iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Support guest-level Realm VSMMU (Part-1)
Subsystems (5)
v3 cover iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Support guest-level Realm VSMMU (Part-1)
This series prepares Realm guest IOMMU and DMA subsystems for devices that are present but not yet inside the Realm trust boundary.
Inside a confidential guest, we expect that all the iommus are going to be T=1 aware; there seems to be no interest in supporting IOMMUs that handle T=0 only. This means they only work on devices that have been put into the run state and issue T=1 transactions.
Today an iommu driver assumes it translates for every device behind it: it probes the device, takes a translating default domain, and puts the DMA API on its page tables. That assumption is wrong for T=0 devices, whose DMA the hypervisor translates instead, so the mappings made by the guest are never consulted and the device silently stops working.
To solve this problem, make TDISP T=0 the default for devices associated with a confidential IOMMU. The tdisp_t1 flag records the future T=1 state.
While T=0, the device remains outside the Realm trust boundary. Its DMA is translated by the host or hypervisor:
[device: T=0] ===> [hypervisor] ===> [memory]
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+-- (guest association) --> [confidential IOMMU: blocking DMA]
Legend: ===> DMA path; --> guest topology and controlAfter reaching T=1, the device is inside the Realm trust boundary. Its DMA may use the guest VSMMU after RMM binds the device to its virtual stream:
[device] ===> [VSMMU: S1] ===> [RMM/PSMMU: S2 + DPT] ===> [memory]
As part 1 of Realm VSMMU support, implement enough core infrastructure to manage a confidential vIOMMU:
- Detect and mark it as confidential in the core iommu structures
- Support devices in T=0 mode by keeping the DMA API in direct mode. The iommu is up and running, but parks such a device in its blocking domain and translates for nothing, as the core takes over what the device still needs, which today is ATS
- Keep it parked: refuse a translating domain by every route in, whether through the default domain, sysfs, group attach or replace, or PASID
Part 1 only adds the helpers required for T=0 setup and teardown. It does not add iommu_tdisp_enter_t1() until part 2 has a transition to perform.
Then implement SMMUv3 support:
- Let a CPU-integrated IOMMU declare that its DMA can reach private memory, so coherent allocations and streaming mappings avoid the SWIOTLB shared pool
- Identify a T=1 VSMMU using trusted RSI because firmware does not distinguish it from a normal T=0 SMMU
- Validate the firmware MMIO range against RSI before activating the VSMMU and allocating its queues and tables from private memory
The series is on github:
https://github.com/nicolinc/iommufd/commits/smmuv3_realm_guest_p1-v3
Changelog
v3:
* Add Acked-by from Marek
* Disable and enable ATS for T=0 devices across a PCI reset
* Rename dma_require_decrypted() to dma_require_unencrypted()
* Explain the minimum STU used to enable ATS while TDISP is T=0
v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
* Rebase on v7.4-rc1
* Drop Assisted-by tags
* Drop Aneesh's firmware patch that was merged
* Skip Tegra CMDQV implementation in the realm world
* Use arm_smccc_1_2_smc() to zero inputs as RMM spec demands
* Add missing iommu_using_t0_stream() check in iommu_dma_prepare_msi()
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Future work
===========
Part 2 will add the T=1 transition after validation through:
- TSM, whose guest-side interface remains under discussion
- RMM, using the Arm-specific RSI VDEV command
For a multi-device IOMMU group, the first device accepted into T=1 claims the group. Part 2 will reject T=1 for every other member.
The current RSI binding validation returns one VSID, so part 2 must reject a firmware specification containing multiple SIDs upon the T=1 transition.
Nicolin Chen (7):
firmware: arm_rmm: Add VSMMU commands and fields
dma-mapping: Let a device declare that it reaches private memory
dma-mapping: Keep DMA memory private for capable devices
iommu: Let a driver mark an IOMMU as confidential
iommu: Introduce TDISP T=0 state for confidential IOMMUs
iommu: Park TDISP T=0 devices in the blocking domain iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Probe a guest-level Realm VSMMU via RSI commands
drivers/iommu/Makefile | 3 + drivers/iommu/iommu-priv.h | 19 ++++ include/linux/arm-rsi-cmds.h | 29 ++++++ include/linux/arm-smccc-rsi.h | 20 ++++ include/linux/device.h | 4 + include/linux/dma-direct.h | 7 +- include/linux/dma-mapping.h | 4 + include/linux/iommu.h | 14 +++ drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu-v3/arm-smmu-v3.c | 64 +++++++++++- drivers/iommu/iommu-cc.c | 63 ++++++++++++ drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 104 +++++++++++++++++++- kernel/dma/direct.c | 21 ++-- kernel/dma/mapping.c | 23 ++++- kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 2 +- 14 files changed, 357 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/iommu/iommu-cc.c
base-commit: 6628e7d4c6b25c8d18f1345e3a20d21829aae7e4
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v3 1/7 firmware: arm_rmm: Add VSMMU commands and fields
DEN0137 2.0-bet3 adds the RSI_VSMMU_GET_INFO command and replaces the old RSI_VSMMU_ACTIVATE command with RSI_ARCH_DEV_ACTIVATE.
Add the command IDs, return codes, SMMUv3 device type, and helpers for both commands.
--- include/linux/arm-rsi-cmds.h | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/arm-smccc-rsi.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
include/linux/arm-rsi-cmds.h +29 -0
@@ -236,4 +236,33 @@ static inline unsigned long rsi_attestation_token_continue(phys_addr_t granule, return res.a0; } +static inline unsigned long rsi_vsmmu_get_info (phys_addr_t addr, +phys_addr_t *top) +{ +struct arm_smccc_1_2_regs regs = { + .a0 =SMC_RSI_VSMMU_GET_INFO , + .a1 = addr, + }; + +arm_smccc_1_2_smc (®s, ®s); +if (regs.a0 ==RSI_SUCCESS && top) + *top = regs.a1; + +return regs.a0; +} + +static inline unsigned long rsi_arch_dev_activate (phys_addr_t base, +unsigned long dev_type) +{ +struct arm_smccc_1_2_regs regs = { + .a0 =SMC_RSI_ARCH_DEV_ACTIVATE , + .a1 = base, + .a2 = dev_type, + }; + +arm_smccc_1_2_smc (®s, ®s); + +return regs.a0; +} +#endif /* __LINUX_ARM_RSI_CMDS_H_ */
include/linux/arm-smccc-rsi.h +20 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@#define RSI_ERROR_STATE UL(2)#define RSI_INCOMPLETE UL(3)#define RSI_ERROR_UNKNOWN UL(4) +#define RSI_ERROR_DEVICE UL(5)#define SMC_RSI_FID (n) ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ ARM_SMCCC_SMC_64, \
@@ -190,4 +191,23 @@ struct realm_config {*/ #define SMC_RSI_HOST_CALL SMC_RSI_FID(0x199) +/* +* Get information about a VSMMU. +* +* arg1 == Base IPA of the VSMMU +* ret0 == Status / error +* ret1 == Top IPA of the VSMMU +*/ +#define SMC_RSI_VSMMU_GET_INFO SMC_RSI_FID(0x19A) + +#define RSI_ARCH_DEV_SMMUV3 UL(0) + +/* +* Activate an architectural device. +* +* arg1 == Base IPA of the architectural device +* arg2 == Architectural device type +* ret0 == Status / error +*/ +#define SMC_RSI_ARCH_DEV_ACTIVATE SMC_RSI_FID(0x19B)#endif /* __LINUX_ARM_SMCCC_RSI_H_ */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v3 2/7 dma-mapping: Let a device declare that it reaches private memory
In reply to Nicolin ChenDMA devices in a confidential guest can access only shared memory, or both private and shared memory. Some method outside the DMA API will confirm the device is able to access private memory through DMA.
Add DEV_FLAG_DMA_CC_PRIVATE and dma_set_cc_private(dev, bool).
The flag must be stable while any DMA mapping exists.
--- include/linux/device.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/dma-mapping.h | 4 ++++ kernel/dma/mapping.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
include/linux/device.h +4 -0
@@ -604,6 +604,8 @@ struct device_physical_location {* ancestor device. * @DEV_FLAG_OFFLINE_DISABLED: If set, the device is permanently online. * @DEV_FLAG_OFFLINE: Set after successful invocation of bus type's .offline(). +* @DEV_FLAG_DMA_CC_PRIVATE: The device is able to access private (encrypted) +* memory, no shared memory bouncing is required from the DMA API. * @DEV_FLAG_COUNT: Number of defined struct_device_flags. */ enum struct_device_flags {
@@ -617,6 +619,7 @@ enum struct_device_flags {DEV_FLAG_OF_NODE_REUSED =7 ,DEV_FLAG_OFFLINE_DISABLED =8 ,DEV_FLAG_OFFLINE =9 , +DEV_FLAG_DMA_CC_PRIVATE =10 , DEV_FLAG_COUNT };
@@ -834,6 +837,7 @@ __create_dev_flag_accessors(dma_coherent, DEV_FLAG_DMA_COHERENT);__create_dev_flag_accessors (of_node_reused,DEV_FLAG_OF_NODE_REUSED );__create_dev_flag_accessors (offline_disabled,DEV_FLAG_OFFLINE_DISABLED );__create_dev_flag_accessors (offline,DEV_FLAG_OFFLINE ); +__create_dev_flag_accessors (dma_cc_private,DEV_FLAG_DMA_CC_PRIVATE );#undef __create_dev_flag_accessors
include/linux/dma-mapping.h +4 -0
@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ void *dma_vmap_noncontiguous(struct device *dev, size_t size,void dma_vunmap_noncontiguous (struct device *dev,void *vaddr);int dma_mmap_noncontiguous (struct device *dev,struct vm_area_struct *vma,size_t size,struct sg_table *sgt); +void dma_set_cc_private (struct device *dev,bool private);#else /* CONFIG_HAS_DMA */ static inline dma_addr_t dma_map_page_attrs(struct device *dev, struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t size,
@@ -357,6 +358,9 @@ static inline int dma_mmap_noncontiguous(struct device *dev, {return -EINVAL ; } +static inline void dma_set_cc_private (struct device *dev,bool private) +{ +}#endif /* CONFIG_HAS_DMA */ #ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_DMA
kernel/dma/mapping.c +21 -0
@@ -501,6 +501,27 @@ static void dma_setup_need_sync(struct device *dev)static inline void dma_setup_need_sync (struct device *dev) { }#endif /* !CONFIG_DMA_NEED_SYNC */ +/** +* dma_set_cc_private - Set whether @dev can DMA to private memory +* @dev: device whose confidential-computing DMA access is being updated +* @private: whether the device can DMA to private memory +* +* Called when a device is known to be able to DMA to private memory. +* For architected CPU integrated devices their kernel drivers will +* self-accept using a driver specific validation. Other devices will +* have a userspace managed process. +* +* DMA mapping must not be active when this flag is changed. For CPU +* integrated devices the driver should self accept early during probe +* after validation. Other devices have this flag set automatically +* before probing. +*/ +void dma_set_cc_private (struct device *dev,bool private) +{ +dev_assign_dma_cc_private (dev, private); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (dma_set_cc_private); +/* * The whole dma_get_sgtable() idea is fundamentally unsafe - it seems * that the intention is to allow exporting memory allocated via the
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v3 3/7 dma-mapping: Keep DMA memory private for capable devices
In reply to Nicolin ChenArchitecture code can require devices to use unencrypted memory. This makes the DMA API use shared memory for coherent allocations and bounce streaming mappings through SWIOTLB.
A device marked with DEV_FLAG_DMA_CC_PRIVATE is able to reach the private memory directly. Add dma_require_unencrypted() that combines the new flag with force_dma_unencrypted(), and use it in the generic DMA code. Also use "unencrypted" in the local variables that hold its result, to avoid mixing the "unencrypted" and "decrypted" terms.
--- include/linux/dma-direct.h | 7 ++++++- kernel/dma/direct.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- kernel/dma/mapping.c | 2 +- kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
include/linux/dma-direct.h +6 -1
@@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ static inline bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) }#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ +static inline bool dma_require_unencrypted (struct device *dev) +{ +return !dev_dma_cc_private (dev) &&force_dma_unencrypted (dev); +} +static inline bool dma_capable (struct device *dev,dma_addr_t addr,size_t size,bool is_ram,unsigned long attrs) {
@@ -146,7 +151,7 @@ static inline bool dma_capable(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t addr, size_t size,* requires unencrypted DMA addresses. Treat it as not DMA-capable * so the caller can fall back to a suitable SWIOTLB pool. */ -if (!(attrs &DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED ) &&force_dma_unencrypted (dev)) +if (!(attrs &DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED ) &&dma_require_unencrypted (dev))return false; if (is_ram && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_DMA_ADDR_T_64BIT) &&
kernel/dma/direct.c +11 -10
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ static inline struct page *dma_direct_to_page(struct device *dev,u64 dma_direct_get_required_mask (struct device *dev) { -bool require_decrypted =force_dma_unencrypted (dev); +bool require_unencrypted =dma_require_unencrypted (dev);phys_addr_t phys = ((phys_addr_t )max_pfn <<PAGE_SHIFT ) -1 ; -u64 max_dma =phys_to_dma_direct (dev, phys, require_decrypted); +u64 max_dma =phys_to_dma_direct (dev, phys, require_unencrypted);return (1ULL << (fls64 (max_dma) -1 )) *2 -1 ; }
@@ -72,8 +72,9 @@ static gfp_t dma_direct_optimal_gfp_mask(struct device *dev, u64 *phys_limit)bool dma_coherent_ok (struct device *dev,phys_addr_t phys,size_t size) { -bool require_decrypted =force_dma_unencrypted (dev); -dma_addr_t dma_addr =phys_to_dma_direct (dev, phys, require_decrypted); +bool require_unencrypted =dma_require_unencrypted (dev); +dma_addr_t dma_addr =phys_to_dma_direct (dev, phys, + require_unencrypted);if (dma_addr ==DMA_MAPPING_ERROR )return false;
@@ -226,7 +227,7 @@ void *dma_direct_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,struct page *page;void *cpu_addr; -if (force_dma_unencrypted (dev)) +if (dma_require_unencrypted (dev)) attrs |= __DMA_ATTR_ALLOC_CC_SHARED;if (attrs & __DMA_ATTR_ALLOC_CC_SHARED) {
@@ -385,7 +386,7 @@ void dma_direct_free(struct device *dev, size_t size,* If the allocation used decrypted/shared backing pages, restore * the encryption state on free. */ -if (force_dma_unencrypted (dev)) +if (dma_require_unencrypted (dev)) attrs |= __DMA_ATTR_ALLOC_CC_SHARED;if (attrs & __DMA_ATTR_ALLOC_CC_SHARED)
@@ -452,7 +453,7 @@ struct page *dma_direct_alloc_pages(struct device *dev, size_t size,struct page *page;void *cpu_addr; -if (force_dma_unencrypted (dev)) +if (dma_require_unencrypted (dev)) attrs |= __DMA_ATTR_ALLOC_CC_SHARED;if ((attrs & __DMA_ATTR_ALLOC_CC_SHARED) &&dma_direct_use_pool (dev, gfp))
@@ -496,7 +497,7 @@ void dma_direct_free_pages(struct device *dev, size_t size,* if the device had requested for an unencrypted buffer, * convert it to encrypted on free */ -bool mark_mem_encrypted =force_dma_unencrypted (dev); +bool mark_mem_encrypted =dma_require_unencrypted (dev);/* If page is not from an atomic pool, dma_free_from_pool_page() fails */ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DMA_COHERENT_POOL) &&
@@ -665,7 +666,7 @@ int dma_direct_mmap(struct device *dev, struct vm_area_struct *vma,const pgoff_t pgoff_end =vma_end_pgoff (vma);int ret = -ENXIO ; -if (force_dma_unencrypted (dev)) +if (dma_require_unencrypted (dev)) attrs |=DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED ; vma->vm_page_prot =dma_pgprot (dev, vma->vm_page_prot, attrs);
@@ -814,7 +815,7 @@ size_t dma_direct_max_mapping_size(struct device *dev)/* If SWIOTLB is active, use its maximum mapping size */ if (is_swiotlb_active (dev) && (dma_addressing_limited (dev) ||is_swiotlb_force_bounce (dev) || -force_dma_unencrypted (dev))) +dma_require_unencrypted (dev)))return swiotlb_max_mapping_size (dev);return SIZE_MAX ;
kernel/dma/mapping.c +1 -1
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ void *dma_alloc_attrs(struct device *dev, size_t size, dma_addr_t *dma_handle,return NULL ; } -if (force_dma_unencrypted (dev)) +if (dma_require_unencrypted (dev)) attrs |= __DMA_ATTR_ALLOC_CC_SHARED;if (dma_alloc_from_dev_coherent (dev, size, dma_handle, &cpu_addr)) {
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c +1 -1
@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t orig_addr,if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT )) {/* swiotlb pool is incorrect for this device */ -if (unlikely (mem->cc_shared !=force_dma_unencrypted (dev))) +if (unlikely (mem->cc_shared !=dma_require_unencrypted (dev)))return (phys_addr_t )DMA_MAPPING_ERROR ; }else if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT )) {
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v3 4/7 iommu: Let a driver mark an IOMMU as confidential
In reply to Nicolin ChenAn IOMMU inside a confidential VM needs private memory for its queues and tables. Later changes also need to identify it when handling TDISP devices.
Add a confidential marker and a helper for IOMMU drivers. The helper also marks the IOMMU device as able to access private memory. Drivers must call it before iommu_device_register().
--- include/linux/iommu.h | 10 ++++++++++ drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
include/linux/iommu.h +10 -0
@@ -824,6 +824,8 @@ struct iommu_domain_ops {* @singleton_group: Used internally for drivers that have only one group * @max_pasids: number of supported PASIDs * @ready: set once iommu_device_register() has completed successfully +* @confidential: this instance runs inside a confidential VM. Set by the driver +* before any dma allocation. */ struct iommu_device {struct list_head list;
@@ -833,6 +835,7 @@ struct iommu_device {struct iommu_group *singleton_group;u32 max_pasids;bool ready; +bool confidential; };/**
@@ -892,6 +895,8 @@ struct dev_iommu {int iommu_device_register (struct iommu_device *iommu,const struct iommu_ops *ops,struct device *hwdev); +void iommu_device_set_confidential (struct iommu_device *iommu, +struct device *hwdev);void iommu_device_unregister (struct iommu_device *iommu); int iommu_device_sysfs_add(struct iommu_device *iommu, struct device *parent,
@@ -1423,6 +1428,11 @@ static inline int iommu_device_register(struct iommu_device *iommu,return -ENODEV ; } +static inline void iommu_device_set_confidential (struct iommu_device *iommu, +struct device *hwdev) +{ +} +static inline struct iommu_device *dev_to_iommu_device (struct device *dev) {return NULL ;
drivers/iommu/iommu.c +20 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/host1x_context_bus.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> #include <linux/iommu.h> #include <linux/iommufd.h> #include <linux/idr.h>
@@ -313,6 +314,25 @@ int iommu_device_register(struct iommu_device *iommu, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (iommu_device_register); +/** +* iommu_device_set_confidential - Mark an IOMMU instance as confidential +* @iommu: the IOMMU instance +* @hwdev: the struct device of @iommu, whose own DMA reaches private memory +* +* Declare that @iommu runs inside a confidential VM +* +* Call this before @iommu makes any DMA allocation of its own, and not merely +* before iommu_device_register(). Queues and tables allocated any earlier land +* in shared memory that the hypervisor can read. +*/ +void iommu_device_set_confidential (struct iommu_device *iommu, +struct device *hwdev) +{ + iommu->confidential = true; +dma_set_cc_private (hwdev, true); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (iommu_device_set_confidential); +void iommu_device_unregister (struct iommu_device *iommu) {for (int i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (iommu_buses); i++)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v3 5/7 iommu: Introduce TDISP T=0 state for confidential IOMMUs
In reply to Nicolin ChenTDISP devices have two independent DMA streams, T=1 and T=0. In several platforms these streams terminate into different IOMMU environments with different translation tables. For such platforms the IOMMU driver in Linux handles exactly one of the streams. Typically we expect the T=1 stream to be linked to the vIOMMU and the T=0 stream to simply be left as a no-iommu identity configuration.
As the HW has these two different DMA translation environments, the iommu subsystem must participate in switching between them. When the device uses T=0, its T=1 vIOMMU path should be left in BLOCKING to disable it, and a simplified "T=0 IDENTITY" mode is setup within the DMA API.
[device: T=0] ===> [hypervisor] ===> [memory]
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+-- (guest association) --> [confidential IOMMU: blocking DMA]Setting the vIOMMU to BLOCKING also gives up its control of ATS, which is now managed by the core code as part of simplified T=0 mode.
A PCI reset does not move a T=0 device out of the blocking domain. So the IOMMU driver does not disable ATS before the reset and does not enable it after. Instead, call the T=0 helpers from pci_dev_reset_iommu_prepare() and pci_dev_reset_iommu_done().
--- drivers/iommu/Makefile | 3 ++ drivers/iommu/iommu-priv.h | 19 ++++++++++++ include/linux/iommu.h | 4 +++ drivers/iommu/iommu-cc.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/iommu/iommu-cc.c
drivers/iommu/Makefile +3 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_RISCV_IOMMU) += riscv/ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_PT) += generic_pt/fmt/ obj-$(CONFIG_HYPERV) += hyperv/ obj-$(CONFIG_IOMMU_API) += iommu.o +ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM +obj-$(CONFIG_IOMMU_API) += iommu-cc.o +endif obj-$(CONFIG_IOMMU_SUPPORT) += iommu-pages.o obj-$(CONFIG_IOMMU_API) += iommu-traces.o obj-$(CONFIG_IOMMU_API) += iommu-sysfs.o
drivers/iommu/iommu-priv.h +19 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,25 @@#include <linux/iommu-debug-pagealloc.h> #include <linux/msi.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM +void iommu_tdisp_enter_t0 (struct device *dev); +void iommu_tdisp_exit_t0 (struct device *dev); +#else +static inline void iommu_tdisp_enter_t0 (struct device *dev) +{ +} + +static inline void iommu_tdisp_exit_t0 (struct device *dev) +{ +} +#endif + +static inline bool iommu_using_t0_stream (struct device *dev) +{ +return dev->iommu->iommu_dev->confidential && + !dev->iommu->tdisp_t1; +} +static inline const struct iommu_ops *dev_iommu_ops (struct device *dev) {/*
include/linux/iommu.h +4 -0
@@ -873,6 +873,9 @@ struct iommu_fault_param {* @max_pasids: number of PASIDs this device can consume * @attach_deferred: the dma domain attachment is deferred * @pci_32bit_workaround: Limit DMA allocations to 32-bit IOVAs +* @tdisp_t1: device uses its confidential IOMMU's T=1 stream. A zero value +* means T=0, where the T=1 stream remains blocked while the core +* owns required DMA operations such as ATS. * @require_direct: device requires IOMMU_RESV_DIRECT regions * @shadow_on_flush: IOTLB flushes are used to sync shadow tables *
@@ -888,6 +891,7 @@ struct dev_iommu {u32 max_pasids; u32 attach_deferred:1; u32 pci_32bit_workaround:1; + u32 tdisp_t1:1; u32 require_direct:1; u32 shadow_on_flush:1; };
drivers/iommu/iommu-cc.c new file +63 -0
63 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/iommu/iommu.c +28 -2
@@ -535,9 +535,17 @@ static int iommu_init_device(struct device *dev) } dev->iommu->iommu_dev = iommu_dev; +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (dev)) { +/* +* After probe the iommu has to leave the T=1 stream in BLOCKING, +* while the T=0 stream will go through the physical path. +*/ +iommu_tdisp_enter_t0 (dev); + } + ret =iommu_device_link (iommu_dev, dev);if (ret) - goto err_release; + goto err_tdisp_t0; group = ops->device_group (dev);if (WARN_ON_ONCE (group ==NULL ))
@@ -555,7 +563,9 @@ static int iommu_init_device(struct device *dev) err_unlink:iommu_device_unlink (iommu_dev, dev); -err_release: +err_tdisp_t0: +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (dev)) +iommu_tdisp_exit_t0 (dev);if (ops->release_device) ops->release_device (dev); err_module_put:
@@ -573,6 +583,9 @@ static void iommu_deinit_device(struct device *dev)lockdep_assert_held (&group->mutex); +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (dev)) +iommu_tdisp_exit_t0 (dev); +iommu_device_unlink (dev->iommu->iommu_dev, dev);/*
@@ -4087,6 +4100,15 @@ int pci_dev_reset_iommu_prepare(struct pci_dev *pdev) } } +/* +* A T=0 device stays in the blocking domain while the core keeps ATS on +* for it. So the attach above does not disable ATS. Disable it here, as +* the note above recommends. pci_dev_reset_iommu_done() will enable it +* again. +*/ +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (&pdev->dev)) +iommu_tdisp_exit_t0 (&pdev->dev); +/* * Update gdev->blocked upon the domain change, as it is used to return * the correct domain in iommu_driver_get_domain_for_dev() that might be
@@ -4213,6 +4235,10 @@ void pci_dev_reset_iommu_done(struct pci_dev *pdev) group->blocking_domain)); } +/* Enable ATS again for a T=0 device after the reset */ +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (&pdev->dev)) +iommu_tdisp_enter_t0 (&pdev->dev); +/* * Update gdev->blocked upon the domain change, as it is used to return * the correct domain in iommu_driver_get_domain_for_dev() that might be
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v3 6/7 iommu: Park TDISP T=0 devices in the blocking domain
In reply to Nicolin ChenA TDISP T=0 device stays associated with its guest T=1 vIOMMU, yet doesn't use that IOMMU for DMA translation. Instead, park its guest-visible stream in the driver's blocking domain.
Linux's model requires a device to either use T=0 or T=1. Aside from MSI, it cannot use T=0 for normal DMA once moved into T=1 mode, since the device will have IOVA's that are not valid in T=0.
Select the blocking domain before normal default-domain policy is applied.
Direct-map reserved regions are still fine, because the T=0 stream always goes to an identity mapping. Skip them here, as recording the request would only refuse the device its blocking domain.
Reject sysfs domain changes, driver-managed group attachment, and any PASID attachments that would install a translating domain. The state is uniform across each group because all devices on a confidential IOMMU start in T=0.
--- drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/iommu.c +51 -3
@@ -1238,6 +1238,14 @@ static int iommu_create_device_direct_mappings(struct iommu_domain *domain,unsigned long pg_size;int ret =0 ; +/* +* The direct-map reserved regions are still fine because the T=0 stream +* always goes to an identity mapping. Skip them: recording the request +* would only refuse the device its blocking domain. +*/ +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (dev)) +return 0 ; + pg_size = domain->pgsize_bitmap ?1UL <<__ffs (domain->pgsize_bitmap) :0 ;if (WARN_ON_ONCE (iommu_is_dma_domain (domain) && !pg_size))
@@ -1790,11 +1798,22 @@ __iommu_group_alloc_default_domain(struct iommu_group *group, int req_type)static struct iommu_domain *iommu_group_alloc_default_domain (struct iommu_group *group,int req_type) { -const struct iommu_ops *ops =dev_iommu_ops (iommu_group_first_dev (group)); +struct device *first =iommu_group_first_dev (group); +const struct iommu_ops *ops =dev_iommu_ops (first);struct iommu_domain *dom;lockdep_assert_held (&group->mutex); +/* +* When in T=0 mode the T=1 vIOMMU must always be set to BLOCKED to +* release control of ATS. +*/ +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (first)) { +if (!ops->blocked_domain) +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +return ops->blocked_domain; + } +/* * Allow legacy drivers to specify the domain that will be the default * domain. This should always be either an IDENTITY/BLOCKED/PLATFORM
@@ -2399,6 +2418,10 @@ static int __iommu_attach_group(struct iommu_domain *domain, !domain_iommu_ops_compatible(dev_iommu_ops(dev), domain)) return -EINVAL; +/* A domain cannot be attached while using the T=0 stream. */ +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (dev)) +return -EINVAL ; +return __iommu_group_set_domain (group, domain); }
@@ -3325,6 +3348,12 @@ static ssize_t iommu_group_store_type(struct iommu_group *group, goto out_unlock; } +/* Default domain changes are not allowed while using the T=0 stream. */ +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (iommu_group_first_dev (group))) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out_unlock; + } + ret =iommu_setup_default_domain (group, req_type);if (ret) goto out_unlock;
@@ -3690,6 +3719,12 @@ int iommu_attach_device_pasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, goto out_unlock; } +/* PASID cannot be used on the T=0 stream. */ +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (dev)) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out_unlock; + } +for_each_group_device (group, device) {/* * Skip PASID validation for devices without PASID support
@@ -3783,6 +3818,12 @@ int iommu_replace_device_pasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, goto out_unlock; } +/* PASID cannot be used on the T=0 stream. */ +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (dev)) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out_unlock; + } + entry =iommu_make_pasid_array_entry (domain, handle); curr =xa_cmpxchg (&group->pasid_array, pasid,NULL ,XA_ZERO_ENTRY ,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -4017,6 +4058,12 @@ int iommu_replace_group_handle(struct iommu_group *group,return -EINVAL ;mutex_lock (&group->mutex); +/* Like attach, replacement is not allowed when using the T=0 stream. */ +if (iommu_using_t0_stream (iommu_group_first_dev (group))) { + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto err_unlock; + } + entry =iommu_make_pasid_array_entry (new_domain, handle); ret =xa_reserve (&group->pasid_array,IOMMU_NO_PASID ,GFP_KERNEL );if (ret)
@@ -4294,8 +4341,9 @@ int iommu_dma_prepare_msi(struct msi_desc *desc, phys_addr_t msi_addr)return ret;mutex_lock (&group->mutex); -/* An IDENTITY domain must pass through */ -if (group->domain && group->domain->type !=IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY ) { +/* An IDENTITY domain or a T=0 device must pass through */ +if (group->domain && group->domain->type !=IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY && + !iommu_using_t0_stream (dev)) {switch (group->domain->cookie_type) {case IOMMU_COOKIE_DMA_MSI :case IOMMU_COOKIE_DMA_IOVA :
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v3 7/7 iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Probe a guest-level Realm VSMMU via RSI commands
In reply to Nicolin ChenIn CCA, the ACPI/etc doesn't tell the OS whether the SMMU is a confidential T=1 instance or a normal T=0 one. Instead, it has to be learned by issuing a trusted RSI. Before the kernel can operate the trusted T=1 IOMMU, it also has to validate all the information that it gets from ACPI against the true information that it gets from the RSI call, to ensure the ACPI is correct and prevent substitution attacks.
Use RSI_VSMMU_GET_INFO during probe and require the returned register range to match firmware. Then use RSI_ARCH_DEV_ACTIVATE before mapping registers.
Currently the driver doesn't support a T=0 SMMU inside a realm. For example it doesn't make the page table allocations into shared memory. If we are in a realm reject any SMMU that is not T=1.
Once the SMMU is activated, its DMA will follow the DEV_FLAG_DMA_CC_PRIVATE rules. It must set that flag to ensure its coherent allocations for its own structures are allocated from private memory, not the SWIOTLB shared pool.
Also skip Tegra241 CMDQV implementation in the realm world, since realm has the support only for a standard SMMU for now.
--- drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu-v3/arm-smmu-v3.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu-v3/arm-smmu-v3.c +62 -2
@@ -11,9 +11,11 @@#include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/acpi_iort.h> +#include <linux/arm-rsi-cmds.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/crash_dump.h> #include <linux/delay.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/io-pgtable.h>
@@ -5611,8 +5613,11 @@ static int acpi_smmu_iort_probe_model(struct acpi_iort_node *node,/* * Tegra241 implementation stores its SMMU options and impl_dev * in DSDT. Thus, go through the ACPI tables unconditionally. +* +* Realm doesn't support Tegra CMDQV yet. */ -acpi_smmu_dsdt_probe_tegra241_cmdqv (node, smmu); +if (!is_realm_world ()) +acpi_smmu_dsdt_probe_tegra241_cmdqv (node, smmu);break ; }
@@ -5676,7 +5681,9 @@ static int arm_smmu_device_dt_probe(struct platform_device *pdev, smmu->features |=ARM_SMMU_FEAT_COHERENCY ;if (of_device_is_compatible (dev->of_node,"nvidia,tegra264-smmu" )) { -tegra_cmdqv_dt_probe (dev->of_node, smmu); +/* Realm doesn't support Tegra CMDQV yet */ +if (!is_realm_world ()) +tegra_cmdqv_dt_probe (dev->of_node, smmu);static_branch_enable (&arm_smmu_erratum_repeat_tlbi_cfgi_key); }
@@ -5779,6 +5786,53 @@ static struct arm_smmu_device *arm_smmu_impl_probe(struct arm_smmu_device *smmu)return ERR_PTR (ret); } +static void arm_smmu_clear_realm_private (void *dev) +{ +dma_set_cc_private (dev, false); +} + +static int arm_smmu_probe_realm_vsmmu (struct arm_smmu_device *smmu, +const struct resource *res) +{ +struct device *dev = smmu->dev; +unsigned long rsi_ret; +phys_addr_t top; + +/* +* Currently the driver does not support a T=0 SMMU inside a realm. For +* instance it does not make the page table allocations into shared +* memory. If we are in a realm reject any SMMU that is not T=1. +*/ + rsi_ret =rsi_vsmmu_get_info (res->start, &top); +if (rsi_ret !=RSI_SUCCESS ) { +dev_err (dev,"RSI_VSMMU_GET_INFO failed for %pr: %lu\n" , res, + rsi_ret); +return -ENODEV ; + } + +if (top != res->end +1 ) { +dev_err (dev,"VSMMU range %pr ends at %pa\n" , res, &top); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + rsi_ret =rsi_arch_dev_activate (res->start,RSI_ARCH_DEV_SMMUV3 ); +if (rsi_ret !=RSI_SUCCESS ) { +dev_err (dev,"RSI_ARCH_DEV_ACTIVATE failed for %pr: %lu\n" , res, + rsi_ret); +return -EIO ; + } + +/* +* Once activated, the SMMU DMA follows DEV_FLAG_DMA_CC_PRIVATE so its +* queues and tables are allocated from private memory, not the SWIOTLB +* shared pool. It only translates for a device we've requested the RMM +* to put into T=1. +*/ +iommu_device_set_confidential (&smmu->iommu, dev); + +return devm_add_action_or_reset (dev, arm_smmu_clear_realm_private, dev); +} +static int arm_smmu_device_probe (struct platform_device *pdev) {int irq, ret;
@@ -5814,6 +5868,12 @@ static int arm_smmu_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } ioaddr = res->start; +if (is_realm_world ()) { + ret =arm_smmu_probe_realm_vsmmu (smmu, res); +if (ret) +return ret; + } +/* * Don't map the IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED regions, since they may contain * the PMCG registers which are reserved by the PMU driver.
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0