signed kernel modules?
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Quoted 10 lines · Richard B. Johnson
One can make a 'certified' kernel with 'certified' modules for some hush-hush project. Adding this kind of junk isn't how it's done. You just take your favorite kernel with the modules you require, you verify that it meets your security requirements, then you CRC the kernel and its modules. You keep the CRCs somewhere safe, available from a read-only source like a CD/ROM or a network file-server. You automatically check these CRCs occasionally using a read-only program on read-only source like the network or a CD/ROM. If the checks fail, you call the "super" and shut down the system.
If a malicious module loads, you lose instantly. You cannot relaibly check module integrity on this system anymore. E.g. the malicious module might patch the module checker to check a signed module instead of the malicious one. Or the Exploit saves the old module, puts in the patched one, loads it and puts the old one back in place.
Therefore you have to check on loading the module, independent from the program loading the module. (Or you'd have to check the program loading the module and provide a reliable way to prevent any race condition, which would be much harder.)
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Quoted 13 lines · Bodo Eggert
Quoted 10 lines · Richard B. Johnson
One can make a 'certified' kernel with 'certified' modules for some hush-hush project. Adding this kind of junk isn't how it's done. You just take your favorite kernel with the modules you require, you verify that it meets your security requirements, then you CRC the kernel and its modules. You keep the CRCs somewhere safe, available from a read-only source like a CD/ROM or a network file-server. You automatically check these CRCs occasionally using a read-only program on read-only source like the network or a CD/ROM. If the checks fail, you call the "super" and shut down the system.
Quoted 6 lines
If a malicious module loads, you lose instantly. You cannot relaibly check module integrity on this system anymore. E.g. the malicious module might patch the module checker to check a signed module instead of the malicious one. Or the Exploit saves the old module, puts in the patched one, loads it and puts the old one back in place.
What malicious module? They have all been certified. That ARE NO OTHER modules. If you don't do it this way, i.e., if you allow anybody to load a module, then you have no security, regardless of what's in the module, the loader, or the kernel. Any crap inside either of these is crap. Then can all be modified to do anything so gigibytes of "protective" software is absouye bullshit, and a lot of memory wasted.
Cheers,
Dick Johnson
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Quoted 10 lines · Bodo Eggert
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines · Richard B. Johnson
One can make a 'certified' kernel with 'certified' modules for some hush-hush project. Adding this kind of junk isn't how it's done. You just take your favorite kernel with the modules you require, you verify that it meets your security requirements, then you CRC the kernel and its modules. You keep the CRCs somewhere safe, available from a read-only source like a CD/ROM or a network file-server.
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Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 1 line
If a malicious module loads, you lose instantly. You cannot relaibly
check
Quoted 2 lines
module integrity on this system anymore. E.g. the malicious module might patch the module checker to check a signed module instead of the
malicious
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one. Or the Exploit saves the old module, puts in the patched one, loads
it
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and puts the old one back in place.
What malicious module? They have all been certified. That ARE NO OTHER modules.
At least until an attacker uploads a malicious module or modifies one of the (untill then) certified modules. (He can, because your kernel doesn't check them while loading.)
Quoted 6 lines
If you don't do it this way, i.e., if you allow
anybody to load a module, then you have no security, regardless of what's in the module, the loader, or the kernel. Any crap inside either of these is crap. Then can all be modified to do anything so gigibytes of "protective" software is absouye bullshit, and a lot of memory wasted.
If your box is r00ted, you'll want to notice this fact and do something against it. If you don't prevent loading malicious modules, the attacker can hide his presence and use your system right under your eyes, and you won't notice (even while checking the checksumes).
Signing modules is (off cause) just one step, the next one(s) would be to prevent all other modifications to the kernel memory.
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