EVM
Subsystems (10)
cover EVM
The EVM patches were previously posted on LSM/LKML. Am reposting them here, as well as on fs-devel for comments and review.
fs summary:
- Moves ima_iint.c up a layer to security/integrity and renames ima_inode_alloc/free hooks to integrity_inode_alloc/free
- Defines 2 new generic functions: vfs_getxattr_alloc, vfs_xattr_cmp
- Adds 3 EVM calls in the security hooks: evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr
- Defines 3 new calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_removexattr()
- Exports: evm_verifyxattr()
- Defines 3 new IMA calls for IMA appraisal: ima_inode_setxattr(), ima_inode_removexattr(), and ima_inode_post_setattr()
To address concerns of exposing the EVM key to userspace in plaintext (Eric Paris, Stephan Smalley), future work will define new key-types for use with TPM sealed keys and encrypted symmetric keys, so that on systems with a TPM, the EVM key will never be visible outside the kernel in plaintext form.
Extended Verification Module(EVM) detects offline tampering of the security extended attributes (e.g. security.selinux, security.SMACK64, security.ima), which is the basis for LSM permission decisions and, with this set of patches, integrity appraisal decisions. To detect offline tampering of the extended attributes, EVM maintains an HMAC-sha1 across a set of security extended attributes, storing the HMAC as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(), which re-calculates the HMAC and compares it with the version stored in 'security.evm'.
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list, containing the hashes of all executables, mmapped execute files, and files open for read by root (assuming the default measurement policy). The measurement list, with other information, can be used to assert the integrity of the running system to a third party. The "ima: integrity appraisal extension" patch extends IMA with local measurement appraisal. The extension stores and maintains the file integrity measurement as an extended attribute 'security.ima', which EVM can be configured to protect.
DAC/MAC protect the integrity of a running system. An offline attack can bypass these protection mechanisms by mounting the disk under a different operating system and modifying the file data/metadata. If the disk is subsequently remounted under the EVM + DAC/MAC + IMA protected OS, then the hash of the file data won't match the hash stored in the IMA xattr, or the TPM-calculated HMAC of the file's metadata won't be valid. Therefore, IMA + MAC + EVM can protect system integrity online and detect offline tampering.
This patch set applies to the security-testing/next tree. For more information on IMA/EVM, refer to http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.
Much appreciation to Dave Hansen, Serge Hallyn, and Matt Helsley for reviewing the patches.
Mimi
Mimi Zohar (15):
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp
evm: re-release
ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
security: imbed evm calls in security hooks
evm: inode post removexattr
evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr
evm: inode_post_init
fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
ima: integrity appraisal extension
ima: appraise default rules
ima: inode post_setattr
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr and ima_inode_removexattr
ima: appraise measurement required
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 + fs/attr.c | 7 +- fs/ext2/xattr_security.c | 31 +++- fs/ext3/xattr_security.c | 30 +++- fs/ext4/xattr_security.c | 30 +++- fs/file_table.c | 2 +- fs/xattr.c | 63 ++++++- include/linux/capability.h | 3 - include/linux/evm.h | 80 ++++++++ include/linux/ima.h | 27 ++- include/linux/integrity.h | 35 ++++ include/linux/xattr.h | 27 +++- security/Kconfig | 2 +- security/Makefile | 4 +- security/integrity/Kconfig | 7 + security/integrity/Makefile | 12 ++ security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 13 ++ security/integrity/evm/Makefile | 7 + security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 38 ++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 335 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 108 +++++++++++ security/integrity/iint.c | 153 +++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 15 ++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 4 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 76 +++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 61 +++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 151 +++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 146 -------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 152 +++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 61 ++++++- security/integrity/integrity.h | 50 +++++ security/security.c | 27 +++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 - security/smack/smack.h | 2 - 35 files changed, 1699 insertions(+), 265 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/evm.h create mode 100644 include/linux/integrity.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/integrity/Makefile create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Makefile create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/iint.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/integrity.h
PATCH 1/15 integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity layer in order to share the integrity data area among the different integrity models.
--- include/linux/ima.h | 12 --- include/linux/integrity.h | 28 +++++++ security/Kconfig | 2 +- security/Makefile | 4 +- security/integrity/Kconfig | 6 ++ security/integrity/Makefile | 10 +++ security/integrity/iint.c | 150 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 + security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 34 +++------ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 9 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 146 ------------------------------------ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 21 +++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 42 ++++++++++ security/security.c | 5 +- 15 files changed, 270 insertions(+), 202 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/integrity.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/integrity/Makefile create mode 100644 security/integrity/iint.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/integrity.h
include/linux/ima.h +0 -12
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ struct linux_binprm;#ifdef CONFIG_IMA extern int ima_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern int ima_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode); -extern void ima_inode_free (struct inode *inode);extern int ima_file_check (struct file *file,int mask);extern void ima_file_free (struct file *file);extern int ima_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long prot);
@@ -28,16 +26,6 @@ static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)return 0 ; } -static inline int ima_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode) -{ -return 0 ; -} - -static inline void ima_inode_free (struct inode *inode) -{ -return ; -} -static inline int ima_file_check (struct file *file,int mask) {return 0 ;
include/linux/integrity.h new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2009 IBM Corporation +* Author: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> +* +* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. +*/ + +#ifndef _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H +#define _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY +extern int integrity_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode); +extern void integrity_inode_free (struct inode *inode); + +#else +static inline int integrity_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline void integrity_inode_free (struct inode *inode) +{ +return ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_H */ +#endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
security/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig -source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +source security/integrity/Kconfig choice prompt "Default security module"
security/Makefile +2 -2
@@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists -subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += integrity/ima -obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += integrity/ima/built-in.o +subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/built-in.o
security/integrity/Kconfig new file +6 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +# +config INTEGRITY + def_bool y + depends on IMA + +source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
security/integrity/Makefile new file +10 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# +# Makefile for caching inode integrity data (iint) +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o + +integrity-y := iint.o + +subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/built-in.o
security/integrity/iint.c new file +150 -0
150 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ config IMA bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)" depends on SECURITY + select INTEGRITY select SECURITYFS select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_HMAC
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ - ima_policy.o ima_iint.o ima_audit.o + ima_policy.o ima_audit.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +10 -24
@@ -24,11 +24,13 @@#include <linux/tpm.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include "../integrity.h" +enum ima_show_type {IMA_SHOW_BINARY ,IMA_SHOW_ASCII };enum tpm_pcrs {TPM_PCR0 =0 ,TPM_PCR8 =8 };/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */ -#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE 20 +#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE#define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255#define IMA_HASH_BITS 9
@@ -94,38 +96,22 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)return hash_long (*digest,IMA_HASH_BITS ); } -/* iint cache flags */ -#define IMA_MEASURED 1 - -/* integrity data associated with an inode */ -struct ima_iint_cache { -u64 version;/* track inode changes */ -unsigned long flags; -u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -struct mutex mutex;/* protects: version, flags, digest */ -long readcount;/* measured files readcount */ -long writecount;/* measured files writecount */ -long opencount;/* opens reference count */ -struct kref refcount;/* ima_iint_cache reference count */ -struct rcu_head rcu; -}; -/* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_must_measure (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct inode *inode, +int ima_must_measure (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct inode *inode,int mask,int function); -int ima_collect_measurement (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file); -void ima_store_measurement (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file, +int ima_collect_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +struct file *file); +void ima_store_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file,const unsigned char *filename);int ima_store_template (struct ima_template_entry *entry,int violation,struct inode *inode); -void ima_template_show (struct seq_file *m,void *e, -enum ima_show_type show); +void ima_template_show (struct seq_file *m,void *e,enum ima_show_type show);/* radix tree calls to lookup, insert, delete * integrity data associated with an inode. */ -struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert (struct inode *inode); -struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_get (struct inode *inode); +struct integrity_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert (struct inode *inode); +struct integrity_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_get (struct inode *inode);void iint_free (struct kref *kref);void iint_rcu_free (struct rcu_head *rcu);
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +5 -4
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ err_out:* For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, or other * error, return an error code. */ -int ima_must_measure (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct inode *inode, +int ima_must_measure (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct inode *inode,int mask,int function) {int must_measure;
@@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,* * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise */ -int ima_collect_measurement (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file) +int ima_collect_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +struct file *file) {int result = -EEXIST ;
@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)* * Must be called with iint->mutex held. */ -void ima_store_measurement (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file, -const unsigned char *filename) +void ima_store_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +struct file *file,const unsigned char *filename) {const char *op ="add_template_measure" ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c deleted +0 -146
146 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +11 -10
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@*/ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -97,7 +98,7 @@ out:*/ enum iint_pcr_error {TOMTOU ,OPEN_WRITERS };static void ima_read_write_check (enum iint_pcr_error error, -struct ima_iint_cache *iint, +struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct inode *inode,const unsigned char *filename) {
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,/* * Update the counts given an fmode_t */ -static void ima_inc_counts (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,fmode_t mode) +static void ima_inc_counts (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,fmode_t mode) {BUG_ON (!mutex_is_locked (&iint->mutex));
@@ -145,12 +146,12 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; -struct ima_iint_cache *iint; +struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;int rc;if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode))return ; - iint =ima_iint_find_get (inode); + iint =integrity_iint_find_get (inode);if (!iint)return ;mutex_lock (&iint->mutex);
@@ -173,8 +174,8 @@ out:/* * Decrement ima counts */ -static void ima_dec_counts (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct inode *inode, -struct file *file) +static void ima_dec_counts (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +struct inode *inode,struct file *file) {mode_t mode = file->f_mode;BUG_ON (!mutex_is_locked (&iint->mutex));
@@ -211,11 +212,11 @@ static void ima_dec_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,void ima_file_free (struct file *file) {struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; -struct ima_iint_cache *iint; +struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode))return ; - iint =ima_iint_find_get (inode); + iint =integrity_iint_find_get (inode);if (!iint)return ;
@@ -229,12 +230,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, int mask, int function) {struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; -struct ima_iint_cache *iint; +struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;int rc;if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode))return 0 ; - iint =ima_iint_find_get (inode); + iint =integrity_iint_find_get (inode);if (!iint)return -ENOMEM ;
security/integrity/integrity.h new file +42 -0
42 lines not on this page · raw message
security/security.c +3 -2
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/ima.h> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
@@ -339,7 +340,7 @@ int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) ret = security_ops->inode_alloc_security (inode);if (ret)return ret; - ret =ima_inode_alloc (inode); + ret =integrity_inode_alloc (inode);if (ret)security_inode_free (inode);return ret;
@@ -347,7 +348,7 @@ int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)void security_inode_free (struct inode *inode) { -ima_inode_free (inode); +integrity_inode_free (inode); security_ops->inode_free_security (inode); }
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 2/15 security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
In reply to Mimi ZoharMake the security extended attributes names global.
--- include/linux/capability.h | 3 --- include/linux/xattr.h | 10 ++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 --- security/smack/smack.h | 2 -- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +0 -3
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct { }__user *cap_user_data_t; -#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" -#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
include/linux/xattr.h +10 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) +/* Security namespace */ +#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" +#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" +#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX +struct inode ;struct dentry ;
security/selinux/hooks.c +0 -3
@@ -87,9 +87,6 @@#include "netlabel.h" #include "audit.h" -#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" -#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX -#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup (u16 sclass,u16 nlmsg_type,u32 *perm);
security/smack/smack.h +0 -2
@@ -126,10 +126,8 @@ struct smack_known {/* * xattr names */ -#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" -#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH 02/15] security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
Quoted 65 lines · Mimi Zohar
Make the security extended attributes names global.
Signed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Acked-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>--- include/linux/capability.h | 3 --- include/linux/xattr.h | 10 ++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 --- security/smack/smack.h | 2 -- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)include/linux/capability.h +0
-3@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct { }__user *cap_user_data_t; -#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" -#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASKinclude/linux/xattr.h +10
-0@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) +/* Security namespace */ +#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" +#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" +#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX +struct inode ;struct dentry ;security/selinux/hooks.c +0
-3@@ -87,9 +87,6 @@#include "netlabel.h" #include "audit.h" -#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" -#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX -#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup (u16 sclass,u16 nlmsg_type,u32 *perm);security/smack/smack.h +0
-0
security/smack/smack.h struct smack_known { · line 133
Quoted 10 lines
security/smack/smack.h +0
-2@@ -126,10 +126,8 @@ struct smack_known {/* * xattr names */ -#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" -#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
Why just the SMACK64 attribute name, and not the others? They are manipulated with the same interfaces (well, fsetxattr, fgetxattr) as the SMACK64 attribute. There isn't any conceptual difference and the rationale for moving attribute names really ought to apply to them as well.
Re: [PATCH 02/15] security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
Quoted 74 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 73 lines · Mimi Zohar
Make the security extended attributes names global.
Signed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Acked-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>--- include/linux/capability.h | 3 --- include/linux/xattr.h | 10 ++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 --- security/smack/smack.h | 2 -- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)include/linux/capability.h +0
-3@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct { }__user *cap_user_data_t; -#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" -#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASKinclude/linux/xattr.h +10
-0@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) +/* Security namespace */ +#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" +#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" +#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX +struct inode ;struct dentry ;security/selinux/hooks.c +0
-3@@ -87,9 +87,6 @@#include "netlabel.h" #include "audit.h" -#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" -#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX -#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup (u16 sclass,u16 nlmsg_type,u32 *perm);security/smack/smack.h +0
-2@@ -126,10 +126,8 @@ struct smack_known {/* * xattr names */ -#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" -#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
Quoted 8 lines
security/smack/smack.h struct smack_known { · line 133
Quoted 2 lines
security/smack/smack.h +0
-0#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUTWhy just the SMACK64 attribute name, and not the others? They are manipulated with the same interfaces (well, fsetxattr, fgetxattr) as the SMACK64 attribute. There isn't any conceptual difference and the rationale for moving attribute names really ought to apply to them as well.
Hi Casey,
Moving the other SMACK xattrs is fine, but are they used on persistent files and need to be EVM protected?
Mimi
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH 02/15] security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
Quoted 87 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 75 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 73 lines · Mimi Zohar
Make the security extended attributes names global.
Signed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Acked-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>--- include/linux/capability.h | 3 --- include/linux/xattr.h | 10 ++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 --- security/smack/smack.h | 2 -- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)include/linux/capability.h +0
-3@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct { }__user *cap_user_data_t; -#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" -#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASKinclude/linux/xattr.h +10
-0@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) +/* Security namespace */ +#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" +#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" +#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX +struct inode ;struct dentry ;security/selinux/hooks.c +0
-3@@ -87,9 +87,6 @@#include "netlabel.h" #include "audit.h" -#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" -#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX -#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup (u16 sclass,u16 nlmsg_type,u32 *perm);security/smack/smack.h +0
-2@@ -126,10 +126,8 @@ struct smack_known {/* * xattr names */ -#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" -#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPINQuoted 9 lines
security/smack/smack.h struct smack_known { · line 133
Quoted 3 lines
security/smack/smack.h +0
-0#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUTWhy just the SMACK64 attribute name, and not the others? They are manipulated with the same interfaces (well, fsetxattr, fgetxattr) as the SMACK64 attribute. There isn't any conceptual difference and the rationale for moving attribute names really ought to apply to them as well.
Quoted 5 lines
Hi Casey,
Moving the other SMACK xattrs is fine, but are they used on persistent files and need to be EVM protected?
They are not persistent in any configuration available today, but as they say, tomorrow never knows. The real reason I'm concerned is that I always dislike having to go look in two places for something like attr names. Either global or local is fine, but it should be one or the other.
Quoted 4 lines
Mimi
Re: [PATCH 02/15] security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
Quoted 94 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 87 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 75 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 73 lines · Mimi Zohar
Make the security extended attributes names global.
Signed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Acked-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>--- include/linux/capability.h | 3 --- include/linux/xattr.h | 10 ++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 --- security/smack/smack.h | 2 -- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)include/linux/capability.h +0
-3@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct { }__user *cap_user_data_t; -#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" -#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASKinclude/linux/xattr.h +10
-0@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) +/* Security namespace */ +#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" +#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" +#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX +struct inode ;struct dentry ;security/selinux/hooks.c +0
-3@@ -87,9 +87,6 @@#include "netlabel.h" #include "audit.h" -#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" -#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX -#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup (u16 sclass,u16 nlmsg_type,u32 *perm);security/smack/smack.h +0
-2@@ -126,10 +126,8 @@ struct smack_known {/* * xattr names */ -#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" -#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPINQuoted 9 lines
security/smack/smack.h struct smack_known { · line 133
Quoted 3 lines
security/smack/smack.h +0
-0#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUTWhy just the SMACK64 attribute name, and not the others? They are manipulated with the same interfaces (well, fsetxattr, fgetxattr) as the SMACK64 attribute. There isn't any conceptual difference and the rationale for moving attribute names really ought to apply to them as well.
Quoted 5 lines
Hi Casey,
Moving the other SMACK xattrs is fine, but are they used on persistent files and need to be EVM protected?
Quoted 5 lines
They are not persistent in any configuration available today, but as they say, tomorrow never knows. The real reason I'm concerned is that I always dislike having to go look in two places for something like attr names. Either global or local is fine, but it should be one or the other.
agreed. So I'll update the patch to move the remaining xattrs, without including them in the HMAC.
Mimi
PATCH 3/15 xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp
In reply to Mimi Zoharvfs_getxattr_alloc() and vfs_xattr_cmp() are two new kernel xattr helper functions. vfs_getxattr_alloc() first allocates memory for the requested xattr and then retrieves it. vfs_xattr_cmp() compares a given value with the contents of an extended attribute.
--- fs/xattr.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/xattr.h | 5 +++- 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/xattr.c +58 -0
@@ -159,6 +159,64 @@ out_noalloc: }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xattr_getsecurity); +/* +* vfs_getxattr_alloc - allocate memory, if necessary, before calling getxattr +* +* Allocate memory, if not already allocated, or re-allocate correct size, +* before retrieving the extended attribute. +* +* Returns the result of alloc, if failed, or the getxattr operation. +*/ +ssize_t +vfs_getxattr_alloc (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,char **xattr_value, +size_t xattr_size,gfp_t flags) +{ +struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; +char *value = *xattr_value; +int error; + + error =xattr_permission (inode, name,MAY_READ ); +if (error) +return error; + +if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + + error = inode->i_op->getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 ); +if (error <0 ) +return error; + +if (!value || (error > xattr_size)) { + value =krealloc (*xattr_value, error +1 , flags); +if (!value) +return -ENOMEM ; +memset (value,0 , error +1 ); + } + + error = inode->i_op->getxattr (dentry, name, value, error); + *xattr_value = value; +return error; +} + +/* Compare an extended attribute value with the given value */ +int vfs_xattr_cmp (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name, +const char *value,size_t size,gfp_t flags) +{ +char *xattr_value =NULL ; +int rc; + + rc =vfs_getxattr_alloc (dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_value,0 , flags); +if (rc <0 ) +return rc; + +if ((rc != size) || (memcmp (xattr_value, value, rc) !=0 )) + rc = -EINVAL ; +else + rc =0 ; +kfree (xattr_value); +return rc; +} +ssize_t vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) {
include/linux/xattr.h +4 -1
@@ -68,7 +68,10 @@ ssize_t generic_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer,ssize_t generic_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *buffer,size_t buffer_size);int generic_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags);int generic_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name); - +ssize_t vfs_getxattr_alloc (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name, +char **xattr_value,size_t size,gfp_t flags); +int vfs_xattr_cmp (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name, +const char *value,size_t size,gfp_t flags);#endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _LINUX_XATTR_H */
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 4/15 evm: re-release
In reply to Mimi ZoharEVM protects a file's security extended attributes against integrity attacks. It maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. EVM has gone through a number of iterations, initially as an LSM module, subsequently as a LIM integrity provider, and now, when co-located with a security_ hook, embedded directly in the security_ hook, similar to IMA.
This is the first part of a local file integrity verification system. While this part does authenticate the selected extended attributes, and cryptographically bind them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. The set of protected security extended attributes is configured at compile.
EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the root's keyring, typically by 'readevmkey', which prompts for a password from the console. (Future work will define new key-types for use with TPM sealed keys and encrypted symmetric keys, so that on systems with a TPM, the EVM key will never be visible outside the kernel in plaintext form.) To signal EVM, that the key has been loaded onto the keyring, 'echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm'. This is normally done in the initrd, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. (Refer to http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)
EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks:evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr.
To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks.
To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().
--- include/linux/integrity.h | 7 + include/linux/xattr.h | 3 + security/integrity/Kconfig | 3 +- security/integrity/Makefile | 2 + security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 13 ++ security/integrity/evm/Makefile | 7 + security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 35 ++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 296 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 108 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/iint.c | 2 + security/integrity/integrity.h | 3 + 12 files changed, 657 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Makefile create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
include/linux/integrity.h +7 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@#ifndef _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H#define _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H +enum integrity_status { +INTEGRITY_PASS =0 , +INTEGRITY_FAIL , +INTEGRITY_NOLABEL , +INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN , +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY extern int integrity_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode);extern void integrity_inode_free (struct inode *inode);
include/linux/xattr.h +3 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)/* Security namespace */ +#define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm" +#define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX +#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
security/integrity/Kconfig +2 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ # config INTEGRITY def_bool y - depends on IMA + depends on IMA || EVM source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
security/integrity/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -8,3 +8,5 @@ integrity-y := iint.o subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/built-in.o +subdir-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm +obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/built-in.o
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig new file +13 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +config EVM + boolean "EVM support" + depends on SECURITY && KEYS + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_MD5 + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + default n + help + A configurable set of security extended attributes are HMAC + protected against modification using the TPM's kernel root key, + if configured, or with a pass-phrase. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
security/integrity/evm/Makefile new file +7 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# +# Makefile for building the Extended Verification Module(EVM) +# +obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o + +evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o +
security/integrity/evm/evm.h new file +35 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation +* +* Authors: +* Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> +* Kylene Hall <[email protected]> +* +* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. +* +* File: evm.h +* +*/ +#include <linux/security.h> +#include "../integrity.h" + +extern int evm_initialized; +extern char *evm_hmac; +extern int evm_hmac_size; + +/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ +extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[]; + +extern int evm_init_tpmkernkey (void ); +extern int evm_update_evmxattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *req_xattr_name, +const char *req_xattr_value, +size_t req_xattr_value_len, +struct integrity_iint_cache *iint); +extern int evm_calc_hmac (struct dentry *dentry,const char *req_xattr_name, +const char *req_xattr_value, +size_t req_xattr_value_len,char *digest); +extern int evm_init_secfs (void ); +extern void evm_cleanup_secfs (void );
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c new file +179 -0
179 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c new file +296 -0
296 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c new file +108 -0
108 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/iint.c +2 -0
@@ -133,9 +133,11 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) iint->version =0 ; iint->flags =0UL ;mutex_init (&iint->mutex); +mutex_init (&iint->evm_mutex); iint->readcount =0 ; iint->writecount =0 ; iint->opencount =0 ; + iint->hmac_status =INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ;kref_init (&iint->refcount); }
security/integrity/integrity.h +3 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {long opencount;/* opens reference count */ struct kref refcount;/* ima_iint_cache reference count */ struct rcu_head rcu; +struct mutex evm_mutex;/* protects: hmac_status, hmac */ +enum integrity_status hmac_status; +u8 hmac[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; };/* radix tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 5/15 ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
In reply to Mimi ZoharIntegrity appraisal measures files on file_free and stores the file measurement as an xattr. Measure the file before releasing it.
--- fs/file_table.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/file_table.c +1 -1
@@ -241,10 +241,10 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)if (file->f_op && file->f_op->fasync) file->f_op->fasync (-1 , file,0 ); } +ima_file_free (file);if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release (inode, file);security_file_free (file); -ima_file_free (file);if (unlikely (S_ISCHR (inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev !=NULL ))cdev_put (inode->i_cdev);fops_put (file->f_op);
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 6/15 security: imbed evm calls in security hooks
In reply to Mimi ZoharImbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr() protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode.
(Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.)
--- include/linux/evm.h | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 16 +++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/evm.h
include/linux/evm.h new file +54 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* +* evm.h +* +* Copyright (c) 2009 IBM Corporation +* Author: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> +*/ + +#ifndef _LINUX_EVM_H +#define _LINUX_EVM_H + +#include <linux/integrity.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM +extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr (struct dentry *dentry, +char *xattr_name, +char *xattr_value, +size_t xattr_value_len); +extern int evm_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name, +const void *value,size_t size); +extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name, +const void *xattr_value, +size_t xattr_value_len); +extern int evm_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name); +#else +static enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr (struct dentry *dentry, +char *xattr_name, +char *xattr_value, +size_t xattr_value_len) +{ +return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; +} + +static inline int evm_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name, +const void *value,size_t size) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name, +const void *xattr_value, +size_t xattr_value_len) +{ +return ; +} + +static inline int evm_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_EVM_H */ +#endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
security/security.c +14 -2
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/ima.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
@@ -548,9 +549,14 @@ int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)int security_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags) { +int ret; +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (dentry->d_inode)))return 0 ; -return security_ops->inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); + ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); +if (ret) +return ret; +return evm_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size); } void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -559,6 +565,7 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (dentry->d_inode)))return ; security_ops->inode_post_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); +evm_inode_post_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size); }int security_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name)
@@ -577,9 +584,14 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name) { +int ret; +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (dentry->d_inode)))return 0 ; -return security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name); + ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name); +if (ret) +return ret; +return evm_inode_removexattr (dentry, name); }int security_inode_need_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry)
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 7/15 evm: inode post removexattr
In reply to Mimi ZoharWhen an EVM protected extended attribute is removed, update 'security.evm'.
--- fs/xattr.c | 5 ++++- include/linux/evm.h | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/xattr.c +4 -1
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
@@ -294,8 +295,10 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) error = inode->i_op->removexattr (dentry, name);mutex_unlock (&inode->i_mutex); -if (!error) +if (!error) {fsnotify_xattr (dentry); +evm_inode_post_removexattr (dentry, name); + }return error; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (vfs_removexattr);
include/linux/evm.h +9 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);extern int evm_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name); +extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name);#else static enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *xattr_name,
@@ -50,5 +52,12 @@ static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, {return 0 ; } + +static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name) +{ +return ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_EVM_H */ #endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 8/15 evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr
In reply to Mimi ZoharChanging the inode's metadata may require the 'security.evm' extended attribute to be re-calculated and updated.
--- fs/attr.c | 5 ++++- include/linux/evm.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/attr.c +4 -1
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/fcntl.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> /* Taken over from the old code... */
@@ -248,8 +249,10 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr)if (ia_valid &ATTR_SIZE )up_write (&dentry->d_inode->i_alloc_sem); -if (!error) +if (!error) {fsnotify_change (dentry, ia_valid); +evm_inode_post_setattr (dentry, ia_valid); + }return error; }
include/linux/evm.h +6 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,char *xattr_name, char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +extern void evm_inode_post_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,int ia_valid);extern int evm_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size); extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -33,6 +34,11 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; } +static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,int ia_valid) +{ +return ; +} +static inline int evm_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size) {
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 9/15 evm: inode_post_init
In reply to Mimi ZoharInitialize 'security.evm' for new files. Reduce number of arguments by defining 'struct xattr'.
--- include/linux/evm.h | 11 ++++++++++ include/linux/xattr.h | 6 +++++ security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 3 ++ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
include/linux/evm.h +11 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#define _LINUX_EVM_H#include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> #ifdef CONFIG_EVM extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -25,6 +26,9 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,extern int evm_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name);extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name); +extern int evm_inode_post_init_security (struct inode *inode, +const struct xattr *new, +struct xattr *evm);#else static enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *xattr_name,
@@ -65,5 +69,12 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,return ; } +static inline int evm_inode_post_init_security (struct inode *inode, +const struct xattr *new, +struct xattr *evm) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_EVM_H */ #endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
include/linux/xattr.h +6 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ struct xattr_handler { size_t size, int flags, int handler_flags); }; +struct xattr { +char *name; +void *value; +size_t value_len; +}; +ssize_t xattr_getsecurity (struct inode *,const char *,void *,size_t );ssize_t vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,void *,size_t );ssize_t vfs_listxattr (struct dentry *d,char *list,size_t size);
security/integrity/evm/evm.h +3 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@* File: evm.h * */ +#include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include "../integrity.h"
@@ -31,5 +32,7 @@ extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,extern int evm_calc_hmac (struct dentry *dentry,const char *req_xattr_name,const char *req_xattr_value,size_t req_xattr_value_len,char *digest); +extern int evm_init_hmac (struct inode *inode,struct xattr *xattr, +char *hmac_val);extern int evm_init_secfs (void );extern void evm_cleanup_secfs (void );
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +19 -0
@@ -150,6 +150,25 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,return rc; } +int evm_init_hmac (struct inode *inode,struct xattr *lsm_xattr,char *hmac_val) +{ +struct hash_desc desc; +struct scatterlist sg[1 ]; +int error; + + error =init_desc (&desc); +if (error !=0 ) { +printk (KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n" ); +return error; + } + +sg_init_one (sg, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len); +crypto_hash_update (&desc, sg, lsm_xattr->value_len); +hmac_add_misc (&desc, inode, hmac_val); +crypto_free_hash (desc.tfm); +return 0 ; +} +/* * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC */
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +36 -0
@@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) found =1 ;break ; } +if (strncmp (req_xattr_name, + *xattrname +XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN , +strlen (req_xattr_name)) ==0 ) { + found =1 ; +break ; + } }return found; }
@@ -256,6 +262,36 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)return ; } +/* +* evm_inode_post_init_security - initializes security.evm +*/ +int evm_inode_post_init_security (struct inode *inode,struct xattr *lsm_xattr, +struct xattr *evm_xattr) +{ +u8 *hmac_val; +int rc; + +if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr (lsm_xattr->name)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + + hmac_val =kzalloc (MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ,GFP_NOFS ); +if (!hmac_val) +return -ENOMEM ; + + rc =evm_init_hmac (inode, lsm_xattr, hmac_val); +if (rc <0 ) + goto out; + + evm_xattr->value = hmac_val; + evm_xattr->value_len = evm_hmac_size; + evm_xattr->name =XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX ; +return 0 ; +out: +kfree (hmac_val); +return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (evm_inode_post_init_security); +static struct crypto_hash *tfm_hmac;/* preload crypto alg */ static int __init init_evm (void ) {
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 10/15 fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
In reply to Mimi ZoharAfter creating the initial LSM security extended attribute, call evm_inode_post_init_security() to create the 'security.evm' extended attribute.
(Support for other fs still needed.)
--- fs/ext2/xattr_security.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- fs/ext3/xattr_security.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- fs/ext4/xattr_security.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
fs/ext2/xattr_security.c +24 -7
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/ext2_fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include "xattr.h" static size_t
@@ -50,21 +51,37 @@ int ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir) { int err; -size_t len; -void *value; -char *name; +struct xattr lsm_xattr; +struct xattr evm_xattr; - err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, &name, &value, &len); + err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, &lsm_xattr.name, + &lsm_xattr.value, + &lsm_xattr.value_len);if (err) {if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP )return 0 ;return err; } err =ext2_xattr_set (inode,EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , - name, value, len,0 ); -kfree (name); -kfree (value); + lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value, + lsm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; + + err =evm_inode_post_init_security (inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr); +if (err) + goto out; + err =ext2_xattr_set (inode,EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , + evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value, + evm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +kfree (evm_xattr.value); +out: +kfree (lsm_xattr.name); +kfree (lsm_xattr.value); +if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP ) +return 0 ;return err; + } const struct xattr_handler ext2_xattr_security_handler = {
fs/ext3/xattr_security.c +23 -7
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include <linux/ext3_jbd.h> #include <linux/ext3_fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include "xattr.h" static size_t
@@ -52,20 +53,35 @@ int ext3_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir) {int err; -size_t len; -void *value; -char *name; +struct xattr lsm_xattr; +struct xattr evm_xattr; - err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, &name, &value, &len); + err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, &lsm_xattr.name, + &lsm_xattr.value, + &lsm_xattr.value_len);if (err) {if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP )return 0 ;return err; } err =ext3_xattr_set_handle (handle, inode,EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , - name, value, len,0 ); -kfree (name); -kfree (value); + lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value, + lsm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; + + err =evm_inode_post_init_security (inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr); +if (err) + goto out; + err =ext3_xattr_set_handle (handle, inode,EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , + evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value, + evm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +kfree (evm_xattr.value); +out: +kfree (lsm_xattr.name); +kfree (lsm_xattr.value); +if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP ) +return 0 ;return err; }
fs/ext4/xattr_security.c +23 -7
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include "ext4_jbd2.h" #include "ext4.h" #include "xattr.h"
@@ -52,20 +53,35 @@ int ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir) {int err; -size_t len; -void *value; -char *name; +struct xattr lsm_xattr; +struct xattr evm_xattr; - err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, &name, &value, &len); + err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, &lsm_xattr.name, + &lsm_xattr.value, + &lsm_xattr.value_len);if (err) {if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP )return 0 ;return err; } err =ext4_xattr_set_handle (handle, inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , - name, value, len,0 ); -kfree (name); -kfree (value); + lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value, + lsm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; + + err =evm_inode_post_init_security (inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr); +if (err) + goto out; + err =ext4_xattr_set_handle (handle, inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , + evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value, + evm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +kfree (evm_xattr.value); +out: +kfree (lsm_xattr.name); +kfree (lsm_xattr.value); +if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP ) +return 0 ;return err; }
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 11/15 ima: integrity appraisal extension
In reply to Mimi ZoharThis patch adds local measurement integrity appraisal to IMA. (Taken from the original EVM postings.) New is the creation and maintainance of an extended attribute 'security.ima' containing the file hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by EVM, if enabled and configured.
Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify the security.ima xattr integrity and, assuming success, compares the xattr hash value with the collected file measurement.
Changelog:
unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status, not before. (Found by Joe Perches)
--- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 + include/linux/xattr.h | 3 + security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 + security/integrity/iint.c | 1 + security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 14 ++++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 42 +++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 54 +++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 76 +++++++++++++++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 7 ++- 11 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -0
@@ -973,6 +973,10 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file ihash_entries= [KNL] Set number of hash buckets for inode cache. + ima_appraise= [IMA] appraise integrity measurements + Format: { "off" | "enforce" | "log" | "fix" } + default: "enforce" + ima_audit= [IMA] Format: { "0" | "1" } 0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
include/linux/xattr.h +3 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@#define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm"#define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX +#define XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX "ima" +#define XATTR_NAME_IMA XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX +#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +3 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK XATTR_NAME_SMACK,#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +XATTR_NAME_IMA , +#endifXATTR_NAME_CAPS ,NULL };
security/integrity/iint.c +1 -0
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) iint->readcount =0 ; iint->writecount =0 ; iint->opencount =0 ; + iint->hash_status =INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; iint->hmac_status =INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ;kref_init (&iint->refcount); }
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +14 -0
@@ -54,3 +54,17 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES default y help Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules. + +config IMA_APPRAISE + bool "Appraise integrity measurements" + depends on IMA + default n + help + This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal. + To protect extended attributes from offline attack, enable + and configure EVM. + + For more information on integrity appraisal refer to: + <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net> + If unsure, say N. +
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -7,3 +7,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o ima_audit.o + +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +39 -3
69 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +39 -15
103 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c new file +139 -0
139 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +64 -12
151 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/integrity.h +6 -1
@@ -18,13 +18,18 @@#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE/* iint cache flags */ -#define IMA_MEASURED 1 +#define IMA_MEASURE 1 +#define IMA_MEASURED 2 +#define IMA_APPRAISE 4 +#define IMA_APPRAISED 8 +#define IMA_COLLECTED 16/* integrity data associated with an inode */ struct integrity_iint_cache {u64 version;/* track inode changes */ unsigned long flags;u8 digest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +enum integrity_status hash_status;struct mutex mutex;/* protects: version, flags, digest */ long readcount;/* measured files readcount */ long writecount;/* measured files writecount */
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 12/15 ima: appraise default rules
In reply to Mimi ZoharUnlike the IMA measurement policy, the appraise policy can not be dependent on runtime process information, such as the task uid, as the 'security.ima' xattr is written on file close and must be updated each time the file changes, regardless of the current task uid. The appraise default policy appraises all files owned by root.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 14 +++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -0
@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);enum ima_hooks {FILE_CHECK =1 ,FILE_MMAP ,BPRM_CHECK ,POST_SETATTR };int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,enum ima_hooks func,int mask); +int ima_match_appraise_policy (struct inode *inode,enum ima_hooks func, +int mask);void ima_init_policy (void );void ima_update_policy (void );ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule (char *);
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +13 -1
@@ -28,7 +28,19 @@ __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);int ima_must_appraise (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct inode *inode,enum ima_hooks func,int mask) { -return 0 ; +int must_appraise, rc =0 ; + +if (!ima_appraise || !inode->i_op->getxattr) +return 0 ; +else if (iint->flags &IMA_APPRAISED ) +return 0 ; + + must_appraise =ima_match_appraise_policy (inode, func, mask); +if (must_appraise) { + iint->flags |=IMA_APPRAISE ; + rc =1 ; + } +return rc; } static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +59 -2
122 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 13/15 ima: inode post_setattr
In reply to Mimi ZoharChanging an inode's metadata may result in our not needing to appraise the file. In such cases, we must remove 'security.ima'.
--- fs/attr.c | 2 ++ include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/attr.c +2 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/fcntl.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> /* Taken over from the old code... */
@@ -251,6 +252,7 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr)if (!error) {fsnotify_change (dentry, ia_valid); +ima_inode_post_setattr (dentry);evm_inode_post_setattr (dentry, ia_valid); }
include/linux/ima.h +6 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);extern void ima_file_free (struct file *file);extern int ima_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long prot);extern void ima_counts_get (struct file *file); +extern void ima_inode_post_setattr (struct dentry *dentry);#else static inline int ima_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -46,5 +47,10 @@ static inline void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)return ; } +static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr (struct dentry *dentry) +{ +return ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */ #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 14/15 ima: add ima_inode_setxattr and ima_inode_removexattr
In reply to Mimi ZoharBased on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security' xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'.
--- include/linux/ima.h | 13 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +13 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);extern int ima_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long prot);extern void ima_counts_get (struct file *file);extern void ima_inode_post_setattr (struct dentry *dentry); +extern int ima_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name, +const void *xattr_value,size_t xattr_value_len); +extern int ima_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name);#else static inline int ima_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -52,5 +55,15 @@ static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)return ; } +int ima_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name, +const void *xattr_value,size_t xattr_value_len) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +int ima_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name) +{ +return 0 ; +}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */ #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +26 -0
@@ -371,6 +371,32 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)return ; } +/* +* ima_protect_xattr - protect 'security.ima' +* +* Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'. +*/ +int ima_protect_xattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name, +const void *xattr_value,size_t xattr_value_len) +{ +if ((strcmp (xattr_name,XATTR_NAME_IMA ) ==0 ) + && !capable (CAP_MAC_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; +return 0 ; +} + +int ima_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name, +const void *xattr_value,size_t xattr_value_len) +{ +return ima_protect_xattr (dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); +} + +int ima_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name) +{ +return ima_protect_xattr (dentry, xattr_name,NULL ,0 ); +} +static int __init init_ima (void ) {int error;
security/security.c +6 -0
@@ -556,6 +556,9 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags);if (ret)return ret; + ret =ima_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size); +if (ret) +return ret;return evm_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size); }
@@ -591,6 +594,9 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name);if (ret)return ret; + ret =ima_inode_removexattr (dentry, name); +if (ret) +return ret;return evm_inode_removexattr (dentry, name); }
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
PATCH 15/15 ima: appraise measurement required
In reply to Mimi ZoharEven if allowed to update security.ima, reset the appraisal flags, forcing re-appraisal.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +31 -2
@@ -385,18 +385,47 @@ int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,return 0 ; } +static void ima_reset_appraise_flags (struct inode *inode) +{ +struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + +if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode)) +return ; + + iint =integrity_iint_find_get (inode); +if (!iint) +return ; + +mutex_lock (&iint->mutex); + iint->flags &= ~(IMA_COLLECTED |IMA_APPRAISED |IMA_MEASURED ); +mutex_unlock (&iint->mutex); +kref_put (&iint->refcount, iint_free); +return ; +} +int ima_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name,const void *xattr_value,size_t xattr_value_len) { -return ima_protect_xattr (dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, +int result; + + result =ima_protect_xattr (dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); +if (!result) +ima_reset_appraise_flags (dentry->d_inode); +return result; }int ima_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name) { -return ima_protect_xattr (dentry, xattr_name,NULL ,0 ); +int result; + + result =ima_protect_xattr (dentry, xattr_name,NULL ,0 ); +if (!result) +ima_reset_appraise_flags (dentry->d_inode); +return result; } +static int __init init_ima (void ) {int error;
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1