compute_creds race (fixed patch)
Subsystems (5)
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
My previous patch broke LSM. Here's a fixed version, which also moves makes the
various bprm_apply_creds implementations a little more readable. SELinux
compiles, but I haven't tested it. I'd be surprised if it broke, but it may have a similar race.
fs/exec.c | 31 +------------------------------ include/linux/security.h | 18 +++++++++--------- security/capability.c | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- security/dummy.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++---- 6 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c renamed from fs/exec.c.orig +1 -30
@@ -869,15 +869,6 @@EXPORT_SYMBOL (flush_old_exec); -/* -* We mustn't allow tracing of suid binaries, unless -* the tracer has the capability to trace anything.. -*/ -static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct * p) -{ -return (p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) && !(p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP ); -} -/* * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. * Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes
@@ -944,27 +935,7 @@void compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { -task_lock (current); -if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; - -if (must_not_trace_exec (current) - ||atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (¤t->files->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) >1 ) { -if (!capable (CAP_SETUID )) { - bprm->e_uid = current->uid; - bprm->e_gid = current->gid; - } - } - } - - current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; - current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; - -task_unlock (current); - -security_bprm_compute_creds (bprm); +security_bprm_apply_creds (bprm); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (compute_creds);
security/selinux/hooks.c renamed from security/selinux/hooks.c.orig +4 -4
@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@spin_unlock (&files->file_lock); } -static void selinux_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {struct task_security_struct *tsec, *psec;struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
@@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;int rc, i; - secondary_ops->bprm_compute_creds (bprm); + secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds (bprm); tsec = current->security;
@@ -2561,7 +2561,7 @@/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit -upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_compute_creds. */ +upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)return task_has_perm (current, current,PROCESS__SETRLIMIT );
@@ -3972,7 +3972,7 @@ .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security, .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security, - .bprm_compute_creds = selinux_bprm_compute_creds, + .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds, .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security, .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security, .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c.orig +24 -14
@@ -115,13 +115,15 @@return 0 ; } -/* Copied from fs/exec.c */ static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) { -return (p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) && !(p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP ); +return ((p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) && !(p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP )) + ||atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) >1 + ||atomic_read (¤t->files->count) >1 + ||atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) >1 ; } -void cap_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {/* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */ kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
@@ -132,18 +134,26 @@ new_permitted =cap_combine (new_permitted, working);task_lock (current); + +if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { + current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + +if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETUID )) { + bprm->e_uid = current->uid; + bprm->e_gid = current->gid; + } + } + + current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; +if (!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { current->mm->dumpable =0 ; -if (must_not_trace_exec (current) - ||atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (¤t->files->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) >1 ) { -if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP )) { - new_permitted =cap_intersect (new_permitted, - current-> - cap_permitted); - } +if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETPCAP )) { + new_permitted =cap_intersect (new_permitted, + current-> + cap_permitted); } }
@@ -315,7 +325,7 @@vm_acct_memory (pages); -/* +/* * Sometimes we want to use more memory than we have */ if (sysctl_overcommit_memory ==1 )
@@ -377,7 +387,7 @@EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_capset_check);EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_capset_set);EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_bprm_set_security); -EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_bprm_compute_creds); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_bprm_apply_creds);EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_bprm_secureexec);EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_inode_setxattr);EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_inode_removexattr);
security/dummy.c renamed from security/dummy.c.orig +27 -4
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@#include <net/sock.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/file.h> static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent,struct task_struct *child) {
@@ -116,7 +118,7 @@vm_acct_memory (pages); -/* +/* * Sometimes we want to use more memory than we have */ if (sysctl_overcommit_memory ==1 )
@@ -169,9 +171,30 @@return ; } -static void dummy_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) { -return ; +return ((p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) && !(p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP )) + ||atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) >1 + ||atomic_read (¤t->files->count) >1 + ||atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) >1 ; +} + +static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ +task_lock (current); +if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { + current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + +if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETUID )) { + bprm->e_uid = current->uid; + bprm->e_gid = current->gid; + } + } + + current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + +task_unlock (current); }static int dummy_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -887,7 +910,7 @@set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, vm_enough_memory);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_alloc_security);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_free_security); -set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_compute_creds); +set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_apply_creds);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_set_security);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_check_security);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_secureexec);
security/capability.c renamed from security/capability.c.orig +1 -1
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send, .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv, - .bprm_compute_creds = cap_bprm_compute_creds, + .bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds, .bprm_set_security = cap_bprm_set_security, .bprm_secureexec = cap_bprm_secureexec,
include/linux/security.h renamed from include/linux/security.h.orig +0 -0
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ extern int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t
*effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t
*effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-extern void cap_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm); +extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value,size_t size, int flags);
extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
* @bprm_free_security:
* @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure to be modified.
* Deallocate and clear the @bprm->security field.
- * @bprm_compute_creds:
+ * @bprm_apply_creds:
* Compute and set the security attributes of a process being transformed
* by an execve operation based on the old attributes (current->security)
* and the information saved in @bprm->security by the set_security hook.
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
* @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
* @bprm_set_security:
* Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based
- * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the compute_creds
+ * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds
* hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
* transitions between security domains).
* This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@
* Check permission before allowing the @parent process to trace the
* @child process.
* Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
- * during an execve in the set_security or compute_creds hooks of
+ * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of
* binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security
* attributes would be changed by the execve.
* @parent contains the task_struct structure for parent process.
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@
int (*bprm_alloc_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); void (*bprm_free_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);
- void (*bprm_compute_creds) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);
+ void (*bprm_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);
int (*bprm_set_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); int (*bprm_secureexec) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);
@@ -1290,9 +1290,9 @@
{
security_ops->bprm_free_security (bprm);
}
-static inline void security_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- security_ops->bprm_compute_creds (bprm);
+ security_ops->bprm_apply_creds (bprm);
}
static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {
@@ -1962,9 +1962,9 @@
static inline void security_bprm_free (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { }
-static inline void security_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- cap_bprm_compute_creds (bprm);
+ cap_bprm_apply_creds (bprm);
}
static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
Quoted 2 lines · Andy Lutomirski
User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 0.5 (Windows/20040207)
uh-oh.
Quoted 1 line
My previous patch broke LSM. Here's a fixed version,
patching file fs/exec.c
Hunk #1 FAILED at 869.
Hunk #2 FAILED at 935.
2 out of 2 hunks FAILED -- saving rejects to file fs/exec.c.rej
patching file security/selinux/hooks.c
Hunk #1 FAILED at 1746.
Hunk #2 succeeded at 1755 with fuzz 2 (offset -1 lines).
Hunk #3 FAILED at 2560.
Hunk #4 FAILED at 3971.
3 out of 4 hunks FAILED -- saving rejects to file security/selinux/hooks.c.rej
patching file security/commoncap.c
Hunk #1 FAILED at 115.
Hunk #2 FAILED at 134.
Hunk #3 FAILED at 325.
Hunk #4 FAILED at 387.
4 out of 4 hunks FAILED -- saving rejects to file security/commoncap.c.rej
patching file security/dummy.c
Hunk #1 FAILED at 26.
Hunk #2 FAILED at 118.
Hunk #3 FAILED at 171.
Hunk #4 FAILED at 910.
4 out of 4 hunks FAILED -- saving rejects to file security/dummy.c.rej
patching file security/capability.c
Hunk #1 FAILED at 35.
1 out of 1 hunk FAILED -- saving rejects to file security/capability.c.rej
patching file include/linux/security.h
patch: **** malformed patch at line 289: *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
Please resend as an attachment. These fancypants mailers just can't keep their sticky paws off plain text.
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 2 lines · Andy Lutomirski
User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 0.5 (Windows/20040207)
uh-oh.
caught me. I swear it's worked before. This one better work, though.
fs/exec.c | 31 +------------------------------ include/linux/security.h | 18 +++++++++--------- security/capability.c | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- security/dummy.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++---- 6 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c renamed from fs/exec.c.orig +1 -30
@@ -869,15 +869,6 @@EXPORT_SYMBOL (flush_old_exec); -/* -* We mustn't allow tracing of suid binaries, unless -* the tracer has the capability to trace anything.. -*/ -static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct * p) -{ -return (p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) && !(p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP ); -} -/* * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. * Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes
@@ -944,27 +935,7 @@void compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { -task_lock (current); -if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; - -if (must_not_trace_exec (current) - ||atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (¤t->files->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) >1 ) { -if (!capable (CAP_SETUID )) { - bprm->e_uid = current->uid; - bprm->e_gid = current->gid; - } - } - } - - current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; - current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; - -task_unlock (current); - -security_bprm_compute_creds (bprm); +security_bprm_apply_creds (bprm); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (compute_creds);
security/selinux/hooks.c renamed from security/selinux/hooks.c.orig +4 -4
@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@spin_unlock (&files->file_lock); } -static void selinux_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {struct task_security_struct *tsec, *psec;struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
@@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;int rc, i; - secondary_ops->bprm_compute_creds (bprm); + secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds (bprm); tsec = current->security;
@@ -2561,7 +2561,7 @@/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit -upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_compute_creds. */ +upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)return task_has_perm (current, current,PROCESS__SETRLIMIT );
@@ -3972,7 +3972,7 @@ .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security, .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security, - .bprm_compute_creds = selinux_bprm_compute_creds, + .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds, .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security, .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security, .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c.orig +24 -14
@@ -115,13 +115,15 @@return 0 ; } -/* Copied from fs/exec.c */ static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) { -return (p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) && !(p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP ); +return ((p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) && !(p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP )) + ||atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) >1 + ||atomic_read (¤t->files->count) >1 + ||atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) >1 ; } -void cap_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {/* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */ kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
@@ -132,18 +134,26 @@ new_permitted =cap_combine (new_permitted, working);task_lock (current); + +if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { + current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + +if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETUID )) { + bprm->e_uid = current->uid; + bprm->e_gid = current->gid; + } + } + + current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; +if (!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { current->mm->dumpable =0 ; -if (must_not_trace_exec (current) - ||atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (¤t->files->count) >1 - ||atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) >1 ) { -if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP )) { - new_permitted =cap_intersect (new_permitted, - current-> - cap_permitted); - } +if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETPCAP )) { + new_permitted =cap_intersect (new_permitted, + current-> + cap_permitted); } }
@@ -315,7 +325,7 @@vm_acct_memory (pages); -/* +/* * Sometimes we want to use more memory than we have */ if (sysctl_overcommit_memory ==1 )
@@ -377,7 +387,7 @@EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_capset_check);EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_capset_set);EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_bprm_set_security); -EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_bprm_compute_creds); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_bprm_apply_creds);EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_bprm_secureexec);EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_inode_setxattr);EXPORT_SYMBOL (cap_inode_removexattr);
security/dummy.c renamed from security/dummy.c.orig +27 -4
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@#include <net/sock.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/file.h> static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent,struct task_struct *child) {
@@ -116,7 +118,7 @@vm_acct_memory (pages); -/* +/* * Sometimes we want to use more memory than we have */ if (sysctl_overcommit_memory ==1 )
@@ -169,9 +171,30 @@return ; } -static void dummy_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p) { -return ; +return ((p->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ) && !(p->ptrace &PT_PTRACE_CAP )) + ||atomic_read (¤t->fs->count) >1 + ||atomic_read (¤t->files->count) >1 + ||atomic_read (¤t->sighand->count) >1 ; +} + +static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ +task_lock (current); +if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { + current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + +if (must_not_trace_exec (current) && !capable (CAP_SETUID )) { + bprm->e_uid = current->uid; + bprm->e_gid = current->gid; + } + } + + current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + +task_unlock (current); }static int dummy_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -887,7 +910,7 @@set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, vm_enough_memory);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_alloc_security);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_free_security); -set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_compute_creds); +set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_apply_creds);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_set_security);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_check_security);set_to_dummy_if_null (ops, bprm_secureexec);
security/capability.c renamed from security/capability.c.orig +1 -1
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send, .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv, - .bprm_compute_creds = cap_bprm_compute_creds, + .bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds, .bprm_set_security = cap_bprm_set_security, .bprm_secureexec = cap_bprm_secureexec,
include/linux/security.h renamed from include/linux/security.h.orig +9 -9
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@extern int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target,kernel_cap_t *effective,kernel_cap_t *inheritable,kernel_cap_t *permitted);extern void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target,kernel_cap_t *effective,kernel_cap_t *inheritable,kernel_cap_t *permitted);extern int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern void cap_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm); +extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm);extern int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm);extern int cap_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags);extern int cap_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *name);
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@* @bprm_free_security: * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure to be modified. * Deallocate and clear the @bprm->security field. -* @bprm_compute_creds: +* @bprm_apply_creds: * Compute and set the security attributes of a process being transformed * by an execve operation based on the old attributes (current->security) * and the information saved in @bprm->security by the set_security hook.
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@* @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * @bprm_set_security: * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based -* on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the compute_creds +* on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds * hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for * transitions between security domains). * This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@* Check permission before allowing the @parent process to trace the * @child process. * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check -* during an execve in the set_security or compute_creds hooks of +* during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of * binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security * attributes would be changed by the execve. * @parent contains the task_struct structure for parent process.
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@int (*bprm_alloc_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);void (*bprm_free_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); -void (*bprm_compute_creds) (struct linux_binprm * bprm); +void (*bprm_apply_creds) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);int (*bprm_set_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);int (*bprm_secureexec) (struct linux_binprm * bprm);
@@ -1290,9 +1290,9 @@ { security_ops->bprm_free_security (bprm); } -static inline void security_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - security_ops->bprm_compute_creds (bprm); + security_ops->bprm_apply_creds (bprm); }static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {
@@ -1962,9 +1962,9 @@static inline void security_bprm_free (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { } -static inline void security_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline void security_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm) { -cap_bprm_compute_creds (bprm); +cap_bprm_apply_creds (bprm); }static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm)