Bluetooth: hci_sync: Protect IRK identity reads with RCU
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 Bluetooth: hci_sync: Protect IRK identity reads with RCU
hci_le_set_privacy_mode_sync() needs the IRK returned by hci_find_irk_by_addr() to remain allocated until its identity address and type have been copied into the command. The finder drops its RCU read lock before returning this borrowed pointer, leaving the later field reads unprotected.
When a privacy-capable controller has a pending peer with address resolution and device privacy enabled, accept-list programming can reach this helper while management reloads the IRKs. The request worker holds hdev->req_lock, whereas load_irks() takes hdev->lock, allowing the following ordering:
Request worker Management / RCU reclaim
hci_le_set_privacy_mode_sync()
hci_find_irk_by_addr()
rcu_read_lock()
find matching IRK
rcu_read_unlock()
return borrowed IRK
load_irks()
hci_dev_lock(hdev)
hci_smp_irks_clear()
list_del_rcu()
kfree_rcu()
hci_dev_unlock(hdev)
RCU grace period and IRK free
read irk->addr_type
copy irk->bdaddrThe request then accesses a freed IRK. KASAN reports a one-byte use-after-free read of addr_type on this path.
Keep an outer RCU read-side critical section across the lookup and both identity-field copies. The finder's nested unlock then leaves the IRK protected until the caller finishes copying it. Release RCU on a lookup miss and after copying the fields, before the synchronous HCI command can sleep.
KASAN report as below:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in
hci_le_add_accept_list_sync+0x90f/0x940
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810aa6072c by task kworker/u17:0/493
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? hci_le_add_accept_list_sync+0x90f/0x940
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20d/0x410
? hci_le_add_accept_list_sync+0x90f/0x940
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? hci_le_add_accept_list_sync+0x90f/0x940
hci_le_add_accept_list_sync+0x90f/0x940
? __pfx_hci_le_add_accept_list_sync+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? conn_params_copy+0x3a0/0x650
hci_passive_scan_sync+0x8c9/0x1e80
? __pfx_hci_passive_scan_sync+0x10/0x10
? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
? hci_lookup_le_connect+0x181/0x3c0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
? hci_update_passive_scan_sync+0x437/0x950
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_release+0xc8/0x280
hci_update_passive_scan_sync+0x461/0x950
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x1b3/0x450
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
process_one_work+0x908/0x19c0
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x34f/0x460
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __switch_to+0x74f/0xf80
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 507:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x251/0x610
hci_add_irk+0xb6/0x220
load_irks+0x5ef/0x7e0
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x128b/0x22e0
__sys_sendto+0x425/0x470
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe5/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 0:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
__rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0x65/0x2a0
rcu_free_sheaf+0x1f/0xe0
rcu_core+0x661/0x1d10
handle_softirqs+0x201/0x930
__irq_exit_rcu+0x110/0x1e0
irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810aa60700
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 44 bytes inside of
freed 64-byte region [ffff88810aa60700, ffff88810aa60740)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
pfn:0x10aa60
flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0200000000000000 ffff8881000428c0 dead000000000100
dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000000f5000000
0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88810aa60600: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88810aa60680: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88810aa60700: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88810aa60780: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88810aa60800: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint---
net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +7 -1
@@ -2554,13 +2554,19 @@ static int hci_le_set_privacy_mode_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev,if (!(params->flags &HCI_CONN_FLAG_DEVICE_PRIVACY ))return 0 ; +rcu_read_lock (); + irk =hci_find_irk_by_addr (hdev, ¶ms->addr, params->addr_type); -if (!irk) +if (!irk) { +rcu_read_unlock ();return 0 ; + }memset (&cp,0 ,sizeof (cp)); cp.bdaddr_type = irk->addr_type;bacpy (&cp.bdaddr, &irk->bdaddr); +rcu_read_unlock (); + cp.mode =HCI_DEVICE_PRIVACY ;/* Note: params->privacy_mode is not updated since it is a copy */
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Dear submitter,
Thank you for submitting the patches to the linux bluetooth mailing list. This is a CI test results with your patch series:
PW Link:https://patchwork.kernel.org/series/1181244/
---Test result---
Test Summary:
CheckPatch PASS 0.68 seconds VerifyFixes PASS 0.11 seconds VerifySignedoff PASS 0.11 seconds GitLint PASS 0.30 seconds SubjectPrefix PASS 0.11 seconds BuildKernel PASS 27.43 seconds CheckAllWarning PASS 30.99 seconds CheckSparse PASS 33.17 seconds BuildKernel32 PASS 27.35 seconds CheckKernelLLVM PASS 28.46 seconds TestRunnerSetup PASS 669.82 seconds TestRunner_l2cap-tester PASS 13.97 seconds TestRunner_iso-tester PASS 14.36 seconds TestRunner_bnep-tester PASS 2.94 seconds TestRunner_mgmt-tester PASS 59.13 seconds TestRunner_rfcomm-tester PASS 4.26 seconds TestRunner_sco-tester PASS 5.35 seconds TestRunner_ioctl-tester PASS 4.44 seconds TestRunner_mesh-tester PASS 5.26 seconds TestRunner_smp-tester PASS 4.14 seconds TestRunner_userchan-tester PASS 3.01 seconds TestRunner_6lowpan-tester PASS 4.21 seconds IncrementalBuild PASS 25.98 seconds
https://github.com/bluez/bluetooth-next/pull/879
---
Regards,
Linux Bluetooth
This patch was applied to bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git (master) by Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git (master) by Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>:
Quoted 6 lines · On Thu, 8 Oct 2026 12:18:50 +0800 you wrote:
hci_le_set_privacy_mode_sync()needs the IRK returned byhci_find_irk_by_addr()to remain allocated until its identity address and type have been copied into the command. The finder drops its RCU read lock before returning this borrowed pointer, leaving the later field reads unprotected.
Quoted 7 lines
When a privacy-capable controller has a pending peer with address resolution and device privacy enabled, accept-list programming can reach this helper while management reloads the IRKs. The request worker holds
hdev->req_lock, whereasload_irks()takeshdev->lock, allowing the following ordering:[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- Bluetooth: hci_sync: Protect IRK identity reads with RCU
https://git.kernel.org/bluetooth/bluetooth-next/c/9cbb87f8951d
You are awesome, thank you!
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