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powerpc: Memory Protection Keys

RFC Superseded Ram Pai 4 participants 25 messages Jun 27, 2017 – Jun 28, 2017

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v4 of 14 Superseded Latest is v14 →

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Ram Pai

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v4 cover powerpc: Memory Protection Keys

Memory protection keys enable applications to protect its address space from inadvertent access or corruption from itself.

The overall idea:

A process allocates a key and associates it with
a address range within its address space.
The process than can dynamically set read/write
permissions on the key without involving the
kernel. Any code that violates the permissions
off the address space; as defined by its associated key, will receive a segmentation fault.

This patch series enables the feature on PPC64 HPTE platform.

ISA3.0 section 5.7.13 describes the detailed specifications.

Testing:
This patch series has passed all the protection key tests available in the selftests directory. The tests are updated to work on both x86 and powerpc.

version v4:
(1) patches no more depend on the pte bits to program the hpte -- comment by Balbir
(2) documentation updates
(3) fixed a bug in the selftest.
(4) unlike x86, powerpc lets signal handler change key permission bits; the change will persist across signal handler boundaries. Earlier we allowed the signal handler to modify a field in the siginfo structure which would than be used by the kernel to program the key protection register (AMR) -- resolves a issue raised by Ben. "Calls to sys_swapcontext with a made-up context will end up with a crap AMR if done by code who didn't know about that register".
(5) these changes enable protection keys on 4k-page kernel aswell.

version v3:
(1) split the patches into smaller consumable patches.
(2) added the ability to disable execute permission on a key at creation.
(3) rename calc_pte_to_hpte_pkey_bits() to pte_to_hpte_pkey_bits() -- suggested by Anshuman
(4) some code optimization and clarity in do_page_fault()
(5) A bug fix while invalidating a hpte slot in __hash_page_4K() -- noticed by Aneesh

version v2:
(1) documentation and selftest added
(2) fixed a bug in 4k hpte backed 64k pte where page invalidation was not done correctly, and initialization of second-part-of-the-pte was not done correctly if the pte was not yet Hashed with a hpte. Reported by Aneesh.
(3) Fixed ABI breakage caused in siginfo structure. Reported by Anshuman.

version v1: Initial version

Ram Pai (17):
mm: introduce an additional vma bit for powerpc pkey
mm: ability to disable execute permission on a key at creation
x86: key creation with PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE disallowed
powerpc: Implement sys_pkey_alloc and sys_pkey_free system call
powerpc: store and restore the pkey state across context switches
powerpc: Implementation for sys_mprotect_pkey() system call
powerpc: make the hash functions protection-key aware
powerpc: Program HPTE key protection bits
powerpc: call the hash functions with the correct pkey value
powerpc: Macro the mask used for checking DSI exception
powerpc: Handle exceptions caused by pkey violation
powerpc: Deliver SEGV signal on pkey violation
selftest: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory
selftest: PowerPC specific test updates to memory protection keys
Documentation: Move protecton key documentation to arch neutral
directory
Documentation: PowerPC specific updates to memory protection keys
procfs: display the protection-key number associated with a vma

 Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt            |    3 +-
 Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt          |  134 +++
 Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt         |   85 --
 Makefile                                      |    2 +-
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                          |   15 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h     |    2 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h |   19 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu.h      |   10 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h  |   62 ++
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h               |    8 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h        |   12 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h               |    1 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h              |  159 +++
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/processor.h          |    5 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h                |    7 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h             |    3 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h             |    6 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h        |    3 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h        |    3 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c             |    5 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S          |   18 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c                 |   18 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c               |    5 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c               |    4 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c                   |   49 +
 arch/powerpc/mm/Makefile                      |    1 +
 arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c                       |   22 +
 arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_4k.c                   |    4 +-
 arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c                  |    8 +-
 arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c               |   42 +-
 arch/powerpc/mm/hugepage-hash64.c             |    4 +-
 arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage-hash64.c          |    5 +-
 arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c                         |    7 +
 arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context_book3s64.c        |    5 +
 arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_decl.h                    |    5 +-
 arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c                       |  256 +++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                  |    3 +
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                            |   18 +-
 include/linux/mm.h                            |   18 +-
 include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h        |    4 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile           |    1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h     |  365 ++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c  | 1488 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile          |    2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h    |  219 ----
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 1395 -----------------------
 46 files changed, 2755 insertions(+), 1755 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt
 delete mode 100644 Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
 delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h
 delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
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author
#1 lore raw

RFC v4 1/17 mm: introduce an additional vma bit for powerpc pkey

Currently there are only 4bits in the vma flags to support 16 keys on x86. powerpc supports 32 keys, which needs 5bits. This patch introduces an addition bit in the vma flags.

---
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c |  6 +++++-
 include/linux/mm.h | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +5 -1
index f0c8b33..2ddc298 100644
@@ -666,12 +666,16 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 		[ilog2(VM_MERGEABLE)]	= "mg",
 		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_MISSING)]= "um",
 		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_WP)]	= "uw",
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 		/* These come out via ProtectionKey: */
 		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT0)]	= "",
 		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT1)]	= "",
 		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT2)]	= "",
 		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT3)]	= "",
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+		/* Additional bit in ProtectionKey: */
+		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT4)]	= "",
 #endif
 	};
 	size_t i;
include/linux/mm.h +13 -5
index 7cb17c6..3d35bcc 100644
@@ -208,21 +208,29 @@ extern int overcommit_kbytes_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void __user *,
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1	33	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2	34	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3	35	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4	36	/* bit only usable on 64-bit arch */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4)
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
-# define VM_PAT		VM_ARCH_1	/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
-#if defined (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
 # define VM_PKEY_SHIFT	VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0
-# define VM_PKEY_BIT0	VM_HIGH_ARCH_0	/* A protection key is a 4-bit value */
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT0	VM_HIGH_ARCH_0
 # define VM_PKEY_BIT1	VM_HIGH_ARCH_1
 # define VM_PKEY_BIT2	VM_HIGH_ARCH_2
 # define VM_PKEY_BIT3	VM_HIGH_ARCH_3
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)
+# define VM_PKEY_BIT4	VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 /* additional key bit used on ppc64 */
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
+# define VM_PAT		VM_ARCH_1	/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
 # define VM_SAO		VM_ARCH_1	/* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)
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#2 lore raw

Re: [RFC v4 01/17] mm: introduce an additional vma bit for powerpc pkey

Quoted 20 lines · Ram Pai

Currently there are only 4bits in the vma flags to support 16 keys on x86. powerpc supports 32 keys, which needs 5bits. This patch introduces an addition bit in the vma flags.

---
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c |  6 +++++-
 include/linux/mm.h | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +1 -1
index f0c8b33..2ddc298 100644
@@ -666,12 +666,16 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 		[ilog2(VM_MERGEABLE)]	= "mg",
 		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_MISSING)]= "um",
 		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_WP)]	= "uw",
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS

fs/proc/task_mmu.c static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma) · line 679

Quoted 10 lines
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +4 -0
 		/* These come out via ProtectionKey: */
 		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT0)]	= "",
 		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT1)]	= "",
 		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT2)]	= "",
 		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT3)]	= "",
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+		/* Additional bit in ProtectionKey: */
+		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT4)]	= "",
 #endif

Not sure why these are linked with smap bits, but I guess the keys live in the Supervisor Mode Access Prevention area?

Balbir Singh.

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author
#3 lore raw

RFC v4 2/17 mm: ability to disable execute permission on a key at creation

In reply to Ram Pai

Currently sys_pkey_create() provides the ability to disable read and write permission on the key, at creation. powerpc has the hardware support to disable execute on a pkey as well.This patch enhances the interface to let disable execute at key creation time. x86 does not allow this. Hence the next patch will add ability in x86 to return error if PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE is specified.

---
 include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h +3 -1
index 8c27db0..bf4fa07 100644
@@ -74,7 +74,9 @@
 
 #define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS	0x1
 #define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE	0x2
+#define PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE	0x4
 #define PKEY_ACCESS_MASK	(PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS |\
-				 PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
+				 PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE  |\
+				 PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE)
 
 #endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_MMAN_COMMON_H */
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Acked-by on v4 2/17
#4 lore raw

Re: [RFC v4 02/17] mm: ability to disable execute permission on a key at creation

Quoted 10 lines · Ram Pai

Currently sys_pkey_create() provides the ability to disable read and write permission on the key, at creation. powerpc has the hardware support to disable execute on a pkey as well.This patch enhances the interface to let disable execute at key creation time. x86 does not allow this. Hence the next patch will add ability in x86 to return error if PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE is specified.

---

author
#5 lore raw

RFC v4 3/17 x86: key creation with PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE disallowed

In reply to Ram Pai

x86 does not support disabling execute permissions on a pkey.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +3 -0
index c24ac1e..d582631 100644
@@ -900,6 +900,9 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Set the bits we need in PKRU:  */
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
 		new_pkru_bits |= PKRU_AD_BIT;
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Acked-by on v4 3/17
#6 lore raw

Re: [RFC v4 03/17] x86: key creation with PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE disallowed

Quoted 12 lines · Ram Pai

x86 does not support disabling execute permissions on a pkey.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +0 -0
index c24ac1e..d582631 100644

arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, · line 908

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +3 -0
@@ -900,6 +900,9 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Set the bits we need in PKRU:  */
 	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
 		new_pkru_bits |= PKRU_AD_BIT;

I am not an x86 expert. IIUC, execute disable is done via allocating an execute_only_pkey and checking vma_key via AD + vma_flags against VM_EXEC.

Your patch looks good to me

Balbir Singh.

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author
#7 lore raw

RFC v4 4/17 powerpc: Implement sys_pkey_alloc and sys_pkey_free system call

In reply to Ram Pai

Sys_pkey_alloc() allocates and returns available pkey Sys_pkey_free() frees up the pkey.

Total 32 keys are supported on powerpc. However pkey 0,1 and 31 are reserved. So effectively we have 29 pkeys.

Each key can be initialized to disable read, write and execute permissions. On powerpc a key can be initialize to disable execute.

---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                         |  15 ++++
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu.h     |  10 +++
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h |  62 ++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h             | 124 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h            |   2 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h            |   4 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h       |   2 +
 arch/powerpc/mm/Makefile                     |   1 +
 arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context_book3s64.c       |   5 ++
 arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c                      |  88 +++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +15 -0
index f7c8f99..81202e5 100644
@@ -871,6 +871,21 @@ config SECCOMP
 
 	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
 
+config PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	prompt "PowerPC Memory Protection Keys"
+	def_bool y
+	# Note: only available in 64-bit mode
+	depends on PPC64
+	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+	select ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
+	---help---
+	  Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing
+	  page-based protections, but without requiring modification of the
+	  page tables when an application changes protection domains.
+
+	  For details, see Documentation/powerpc/protection-keys.txt
+
+	  If unsure, say y.
 endmenu
 
 config ISA_DMA_API
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu.h +10 -0
index 77529a3..0c0a2a8 100644
@@ -108,6 +108,16 @@ struct patb_entry {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU
 	struct list_head iommu_group_mem_list;
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	/*
+	 * Each bit represents one protection key.
+	 * bit set   -> key allocated
+	 * bit unset -> key available for allocation
+	 */
+	u32 pkey_allocation_map;
+	s16 execute_only_pkey; /* key holding execute-only protection */
+#endif
 } mm_context_t;
 
 /*
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h +62 -0

68 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h new file +124 -0

124 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h +2 -0
index 1c94708..22dd776 100644
@@ -388,3 +388,5 @@
 COMPAT_SYS_SPU(pwritev2)
 SYSCALL(kexec_file_load)
 SYSCALL(statx)
+SYSCALL(pkey_alloc)
+SYSCALL(pkey_free)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -3
index 9ba11db..e0273bc 100644
@@ -12,13 +12,11 @@
 #include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
 
 
-#define NR_syscalls		384
+#define NR_syscalls		386
 
 #define __NR__exit __NR_exit
 
 #define __IGNORE_pkey_mprotect
-#define __IGNORE_pkey_alloc
-#define __IGNORE_pkey_free
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +2 -0
index b85f142..7993a07 100644
@@ -394,5 +394,7 @@
 #define __NR_pwritev2		381
 #define __NR_kexec_file_load	382
 #define __NR_statx		383
+#define __NR_pkey_alloc		384
+#define __NR_pkey_free		385
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_POWERPC_UNISTD_H_ */
arch/powerpc/mm/Makefile +1 -0
index 7414034..8cc2ff1 100644
@@ -45,3 +45,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_COPRO_BASE)	+= copro_fault.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU)	+= mmu_context_iommu.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_PTDUMP)	+= dump_linuxpagetables.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_HTDUMP)	+= dump_hashpagetable.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS)	+= pkeys.o
arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_context_book3s64.c +5 -0
index c6dca2a..2da9931 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/idr.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
@@ -120,6 +121,10 @@ static int hash__init_new_context(struct mm_struct *mm)
 
 	subpage_prot_init_new_context(mm);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	pkey_mm_init(mm);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
 	return index;
 }
 
arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c new file +88 -0

88 lines not on this page · raw message

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author
#8 lore raw

RFC v4 5/17 powerpc: store and restore the pkey state across context switches

In reply to Ram Pai

Store and restore the AMR, IAMR and UMOR register state of the task before scheduling out and after scheduling in, respectively.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/processor.h |  5 +++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c        | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/processor.h +5 -0
index a2123f2..1f714df 100644
@@ -310,6 +310,11 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	struct thread_vr_state ckvr_state; /* Checkpointed VR state */
 	unsigned long	ckvrsave; /* Checkpointed VRSAVE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	unsigned long	amr;
+	unsigned long	iamr;
+	unsigned long	uamor;
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_32_HANDLER
 	void*		kvm_shadow_vcpu; /* KVM internal data */
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_32_HANDLER */
arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +18 -0
index baae104..37d001a 100644
@@ -1096,6 +1096,11 @@ static inline void save_sprs(struct thread_struct *t)
 		t->tar = mfspr(SPRN_TAR);
 	}
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	t->amr = mfspr(SPRN_AMR);
+	t->iamr = mfspr(SPRN_IAMR);
+	t->uamor = mfspr(SPRN_UAMOR);
+#endif
 }
 
 static inline void restore_sprs(struct thread_struct *old_thread,
@@ -1131,6 +1136,14 @@ static inline void restore_sprs(struct thread_struct *old_thread,
 			mtspr(SPRN_TAR, new_thread->tar);
 	}
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	if (old_thread->amr != new_thread->amr)
+		mtspr(SPRN_AMR, new_thread->amr);
+	if (old_thread->iamr != new_thread->iamr)
+		mtspr(SPRN_IAMR, new_thread->iamr);
+	if (old_thread->uamor != new_thread->uamor)
+		mtspr(SPRN_UAMOR, new_thread->uamor);
+#endif
 }
 
 struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
@@ -1686,6 +1699,11 @@ void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long start, unsigned long sp)
 	current->thread.tm_texasr = 0;
 	current->thread.tm_tfiar = 0;
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	current->thread.amr   = 0x0ul;
+	current->thread.iamr  = 0x0ul;
+	current->thread.uamor = 0x0ul;
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(start_thread);
 
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#9 lore raw

RFC v4 6/17 powerpc: Implementation for sys_mprotect_pkey() system call

In reply to Ram Pai

This system call, associates the pkey with vma corresponding to the given address range.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h        |  8 ++-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h       | 17 ++++++-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h      |  1 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h      |  4 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h |  1 +
 arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c                | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 6 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mman.h +7 -1
index 30922f6..067eec2 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/cputable.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_has_feature.h>
 
 /*
@@ -22,7 +23,12 @@
 static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
 		unsigned long pkey)
 {
-	return (prot & PROT_SAO) ? VM_SAO : 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	return (((prot & PROT_SAO) ? VM_SAO : 0) |
+			pkey_to_vmflag_bits(pkey));
+#else
+	return ((prot & PROT_SAO) ? VM_SAO : 0);
+#endif
 }
 #define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
 
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h +16 -1
index 7bc8746..41bf5d4 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,15 @@
 			VM_PKEY_BIT3 | \
 			VM_PKEY_BIT4)
 
+static inline unsigned long  pkey_to_vmflag_bits(int pkey)
+{
+	return (((pkey & 0x1UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pkey & 0x2UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pkey & 0x4UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pkey & 0x8UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pkey & 0x10UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT4 : 0x0UL));
+}
+
 /*
  * Bits are in BE format.
  * NOTE: key 31, 1, 0 are not used.
@@ -42,6 +51,12 @@
 #define mm_set_pkey_is_reserved(mm, pkey) (PKEY_INITIAL_ALLOCAION & \
 					pkeybit_mask(pkey))
 
+
+static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	return (vma->vm_flags & ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS) >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT;
+}
+
 static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
 {
 	/* a reserved key is never considered as 'explicitly allocated' */
@@ -114,7 +129,7 @@ static inline int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
 	return __arch_set_user_pkey_access(tsk, pkey, init_val);
 }
 
-static inline pkey_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm)
+static inline void pkey_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
 	mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) = PKEY_INITIAL_ALLOCAION;
 	/* -1 means unallocated or invalid */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/systbl.h +1 -0
index 22dd776..b33b551 100644
@@ -390,3 +390,4 @@
 SYSCALL(statx)
 SYSCALL(pkey_alloc)
 SYSCALL(pkey_free)
+SYSCALL(pkey_mprotect)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/unistd.h +1 -3
index e0273bc..daf1ba9 100644
@@ -12,12 +12,10 @@
 #include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
 
 
-#define NR_syscalls		386
+#define NR_syscalls		387
 
 #define __NR__exit __NR_exit
 
-#define __IGNORE_pkey_mprotect
-
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h +1 -0
index 7993a07..71ae45e 100644
@@ -396,5 +396,6 @@
 #define __NR_statx		383
 #define __NR_pkey_alloc		384
 #define __NR_pkey_free		385
+#define __NR_pkey_mprotect	386
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_POWERPC_UNISTD_H_ */
arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c +91 -2

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#10 lore raw

RFC v4 7/17 powerpc: make the hash functions protection-key aware

In reply to Ram Pai

Prepare the hash functions to be aware of protection keys. This key will later be used to program the HPTE.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h     |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h | 14 ++++++-----
 arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_4k.c                   |  4 ++--
 arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c                  |  8 +++----
 arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c               | 34 ++++++++++++++++++---------
 arch/powerpc/mm/hugepage-hash64.c             |  4 ++--
 arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage-hash64.c          |  5 ++--
 arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c                         |  1 +
 arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_decl.h                    |  5 +++-
 9 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/hash.h +1 -1
index 4e957b0..3c1ef01 100644
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static inline int hash__pgd_bad(pgd_t pgd)
 
 extern void hpte_need_flush(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
 			    pte_t *ptep, unsigned long pte, int huge);
-extern unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags);
+extern unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags, int pkey);
 /* Atomic PTE updates */
 static inline unsigned long hash__pte_update(struct mm_struct *mm,
 					 unsigned long addr,
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h +8 -6
index 6981a52..aa3c299 100644
@@ -430,11 +430,11 @@ static inline unsigned long hpt_hash(unsigned long vpn,
 #define HPTE_NOHPTE_UPDATE	0x2
 
 extern int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
-			  unsigned long vsid, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap,
-			  unsigned long flags, int ssize, int subpage_prot);
+		  unsigned long vsid, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap,
+		  unsigned long flags, int ssize, int subpage_prot, int pkey);
 extern int __hash_page_64K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
 			   unsigned long vsid, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap,
-			   unsigned long flags, int ssize);
+			   unsigned long flags, int ssize, int pkey);
 struct mm_struct;
 unsigned int hash_page_do_lazy_icache(unsigned int pp, pte_t pte, int trap);
 extern int hash_page_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
@@ -444,16 +444,18 @@ extern int hash_page(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long trap,
 		     unsigned long dsisr);
 int __hash_page_huge(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
 		     pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap, unsigned long flags,
-		     int ssize, unsigned int shift, unsigned int mmu_psize);
+		     int ssize, unsigned int shift, unsigned int mmu_psize,
+		     int pkey);
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
 extern int __hash_page_thp(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
 			   unsigned long vsid, pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long trap,
-			   unsigned long flags, int ssize, unsigned int psize);
+			   unsigned long flags, int ssize, unsigned int psize,
+			   int pkey);
 #else
 static inline int __hash_page_thp(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
 				  unsigned long vsid, pmd_t *pmdp,
 				  unsigned long trap, unsigned long flags,
-				  int ssize, unsigned int psize)
+				  int ssize, unsigned int psize, int pkey)
 {
 	BUG();
 	return -1;
arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_4k.c +2 -2
index 6fa450c..6765ba2 100644
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 
 int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
 		   pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap, unsigned long flags,
-		   int ssize, int subpg_prot)
+		   int ssize, int subpg_prot, int pkey)
 {
 	unsigned long hpte_group;
 	unsigned long rflags, pa;
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
 	 * PP bits. _PAGE_USER is already PP bit 0x2, so we only
 	 * need to add in 0x1 if it's a read-only user page
 	 */
-	rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pte);
+	rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pte, pkey);
 
 	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_NOEXECUTE) &&
 	    !cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_COHERENT_ICACHE))
arch/powerpc/mm/hash64_64k.c +4 -4
index 1a68cb1..9ce4d7b 100644
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static unsigned long mark_subptegroup_valid(unsigned long ptev, unsigned long in
 
 int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
 		   pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap, unsigned long flags,
-		   int ssize, int subpg_prot)
+		   int ssize, int subpg_prot, int pkey)
 {
 	real_pte_t rpte;
 	unsigned long *hidxp;
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
 	 * Handle the subpage protection bits
 	 */
 	subpg_pte = new_pte & ~subpg_prot;
-	rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(subpg_pte);
+	rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(subpg_pte, pkey);
 
 	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_NOEXECUTE) &&
 	    !cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_COHERENT_ICACHE)) {
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ int __hash_page_4K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
 
 int __hash_page_64K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
 		    unsigned long vsid, pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap,
-		    unsigned long flags, int ssize)
+		    unsigned long flags, int ssize, int pkey)
 {
 	unsigned long hpte_group;
 	unsigned long rflags, pa;
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ int __hash_page_64K(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access,
 			new_pte |= _PAGE_DIRTY;
 	} while (!pte_xchg(ptep, __pte(old_pte), __pte(new_pte)));
 
-	rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pte);
+	rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pte, pkey);
 
 	if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_NOEXECUTE) &&
 	    !cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_COHERENT_ICACHE))
arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c +23 -11
index f2095ce..2254ff0 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
 #include <linux/libfdt.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
 
 #include <asm/debugfs.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@
  *    - We make sure R is always set and never lost
  *    - C is _PAGE_DIRTY, and *should* always be set for a writeable mapping
  */
-unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags)
+unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags, int pkey)
 {
 	unsigned long rflags = 0;
 
@@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ int htab_bolt_mapping(unsigned long vstart, unsigned long vend,
 	shift = mmu_psize_defs[psize].shift;
 	step = 1 << shift;
 
-	prot = htab_convert_pte_flags(prot);
+	prot = htab_convert_pte_flags(prot, 0);
 
 	DBG("htab_bolt_mapping(%lx..%lx -> %lx (%lx,%d,%d)\n",
 	    vstart, vend, pstart, prot, psize, ssize);
@@ -1228,7 +1229,7 @@ int hash_page_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
 	unsigned hugeshift;
 	const struct cpumask *tmp;
 	int rc, user_region = 0;
-	int psize, ssize;
+	int psize, ssize, pkey = 0;
 
 	DBG_LOW("hash_page(ea=%016lx, access=%lx, trap=%lx\n",
 		ea, access, trap);
@@ -1317,11 +1318,13 @@ int hash_page_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
 	if (hugeshift) {
 		if (is_thp)
 			rc = __hash_page_thp(ea, access, vsid, (pmd_t *)ptep,
-					     trap, flags, ssize, psize);
+					     trap, flags, ssize, psize,
+					     pkey);
 #ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
 		else
 			rc = __hash_page_huge(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap,
-					      flags, ssize, hugeshift, psize);
+					      flags, ssize, hugeshift, psize,
+					      pkey);
 #else
 		else {
 			/*
@@ -1381,7 +1384,8 @@ int hash_page_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
 	if (psize == MMU_PAGE_64K)
 		rc = __hash_page_64K(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap,
-				     flags, ssize);
+				     flags, ssize,
+				     pkey);
 	else
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES */
 	{
@@ -1390,7 +1394,8 @@ int hash_page_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
 			rc = -2;
 		else
 			rc = __hash_page_4K(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap,
-					    flags, ssize, spp);
+						flags, ssize, spp,
+						pkey);
 	}
 
 	/* Dump some info in case of hash insertion failure, they should
@@ -1486,8 +1491,9 @@ static bool should_hash_preload(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea)
 }
 #endif
 
-void hash_preload(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
-		  unsigned long access, unsigned long trap)
+void hash_preload_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
+		  unsigned long access, unsigned long trap,
+		  int pkey)
 {
 	int hugepage_shift;
 	unsigned long vsid;
@@ -1548,11 +1554,11 @@ void hash_preload(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES
 	if (mm->context.user_psize == MMU_PAGE_64K)
 		rc = __hash_page_64K(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap,
-				     update_flags, ssize);
+				     update_flags, ssize, pkey);
 	else
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_64K_PAGES */
 		rc = __hash_page_4K(ea, access, vsid, ptep, trap, update_flags,
-				    ssize, subpage_protection(mm, ea));
+				    ssize, subpage_protection(mm, ea), pkey);
 
 	/* Dump some info in case of hash insertion failure, they should
 	 * never happen so it is really useful to know if/when they do
@@ -1566,6 +1572,12 @@ void hash_preload(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
+void hash_preload(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
+		  unsigned long access, unsigned long trap)
+{
+	hash_preload_pkey(mm, ea, access, trap, 0);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
 static inline void tm_flush_hash_page(int local)
 {
arch/powerpc/mm/hugepage-hash64.c +2 -2
index f20d16f..cc4855e 100644
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 
 int __hash_page_thp(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
 		    pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long trap, unsigned long flags,
-		    int ssize, unsigned int psize)
+		    int ssize, unsigned int psize, int pkey)
 {
 	unsigned int index, valid;
 	unsigned char *hpte_slot_array;
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ int __hash_page_thp(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
 			new_pmd |= _PAGE_DIRTY;
 	} while (!pmd_xchg(pmdp, __pmd(old_pmd), __pmd(new_pmd)));
 
-	rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pmd);
+	rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pmd, pkey);
 
 #if 0
 	if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_COHERENT_ICACHE)) {
arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage-hash64.c +3 -2
index a84bb44..fe7d671 100644
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ extern long hpte_insert_repeating(unsigned long hash, unsigned long vpn,
 
 int __hash_page_huge(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
 		     pte_t *ptep, unsigned long trap, unsigned long flags,
-		     int ssize, unsigned int shift, unsigned int mmu_psize)
+		     int ssize, unsigned int shift, unsigned int mmu_psize,
+		     int pkey)
 {
 	unsigned long vpn;
 	unsigned long old_pte, new_pte;
@@ -60,7 +61,7 @@ int __hash_page_huge(unsigned long ea, unsigned long access, unsigned long vsid,
 			new_pte |= _PAGE_DIRTY;
 	} while(!pte_xchg(ptep, __pte(old_pte), __pte(new_pte)));
 
-	rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pte);
+	rflags = htab_convert_pte_flags(new_pte, pkey);
 
 	sz = ((1UL) << shift);
 	if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_COHERENT_ICACHE))
arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c +1 -0
index 9ee536e..ec890d3 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
 #include <asm/prom.h>
arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_decl.h +4 -1
index f988db6..e425c27 100644
@@ -82,10 +82,13 @@ static inline void _tlbivax_bcast(unsigned long address, unsigned int pid,
 
 #else /* CONFIG_PPC_MMU_NOHASH */
 
+extern void hash_preload_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
+			 unsigned long access, unsigned long trap,
+			 int pkey);
+
 extern void hash_preload(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
 			 unsigned long access, unsigned long trap);
 
-
 extern void _tlbie(unsigned long address);
 extern void _tlbia(void);
 
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author
#11 lore raw

RFC v4 8/17 powerpc: Program HPTE key protection bits

In reply to Ram Pai

Map the PTE protection key bits to the HPTE key protection bits, while creating HPTE entries.

---
 Makefile                                      | 2 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h | 5 +++++
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h              | 9 +++++++++
 arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c               | 4 ++++
 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Makefile +1 -1
index 470bd4d..141ea4e 100644
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 12
 SUBLEVEL = 0
-EXTRAVERSION = -rc3
+EXTRAVERSION = -rc3-64k
 NAME = Fearless Coyote
 
 # *DOCUMENTATION*
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h +5 -0
index aa3c299..721a4c3 100644
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@
 #define HPTE_R_PP0		ASM_CONST(0x8000000000000000)
 #define HPTE_R_TS		ASM_CONST(0x4000000000000000)
 #define HPTE_R_KEY_HI		ASM_CONST(0x3000000000000000)
+#define HPTE_R_KEY_BIT0		ASM_CONST(0x2000000000000000)
+#define HPTE_R_KEY_BIT1		ASM_CONST(0x1000000000000000)
 #define HPTE_R_RPN_SHIFT	12
 #define HPTE_R_RPN		ASM_CONST(0x0ffffffffffff000)
 #define HPTE_R_RPN_3_0		ASM_CONST(0x01fffffffffff000)
@@ -104,6 +106,9 @@
 #define HPTE_R_C		ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000080)
 #define HPTE_R_R		ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000100)
 #define HPTE_R_KEY_LO		ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000e00)
+#define HPTE_R_KEY_BIT2		ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000800)
+#define HPTE_R_KEY_BIT3		ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000400)
+#define HPTE_R_KEY_BIT4		ASM_CONST(0x0000000000000200)
 
 #define HPTE_V_1TB_SEG		ASM_CONST(0x4000000000000000)
 #define HPTE_V_VRMA_MASK	ASM_CONST(0x4001ffffff000000)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h +9 -0
index 41bf5d4..ef1c601 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,15 @@ static inline unsigned long  pkey_to_vmflag_bits(int pkey)
 		((pkey & 0x10UL) ? VM_PKEY_BIT4 : 0x0UL));
 }
 
+static inline unsigned long  pkey_to_hpte_pkey_bits(int pkey)
+{
+	return	(((pkey & 0x10) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT0 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pkey & 0x8) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT1 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pkey & 0x4) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT2 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pkey & 0x2) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT3 : 0x0UL) |
+		((pkey & 0x1) ? HPTE_R_KEY_BIT4 : 0x0UL));
+}
+
 /*
  * Bits are in BE format.
  * NOTE: key 31, 1, 0 are not used.
arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c +4 -0
index 2254ff0..7e67dea 100644
@@ -231,6 +231,10 @@ unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags, int pkey)
 		 */
 		rflags |= HPTE_R_M;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	rflags |= pkey_to_hpte_pkey_bits(pkey);
+#endif
+
 	return rflags;
 }
 
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author
#12 lore raw

RFC v4 9/17 powerpc: call the hash functions with the correct pkey value

In reply to Ram Pai

Pass the correct protection key value to the hash functions on page fault.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c  |  4 ++++
 arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c            |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h +11 -0
index ef1c601..1370b3f 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,17 @@ static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
 }
 
 /*
+ * return the protection key of the vma corresponding to the
+ * given effective address @ea.
+ */
+static inline int mm_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, ea);
+	int pkey = vma ? vma_pkey(vma) : 0;
+	return pkey;
+}
+
+/*
  * Returns a positive, 5-bit key on success, or -1 on failure.
  */
 static inline int mm_pkey_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c +4 -0
index 7e67dea..403f75d 100644
@@ -1319,6 +1319,10 @@ int hash_page_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea,
 		goto bail;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	pkey = mm_pkey(mm, ea);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
 	if (hugeshift) {
 		if (is_thp)
 			rc = __hash_page_thp(ea, access, vsid, (pmd_t *)ptep,
arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c +6 -0
index ec890d3..0fcaa48 100644
@@ -541,8 +541,14 @@ void update_mmu_cache(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
 		return;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	hash_preload_pkey(vma->vm_mm, address, access, trap, vma_pkey(vma));
+#else
 	hash_preload(vma->vm_mm, address, access, trap);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU */
+
 #if (defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E_64) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E)) \
 	&& defined(CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE)
 	if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
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#13 lore raw

Re: [RFC v4 09/17] powerpc: call the hash functions with the correct pkey value

Quoted 20 lines · Ram Pai

Pass the correct protection key value to the hash functions on page fault.

---
  arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | 11 +++++++++++
  arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c  |  4 ++++
  arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c            |  6 ++++++
  3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h +2 -0
index ef1c601..1370b3f 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,17 @@ static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
  }
 
  /*
+ * return the protection key of the vma corresponding to the
+ * given effective address @ea.

arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey) · line 88

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h +9 -0
+ */
+static inline int mm_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, ea);
+	int pkey = vma ? vma_pkey(vma) : 0;
+	return pkey;
+}
+
+/*
 

That is not going to work in hash fault path right ? We can't do a find_vma there without holding the mmap_sem

-aneesh

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author
#14 lore raw

Re: [RFC v4 09/17] powerpc: call the hash functions with the correct pkey value

Quoted 20 lines · Aneesh Kumar K.V
Quoted 17 lines · Ram Pai

Pass the correct protection key value to the hash functions on page fault.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c  |  4 ++++
 arch/powerpc/mm/mem.c            |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h +0 -0
index ef1c601..1370b3f 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,17 @@ static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)
 }
 
Quoted 16 lines

arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey)

Quoted 13 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h +11 -0
 /*
+ * return the protection key of the vma corresponding to the
+ * given effective address @ea.
+ */
+static inline int mm_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, ea);
+	int pkey = vma ? vma_pkey(vma) : 0;
+	return pkey;
+}
+
+/*
 

That is not going to work in hash fault path right ? We can't do a find_vma there without holding the mmap_sem

There is a fundamental problem with this new design. Looks like we can't hold a lock in that path, without badly hurting the performance.

I am moving back to the old design. Cant by-pass the pte. The keys will be programmed into the pte which will than be used to program the hpte.

RP

author
#15 lore raw

RFC v4 10/17 powerpc: Macro the mask used for checking DSI exception

In reply to Ram Pai

Replace the magic number used to check for DSI exception with a meaningful value.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h       | 7 ++++++-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h +6 -1
index 7e50e47..ba110dd 100644
@@ -272,16 +272,21 @@
 #define SPRN_DAR	0x013	/* Data Address Register */
 #define SPRN_DBCR	0x136	/* e300 Data Breakpoint Control Reg */
 #define SPRN_DSISR	0x012	/* Data Storage Interrupt Status Register */
+#define   DSISR_BIT32		0x80000000	/* not defined */
 #define   DSISR_NOHPTE		0x40000000	/* no translation found */
+#define   DSISR_PAGEATTR_CONFLT	0x20000000	/* page attribute conflict */
+#define   DSISR_BIT35		0x10000000	/* not defined */
 #define   DSISR_PROTFAULT	0x08000000	/* protection fault */
 #define   DSISR_BADACCESS	0x04000000	/* bad access to CI or G */
 #define   DSISR_ISSTORE		0x02000000	/* access was a store */
 #define   DSISR_DABRMATCH	0x00400000	/* hit data breakpoint */
-#define   DSISR_NOSEGMENT	0x00200000	/* SLB miss */
 #define   DSISR_KEYFAULT	0x00200000	/* Key fault */
+#define   DSISR_BIT43		0x00100000	/* not defined */
 #define   DSISR_UNSUPP_MMU	0x00080000	/* Unsupported MMU config */
 #define   DSISR_SET_RC		0x00040000	/* Failed setting of R/C bits */
 #define   DSISR_PGDIRFAULT      0x00020000      /* Fault on page directory */
+#define   DSISR_PAGE_FAULT_MASK (DSISR_BIT32 | DSISR_PAGEATTR_CONFLT | \
+				DSISR_BADACCESS | DSISR_BIT43)
 #define SPRN_TBRL	0x10C	/* Time Base Read Lower Register (user, R/O) */
 #define SPRN_TBRU	0x10D	/* Time Base Read Upper Register (user, R/O) */
 #define SPRN_CIR	0x11B	/* Chip Information Register (hyper, R/0) */
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +1 -1
index ae418b8..3fd0528 100644
@@ -1411,7 +1411,7 @@ USE_TEXT_SECTION()
 	.balign	IFETCH_ALIGN_BYTES
 do_hash_page:
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
-	andis.	r0,r4,0xa410		/* weird error? */
+	andis.	r0,r4,DSISR_PAGE_FAULT_MASK@h
 	bne-	handle_page_fault	/* if not, try to insert a HPTE */
 	andis.  r0,r4,DSISR_DABRMATCH@h
 	bne-    handle_dabr_fault
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author
#16 lore raw

RFC v4 11/17 powerpc: Handle exceptions caused by pkey violation

In reply to Ram Pai

Handle Data and Instruction exceptions caused by memory protection-key.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 12 ++++++
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h         |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c                | 20 +++++++++
 arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c                | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu_context.h +12 -0
index da7e943..71fffe0 100644
@@ -175,11 +175,23 @@ static inline void arch_bprm_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm,
 {
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+bool arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write);
+bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		bool write, bool execute, bool foreign);
+#else /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+static inline bool arch_pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
+{
+	/* by default, allow everything */
+	return true;
+}
 static inline bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		bool write, bool execute, bool foreign)
 {
 	/* by default, allow everything */
 	return true;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 #endif /* __ASM_POWERPC_MMU_CONTEXT_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h +1 -1
index ba110dd..6e2a860 100644
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@
 #define   DSISR_SET_RC		0x00040000	/* Failed setting of R/C bits */
 #define   DSISR_PGDIRFAULT      0x00020000      /* Fault on page directory */
 #define   DSISR_PAGE_FAULT_MASK (DSISR_BIT32 | DSISR_PAGEATTR_CONFLT | \
-				DSISR_BADACCESS | DSISR_BIT43)
+			DSISR_BADACCESS | DSISR_KEYFAULT | DSISR_BIT43)
 #define SPRN_TBRL	0x10C	/* Time Base Read Lower Register (user, R/O) */
 #define SPRN_TBRU	0x10D	/* Time Base Read Upper Register (user, R/O) */
 #define SPRN_CIR	0x11B	/* Chip Information Register (hyper, R/0) */
arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c +20 -0
index 3a7d580..3d71984 100644
@@ -261,6 +261,13 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
 	}
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	if (error_code & DSISR_KEYFAULT) {
+		code = SEGV_PKUERR;
+		goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
+	}
+#endif /*  CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
 	/* We restore the interrupt state now */
 	if (!arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs))
 		local_irq_enable();
@@ -441,6 +448,19 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code & DSISR_PROTFAULT);
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE,
+					is_exec, 0)) {
+		code = SEGV_PKUERR;
+		goto bad_area;
+	}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
+	/* handle_mm_fault() needs to know if its a instruction access
+	 * fault.
+	 */
+	if (is_exec)
+		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION;
 	/*
 	 * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
 	 * make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c +79 -0

88 lines not on this page · raw message

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author
#17 lore raw

RFC v4 12/17 powerpc: Deliver SEGV signal on pkey violation

In reply to Ram Pai

The value of the AMR register at the time of exception is made available in gp_regs[PT_AMR] of the siginfo.

The value of the pkey, whose protection got violated, is made available in si_pkey field of the siginfo structure.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h        |  1 +
 arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h |  3 ++-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c      |  5 ++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S   | 16 +++++++++--
 arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c        |  5 ++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c        |  4 +++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c            | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c                |  2 ++
 8 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h +1 -0
index 1c09f8f..a41afd3 100644
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ struct paca_struct {
 	struct dtl_entry *dispatch_log_end;
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 */
 	u64 dscr_default;		/* per-CPU default DSCR */
+	u64 paca_amr;			/* value of amr at exception */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64
 	/*
arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h +2 -1
index 8036b38..7ec2428 100644
@@ -108,8 +108,9 @@ struct pt_regs {
 #define PT_DAR	41
 #define PT_DSISR 42
 #define PT_RESULT 43
-#define PT_DSCR 44
 #define PT_REGS_COUNT 44
+#define PT_DSCR 44
+#define PT_AMR	45
 
 #define PT_FPR0	48	/* each FP reg occupies 2 slots in this space */
 
arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c +5 -0
index 709e234..17f5d8a 100644
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ int main(void)
 	OFFSET(PACAHWCPUID, paca_struct, hw_cpu_id);
 	OFFSET(PACAKEXECSTATE, paca_struct, kexec_state);
 	OFFSET(PACA_DSCR_DEFAULT, paca_struct, dscr_default);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	OFFSET(PACA_AMR, paca_struct, paca_amr);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
 	OFFSET(ACCOUNT_STARTTIME, paca_struct, accounting.starttime);
 	OFFSET(ACCOUNT_STARTTIME_USER, paca_struct, accounting.starttime_user);
 	OFFSET(ACCOUNT_USER_TIME, paca_struct, accounting.utime);
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +14 -2
index 3fd0528..a4de1b4 100644
@@ -493,9 +493,15 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(data_access_common)
 	ld	r12,_MSR(r1)
 	ld	r3,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DAR(r13)
 	lwz	r4,PACA_EXGEN+EX_DSISR(r13)
-	li	r5,0x300
 	std	r3,_DAR(r1)
 	std	r4,_DSISR(r1)
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	andis.  r0,r4,DSISR_KEYFAULT@h /* save AMR only if its a key fault */
+	beq+	1f
+	mfspr	r5,SPRN_AMR
+	std	r5,PACA_AMR(r13)
+#endif /*  CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+1:	li	r5,0x300
 BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION
 	b	do_hash_page		/* Try to handle as hpte fault */
 MMU_FTR_SECTION_ELSE
@@ -561,9 +567,15 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(instruction_access_common)
 	ld	r12,_MSR(r1)
 	ld	r3,_NIP(r1)
 	andis.	r4,r12,0x5820
-	li	r5,0x400
 	std	r3,_DAR(r1)
 	std	r4,_DSISR(r1)
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	andis.  r0,r4,DSISR_KEYFAULT@h /* save AMR only if its a key fault */
+	beq+	1f
+	mfspr	r5,SPRN_AMR
+	std	r5,PACA_AMR(r13)
+#endif /*  CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+1:	li	r5,0x400
 BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION
 	b	do_hash_page		/* Try to handle as hpte fault */
 MMU_FTR_SECTION_ELSE
arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c +5 -0
index 97bb138..9c4a7f3 100644
@@ -500,6 +500,11 @@ static int save_user_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, struct mcontext __user *frame,
 				   (unsigned long) &frame->tramp[2]);
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	if (__put_user(get_paca()->paca_amr, &frame->mc_gregs[PT_AMR]))
+		return 1;
+#endif /*  CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c +4 -0
index c83c115..86a4262 100644
@@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ static long setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext __user *sc,
 	if (set != NULL)
 		err |=  __put_user(set->sig[0], &sc->oldmask);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+	err |= __put_user(get_paca()->paca_amr, &sc->gp_regs[PT_AMR]);
+#endif /*  CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS */
+
 	return err;
 }
 
arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c +49 -0

67 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c +2 -0
index 3d71984..0780a53 100644
@@ -451,6 +451,8 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 	if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE,
 					is_exec, 0)) {
+		/* our caller may not have saved the amr. Lets save it */
+		get_paca()->paca_amr = read_amr();
 		code = SEGV_PKUERR;
 		goto bad_area;
 	}
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author
#18 lore raw

RFC v4 13/17 selftest: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory

In reply to Ram Pai
---
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile           |    1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h     |  219 ++++
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c  | 1395 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile          |    2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h    |  219 ----
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c | 1395 -------------------------
 6 files changed, 1616 insertions(+), 1615 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c
 delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h
 delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c
tools/testing/selftests/vm/Makefile +1 -0
index cbb29e4..1d32f78 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES += transhuge-stress
 TEST_GEN_FILES += userfaultfd
 TEST_GEN_FILES += mlock-random-test
 TEST_GEN_FILES += virtual_address_range
+TEST_GEN_FILES += protection_keys
 
 TEST_PROGS := run_vmtests
 
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h new file +219 -0

219 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c new file +1395 -0

1,395 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile +1 -1
index 97f187e..fee6181 100644
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ include ../lib.mk
 
 TARGETS_C_BOTHBITS := single_step_syscall sysret_ss_attrs syscall_nt ptrace_syscall test_mremap_vdso \
 			check_initial_reg_state sigreturn ldt_gdt iopl mpx-mini-test ioperm \
-			protection_keys test_vdso
+			test_vdso
 TARGETS_C_32BIT_ONLY := entry_from_vm86 syscall_arg_fault test_syscall_vdso unwind_vdso \
 			test_FCMOV test_FCOMI test_FISTTP \
 			vdso_restorer
tools/testing/selftests/x86/pkey-helpers.h deleted +0 -219

219 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c deleted +0 -1395

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author
#19 lore raw

RFC v4 14/17 selftest: PowerPC specific test updates to memory protection keys

In reply to Ram Pai

Abstracted out the arch specific code into the header file, and added powerpc specific changes.

a) added 4k-backed hpte, memory allocator, powerpc specific.
b) added three test case where the key is associated after the page is accessed/allocated/mapped.
c) cleaned up the code to make checkpatch.pl happy

---
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h    | 230 +++++++++--
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c | 567 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 518 insertions(+), 279 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/vm/pkey-helpers.h +188 -42
index b202939..69bfa89 100644
@@ -12,13 +12,72 @@
 #include <ucontext.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 
-#define NR_PKEYS 16
-#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+/* Define some kernel-like types */
+#define  u8 uint8_t
+#define u16 uint16_t
+#define u32 uint32_t
+#define u64 uint64_t
+
+#ifdef __i386__ /* arch */
+
+#define SYS_mprotect_key 380
+#define SYS_pkey_alloc	 381
+#define SYS_pkey_free	 382
+#define REG_IP_IDX REG_EIP
+#define si_pkey_offset 0x14
+
+#define NR_PKEYS		16
+#define NR_RESERVED_PKEYS	1
+#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY	2
+#define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS	0x1
+#define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE	0x2
+#define HPAGE_SIZE		(1UL<<21)
+
+#define INIT_PRKU 0x0UL
+
+#elif __powerpc64__ /* arch */
+
+#define SYS_mprotect_key 386
+#define SYS_pkey_alloc	 384
+#define SYS_pkey_free	 385
+#define si_pkey_offset	0x20
+#define REG_IP_IDX PT_NIP
+#define REG_TRAPNO PT_TRAP
+#define REG_AMR		45
+#define gregs gp_regs
+#define fpregs fp_regs
+
+#define NR_PKEYS		32
+#define NR_RESERVED_PKEYS	3
+#define PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY	2
+#define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS	0x3  /* disable read and write */
+#define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE	0x2
+#define HPAGE_SIZE		(1UL<<24)
+
+#define INIT_PRKU 0x3UL
+#else /* arch */
+
+	NOT SUPPORTED
+
+#endif /* arch */
+
 
 #ifndef DEBUG_LEVEL
 #define DEBUG_LEVEL 0
 #endif
 #define DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE 4096
+
+
+static inline u32 pkey_to_shift(int pkey)
+{
+#ifdef __i386__ /* arch */
+	return pkey * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+#elif __powerpc64__ /* arch */
+	return (NR_PKEYS - pkey - 1) * PKRU_BITS_PER_PKEY;
+#endif /* arch */
+}
+
+
 extern int dprint_in_signal;
 extern char dprint_in_signal_buffer[DPRINT_IN_SIGNAL_BUF_SIZE];
 static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
@@ -53,53 +112,76 @@ static inline void sigsafe_printf(const char *format, ...)
 #define dprintf3(args...) dprintf_level(3, args)
 #define dprintf4(args...) dprintf_level(4, args)
 
-extern unsigned int shadow_pkru;
-static inline unsigned int __rdpkru(void)
+extern u64 shadow_pkey_reg;
+
+static inline u64 __rdpkey_reg(void)
 {
+#ifdef __i386__ /* arch */
 	unsigned int eax, edx;
 	unsigned int ecx = 0;
-	unsigned int pkru;
+	unsigned int pkey_reg;
 
 	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xee\n\t"
 		     : "=a" (eax), "=d" (edx)
 		     : "c" (ecx));
-	pkru = eax;
-	return pkru;
+#elif __powerpc64__ /* arch */
+	u64 eax;
+	u64 pkey_reg;
+
+	asm volatile("mfspr %0, 0xd" : "=r" ((u64)(eax)));
+#endif /* arch */
+	pkey_reg = (u64)eax;
+	return pkey_reg;
 }
 
-static inline unsigned int _rdpkru(int line)
+static inline u64 _rdpkey_reg(int line)
 {
-	unsigned int pkru = __rdpkru();
+	u64 pkey_reg = __rdpkey_reg();
 
-	dprintf4("rdpkru(line=%d) pkru: %x shadow: %x\n",
-			line, pkru, shadow_pkru);
-	assert(pkru == shadow_pkru);
+	dprintf4("rdpkey_reg(line=%d) pkey_reg: %lx shadow: %lx\n",
+			line, pkey_reg, shadow_pkey_reg);
+	assert(pkey_reg == shadow_pkey_reg);
 
-	return pkru;
+	return pkey_reg;
 }
 
-#define rdpkru() _rdpkru(__LINE__)
+#define rdpkey_reg() _rdpkey_reg(__LINE__)
 
-static inline void __wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
+static inline void __wrpkey_reg(u64 pkey_reg)
 {
-	unsigned int eax = pkru;
+#ifdef __i386__ /* arch */
+	unsigned int eax = pkey_reg;
 	unsigned int ecx = 0;
 	unsigned int edx = 0;
 
-	dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
+	dprintf4("%s() changing %lx to %lx\n",
+			 __func__, __rdpkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
 	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f,0x01,0xef\n\t"
 		     : : "a" (eax), "c" (ecx), "d" (edx));
-	assert(pkru == __rdpkru());
+	dprintf4("%s() PKRUP after changing %lx to %lx\n",
+			__func__, __rdpkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
+#else /* arch */
+	u64 eax = pkey_reg;
+
+	dprintf4("%s() changing %llx to %llx\n",
+			 __func__, __rdpkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
+	asm volatile("mtspr 0xd, %0" : : "r" ((unsigned long)(eax)) : "memory");
+	dprintf4("%s() PKRUP after changing %llx to %llx\n",
+			 __func__, __rdpkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
+#endif /* arch */
+	assert(pkey_reg == __rdpkey_reg());
 }
 
-static inline void wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
+static inline void wrpkey_reg(u64 pkey_reg)
 {
-	dprintf4("%s() changing %08x to %08x\n", __func__, __rdpkru(), pkru);
+	dprintf4("%s() changing %lx to %lx\n",
+			__func__, __rdpkey_reg(), pkey_reg);
 	/* will do the shadow check for us: */
-	rdpkru();
-	__wrpkru(pkru);
-	shadow_pkru = pkru;
-	dprintf4("%s(%08x) pkru: %08x\n", __func__, pkru, __rdpkru());
+	rdpkey_reg();
+	__wrpkey_reg(pkey_reg);
+	shadow_pkey_reg = pkey_reg;
+	dprintf4("%s(%lx) pkey_reg: %lx\n",
+		__func__, pkey_reg, __rdpkey_reg());
 }
 
 /*
@@ -108,40 +190,37 @@ static inline void wrpkru(unsigned int pkru)
  */
 static inline void __pkey_access_allow(int pkey, int do_allow)
 {
-	unsigned int pkru = rdpkru();
+	u64 pkey_reg = rdpkey_reg();
 	int bit = pkey * 2;
 
 	if (do_allow)
-		pkru &= (1<<bit);
+		pkey_reg &= (1<<bit);
 	else
-		pkru |= (1<<bit);
+		pkey_reg |= (1<<bit);
 
-	dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
-	wrpkru(pkru);
+	dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %lx\n", rdpkey_reg());
+	wrpkey_reg(pkey_reg);
 }
 
 static inline void __pkey_write_allow(int pkey, int do_allow_write)
 {
-	long pkru = rdpkru();
+	u64 pkey_reg = rdpkey_reg();
 	int bit = pkey * 2 + 1;
 
 	if (do_allow_write)
-		pkru &= (1<<bit);
+		pkey_reg &= (1<<bit);
 	else
-		pkru |= (1<<bit);
+		pkey_reg |= (1<<bit);
 
-	wrpkru(pkru);
-	dprintf4("pkru now: %08x\n", rdpkru());
+	wrpkey_reg(pkey_reg);
+	dprintf4("pkey_reg now: %lx\n", rdpkey_reg());
 }
 
-#define PROT_PKEY0     0x10            /* protection key value (bit 0) */
-#define PROT_PKEY1     0x20            /* protection key value (bit 1) */
-#define PROT_PKEY2     0x40            /* protection key value (bit 2) */
-#define PROT_PKEY3     0x80            /* protection key value (bit 3) */
-
-#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
 #define MB	(1<<20)
 
+#ifdef __i386__ /* arch */
+
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
 static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
 		unsigned int *ecx, unsigned int *edx)
 {
@@ -159,7 +238,7 @@ static inline void __cpuid(unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx,
 #define X86_FEATURE_PKU        (1<<3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
 #define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE      (1<<4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
 
-static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
+static inline int cpu_has_pkey(void)
 {
 	unsigned int eax;
 	unsigned int ebx;
@@ -183,7 +262,6 @@ static inline int cpu_has_pku(void)
 
 #define XSTATE_PKRU_BIT	(9)
 #define XSTATE_PKRU	0x200
-
 int pkru_xstate_offset(void)
 {
 	unsigned int eax;
@@ -216,4 +294,72 @@ int pkru_xstate_offset(void)
 	return xstate_offset;
 }
 
+/* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */
+#define __page_o_noops() asm(".rept 512 ; nopl 0x7eeeeeee(%eax) ; .endr")
+
+#elif __powerpc64__ /* arch */
+
+#define PAGE_SIZE (0x1UL << 16)
+static inline int cpu_has_pkey(void)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* 8-bytes of instruction * 16384bytes = 1 page */
+#define __page_o_noops() asm(".rept 16384 ; nop; .endr")
+
+#endif /* arch */
+
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
+#define ALIGN_UP(x, align_to)	(((x) + ((align_to)-1)) & ~((align_to)-1))
+#define ALIGN_DOWN(x, align_to) ((x) & ~((align_to)-1))
+#define ALIGN_PTR_UP(p, ptr_align_to)	\
+		((typeof(p))ALIGN_UP((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
+#define ALIGN_PTR_DOWN(p, ptr_align_to) \
+	((typeof(p))ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)(p), ptr_align_to))
+#define __stringify_1(x...)     #x
+#define __stringify(x...)       __stringify_1(x)
+
+#define PTR_ERR_ENOTSUP ((void *)-ENOTSUP)
+
+extern void abort_hooks(void);
+#define pkey_assert(condition) do {		\
+	if (!(condition)) {			\
+		dprintf0("assert() at %s::%d test_nr: %d iteration: %d\n", \
+				__FILE__, __LINE__,	\
+				test_nr, iteration_nr);	\
+		dprintf0("errno at assert: %d", errno);	\
+		abort_hooks();			\
+		assert(condition);		\
+	}					\
+} while (0)
+#define raw_assert(cond) assert(cond)
+
+
+static inline int open_hugepage_file(int flag)
+{
+	int fd;
+#ifdef __i386__ /* arch */
+	fd = open("/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages",
+		 O_RDONLY);
+#elif __powerpc64__ /* arch */
+	fd = open("/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-16384kB/nr_hugepages",
+		O_RDONLY);
+#else /* arch */
+	NOT SUPPORTED
+#endif /* arch */
+	return fd;
+}
+
+static inline int get_start_key(void)
+{
+#ifdef __i386__ /* arch */
+	return 1;
+#elif __powerpc64__ /* arch */
+	return 0;
+#else /* arch */
+	NOT SUPPORTED
+#endif /* arch */
+}
+
 #endif /* _PKEYS_HELPER_H */
tools/testing/selftests/vm/protection_keys.c +330 -237

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#20 lore raw

RFC v4 15/17 Documentation: Move protecton key documentation to arch neutral directory

In reply to Ram Pai

Since PowerPC and Intel both support memory protection keys, moving the documenation to arch-neutral directory.

---
 Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt  | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt | 85 -----------------------------------
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt
 delete mode 100644 Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt new file +85 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b643045
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature
+which will be found on future Intel CPUs.
+
+Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
+protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
+when an application changes protection domains.  It works by
+dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
+"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
+
+There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
+bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
+register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
+thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+
+There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
+to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
+even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
+permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
+instruction fetches.
+
+=========================== Syscalls ===========================
+
+There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys:
+
+	int pkey_alloc(unsigned long flags, unsigned long init_access_rights)
+	int pkey_free(int pkey);
+	int pkey_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len,
+			  unsigned long prot, int pkey);
+
+Before a pkey can be used, it must first be allocated with
+pkey_alloc().  An application calls the WRPKRU instruction
+directly in order to change access permissions to memory covered
+with a key.  In this example WRPKRU is wrapped by a C function
+called pkey_set().
+
+	int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
+	pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DENY_WRITE);
+	ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+	ret = pkey_mprotect(ptr, PAGE_SIZE, real_prot, pkey);
+	... application runs here
+
+Now, if the application needs to update the data at 'ptr', it can
+gain access, do the update, then remove its write access:
+
+	pkey_set(pkey, 0); // clear PKEY_DENY_WRITE
+	*ptr = foo; // assign something
+	pkey_set(pkey, PKEY_DENY_WRITE); // set PKEY_DENY_WRITE again
+
+Now when it frees the memory, it will also free the pkey since it
+is no longer in use:
+
+	munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
+	pkey_free(pkey);
+
+(Note: pkey_set() is a wrapper for the RDPKRU and WRPKRU instructions.
+ An example implementation can be found in
+ tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c)
+
+=========================== Behavior ===========================
+
+The kernel attempts to make protection keys consistent with the
+behavior of a plain mprotect().  For instance if you do this:
+
+	mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_NONE);
+	something(ptr);
+
+you can expect the same effects with protection keys when doing this:
+
+	pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE | PKEY_DISABLE_READ);
+	pkey_mprotect(ptr, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, pkey);
+	something(ptr);
+
+That should be true whether something() is a direct access to 'ptr'
+like:
+
+	*ptr = foo;
+
+or when the kernel does the access on the application's behalf like
+with a read():
+
+	read(fd, ptr, 1);
+
+The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
+to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
+the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt deleted +0 -85

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#21 lore raw

RFC v4 16/17 Documentation: PowerPC specific updates to memory protection keys

In reply to Ram Pai

Add documentation updates that capture PowerPC specific changes.

---
 Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
Documentation/vm/protection-keys.txt +69 -20
index b643045..889f32e 100644
@@ -1,21 +1,46 @@
-Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature
-which will be found on future Intel CPUs.
+Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a CPU feature found in
+new generation of intel CPUs and on PowerPC 7 and higher CPUs.
 
 Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
-protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
-when an application changes protection domains.  It works by
-dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
-"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
-
-There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
-bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
-register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
-thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
-
-There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
-to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
-even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
-permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
+protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables when an
+application changes protection domains.
+
+
+On Intel:
+
+	It works by dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table
+	entry to a "protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
+
+	There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
+	bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
+	register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
+	thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+
+	There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
+	to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
+	even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
+	permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
+	instruction fetches.
+
+
+On PowerPC:
+
+	It works by dedicating 5 hash-page table entry bits to a "protection key",
+	giving 32 possible keys.
+
+	There  is  a  user-accessible  register (AMR)  with  two separate bits;
+	Access Disable and  Write  Disable, for  each key.  Being  a  CPU
+	register,  AMR  is inherently  thread-local,  potentially  giving  each
+	thread a different set of protections from every other thread.  NOTE:
+	Disabling read permission does not disable write and vice-versa.
+
+	The feature is available on 64-bit HPTE mode only.
+	'mtspr 0xd, mem' reads the AMR register
+	'mfspr mem, 0xd' writes into the AMR register.
+
+
+
+Permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
 instruction fetches.
 
 =========================== Syscalls ===========================
@@ -28,9 +53,9 @@ There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys:
 			  unsigned long prot, int pkey);
 
 Before a pkey can be used, it must first be allocated with
-pkey_alloc().  An application calls the WRPKRU instruction
+pkey_alloc().  An application calls the WRPKRU/AMR instruction
 directly in order to change access permissions to memory covered
-with a key.  In this example WRPKRU is wrapped by a C function
+with a key.  In this example WRPKRU/AMR is wrapped by a C function
 called pkey_set().
 
 	int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
@@ -52,11 +77,11 @@ is no longer in use:
 	munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
 	pkey_free(pkey);
 
-(Note: pkey_set() is a wrapper for the RDPKRU and WRPKRU instructions.
+(Note: pkey_set() is a wrapper for the RDPKRU,WRPKRU or AMR instructions.
  An example implementation can be found in
  tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c)
 
-=========================== Behavior ===========================
+=========================== Behavior =================================
 
 The kernel attempts to make protection keys consistent with the
 behavior of a plain mprotect().  For instance if you do this:
@@ -83,3 +108,27 @@ with a read():
 The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
 to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
 the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
+
+
+====================================================================
+		Semantic differences
+
+The following semantic differences exist between x86 and power.
+
+a) powerpc allows creation of a key with execute-disabled.  The following
+	is allowed on powerpc.
+	pkey = pkey_alloc(0, PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE | PKEY_DISABLE_READ |
+			PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE);
+   x86 disallows PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE during key creation.
+
+b) x86, PKEY_DISABLE_READ disables read and write on the key.
+   Powerpc, PKEY_DISABLE_READ just disables read.
+   PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE has to be specified explicitly to disable write.
+
+c) changing the permission bits of a key from a signal handler does not
+   persist on x86. The PKRU specific fpregs entry needs to be modified
+   for it to persist.  On powerpc the permission bits of the key can be
+   modified by programming the AMR register from the signal handler.
+   The changes persists across signal boundaries.
+
+=====================================================================
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#22 lore raw

RFC v4 17/17 procfs: display the protection-key number associated with a vma

In reply to Ram Pai

Display the pkey number associated with the vma in smaps of a task. The key will be seen as below:

VmFlags: rd wr mr mw me dw ac key=0

---
 Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt |  3 ++-
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                 | 22 +++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt +2 -1
index 4cddbce..a8c74aa 100644
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ SwapPss:               0 kB
 KernelPageSize:        4 kB
 MMUPageSize:           4 kB
 Locked:                0 kB
-VmFlags: rd ex mr mw me dw
+VmFlags: rd ex mr mw me dw key=<num>
 
 the first of these lines shows the same information as is displayed for the
 mapping in /proc/PID/maps.  The remaining lines show the size of the mapping
@@ -491,6 +491,7 @@ manner. The codes are the following:
     hg  - huge page advise flag
     nh  - no-huge page advise flag
     mg  - mergable advise flag
+    key=<num> - the memory protection key number
 
 Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
 be present in all further kernel releases. Things get changed, the flags may
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +11 -11
index 2ddc298..d2eb096 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
+#include <linux/huge_mm.h>
 #include <linux/vmacache.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
 #include <linux/huge_mm.h>
@@ -666,22 +668,20 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 		[ilog2(VM_MERGEABLE)]	= "mg",
 		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_MISSING)]= "um",
 		[ilog2(VM_UFFD_WP)]	= "uw",
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
-		/* These come out via ProtectionKey: */
-		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT0)]	= "",
-		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT1)]	= "",
-		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT2)]	= "",
-		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT3)]	= "",
-#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
-#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
-		/* Additional bit in ProtectionKey: */
-		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT4)]	= "",
-#endif
 	};
 	size_t i;
 
 	seq_puts(m, "VmFlags: ");
 	for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG; i++) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
+		if (i == ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT0)) {
+			int keyvalue = vma_pkey(vma);
+
+			i += ilog2(arch_max_pkey())-1;
+			seq_printf(m, "key=%d ", keyvalue);
+			continue;
+		}
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
 		if (!mnemonics[i][0])
 			continue;
 		if (vma->vm_flags & (1UL << i)) {
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#23 lore raw

Re: [RFC v4 17/17] procfs: display the protection-key number associated with a vma

Quoted 4 lines · Ram Pai

Display the pkey number associated with the vma in smaps of a task. The key will be seen as below:

VmFlags: rd wr mr mw me dw ac key=0

Why wouldn't we just emit a "ProtectionKey:" line like x86 does?

See their arch_show_smap().

You should probably also do what x86 does, which is to not display the key on CPUs that don't support keys.

cheers

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#24 lore raw
In reply to Ram Pai
Quoted 34 lines · Ram Pai

Memory protection keys enable applications to protect its address space from inadvertent access or corruption from itself.

The overall idea:

A process allocates a key and associates it with
a address range within its address space.
The process than can dynamically set read/write
permissions on the key without involving the
kernel. Any code that violates the permissions
off the address space; as defined by its associated key, will receive a segmentation fault.

This patch series enables the feature on PPC64 HPTE platform.

ISA3.0 section 5.7.13 describes the detailed specifications.

Testing:
This patch series has passed all the protection key tests available in the selftests directory. The tests are updated to work on both x86 and powerpc.

version v4:
(1) patches no more depend on the pte bits to program the hpte -- comment by Balbir
(2) documentation updates
(3) fixed a bug in the selftest.
(4) unlike x86, powerpc lets signal handler change key permission bits; the change will persist across signal handler boundaries. Earlier we allowed the signal handler to modify a field in the siginfo

Quoted 8 lines

structure which would than be used by the kernel to program the key protection register (AMR)
-- resolves a issue raised by Ben. "Calls to sys_swapcontext with a made-up context will end up with a crap AMR if done by code who didn't know about that register".
(5) these changes enable protection keys on 4k-page kernel aswell.

I have not looked at the full series, but it seems cleaner than the original one and the side-effect is that we can support 4k as well. Nice!

Balbir Singh.

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