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osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution

PATCH Superseded Koji Nakamaru via GitGitGadget 6 participants 21 messages May 10, 2024 – May 15, 2024 1 message not in the archive

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution

From: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

Resolves "failed to store: -25299" when "fetch.parallel 0" is configured and there are many submodules.

The error code -25299 (errSecDuplicateItem) may be returned by SecItemUpdate() in add_internet_password() if multiple instances of git-credential-osxkeychain run in parallel. This patch introduces an exclusive lock to serialize execution for avoiding this and other potential issues.

---
osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution

Published-As: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/releases/tag/pr-1729%2FKojiNakamaru%2Ffeature%2Fosxkeychian_exlock-v1
Fetch-It-Via: git fetch https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git pr-1729/KojiNakamaru/feature/osxkeychian_exlock-v1
Pull-Request: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/pull/1729

 contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c +3 -0
index 6a40917b1ef..0884db48d0a 100644
@@ -414,6 +414,9 @@ int main(int argc, const char **argv)
 	if (!argv[1])
 		die("%s", usage);
 
+	if (open(argv[0], O_RDONLY | O_EXLOCK) == -1)
+		die("failed to lock %s", argv[0]);
+
 	read_credential();
 
 	if (!strcmp(argv[1], "get"))

base-commit: 0f3415f1f8478b05e64db11eb8aaa2915e48fef6

Signature · 1 line
gitgitgadget
#1 lore raw

Interesting.

SecItemUpdate returning errSecDuplicateItem didn’t make sense to make sense to me so I had a check to see what scenario this happens and it appears to be a scenario where updating in-place fails but replacing it entirely succeeds. However it seems the item might have ultimately still been updated: https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/Security/blob/0600e7bab30fbac3adcafcb6c57d3981dc682304/OSX/libsecurity_keychain/lib/SecItem.cpp#L2398

The behaviour is a bit odd and the associated code comment referencing an Apple bug number is perhaps is indicative of that. I guess it perhaps makes sense if you are holding references, but that doesn’t apply to us.

I wonder if a fix here could be to treat errSecDuplicateItem as a successful operation for SecItemUpdate. Can you confirm the keychain item is successfully updated in that scenario?

A broader Git-wide question that you perhaps don’t know the answer to but someone else here might do is: why are we spamming updates to the credential helper? Every parallel fetch instance performing a store operation on the same host seems unexpected to me, particularly if there’s no actual changes.

Bo

Quoted 42 lines · Koji Nakamaru via GitGitGadget

From: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

Resolves "failed to store: -25299" when "fetch.parallel 0" is configured and there are many submodules.

The error code -25299 (errSecDuplicateItem) may be returned by SecItemUpdate() in add_internet_password() if multiple instances of git-credential-osxkeychain run in parallel. This patch introduces an exclusive lock to serialize execution for avoiding this and other potential issues.

---
osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution

Published-As: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/releases/tag/pr-1729%2FKojiNakamaru%2Ffeature%2Fosxkeychian_exlock-v1
Fetch-It-Via: git fetch https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git pr-1729/KojiNakamaru/feature/osxkeychian_exlock-v1
Pull-Request: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/pull/1729

contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c | 3 +++

1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c +3 -0
index 6a40917b1ef..0884db48d0a 100644
@@ -414,6 +414,9 @@ int main(int argc, const char **argv)
 if (!argv[1])
 die("%s", usage);
 
+ if (open(argv[0], O_RDONLY | O_EXLOCK) == -1)
+ die("failed to lock %s", argv[0]);
+
 read_credential();
 
 if (!strcmp(argv[1], "get"))

base-commit: 0f3415f1f8478b05e64db11eb8aaa2915e48fef6

Signature · 1 line
gitgitgadget
#2 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Bo Anderson

A broader Git-wide question that you perhaps don’t know the answer to but someone else here might do is: why are we spamming updates to the credential helper? Every parallel fetch instance performing a store operation on the same host seems unexpected to me, particularly if there’s no actual changes.

The short answer is that Git always passes a credential which has been used successfully to the helpers to record (if they want to). That's how stuff gets stored in the first place. And those parallel fetches have no knowledge of what the other ones are doing, so they all try to store.

But the more interesting question is: why do we tell helpers to store a credential that we got from helpers in the first place? The behavior is mostly an artifact of how the original implementation behaved, as it did not record the source of the credential.

And I think there are several problems with that, besides inefficiency and locking. See this old patch, which fixes it by remembering when a credential came from a helper:

https://lore.kernel.org/git/[email protected]/

But we didn't merge it because some people rely on the behavior of helpers feeding back to themselves. I outlined some solutions there, but it would definitely be a change in behavior that people would have to adapt to.

Some possible alternatives:

- we could remember _which_ helper we got the credential from, and avoid invoking it again.

- we could record a bit saying that the credential came from a helper, and then feed that back to helpers when storing. So osxkeychain could then decide not to store it.

Both of those solve the repeated stores, but still let credentials populate across helpers (which I still think is a questionable thing to do by default, per the discussion in that thread, but is the very thing that some people rely on).

-Peff

#3 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Jeff King

And I think there are several problems with that, besides inefficiency and locking. See this old patch, which fixes it by remembering when a credential came from a helper:

https://lore.kernel.org/git/[email protected]/

But we didn't merge it because some people rely on the behavior of helpers feeding back to themselves. I outlined some solutions there, but it would definitely be a change in behavior that people would have to adapt to.

Quoted 4 lines

Some possible alternatives:

- we could remember _which_ helper we got the credential from, and avoid invoking it again.

This will break the new state[] feature, which relies on being able to see the state after the fact to know whether the operation was successful. As an example of the functionality the current approach allows, authentication could use an HOTP (like TOTP, but using a counter instead of time) value, and storing the correct used counter on success would be important.

I agree it's not super important if we're just using a username and password, but considering I just added support for arbitrary authentication schemes, which can include things such as limited-use OAuth tokens, one-time use passcodes, and certain types of HMAC-based signing, we probably don't want to choose this approach.

Quoted 3 lines

- we could record a bit saying that the credential came from a helper, and then feed that back to helpers when storing. So osxkeychain could then decide not to store it.

This is actually possible with the new state[] feature. osxkeychain can simply set that field to something like osxkeychain:seen=1 and simply do nothing if it sees that field.

All the credential helper needs to do is declare support for that functionality with the appropriate capability and emit the field if it gets that capability on standard input.

Signature · 2 lines
brian m. carlson (they/them or he/him)
Toronto, Ontario, CA
#4 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · brian m. carlson
Quoted 4 lines

Some possible alternatives:

- we could remember _which_ helper we got the credential from, and avoid invoking it again.

This will break the new state[] feature, which relies on being able to see the state after the fact to know whether the operation was successful. As an example of the functionality the current approach allows, authentication could use an HOTP (like TOTP, but using a counter instead of time) value, and storing the correct used counter on success would be important.

Quoted 5 lines

I agree it's not super important if we're just using a username and password, but considering I just added support for arbitrary authentication schemes, which can include things such as limited-use OAuth tokens, one-time use passcodes, and certain types of HMAC-based signing, we probably don't want to choose this approach.

Yeah, I think it makes sense to keep the Git side as general as possible. So invoking the helper but giving it extra information (so it can decide whether to be a noop or not) seems like the better approach.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

- we could record a bit saying that the credential came from a helper, and then feed that back to helpers when storing. So osxkeychain could then decide not to store it.

This is actually possible with the new state[] feature. osxkeychain can simply set that field to something like osxkeychain:seen=1 and simply do nothing if it sees that field.

Makes sense. Back in that old thread I showed a patch which would let helpers pass arbitrary fields to each other (or back to themselves), and this works in roughly the same way.

Quoted 3 lines

All the credential helper needs to do is declare support for that functionality with the appropriate capability and emit the field if it gets that capability on standard input.

If I understand the protocol, it is just:

  printf("capability[]=state\n");
  printf("state[]=osxkeychain:seen=1\n");

in the helper when it returns a username/password? And I guess the matching parse/check on "store".

Sounds like that would be easy for folks on macOS to play with.

-Peff

#5 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Jeff King
Quoted 3 lines · brian m. carlson

All the credential helper needs to do is declare support for that functionality with the appropriate capability and emit the field if it gets that capability on standard input.

If I understand the protocol, it is just:

Quoted 7 lines
  printf("capability[]=state\n");
  printf("state[]=osxkeychain:seen=1\n");

in the helper when it returns a username/password? And I guess the matching parse/check on "store".

Sounds like that would be easy for folks on macOS to play with.

Yup. It may receive state[] fields from other helpers, so it needs to check that the entries are its own (presumably starting with osxkeychain:) when it reads them, but otherwise, that's it.

Signature · 2 lines
brian m. carlson (they/them or he/him)
Toronto, Ontario, CA
#6 lore raw
In reply to Jeff King
Quoted 11 lines · Jeff King

- we could remember _which_ helper we got the credential from, and avoid invoking it again.

- we could record a bit saying that the credential came from a helper, and then feed that back to helpers when storing. So osxkeychain could then decide not to store it.

Both of those solve the repeated stores, but still let credentials populate across helpers (which I still think is a questionable thing to do by default, per the discussion in that thread, but is the very thing that some people rely on).

Would "refreshing the last-time-used record" a valid use case for the behaviour that feeds the successful one back to where the credential came from? Such a helper could instead log the last-time the credential was asked for, and assume that the lack of an explicit "reject" call signals that the use of the value it returned earlier was auccessfully used, but it is a less obvious way to implement such a "this hasn't been successfully used for a long time, perhaps we should expire/ask again/do something else?" logic.

#7 lore raw
Quoted 14 lines · Junio C Hamano
Quoted 11 lines · Jeff King

- we could remember _which_ helper we got the credential from, and avoid invoking it again.

- we could record a bit saying that the credential came from a helper, and then feed that back to helpers when storing. So osxkeychain could then decide not to store it.

Both of those solve the repeated stores, but still let credentials populate across helpers (which I still think is a questionable thing to do by default, per the discussion in that thread, but is the very thing that some people rely on).

Quoted 8 lines

Would "refreshing the last-time-used record" a valid use case for the behaviour that feeds the successful one back to where the credential came from? Such a helper could instead log the last-time the credential was asked for, and assume that the lack of an explicit "reject" call signals that the use of the value it returned earlier was auccessfully used, but it is a less obvious way to implement such a "this hasn't been successfully used for a long time, perhaps we should expire/ask again/do something else?" logic.

There was some discussion in that old thread about whether that was important or not. I don't have a strong opinion there. Not refreshing is a more secure default, but possibly more annoying (and a change from the status quo).

I do think brian's suggestion to use state[] to pass it back means that the decision is then in the hands of the helper. So "credential-cache", for example, could decide whether to refresh its ttl or not, or we could even make it configurable with a command-line option for the helper.

-Peff

#8 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Jeff King

I do think brian's suggestion to use state[] to pass it back means that the decision is then in the hands of the helper. So "credential-cache", for example, could decide whether to refresh its ttl or not, or we could even make it configurable with a command-line option for the helper.

Yeah, I read your discussion with brian, and the state[] thing all made sense to me.

Thanks.

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]

#10 lore raw

Thank you for detailed insights.

Quoted 5 lines

SecItemUpdate returning errSecDuplicateItem didn’t make sense to make sense to me so I had a check to see what scenario this happens and it appears to be a scenario where updating in-place fails but replacing it entirely succeeds. However it seems the item might have ultimately still been updated: https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/Security/blob/0600e7bab30fbac3adcafcb6c57d3981dc682304/OSX/libsecurity_keychain/lib/SecItem.cpp#L2398

The behaviour is a bit odd and the associated code comment referencing an Apple bug number is perhaps is indicative of that. I guess it perhaps makes sense if you are holding references, but that doesn’t apply to us.

I wonder if a fix here could be to treat errSecDuplicateItem as a successful operation for SecItemUpdate. Can you confirm the keychain item is successfully updated in that scenario?

I tested osxkeychain with the modification at the end of this note and got the following log for
"git fetch --all --prune --recurse-submodules". SecItemUpdate() sometimes returns
errSecDuplicateItem but the keychain item seems okay -- its value is correct after the command
finished -- perhaps because one of successful operations stores the correct value. Even if every
store operation fails, perhaps the originally stored value is kept and no damage occurs.

XXX: get
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: wwwauth[]=Basic realm="GitHub"
XXX: store
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: username=jenkins
XXXX: password=ghq_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
XXXX: -25299
XXXXX: 0
XXX: get
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: wwwauth[]=Basic realm="GitHub"
XXX: store
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: username=jenkins
XXXX: password=ghq_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
XXXX: -25299
XXXXX: 0
XXX: get
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: wwwauth[]=Basic realm="GitHub"
XXX: store
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: username=jenkins
XXXX: password=ghq_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
XXXX: -25299
XXXXX: 0
XXX: get
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: wwwauth[]=Basic realm="GitHub"
XXX: store
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: username=jenkins
XXXX: password=ghq_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
XXXX: -25299
XXXXX: -25299
failed to store: -25299
XXX: get
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: wwwauth[]=Basic realm="GitHub"
XXX: store
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: username=jenkins
XXXX: password=ghq_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
XXXX: -25299
XXXXX: 0
XXX: get
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: wwwauth[]=Basic realm="GitHub"
XXX: store
XXXX: protocol=https
XXXX: host=github.com
XXXX: username=jenkins
XXXX: password=ghq_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
XXXX: -25299
XXXXX: -25299
failed to store: -25299
...

This issue however occurs only when fetch.parallel is configured. If fetch.parallel is not
configured, we should not ignore any error (including errSecDuplicateItem). Also, the above unstable
behaviour is essentially caused by running osxkeychain instances in parallel where some of them
treat "get" and others treat "store". I've also considered treating errSecDuplicateItem of
SecItemUpdate() as errSecSuccess, but ended up with the current patch for these reasons.

Quoted 1 line

A broader Git-wide question that you perhaps don’t know the answer to but someone else here might do is: why are we spamming updates to the credential helper? Every parallel fetch instance performing a store operation on the same host seems unexpected to me, particularly if there’s no actual changes.

I agree on this point and would like to know the reason.

Koji Nakamaru

(quoted diff) +0 -0

b/contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c index 6a40917b1e..0373857731 100644

contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c +4 -0
@@ -308,10 +308,12 @@ static OSStatus add_internet_password(void)
       NULL);
 
  result = SecItemAdd(attrs, NULL);
+ fprintf(stderr, "XXXX: %d\n", result);
  if (result == errSecDuplicateItem) {
  CFDictionaryRef query;
  query = CREATE_SEC_ATTRIBUTES(NULL);
  result = SecItemUpdate(query, attrs);
+ fprintf(stderr, "XXXXX: %d\n", result);
  CFRelease(query);
  }
 
@@ -333,6 +335,7 @@ static void read_credential(void)
  if (!strcmp(buf, "\n"))
  break;
  buf[line_len-1] = '\0';
+ fprintf(stderr, "XXXX: %s\n", buf);
 
  v = strchr(buf, '=');
  if (!v)
@@ -414,6 +417,7 @@ int main(int argc, const char **argv)
  if (!argv[1])
  die("%s", usage);
 
+ fprintf(stderr, "XXX: %s\n", argv[1]);
  read_credential();
 
  if (!strcmp(argv[1], "get"))

2024年5月10日(金) 23:58 Bo Anderson <[email protected]>:

Quoted 57 lines

Interesting.

SecItemUpdate returning errSecDuplicateItem didn’t make sense to make sense to me so I had a check to see what scenario this happens and it appears to be a scenario where updating in-place fails but replacing it entirely succeeds. However it seems the item might have ultimately still been updated: https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/Security/blob/0600e7bab30fbac3adcafcb6c57d3981dc682304/OSX/libsecurity_keychain/lib/SecItem.cpp#L2398

The behaviour is a bit odd and the associated code comment referencing an Apple bug number is perhaps is indicative of that. I guess it perhaps makes sense if you are holding references, but that doesn’t apply to us.

I wonder if a fix here could be to treat errSecDuplicateItem as a successful operation for SecItemUpdate. Can you confirm the keychain item is successfully updated in that scenario?

A broader Git-wide question that you perhaps don’t know the answer to but someone else here might do is: why are we spamming updates to the credential helper? Every parallel fetch instance performing a store operation on the same host seems unexpected to me, particularly if there’s no actual changes.

Bo

On 10 May 2024, at 09:07, Koji Nakamaru via GitGitGadget <[email protected]> wrote:

From: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

Resolves "failed to store: -25299" when "fetch.parallel 0" is configured and there are many submodules.

The error code -25299 (errSecDuplicateItem) may be returned by SecItemUpdate() in add_internet_password() if multiple instances of git-credential-osxkeychain run in parallel. This patch introduces an exclusive lock to serialize execution for avoiding this and other potential issues.

---
osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution

Published-As: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/releases/tag/pr-1729%2FKojiNakamaru%2Ffeature%2Fosxkeychian_exlock-v1
Fetch-It-Via: git fetch https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git pr-1729/KojiNakamaru/feature/osxkeychian_exlock-v1
Pull-Request: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/pull/1729

contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c | 3 +++

1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c +3 -0
index 6a40917b1ef..0884db48d0a 100644
@@ -414,6 +414,9 @@ int main(int argc, const char **argv)
 if (!argv[1])
 die("%s", usage);
 
+ if (open(argv[0], O_RDONLY | O_EXLOCK) == -1)
+ die("failed to lock %s", argv[0]);
+
 read_credential();
 
 if (!strcmp(argv[1], "get"))

base-commit: 0f3415f1f8478b05e64db11eb8aaa2915e48fef6 --
gitgitgadget

#11 lore raw

v2 cover osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution

In reply to Koji Nakamaru via GitGitGadget

Koji Nakamaru (2):
osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution
osxkeychain: state[] seen=1 to skip unnecessary store operations

 .../osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c       | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

base-commit: 0f3415f1f8478b05e64db11eb8aaa2915e48fef6
Published-As: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/releases/tag/pr-1729%2FKojiNakamaru%2Ffeature%2Fosxkeychian_exlock-v2
Fetch-It-Via: git fetch https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git pr-1729/KojiNakamaru/feature/osxkeychian_exlock-v2
Pull-Request: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/pull/1729

Range-diff vs v1:

 1:  309c17c78f3 = 1:  309c17c78f3 osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution
 -:  ----------- > 2:  1f57718abff osxkeychain: state[] seen=1 to skip unnecessary store operations
Signature · 1 line
gitgitgadget
#12 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution

From: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

Resolves "failed to store: -25299" when "fetch.parallel 0" is configured and there are many submodules.

The error code -25299 (errSecDuplicateItem) may be returned by SecItemUpdate() in add_internet_password() if multiple instances of git-credential-osxkeychain run in parallel. This patch introduces an exclusive lock to serialize execution for avoiding this and other potential issues.

---
 contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c +3 -0
index 6a40917b1ef..0884db48d0a 100644
@@ -414,6 +414,9 @@ int main(int argc, const char **argv)
 	if (!argv[1])
 		die("%s", usage);
 
+	if (open(argv[0], O_RDONLY | O_EXLOCK) == -1)
+		die("failed to lock %s", argv[0]);
+
 	read_credential();
 
 	if (!strcmp(argv[1], "get"))
Signature · 1 line
gitgitgadget
#13 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Koji Nakamaru via GitGitGadget

From: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

Resolves "failed to store: -25299" when "fetch.parallel 0" is configured and there are many submodules.

Use of third-person singular without subject for the "observation" part is highly unusual the log messages in our codebase.

The usual way to compose a log message of this project is to

- Give an observation on how the current system work in the present tense (so no need to say "Currently X is Y", just "X is Y"), and discuss what you perceive as a problem in it.

- Propose a solution (optional---often, problem description trivially leads to an obvious solution in reader's minds).

- Give commands to the codebase to "become like so".

in this order.

Quoted 5 lines

The error code -25299 (errSecDuplicateItem) may be returned by SecItemUpdate() in add_internet_password() if multiple instances of git-credential-osxkeychain run in parallel. This patch introduces an exclusive lock to serialize execution for avoiding this and other potential issues.

"This patch introduces" -> "Introduce"

Is this step still needed, though?

Quoted 19 lines
---
 contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c +3 -0
index 6a40917b1ef..0884db48d0a 100644
@@ -414,6 +414,9 @@ int main(int argc, const char **argv)
 	if (!argv[1])
 		die("%s", usage);
 
+	if (open(argv[0], O_RDONLY | O_EXLOCK) == -1)
+		die("failed to lock %s", argv[0]);
+
 	read_credential();
 
 	if (!strcmp(argv[1], "get"))
#14 lore raw

Thank you for the instruction about a log message. I'll follow it.

Quoted 1 line

Is this step still needed, though?

For solving the issue I originally had, just utilizing state[] to skip "store" operations is enough.

Since the osxkeychain implementation doesn't seem to be aware that it can run in parallel, I thought it would be better to leave this step in case a similar problem occurs. If this reason is weak, I'll remove this step.

Koji Nakamaru

#15 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 osxkeychain: state[] seen=1 to skip unnecessary store operations

In reply to Koji Nakamaru via GitGitGadget

From: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

Records whether credentials come from get operations and skips unnecessary store operations by utilizing the state[] feature, as suggested by brian m. carlson.

---
 .../osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c          | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c +11 -0
index 0884db48d0a..6ce22a28ed7 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ static CFStringRef username;
 static CFDataRef password;
 static CFDataRef password_expiry_utc;
 static CFDataRef oauth_refresh_token;
+static int state_seen;
 
 static void clear_credential(void)
 {
@@ -171,6 +172,9 @@ static OSStatus find_internet_password(void)
 
 	CFRelease(item);
 
+	write_item("capability[]", "state", strlen("state"));
+	write_item("state[]", "osxkeychain:seen=1", strlen("osxkeychain:seen=1"));
+
 out:
 	CFRelease(attrs);
 
@@ -284,6 +288,9 @@ static OSStatus add_internet_password(void)
 	CFDictionaryRef attrs;
 	OSStatus result;
 
+	if (state_seen)
+		return errSecSuccess;
+
 	/* Only store complete credentials */
 	if (!protocol || !host || !username || !password)
 		return -1;
@@ -395,6 +402,10 @@ static void read_credential(void)
 			oauth_refresh_token = CFDataCreate(kCFAllocatorDefault,
 							   (UInt8 *)v,
 							   strlen(v));
+		else if (!strcmp(buf, "state[]")) {
+			if (!strcmp(v, "osxkeychain:seen=1"))
+				state_seen = 1;
+		}
 		/*
 		 * Ignore other lines; we don't know what they mean, but
 		 * this future-proofs us when later versions of git do
Signature · 1 line
gitgitgadget
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] osxkeychain: state[] seen=1 to skip unnecessary store operations

Quoted 5 lines · Koji Nakamaru via GitGitGadget

From: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

Records whether credentials come from get operations and skips unnecessary store operations by utilizing the state[] feature, as suggested by brian m. carlson.

This step has a problem description that is even sketchier than the previous one. Anticipate questions by the other developers who read this commit 6 months after it is accepted in the mainline (e.g., What problem is there in the current system, why it is bad and worth solving, and how is the patch trying to solve it?) and let your proposed log message answer the questions, as you won't be always sitting next to these developers.

Thanks.

#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] osxkeychain: state[] seen=1 to skip unnecessary store operations

Thank you. I'll clean up the whole patch and its description after getting a final reply about exlock.

Koji Nakamaru

#18 lore raw

v3 cover osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution

In reply to Koji Nakamaru via GitGitGadget

Koji Nakamaru (2):
osxkeychain: exclusive lock to serialize execution of operations
osxkeychain: state to skip unnecessary store operations

 .../osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c       | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

base-commit: 83f1add914c6b4682de1e944ec0d1ac043d53d78
Published-As: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/releases/tag/pr-1729%2FKojiNakamaru%2Ffeature%2Fosxkeychian_exlock-v3
Fetch-It-Via: git fetch https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git pr-1729/KojiNakamaru/feature/osxkeychian_exlock-v3
Pull-Request: https://github.com/gitgitgadget/git/pull/1729

Range-diff vs v2:

1: 309c17c78f3 ! 1: 3341346c5e6 osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution
@@ Metadata
Author: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

## Commit message ##
- osxkeychain: lock for exclusive execution
+ osxkeychain: exclusive lock to serialize execution of operations

- Resolves "failed to store: -25299" when "fetch.parallel 0" is configured
- and there are many submodules.
+ git passes a credential that has been used successfully to the helpers
+ to record. If "git-credential-osxkeychain store" commands run in
+ parallel (with fetch.parallel configuration and/or by running multiple
+ git commands simultaneously), some of them may exit with the error
+ "failed to store: -25299". This is because SecItemUpdate() in
+ add_internet_password() may return errSecDuplicateItem (-25299) in this
+ situation. Apple's documentation [1] also states as below:

- The error code -25299 (errSecDuplicateItem) may be returned by
- SecItemUpdate() in add_internet_password() if multiple instances of
- git-credential-osxkeychain run in parallel. This patch introduces an
- exclusive lock to serialize execution for avoiding this and other
- potential issues.
+ In macOS, some of the functions of this API block while waiting for
+ input from the user (for example, when the user is asked to unlock a
+ keychain or give permission to change trust settings). In general, it
+ is safe to use this API in threads other than your main thread, but
+ avoid calling the functions from multiple operations, work queues, or
+ threads concurrently. Instead, serialize function calls or confine
+ them to a single thread.
+
+ The error has not been noticed before, because the former implementation
+ ignored the error.
+
+ Introduce an exclusive lock to serialize execution of operations.
+
+ [1] https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/certificate_key_and_trust_services/working_with_concurrency

2: 1f57718abff ! 2: 146b0ae9146 osxkeychain: state[] seen=1 to skip unnecessary store operations
@@ Metadata
Author: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

## Commit message ##
- osxkeychain: state[] seen=1 to skip unnecessary store operations
+ osxkeychain: state to skip unnecessary store operations

- Records whether credentials come from get operations and skips
- unnecessary store operations by utilizing the state[] feature, as
- suggested by brian m. carlson.
+ git passes a credential that has been used successfully to the helpers
+ to record. If a credential is already stored,
+ "git-credential-osxkeychain store" just records the credential returned
+ by "git-credential-osxkeychain get", and unnecessary (sometimes
+ problematic) SecItemAdd() and/or SecItemUpdate() are performed.

+ We can skip such unnecessary operations by marking a credential returned
+ by "git-credential-osxkeychain get". This marking can be done by
+ utilizing the "state[]" feature:
+
+ - The "get" command sets the field "state[]=osxkeychain:seen=1".
+
+ - The "store" command skips its actual operation if the field
+ "state[]=osxkeychain:seen=1" exists.
+
+ Introduce a new state "state[]=osxkeychain:seen=1".
+
+ Suggested-by: brian m. carlson <[email protected]>

## contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c ##

Signature · 1 line
gitgitgadget
#19 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/2 osxkeychain: exclusive lock to serialize execution of operations

From: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

git passes a credential that has been used successfully to the helpers to record. If "git-credential-osxkeychain store" commands run in parallel (with fetch.parallel configuration and/or by running multiple git commands simultaneously), some of them may exit with the error "failed to store: -25299". This is because SecItemUpdate() in add_internet_password() may return errSecDuplicateItem (-25299) in this situation. Apple's documentation [1] also states as below:

In macOS, some of the functions of this API block while waiting for input from the user (for example, when the user is asked to unlock a keychain or give permission to change trust settings). In general, it is safe to use this API in threads other than your main thread, but avoid calling the functions from multiple operations, work queues, or threads concurrently. Instead, serialize function calls or confine them to a single thread.

The error has not been noticed before, because the former implementation ignored the error.

Introduce an exclusive lock to serialize execution of operations.

[1] https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/certificate_key_and_trust_services/working_with_concurrency

---
 contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c +3 -0
index 6a40917b1ef..0884db48d0a 100644
@@ -414,6 +414,9 @@ int main(int argc, const char **argv)
 	if (!argv[1])
 		die("%s", usage);
 
+	if (open(argv[0], O_RDONLY | O_EXLOCK) == -1)
+		die("failed to lock %s", argv[0]);
+
 	read_credential();
 
 	if (!strcmp(argv[1], "get"))
Signature · 1 line
gitgitgadget
#20 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/2 osxkeychain: state to skip unnecessary store operations

In reply to Koji Nakamaru via GitGitGadget

From: Koji Nakamaru <[email protected]>

git passes a credential that has been used successfully to the helpers to record. If a credential is already stored, "git-credential-osxkeychain store" just records the credential returned by "git-credential-osxkeychain get", and unnecessary (sometimes problematic) SecItemAdd() and/or SecItemUpdate() are performed.

We can skip such unnecessary operations by marking a credential returned by "git-credential-osxkeychain get". This marking can be done by utilizing the "state[]" feature:

- The "get" command sets the field "state[]=osxkeychain:seen=1".

- The "store" command skips its actual operation if the field "state[]=osxkeychain:seen=1" exists.

Introduce a new state "state[]=osxkeychain:seen=1".

---
 .../osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c          | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
contrib/credential/osxkeychain/git-credential-osxkeychain.c +11 -0
index 0884db48d0a..6ce22a28ed7 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ static CFStringRef username;
 static CFDataRef password;
 static CFDataRef password_expiry_utc;
 static CFDataRef oauth_refresh_token;
+static int state_seen;
 
 static void clear_credential(void)
 {
@@ -171,6 +172,9 @@ static OSStatus find_internet_password(void)
 
 	CFRelease(item);
 
+	write_item("capability[]", "state", strlen("state"));
+	write_item("state[]", "osxkeychain:seen=1", strlen("osxkeychain:seen=1"));
+
 out:
 	CFRelease(attrs);
 
@@ -284,6 +288,9 @@ static OSStatus add_internet_password(void)
 	CFDictionaryRef attrs;
 	OSStatus result;
 
+	if (state_seen)
+		return errSecSuccess;
+
 	/* Only store complete credentials */
 	if (!protocol || !host || !username || !password)
 		return -1;
@@ -395,6 +402,10 @@ static void read_credential(void)
 			oauth_refresh_token = CFDataCreate(kCFAllocatorDefault,
 							   (UInt8 *)v,
 							   strlen(v));
+		else if (!strcmp(buf, "state[]")) {
+			if (!strcmp(v, "osxkeychain:seen=1"))
+				state_seen = 1;
+		}
 		/*
 		 * Ignore other lines; we don't know what they mean, but
 		 * this future-proofs us when later versions of git do
Signature · 1 line
gitgitgadget
#21 lore raw
In reply to Koji Nakamaru via GitGitGadget

I thought about the issue further. The approach with the "state[]" feature reduces problematic "store" operations a lot in most cases, it is however not perfect to avoid the original issue about parallel execution.

For example (though quite artificial), let's suppose if two git commands start simultaneously where the credential is input automatically by "expect" command. Two "osxkeychain store" commands will then run simultaneously.

I hope new descriptions are convincing.

Koji Nakamaru