Skip to contentSkip to conversation

Require mmap handler for a.out executables

DISCUSSION Bodo Eggert 4 participants 4 messages Jul 27, 2006 1 message not in the archive

lore
Share & tools
lore

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]

#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Marcel Holtmann

with the nasty /proc privilege escalation (CVE-2006-3626) it became clear that we need to do something more to better protect us against people exploiting stuff in /proc. Besides the don't allow chmod stuff, Eugene also proposed to depend the a.out execution on the existence of the mmap handler. Since we are doing the same for ELF, this makes totally sense to me.

Can shell scripts or binfmt_misc be exploited, too? Even if not, I'd additionally force noexec, nosuid on proc and sysfs mounts.

Signature · 4 lines
Ich danke GMX dafür, die Verwendung meiner Adressen mittels per SPF
verbreiteten Lügen zu sabotieren.

http://david.woodhou.se/why-not-spf.html
#2 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Bodo Eggert
Quoted 6 lines · Marcel Holtmann

with the nasty /proc privilege escalation (CVE-2006-3626) it became clear that we need to do something more to better protect us against people exploiting stuff in /proc. Besides the don't allow chmod stuff, Eugene also proposed to depend the a.out execution on the existence of the mmap handler. Since we are doing the same for ELF, this makes totally sense to me.

Can shell scripts or binfmt_misc be exploited, too? Even if not, I'd additionally force noexec, nosuid on proc and sysfs mounts.

Right. That's why we do not allow chmod() /proc/*/*/* files.
http://kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=6d76fa58b050044994fe25f8753b8023f2b36737

Eugene

Signature · 2 lines
eteo redhat.com  ph: +65 6490 4142  http://www.kernel.org/~eugeneteo
gpg fingerprint:  47B9 90F6 AE4A 9C51 37E0  D6E1 EA84 C6A2 58DF 8823
#3 lore raw
In reply to Bodo Eggert

Ar Iau, 2006-07-27 am 19:49 +0200, ysgrifennodd Bodo Eggert:

Quoted 2 lines

Can shell scripts or binfmt_misc be exploited, too? Even if not, I'd additionally force noexec, nosuid on proc and sysfs mounts.

Why force them, this is just papering over imagined cracks and running from shadows. If users want to be paranoid about these file systems or their distro vendor is smart then the ability to set noexec/nosuid is already supported and even more can be done with selinux. In fact as its usually mounted in one place even AppArmor might be able to get it right
8)

#4 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Alan Cox

Ar Iau, 2006-07-27 am 19:49 +0200, ysgrifennodd Bodo Eggert:

Quoted 2 lines

Can shell scripts or binfmt_misc be exploited, too? Even if not, I'd additionally force noexec, nosuid on proc and sysfs mounts.

Why force them, this is just papering over imagined cracks and running from shadows. If users want to be paranoid about these file systems or their distro vendor is smart then the ability to set noexec/nosuid is already supported and even more can be done with selinux. In fact as its usually mounted in one place even AppArmor might be able to get it right
8)

s/force/default to/, since it's not OK to let the admin shoot his feet unless he _explicitely_ demands to. What if the next crack allows evading nosuid by using proc?

Being paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you ...

Signature · 1 line
bus error. passengers dumped.