hostname escape sequence injection.
The CVE-2024-28085 fix sanitized only message bodies; the banner headers still interpolated the system hostname without sanitization. An unprivileged user can inject terminal escape sequences via a user namespace hostname.
Additional fix for CVE-2024-28085.
Reported-by: Skyler Ferrante

Changes between v2.41.5 and v2.41.6:

lib/fileutils:
- add ul_openat_resolve() openat2 wrapper (by Karel Zak)

libmount:
- skip post-mount hooks after failed mount helper [CVE-2026-76642] (by Karel Zak)
- pin source path with openat2() for restricted users [CVE-2026-78410] (by Karel Zak)
- restrict source path canonicalization for non-root users [CVE-2026-78410] (by Karel Zak)
- add mnt_open_tree() helper for safe tree opening (by Karel Zak)

loopdev:
- use openat2(RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) for backing file (by Karel Zak)

nsenter, unshare:
- add O_CLOEXEC to all open() calls [CVE-2026-78408] (by Karel Zak)

tests:
- (lsfd) add a function checking the availability of UDPLite socket (by Masatake YAMATO)
- (lsfd/option-inet) make UDPLite related test case skippable (by Masatake YAMATO)
- (lsfd/mkfds-udp*) make UDPLite related test cases skippable (by Masatake YAMATO)

wall, write:
- sanitize hostname in banner header (by Karel Zak)

[1] https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/blob/v2.41.6/Documentation/releases/v2.41.6-ReleaseNotes

---
 ...2.41.5.bb => util-linux-libuuid_2.41.6.bb} |   0
 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux.inc   |   5 +-
 ...sing-fileutils.h-include-to-hook_idm.patch |  38 ++++++
 .../util-linux/CVE-2026-78408.patch           |  75 ++++++++++++
 .../util-linux/CVE-2026-78410.patch           | 115 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...l-linux_2.41.5.bb => util-linux_2.41.6.bb} |   0
 6 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 rename meta/recipes-core/util-linux/{util-linux-libuuid_2.41.5.bb => util-linux-libuuid_2.41.6.bb} (100%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/0001-libmount-add-missing-fileutils.h-include-to-hook_idm.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2026-78408.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2026-78410.patch
 rename meta/recipes-core/util-linux/{util-linux_2.41.5.bb => util-linux_2.41.6.bb} (100%)
meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux-libuuid_2.41.6.bb renamed from meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux-libuuid_2.41.5.bb +0 -0
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux-libuuid_2.41.5.bb
rename to meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux-libuuid_2.41.6.bb
meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux.inc +4 -1
index be49160eac9..5b9762e24d9 100644
@@ -21,9 +21,12 @@ SRC_URI = "${KERNELORG_MIRROR}/linux/utils/util-linux/v${MAJOR_VERSION}/util-lin
            file://0001-ts-kill-decode-use-RTMIN-from-kill-L-instead-of-hard.patch \
            file://0001-tests-script-Disable-size-option-test.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-3184.patch \
+           file://0001-libmount-add-missing-fileutils.h-include-to-hook_idm.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-78408.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-78410.patch \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f586e35d320ff537aab3ffeca37e9ecd482ccbe013590db4429a414d8aa6a728"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "e596083744e746be7d2823b62b43f4418dd7bf56303b4dc09e6fe8112fe3d7ed"
 
 CVE_PRODUCT = "util-linux"
 
meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/0001-libmount-add-missing-fileutils.h-include-to-hook_idm.patch new file +38 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2beb9963c86
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 79c2881c27a0b40889cd5433d9f125689826d1d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2026 13:32:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] libmount: add missing fileutils.h include to hook_idmap.c
+
+The hook_idmap.c uses RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS (added by commit fb8e26535)
+but does not include fileutils.h, which provides the fallback #define
+for this constant.
+
+On Fedora (glibc 2.40+), this is masked because glibc's
+<bits/fcntl-linux.h> transitively includes <linux/openat2.h>, which
+defines RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS. On Ubuntu (and other distros with older
+glibc), <fcntl.h> does not pull in openat2.h, so the build fails:
+
+  hook_idmap.c:335:33: error: 'RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS' undeclared
+
+Fixes: fb8e26535 ("libmount: pin source path with openat2() for restricted users")
+Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
+(cherry picked from commit 7e2e010874b10b3aabdc3c4c844c9ffc46a4a374)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/79c2881c27a0b40889cd5433d9f125689826d1d2]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ libmount/src/hook_idmap.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/libmount/src/hook_idmap.c b/libmount/src/hook_idmap.c
+index 97d8e0d1e..d4d7fbacc 100644
+--- a/libmount/src/hook_idmap.c
++++ b/libmount/src/hook_idmap.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "strutils.h"
+ #include "all-io.h"
++#include "fileutils.h"
+ #include "namespace.h"
+ 
+ #include "mountP.h"
meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2026-78408.patch new file +75 -0

75 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2026-78410.patch new file +115 -0

115 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux_2.41.6.bb renamed from meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux_2.41.5.bb +0 -0
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux_2.41.5.bb
rename to meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux_2.41.6.bb
#39 lore raw

PATCH 38/60 qemuriscv.inc: default to fw_dynamic.elf as QEMU BIOS

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Harish Sadineni <[email protected]>

QEMU RISC-V can hang at boot when using fw_jump.elf as the BIOS if the kernel Image is large enough to overlap the memory region where the FDT (device tree blob) is loaded. This was observed with KERNEL_DEBUG-enabled 6.18 kernel builds, which inflate the Image size (e.g. ~27M -> ~33M on qemuriscv64), but the underlying issue is not specific to KERNEL_DEBUG or to any one kernel version, it is a property of fw_jump.elf's fixed compile-time boot address layout which does not adapt to a larger next-stage image.

This was confirmed by dumping guest memory from the QEMU monitor at the kernel load address and finding the FDT magic number (0xd00dfeed, see scripts/dtc/libfdt/fdt.h) sitting where kernel code should be, i.e. the DTB and Image had started to overlap [1].

fw_dynamic.elf instead receives next-stage boot information at runtime from the prior boot stage rather than assuming a fixed address, avoiding this overlap.

[1] https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/246090

[YOCTO #16409]

(cherry picked from commit 51b72fb2e8917a8627023f419b27a1d83132a361)
---
 meta/conf/machine/include/riscv/qemuriscv.inc | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/conf/machine/include/riscv/qemuriscv.inc +4 -1
index bac376ce5a8..d8522fd552e 100644
@@ -29,7 +29,10 @@ QB_SMP ?= "-smp 4"
 QB_KERNEL_CMDLINE_APPEND = "earlycon=sbi"
 QB_CPU:riscv64 ?= "-cpu rva23s64,pmp=true"
 QB_MACHINE = "-machine virt"
-QB_DEFAULT_BIOS = "fw_jump.elf"
+# fw_jump.elf's memory layout can be overrun by a sufficiently large kernel Image,
+# causing it to overlap the FDT load address and hang QEMU at boot (see [YOCTO #16409]),
+# so use fw_dynamic.elf in that case instead, which avoids the overlap.
+QB_DEFAULT_BIOS = "fw_dynamic.elf"
 QB_TAP_OPT = "-netdev tap,id=net0,ifname=@TAP@,script=no,downscript=no"
 QB_NETWORK_DEVICE = "-device virtio-net-device,netdev=net0,mac=@MAC@"
 QB_ROOTFS_OPT = "-drive id=disk0,file=@ROOTFS@,if=none,format=raw -device virtio-blk-device,drive=disk0"
#40 lore raw

PATCH 39/60 libsolv: patch CVE-2026-48863

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1].

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-48863

---
 .../libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-48863.patch      | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../libsolv/libsolv_0.7.36.bb                 |  1 +
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-48863.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-48863.patch new file +25 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..131d035b408
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From 44f8c085045b1f771641091bbb2b810d12cff9e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Schroeder <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 10:30:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix wrong variable being used in solv_pgpvrfy
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-48863
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv/commit/44f8c085045b1f771641091bbb2b810d12cff9e8]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ ext/solv_pgpvrfy.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/ext/solv_pgpvrfy.c b/ext/solv_pgpvrfy.c
+index 9f1bd72e..9358558b 100644
+--- a/ext/solv_pgpvrfy.c
++++ b/ext/solv_pgpvrfy.c
+@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ solv_pgpvrfy(const unsigned char *pub, int publ, const unsigned char *sig, int s
+ 	if (rlen)
+ 	  memcpy(sigdata + 32 - rlen, r, rlen);
+ 	if (slen)
+-	  memcpy(sigdata + 64 - slen, s, rlen);
++	  memcpy(sigdata + 64 - slen, s, slen);
+ 	res = mped25519(pub + 1 + 10 + 2 + 1, sigdata, sig + 2, hashl);
+ 	break;
+       }
meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv_0.7.36.bb +1 -0
index cca2511ea57..b6704a3d3bb 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/openSUSE/libsolv.git;branch=master;protocol=https;ta
            file://run-ptest \
            file://CVE-2026-9150.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-9149.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-48863.patch \
 "
 
 SRCREV = "1e377699be108ec82bb798ec9c223d45d84a733c"
#41 lore raw

PATCH 40/60 expat: patch CVE-2026-66046 and CVE-2026-76641

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patches per [1] and [2].
(fix for CVE-2026-66046 introduces CVE-2026-76641)

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-66046
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-76641

[YC: fixed CVE: tags in CVE-2026-66046-{01,02}.patch ]
---
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-01.patch       | 107 ++++++++++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-02.patch       |  90 ++++++++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76641.patch          | 160 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.8.3.bb        |   3 +
 4 files changed, 360 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76641.patch
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-01.patch new file +107 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e7b3d467899
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+From 98f5acc146af76859cd7c345c0906e9e9e8ea656 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Pipping <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 15:47:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: Rename hash table `defaultAttsNames` to
+ `defaultAttForName`
+
+It was previously used as a "set". This prepares for the upcoming
+change to a true "dictionary".
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-66046
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/98f5acc146af76859cd7c345c0906e9e9e8ea656]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/xmlparse.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index e5242480..239dc6de 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ typedef struct {
+   size_t nDefaultAtts;
+   size_t allocDefaultAtts;
+   DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *defaultAtts;
+-  HASH_TABLE defaultAttsNames;
++  HASH_TABLE defaultAttForName;
+ } ELEMENT_TYPE;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -3837,8 +3837,8 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
+                                          sizeof(ELEMENT_TYPE));
+     if (! elementType)
+       return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+-    if (! elementType->defaultAttsNames.parser)
+-      hashTableInit(&(elementType->defaultAttsNames), parser);
++    if (! elementType->defaultAttForName.parser)
++      hashTableInit(&(elementType->defaultAttForName), parser);
+     if (parser->m_ns && ! setElementTypePrefix(parser, elementType))
+       return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+   }
+@@ -7239,7 +7239,7 @@ defineAttribute(ELEMENT_TYPE *type, ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId, XML_Bool isCdata,
+     /* The handling of default attributes gets messed up if we have
+        a default which duplicates a non-default. */
+     NAMED *const nameFound
+-        = lookup(parser, &(type->defaultAttsNames), attId->name, 0);
++        = lookup(parser, &(type->defaultAttForName), attId->name, 0);
+     if (nameFound)
+       return 1;
+     if (isId && ! type->idAtt && ! attId->xmlns)
+@@ -7276,7 +7276,7 @@ defineAttribute(ELEMENT_TYPE *type, ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId, XML_Bool isCdata,
+     attId->maybeTokenized = XML_TRUE;
+ 
+   NAMED *const nameAddedOrFound
+-      = lookup(parser, &(type->defaultAttsNames), attId->name, sizeof(NAMED));
++      = lookup(parser, &(type->defaultAttForName), attId->name, sizeof(NAMED));
+   if (! nameAddedOrFound)
+     return 0;
+ 
+@@ -7597,7 +7597,7 @@ dtdReset(DTD *p, XML_Parser parser) {
+     ELEMENT_TYPE *e = (ELEMENT_TYPE *)hashTableIterNext(&iter);
+     if (! e)
+       break;
+-    hashTableDestroy(&(e->defaultAttsNames));
++    hashTableDestroy(&(e->defaultAttForName));
+     FREE(parser, e->defaultAtts);
+   }
+   hashTableClear(&(p->generalEntities));
+@@ -7639,7 +7639,7 @@ dtdDestroy(DTD *p, XML_Bool isDocEntity, XML_Parser parser) {
+     ELEMENT_TYPE *e = (ELEMENT_TYPE *)hashTableIterNext(&iter);
+     if (! e)
+       break;
+-    hashTableDestroy(&(e->defaultAttsNames));
++    hashTableDestroy(&(e->defaultAttForName));
+     FREE(parser, e->defaultAtts);
+   }
+   hashTableDestroy(&(p->generalEntities));
+@@ -7732,8 +7732,8 @@ dtdCopy(XML_Parser oldParser, DTD *newDtd, const DTD *oldDtd,
+     if (! newE)
+       return 0;
+ 
+-    if (! newE->defaultAttsNames.parser)
+-      hashTableInit(&(newE->defaultAttsNames), parser);
++    if (! newE->defaultAttForName.parser)
++      hashTableInit(&(newE->defaultAttForName), parser);
+ 
+     if (oldE->nDefaultAtts) {
+       /* Detect and prevent integer overflow. */
+@@ -7766,7 +7766,7 @@ dtdCopy(XML_Parser oldParser, DTD *newDtd, const DTD *oldDtd,
+       } else
+         newE->defaultAtts[i].value = NULL;
+ 
+-      NAMED *const nameAddedOrFound = lookup(parser, &(newE->defaultAttsNames),
++      NAMED *const nameAddedOrFound = lookup(parser, &(newE->defaultAttForName),
+                                              attributeName, sizeof(NAMED));
+       if (! nameAddedOrFound) {
+         return 0;
+@@ -8535,8 +8535,8 @@ getElementType(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr,
+                                sizeof(ELEMENT_TYPE));
+   if (! ret)
+     return NULL;
+-  if (! ret->defaultAttsNames.parser)
+-    hashTableInit(&(ret->defaultAttsNames), getRootParserOf(parser, NULL));
++  if (! ret->defaultAttForName.parser)
++    hashTableInit(&(ret->defaultAttForName), getRootParserOf(parser, NULL));
+   if (ret->name != name)
+     poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
+   else {
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-02.patch new file +90 -0

90 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76641.patch new file +160 -0

160 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.8.3.bb +3 -0
index 79e8c15227a..5d30a844fa0 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ VERSION_TAG = "${@d.getVar('PV').replace('.', '_')}"
 
 SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/R_${VERSION_TAG}/expat-${PV}.tar.bz2  \
            file://run-ptest \
+           file://CVE-2026-66046-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-66046-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-76641.patch \
            "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/"
#42 lore raw

PATCH 41/60 expat: patch CVE-2026-76956

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1].

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-76956

---
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76956.patch          | 26 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.8.3.bb        |  1 +
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76956.patch
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76956.patch new file +26 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..96d9b68ee7c
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 40daa9996d616e66a75dea41ed2b18f2c3901b9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sorrachat <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 17:29:50 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: Fix inverted getentropy() return in
+ writeRandomBytes_getentropy
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-76956
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/40daa9996d616e66a75dea41ed2b18f2c3901b9f]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/random_getentropy.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/random_getentropy.c b/expat/lib/random_getentropy.c
+index d258df6a..ad8b1984 100644
+--- a/lib/random_getentropy.c
++++ b/lib/random_getentropy.c
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
+ bool
+ writeRandomBytes_getentropy(void *target, size_t count) {
+   errno = 0;
+-  const bool success = getentropy(target, count);
++  const bool success = (getentropy(target, count) == 0);
+   // MSan does not understand `getentropy`, so explain its effects
+   if (success)
+     MSAN_UNPOISON(target, count);
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.8.3.bb +1 -0
index 5d30a844fa0..c3c9f738453 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/R_${VERSION_TAG}/expat-${PV}.tar.bz2  \
            file://CVE-2026-66046-01.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-66046-02.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-76641.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-76956.patch \
            "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/"
#43 lore raw

PATCH 42/60 expat: patch CVE-2026-76957

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patches per [1].

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-76957

---
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-01.patch       | 121 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-02.patch       |  85 ++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.8.3.bb        |   2 +
 3 files changed, 208 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-02.patch
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-01.patch new file +121 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..fb7a8e0b022
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From 127b7d4beb8fe7e5ce5cb021c2e56379c95863d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Carreras <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 21:16:00 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Protect custom encoding callbacks from parser reentry
+
+Co-authored-by: Sebastian Pipping <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-76957
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/127b7d4beb8fe7e5ce5cb021c2e56379c95863d0]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/xmlparse.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
+index e5242480..4f9dcbb6 100644
+--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
+@@ -771,6 +771,8 @@ struct XML_ParserStruct {
+   void *m_unknownEncodingMem;
+   void *m_unknownEncodingData;
+   void *m_unknownEncodingHandlerData;
++  // Application callback invoked by callUnknownEncodingConvert.
++  int(XMLCALL *m_unknownEncodingConvert)(void *, const char *);
+   void(XMLCALL *m_unknownEncodingRelease)(void *);
+   PROLOG_STATE m_prologState;
+   Processor *m_processor;
+@@ -1193,6 +1195,25 @@ isCalledFromInsideHandler(XML_Parser parser) {
+   return parser->m_handlerCallDepth > 0;
+ }
+ 
++static void
++callUnknownEncodingRelease(XML_Parser parser) {
++  beforeHandler(parser);
++  parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease(parser->m_unknownEncodingData);
++  afterHandler(parser);
++  parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease = NULL;
++  parser->m_unknownEncodingData = NULL;
++}
++
++static int XMLCALL
++callUnknownEncodingConvert(void *data, const char *p) {
++  XML_Parser parser = data;
++  beforeHandler(parser);
++  const int result
++      = parser->m_unknownEncodingConvert(parser->m_unknownEncodingData, p);
++  afterHandler(parser);
++  return result;
++}
++
+ static enum XML_Error
+ callProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *start, const char *end,
+               const char **endPtr) {
+@@ -1540,6 +1561,7 @@ parserInit(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *encodingName) {
+   parser->m_inheritedBindings = NULL;
+   parser->m_nSpecifiedAtts = 0;
+   parser->m_unknownEncodingMem = NULL;
++  parser->m_unknownEncodingConvert = NULL;
+   parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease = NULL;
+   parser->m_unknownEncodingData = NULL;
+   parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing = XML_INITIALIZED;
+@@ -1620,7 +1642,7 @@ XML_ParserReset(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *encodingName) {
+   moveToFreeBindingList(parser, parser->m_inheritedBindings);
+   FREE(parser, parser->m_unknownEncodingMem);
+   if (parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease)
+-    parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease(parser->m_unknownEncodingData);
++    callUnknownEncodingRelease(parser);
+   poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
+   poolClear(&parser->m_temp2Pool);
+   FREE(parser, (void *)parser->m_protocolEncodingName);
+@@ -1931,7 +1953,7 @@ XML_ParserFree(XML_Parser parser) {
+   FREE(parser, parser->m_nsAtts);
+   FREE(parser, parser->m_unknownEncodingMem);
+   if (parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease)
+-    parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease(parser->m_unknownEncodingData);
++    callUnknownEncodingRelease(parser);
+   FREE(parser, parser);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -4965,25 +4987,34 @@ handleUnknownEncoding(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *encodingName) {
+     const int status = parser->m_unknownEncodingHandler(
+         parser->m_unknownEncodingHandlerData, encodingName, &info);
+     afterHandler(parser);
++
++    parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease = info.release;
++    parser->m_unknownEncodingData = info.data;
++
+     if (status) {
+       ENCODING *enc;
+       parser->m_unknownEncodingMem = MALLOC(parser, XmlSizeOfUnknownEncoding());
+       if (! parser->m_unknownEncodingMem) {
+-        if (info.release)
+-          info.release(info.data);
++        if (parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease)
++          callUnknownEncodingRelease(parser);
++        else
++          parser->m_unknownEncodingData = NULL;
+         return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+       }
++      parser->m_unknownEncodingConvert = info.convert;
+       enc = (parser->m_ns ? XmlInitUnknownEncodingNS : XmlInitUnknownEncoding)(
+-          parser->m_unknownEncodingMem, info.map, info.convert, info.data);
++          parser->m_unknownEncodingMem, info.map,
++          info.convert ? callUnknownEncodingConvert : NULL, parser);
+       if (enc) {
+-        parser->m_unknownEncodingData = info.data;
+-        parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease = info.release;
+         parser->m_encoding = enc;
+         return XML_ERROR_NONE;
+       }
++      parser->m_unknownEncodingConvert = NULL;
+     }
+-    if (info.release != NULL)
+-      info.release(info.data);
++    if (parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease != NULL)
++      callUnknownEncodingRelease(parser);
++    else
++      parser->m_unknownEncodingData = NULL;
+   }
+   return XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING;
+ }
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-02.patch new file +85 -0

85 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.8.3.bb +2 -0
index c3c9f738453..c9a1c9b18e3 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/R_${VERSION_TAG}/expat-${PV}.tar.bz2  \
            file://CVE-2026-66046-02.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-76641.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-76956.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-76957-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-76957-02.patch \
            "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/"
#44 lore raw

PATCH 43/60 expat: patch CVE-2026-93990

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patches per [1].

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-93990

---
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-01.patch       | 191 ++++++++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-02.patch       | 328 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.8.3.bb        |   2 +
 3 files changed, 521 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-02.patch
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-01.patch new file +191 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..fde01b916ad
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+From 0cfd15bdf4b2c22d6b0df73610709dfb60921091 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kartik Kenchi <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 15:51:06 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] lib: reject UTF-16 high surrogate not followed by a low
+ surrogate
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-93990
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/0cfd15bdf4b2c22d6b0df73610709dfb60921091]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ lib/xmltok.c      | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ lib/xmltok_impl.c |  4 ----
+ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/xmltok.c b/lib/xmltok.c
+index 8abb145e..5f4e78ec 100644
+--- a/lib/xmltok.c
++++ b/lib/xmltok.c
+@@ -232,6 +232,19 @@ struct normal_encoding {
+       /* isNmstrt2 */ NULL, /* isNmstrt3 */ NULL, /* isNmstrt4 */ NULL,        \
+       /* isInvalid2 */ NULL, /* isInvalid3 */ NULL, /* isInvalid4 */ NULL
+ 
++/* Like NULL_VTABLE but with a real isInvalid4 so the UTF-16 encodings reject a
++   high surrogate that is not followed by a low surrogate.  Only needed for the
++   XML_MIN_SIZE build, where the shared tokenizer dispatches through the vtable;
++   the regular build inlines the same check via IS_INVALID_CHAR. */
++#ifdef XML_MIN_SIZE
++#  define UTF16_NULL_VTABLE(E)                                                 \
++    /* isName2 */ NULL, /* isName3 */ NULL, /* isName4 */ NULL,                \
++        /* isNmstrt2 */ NULL, /* isNmstrt3 */ NULL, /* isNmstrt4 */ NULL,      \
++        /* isInvalid2 */ NULL, /* isInvalid3 */ NULL, E##isInvalid4
++#else
++#  define UTF16_NULL_VTABLE(E) NULL_VTABLE
++#endif
++
+ static int FASTCALL checkCharRefNumber(int result);
+ 
+ #include "xmltok_impl.h"
+@@ -749,6 +762,11 @@ DEFINE_UTF16_TO_UTF16(big2_)
+   UCS2_GET_NAMING(namePages, (unsigned char)p[1], (unsigned char)p[0])
+ #define LITTLE2_IS_NMSTRT_CHAR_MINBPC(p)                                       \
+   UCS2_GET_NAMING(nmstrtPages, (unsigned char)p[1], (unsigned char)p[0])
++/* A 4-byte UTF-16 character is a surrogate pair; byteType only reports BT_LEAD4
++   for a high surrogate, so the pair is invalid unless the second unit is a low
++   surrogate (U+DC00..U+DFFF, i.e. high byte 0xDC..0xDF). */
++#define LITTLE2_IS_INVALID_CHAR(p, n)                                          \
++  ((n) == 4 && ((unsigned char)(p)[3] & 0xFC) != 0xDC)
+ 
+ #ifdef XML_MIN_SIZE
+ 
+@@ -781,6 +799,12 @@ little2_isNmstrtMin(const ENCODING *enc, const char *p) {
+   return LITTLE2_IS_NMSTRT_CHAR_MINBPC(p);
+ }
+ 
++static int
++little2_isInvalid4(const ENCODING *enc, const char *p) {
++  UNUSED_P(enc);
++  return LITTLE2_IS_INVALID_CHAR(p, 4);
++}
++
+ #  undef VTABLE
+ #  define VTABLE VTABLE1, little2_toUtf8, little2_toUtf16
+ 
+@@ -797,6 +821,7 @@ little2_isNmstrtMin(const ENCODING *enc, const char *p) {
+ #  define IS_NAME_CHAR_MINBPC(enc, p) LITTLE2_IS_NAME_CHAR_MINBPC(p)
+ #  define IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, p, n) (0)
+ #  define IS_NMSTRT_CHAR_MINBPC(enc, p) LITTLE2_IS_NMSTRT_CHAR_MINBPC(p)
++#  define IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, p, n) LITTLE2_IS_INVALID_CHAR(p, n)
+ 
+ #  define XML_TOK_IMPL_C
+ #  include "xmltok_impl.c"
+@@ -828,7 +853,7 @@ static const struct normal_encoding little2_encoding_ns
+ #  include "asciitab.h"
+ #  include "latin1tab.h"
+        },
+-       STANDARD_VTABLE(little2_) NULL_VTABLE};
++       STANDARD_VTABLE(little2_) UTF16_NULL_VTABLE(little2_)};
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -846,7 +871,7 @@ static const struct normal_encoding little2_encoding
+ #undef BT_COLON
+ #include "latin1tab.h"
+        },
+-       STANDARD_VTABLE(little2_) NULL_VTABLE};
++       STANDARD_VTABLE(little2_) UTF16_NULL_VTABLE(little2_)};
+ 
+ #if BYTEORDER != 4321
+ 
+@@ -858,7 +883,7 @@ static const struct normal_encoding internal_little2_encoding_ns
+ #    include "iasciitab.h"
+ #    include "latin1tab.h"
+        },
+-       STANDARD_VTABLE(little2_) NULL_VTABLE};
++       STANDARD_VTABLE(little2_) UTF16_NULL_VTABLE(little2_)};
+ 
+ #  endif
+ 
+@@ -870,7 +895,7 @@ static const struct normal_encoding internal_little2_encoding
+ #  undef BT_COLON
+ #  include "latin1tab.h"
+        },
+-       STANDARD_VTABLE(little2_) NULL_VTABLE};
++       STANDARD_VTABLE(little2_) UTF16_NULL_VTABLE(little2_)};
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -882,6 +907,11 @@ static const struct normal_encoding internal_little2_encoding
+   UCS2_GET_NAMING(namePages, (unsigned char)p[0], (unsigned char)p[1])
+ #define BIG2_IS_NMSTRT_CHAR_MINBPC(p)                                          \
+   UCS2_GET_NAMING(nmstrtPages, (unsigned char)p[0], (unsigned char)p[1])
++/* A 4-byte UTF-16 character is a surrogate pair; byteType only reports BT_LEAD4
++   for a high surrogate, so the pair is invalid unless the second unit is a low
++   surrogate (U+DC00..U+DFFF, i.e. high byte 0xDC..0xDF). */
++#define BIG2_IS_INVALID_CHAR(p, n)                                             \
++  ((n) == 4 && ((unsigned char)(p)[2] & 0xFC) != 0xDC)
+ 
+ #ifdef XML_MIN_SIZE
+ 
+@@ -914,6 +944,12 @@ big2_isNmstrtMin(const ENCODING *enc, const char *p) {
+   return BIG2_IS_NMSTRT_CHAR_MINBPC(p);
+ }
+ 
++static int
++big2_isInvalid4(const ENCODING *enc, const char *p) {
++  UNUSED_P(enc);
++  return BIG2_IS_INVALID_CHAR(p, 4);
++}
++
+ #  undef VTABLE
+ #  define VTABLE VTABLE1, big2_toUtf8, big2_toUtf16
+ 
+@@ -930,6 +966,7 @@ big2_isNmstrtMin(const ENCODING *enc, const char *p) {
+ #  define IS_NAME_CHAR_MINBPC(enc, p) BIG2_IS_NAME_CHAR_MINBPC(p)
+ #  define IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, p, n) (0)
+ #  define IS_NMSTRT_CHAR_MINBPC(enc, p) BIG2_IS_NMSTRT_CHAR_MINBPC(p)
++#  define IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, p, n) BIG2_IS_INVALID_CHAR(p, n)
+ 
+ #  define XML_TOK_IMPL_C
+ #  include "xmltok_impl.c"
+@@ -961,7 +998,7 @@ static const struct normal_encoding big2_encoding_ns
+ #  include "asciitab.h"
+ #  include "latin1tab.h"
+        },
+-       STANDARD_VTABLE(big2_) NULL_VTABLE};
++       STANDARD_VTABLE(big2_) UTF16_NULL_VTABLE(big2_)};
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -979,7 +1016,7 @@ static const struct normal_encoding big2_encoding
+ #undef BT_COLON
+ #include "latin1tab.h"
+        },
+-       STANDARD_VTABLE(big2_) NULL_VTABLE};
++       STANDARD_VTABLE(big2_) UTF16_NULL_VTABLE(big2_)};
+ 
+ #if BYTEORDER != 1234
+ 
+@@ -991,7 +1028,7 @@ static const struct normal_encoding internal_big2_encoding_ns
+ #    include "iasciitab.h"
+ #    include "latin1tab.h"
+        },
+-       STANDARD_VTABLE(big2_) NULL_VTABLE};
++       STANDARD_VTABLE(big2_) UTF16_NULL_VTABLE(big2_)};
+ 
+ #  endif
+ 
+@@ -1003,7 +1040,7 @@ static const struct normal_encoding internal_big2_encoding
+ #  undef BT_COLON
+ #  include "latin1tab.h"
+        },
+-       STANDARD_VTABLE(big2_) NULL_VTABLE};
++       STANDARD_VTABLE(big2_) UTF16_NULL_VTABLE(big2_)};
+ 
+ #endif
+ 
+diff --git a/lib/xmltok_impl.c b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
+index b7a9b5eb..3cc9e5ab 100644
+--- a/lib/xmltok_impl.c
++++ b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
+@@ -44,10 +44,6 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef XML_TOK_IMPL_C
+ 
+-#  ifndef IS_INVALID_CHAR // i.e. for UTF-16 and XML_MIN_SIZE not defined
+-#    define IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) (0)
+-#  endif
+-
+ #  define INVALID_LEAD_CASE(n, ptr, nextTokPtr)                                \
+   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
+     if (end - ptr < n)                                                         \
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-02.patch new file +328 -0

328 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.8.3.bb +2 -0
index c9a1c9b18e3..6d08a3fd94b 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/R_${VERSION_TAG}/expat-${PV}.tar.bz2  \
            file://CVE-2026-76956.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-76957-01.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-76957-02.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-93990-01.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-93990-02.patch \
            "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/"
#45 lore raw

PATCH 44/60 ffmpeg: Fix for CVE-2026-66036

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Bhavesh R Maheshwari <[email protected]>

Pick the patch from [1] and [2], mentioned in PR#23783 [3] which is referenced in the NVD report [4]

[1] https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/f0f634b6585fdc7bbb43ab3ae461499bfca9ad2e
[2] https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/5d7112c60e6f0f0742ce47d448e6da0718a70f4c
[3] https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/pulls/23783
[4] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-66036

---
 .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p1.patch     | 120 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p2.patch     |  71 +++++++++++
 .../recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_8.0.3.bb |   2 +
 3 files changed, 193 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p2.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p1.patch new file +120 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..bce02651143
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From 7ac88955c4678fc10cc44a786ff9bf724bb12deb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2026 13:05:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] avfilter/vf_hqdn3d: reject unsupported frame parameter
+ changes
+
+Fixes: out of array access
+Fixes: 9aj_hqdn3d_dynamic_res.mjpg / 9aj_generate_hqdn3d_dynamic_res_mjpg.py
+Fixes: wWDsy2oDvMuR
+Found-by: Adrian Junge (vurlo) <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-66036
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/f0f634b6585fdc7bbb43ab3ae461499bfca9ad2e]
+
+Signed-off-by: Bhavesh R Maheshwari <[email protected]>
+---
+ libavfilter/vf_hqdn3d.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ libavfilter/vf_hqdn3d.h |  2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libavfilter/vf_hqdn3d.c b/libavfilter/vf_hqdn3d.c
+index 1136931b9b..44fb3574a0 100644
+--- a/libavfilter/vf_hqdn3d.c
++++ b/libavfilter/vf_hqdn3d.c
+@@ -165,12 +165,8 @@ static int denoise_depth(HQDN3DContext *s,
+             case 14: ret = denoise_depth(__VA_ARGS__, 14); break;             \
+             case 16: ret = denoise_depth(__VA_ARGS__, 16); break;             \
+         }                                                                     \
+-        if (ret < 0) {                                                        \
+-            av_frame_free(&out);                                              \
+-            if (!direct)                                                      \
+-                av_frame_free(&in);                                           \
++        if (ret < 0)                                                          \
+             return ret;                                                       \
+-        }                                                                     \
+     } while (0)
+ 
+ static void precalc_coefs(double dist25, int depth, int16_t *ct)
+@@ -283,12 +279,15 @@ static int config_input(AVFilterLink *inlink)
+     ff_hqdn3d_init_x86(s);
+ #endif
+ 
++    s->format = inlink->format;
++    s->width  = inlink->w;
++    s->height = inlink->h;
++
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ typedef struct ThreadData {
+     AVFrame *in, *out;
+-    int direct;
+ } ThreadData;
+ 
+ static int do_denoise(AVFilterContext *ctx, void *data, int job_nr, int n_jobs)
+@@ -297,7 +296,6 @@ static int do_denoise(AVFilterContext *ctx, void *data, int job_nr, int n_jobs)
+     const ThreadData *td = data;
+     AVFrame *out = td->out;
+     AVFrame *in = td->in;
+-    int direct = td->direct;
+ 
+     denoise(s, in->data[job_nr], out->data[job_nr],
+                 s->line[job_nr], &s->frame_prev[job_nr],
+@@ -314,10 +312,21 @@ static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
+ {
+     AVFilterContext *ctx  = inlink->dst;
+     AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
++    HQDN3DContext *s = ctx->priv;
+ 
+     AVFrame *out;
+     int direct = av_frame_is_writable(in) && !ctx->is_disabled;
+     ThreadData td;
++    int ret[3];
++
++    if (in->format != s->format ||
++        in->width  != s->width  ||
++        in->height != s->height) {
++        av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
++               "Frame size or format changed without filter graph reinitialization\n");
++        av_frame_free(&in);
++        return AVERROR(EINVAL);
++    }
+ 
+     if (direct) {
+         out = in;
+@@ -333,9 +342,16 @@ static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
+ 
+     td.in = in;
+     td.out = out;
+-    td.direct = direct;
+     /* one thread per plane */
+-    ff_filter_execute(ctx, do_denoise, &td, NULL, 3);
++    ff_filter_execute(ctx, do_denoise, &td, ret, 3);
++    for (int i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(ret); i++) {
++        if (ret[i] < 0) {
++            av_frame_free(&out);
++            if (!direct)
++                av_frame_free(&in);
++            return ret[i];
++        }
++    }
+ 
+     if (ctx->is_disabled) {
+         av_frame_free(&out);
+diff --git a/libavfilter/vf_hqdn3d.h b/libavfilter/vf_hqdn3d.h
+index 3279bbcc77..3467f27145 100644
+--- a/libavfilter/vf_hqdn3d.h
++++ b/libavfilter/vf_hqdn3d.h
+@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ typedef struct HQDN3DContext {
+     double strength[4];
+     int hsub, vsub;
+     int depth;
++    int width, height;
++    enum AVPixelFormat format;
+     void (*denoise_row[17])(uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst, uint16_t *line_ant, uint16_t *frame_ant, ptrdiff_t w, int16_t *spatial, int16_t *temporal);
+ } HQDN3DContext;
+ 
+-- 
+2.53.0
+
meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p2.patch new file +71 -0

71 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_8.0.3.bb +2 -0
index 06c6e402c97..9a2a3353ca4 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.ffmpeg.org/releases/${BP}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2026-66037.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-66038.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-66039.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-66036_p1.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-66036_p2.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6136812ea6d4e68bdba27e33c2a94382711cdf4f8602ffef056ff792bd6f9818"
#46 lore raw

PATCH 45/60 ffmpeg: Fix for CVE-2026-66041

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Bhavesh R Maheshwari <[email protected]>

Pick the patch from [1], also referenced in the NVD report [2].

[1] https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/4da9812e25894fb51d62a8875cfa8eb39b5e20f5
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-66041

---
 .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66041.patch        | 60 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_8.0.3.bb |  1 +
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66041.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66041.patch new file +60 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7a8c4e0c8b9
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From 9db6b5816516b85e981e177863b2eb361dbec3c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 15:33:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] avfilter/vf_quirc: resize the quirc buffers when the input
+ size changes
+
+Fixes: out of array access
+Fixes: JbvzNObhorBp
+Fixes: 030e140145 (lavfi: add quirc filter)
+Found-by: Adrian Junge (vurlo)
+Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-66041
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://code.ffmpeg.org/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/4da9812e25894fb51d62a8875cfa8eb39b5e20f5]
+
+Signed-off-by: Bhavesh R Maheshwari <[email protected]>
+---
+ libavfilter/vf_quirc.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libavfilter/vf_quirc.c b/libavfilter/vf_quirc.c
+index 59dc84caa8..d2ba48e7bc 100644
+--- a/libavfilter/vf_quirc.c
++++ b/libavfilter/vf_quirc.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ typedef struct QuircContext {
+     const AVClass *class;
+ 
+     struct quirc *quirc;
++    int width, height;
+ } QuircContext;
+ 
+ static av_cold int init(AVFilterContext *ctx)
+@@ -67,6 +68,8 @@ static int config_input(AVFilterLink *inlink)
+     if (err == -1) {
+         return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
+     }
++    quirc->width  = inlink->w;
++    quirc->height = inlink->h;
+ 
+     return 0;
+ }
+@@ -80,6 +83,15 @@ static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *frame)
+     int codes_count;
+     uint8_t *image;
+ 
++    if (quirc->width != inlink->w || quirc->height != inlink->h) {
++        if (quirc_resize(quirc->quirc, inlink->w, inlink->h) < 0) {
++            av_frame_free(&frame);
++            return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
++        }
++        quirc->width  = inlink->w;
++        quirc->height = inlink->h;
++    }
++
+     /* copy input image to quirc buffer */
+     image = quirc_begin(quirc->quirc, NULL, NULL);
+     av_image_copy_plane(image, inlink->w,
+-- 
+2.53.0
+
meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_8.0.3.bb +1 -0
index 9a2a3353ca4..b92676d4dbb 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.ffmpeg.org/releases/${BP}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2026-66039.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-66036_p1.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-66036_p2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-66041.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6136812ea6d4e68bdba27e33c2a94382711cdf4f8602ffef056ff792bd6f9818"
#47 lore raw

PATCH 46/60 systemd: fix mDNS hostname changes

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Tatrai <[email protected]>

When a DNS-SD service unregisters, resolved re-probes its records. The looped-back mDNS announcement can then be treated as a conflicting reply, causing resolved to rename the host.

Backport systemd commit 658e5ac06f80ee2078b034f7cc483204d7f91c5e to move the local-address check ahead of reply processing while continuing to allow legacy unicast queries from non-mDNS ports.

This is needed on wrynose, which uses systemd 259.5 and checks local addresses only for queries. OE-Core master uses systemd 261, whose source already checks local addresses before the query/reply split.

---
 ...use-traffic-from-the-local-host-only.patch | 61 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_259.5.bb    |  1 +
 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-Revert-resolve-refuse-traffic-from-the-local-host-only.patch
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-Revert-resolve-refuse-traffic-from-the-local-host-only.patch new file +61 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..efdc2852f9e
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 658e5ac06f80ee2078b034f7cc483204d7f91c5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bret Comnes <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2026 05:59:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "resolve: refuse traffic from the local host only for
+ queries"
+
+This reverts commit 526f1594daec073269c3e70ee7914f6dd8740d5c.
+
+This revert is necessary because the change breaks mDNS hostname stability
+whenever a DNS-SD service calls UnregisterService. When a service
+unregisters (e.g. on process restart), manager_refresh_rrs() clears and
+re-adds all RRs in PROBING state, which sends a multicast announcement
+(QR=1). The kernel reflects this back to resolved's own socket. Because
+the local-address check was moved inside the query-only branch by the
+reverted commit, the reply path in on_mdns_packet() is now unguarded.
+The looped-back announcement matches the pending probe transaction and
+completes it with DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS. Since the zone item is still
+in PROBING state (not ESTABLISHED), dns_zone_item_notify() sets
+we_lost=true and calls dns_zone_item_conflict(), which invokes
+manager_next_hostname() and renames the hostname (e.g. foo.local to
+foo4.local). This happens reliably on every restart of any service using
+RegisterService/UnregisterService (homebridge, avahi-compat wrappers,
+etc.).
+
+The top-level local-address check in on_mdns_packet() suppresses all
+looped-back multicast traffic before the reply/query split. Restoring it
+there is consistent with the overall design: dns_scope_check_conflicts()
+already has its own manager_packet_from_local_address() guard and is
+unaffected.
+
+A more targeted long-term fix (e.g. guarding dns_transaction_process_reply()
+for mDNS, or avoiding unnecessary re-probing of already-established records
+in manager_refresh_rrs()) can be pursued separately.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/658e5ac06f80ee2078b034f7cc483204d7f91c5e]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Tatrai <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/resolve/resolved-mdns.c | 16 ++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-mdns.c b/src/resolve/resolved-mdns.c
+--- a/src/resolve/resolved-mdns.c
++++ b/src/resolve/resolved-mdns.c
+@@ -415,0 +416,8 @@
++        /* Refuse traffic from the local host, to avoid query loops. However, allow legacy mDNS
++         * unicast queries through anyway (we never send those ourselves, hence no risk).
++         * i.e. check for the source port nr. */
++        if (p->sender_port == MDNS_PORT && manager_packet_from_local_address(m, p)) {
++                log_debug("Got mDNS UDP packet from local host, ignoring.");
++                return 0;
++        }
++
+@@ -532,8 +539,0 @@
+-                /* Refuse traffic from the local host, to avoid query loops. However, allow legacy mDNS
+-                 * unicast queries through anyway (we never send those ourselves, hence no risk).
+-                 * i.e. check for the source port nr. */
+-                if (p->sender_port == MDNS_PORT && manager_packet_from_local_address(m, p)) {
+-                        log_debug("Got mDNS UDP packet from local host, ignoring.");
+-                        return 0;
+-                }
+-
meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_259.5.bb +1 -0
index f3ec0edae72..e924884bf95 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ SRC_URI += " \
            file://0001-meson-use-libfido2_cflags-dependency.patch \
            file://0018-shared-fdset-add-detailed-debug-logging-to-fdset_new.patch \
            file://0004-tpm2-util-fix-PCR-bank-guessing-without-EFI.patch \
+           file://0001-Revert-resolve-refuse-traffic-from-the-local-host-only.patch \
            "
 
 PAM_PLUGINS = " \
#48 lore raw

PATCH 47/60 gstreamer: skip test_queue:test_leaky_downstream test as it's flakey

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Ross Burton <[email protected]>

This test occasionally fails, so skip it. A bug has been filed upstream.

[ YOCTO #15408 ]

(cherry picked from commit ac8fa6ada2a0cf0ae27316837985dd57b01e727f)
---
 meta/recipes-multimedia/gstreamer/gstreamer1.0/run-ptest | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-multimedia/gstreamer/gstreamer1.0/run-ptest +3 -0
index 83a78fabd0f..d425eed825d 100755
@@ -27,4 +27,7 @@ GST_CHECKS_IGNORE="$GST_CHECKS_IGNORE,parser_convert_duration,parser_pull_frame_
 # https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/gstreamer/gstreamer/-/work_items/5163
 GST_CHECKS_IGNORE="$GST_CHECKS_IGNORE,test_device_monitor"
 
+# https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15408
+GST_CHECKS_IGNORE="$GST_CHECKS_IGNORE,test_leaky_downstream"
+
 gnome-desktop-testing-runner --parallel=4 gstreamer "$@"
#49 lore raw

PATCH 48/60 libaio: update SRC_URI

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Ross Burton <[email protected]>

libaio has moved to Codeberg as pagure.io will be closed down shortly.

(cherry picked from commit 237c32e181cd47194c3877d220360d6e6fbb2af8)
---
 meta/recipes-extended/libaio/libaio_0.3.113.bb | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-extended/libaio/libaio_0.3.113.bb +1 -1
index 2392fd5db23..5f4c5547a11 100644
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://lse.sourceforge.net/io/aio.html"
 LICENSE = "LGPL-2.1-or-later"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=d8045f3b8f929c1cb29a1e3fd737b499"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://pagure.io/libaio.git;protocol=https;branch=master \
+SRC_URI = "git://codeberg.org/jmoyer/libaio.git;protocol=https;branch=master;tag=${BP} \
            file://00_arches.patch \
            file://libaio_fix_for_mips_syscalls.patch \
            file://system-linkage.patch \
#50 lore raw

PATCH 49/60 alsa-lib: patch CVE-2026-90781

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1].

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-90781

---
 .../alsa/alsa-lib/CVE-2026-90781.patch        | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../alsa/alsa-lib_1.2.15.3.bb                 |  1 +
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/alsa/alsa-lib/CVE-2026-90781.patch
meta/recipes-multimedia/alsa/alsa-lib/CVE-2026-90781.patch new file +41 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b2b2ce84cff
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From f84cd4ced7b36fddb8e4ee24404cf7c091d27020 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2026 20:20:30 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] control: ctlparse - another fix for one-byte overrrun in
+ __snd_ctl_ascii_elem_id_parse
+
+Follows 1e27d63ef6d1dcf7d1f1a1e1eca3ea779e7de377 .
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/alsa-devel/CACBQ=P2FhO3M6dkv3cWuKb6Qhs92ouV+FJ3SJZ_PVBSSdJWRAQ@mail.gmail.com/
+Reported-by: Harsh Raj Singhania <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-90781
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/alsa-project/alsa-lib/commit/f84cd4ced7b36fddb8e4ee24404cf7c091d27020]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/control/ctlparse.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/control/ctlparse.c b/src/control/ctlparse.c
+index c40de2bd..7132210e 100644
+--- a/src/control/ctlparse.c
++++ b/src/control/ctlparse.c
+@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ int __snd_ctl_ascii_elem_id_parse(snd_ctl_elem_id_t *dst, const char *str,
+ 			if (*str == '\'' || *str == '\"') {
+ 				c = *str++;
+ 				while (*str && *str != c) {
+-					if (size < (int)sizeof(buf)) {
++					if (size < (int)sizeof(buf) - 1) {
+ 						*ptr++ = *str;
+ 						size++;
+ 					}
+@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int __snd_ctl_ascii_elem_id_parse(snd_ctl_elem_id_t *dst, const char *str,
+ 					str++;
+ 			} else {
+ 				while (*str && *str != ',') {
+-					if (size < (int)sizeof(buf)) {
++					if (size < (int)sizeof(buf) - 1) {
+ 						*ptr++ = *str;
+ 						size++;
+ 					}
meta/recipes-multimedia/alsa/alsa-lib_1.2.15.3.bb +1 -0
index 04976f3bf77..3081a522cba 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=a916467b91076e631dd8edb7424769c7 \
 SRC_URI = "https://www.alsa-project.org/files/pub/lib/${BP}.tar.bz2"
 SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-25068.patch"
 SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-56109.patch"
+SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-90781.patch"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "7b079d614d582cade7ab8db2364e65271d0877a37df8757ac4ac0c8970be861e"
 
 inherit autotools pkgconfig
#51 lore raw

PATCH 50/60 weston: fix VNC backend build with aml 1.0

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Frieder Schrempf <[email protected]>

meta-oe's aml 1.0 installs aml1.pc, but weston 15 looks for aml 0.3.x, so enabling the vnc PACKAGECONFIG fails at configure time. Backport the aml part of the upstream fix from weston 16 and add aml to the vnc dependencies, as weston uses it directly.

Tested by building weston with PACKAGECONFIG vnc for ARMv7.

AI-Generated: Uses Claude Code (Claude Opus 5.5)

---
 .../weston/0001-backend-vnc-Use-aml-v1.patch  | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-graphics/wayland/weston_15.0.0.bb |  3 ++-
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/wayland/weston/0001-backend-vnc-Use-aml-v1.patch
meta/recipes-graphics/wayland/weston/0001-backend-vnc-Use-aml-v1.patch new file +24 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c752a2b3624
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+From: Frieder Schrempf <[email protected]>
+Subject: [PATCH] backend-vnc: Use aml v1
+
+aml 1.0 installs aml1.pc and neatvnc already uses it. Only the aml part
+of the upstream commit is taken, as the rest needs Neat VNC 1.0.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [partial, https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/wayland/weston/-/commit/8a1c91e7]
+Signed-off-by: Frieder Schrempf <[email protected]>
+---
+ libweston/backend-vnc/meson.build | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libweston/backend-vnc/meson.build b/libweston/backend-vnc/meson.build
+--- a/libweston/backend-vnc/meson.build
++++ b/libweston/backend-vnc/meson.build
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ if not dep_neatvnc.found()
+ 	error('VNC backend requires neatvnc which was not found. Or, you can use \'-Dbackend-vnc=false\'.')
+ endif
+ 
+-dep_aml = dependency('aml', version: ['>= 0.3.0', '< 0.4.0'], required: false, fallback: ['aml', 'aml_dep'])
++dep_aml = dependency('aml1', version: ['>= 1.0.0', '< 2.0.0'], required: false, fallback: ['aml', 'aml_dep'])
+ if not dep_aml.found()
+ 	error('VNC backend requires libaml which was not found. Or, you can use \'-Dbackend-vnc=false\'.')
+ endif
meta/recipes-graphics/wayland/weston_15.0.0.bb +2 -1
index da347659f12..3f9fff51fd4 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=d79ee9e66bb0f95d3386a7acae780b70 \
 SRC_URI = "https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/wayland/weston/-/releases/${PV}/downloads/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://0001-vulkan-renderer-guard-surface-output-creation-with-b.patch \
            file://0001-gl-shaders-Remove-asserts-relying-on-shader-compiler.patch \
+           file://0001-backend-vnc-Use-aml-v1.patch \
            file://weston.png \
            file://weston.desktop \
            file://xwayland.weston-start \
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[image-jpeg] = "-Dimage-jpeg=true,-Dimage-jpeg=false, jpeg"
 # screencasting via PipeWire
 PACKAGECONFIG[pipewire] = "-Dbackend-pipewire=true,-Dbackend-pipewire=false,pipewire,pipewire"
 # VNC remote screensharing
-PACKAGECONFIG[vnc] = "-Dbackend-vnc=true,-Dbackend-vnc=false,neatvnc libpam"
+PACKAGECONFIG[vnc] = "-Dbackend-vnc=true,-Dbackend-vnc=false,neatvnc aml libpam"
 # Perfetto performance analysis support
 PACKAGECONFIG[perfetto] = "-Dperfetto=true,-Dperfetto=false,libperfetto"
 
#52 lore raw

PATCH 51/60 go: upgrade 1.26.8 -> 1.26.9

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Upgrade to latest 1.26.x release [1]:

$ git --no-pager log --oneline go1.26.8..go1.26.9
2ae494ef9f (tag: go1.26.9) [release-branch.go1.26] go1.26.9
6e04952188 [release-branch.go1.26] net/http: bundled HTTP/2 vuln fixes
eb25b4e532 [release-branch.go1.26] net/http: limit the size of range headers parsed in ServeContent
be88124d06 [release-branch.go1.26] os: correct Root junction handling on Windows (avoid mkdir escape)
087de1ff08 [release-branch.go1.26] net/http: avoid server reuse of connection after CONNECT
3fe1aac0ce [release-branch.go1.26] net/http, net/http/httputil: avoid post-CONNECT pool corruption
d7a7aa8e67 [release-branch.go1.26] net/textproto: enforce MIME memory limit on first line
eb1bf6e0c4 [release-branch.go1.26] crypto/tls: validate ECH outer extension references
7325b729f0 [release-branch.go1.26] cmd/go: always verify toolchain downloads with sumdb
5fa9de4696 [release-branch.go1.26] cmd/go: bundle go.sum h1 hashes for golang.org/fips140
5d84f6f08c [release-branch.go1.26] html/template: recognize `yield` as regexp preceder keyword
e59c03e695 [release-branch.go1.26] html/template: reset JS context for template expressions
7060ef9d77 [release-branch.go1.26] cmd/link: pass -no_fixup_chains to C linker when building plugin on macOS
305bfa6252 [release-branch.go1.26] cmd/go: include VetxOnly in the vet action ID
179610a1ed [release-branch.go1.26] os: preserve completion notification modes for NewFile handles
2a1834bf42 [release-branch.go1.26] cmd/compile: fix slice backing store analysis
c7183cd20d [release-branch.go1.26] os: handle unsupported OBJ_DONT_REPARSE on older Windows
19777cc57f [release-branch.go1.26] cmd/compile: don't stack-allocate a slice whose element interior escapes
5bf869b5ac [release-branch.go1.26] internal/runtime/syscall/linux: sync EpollEvent with the kernel header
6a97c5bf7c [release-branch.go1.26] net/http: vendor in CL 836505
ee49ded5ca [release-branch.go1.26] cmd/compile: fix large riscv64 move/zero
25d767a9a1 [release-branch.go1.26] runtime: netpoll: fix 32-bit little-endian eventfd type confusion
5e38ca6aaa [release-branch.go1.26] runtime: disable mutex profile during async preemption on windows
2c99952588 [release-branch.go1.26] crypto/mlkem: fix FIPS 130-3 CAST

Fixes CVE-2026-97032, CVE-2026-78659, CVE-2026-97031, CVE-2026-94444,

      CVE-2026-94447, CVE-2026-94448, CVE-2026-97030, CVE-2026-94440,
      CVE-2026-56866, CVE-2026-94439, CVE-2026-78669, CVE-2026-78660,
      CVE-2026-56857, CVE-2026-78667 and CVE-2026-78663.

Release information: [2]

[1] https://github.com/golang/go/compare/go1.26.8...go1.26.9
[2] https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/U2fTuyDJznI

---
 meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-1.26.8.inc => go-1.26.9.inc} | 2 +-
 ...binary-native_1.26.8.bb => go-binary-native_1.26.9.bb} | 6 +++---
 ...oss-canadian_1.26.8.bb => go-cross-canadian_1.26.9.bb} | 0
 .../go/{go-cross_1.26.8.bb => go-cross_1.26.9.bb}         | 0
 .../go/{go-crosssdk_1.26.8.bb => go-crosssdk_1.26.9.bb}   | 0
 .../go/{go-runtime_1.26.8.bb => go-runtime_1.26.9.bb}     | 0
 ...go-make-content-based-hash-generation-less-pedan.patch | 8 ++++----
 .../go/go/0003-ld-add-soname-to-shareable-objects.patch   | 6 +++---
 .../go/0006-cmd-go-make-GOROOT-precious-by-default.patch  | 2 +-
 ....go-filter-out-build-specific-paths-from-linker-.patch | 4 ++--
 meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go_1.26.8.bb => go_1.26.9.bb}   | 0
 11 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-1.26.8.inc => go-1.26.9.inc} (90%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-binary-native_1.26.8.bb => go-binary-native_1.26.9.bb} (80%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-cross-canadian_1.26.8.bb => go-cross-canadian_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-cross_1.26.8.bb => go-cross_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-crosssdk_1.26.8.bb => go-crosssdk_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-runtime_1.26.8.bb => go-runtime_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go_1.26.8.bb => go_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.26.9.inc renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.26.8.inc +1 -1
similarity index 90%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.26.8.inc
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.26.9.inc
index 7fa02ad7100..e2657cf8ad8 100644
@@ -16,4 +16,4 @@ SRC_URI += "\
     file://0009-go-Filter-build-paths-on-staticly-linked-arches.patch \
     file://0010-cmd-go-clear-GOROOT-for-func-ldShared-when-trimpath-.patch \
 "
-SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "4e39b98e42f946fa05ac8bc5b71877df97dbdb7cbb1a777b541667ad7117fd2e"
+SRC_URI[main.sha256sum] = "9735d7dcdb65b35d3fa577f04064737c03b89cf1a2b71e6e69fe2f3c6f9fd4ca"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-binary-native_1.26.9.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-binary-native_1.26.8.bb +3 -3
similarity index 80%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-binary-native_1.26.8.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-binary-native_1.26.9.bb
index 1865c700fd4..a42ce443604 100644
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ PROVIDES = "go-native"
 
 # Checksums available at https://go.dev/dl/
 SRC_URI = "https://dl.google.com/go/go${PV}.${BUILD_GOOS}-${BUILD_GOARCH}.tar.gz;name=go_${BUILD_GOTUPLE}"
-SRC_URI[go_linux_amd64.sha256sum] = "d0f743b33e8d8945e6b1f432edd15785c70507121d6e2a723b21285eddf8b57b"
-SRC_URI[go_linux_arm64.sha256sum] = "211ffced9dcb9633a55eac6364816ec0ddd951389a740e88fa8b3337971bdda0"
-SRC_URI[go_linux_ppc64le.sha256sum] = "0ddf3ecab842013e6bd618602823a0b8158a18d3e9362f2540463ea5aa184975"
+SRC_URI[go_linux_amd64.sha256sum] = "42d158b4d8f7b61ac0a830567c940a86098fb7aac52e467a5ebec03ef5cc2f8d"
+SRC_URI[go_linux_arm64.sha256sum] = "4a97373d49fcacdcf3694fea368a500b00ee3e963974f3e7514132717632f052"
+SRC_URI[go_linux_ppc64le.sha256sum] = "a21a65001146ca0c6c022c690d5418f8298c5513a81fb5eed42f6cdb29f40063"
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://golang.org/dl/"
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "go(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.linux"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-cross-canadian_1.26.9.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-cross-canadian_1.26.8.bb +0 -0
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-cross-canadian_1.26.8.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-cross-canadian_1.26.9.bb
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-cross_1.26.9.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-cross_1.26.8.bb +0 -0
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-cross_1.26.8.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-cross_1.26.9.bb
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-crosssdk_1.26.9.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-crosssdk_1.26.8.bb +0 -0
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-crosssdk_1.26.8.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-crosssdk_1.26.9.bb
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-runtime_1.26.9.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-runtime_1.26.8.bb +0 -0
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-runtime_1.26.8.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-runtime_1.26.9.bb
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/0001-cmd-go-make-content-based-hash-generation-less-pedan.patch +4 -4
index 077bebe743b..cd61571e2c7 100644
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ index 7b073165d5..1f618be0bb 100644
  	}
  
  	// Configuration specific to compiler toolchain.
-@@ -2804,8 +2806,25 @@ func envList(key, def string) []string {
+@@ -2805,8 +2807,25 @@ func envList(key, def string) []string {
  	return args
  }
  
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ index 7b073165d5..1f618be0bb 100644
  	if cppflags, err = buildFlags("CPPFLAGS", "", p.CgoCPPFLAGS, checkCompilerFlags); err != nil {
  		return
  	}
-@@ -2821,6 +2840,13 @@ func (b *Builder) CFlags(p *load.Package) (cppflags, cflags, cxxflags, fflags, l
+@@ -2822,6 +2841,13 @@ func (b *Builder) CFlags(p *load.Package) (cppflags, cflags, cxxflags, fflags, l
  	if ldflags, err = buildFlags("LDFLAGS", DefaultCFlags, p.CgoLDFLAGS, checkLinkerFlags); err != nil {
  		return
  	}
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ index 7b073165d5..1f618be0bb 100644
  
  	return
  }
-@@ -2909,7 +2935,7 @@ func (b *Builder) runCgo(ctx context.Context, a *Action) error {
+@@ -2910,7 +2936,7 @@ func (b *Builder) runCgo(ctx context.Context, a *Action) error {
  	cgoExe := base.Tool("cgo")
  	cgofiles = mkAbsFiles(p.Dir, cgofiles)
  
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ index 7b073165d5..1f618be0bb 100644
  	if err != nil {
  		return err
  	}
-@@ -3462,7 +3488,7 @@ func (b *Builder) swigOne(a *Action, file, objdir string, pcCFLAGS []string, cxx
+@@ -3463,7 +3489,7 @@ func (b *Builder) swigOne(a *Action, file, objdir string, pcCFLAGS []string, cxx
  	p := a.Package
  	sh := b.Shell(a)
  
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/0003-ld-add-soname-to-shareable-objects.patch +3 -3
index 0b5026fc123..f7f4dbead93 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ diff --git a/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/lib.go b/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/lib.go
 index 2d8f964f35..dfc72e02c0 100644
 --- a/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/lib.go
 +++ b/src/cmd/link/internal/ld/lib.go
-@@ -1652,6 +1652,7 @@ func (ctxt *Link) hostlink() {
+@@ -1660,6 +1660,7 @@ func (ctxt *Link) hostlink() {
  				argv = append(argv, "-Wl,-z,relro")
  			}
  			argv = append(argv, "-shared")
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ index 2d8f964f35..dfc72e02c0 100644
  			if ctxt.HeadType == objabi.Hwindows {
  				argv = addASLRargs(argv, *flagAslr)
  			} else {
-@@ -1667,6 +1668,7 @@ func (ctxt *Link) hostlink() {
+@@ -1675,6 +1676,7 @@ func (ctxt *Link) hostlink() {
  			argv = append(argv, "-Wl,-z,relro")
  		}
  		argv = append(argv, "-shared")
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ index 2d8f964f35..dfc72e02c0 100644
  	case BuildModePlugin:
  		if ctxt.HeadType == objabi.Hdarwin {
  			argv = append(argv, "-dynamiclib")
-@@ -1675,6 +1677,7 @@ func (ctxt *Link) hostlink() {
+@@ -1683,6 +1685,7 @@ func (ctxt *Link) hostlink() {
  				argv = append(argv, "-Wl,-z,relro")
  			}
  			argv = append(argv, "-shared")
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/0006-cmd-go-make-GOROOT-precious-by-default.patch +1 -1
index 9aebc2f0dc3..70e16a1d57c 100644
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ index 1f618be0bb..651fa64582 100644
  	if err := sh.Mkdir(buildAction.Objdir); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
-@@ -1888,6 +1905,14 @@ func (b *Builder) linkShared(ctx context.Context, a *Action) (err error) {
+@@ -1889,6 +1906,14 @@ func (b *Builder) linkShared(ctx context.Context, a *Action) (err error) {
  		return err
  	}
  
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/0007-exec.go-filter-out-build-specific-paths-from-linker-.patch +2 -2
index 2598a7b34a9..a620a9cb637 100644
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ diff --git a/src/cmd/go/internal/work/exec.go b/src/cmd/go/internal/work/exec.go
 index 651fa64582..586079afb4 100644
 --- a/src/cmd/go/internal/work/exec.go
 +++ b/src/cmd/go/internal/work/exec.go
-@@ -1563,6 +1563,29 @@ func (b *Builder) linkActionID(a *Action) cache.ActionID {
+@@ -1564,6 +1564,29 @@ func (b *Builder) linkActionID(a *Action) cache.ActionID {
  	return h.Sum()
  }
  
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ index 651fa64582..586079afb4 100644
  // printLinkerConfig prints the linker config into the hash h,
  // as part of the computation of a linker-related action ID.
  func (b *Builder) printLinkerConfig(h io.Writer, p *load.Package) {
-@@ -1573,7 +1596,7 @@ func (b *Builder) printLinkerConfig(h io.Writer, p *load.Package) {
+@@ -1574,7 +1597,7 @@ func (b *Builder) printLinkerConfig(h io.Writer, p *load.Package) {
  	case "gc":
  		fmt.Fprintf(h, "link %s %q %s\n", b.toolID("link"), forcedLdflags, ldBuildmode)
  		if p != nil {
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go_1.26.9.bb renamed from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go_1.26.8.bb +0 -0
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go_1.26.8.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/go/go_1.26.9.bb
#53 lore raw

PATCH 52/60 wget: fix CVE-2026-15146

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Ghanshyam Banait <[email protected]>

GNU Wget does not validate the IP address provided by an FTP PASV response while operating in FTP passive mode. A malicious FTP server, or an HTTP server that redirects to an FTP URL, can exploit this behavior to redirect Wget’s data connection to an arbitrary IP address and port.This allows an attacker to forge server-side requests (SSRF) from the machine running Wget, potentially accessing localhost services or internal network resources.

Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-15146.
https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=4f85853f641863d5915786a8413e1a213726a62b

Ptest Result
DURATION: 18
END: /usr/lib/wget/ptest
2026-10-09T11:05
STOP: ptest-runner
TOTAL: 1 FAIL: 0

References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15146
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-15146
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-15146
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-15146

(cherry picked from commit 1a3f905de376f5a79a2a8b70545f08a4daec5a37)
---
 .../wget/wget/CVE-2026-15146.patch            | 126 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.25.0.bb     |   1 +
 2 files changed, 127 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-15146.patch
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-15146.patch new file +126 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5d8d1a898ea
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From 4f85853f641863d5915786a8413e1a213726a62b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Acts1631 <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2026 17:22:55 -0400
+Subject: ftp: validate PASV/LPSV response address against control connection
+ peer
+
+* src/ftp-basic.c (ftp_pasv): Reject if peer address doesn't match advertised
+  address,
+  (ftp_lpsv): Likewise.
+
+ftp_pasv() and ftp_lpsv() copied the IP address and port advertised in
+the server's 227 response without checking that it matched the peer
+of the control connection.  A malicious or compromised FTP server
+could therefore direct wget's data connection to an arbitrary host and
+port of its choosing (e.g. an internal service unreachable from the
+attacker directly), which is a server-side request forgery.
+
+ftp_epsv() was already safe since it only extracts a port and reuses
+the pre-filled control-connection address.
+
+Fix ftp_pasv() and ftp_lpsv() the same way: capture the control
+connection's peer address via socket_ip_address() before parsing the
+response, and reject the response (FTPINVPASV) if the parsed address
+does not match.
+
+Verified with a fake FTP server that returns a PASV response pointing
+at a different loopback address (127.0.0.2 instead of the real peer
+127.0.0.1): before the fix wget connects to the spoofed address, after
+the fix it rejects the response with "Cannot parse PASV response."
+Legitimate transfers using a correctly-addressed PASV response
+continue to work.
+
+Copyright-paperwork-exempt: Yes
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-15146
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=4f85853f641863d5915786a8413e1a213726a62b]
+
+Signed-off-by: Ghanshyam Banait <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/ftp-basic.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ftp-basic.c b/src/ftp-basic.c
+index 4870256a..0f4bb821 100644
+--- a/src/ftp-basic.c
++++ b/src/ftp-basic.c
+@@ -623,10 +623,19 @@ ftp_pasv (int csock, ip_address *addr, int *port)
+   int nwritten, i;
+   uerr_t err;
+   unsigned char tmp[6];
++  ip_address peer_addr;
+ 
+   assert (addr != NULL);
+   assert (port != NULL);
+ 
++  /* Remember who we are talking to on the control connection, so that
++     the address returned in the PASV response can be checked below.
++     Accepting an arbitrary server-supplied address would let a
++     malicious FTP server redirect our data connection to any host of
++     its choosing (SSRF).  */
++  if (!socket_ip_address (csock, &peer_addr, ENDPOINT_PEER))
++    return FTPINVPASV;
++
+   xzero (*addr);
+ 
+   /* Form the request.  */
+@@ -677,6 +686,16 @@ ftp_pasv (int csock, ip_address *addr, int *port)
+   memcpy (IP_INADDR_DATA (addr), tmp, 4);
+   *port = ((tmp[4] << 8) & 0xff00) + tmp[5];
+ 
++  /* Reject the response if the advertised address does not match the
++     control connection's peer.  */
++  if (peer_addr.family != AF_INET
++      || memcmp (IP_INADDR_DATA (addr), IP_INADDR_DATA (&peer_addr), 4) != 0)
++    {
++      xzero (*addr);
++      *port = 0;
++      return FTPINVPASV;
++    }
++
+   return FTPOK;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -692,10 +711,19 @@ ftp_lpsv (int csock, ip_address *addr, int *port)
+   uerr_t err;
+   unsigned char tmp[16];
+   unsigned char tmpprt[2];
++  ip_address peer_addr;
+ 
+   assert (addr != NULL);
+   assert (port != NULL);
+ 
++  /* Remember who we are talking to on the control connection, so that
++     the address returned in the LPSV response can be checked below.
++     Accepting an arbitrary server-supplied address would let a
++     malicious FTP server redirect our data connection to any host of
++     its choosing (SSRF).  */
++  if (!socket_ip_address (csock, &peer_addr, ENDPOINT_PEER))
++    return FTPINVPASV;
++
+   xzero (*addr);
+ 
+   /* Form the request.  */
+@@ -842,6 +870,18 @@ ftp_lpsv (int csock, ip_address *addr, int *port)
+       DEBUGP (("*port is: %d\n", *port));
+     }
+ 
++  /* Reject the response if the advertised address does not match the
++     control connection's peer.  */
++  if (peer_addr.family != addr->family
++      || memcmp (IP_INADDR_DATA (addr), IP_INADDR_DATA (&peer_addr),
++                 af == 4 ? 4 : 16) != 0)
++    {
++      xzero (*addr);
++      *port = 0;
++      xfree (respline);
++      return FTPINVPASV;
++    }
++
+   xfree (respline);
+   return FTPOK;
+ }
+-- 
+cgit v1.3
+
meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.25.0.bb +1 -0
index 26f5c84e5a7..b8c803aae1f 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/wget/wget-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2026-16599.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-58470.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-58470-regression.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-15146.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "766e48423e79359ea31e41db9e5c289675947a7fcf2efdcedb726ac9d0da3784"
#54 lore raw

PATCH 53/60 libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89162

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1] since [2] does not provide it.

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-89162
[2] https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/security/advisories/GHSA-q7rw-r7qq-2hx6

---
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89162.patch     | 88 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb |  1 +
 2 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89162.patch
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89162.patch new file +88 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..efc6c856b98
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+From edc111a6831591f68b5355a08cc9df8be8f35304 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicholas Wilson <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2025 10:50:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Write padding values to ensure pcre2_serialize_encode()
+ outputs defined values (#826)
+
+Fixes low-severity valgrind error reported in GHSA-q7rw-r7qq-2hx6.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-89162
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/edc111a6831591f68b5355a08cc9df8be8f35304]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/pcre2_compile_class.c | 17 +++++++----------
+ src/pcre2test_inc.h       | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_compile_class.c b/src/pcre2_compile_class.c
+index 9a1fc022..55b641c1 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_compile_class.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_compile_class.c
+@@ -1802,17 +1802,14 @@ if ((xclass_props & XCLASS_REQUIRED) != 0)
+       PUT(code, 0, (uint32_t)(char_lists_size >> 1));
+       code += LINK_SIZE;
+ 
+-#if defined PCRE2_DEBUG || defined SUPPORT_VALGRIND
++      /* If we added padding to align the list, initialize the bytes to
++      defined values, so the library is valgrind-clean. It could also
++      be a security concern for clients calling into PCRE2 via bindings
++      from a memory-safe language, if pcre2_serialize_encode() exposes
++      uninitialized memory that may contain sensitive information. */
++
+       if ((char_lists_size & 0x2) != 0)
+-        {
+-        /* In debug the unused 16 bit value is set
+-        to a fixed value and marked unused. */
+-        ((uint16_t*)data)[-1] = 0x5555;
+-#ifdef SUPPORT_VALGRIND
+-        VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_NOACCESS(data - 2, 2);
+-#endif
+-        }
+-#endif
++        ((uint16_t*)data)[-1] = 0xdead;
+ 
+       cb->char_lists_size =
+         CLIST_ALIGN_TO(char_lists_size, sizeof(uint32_t));
+diff --git a/src/pcre2test_inc.h b/src/pcre2test_inc.h
+index 8124e9ca..c4707417 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2test_inc.h
++++ b/src/pcre2test_inc.h
+@@ -2019,6 +2019,9 @@ uint32_t use_forbid_utf = forbid_utf;
+ PCRE2_SIZE patlen, full_patlen;
+ PCRE2_SIZE valgrind_access_length;
+ PCRE2_SIZE erroroffset;
++int32_t serialize_rc;
++uint8_t *serialized_bytes;
++PCRE2_SIZE serialized_size;
+ 
+ /* The perltest.sh script supports only / as a delimiter. */
+ 
+@@ -2966,6 +2969,28 @@ if ((pat_patctl.control2 & CTL2_NL_SET) != 0)
+ rc = show_pattern_info();
+ if (rc != PR_OK) return rc;
+ 
++/* Verify that the compiled structure can be serialized without generating
++memory errors. */
++
++serialize_rc = pcre2_serialize_encode((const pcre2_code **)&compiled_code, 1,
++  &serialized_bytes, &serialized_size, general_context);
++if (serialize_rc != 1)
++  {
++  cfprintf(clr_test_error, outfile, "** pcre2_serialize_encode() returned %d instead of 1\n",
++    serialize_rc);
++  return PR_ABEND;
++  }
++
++#if defined SUPPORT_VALGRIND
++if (VALGRIND_CHECK_MEM_IS_DEFINED(serialized_bytes, serialized_size) != 0)
++  {
++  cfprintf(clr_test_error, outfile, "** pcre2_serialize_encode() returned undefined data\n");
++  return PR_ABEND;
++  }
++#endif
++
++pcre2_serialize_free(serialized_bytes);
++
+ /* The "push" control requests that the compiled pattern be remembered on a
+ stack. This is mainly for testing the serialization functionality. */
+ 
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb +1 -0
index 70079e0b65b..b81480c8ffb 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.md;md5=6720bf3bcff57543b915c2b22e526df0 \
 
 SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/pcre2-${PV}/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://run-ptest \
+           file://CVE-2026-89162.patch \
 "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/releases"
#55 lore raw

PATCH 54/60 libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89161

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1].

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-89161

---
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89161.patch     | 221 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 222 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89161.patch
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89161.patch new file +221 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..42e69acbcc1
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+From 1dcd0cf42a6a7cb62cc9a7c024196733abcfda95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicholas Wilson <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2026 19:17:36 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix leak & stale PCRE2_MD_COPIED_SUBJECT if pcre2_jit_match
+ used with existing match context (#937)
+
+The problem is not that pcre2_jit_match() needs to add support for PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT. Instead, if the passed-in context somehow contains a previously-copied subject (by non-JIT matcher using a global or cached subject) then it will be leaked, and worse, incorrectly free'd later.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-89161
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/1dcd0cf42a6a7cb62cc9a7c024196733abcfda95]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ doc/html/pcre2jit.html    |  9 +++---
+ doc/pcre2.txt             | 10 +++----
+ doc/pcre2jit.3            |  9 +++---
+ src/pcre2_jit_match_inc.h | 10 +++++++
+ src/pcre2test_inc.h       | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ testdata/testinput17      |  1 +
+ testdata/testoutput17     |  2 ++
+ 7 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/html/pcre2jit.html b/doc/html/pcre2jit.html
+index cc26cc06..4e6d31e5 100644
+--- a/doc/html/pcre2jit.html
++++ b/doc/html/pcre2jit.html
+@@ -460,10 +460,11 @@ processed by <b>pcre2_jit_compile()</b>).
+ The fast path function is called <b>pcre2_jit_match()</b>, and it takes exactly
+ the same arguments as <b>pcre2_match()</b>. However, the subject string must be
+ specified with a length; PCRE2_ZERO_TERMINATED is not supported. Unsupported
+-option bits (for example, PCRE2_ANCHORED and PCRE2_ENDANCHORED) are ignored, as
+-is the PCRE2_NO_JIT option. The return values are also the same as for
+-<b>pcre2_match()</b>, plus PCRE2_ERROR_JIT_BADOPTION if a matching mode (partial
+-or complete) is requested that was not compiled.
++option bits (for example, PCRE2_ANCHORED, PCRE2_ENDANCHORED, and
++PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT) are ignored, as is the PCRE2_NO_JIT option. The
++return values are also the same as for <b>pcre2_match()</b>, plus
++PCRE2_ERROR_JIT_BADOPTION if a matching mode (partial or complete) is requested
++that was not compiled.
+ </p>
+ <p>
+ When you call <b>pcre2_match()</b>, as well as testing for invalid options, a
+diff --git a/doc/pcre2.txt b/doc/pcre2.txt
+index 693908ee..cc316178 100644
+--- a/doc/pcre2.txt
++++ b/doc/pcre2.txt
+@@ -6176,11 +6176,11 @@ JIT FAST PATH API
+        The  fast  path  function is called pcre2_jit_match(), and it takes ex-
+        actly the same arguments as pcre2_match(). However, the subject  string
+        must  be  specified  with  a  length; PCRE2_ZERO_TERMINATED is not sup-
+-       ported.  Unsupported  option  bits  (for  example,  PCRE2_ANCHORED  and
+-       PCRE2_ENDANCHORED)  are ignored, as is the PCRE2_NO_JIT option. The re-
+-       turn values are also the same  as  for  pcre2_match(),  plus  PCRE2_ER-
+-       ROR_JIT_BADOPTION if a matching mode (partial or complete) is requested
+-       that was not compiled.
++       ported. Unsupported option bits (for example, PCRE2_ANCHORED, PCRE2_EN-
++       DANCHORED, and  PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT)  are  ignored,  as  is  the
++       PCRE2_NO_JIT  option.  The  return  values  are  also  the  same as for
++       pcre2_match(), plus PCRE2_ERROR_JIT_BADOPTION if a matching mode  (par-
++       tial or complete) is requested that was not compiled.
+ 
+        When  you call pcre2_match(), as well as testing for invalid options, a
+        number of other sanity checks are performed on the arguments. For exam-
+diff --git a/doc/pcre2jit.3 b/doc/pcre2jit.3
+index 95451b56..729d898f 100644
+--- a/doc/pcre2jit.3
++++ b/doc/pcre2jit.3
+@@ -444,10 +444,11 @@ processed by \fBpcre2_jit_compile()\fP).
+ The fast path function is called \fBpcre2_jit_match()\fP, and it takes exactly
+ the same arguments as \fBpcre2_match()\fP. However, the subject string must be
+ specified with a length; PCRE2_ZERO_TERMINATED is not supported. Unsupported
+-option bits (for example, PCRE2_ANCHORED and PCRE2_ENDANCHORED) are ignored, as
+-is the PCRE2_NO_JIT option. The return values are also the same as for
+-\fBpcre2_match()\fP, plus PCRE2_ERROR_JIT_BADOPTION if a matching mode (partial
+-or complete) is requested that was not compiled.
++option bits (for example, PCRE2_ANCHORED, PCRE2_ENDANCHORED, and
++PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT) are ignored, as is the PCRE2_NO_JIT option. The
++return values are also the same as for \fBpcre2_match()\fP, plus
++PCRE2_ERROR_JIT_BADOPTION if a matching mode (partial or complete) is requested
++that was not compiled.
+ .P
+ When you call \fBpcre2_match()\fP, as well as testing for invalid options, a
+ number of other sanity checks are performed on the arguments. For example, if
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_match_inc.h b/src/pcre2_jit_match_inc.h
+index 32d4c8a5..4163cf61 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_jit_match_inc.h
++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_match_inc.h
+@@ -125,6 +125,16 @@ else if ((options & PCRE2_PARTIAL_SOFT) != 0)
+ if (functions == NULL || functions->executable_funcs[index] == NULL)
+   return match_data->rc = PCRE2_ERROR_JIT_BADOPTION;
+ 
++/* If the match data block was previously used with PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT,
++free the memory that was obtained. */
++
++if ((match_data->flags & PCRE2_MD_COPIED_SUBJECT) != 0)
++  {
++  match_data->memctl.free((void *)match_data->subject,
++    match_data->memctl.memory_data);
++  match_data->flags &= ~PCRE2_MD_COPIED_SUBJECT;
++  }
++
+ /* Sanity checks should be handled by pcre2_match. */
+ arguments.str = subject + start_offset;
+ arguments.begin = subject;
+diff --git a/src/pcre2test_inc.h b/src/pcre2test_inc.h
+index 5d282435..a74e3368 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2test_inc.h
++++ b/src/pcre2test_inc.h
+@@ -5171,20 +5171,28 @@ for (gmatched = 0;; gmatched++)
+     /* If PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT was set, check that things are as they
+     should be, but not for fast JIT, where it isn't supported. */
+ 
+-    if ((dat_datctl.options & PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT) != 0 &&
+-        (pat_patctl.control & CTL_JITFAST) == 0)
++    if ((dat_datctl.options & PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT) != 0)
+       {
+-      if ((match_data->flags & PCRE2_MD_COPIED_SUBJECT) == 0)
+-        cfprintf(clr_test_error, outfile,
+-          "** PCRE2 error: flag not set after copy_matched_subject\n");
++      if ((pat_patctl.control & CTL_JITFAST) != 0)
++        {
++        if ((match_data->flags & PCRE2_MD_COPIED_SUBJECT) != 0)
++          cfprintf(clr_test_error, outfile,
++            "** PCRE2 error: flag set after unsupported copy_matched_subject\n");
++        }
++      else
++        {
++        if ((match_data->flags & PCRE2_MD_COPIED_SUBJECT) == 0)
++          cfprintf(clr_test_error, outfile,
++            "** PCRE2 error: flag not set after copy_matched_subject\n");
+ 
+-      if (match_data->subject == pp)
+-        cfprintf(clr_test_error, outfile,
+-          "** PCRE2 error: copy_matched_subject has not copied\n");
++        if (match_data->subject == pp)
++          cfprintf(clr_test_error, outfile,
++            "** PCRE2 error: copy_matched_subject has not copied\n");
+ 
+-      if (memcmp(match_data->subject, pp, ulen) != 0)
+-        cfprintf(clr_test_error, outfile,
+-          "** PCRE2 error: copy_matched_subject mismatch\n");
++        if (memcmp(match_data->subject, pp, ulen) != 0)
++          cfprintf(clr_test_error, outfile,
++            "** PCRE2 error: copy_matched_subject mismatch\n");
++        }
+       }
+ 
+     /* If this is not the first time round a global loop, check that the
+@@ -5661,6 +5669,9 @@ pcre2_match_context *test_dat_context = NULL, *test_dat_context_copy = NULL;
+ pcre2_convert_context *test_con_context = NULL, *test_con_context_copy = NULL;
+ pcre2_match_data *test_match_data = NULL;
+ pcre2_code *test_compiled_code = NULL;
++#ifdef SUPPORT_JIT
++BOOL test_compiled_with_jit = FALSE;
++#endif
+ PCRE2_UCHAR pattern[] = { CHAR_A, CHAR_B, CHAR_C, 0 };
+ PCRE2_UCHAR callout_int_pattern[] = {
+   CHAR_LEFT_PARENTHESIS, CHAR_QUESTION_MARK, CHAR_C, CHAR_RIGHT_PARENTHESIS, 0 };
+@@ -5965,11 +5976,38 @@ ASSERT(rc == 0 && sizeval == 0, "pcre2_pattern_info(JIT)");
+ 
+ if (pcre2_jit_compile(test_compiled_code, PCRE2_JIT_COMPLETE) == 0)
+   {
++  test_compiled_with_jit = TRUE;
++
+   rc = pcre2_pattern_info(test_compiled_code, PCRE2_INFO_JITSIZE, &sizeval);
+   ASSERT(rc == 0 && sizeval > 0, "pcre2_pattern_info(JIT after compile)");
+   }
+ #endif
+ 
++/* ----------------------- Matching functions ------------------------------ */
++
++#ifdef SUPPORT_JIT
++
++/* Check that fast JIT releases a copied subject when reusing match data. */
++if (test_compiled_with_jit)
++  {
++  test_match_data = pcre2_match_data_create_from_pattern(test_compiled_code,
++    test_gen_context);
++  ASSERT(test_match_data != NULL, "pcre2_match_data_create_from_pattern(JIT)");
++
++  rc = pcre2_match(test_compiled_code, pattern, 3, 0,
++    PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT, test_match_data, NULL);
++  ASSERT(rc == 1, "pcre2_match(COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT)");
++
++  rc = pcre2_jit_match(test_compiled_code, subject_abcz, 4, 0, 0,
++    test_match_data, NULL);
++  ASSERT(rc == 1, "pcre2_jit_match(reused match data)");
++
++  pcre2_match_data_free(test_match_data);
++  test_match_data = NULL;
++  }
++
++#endif
++
+ /* ----------------------- POSIX functions --------------------------------- */
+ 
+ #if PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 8
+diff --git a/testdata/testinput17 b/testdata/testinput17
+index 08fd72e0..9d728965 100644
+--- a/testdata/testinput17
++++ b/testdata/testinput17
+@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@
+     
+ /abc/jitfast
+     abc
++    abc\=copy_matched_subject
+     abc\=no_jit 
+     
+ # ---- 
+diff --git a/testdata/testoutput17 b/testdata/testoutput17
+index 6d550084..773ec18a 100644
+--- a/testdata/testoutput17
++++ b/testdata/testoutput17
+@@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ Failed: error -47: match limit exceeded
+     
+ /abc/jitfast
+     abc
++ 0: abc (JIT)
++    abc\=copy_matched_subject
+  0: abc (JIT)
+     abc\=no_jit 
+  0: abc (JIT)
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb +1 -0
index b81480c8ffb..fa59747fdca 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENCE.md;md5=6720bf3bcff57543b915c2b22e526df0 \
 SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/pcre2-${PV}/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://run-ptest \
            file://CVE-2026-89162.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-89161.patch \
 "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/releases"
#56 lore raw

PATCH 55/60 libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89156

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1] and [2].

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-89156
[2] https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/security/advisories/GHSA-2p8c-ff85-vh9x

---
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89156.patch     | 275 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 276 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89156.patch
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89156.patch new file +275 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7937a6a4c5b
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+From f67db227af31bba7cdf2a7a00b97af91b588c2f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Herczeg <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2026 11:05:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix pcre2_match to check for JIT support before JIT
+ validation & execution (#926)
+
+This fixes the issue that the JIT branch's UTF validation is not pinned to be identical to the interpreter's validation.
+
+This was not robust, and lead to a bug, in the case where the JIT UTF validation is done, but because the relevant JIT mode was not compiled, it falls through to the interpreter and skips the interpreter's own UTF validation and setup.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-89156
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/f67db227af31bba7cdf2a7a00b97af91b588c2f5]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/pcre2_internal.h      |  2 +
+ src/pcre2_jit_match_inc.h |  1 +
+ src/pcre2_jit_misc_inc.h  | 38 +++++++++++++---
+ src/pcre2_match.c         | 95 +++++++++++++++------------------------
+ 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_internal.h b/src/pcre2_internal.h
+index 2e8c7e47..930c745b 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_internal.h
++++ b/src/pcre2_internal.h
+@@ -2296,6 +2296,7 @@ is available. */
+ #define _pcre2_is_newline            PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_is_newline_)
+ #define _pcre2_jit_free_rodata       PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_jit_free_rodata_)
+ #define _pcre2_jit_free              PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_jit_free_)
++#define _pcre2_jit_check_exec        PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_jit_check_exec_)
+ #define _pcre2_jit_get_size          PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_jit_get_size_)
+ #define _pcre2_jit_get_target        PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_jit_get_target_)
+ #define _pcre2_memctl_malloc         PCRE2_SUFFIX(_pcre2_memctl_malloc_)
+@@ -2325,6 +2326,7 @@ extern BOOL         _pcre2_is_newline(PCRE2_SPTR, uint32_t, PCRE2_SPTR,
+                       uint32_t *, BOOL);
+ extern void         _pcre2_jit_free_rodata(void *, void *);
+ extern void         _pcre2_jit_free(void *, pcre2_memctl *);
++extern BOOL         _pcre2_jit_check_exec(void *, uint32_t);
+ extern size_t       _pcre2_jit_get_size(void *);
+ const char *        _pcre2_jit_get_target(void);
+ extern void *       _pcre2_memctl_malloc(size_t, pcre2_memctl *);
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_match_inc.h b/src/pcre2_jit_match_inc.h
+index 4163cf61..ba210007 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_jit_match_inc.h
++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_match_inc.h
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ jit_arguments arguments;
+ int rc;
+ int index = 0;
+ 
++/* The same check is performed by jit_check_exec(). */
+ if ((options & PCRE2_PARTIAL_HARD) != 0)
+   index = 2;
+ else if ((options & PCRE2_PARTIAL_SOFT) != 0)
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_misc_inc.h b/src/pcre2_jit_misc_inc.h
+index 0225fc6b..16c230e9 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_jit_misc_inc.h
++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_misc_inc.h
+@@ -200,17 +200,28 @@ if (jit_stack != NULL)
+ 
+ 
+ /*************************************************
+-*               Get target CPU type              *
++*          Checks function compilation           *
+ *************************************************/
+ 
+-const char*
+-PRIV(jit_get_target)(void)
++BOOL
++PRIV(jit_check_exec)(void *executable_jit, uint32_t options)
+ {
+ #ifndef SUPPORT_JIT
+-return "JIT is not supported";
++(void)executable_jit;
++(void)options;
++return FALSE;
+ #else  /* SUPPORT_JIT */
+-return sljit_get_platform_name();
+-#endif  /* SUPPORT_JIT */
++/* The same check is performed at the beginning of pcre2_jit_match(). */
++executable_functions *functions = (executable_functions *)executable_jit;
++int index = 0;
++
++if ((options & PCRE2_PARTIAL_HARD) != 0)
++  index = 2;
++else if ((options & PCRE2_PARTIAL_SOFT) != 0)
++  index = 1;
++
++return functions->executable_funcs[index] != NULL;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -231,4 +242,19 @@ return executable_sizes[0] + executable_sizes[1] + executable_sizes[2];
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
++/*************************************************
++*               Get target CPU type              *
++*************************************************/
++
++const char*
++PRIV(jit_get_target)(void)
++{
++#ifndef SUPPORT_JIT
++return "JIT is not supported";
++#else  /* SUPPORT_JIT */
++return sljit_get_platform_name();
++#endif  /* SUPPORT_JIT */
++}
++
++
+ /* End of pcre2_jit_misc_inc.h */
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_match.c b/src/pcre2_match.c
+index 9ee8a476..a5a8421f 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_match.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_match.c
+@@ -6995,10 +6995,6 @@ PCRE2_SPTR req_cu_ptr;
+ PCRE2_SPTR start_partial;
+ PCRE2_SPTR match_partial;
+ 
+-#ifdef SUPPORT_JIT
+-BOOL use_jit;
+-#endif
+-
+ /* This flag is needed even when Unicode is not supported for convenience
+ (it is used by the IS_NEWLINE macro). */
+ 
+@@ -7008,9 +7004,6 @@ BOOL utf = FALSE;
+ BOOL ucp = FALSE;
+ BOOL allow_invalid;
+ uint32_t fragment_options = 0;
+-#ifdef SUPPORT_JIT
+-BOOL jit_checked_utf = FALSE;
+-#endif
+ #endif  /* SUPPORT_UNICODE */
+ 
+ PCRE2_SIZE frame_size;
+@@ -7073,15 +7066,6 @@ options |= (re->flags & FF) / ((FF & (~FF+1)) / (OO & (~OO+1)));
+ #undef FF
+ #undef OO
+ 
+-/* If the pattern was successfully studied with JIT support, we will run the
+-JIT executable instead of the rest of this function. Most options must be set
+-at compile time for the JIT code to be usable. */
+-
+-#ifdef SUPPORT_JIT
+-use_jit = (re->executable_jit != NULL &&
+-          (options & ~PUBLIC_JIT_MATCH_OPTIONS) == 0);
+-#endif
+-
+ /* Initialize UTF/UCP parameters. */
+ 
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE
+@@ -7128,20 +7112,25 @@ match_data->startchar = 0;
+ 
+ /* ============================= JIT matching ============================== */
+ 
+-/* Prepare for JIT matching. Check a UTF string for validity unless no check is
+-requested or invalid UTF can be handled. We check only the portion of the
+-subject that might be be inspected during matching - from the offset minus the
+-maximum lookbehind to the given length. This saves time when a small part of a
+-large subject is being matched by the use of a starting offset. Note that the
+-maximum lookbehind is a number of characters, not code units. */
++/* If the pattern was successfully studied with JIT support, we will run the
++JIT executable instead of the rest of this function. Most options must be set
++at compile time for the JIT code to be usable. */
+ 
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_JIT
+-if (use_jit)
++if (re->executable_jit != NULL &&
++    (options & ~PUBLIC_JIT_MATCH_OPTIONS) == 0 &&
++    PRIV(jit_check_exec)(re->executable_jit, options))
+   {
++  /* Prepare for JIT matching. Check a UTF string for validity unless no check
++  is requested or invalid UTF can be handled. We check only the portion of the
++  subject that might be be inspected during matching - from the offset minus
++  the maximum lookbehind to the given length. This saves time when a small part
++  of a large subject is being matched by the use of a starting offset. Note that
++  the maximum lookbehind is a number of characters, not code units. */
++
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE
+   if (utf && (options & PCRE2_NO_UTF_CHECK) == 0 && !allow_invalid)
+     {
+-
+     /* For 8-bit and 16-bit UTF, check that the first code unit is a valid
+     character start. */
+ 
+@@ -7194,40 +7183,36 @@ if (use_jit)
+       match_data->startchar += start_match - subject;
+       return match_data->rc = rc;
+       }
+-    jit_checked_utf = TRUE;
+     }
+ #endif  /* SUPPORT_UNICODE */
+ 
+-  /* If JIT returns BADOPTION, which means that the selected complete or
+-  partial matching mode was not compiled, fall through to the interpreter. */
+-
+   rc = pcre2_jit_match(code, subject, length, start_offset, options,
+     match_data, mcontext);
+-  if (rc != PCRE2_ERROR_JIT_BADOPTION)
++  /* JIT must be able to perform the match. */
++  PCRE2_ASSERT(rc != PCRE2_ERROR_JIT_BADOPTION);
++
++  match_data->options = original_options;
++  if (rc >= 0 && (options & PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT) != 0)
+     {
+-    match_data->options = original_options;
+-    if (rc >= 0 && (options & PCRE2_COPY_MATCHED_SUBJECT) != 0)
++    if (length != 0)
+       {
+-      if (length != 0)
+-        {
+-        match_data->subject = match_data->memctl.malloc(CU2BYTES(length),
+-          match_data->memctl.memory_data);
+-        if (match_data->subject == NULL)
+-          return match_data->rc = PCRE2_ERROR_NOMEMORY;
+-        memcpy((void *)match_data->subject, subject, CU2BYTES(length));
+-        }
+-      else
+-        match_data->subject = NULL;
+-      match_data->flags |= PCRE2_MD_COPIED_SUBJECT;
++      match_data->subject = match_data->memctl.malloc(CU2BYTES(length),
++        match_data->memctl.memory_data);
++      if (match_data->subject == NULL)
++        return match_data->rc = PCRE2_ERROR_NOMEMORY;
++      memcpy((void *)match_data->subject, subject, CU2BYTES(length));
+       }
+     else
+-      {
+-      /* When pcre2_jit_match sets the subject, it doesn't know what the
+-      original passed-in pointer was. */
+-      if (match_data->subject != NULL) match_data->subject = original_subject;
+-      }
+-    return rc;
++      match_data->subject = NULL;
++    match_data->flags |= PCRE2_MD_COPIED_SUBJECT;
+     }
++  else
++    {
++    /* When pcre2_jit_match sets the subject, it doesn't know what the
++    original passed-in pointer was. */
++    if (match_data->subject != NULL) match_data->subject = original_subject;
++    }
++  return rc;
+   }
+ #endif  /* SUPPORT_JIT */
+ 
+@@ -7240,12 +7225,8 @@ this. */
+ 
+ mb->check_subject = subject;
+ 
+-/* If a UTF subject string was not checked for validity in the JIT code above,
+-check it here, and handle support for invalid UTF strings. The check above
+-happens only when invalid UTF is not supported and PCRE2_NO_CHECK_UTF is unset.
+-If we get here in those circumstances, it means the subject string is valid,
+-but for some reason JIT matching was not successful. There is no need to check
+-the subject again.
++/* Check the validity of UTF subject strings. The check happens only when
++PCRE2_NO_CHECK_UTF is unset.
+ 
+ We check only the portion of the subject that might be be inspected during
+ matching - from the offset minus the maximum lookbehind to the given length.
+@@ -7257,11 +7238,7 @@ Note also that support for invalid UTF forces a check, overriding the setting
+ of PCRE2_NO_CHECK_UTF. */
+ 
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE
+-if (utf &&
+-#ifdef SUPPORT_JIT
+-    !jit_checked_utf &&
+-#endif
+-    ((options & PCRE2_NO_UTF_CHECK) == 0 || allow_invalid))
++if (utf && ((options & PCRE2_NO_UTF_CHECK) == 0 || allow_invalid))
+   {
+ #if PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH != 32
+   BOOL skipped_bad_start = FALSE;
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb +1 -0
index fa59747fdca..7d027e90eec 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/pcre2-${PV}/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://run-ptest \
            file://CVE-2026-89162.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-89161.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-89156.patch \
 "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/releases"
#57 lore raw

PATCH 56/60 libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89157

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1] and [2].

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-89157
[2] https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/security/advisories/GHSA-q8g2-wprr-34m9

---
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89157.patch     | 61 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb |  1 +
 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89157.patch
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89157.patch new file +61 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..fa525c79d87
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 8156b3989a82f2ddf9504d8248496e9b124be7f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ilia Alshanetsky <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2026 07:15:03 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Use CU2BYTES for byte sizing in two allocation sites (#909)
+
+Two allocation sites multiplied by PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH (the bit width:
+8, 16, or 32) where the CU2BYTES(x) byte-count helper is intended. The
+result over-allocates by the code-unit byte width: 8x in 8-bit mode, 16x
+in 16-bit, 32x in 32-bit. Subsequent memcpy calls already use CU2BYTES
+correctly, so no out-of-bounds write occurs; the over-allocation is
+leaked until the buffer is freed.
+
+Also guard each site against integer overflow in
+sizeof(pcre2_memctl) + CU2BYTES(N + 1) by rejecting N greater than
+(PCRE2_SIZE_MAX - sizeof(pcre2_memctl)) / CU2BYTES(1) - 1.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-89157
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/8156b3989a82f2ddf9504d8248496e9b124be7f3]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/pcre2_convert.c   | 8 +++++---
+ src/pcre2_substring.c | 7 ++++---
+ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_convert.c b/src/pcre2_convert.c
+index ad7312ab..8a2b293d 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_convert.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_convert.c
+@@ -1215,9 +1215,11 @@ for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+   /* Allocate memory for the buffer, with hidden space for an allocator at
+   the start. The next time round the loop runs the conversion for real. */
+ 
+-  allocated = PRIV(memctl_malloc)(sizeof(pcre2_memctl) +
+-    (*bufflenptr + 1)*PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH, (pcre2_memctl *)ccontext);
+-  if (allocated == NULL)
++  if (*bufflenptr > ((PCRE2_SIZE_MAX - sizeof(pcre2_memctl)) /
++        CU2BYTES(1)) - 1 ||
++      (allocated = PRIV(memctl_malloc)(sizeof(pcre2_memctl) +
++        CU2BYTES(*bufflenptr + 1),
++        (pcre2_memctl *)ccontext)) == NULL)
+     {
+     *bufflenptr = 0;  /* Error offset */
+     return PCRE2_ERROR_NOMEMORY;
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_substring.c b/src/pcre2_substring.c
+index f68b464e..a6f5277a 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_substring.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_substring.c
+@@ -210,9 +210,10 @@ PCRE2_SIZE size;
+ PCRE2_UCHAR *yield;
+ rc = pcre2_substring_length_bynumber(match_data, stringnumber, &size);
+ if (rc < 0) return rc;
+-yield = PRIV(memctl_malloc)(sizeof(pcre2_memctl) +
+-  (size + 1)*PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH, (pcre2_memctl *)match_data);
+-if (yield == NULL) return PCRE2_ERROR_NOMEMORY;
++if (size > ((PCRE2_SIZE_MAX - sizeof(pcre2_memctl)) / CU2BYTES(1)) - 1 ||
++    (yield = PRIV(memctl_malloc)(sizeof(pcre2_memctl) +
++      CU2BYTES(size + 1), (pcre2_memctl *)match_data)) == NULL)
++  return PCRE2_ERROR_NOMEMORY;
+ yield = (PCRE2_UCHAR *)(((char *)yield) + sizeof(pcre2_memctl));
+ if (size != 0) memcpy(yield, match_data->subject + match_data->ovector[stringnumber*2],
+   CU2BYTES(size));
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb +1 -0
index 7d027e90eec..bbe37573215 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/pcre2-${PV}/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2026-89162.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-89161.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-89156.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-89157.patch \
 "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/releases"
#58 lore raw

PATCH 57/60 libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89160

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1] since [2] does not provide it.

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-89160
[2] https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/security/advisories/GHSA-9qww-pwc4-77qq

---
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89160.patch     | 225 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 226 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89160.patch
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89160.patch new file +225 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..bff6bc83efa
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+From 4889caf31a4c5a6b3c051f0031bf2dbd78f2c287 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicholas Wilson <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 16:52:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix invalid UTF backwards-scan reads; see GHSA-9qww-pwc4-77qq
+ for details
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-89160
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/4889caf31a4c5a6b3c051f0031bf2dbd78f2c287]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/pcre2_extuni.c       | 10 +++++-----
+ src/pcre2_match.c        | 10 +++++-----
+ testdata/testinput10     | 10 ++++++++++
+ testdata/testinput12     | 10 ++++++++++
+ testdata/testoutput10    | 12 ++++++++++++
+ testdata/testoutput12-16 | 12 ++++++++++++
+ testdata/testoutput12-32 | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 7 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_extuni.c b/src/pcre2_extuni.c
+index 1b7f04b4..fea098a7 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_extuni.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_extuni.c
+@@ -54,12 +54,12 @@ support, because some compilers do not like functionless source files. */
+ 
+ #ifndef SUPPORT_UNICODE
+ PCRE2_SPTR
+-PRIV(extuni)(uint32_t c, PCRE2_SPTR eptr, PCRE2_SPTR start_subject,
++PRIV(extuni)(uint32_t c, PCRE2_SPTR eptr, PCRE2_SPTR check_subject,
+   PCRE2_SPTR end_subject, BOOL utf, int *xcount)
+ {
+ (void)c;
+ (void)eptr;
+-(void)start_subject;
++(void)check_subject;
+ (void)end_subject;
+ (void)utf;
+ (void)xcount;
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ same behaviour.
+ Arguments:
+   c              the first character
+   eptr           pointer to next character
+-  start_subject  pointer to start of subject
++  check_subject  pointer to start of validated subject
+   end_subject    pointer to end of subject
+   utf            TRUE if in UTF mode
+   xcount         pointer to count of additional characters,
+@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ Returns:         pointer after the end of the sequence
+ */
+ 
+ PCRE2_SPTR
+-PRIV(extuni)(uint32_t c, PCRE2_SPTR eptr, PCRE2_SPTR start_subject,
++PRIV(extuni)(uint32_t c, PCRE2_SPTR eptr, PCRE2_SPTR check_subject,
+   PCRE2_SPTR end_subject, BOOL utf, int *xcount)
+ {
+ BOOL was_ep_ZWJ = FALSE;
+@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ while (eptr < end_subject)
+ 
+     /* bptr is pointing to the left-hand character */
+ 
+-    while (bptr > start_subject)
++    while (bptr > check_subject)
+       {
+       bptr--;
+       if (utf)
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_match.c b/src/pcre2_match.c
+index a5a8421f..966576e1 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_match.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_match.c
+@@ -2893,7 +2893,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "++ %2ld op=%3d %s\n", Fecode - mb->start_code, *Fecode,
+     else
+       {
+       GETCHARINCTEST(fc, Feptr);
+-      Feptr = PRIV(extuni)(fc, Feptr, mb->start_subject, mb->end_subject, utf,
++      Feptr = PRIV(extuni)(fc, Feptr, mb->check_subject, mb->end_subject, utf,
+         NULL);
+       }
+     CHECK_PARTIAL();
+@@ -3244,7 +3244,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "++ %2ld op=%3d %s\n", Fecode - mb->start_code, *Fecode,
+           else
+             {
+             GETCHARINCTEST(fc, Feptr);
+-            Feptr = PRIV(extuni)(fc, Feptr, mb->start_subject,
++            Feptr = PRIV(extuni)(fc, Feptr, mb->check_subject,
+               mb->end_subject, utf, NULL);
+             }
+           CHECK_PARTIAL();
+@@ -4069,7 +4069,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "++ %2ld op=%3d %s\n", Fecode - mb->start_code, *Fecode,
+           else
+             {
+             GETCHARINCTEST(fc, Feptr);
+-            Feptr = PRIV(extuni)(fc, Feptr, mb->start_subject, mb->end_subject,
++            Feptr = PRIV(extuni)(fc, Feptr, mb->check_subject, mb->end_subject,
+               utf, NULL);
+             }
+           CHECK_PARTIAL();
+@@ -4658,7 +4658,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "++ %2ld op=%3d %s\n", Fecode - mb->start_code, *Fecode,
+           else
+             {
+             GETCHARINCTEST(fc, Feptr);
+-            Feptr = PRIV(extuni)(fc, Feptr, mb->start_subject, mb->end_subject,
++            Feptr = PRIV(extuni)(fc, Feptr, mb->check_subject, mb->end_subject,
+               utf, NULL);
+             }
+           CHECK_PARTIAL();
+@@ -6233,7 +6233,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "++ %2ld op=%3d %s\n", Fecode - mb->start_code, *Fecode,
+       {
+       for (i = 0; i < Lmax; i++)
+         {
+-        if (Feptr == mb->start_subject)
++        if (Feptr <= mb->check_subject)
+           {
+           if (i < Lmin) RRETURN(MATCH_NOMATCH);
+           Lmax = i;
+diff --git a/testdata/testinput10 b/testdata/testinput10
+index d9e6ba8c..bfa9dad8 100644
+--- a/testdata/testinput10
++++ b/testdata/testinput10
+@@ -585,6 +585,16 @@
+     AAA\x80BXYZ 
+     AAA\x80BBXYZ 
+ 
++# Backward scans must not enter the invalid prefix before check_subject.
++
++/(?<=a{1,2})X/utf,match_invalid_utf
++\= Expect no match
++    \x80X
++
++/\X\X/utf,match_invalid_utf
++\= Expect no match
++    \x80\x{1f1e6}\x{1f1e7}
++
+ # -------------------------------------
+ 
+ /(*UTF)(?=\x{123})/I
+diff --git a/testdata/testinput12 b/testdata/testinput12
+index 01cc76a4..c4a89a26 100644
+--- a/testdata/testinput12
++++ b/testdata/testinput12
+@@ -498,6 +498,16 @@
+ /(..)(*scs:(1)ab$)/match_invalid_utf
+     ab\x{df00}cde         
+ 
++# Backward scans must not enter the invalid prefix before check_subject.
++
++/(?<=a{1,2})X/utf,match_invalid_utf
++\= Expect no match
++    \x{dc00}X
++
++/\X\X/utf,match_invalid_utf
++\= Expect no match
++    \x{dc00}\x{1f1e6}\x{1f1e7}
++
+ # ---------------------------------------------------- 
+ 
+ /(*UTF)(?=\x{123})/I
+diff --git a/testdata/testoutput10 b/testdata/testoutput10
+index 393ac207..9e124e2b 100644
+--- a/testdata/testoutput10
++++ b/testdata/testoutput10
+@@ -1779,6 +1779,18 @@ No match
+     AAA\x80BBXYZ 
+ No match
+ 
++# Backward scans must not enter the invalid prefix before check_subject.
++
++/(?<=a{1,2})X/utf,match_invalid_utf
++\= Expect no match
++    \x80X
++No match
++
++/\X\X/utf,match_invalid_utf
++\= Expect no match
++    \x80\x{1f1e6}\x{1f1e7}
++No match
++
+ # -------------------------------------
+ 
+ /(*UTF)(?=\x{123})/I
+diff --git a/testdata/testoutput12-16 b/testdata/testoutput12-16
+index d235c11f..b0676a19 100644
+--- a/testdata/testoutput12-16
++++ b/testdata/testoutput12-16
+@@ -1659,6 +1659,18 @@ No match
+  0: ab
+  1: ab
+ 
++# Backward scans must not enter the invalid prefix before check_subject.
++
++/(?<=a{1,2})X/utf,match_invalid_utf
++\= Expect no match
++    \x{dc00}X
++No match
++
++/\X\X/utf,match_invalid_utf
++\= Expect no match
++    \x{dc00}\x{1f1e6}\x{1f1e7}
++No match
++
+ # ---------------------------------------------------- 
+ 
+ /(*UTF)(?=\x{123})/I
+diff --git a/testdata/testoutput12-32 b/testdata/testoutput12-32
+index 725cb274..a97051a6 100644
+--- a/testdata/testoutput12-32
++++ b/testdata/testoutput12-32
+@@ -1658,6 +1658,18 @@ No match
+  0: ab
+  1: ab
+ 
++# Backward scans must not enter the invalid prefix before check_subject.
++
++/(?<=a{1,2})X/utf,match_invalid_utf
++\= Expect no match
++    \x{dc00}X
++No match
++
++/\X\X/utf,match_invalid_utf
++\= Expect no match
++    \x{dc00}\x{1f1e6}\x{1f1e7}
++No match
++
+ # ---------------------------------------------------- 
+ 
+ /(*UTF)(?=\x{123})/I
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb +1 -0
index bbe37573215..ef8274c9b16 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/pcre2-${PV}/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2026-89161.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-89156.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-89157.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-89160.patch \
 "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/releases"
#59 lore raw

PATCH 58/60 libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89158

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1] since [2] does not provide it.

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-89158
[2] https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/security/advisories/GHSA-fmgr-6ggq-9859

---
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89158.patch     | 208 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 209 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89158.patch
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89158.patch new file +208 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..80996674332
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+From ec9c286d5c10cf1c388b58a442ccefded42254fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicholas Wilson <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 16:52:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix compiler integer overflows; see GHSA-fmgr-6ggq-9859 for
+ details
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-89158
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/ec9c286d5c10cf1c388b58a442ccefded42254fd]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/pcre2_compile.c       | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ src/pcre2_compile_class.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_compile.c b/src/pcre2_compile.c
+index 1081cf64..32cb32f6 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_compile.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_compile.c
+@@ -6195,7 +6195,8 @@ for (;; pptr++)
+ 
+     if (meta < META_ASTERISK || meta > META_MINMAX_QUERY)
+       {
+-      if (OFLOW_MAX - *lengthptr < (PCRE2_SIZE)(code - orig_code))
++      if (*lengthptr > OFLOW_MAX ||
++          OFLOW_MAX - *lengthptr < (PCRE2_SIZE)(code - orig_code))
+         {
+         *errorcodeptr = ERR20;   /* Integer overflow */
+         cb->erroroffset = 0;
+@@ -8795,7 +8796,8 @@ for (;;)
+     *reqcuflagsptr = reqcuflags;
+     if (lengthptr != NULL)
+       {
+-      if (OFLOW_MAX - *lengthptr < length)
++      if (*lengthptr > MAX_PATTERN_SIZE ||
++          MAX_PATTERN_SIZE - *lengthptr < length)
+         {
+         *errorcodeptr = ERR20;
+         return 0;
+@@ -8818,6 +8820,19 @@ for (;;)
+     {
+     code = *codeptr + 1 + LINK_SIZE + skipunits;
+     length += 1 + LINK_SIZE;
++
++    /* Move the accumulated length into *lengthptr, providing the next call to
++    compile_branch with as much space in &length and &code as the first did. */
++
++    if (*lengthptr > MAX_PATTERN_SIZE ||
++        MAX_PATTERN_SIZE - *lengthptr < length)
++      {
++      *errorcodeptr = ERR20;
++      cb->erroroffset = 0;
++      return 0;
++      }
++    *lengthptr += length;
++    length = 0;
+     }
+   else
+     {
+@@ -10831,7 +10846,8 @@ if (errorcode != 0) goto HAD_CB_ERROR;  /* Offset is in cb.erroroffset */
+ #if defined SUPPORT_WIDE_CHARS
+ PCRE2_ASSERT((cb.char_lists_size & 0x3) == 0);
+ if (length > MAX_PATTERN_SIZE ||
+-    MAX_PATTERN_SIZE - length < (cb.char_lists_size / sizeof(PCRE2_UCHAR)))
++    BYTES2CU(cb.char_lists_size) > MAX_PATTERN_SIZE ||
++    MAX_PATTERN_SIZE - length < BYTES2CU(cb.char_lists_size))
+ #else
+ if (length > MAX_PATTERN_SIZE)
+ #endif
+@@ -10856,11 +10872,36 @@ if (cb.char_lists_size != 0)
+   /* Align to 32 bit first. This ensures the
+   allocated area will also be 32 bit aligned. */
+   re_blocksize = (PCRE2_SIZE)CLIST_ALIGN_TO(re_blocksize, sizeof(uint32_t));
++#else
++  /* Already 32 bit aligned. */
+ #endif
++
++  /* We have bounded the length and BYTES2CU(char_lists_size) to
++  MAX_PATTERN_SIZE units, however (with 32-bit code units) char_lists_size
++  in bytes could still be extremely close to (or greater than) SIZE_MAX, so
++  we require another overflow check. */
++
++  if (cb.char_lists_size > PCRE2_SIZE_MAX - re_blocksize)
++    {
++    errorcode = ERR20;
++    cb.erroroffset = 0;
++    goto HAD_CB_ERROR;
++    }
++
+   re_blocksize += cb.char_lists_size;
+   }
+ #endif
+ 
++if (length > BYTES2CU(PCRE2_SIZE_MAX - re_blocksize))
++  {
++  /* Given the current value of 2^30 for MAX_PATTERN_SIZE, this block is only
++  reachable when both PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH >= 16 and sizeof(size_t) is
++  32 bits. */
++  errorcode = ERR20;
++  cb.erroroffset = 0;
++  goto HAD_CB_ERROR;
++  }
++
+ re_blocksize += CU2BYTES(length);
+ 
+ if (re_blocksize > ccontext->max_pattern_compiled_length)
+@@ -10870,7 +10911,15 @@ if (re_blocksize > ccontext->max_pattern_compiled_length)
+   goto HAD_CB_ERROR;
+   }
+ 
++if (sizeof(pcre2_real_code) > PCRE2_SIZE_MAX - re_blocksize)
++  {
++  errorcode = ERR20;
++  cb.erroroffset = 0;
++  goto HAD_CB_ERROR;
++  }
++
+ re_blocksize += sizeof(pcre2_real_code);
++
+ re = (pcre2_real_code *)
+   ccontext->memctl.malloc(re_blocksize, ccontext->memctl.memory_data);
+ if (re == NULL)
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_compile_class.c b/src/pcre2_compile_class.c
+index c6f30d6f..c0606643 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_compile_class.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_compile_class.c
+@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static const uint32_t char_list_starts[] = {
+ 
+ static class_ranges *
+ compile_optimize_class(uint32_t *start_ptr, uint32_t options,
+-  uint32_t xoptions, compile_block *cb)
++  uint32_t xoptions, int *errorcodeptr, compile_block *cb)
+ {
+ class_ranges* cranges;
+ uint32_t *ptr;
+@@ -538,12 +538,23 @@ PCRE2_ASSERT((range_list_size & 0x1) == 0);
+ 
+ total_size = range_list_size +
+    ((range_list_size >= 2) ? CHAR_LIST_EXTRA_SIZE : 0);
++if (total_size > (PCRE2_SIZE_MAX - sizeof(class_ranges)) / sizeof(uint32_t))
++  {
++  *errorcodeptr = ERR20;
++  cb->erroroffset = 0;
++  return NULL;
++  }
+ 
+ cranges = cb->cx->memctl.malloc(
+   sizeof(class_ranges) + total_size * sizeof(uint32_t),
+   cb->cx->memctl.memory_data);
+ 
+-if (cranges == NULL) return NULL;
++if (cranges == NULL)
++  {
++  *errorcodeptr = ERR21;
++  cb->erroroffset = 0;
++  return NULL;
++  }
+ 
+ cranges->header.next = NULL;
+ #ifdef PCRE2_DEBUG
+@@ -1116,13 +1127,10 @@ if (utf)
+   {
+   if (lengthptr != NULL)
+     {
+-    cranges = compile_optimize_class(pptr, options, xoptions, cb);
++    cranges = compile_optimize_class(pptr, options, xoptions, errorcodeptr, cb);
+ 
+     if (cranges == NULL)
+-      {
+-      *errorcodeptr = ERR21;
+       return NULL;
+-      }
+ 
+     /* Caching the pre-processed character ranges. */
+     if (cb->last_data != NULL)
+@@ -1755,18 +1763,17 @@ if ((xclass_props & XCLASS_REQUIRED) != 0)
+       *lengthptr += 1 + LINK_SIZE;
+ #endif
+ 
+-      cb->char_lists_size += char_lists_size;
++      PCRE2_ASSERT(BYTES2CU(cb->char_lists_size) <= MAX_PATTERN_SIZE);
+ 
+-      char_lists_size /= sizeof(PCRE2_UCHAR);
+-
+-      /* Storage space for character lists is included
+-      in the maximum pattern size. */
+-      if (*lengthptr > MAX_PATTERN_SIZE ||
+-          MAX_PATTERN_SIZE - *lengthptr < char_lists_size)
++      if (char_lists_size > PCRE2_SIZE_MAX - cb->char_lists_size ||
++          BYTES2CU(char_lists_size) > MAX_PATTERN_SIZE ||
++          BYTES2CU(cb->char_lists_size) > MAX_PATTERN_SIZE - BYTES2CU(char_lists_size))
+         {
+         *errorcodeptr = ERR20;   /* Pattern is too large */
+         return NULL;
+         }
++
++      cb->char_lists_size += char_lists_size;
+       }
+     else
+       {
+@@ -1789,6 +1796,8 @@ if ((xclass_props & XCLASS_REQUIRED) != 0)
+       Each list is aligned to 32 bit with an optional unused
+       16 bit value at the beginning of the character list. */
+ 
++      PCRE2_ASSERT(char_lists_size <= PCRE2_SIZE_MAX - cb->char_lists_size);
++
+       cb->char_lists_size += char_lists_size;
+       data = (uint8_t*)cb->start_code - cb->char_lists_size;
+ 
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb +1 -0
index ef8274c9b16..2f40ef463eb 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/pcre2-${PV}/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2026-89156.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-89157.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-89160.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-89158.patch \
 "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/releases"
#60 lore raw

PATCH 59/60 libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-86145

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1] since [2] does not provide valid commit hash.

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-86145
[2] https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/security/advisories/GHSA-3r4p-g7gg-ppmf

---
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-86145.patch     | 158 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 159 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-86145.patch
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-86145.patch new file +158 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..a044a006e5f
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+From c932e70451eafef922ebef364ac25042f0031135 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicholas Wilson <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 16:52:16 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DFA workspace overflows; see GHSA-3r4p-g7gg-ppmf for
+ details
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-86145
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/c932e70451eafef922ebef364ac25042f0031135]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/pcre2_dfa_match.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ testdata/testinput6   |  7 +++++++
+ testdata/testoutput6  |  8 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_dfa_match.c b/src/pcre2_dfa_match.c
+index 314e9775..8e9512c4 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_dfa_match.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_dfa_match.c
+@@ -405,8 +405,8 @@ return (mb->callout)(cb, mb->callout_data);
+ 
+ /* This function is called when internal_dfa_match() is about to be called
+ recursively and there is insufficient working space left in the current
+-workspace block. If there's an existing next block, use it; otherwise get a new
+-block unless the heap limit is reached.
++workspace block. If there's a sufficiently large next block, use it; get a new
++block unless the heap limit is (or has been) reached.
+ 
+ Arguments:
+   rwsptr     pointer to block pointer (updated)
+@@ -422,9 +422,18 @@ more_workspace(RWS_anchor **rwsptr, unsigned int ovecsize, dfa_match_block *mb)
+ {
+ RWS_anchor *rws = *rwsptr;
+ RWS_anchor *new;
++uint32_t requested;
++
++PCRE2_ASSERT(ovecsize <= UINT32_MAX - RWS_RSIZE - RWS_ANCHOR_SIZE);
++requested = RWS_RSIZE + ovecsize + RWS_ANCHOR_SIZE;
+ 
+ if (rws->next != NULL)
+   {
++  /* Although the initial block is large, and subsequent ones try to double, the
++  heap limit may cause the last one to be smaller; in this case, we have already
++  hit the heap limit and allocating a larger block will not be possible. */
++  if (rws->next->size < requested)
++    return PCRE2_ERROR_HEAPLIMIT;
+   new = rws->next;
+   }
+ 
+@@ -434,14 +443,30 @@ overflow. */
+ 
+ else
+   {
+-  uint32_t newsize = (rws->size >= UINT32_MAX/(sizeof(int)*2))? UINT32_MAX/sizeof(int) : rws->size * 2;
++  uint32_t newsize = (rws->size >= (UINT32_MAX/sizeof(int))/2)?
++    UINT32_MAX/sizeof(int) : rws->size * 2;
+   uint32_t newsizeK = newsize/(1024/sizeof(int));
+ 
+-  if (newsizeK + mb->heap_used > mb->heap_limit)
+-    newsizeK = (uint32_t)(mb->heap_limit - mb->heap_used);
+-  newsize = newsizeK*(1024/sizeof(int));
++  /* Clamp the allocation to the remaining heap allowance with care for overflows */
+ 
+-  if (newsize < RWS_RSIZE + ovecsize + RWS_ANCHOR_SIZE)
++  if (mb->heap_used >= mb->heap_limit)
++    {
++    newsize = 0;
++    newsizeK = 0;
++    }
++  else
++    {
++    PCRE2_SIZE availableK = mb->heap_limit - mb->heap_used;
++    /* newsize always capped at UINT32_MAX/sizeof(int), so newsizeK also capped;
++    and - if availableK is smaller - then multiplication to form newsize is safe */
++    if (newsizeK > availableK)
++      {
++      newsize = (uint32_t)(availableK*(1024/sizeof(int)));
++      newsizeK = availableK;
++      }
++    }
++
++  if (newsize < requested)
+     return PCRE2_ERROR_HEAPLIMIT;
+   new = mb->memctl.malloc(newsize*sizeof(int), mb->memctl.memory_data);
+   if (new == NULL) return PCRE2_ERROR_NOMEMORY;
+@@ -2801,6 +2826,7 @@ for (;;)
+ 
+         local_offsets = (PCRE2_SIZE *)(RWS + rws->size - rws->free);
+         local_workspace = ((int *)local_offsets) + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE;
++        PCRE2_ASSERT(rws->free >= RWS_RSIZE + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE);
+         rws->free -= RWS_RSIZE + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE;
+ 
+         while (*endasscode == OP_ALT) endasscode += GET(endasscode, 1);
+@@ -2900,6 +2926,7 @@ for (;;)
+ 
+           local_offsets = (PCRE2_SIZE *)(RWS + rws->size - rws->free);
+           local_workspace = ((int *)local_offsets) + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE;
++          PCRE2_ASSERT(rws->free >= RWS_RSIZE + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE);
+           rws->free -= RWS_RSIZE + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE;
+ 
+           while (*endasscode == OP_ALT) endasscode += GET(endasscode, 1);
+@@ -2951,6 +2978,7 @@ for (;;)
+ 
+         local_offsets = (PCRE2_SIZE *)(RWS + rws->size - rws->free);
+         local_workspace = ((int *)local_offsets) + RWS_OVEC_RSIZE;
++        PCRE2_ASSERT(rws->free >= RWS_RSIZE + RWS_OVEC_RSIZE);
+         rws->free -= RWS_RSIZE + RWS_OVEC_RSIZE;
+ 
+         /* Check for repeating a recursion without advancing the subject
+@@ -3050,6 +3078,7 @@ for (;;)
+ 
+         local_offsets = (PCRE2_SIZE *)(RWS + rws->size - rws->free);
+         local_workspace = ((int *)local_offsets) + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE;
++        PCRE2_ASSERT(rws->free >= RWS_RSIZE + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE);
+         rws->free -= RWS_RSIZE + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE;
+ 
+         if (codevalue == OP_BRAPOSZERO)
+@@ -3149,6 +3178,7 @@ for (;;)
+ 
+         local_offsets = (PCRE2_SIZE *)(RWS + rws->size - rws->free);
+         local_workspace = ((int *)local_offsets) + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE;
++        PCRE2_ASSERT(rws->free >= RWS_RSIZE + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE);
+         rws->free -= RWS_RSIZE + RWS_OVEC_OSIZE;
+ 
+         rc = internal_dfa_match(
+diff --git a/testdata/testinput6 b/testdata/testinput6
+index f6f5cbf4..197f6f76 100644
+--- a/testdata/testinput6
++++ b/testdata/testinput6
+@@ -5263,4 +5263,11 @@
+     abc\=replace=xyz
+     abc\=replace=xyz,substitute_matched
+ 
++# --------------
++
++# Test workspace resizing and workspace re-use
++
++/(*LIMIT_HEAP=4)(?=(?=(?=(?=(?=(?=(?=(?=a))(?R)))))))./
++    a\=dfa
++
+ # End of testinput6
+diff --git a/testdata/testoutput6 b/testdata/testoutput6
+index 8ecf0040..4316c8a6 100644
+--- a/testdata/testoutput6
++++ b/testdata/testoutput6
+@@ -8237,4 +8237,12 @@ Failed: error -42: pattern contains an item that is not supported for DFA matchi
+     abc\=replace=xyz,substitute_matched
+ Failed: error -41: function is not supported for DFA matching
+ 
++# --------------
++
++# Test workspace resizing and workspace re-use
++
++/(*LIMIT_HEAP=4)(?=(?=(?=(?=(?=(?=(?=(?=a))(?R)))))))./
++    a\=dfa
++Failed: error -63: heap limit exceeded
++
+ # End of testinput6
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb +1 -0
index 2f40ef463eb..60ba56014bf 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/pcre2-${PV}/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2026-89157.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-89160.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-89158.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-86145.patch \
 "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/releases"
#61 lore raw

PATCH 60/60 libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-103111

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

Pick patch per [1] and [2].

[1] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-103111
[2] https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/security/advisories/GHSA-r9hj-j2rw-4q3m

---
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-103111.patch    | 111 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb |   1 +
 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-103111.patch
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-103111.patch new file +111 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..6006566d840
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From 2b4038298072684b0fae29b15bedfb1a75bda46d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zoltan Herczeg <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2026 07:46:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix large JIT stack allocation
+
+(GHSA-r9hj-j2rw-4q3m) Security fix to prevent an out of bounds write with
+arbitrary data. Applications are only affected if using the
+pcre2_jit_stack_assign() API to create a growable JIT stack, and then matching
+against a pattern with an extremely JIT stack usage, such as a large number of
+capturing groups.
+
+The implications of an out of bounds write could include arbitrary code
+execution.
+
+The issue is not a regression and affects releases 10.48 and earlier.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-103111
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/2b4038298072684b0fae29b15bedfb1a75bda46d]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/pcre2_jit_compile.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
+ testdata/testinput17    |  5 +++++
+ testdata/testoutput17   |  6 ++++++
+ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
+index 105a1dd3..c5da883c 100644
+--- a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ Fast, but limited size. */
+ 
+ /* Growth rate for stack allocated by the OS. Should be the multiply
+ of page size. */
+-#define STACK_GROWTH_RATE 8192
++#define STACK_GROWTH_RATE (sljit_sw)8192
+ 
+ /* Enable to check that the allocation could destroy temporaries. */
+ #if defined SLJIT_DEBUG && SLJIT_DEBUG
+@@ -472,6 +472,8 @@ typedef struct compiler_common {
+   BOOL local_quit_available;
+   /* Currently in a positive assertion. */
+   BOOL in_positive_assertion;
++  /* More than STACK_GROWTH_RATE / 2 stack memory is allocated. */
++  BOOL large_stack_allocation;
+   /* Newline control. */
+   int nltype;
+   sljit_u32 nlmax;
+@@ -3523,6 +3525,8 @@ static SLJIT_INLINE void allocate_stack(compiler_common *common, sljit_s32 size)
+ DEFINE_COMPILER;
+ 
+ SLJIT_ASSERT(size > 0);
++if (size > (STACK_GROWTH_RATE / (SSIZE_OF(sw) * 2)))
++  common->large_stack_allocation = TRUE;
+ OP2(SLJIT_SUB, STACK_TOP, 0, STACK_TOP, 0, SLJIT_IMM, size * SSIZE_OF(sw));
+ #ifdef DESTROY_REGISTERS
+ OP1(SLJIT_MOV, TMP1, 0, SLJIT_IMM, 12345);
+@@ -13974,7 +13978,20 @@ SLJIT_ASSERT(TMP1 == SLJIT_R0 && STR_PTR == SLJIT_R1);
+ 
+ OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_SP), LOCAL1, STR_PTR, 0);
+ OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_R0, 0, ARGUMENTS, 0);
+-OP2(SLJIT_SUB, SLJIT_R1, 0, STACK_LIMIT, 0, SLJIT_IMM, STACK_GROWTH_RATE);
++if (common->large_stack_allocation)
++  {
++  SLJIT_COMPILE_ASSERT((STACK_GROWTH_RATE & (STACK_GROWTH_RATE - 1)) == 0, stack_growth_must_be_power_of_2);
++  // Negative difference. The positive difference would also use the same amount
++  // of operations, but the last subtraction emits several instructions on x86.
++  OP2(SLJIT_SUB, SLJIT_R1, 0, STACK_TOP, 0, STACK_LIMIT, 0);
++  // Minimum extra space after allocation.
++  OP2(SLJIT_SUB, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_IMM, (STACK_GROWTH_RATE / 2));
++  // Rounds down negative numbers.
++  OP2(SLJIT_AND, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_IMM, ~(STACK_GROWTH_RATE - 1));
++  OP2(SLJIT_ADD, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_R1, 0, STACK_LIMIT, 0);
++  }
++else
++  OP2(SLJIT_SUB, SLJIT_R1, 0, STACK_LIMIT, 0, SLJIT_IMM, STACK_GROWTH_RATE);
+ OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_R0, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_R0), SLJIT_OFFSETOF(jit_arguments, stack));
+ OP1(SLJIT_MOV, STACK_LIMIT, 0, TMP2, 0);
+ 
+diff --git a/testdata/testinput17 b/testdata/testinput17
+index a02e6be2..486998b4 100644
+--- a/testdata/testinput17
++++ b/testdata/testinput17
+@@ -188,6 +188,11 @@
+ /(?(R)a*(?1)|((?R))b)/
+ \= Expect JIT stack limit reached
+     aaaabcde
++
++# A single large stack allocation must grow beyond the current stack top.
++
++/((?(DEFINE)\[()\g{-1}]{1400}).{1}(?R)|)/expand,jit
++    AAAAAA\=jitstack=192
+     
+ # Invalid options disable JIT when called via pcre2_match(), causing the
+ # match to happen via the interpreter, but for fast JIT invalid options are
+diff --git a/testdata/testoutput17 b/testdata/testoutput17
+index c678587f..b6e7e1a6 100644
+--- a/testdata/testoutput17
++++ b/testdata/testoutput17
+@@ -350,6 +350,12 @@ Failed: error -46: JIT stack limit reached
+ \= Expect JIT stack limit reached
+     aaaabcde
+ Failed: error -46: JIT stack limit reached
++
++# A single large stack allocation must grow beyond the current stack top.
++
++/((?(DEFINE)\[()\g{-1}]{1400}).{1}(?R)|)/expand,jit
++    AAAAAA\=jitstack=192
++Failed: error -46: JIT stack limit reached
+     
+ # Invalid options disable JIT when called via pcre2_match(), causing the
+ # match to happen via the interpreter, but for fast JIT invalid options are
meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb +1 -0
index 60ba56014bf..4884ffb0928 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GITHUB_BASE_URI}/download/pcre2-${PV}/pcre2-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://CVE-2026-89160.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-89158.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-86145.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-103111.patch \
 "
 
 GITHUB_BASE_URI = "https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/releases"
#62 lore raw
In reply to Yoann Congal

Please drop my libpcre2 series for now.

When trying to create this series for scarthgap and trying to resolve conflicts I found that pcre2 now committed to do "at least five years" of maintenance for each release.
https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/0f85a365a7ab586a39089f4ecdc4f9f6857c043e#diff-599c7525a19150cfd62bfa7bafbf578487389804a4ec3964ffa60d322db9bbfdR22-R44

Release branches are available that we could use.
Checking contents of release/10.47 branch, it contains commits which I picked, however some are squashed with other ones indicating that my backport was not complete. For example fix for CVE-2026-89156 now consists of two squashed commits where I picked only one.
https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/5528f329f597eabbf1cfd5a1f3b4fa51a8c02d60
This requires further study before merging.

This also opens second question, similar to one recently asked for rsync very recently.
May I switch libpcre2 to gif fetcher and update to latest release branch hash instead of backporting commits? Or should I rather pick (potentially all) commits from there?
I'd prefer to switch to the git fetcher.

Peter

Quoted 293 lines

-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] <openembedded- [email protected]> On Behalf Of Yoann Congal via lists.openembedded.org
Sent: Sunday, October 11, 2026 10:40 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: [OE-core][wrynose 00/60] Patch review

Please review this set of changes for wrynose and have comments back by end of day Tuesday, October 13.

Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/?#/builders/29/builds/4907
qemuarm-tc failed due to disk space issue on the autobuilder worker. Retried in https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/?#/builders/42/builds/4782

The following changes since commit 0f03c732a0a2d0506b41b1abe60b3f368b2300dc:

build-appliance-image: Update to wrynose head revisions (2026-09-30 11:06:32
+0100)

are available in the Git repository at:

https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/wrynose-review
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/wrynose-
review

for you to fetch changes up to d1d174cf7d58aae5f00281aafcebc2fe11e41200:

libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-103111 (2026-10-10 23:41:04 +0200)

----------------------------------------------------------------

Alexander Kanavin (1):
tzcode/tzdata: fix upstream version check

Babanpreet Singh (2):
devtool: standard: fix update-recipe/finish --initial-rev override oeqa/selftest/devtool: cover update-recipe --initial-rev

Bhavesh R Maheshwari (2):
ffmpeg: Fix for CVE-2026-66036
ffmpeg: Fix for CVE-2026-66041

Darsh Kelaiya (1):
python3-click: depend on python3-shell for shlex

Deepesh Varatharajan (1):
glibc: stable 2.43 branch updates to 9cda6fc96ab

Frieder Schrempf (1):
weston: fix VNC backend build with aml 1.0

Ghanshyam Banait (1):
wget: fix CVE-2026-15146

Harish Sadineni (2):
glibc: stable 2.43 branch updates to 562cd7badd qemuriscv.inc: default to fw_dynamic.elf as QEMU BIOS

Hetvi Thakar (5):
openssh: fix CVE-2026-73283
openssh: fix CVE-2026-73282
openssh: fix CVE-2026-73281
vim: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-51400
vim: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-51401

Jaipaul Cheernam (1):
bind: upgrade 9.20.26 -> 9.20.27

Jakub Szczudlo (Nokia) (5):
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42012
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42013
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42014
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-42015
gnutls: fix CVE-2026-5260

Lucas Stach (1):
barebox: upgrade 2026.04.0 -> 2026.04.2

Peter Marko (32):
glibc: set status for CVE-2011-0536 and CVE-2025-0577
gnutls: set status for CVE-2023-0361
libarchive: set status for CVE-2026-4424
nfs-utils: set status for CVE-2025-12801
openssl: set status for CVE-2015-3216
ovmf: set status of CVE-2017-5731 and CVE-2019-14584
ppp: set status for CVE-2020-15704
pulseaudio: set status for CVE-2020-15710 and CVE-2020-16123
graphene: set status for CVE-2026-81281
openssh: set status for CVE-2026-55655
openssh: set status for CVE-2026-55654
xserver-xorg: set status for CVE-2026-55999 and CVE-2026-56000
openssl: upgrade 3.5.8 -> 3.5.9
glibc: set status for CVE-2026-86805 and CVE-2026-95818
libpng: upgrade 1.6.56 -> 1.6.58
libpng: upgrade 1.6.58 -> 1.6.59
util-linux(-uuid): upgrade 2.41.5 -> 2.41.6
libsolv: patch CVE-2026-48863
expat: patch CVE-2026-66046 and CVE-2026-76641
expat: patch CVE-2026-76956
expat: patch CVE-2026-76957
expat: patch CVE-2026-93990
alsa-lib: patch CVE-2026-90781
go: upgrade 1.26.8 -> 1.26.9
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89162
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89161
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89156
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89157
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89160
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-89158
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-86145
libpcre2: patch CVE-2026-103111

Peter Tatrai (1):
systemd: fix mDNS hostname changes

Richard Purdie (1):
bind: upgrade 9.20.27 -> 9.20.29

Ross Burton (2):
gstreamer: skip test_queue:test_leaky_downstream test as it's flakey
libaio: update SRC_URI

Vijay Anusuri (1):
tzdata/tzcode-native: upgrade 2026c -> 2026d

 meta/conf/machine/include/riscv/qemuriscv.inc |   5 +-
 meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py       |  22 +
 meta/recipes-bsp/barebox/barebox-common.inc   |   4 +-
 ...1-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch |   2 +-
 ...kport-ax_prog_cc_for_build.m4-macros.patch |   2 +-
 ...d-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch |   4 +-
 ...ching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch |   4 +-
 .../recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/conf.patch |   2 +-
 ...t.d-add-support-for-read-only-rootfs.patch |   2 +-
 .../bind/make-etc-initd-bind-stop-work.patch  |   2 +-
 .../bind/{bind_9.20.26.bb => bind_9.20.29.bb} |   2 +-
 .../nfs-utils/nfs-utils_2.8.7.bb              |   2 +
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73281.patch      |  80 +++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73282.patch      |  80 +++
 .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-73283.patch      |  42 ++
 .../openssh/openssh_10.3p1.bb                 |   5 +
 .../{openssl_3.5.8.bb => openssl_3.5.9.bb}    |   4 +-
 meta/recipes-connectivity/ppp/ppp_2.5.2.bb    |   1 +
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-01.patch       | 107 ++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-02.patch       |  90 +++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76641.patch          | 160 ++++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76956.patch          |  26 +
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-01.patch       | 121 ++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-02.patch       |  85 +++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-01.patch       | 191 +++++++
 .../expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-02.patch       | 328 +++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.8.3.bb        |   8 +
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc-version.inc     |   2 +-
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.43.bb         |   5 +
 meta/recipes-core/ovmf/ovmf_git.bb            |   2 +
 ...use-traffic-from-the-local-host-only.patch |  61 +++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_259.5.bb    |   1 +
 ...2.41.5.bb => util-linux-libuuid_2.41.6.bb} |   0
 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux.inc   |   5 +-
 ...sing-fileutils.h-include-to-hook_idm.patch |  38 ++
 .../util-linux/CVE-2026-78408.patch           |  75 +++
 .../util-linux/CVE-2026-78410.patch           | 115 ++++
 ...l-linux_2.41.5.bb => util-linux_2.41.6.bb} |   0
 .../go/{go-1.26.8.inc => go-1.26.9.inc}       |   2 +-
 ...e_1.26.8.bb => go-binary-native_1.26.9.bb} |   6 +-
 ..._1.26.8.bb => go-cross-canadian_1.26.9.bb} |   0
 ...{go-cross_1.26.8.bb => go-cross_1.26.9.bb} |   0
 ...osssdk_1.26.8.bb => go-crosssdk_1.26.9.bb} |   0
 ...runtime_1.26.8.bb => go-runtime_1.26.9.bb} |   0
 ...ent-based-hash-generation-less-pedan.patch |   8 +-
 ...3-ld-add-soname-to-shareable-objects.patch |   6 +-
 ...d-go-make-GOROOT-precious-by-default.patch |   2 +-
 ...ut-build-specific-paths-from-linker-.patch |   4 +-
 .../go/{go_1.26.8.bb => go_1.26.9.bb}         |   0
 .../python/python3-click_8.3.3.bb             |   1 +
 .../recipes-extended/libaio/libaio_0.3.113.bb |   2 +-
 .../libarchive/libarchive_3.8.7.bb            |   1 +
 .../libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-48863.patch      |  25 +
 .../libsolv/libsolv_0.7.36.bb                 |   1 +
 meta/recipes-extended/timezone/timezone.inc   |   8 +-
 .../wget/wget/CVE-2026-15146.patch            | 126 +++++
 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget_1.25.0.bb     |   1 +
 .../graphene/graphene_1.10.8.bb               |   1 +
 .../weston/0001-backend-vnc-Use-aml-v1.patch  |  24 +
 .../recipes-graphics/wayland/weston_15.0.0.bb |   3 +-
 .../xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg.inc             |   2 +
 .../alsa/alsa-lib/CVE-2026-90781.patch        |  41 ++
 .../alsa/alsa-lib_1.2.15.3.bb                 |   1 +
 .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p1.patch     | 120 ++++
 .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66036_p2.patch     |  71 +++
 .../ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66041.patch        |  60 ++
 .../recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg_8.0.3.bb |   3 +
 .../gstreamer/gstreamer1.0/run-ptest          |   3 +
 .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p1.patch      | 518 ------------------
 .../libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p2.patch      | 481 ----------------
 .../{libpng_1.6.56.bb => libpng_1.6.59.bb}    |   7 +-
 .../pulseaudio/pulseaudio.inc                 |   2 +
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre1.patch   |  69 +++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-pre2.patch   | 161 ++++++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012.patch        |  48 ++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013-pre1.patch   |  56 ++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013.patch        |  74 +++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42014.patch        |  60 ++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42015.patch        |  43 ++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p1.patch      |  69 +++
 .../gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p2.patch      |  33 ++
 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls_3.8.12.bb  |  10 +
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-103111.patch    | 111 ++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-86145.patch     | 158 ++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89156.patch     | 275 ++++++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89157.patch     |  61 +++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89158.patch     | 208 +++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89160.patch     | 225 ++++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89161.patch     | 221 ++++++++
 .../libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89162.patch     |  88 +++
 .../recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2_10.47.bb |   8 +
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc              |   3 +
 scripts/lib/devtool/standard.py               |   4 +
 93 files changed, 4160 insertions(+), 1040 deletions(-)
 rename meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/{bind_9.20.26.bb => bind_9.20.29.bb} (97%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-
73281.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-
73282.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2026-
73283.patch
 rename meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/{openssl_3.5.8.bb => openssl_3.5.9.bb}
(98%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-66046-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76641.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76956.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-76957-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-01.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2026-93990-02.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0001-Revert-resolve-
refuse-traffic-from-the-local-host-only.patch
 rename meta/recipes-core/util-linux/{util-linux-libuuid_2.41.5.bb => util-linux-
libuuid_2.41.6.bb} (100%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/0001-libmount-add-
missing-fileutils.h-include-to-hook_idm.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2026-78408.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/util-linux/util-linux/CVE-2026-78410.patch
 rename meta/recipes-core/util-linux/{util-linux_2.41.5.bb => util-linux_2.41.6.bb}
(100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-1.26.8.inc => go-1.26.9.inc} (90%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-binary-native_1.26.8.bb => go-binary-
native_1.26.9.bb} (80%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-cross-canadian_1.26.8.bb => go-cross-
canadian_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-cross_1.26.8.bb => go-cross_1.26.9.bb}
(100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-crosssdk_1.26.8.bb => go-
crosssdk_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go-runtime_1.26.8.bb => go-runtime_1.26.9.bb}
(100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/{go_1.26.8.bb => go_1.26.9.bb} (100%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-48863.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/wget/wget/CVE-2026-15146.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/wayland/weston/0001-backend-vnc-
Use-aml-v1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/alsa/alsa-lib/CVE-2026-90781.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-
66036_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-
66036_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/ffmpeg/ffmpeg/CVE-2026-66041.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p1.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/files/CVE-2026-34757_p2.patch
 rename meta/recipes-multimedia/libpng/{libpng_1.6.56.bb => libpng_1.6.59.bb} (94%)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-
pre1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012-
pre2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42012.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013-
pre1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42013.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42014.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-42015.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p1.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/gnutls/gnutls/CVE-2026-5260_p2.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-103111.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-86145.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89156.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89157.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89158.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89160.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89161.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libpcre/libpcre2/CVE-2026-89162.patch
#63 lore raw
Quoted 1 line · Peter Marko

Please drop my libpcre2 series for now.

Ok, I dropped it from stable/wrynose-next.

Quoted 5 lines

When trying to create this series for scarthgap and trying to resolve conflicts I found that pcre2 now committed to do "at least five years" of maintenance for each release.
https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/0f85a365a7ab586a39089f4ecdc4f9f6857c043e#diff-599c7525a19150cfd62bfa7bafbf578487389804a4ec3964ffa60d322db9bbfdR22-R44

Quoted 8 lines

Release branches are available that we could use.
Checking contents of release/10.47 branch, it contains commits which I picked, however some are squashed with other ones indicating that my backport was not complete.
For example fix for CVE-2026-89156 now consists of two squashed commits where I picked only one.
https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/5528f329f597eabbf1cfd5a1f3b4fa51a8c02d60
This requires further study before merging.

Agreed but this upstream maintenance branch looks - on paper - compatible with our policy. So, this is encouraging.

Quoted 6 lines

This also opens second question, similar to one recently asked for rsync very recently.
May I switch libpcre2 to gif fetcher and update to latest release branch hash instead of backporting commits?
Or should I rather pick (potentially all) commits from there? I'd prefer to switch to the git fetcher.

I also like the idea of switching to git fetcher. So, I'll happily review a series doing the switch then upgrade along the branch.

Thanks!

Signature · 2 lines
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS