ivshmem security fixes
v3 cover ivshmem security fixes
Hello,
This series tightens security on incoming data for ivshmem, originally sparked by SUSE's security team (Sebastian Krahmer). I've combined them and tackled remaining review feedback.
Regards,
Andreas
Changes from Sebastian's #2:
* Rebased onto Stefan's patches
* Dropped g_realloc() check (Stefan)
* Fixed fd leak and appended a patch fixing another one (Stefan)
* Simplified comment (Stefan)
Changes from Stefan's series:
* Modified to handle partial reads (Peter/Gerd)
* Changed check from > to >= (Peter)
Andreas Färber (1):
ivshmem: Fix fd leak on error
Sebastian Krahmer (1):
ivshmem: Fix potential OOB r/w access
Stefan Hajnoczi (2):
ivshmem: Check ivshmem_read() size argument
ivshmem: validate incoming_posn value from server
hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.5
PATCH v3 1/4 ivshmem: Check ivshmem_read() size argument
From: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
The third argument to the fd_read() callback implemented by ivshmem_read() is the number of bytes, not a flags field. Fix this and check we received enough bytes before accessing the buffer pointer.
--- hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
hw/misc/ivshmem.c +28 -2
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#include "migration/migration.h" #include "qapi/qmp/qerror.h" #include "qemu/event_notifier.h" +#include "qemu/fifo8.h" #include "sysemu/char.h" #include <sys/mman.h>
@@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ typedef struct IVShmemState {CharDriverState **eventfd_chr;CharDriverState *server_chr; +Fifo8 incoming_fifo;MemoryRegion ivshmem_mmio;/* We might need to register the BAR before we actually have the memory.
@@ -424,14 +426,35 @@ static void increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size) { } } -static void ivshmem_read (void *opaque,const uint8_t * buf,int flags) +static void ivshmem_read (void *opaque,const uint8_t *buf,int size) {IVShmemState *s = opaque;int incoming_fd, tmp_fd;int guest_max_eventfd;long incoming_posn; -memcpy (&incoming_posn, buf,sizeof (long )); +if (fifo8_is_empty (&s->incoming_fifo) && size ==sizeof (incoming_posn)) { +memcpy (&incoming_posn, buf, size); + }else { +const uint8_t *p; +uint32_t num; + +IVSHMEM_DPRINTF ("short read of %d bytes\n" , size); + num =MAX (size,sizeof (long ) -fifo8_num_used (&s->incoming_fifo)); +fifo8_push_all (&s->incoming_fifo, buf, num); +if (fifo8_num_used (&s->incoming_fifo) <sizeof (incoming_posn)) { +return ; + } + size -= num; + buf += num; + p =fifo8_pop_buf (&s->incoming_fifo,sizeof (incoming_posn), &num); +g_assert (num ==sizeof (incoming_posn)); +memcpy (&incoming_posn, p,sizeof (incoming_posn)); +if (size >0 ) { +fifo8_push_all (&s->incoming_fifo, buf, size); + } + } +/* pick off s->server_chr->msgfd and store it, posn should accompany msg */ tmp_fd =qemu_chr_fe_get_msgfd (s->server_chr);IVSHMEM_DPRINTF ("posn is %ld, fd is %d\n" , incoming_posn, tmp_fd);
@@ -663,6 +686,8 @@ static int pci_ivshmem_init(PCIDevice *dev) s->ivshmem_size =ivshmem_get_size (s); } +fifo8_create (&s->incoming_fifo,sizeof (long )); +register_savevm (DEVICE (dev),"ivshmem" ,0 ,0 , ivshmem_save, ivshmem_load, dev);
@@ -796,6 +821,7 @@ static void pci_ivshmem_uninit(PCIDevice *dev)memory_region_del_subregion (&s->bar, &s->ivshmem);vmstate_unregister_ram (&s->ivshmem,DEVICE (dev));unregister_savevm (DEVICE (dev),"ivshmem" , s); +fifo8_destroy (&s->incoming_fifo); }static Property ivshmem_properties[] = {
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.5
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 1/4] ivshmem: Check ivshmem_read() size argument
Quoted 6 lines · Andreas Färber
From: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
The third argument to the
fd_read()callback implemented byivshmem_read()is the number of bytes, not a flags field. Fix this and check we received enough bytes before accessing the buffer pointer.
Quoted 7 lines
Cc Cam Macdonell <[email protected]>Reported-by Sebastian Krahmer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>[AF: Handle partial reads via FIFO]Reported-by Peter Maydell <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Andreas Färber <[email protected]>
Quoted 81 lines
--- hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)hw/misc/ivshmem.c +28
-2@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#include "migration/migration.h" #include "qapi/qmp/qerror.h" #include "qemu/event_notifier.h" +#include "qemu/fifo8.h" #include "sysemu/char.h" #include <sys/mman.h> @@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ typedef struct IVShmemState {CharDriverState **eventfd_chr;CharDriverState *server_chr; +Fifo8 incoming_fifo;MemoryRegion ivshmem_mmio;/* We might need to register the BAR before we actually have the memory. @@ -424,14 +426,35 @@ static void increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size) { } } -static void ivshmem_read (void *opaque,const uint8_t * buf,int flags) +static void ivshmem_read (void *opaque,const uint8_t *buf,int size) {IVShmemState *s = opaque;int incoming_fd, tmp_fd;int guest_max_eventfd;long incoming_posn; -memcpy (&incoming_posn, buf,sizeof (long )); +if (fifo8_is_empty (&s->incoming_fifo) && size ==sizeof (incoming_posn)) { +memcpy (&incoming_posn, buf, size); + }else { +const uint8_t *p; +uint32_t num; + +IVSHMEM_DPRINTF ("short read of %d bytes\n" , size); + num =MAX (size,sizeof (long ) -fifo8_num_used (&s->incoming_fifo)); +fifo8_push_all (&s->incoming_fifo, buf, num); +if (fifo8_num_used (&s->incoming_fifo) <sizeof (incoming_posn)) { +return ; + } + size -= num; + buf += num; + p =fifo8_pop_buf (&s->incoming_fifo,sizeof (incoming_posn), &num); +g_assert (num ==sizeof (incoming_posn)); +memcpy (&incoming_posn, p,sizeof (incoming_posn)); +if (size >0 ) { +fifo8_push_all (&s->incoming_fifo, buf, size); + } + } +/* pick off s->server_chr->msgfd and store it, posn should accompany msg */ tmp_fd =qemu_chr_fe_get_msgfd (s->server_chr);IVSHMEM_DPRINTF ("posn is %ld, fd is %d\n" , incoming_posn, tmp_fd);@@ -663,6 +686,8 @@ static int pci_ivshmem_init(PCIDevice *dev) s->ivshmem_size =ivshmem_get_size (s); } +fifo8_create (&s->incoming_fifo,sizeof (long )); +register_savevm (DEVICE (dev),"ivshmem" ,0 ,0 , ivshmem_save, ivshmem_load, dev);@@ -796,6 +821,7 @@ static void pci_ivshmem_uninit(PCIDevice *dev)memory_region_del_subregion (&s->bar, &s->ivshmem);vmstate_unregister_ram (&s->ivshmem,DEVICE (dev));unregister_savevm (DEVICE (dev),"ivshmem" , s); +fifo8_destroy (&s->incoming_fifo); }static Property ivshmem_properties[] = {Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.5
PATCH v3 2/4 ivshmem: validate incoming_posn value from server
In reply to Andreas FärberFrom: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Check incoming_posn to avoid out-of-bounds array accesses if the ivshmem server on the host sends invalid values.
--- hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
hw/misc/ivshmem.c +8 -0
@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ static void close_guest_eventfds(IVShmemState *s, int posn)if (!ivshmem_has_feature (s,IVSHMEM_IOEVENTFD )) {return ; } +if (posn <0 || posn >= s->nb_peers) { +return ; + } guest_curr_max = s->peers[posn].nb_eventfds;
@@ -455,6 +458,11 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) } } +if (incoming_posn <-1 ) { +IVSHMEM_DPRINTF ("invalid incoming_posn %ld\n" , incoming_posn); +return ; + } +/* pick off s->server_chr->msgfd and store it, posn should accompany msg */ tmp_fd =qemu_chr_fe_get_msgfd (s->server_chr);IVSHMEM_DPRINTF ("posn is %ld, fd is %d\n" , incoming_posn, tmp_fd);
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.5
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 2/4] ivshmem: validate incoming_posn value from server
Quoted 11 lines · Andreas Färber
From: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Check
incoming_posnto avoid out-of-bounds array accesses if the ivshmem server on the host sends invalid values.Cc Cam Macdonell <[email protected]>Reported-by Sebastian Krahmer <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>[AF: Tighten upper bound check for posn in close_guest_eventfds()]Signed-off-by Andreas Färber <[email protected]>
Quoted 32 lines
--- hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)hw/misc/ivshmem.c +8
-0@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ static void close_guest_eventfds(IVShmemState *s, int posn)if (!ivshmem_has_feature (s,IVSHMEM_IOEVENTFD )) {return ; } +if (posn <0 || posn >= s->nb_peers) { +return ; + } guest_curr_max = s->peers[posn].nb_eventfds;@@ -455,6 +458,11 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size) } } +if (incoming_posn <-1 ) { +IVSHMEM_DPRINTF ("invalid incoming_posn %ld\n" , incoming_posn); +return ; + } +/* pick off s->server_chr->msgfd and store it, posn should accompany msg */ tmp_fd =qemu_chr_fe_get_msgfd (s->server_chr);IVSHMEM_DPRINTF ("posn is %ld, fd is %d\n" , incoming_posn, tmp_fd);Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.5
PATCH v3 3/4 ivshmem: Fix potential OOB r/w access
In reply to Andreas FärberFrom: Sebastian Krahmer <[email protected]>
Fix OOB access via malformed incoming_posn parameters and check that requested memory is actually alloc'ed.
--- hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
hw/misc/ivshmem.c +23 -4
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@#include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/types.h> +#include <limits.h> #define PCI_VENDOR_ID_IVSHMEM PCI_VENDOR_ID_REDHAT_QUMRANET#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_IVSHMEM 0x1110
@@ -410,14 +411,24 @@ static void close_guest_eventfds(IVShmemState *s, int posn)/* this function increase the dynamic storage need to store data about other * guests */ -static void increase_dynamic_storage (IVShmemState *s,int new_min_size) { +static int increase_dynamic_storage (IVShmemState *s,int new_min_size) +{int j, old_nb_alloc; +/* check for integer overflow */ +if (new_min_size >=INT_MAX /sizeof (Peer) -1 || new_min_size <=0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + old_nb_alloc = s->nb_peers; -while (new_min_size >= s->nb_peers) - s->nb_peers = s->nb_peers *2 ; +if (new_min_size >= s->nb_peers) { +/* +1 because #new_min_size is used as last array index */ + s->nb_peers = new_min_size +1 ; + }else { +return 0 ; + }IVSHMEM_DPRINTF ("bumping storage to %d guests\n" , s->nb_peers); s->peers =g_realloc (s->peers, s->nb_peers *sizeof (Peer));
@@ -427,6 +438,8 @@ static void increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size) { s->peers[j].eventfds =NULL ; s->peers[j].nb_eventfds =0 ; } + +return 0 ; }static void ivshmem_read (void *opaque,const uint8_t *buf,int size)
@@ -469,7 +482,13 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)/* make sure we have enough space for this guest */ if (incoming_posn >= s->nb_peers) { -increase_dynamic_storage (s, incoming_posn); +if (increase_dynamic_storage (s, incoming_posn) <0 ) { +error_report ("increase_dynamic_storage() failed" ); +if (tmp_fd !=-1 ) { +close (tmp_fd); + } +return ; + } }if (tmp_fd ==-1 ) {
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.5
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 3/4] ivshmem: Fix potential OOB r/w access
Quoted 9 lines · Andreas Färber
From: Sebastian Krahmer <[email protected]>
Fix OOB access via malformed
incoming_posnparameters and check that requested memory is actually alloc'ed.Signed-off-by Sebastian Krahmer <[email protected]>[AF: Rebased, cleanups, avoid fd leak]Signed-off-by Andreas Färber <[email protected]>
Quoted 70 lines
--- hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)hw/misc/ivshmem.c +23
-4@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@#include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/types.h> +#include <limits.h> #define PCI_VENDOR_ID_IVSHMEM PCI_VENDOR_ID_REDHAT_QUMRANET#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_IVSHMEM 0x1110@@ -410,14 +411,24 @@ static void close_guest_eventfds(IVShmemState *s, int posn)/* this function increase the dynamic storage need to store data about other * guests */ -static void increase_dynamic_storage (IVShmemState *s,int new_min_size) { +static int increase_dynamic_storage (IVShmemState *s,int new_min_size) +{int j, old_nb_alloc; +/* check for integer overflow */ +if (new_min_size >=INT_MAX /sizeof (Peer) -1 || new_min_size <=0 ) { +return -1 ; + } + old_nb_alloc = s->nb_peers; -while (new_min_size >= s->nb_peers) - s->nb_peers = s->nb_peers *2 ; +if (new_min_size >= s->nb_peers) { +/* +1 because #new_min_size is used as last array index */ + s->nb_peers = new_min_size +1 ; + }else { +return 0 ; + }IVSHMEM_DPRINTF ("bumping storage to %d guests\n" , s->nb_peers); s->peers =g_realloc (s->peers, s->nb_peers *sizeof (Peer));@@ -427,6 +438,8 @@ static void increase_dynamic_storage(IVShmemState *s, int new_min_size) { s->peers[j].eventfds =NULL ; s->peers[j].nb_eventfds =0 ; } + +return 0 ; }static void ivshmem_read (void *opaque,const uint8_t *buf,int size)@@ -469,7 +482,13 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)/* make sure we have enough space for this guest */ if (incoming_posn >= s->nb_peers) { -increase_dynamic_storage (s, incoming_posn); +if (increase_dynamic_storage (s, incoming_posn) <0 ) { +error_report ("increase_dynamic_storage() failed" ); +if (tmp_fd !=-1 ) { +close (tmp_fd); + } +return ; + } }if (tmp_fd ==-1 ) {Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.5
PATCH v3 4/4 ivshmem: Fix fd leak on error
In reply to Andreas Färber--- hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
hw/misc/ivshmem.c +1 -0
@@ -512,6 +512,7 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)if (incoming_fd ==-1 ) {fprintf (stderr,"could not allocate file descriptor %s\n" ,strerror (errno)); +close (tmp_fd);return ; }
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.5
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v3 4/4] ivshmem: Fix fd leak on error
Quoted 3 lines · Andreas Färber
Reported-by Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Andreas Färber <[email protected]>
Quoted 18 lines
--- hw/misc/ivshmem.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)hw/misc/ivshmem.c +1
-0@@ -512,6 +512,7 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)if (incoming_fd ==-1 ) {fprintf (stderr,"could not allocate file descriptor %s\n" ,strerror (errno)); +close (tmp_fd);return ; }Signature · 1 line
1.8.4.5
Quoted 33 lines · Andreas Färber
Hello,
This series tightens security on incoming data for ivshmem, originally sparked by SUSE's security team (Sebastian Krahmer). I've combined them and tackled remaining review feedback.
Regards,
AndreasChanges from Sebastian's #2:
* Rebased onto Stefan's patches
* Droppedg_realloc()check (Stefan)
* Fixed fd leak and appended a patch fixing another one (Stefan)
* Simplified comment (Stefan)Changes from Stefan's series:
* Modified to handle partial reads (Peter/Gerd)
* Changed check from > to >= (Peter)Cc Cam Macdonell <[email protected]>Cc Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>Cc Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>Cc Sebastian Krahmer <[email protected]>Cc Peter Maydell <[email protected]>Cc Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>Cc David Marchand <[email protected]>Andreas Färber (1):
ivshmem: Fix fd leak on errorSebastian Krahmer (1):
ivshmem: Fix potential OOB r/w access
Quoted 7 lines
Stefan Hajnoczi (2):
ivshmem: Checkivshmem_read()size argument
ivshmem: validateincoming_posnvalue from serverhw/misc/ivshmem.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
These seem to have falled on the floor, and they're a dependency for Andrew's error_report cleanup, so I picked them up.
Paolo