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add some long-missing capabilities to fs_mask

PATCH In review Serge E. Hallyn 3 participants 4 messages Apr 13, 2009

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 add some long-missing capabilities to fs_mask

When POSIX capabilities were introduced during the 2.1 Linux cycle, the fs mask, which represents the capabilities which having fsuid==0 is supposed to grant, did not include CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. However, before capabilities the privilege to call these did in fact depend upon fsuid==0.

This patch introduces those capabilities into the fsmask, restoring the old behavior.

See the thread starting at http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/3/11/157 for reference.

Note that if this fix is deemed valid, then earlier kernel versions (2.4 and 2.2) ought to be fixed too.

Changelog:
[Mar 23] Actually delete old CAP_FS_SET definition... [Mar 20] Updated against J. Bruce Fields's patch

---
 include/linux/capability.h |   23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +19 -4
index 4864a43..c302110 100644
@@ -377,7 +377,21 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 #define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi)  \
 	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
 
+/*
+ * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
+ *
+ * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
+ * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
+ *
+ * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
+ *
+ * We could also define fsmask as follows:
+ *   1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
+ *   2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
+ */
+
 # define CAP_FS_MASK_B0     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN)		\
+			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD)		\
 			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)	\
 			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)	\
 			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
@@ -392,11 +406,12 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
 # define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
 # define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
 # define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }})
-# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
+				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
+				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
 # define CAP_NFSD_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
-					    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) \
-					    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD), \
-					    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
+				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
+				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
 
 #endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
 
Signature · 8 lines
1.5.4.3


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#1 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

When POSIX capabilities were introduced during the 2.1 Linux cycle, the fs mask, which represents the capabilities which having fsuid==0 is supposed to grant, did not include CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. However, before capabilities the privilege to call these did in fact depend upon fsuid==0.

Wow. How did this manage to stay un-noticed for this long?

#3 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 8 lines · Quoting [email protected] ([email protected]):
Quoted 5 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

When POSIX capabilities were introduced during the 2.1 Linux cycle, the fs mask, which represents the capabilities which having fsuid==0 is supposed to grant, did not include CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. However, before capabilities the privilege to call these did in fact depend upon fsuid==0.

Wow. How did this manage to stay un-noticed for this long?

I guess setfsuid() is mainly used by NFS, and not a lot of people do mknod over NFS?

To run into this, you'd have to do something like

1. run as root
2. setresuid(500,500,0);
3. (...)
4. setfsuid(0);
5. mknod(path, mode, dev);

so I suspect the simpler (cross-platform) thing to do was seteuid(0) for the mknod anyway... Plus there is nowhere I've found where the precise capabilities afforded to fsuid=0 are documented, so noone would complain, they'd just accept it and do seteuid()?

I'm guessing of course.

-serge