Bluetooth: Keep IRKs alive during updates
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 Bluetooth: Keep IRKs alive during updates
An IRK selected by hci_add_irk() must remain allocated until its value and RPA have been copied. hci_find_irk_by_addr() returns a borrowed pointer after dropping its RCU read lock, leaving the subsequent stores without lifetime protection on the SMP receive path.
A valid SMP Identity Address Information message can update an existing IRK while MGMT Load IRKs replaces the identity resolving key list. l2cap_recv_acldata() drops hdev->lock before SMP processing, so the connection and channel locks do not exclude load_irks(). One possible ordering is:
SMP receive worker Management / RCU
hci_add_irk()
hci_find_irk_by_addr()
rcu_read_lock()
find matching IRK
rcu_read_unlock()
load_irks()
hci_dev_lock()
hci_smp_irks_clear()
list_del_rcu()
kfree_rcu()
hci_dev_unlock()
RCU grace period ends
IRK is freed
memcpy(irk->val, val, 16)
bacpy(&irk->rpa, rpa)The receive worker then writes into freed memory. KASAN reported a 16-byte write in hci_add_irk(), 45 bytes into a freed smp_irk allocation.
Keep an outer RCU read-side critical section in hci_add_irk() across the lookup and both copies. Drop it before the GFP_KERNEL allocation and reacquire it before publishing a new node. Reclamation must then wait until the stores finish. This also avoids acquiring hdev->lock under the L2CAP locks, which would invert the existing lock order.
The change has not been runtime-tested.
KASAN report as below:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_add_irk+0x77/0x2a0
Write of size 16 at addr ffff88810bbdcc2d by task kworker/u17:0/526
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? hci_add_irk+0x77/0x2a0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20d/0x410
? hci_add_irk+0x77/0x2a0
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? hci_add_irk+0x77/0x2a0
kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0
__asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60
hci_add_irk+0x77/0x2a0
smp_recv_cb+0x594d/0x8e40
? __pfx_smp_recv_cb+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? stack_depot_save_flags+0x29/0x9a0
? __mutex_lock+0x182c/0x2590
? kasan_save_stack+0x42/0x60
? l2cap_recv_frame+0x9ef/0x8830
? __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
? kmem_cache_free+0x242/0x580
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
? l2cap_recv_frame+0xaef/0x8830
? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? __lock_acquire+0x466/0x2260
? __pfx_l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero+0x10/0x10
? l2cap_recv_frame+0x13cc/0x8830
? __pfx_smp_recv_cb+0x10/0x10
l2cap_recv_frame+0x13cc/0x8830
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __mutex_lock+0x182c/0x2590
? __pfx_l2cap_recv_frame+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
? l2cap_recv_acldata+0x1eb/0x10e0
? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x147/0x920
? __pfx_l2cap_conn_hold_unless_zero+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_hci_conn_enter_active_mode+0x10/0x10
? l2cap_recv_acldata+0x13d/0x10e0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
l2cap_recv_acldata+0xe9f/0x10e0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
hci_rx_work+0x5a6/0xf00
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
process_one_work+0x908/0x19c0
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x34f/0x460
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __switch_to+0x74f/0xf80
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 520:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x251/0x610
hci_add_irk+0x131/0x2a0
load_irks+0x5fb/0x8c0
hci_sock_sendmsg+0x128b/0x22e0
sock_write_iter+0x4c0/0x550
do_iter_readv_writev+0x59c/0x860
vfs_writev+0x30e/0xc10
do_writev+0x241/0x2f0
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 0:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
__rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0x65/0x2a0
rcu_free_sheaf+0x1f/0xe0
rcu_core+0x661/0x1d10
handle_softirqs+0x201/0x930
__irq_exit_rcu+0x110/0x1e0
irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810bbdcc00
which
belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 45 bytes inside of
freed
64-byte region [ffff88810bbdcc00,
ffff88810bbdcc40)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
pfn:0x10bbdc
flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0200000000000000 ffff8881000428c0 dead000000000100
dead000000000122
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000000f5000000
0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88810bbdcb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88810bbdcb80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88810bbdcc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88810bbdcc80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88810bbdcd00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint---
net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +8 -0
@@ -1317,8 +1317,14 @@ struct smp_irk *hci_add_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, {struct smp_irk *irk; +/* +* Keep the IRK alive until the value and RPA copies are complete. +*/ +rcu_read_lock (); irk =hci_find_irk_by_addr (hdev, bdaddr, addr_type);if (!irk) { +rcu_read_unlock (); + irk =kzalloc_obj (*irk);if (!irk)return NULL ;
@@ -1326,11 +1332,13 @@ struct smp_irk *hci_add_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,bacpy (&irk->bdaddr, bdaddr); irk->addr_type = addr_type; +rcu_read_lock ();list_add_rcu (&irk->list, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys); }memcpy (irk->val, val,16 );bacpy (&irk->rpa, rpa); +rcu_read_unlock ();return irk; }
This is automated email and please do not reply to this email!
Dear submitter,
Thank you for submitting the patches to the linux bluetooth mailing list. This is a CI test results with your patch series:
PW Link:https://patchwork.kernel.org/series/1183564/
---Test result---
Test Summary:
CheckPatch PASS 0.68 seconds VerifyFixes PASS 0.12 seconds VerifySignedoff PASS 0.12 seconds GitLint PASS 0.31 seconds SubjectPrefix PASS 0.12 seconds BuildKernel PASS 24.69 seconds CheckAllWarning PASS 27.78 seconds CheckSparse PASS 30.55 seconds BuildKernel32 PASS 24.90 seconds CheckKernelLLVM PASS 25.69 seconds TestRunnerSetup PASS 596.48 seconds TestRunner_l2cap-tester PASS 13.79 seconds TestRunner_iso-tester PASS 9.74 seconds TestRunner_bnep-tester PASS 2.94 seconds TestRunner_mgmt-tester PASS 57.16 seconds TestRunner_rfcomm-tester PASS 4.24 seconds TestRunner_sco-tester PASS 5.29 seconds TestRunner_ioctl-tester PASS 4.32 seconds TestRunner_mesh-tester PASS 5.20 seconds TestRunner_smp-tester PASS 4.06 seconds TestRunner_userchan-tester PASS 3.35 seconds TestRunner_6lowpan-tester PASS 4.09 seconds IncrementalBuild PASS 23.50 seconds
https://github.com/bluez/bluetooth-next/pull/903
---
Regards,
Linux Bluetooth