add some long-missing capabilities to fs_mask
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 add some long-missing capabilities to fs_mask
When POSIX capabilities were introduced during the 2.1 Linux cycle, the fs mask, which represents the capabilities which having fsuid==0 is supposed to grant, did not include CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. However, before capabilities the privilege to call these did in fact depend upon fsuid==0.
This patch introduces those capabilities into the fsmask, restoring the old behavior.
See the thread starting at http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/3/11/157 for reference.
Note that if this fix is deemed valid, then earlier kernel versions (2.4 and 2.2) ought to be fixed too.
Changelog:
[Mar 23] Actually delete old CAP_FS_SET definition... [Mar 20] Updated against J. Bruce Fields's patch
--- include/linux/capability.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++---- 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +19 -4
@@ -377,7 +377,21 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32 (__capi) \ for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi) +/* +* CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS: +* +* The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant. +* At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. +* +* It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs. +* +* We could also define fsmask as follows: +* 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions +* 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions +*/ +# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \ + | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
@@ -392,11 +406,12 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }}) -# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) +# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ + | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ + CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) \ - | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD), \ - CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) + | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \ + CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
Signature · 8 lines
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Quoted 5 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
When POSIX capabilities were introduced during the 2.1 Linux cycle, the fs mask, which represents the capabilities which having fsuid==0 is supposed to grant, did not include
CAP_MKNODandCAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. However, before capabilities the privilege to call these did in fact depend upon fsuid==0.
Wow. How did this manage to stay un-noticed for this long?
Quoted 2 lines · On Mon, 13 Apr 2009, [email protected] wrote:
Wow. How did this manage to stay un-noticed for this long?
Because nobody uses capabilities?
Linus
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Quoted 8 lines · Quoting [email protected] ([email protected]):
Quoted 5 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
When POSIX capabilities were introduced during the 2.1 Linux cycle, the fs mask, which represents the capabilities which having fsuid==0 is supposed to grant, did not include
CAP_MKNODandCAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. However, before capabilities the privilege to call these did in fact depend upon fsuid==0.Wow. How did this manage to stay un-noticed for this long?
I guess setfsuid() is mainly used by NFS, and not a lot of people do mknod over NFS?
To run into this, you'd have to do something like
1. run as root
2. setresuid(500,500,0);
3. (...)
4. setfsuid(0);
5. mknod(path, mode, dev);
so I suspect the simpler (cross-platform) thing to do was seteuid(0) for the mknod anyway... Plus there is nowhere I've found where the precise capabilities afforded to fsuid=0 are documented, so noone would complain, they'd just accept it and do seteuid()?
I'm guessing of course.
-serge