intrusion detection
Hi
What intrusion detection software would you guys
recommend?Is psad or portsentry any good?
Regards
______________________________________________________________
Herbalife Independent Distributor http://www.healthiest.co.za
Quoted 2 lines · IT Clown
What intrusion detection software would you guys
recommend?Is psad or portsentry any good?
Personally I use Snort (http://www.snort.org) which I find to be easy to configure and fairly flexible. The default rulesets are quite concise and daily reports give a good summary of what is happening.
However, I haven't used either psad or portsentry so couldn't compare.
David
Hello,
Is portsentry not just more of a port monitor -- to let you know who is
"knocking" at your door. Where snort will monitor the actual traffic on the pipe.
Michael.
Quoted 16 lines · On Sun, 18 Apr 2004 18:49:29 +0100 David Cannings <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · IT Clown
What intrusion detection software would you guys
recommend?Is psad or portsentry any good?Personally I use Snort (http://www.snort.org) which I find to be easy to configure and fairly flexible. The default rulesets are quite concise and daily reports give a good summary of what is happening.
However, I haven't used either psad or portsentry so couldn't compare.
David
Signature · 3 lines
Michael Gale Network Administrator Utilitran Corporation
Quoted 4 lines · IT Clown
Hi
What intrusion detection software would you guys
recommend?Is psad or portsentry any good?
<snip>
I wonder if I might permutate this question slightly. I have spent a fair amount of time recently looking at Intrusion Detection Systems and came away with a conclusion I did not expect. I would like to share that conclusion not to start a flame war but to hold it up to scrutiny to see if I am truly out of my mind or whether it makes sense.
I concluded that NIDS can be effective but that they required so much upkeep, maintenance and ongoing expertise that I would rather invest my time and money in other security measures. There were two primary reasons for this conclusion.
1) Those attempting to perpetrate an intensional, focused attack (as opposed to the random "door-knob jiggling" antics of script-kiddies) are as likely to attack from the inside as from the outside. In other words, if the front door firewall is secure, I would not waste my time trying to break through it. I would send forged e-mails that direct internal users to a phished site where I would plant a malicious trojan or I would find a vulnerable remote user, e.g., one with an insecure home wireless access method and do a man-in-the-middle attack. In our brave new networked world, I would find a way to attack from the inside rather than the outside.
That makes the placement of NIDS quite a challenge. How many and where do I place them? Do I use port mirroring or taps? What are the impacts on network capacity and traffic patterns? Do I fail safe or open? By the time of build a NIDS environment to protect against external and internal attacks, I can have a very complex and very expensive architecture - one that may have inflicted more impact on the business bottom line that the attacks it may prevent.
2) As I studied the mechanisms used to evade NIDS and the counter-measures use to defeat the evasion attempts, it seemed like a constant "cat and mouse" game -- one that required constant vigilance and maintenance. I felt like my NIDS would be secure only until the next major publication of a new evasion technique.
This does not mean that NIDS cannot work -- just that it takes a lot of effort and expertise to make it work well. I felt I would rather make the following investment in time and money:
1) Create a multi-layered security environment with inter and intra office access control and encryption and move away from the "hard and crunchy outside - soft and chewy inside" perimeter security model. Of course, I am quite biased here as making this method affordable is one of the driving factors behind the ISCS project I am working on
(http://iscs.sourceforge.net). If an attacker breaches my outer defenses or is attacking from the inside, I want to do my best to contain them to a limited area.
2) Combine regular vulnerability assessments using something like the automated features of the fabulous Nessus product
(http://www.nessus.org) with an automated software management tool to close known vulnerabilities as quickly as possible. If an attacker manages to break through all my defenses, I want to render them impotent and unable to use known exploits against my systems.
3) Implement even a simple HIDS or integrity checker like tripwire or the fully open source Osiris (http://osiris.shmoo.com). If an attacker has penetrated all my defenses and succeeded in using some exploit, I want to know about it.
This threefold solution is also not simple. But given the return on investment of my time an money maintaining NIDS in an ever changing security world where an attack is as likely to come from the inside as the outside versus maintaining these three combined strategies, I think I get more from my investment in the latter.
However, as always, I am suspicious of putting too much faith in my own conclusion without significant corroboration. I would be interested in other's thoughts, insights and insults -- well, maybe not too many insults. Thanks, all - John
Signature · 3 lines
Open Source Development Corporation Financially Sustainable open source development http://www.opensourcedevelopmentcorp.com
Hello,
I appreciate the information, as I myself am also looking into a IDS solution
of some sort. I was thinking along the lines of the following:
1. The NIDS would sit between the firewall internal line and our office backbone using a tap that would fail open.
I figure this was if anything breaks the firewall or a attack comes from inside and tries to make a outbound connection I would know.
I completely agree with you about the attack from inside vs a attacker from out side.
I also come completely agree with the HIDS. I have also thought about a internal machine (not sure of the technical name for it) to act as a live bit box. I believe the theory is that you leave a internal box a little open or un-patched with bogus data on it, this is used to attract the attacker and trigger other bells and whistles.
Michael.
Quoted 86 lines · On Mon, 19 Apr 2004 11:27:54 -0400 "John A. Sullivan III"…
Quoted 4 lines · IT Clown
Hi
What intrusion detection software would you guys
recommend?Is psad or portsentry any good?<snip>
I wonder if I might permutate this question slightly. I have spent a fair amount of time recently looking at Intrusion Detection Systems and came away with a conclusion I did not expect. I would like to share that conclusion not to start a flame war but to hold it up to scrutiny to see if I am truly out of my mind or whether it makes sense.I concluded that NIDS can be effective but that they required so much upkeep, maintenance and ongoing expertise that I would rather invest my time and money in other security measures. There were two primary reasons for this conclusion.
1) Those attempting to perpetrate an intensional, focused attack (as opposed to the random "door-knob jiggling" antics of script-kiddies) are as likely to attack from the inside as from the outside. In other words, if the front door firewall is secure, I would not waste my time trying to break through it. I would send forged e-mails that direct internal users to a phished site where I would plant a malicious trojan or I would find a vulnerable remote user, e.g., one with an insecure home wireless access method and do a man-in-the-middle attack. In our brave new networked world, I would find a way to attack from the inside rather than the outside.
That makes the placement of NIDS quite a challenge. How many and where do I place them? Do I use port mirroring or taps? What are the impacts on network capacity and traffic patterns? Do I fail safe or open? By the time of build a NIDS environment to protect against external and internal attacks, I can have a very complex and very expensive architecture - one that may have inflicted more impact on the business bottom line that the attacks it may prevent.2) As I studied the mechanisms used to evade NIDS and the counter-measures use to defeat the evasion attempts, it seemed like a constant "cat and mouse" game -- one that required constant vigilance and maintenance. I felt like my NIDS would be secure only until the next major publication of a new evasion technique.
This does not mean that NIDS cannot work -- just that it takes a lot of effort and expertise to make it work well. I felt I would rather make the following investment in time and money:
1) Create a multi-layered security environment with inter and intra office access control and encryption and move away from the "hard and crunchy outside - soft and chewy inside" perimeter security model. Of course, I am quite biased here as making this method affordable is one of the driving factors behind the ISCS project I am working on
(http://iscs.sourceforge.net). If an attacker breaches my outer defenses or is attacking from the inside, I want to do my best to contain them to a limited area.2) Combine regular vulnerability assessments using something like the automated features of the fabulous Nessus product
(http://www.nessus.org) with an automated software management tool to close known vulnerabilities as quickly as possible. If an attacker manages to break through all my defenses, I want to render them impotent and unable to use known exploits against my systems.3) Implement even a simple HIDS or integrity checker like tripwire or the fully open source Osiris (http://osiris.shmoo.com). If an attacker has penetrated all my defenses and succeeded in using some exploit, I want to know about it.
This threefold solution is also not simple. But given the return on investment of my time an money maintaining NIDS in an ever changing security world where an attack is as likely to come from the inside as the outside versus maintaining these three combined strategies, I think I get more from my investment in the latter.
However, as always, I am suspicious of putting too much faith in my own conclusion without significant corroboration. I would be interested in other's thoughts, insights and insults -- well, maybe not too many insults. Thanks, all - John
Signature · 3 lines
Open Source Development Corporation Financially Sustainable open source development http://www.opensourcedevelopmentcorp.com
Signature · 3 lines
Michael Gale Network Administrator Utilitran Corporation
Quoted 2 lines · Michael Gale
I have also thought about a internal machine (not sure of the technical name for it)
Honeypot or honeynet (depending on whether there's one or several machines involved).
Quoted 3 lines
to act as a live bit box. I believe the theory is that you leave a internal box a little open or un-patched with bogus data on it, this is used to attract the attacker and trigger other bells and whistles.
Regards,
Antony.
Signature · 7 lines
Behind the counter a boy with a shaven head stared vacantly into space,
a dozen spikes of microsoft protruding from the socket behind his ear.
- William Gibson, Neuromancer (1984)
Please reply to the list;
please don't CC me.Quoted 11 lines · John A. Sullivan III
I have spent a fair amount of time recently looking at Intrusion Detection Systems and came away with a conclusion I did not expect. I would like to share that conclusion not to start a flame war but to hold it up to scrutiny to see if I am truly out of my mind or whether it makes sense.
I concluded that NIDS can be effective but that they required so much upkeep, maintenance and ongoing expertise that I would rather invest my time and money in other security measures.
This does not mean that NIDS cannot work -- just that it takes a lot of effort and expertise to make it work well.
I agree with you. NIDS is an expensive activity, and whilst some people like
to get the information it provides, it does indeed require a big investment of time to keep things up to date, ensure you're looking for the latest attacks, and avoiding too many false positives.
Quoted 6 lines
I felt I would rather make
the following investment in time and money:1) Create a multi-layered security environment with inter and intra office access control and encryption and move away from the "hard and crunchy outside - soft and chewy inside" perimeter security model.
I believe that many security professionals are now of the opinion that this is
an outdated model on any reasonable-sized corporate network. It may still
be fine for home users and small businesses, but beyond a certain size and complexity there are now too many "grey areas" where you can't be quite sure if something is inside or outside the protected zone.
Quoted 9 lines
2) Combine regular vulnerability assessments using something like the automated features of the fabulous Nessus product
(http://www.nessus.org) with an automated software management tool to close known vulnerabilities as quickly as possible.3) Implement even a simple HIDS or integrity checker like tripwire or the fully open source Osiris (http://osiris.shmoo.com). If an attacker has penetrated all my defenses and succeeded in using some exploit, I want to know about it.
Yes - these two are IMHO very sensible strategies, and I also think more certain than NIDS, because you at least know what you are protecting and what
you've done about it. With NIDS you are still very much "hoping it does the
job okay" and you can never be sure of what you're missing.
Quoted 5 lines
This threefold solution is also not simple. But given the return on investment of my time an money maintaining NIDS in an ever changing security world where an attack is as likely to come from the inside as the outside versus maintaining these three combined strategies, I think I get more from my investment in the latter.
I agree. Once you've taken the steps you describe, you might choose later to
add NIDS as well, however I think you have the correct sequence of priorities.
Regards,
Antony.
Signature · 6 lines
The words "e pluribus unum" on the Great Seal of the United States are from a
poem by Virgil entitled "Moretum", which is about cheese and garlic salad
dressing.
Please reply to the list;
please don't CC me.Thanks for the reply, Antony. I notice how much you help on this list and esteem your opinion highly. I would just like to annotate your comment on the inter/intra office security measures. Its infeasibility in a large, complex environment is why we saw traditional firewalls, VPNs, etc., would not work in our complex, multi-client environment awash in its sea of grey regarding what is inside and what is outside.
This, again, is why we feel ISCS is so unlike similar products. It is designed to make the complexity manageable even for enterprise and carrier environments and to bring into sharper contrast the grey areas by abandoning the concept of zones, inside or outside and focusing on the real traffic pattern issues of which accessors are attempting access to which resources wherever they are.
Thanks again, and thanks for all the help you give - John
Quoted 60 lines · Antony Stone
Quoted 11 lines · John A. Sullivan III
I have spent a fair amount of time recently looking at Intrusion Detection Systems and came away with a conclusion I did not expect. I would like to share that conclusion not to start a flame war but to hold it up to scrutiny to see if I am truly out of my mind or whether it makes sense.
I concluded that NIDS can be effective but that they required so much upkeep, maintenance and ongoing expertise that I would rather invest my time and money in other security measures.
This does not mean that NIDS cannot work -- just that it takes a lot of effort and expertise to make it work well.
I agree with you. NIDS is an expensive activity, and whilst some people like
to get the information it provides, it does indeed require a big investment of time to keep things up to date, ensure you're looking for the latest attacks, and avoiding too many false positives.Quoted 6 lines
I felt I would rather make
the following investment in time and money:1) Create a multi-layered security environment with inter and intra office access control and encryption and move away from the "hard and crunchy outside - soft and chewy inside" perimeter security model.
I believe that many security professionals are now of the opinion that this is
an outdated model on any reasonable-sized corporate network. It may still
be fine for home users and small businesses, but beyond a certain size and complexity there are now too many "grey areas" where you can't be quite sure if something is inside or outside the protected zone.Quoted 9 lines
2) Combine regular vulnerability assessments using something like the automated features of the fabulous Nessus product
(http://www.nessus.org) with an automated software management tool to close known vulnerabilities as quickly as possible.3) Implement even a simple HIDS or integrity checker like tripwire or the fully open source Osiris (http://osiris.shmoo.com). If an attacker has penetrated all my defenses and succeeded in using some exploit, I want to know about it.
Yes - these two are IMHO very sensible strategies, and I also think more certain than NIDS, because you at least know what you are protecting and what
you've done about it. With NIDS you are still very much "hoping it does the
job okay" and you can never be sure of what you're missing.Quoted 5 lines
This threefold solution is also not simple. But given the return on investment of my time an money maintaining NIDS in an ever changing security world where an attack is as likely to come from the inside as the outside versus maintaining these three combined strategies, I think I get more from my investment in the latter.
I agree. Once you've taken the steps you describe, you might choose later to
add NIDS as well, however I think you have the correct sequence of priorities.Regards,
Antony.
Signature · 5 lines
John A. Sullivan III Chief Technology Officer Nexus Management +1 207-985-7880 [email protected]