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Patch "fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers" has been added to the 4.11-stable tree

PATCH [email protected] 1 participant 1 message Jun 26, 2017

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers

to the 4.11-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
fs-exec.c-account-for-argv-envp-pointers.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.11 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.

Quoted 1 line

From 98da7d08850fb8bdeb395d6368ed15753304aa0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 15:08:57 -0700
Subject: fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 98da7d08850fb8bdeb395d6368ed15753304aa0c upstream.

When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit, the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the pointers to the strings.

For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721 single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB /
4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884).

The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365).

[[email protected]: additional commenting from Kees]
Fixes b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support")
Cc Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]>
---
 fs/exec.c |   28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +24 -4
@@ -220,8 +220,26 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct
 
 	if (write) {
 		unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
+		unsigned long ptr_size;
 		struct rlimit *rlim;
 
+		/*
+		 * Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we
+		 * must account for them as well.
+		 *
+		 * The size calculation is the entire vma while each arg page is
+		 * built, so each time we get here it's calculating how far it
+		 * is currently (rather than each call being just the newly
+		 * added size from the arg page).  As a result, we need to
+		 * always add the entire size of the pointers, so that on the
+		 * last call to get_arg_page() we'll actually have the entire
+		 * correct size.
+		 */
+		ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *);
+		if (ptr_size > ULONG_MAX - size)
+			goto fail;
+		size += ptr_size;
+
 		acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);
 
 		/*
@@ -239,13 +257,15 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct
 		 *    to work from.
 		 */
 		rlim = current->signal->rlim;
-		if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) {
-			put_page(page);
-			return NULL;
-		}
+		if (size > READ_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4)
+			goto fail;
 	}
 
 	return page;
+
+fail:
+	put_page(page);
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static void put_arg_page(struct page *page)

Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are

queue-4.11/fs-exec.c-account-for-argv-envp-pointers.patch