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libselinux: mount selinuxfs nodev,noexec,nosuid

PATCH Superseded Topi Miettinen 4 participants 6 messages Mar 28, 2020 – Apr 27, 2020 SELinux security module

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 libselinux: mount selinuxfs nodev,noexec,nosuid

Mount selinuxfs with mount flags nodev,noexec and nosuid. It's not likely that this has any effect, but it's visually more pleasing.

---
 libselinux/src/load_policy.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
libselinux/src/load_policy.c +1 -1
index fa1a3bf1..3e4020a9 100644
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce)
        const char *mntpoint = NULL;
        /* First make sure /sys is mounted */
        if (mount("sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", 0, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) {
-               if (mount(SELINUXFS, SELINUXMNT, SELINUXFS, 0, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) {
+               if (mount(SELINUXFS, SELINUXMNT, SELINUXFS, MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOSUID, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) {
                        mntpoint = SELINUXMNT;
                } else {
                        /* check old mountpoint */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Topi Miettinen

Mount selinuxfs with mount flags nodev,noexec and nosuid. It's not likely that this has any effect, but it's visually more pleasing.

will nodev interfere with this?

File: /sys/fs/selinux/null
Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 4096 character special file
Device: 15h/21d Inode: 23 Links: 1 Device type: 1,3
Access: (0666/crw-rw-rw-) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
Context: sys.id:sys.role:null.isid:s0
Access: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Modify: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Change: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Birth: -

/sys/fs/selinux/null: character special (1/3)

Quoted 21 lines
---
 libselinux/src/load_policy.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
libselinux/src/load_policy.c +1 -1
index fa1a3bf1..3e4020a9 100644
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce)
        const char *mntpoint = NULL;
        /* First make sure /sys is mounted */
        if (mount("sysfs", "/sys", "sysfs", 0, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) {
-               if (mount(SELINUXFS, SELINUXMNT, SELINUXFS, 0, 0) == 0
 || errno == EBUSY) {
+               if (mount(SELINUXFS, SELINUXMNT, SELINUXFS, MS_NODEV |
 MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOSUID, 0) == 0 || errno == EBUSY) {
                        mntpoint = SELINUXMNT;
                } else {
                        /* check old mountpoint */
Signature · 3 lines
Key fingerprint = FCD2 3660 5D6B 9D27 7FC6  E0FF DA7E 521F 10F6 4098
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Dominick Grift
#2 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 2 lines · Topi Miettinen

Mount selinuxfs with mount flags nodev,noexec and nosuid. It's not likely that this has any effect, but it's visually more pleasing.

will nodev interfere with this?

File: /sys/fs/selinux/null
Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 4096 character special file
Device: 15h/21d Inode: 23 Links: 1 Device type: 1,3
Access: (0666/crw-rw-rw-) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
Context: sys.id:sys.role:null.isid:s0
Access: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Modify: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Change: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Birth: -

Quoted 1 line

/sys/fs/selinux/null: character special (1/3)

That device does not give me joy. Yes, the patch prevents it from being used. But I didn't see any problems in the logs, even with something else mounted over it (adding InaccessiblePaths=/sys/fs/selinux/null to systemd unit files). The device file was added pretty early to Linux, perhaps it was needed then, but not anymore?

Judging from internet searches, maybe it's only used by Android. They seem to use a forked version of libselinux anyway.

-Topi

#3 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 17 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 2 lines · Topi Miettinen

Mount selinuxfs with mount flags nodev,noexec and nosuid. It's not likely that this has any effect, but it's visually more pleasing.

will nodev interfere with this?

File: /sys/fs/selinux/null
Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 4096 character special file
Device: 15h/21d Inode: 23 Links: 1 Device type: 1,3
Access: (0666/crw-rw-rw-) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
Context: sys.id:sys.role:null.isid:s0
Access: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Modify: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Change: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Birth: -

Quoted 1 line

/sys/fs/selinux/null: character special (1/3)

Quoted 8 lines

That device does not give me joy. Yes, the patch prevents it from being used. But I didn't see any problems in the logs, even with something else mounted over it (adding InaccessiblePaths=/sys/fs/selinux/null to systemd unit files). The device file was added pretty early to Linux, perhaps it was needed then, but not anymore?

Judging from internet searches, maybe it's only used by Android. They seem to use a forked version of libselinux anyway.

/sys/fs/selinux/null is used by the kernel; SELinux closes any open file descriptors not authorized for the new process context upon a context-changing exec, and replaces them with a reference to /sys/fs/selinux/null. This was introduced because /dev/null couldn't be guaranteed to exist or be available at all times. nodev likely has no effect on this usage because it is probably only checked when a userspace process tries to open it.

That said, I don't really understand what you think you are gaining by adding these mount options to selinuxfs. What threat are you
mitigating? It is a kernel pseudo filesystem that doesn't support
dynamic file creation by userspace and whose contents are entirely determined by the kernel.

#4 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 21 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 17 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 2 lines · Topi Miettinen

Mount selinuxfs with mount flags nodev,noexec and nosuid. It's not likely that this has any effect, but it's visually more pleasing.

will nodev interfere with this?

File: /sys/fs/selinux/null
Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 4096 character special file
Device: 15h/21d Inode: 23 Links: 1 Device type: 1,3
Access: (0666/crw-rw-rw-) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
Context: sys.id:sys.role:null.isid:s0
Access: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Modify: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Change: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Birth: -

Quoted 1 line

/sys/fs/selinux/null: character special (1/3)

Quoted 8 lines

That device does not give me joy. Yes, the patch prevents it from being used. But I didn't see any problems in the logs, even with something else mounted over it (adding InaccessiblePaths=/sys/fs/selinux/null to systemd unit files). The device file was added pretty early to Linux, perhaps it was needed then, but not anymore?

Judging from internet searches, maybe it's only used by Android. They seem to use a forked version of libselinux anyway.

Quoted 7 lines

/sys/fs/selinux/null is used by the kernel; SELinux closes any open file descriptors not authorized for the new process context upon a context-changing exec, and replaces them with a reference to /sys/fs/selinux/null. This was introduced because /dev/null couldn't be guaranteed to exist or be available at all times. nodev likely has no effect on this usage because it is probably only checked when a userspace process tries to open it.

Perhaps then the device should not be visible to user space at all, or at least not usable (which is the effect of MS_NODEV)? The file descriptor replacement thing seems to work also when /sys{,/fs/selinux} is not mounted in the mount namespace of the process, at least I haven't seen any problems.

Quoted 5 lines

That said, I don't really understand what you think you are gaining by adding these mount options to selinuxfs. What threat are you
mitigating? It is a kernel pseudo filesystem that doesn't support
dynamic file creation by userspace and whose contents are entirely determined by the kernel.

I don't think there's any change to threat situation (a process which shouldn't have access to /dev/null, gains access by using /sys/fs/selinux/null? Not very credible) or even any other effect from this change, but I don't like it when selinuxfs always shows up when I grep for filesystems without nodev/noexec/nosuid. So the gain is visual.

What's the purpose and gain of having the filesystem mounted with dev,exec,suid, which for other filesystems than selinuxfs are the more dangerous options?

-Topi

maintainer
#5 lore raw
Quoted 59 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 31 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 21 lines · Topi Miettinen
Quoted 17 lines · Dominick Grift
Quoted 2 lines · Topi Miettinen

Mount selinuxfs with mount flags nodev,noexec and nosuid. It's not likely that this has any effect, but it's visually more pleasing.

will nodev interfere with this?

File: /sys/fs/selinux/null
Size: 0 Blocks: 0 IO Block: 4096 character special file
Device: 15h/21d Inode: 23 Links: 1 Device type: 1,3
Access: (0666/crw-rw-rw-) Uid: ( 0/ root) Gid: ( 0/ root)
Context: sys.id:sys.role:null.isid:s0
Access: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Modify: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Change: 2020-03-28 13:04:05.578999988 +0100
Birth: -

Quoted 1 line

/sys/fs/selinux/null: character special (1/3)

Quoted 8 lines

That device does not give me joy. Yes, the patch prevents it from being used. But I didn't see any problems in the logs, even with something else mounted over it (adding InaccessiblePaths=/sys/fs/selinux/null to systemd unit files). The device file was added pretty early to Linux, perhaps it was needed then, but not anymore?

Judging from internet searches, maybe it's only used by Android. They seem to use a forked version of libselinux anyway.

Quoted 7 lines

/sys/fs/selinux/null is used by the kernel; SELinux closes any open file descriptors not authorized for the new process context upon a context-changing exec, and replaces them with a reference to /sys/fs/selinux/null. This was introduced because /dev/null couldn't be guaranteed to exist or be available at all times. nodev likely has no effect on this usage because it is probably only checked when a userspace process tries to open it.

Perhaps then the device should not be visible to user space at all, or at least not usable (which is the effect of MS_NODEV)? The file descriptor replacement thing seems to work also when /sys{,/fs/selinux} is not mounted in the mount namespace of the process, at least I haven't seen any problems.

Quoted 5 lines

That said, I don't really understand what you think you are gaining by adding these mount options to selinuxfs. What threat are you
mitigating? It is a kernel pseudo filesystem that doesn't support
dynamic file creation by userspace and whose contents are entirely determined by the kernel.

I don't think there's any change to threat situation (a process which shouldn't have access to /dev/null, gains access by using /sys/fs/selinux/null? Not very credible) or even any other effect from this change, but I don't like it when selinuxfs always shows up when I grep for filesystems without nodev/noexec/nosuid. So the gain is visual.

Quoted 3 lines

What's the purpose and gain of having the filesystem mounted with dev,exec,suid, which for other filesystems than selinuxfs are the more dangerous options?

I don't think we can switch to nodev since we have been exposing that null device node forever and
we know of at least one user (Android). Android started with a complete fork of libselinux but went
back to following upstream, although they still retain their own custom additions. So I think at most we
could add noexec/nosuid here with no risk of userspace breakage.