Require mmap handler for a.out executables
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Quoted 6 lines · Marcel Holtmann
with the nasty /proc privilege escalation (CVE-2006-3626) it became clear that we need to do something more to better protect us against people exploiting stuff in /proc. Besides the don't allow chmod stuff, Eugene also proposed to depend the a.out execution on the existence of the mmap handler. Since we are doing the same for ELF, this makes totally sense to me.
Can shell scripts or binfmt_misc be exploited, too? Even if not, I'd additionally force noexec, nosuid on proc and sysfs mounts.
Signature · 4 lines
Ich danke GMX dafür, die Verwendung meiner Adressen mittels per SPF verbreiteten Lügen zu sabotieren. http://david.woodhou.se/why-not-spf.html
Quoted 11 lines · Bodo Eggert
Quoted 6 lines · Marcel Holtmann
with the nasty /proc privilege escalation (CVE-2006-3626) it became clear that we need to do something more to better protect us against people exploiting stuff in /proc. Besides the don't allow chmod stuff, Eugene also proposed to depend the a.out execution on the existence of the mmap handler. Since we are doing the same for ELF, this makes totally sense to me.
Can shell scripts or
binfmt_miscbe exploited, too? Even if not, I'd additionally force noexec, nosuid on proc and sysfs mounts.
Right. That's why we do not allow chmod() /proc/*/*/* files.
http://kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=6d76fa58b050044994fe25f8753b8023f2b36737
Eugene
Signature · 2 lines
eteo redhat.com ph: +65 6490 4142 http://www.kernel.org/~eugeneteo gpg fingerprint: 47B9 90F6 AE4A 9C51 37E0 D6E1 EA84 C6A2 58DF 8823
Ar Iau, 2006-07-27 am 19:49 +0200, ysgrifennodd Bodo Eggert:
Quoted 2 lines
Can shell scripts or
binfmt_miscbe exploited, too? Even if not, I'd additionally force noexec, nosuid on proc and sysfs mounts.
Why force them, this is just papering over imagined cracks and running from shadows. If users want to be paranoid about these file systems or their distro vendor is smart then the ability to set noexec/nosuid is already supported and even more can be done with selinux. In fact as its usually mounted in one place even AppArmor might be able to get it right
8)
Quoted 11 lines · Alan Cox
Ar Iau, 2006-07-27 am 19:49 +0200, ysgrifennodd Bodo Eggert:
Quoted 2 lines
Can shell scripts or
binfmt_miscbe exploited, too? Even if not, I'd additionally force noexec, nosuid on proc and sysfs mounts.Why force them, this is just papering over imagined cracks and running from shadows. If users want to be paranoid about these file systems or their distro vendor is smart then the ability to set noexec/nosuid is already supported and even more can be done with selinux. In fact as its usually mounted in one place even AppArmor might be able to get it right
8)
s/force/default to/, since it's not OK to let the admin shoot his feet unless he _explicitely_ demands to. What if the next crack allows evading nosuid by using proc?
Being paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you ...
Signature · 1 line
bus error. passengers dumped.