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ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode

RFC PATCH In review Mimi Zohar 4 participants 17 messages Oct 23, 2017 – Nov 9, 2017

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Mimi Zohar

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#0 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/1 ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode

Require the "secure_boot" rules, whether or not it is specified on the boot command line, for both the builtin and custom policies in secure boot lockdown mode.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +34 -12
index 95209a5f8595..81a7496171d0 100644
@@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 		if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy)
 			ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
-			ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
+			ima_use_appraise_tcb = TRUE;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
-			ima_use_secure_boot = 1;
+			ima_use_secure_boot = TRUE;
 	}
 
 	return 1;
@@ -427,14 +427,21 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
  */
 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
-	int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries;
+	int i;
+	int measure_entries = 0;
+	int appraise_entries = 0;
+	int secure_boot_entries = 0;
+	bool kernel_locked_down = kernel_is_locked_down();
 
 	/* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
-	measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
-	appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
-			 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
-	secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ?
-			ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0;
+	if (ima_policy)
+		measure_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules);
+
+	if (ima_use_appraise_tcb)
+		appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules);
+
+	if (ima_use_secure_boot || kernel_locked_down)
+		secure_boot_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
 		list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
@@ -455,11 +462,26 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to
-	 * any other appraise rules.
+	 * any other appraise rules.  In secure boot lock-down mode, also
+	 * require these appraise rules for custom policies.
 	 */
-	for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++)
-		list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list,
-			      &ima_default_rules);
+	for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) {
+		struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+
+		/* Include for builtin policies */
+		list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
+
+		/* Include for custom policies */
+		if (kernel_locked_down) {
+			entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (entry) {
+				memcpy(entry, &secure_boot_rules[i],
+				       sizeof(*entry));
+				INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+				list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
 		list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
Signature · 6 lines
2.7.4

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#1 lore raw

I've added this into my series as the third patch, but:

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int __init policy_setup(char *str) · line 199

Quoted 1 line · Mimi Zohar
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -0
+			ima_use_appraise_tcb = TRUE;

Did you mean "true" rather than "TRUE"?

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void __init ima_init_policy(void) · line 479

Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +4 -0
+			entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (entry) {
+				memcpy(entry, &secure_boot_rules[i],
+				       sizeof(*entry));

kmemdup()?

I guess also that oopsing is okay if the allocation fails. We've run out of memory during early boot, after all.

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void __init ima_init_policy(void) · line 481

Quoted 2 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -0
+				INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+				list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);

Isn't the init redundant, given the following line?

David
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author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · David Howells

I've added this into my series as the third patch, but:

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int __init policy_setup(char *str) · line 199

Quoted 1 line · Mimi Zohar
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -0
+			ima_use_appraise_tcb = TRUE;

Did you mean "true" rather than "TRUE"?

Yes, of course. ?Commit 9f4b6a254d7a "ima: Fix bool initialization/comparison" already addresses it. ?Please remove it from this patch.

Quoted 7 lines

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void __init ima_init_policy(void) · line 479

Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +4 -0
+			entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (entry) {
+				memcpy(entry, &secure_boot_rules[i],
+				       sizeof(*entry));

kmemdup()?

Probably

Quoted 3 lines

I guess also that oopsing is okay if the allocation fails. We've run out of memory during early boot, after all.

If the memory allocation fails, the "secure_boot" policy will not be enabled for custom policies, but how is that "oopsing". ?If it fails, there needs to be some indication of the failure, which there currently isn't. ?Perhaps also prevent loading a custom policy.

Quoted 5 lines

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void __init ima_init_policy(void) · line 481

Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -0
+				INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+				list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);

Isn't the init redundant, given the following line?

ok

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#3 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 1 line

Did you mean "true" rather than "TRUE"?

Yes, of course. ?Commit 9f4b6a254d7a "ima: Fix bool initialization/comparison" already addresses it. ?Please remove it from this patch.

Is that with James? I don't seem to have a copy, and I don't want to cause a patch collision.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I guess also that oopsing is okay if the allocation fails. We've run out of memory during early boot, after all.

If the memory allocation fails, the "secure_boot" policy will not be enabled for custom policies, but how is that "oopsing".

Sorry - I overlooked the fact that the variable is not used if it's not zero.

Quoted 2 lines

If it fails, there needs to be some indication of the failure, which there currently isn't. ?Perhaps also prevent loading a custom policy.

Does it need to panic (probably fine as a small memory alloc failed)? If it doesn't set this policy what's the effect on things using is_ima_appraise_enabled() - assuming we get that far?

David
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author
#4 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · David Howells
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 1 line

Did you mean "true" rather than "TRUE"?

Yes, of course. ?Commit 9f4b6a254d7a "ima: Fix bool initialization/comparison" already addresses it. ?Please remove it from this patch.

Is that with James? I don't seem to have a copy, and I don't want to cause a patch collision.

No, it's staged in my next branch. ?After the disaster during the last open window due to a linux-integrity patch, Linus requested linux- integrity be pulled independently of the security pull request. ?We'll see how that goes during the next open window.

James is staging the subsystem patches independently of each other, in case of a similar problem, so that they can be pulled separately. ?There's a new "next-general" branch.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I guess also that oopsing is okay if the allocation fails. We've run out of memory during early boot, after all.

If the memory allocation fails, the "secure_boot" policy will not be enabled for custom policies, but how is that "oopsing".

Quoted 8 lines

Sorry - I overlooked the fact that the variable is not used if it's not zero.

Quoted 2 lines

If it fails, there needs to be some indication of the failure, which there currently isn't. ?Perhaps also prevent loading a custom policy.

Does it need to panic (probably fine as a small memory alloc failed)? If it doesn't set this policy what's the effect on things using is_ima_appraise_enabled() - assuming we get that far?

Assuming that the memory is a temporary failure, the system continues to boot, and a custom policy is installed, there's a potential IMA- appraisal gap, meaning that if the custom policy doesn't include the secure boot rules, files that should be appraised (eg. kernel modules, kexec'ed kernel image, firmware) won't be.

Mimi

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#5 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Mimi Zohar

James is staging the subsystem patches independently of each other, in case of a similar problem, so that they can be pulled separately. ?There's a new "next-general" branch.

If you send me a pull request, I'm combining branches into next-testing, too, which is pulled into -next.

Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>
author
#6 lore raw

[Cc'ing Stephen Rothwell]

Quoted 8 lines · James Morris
Quoted 3 lines · Mimi Zohar

James is staging the subsystem patches independently of each other, in case of a similar problem, so that they can be pulled separately. ?There's a new "next-general" branch.

If you send me a pull request, I'm combining branches into next-testing, too, which is pulled into -next.

linux-next already has the IMA patches, which might be confusing.

Mimi

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#7 lore raw

Hi Mimi,

Quoted 6 lines · On Wed, 08 Nov 2017 15:46:22 -0500 Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> wrote:

[Cc'ing Stephen Rothwell]

Quoted 2 lines · James Morris

On Mon, 30 Oct 2017, Mimi Zohar wrote:

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

James is staging the subsystem patches independently of each other, in case of a similar problem, so that they can be pulled separately. ?There's a new "next-general" branch.

If you send me a pull request, I'm combining branches into next-testing, too, which is pulled into -next.

linux-next already has the IMA patches, which might be confusing.

Not if they are the same *commits* i.e. if the tree/branch that James merges is the same as the one that I already merge of yours
(git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity#next)

Signature · 6 lines
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell
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author
#8 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · Stephen Rothwell

Hi Mimi,

Quoted 10 lines · On Wed, 08 Nov 2017 15:46:22 -0500 Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> wrote:

[Cc'ing Stephen Rothwell]

Quoted 6 lines · James Morris
Quoted 3 lines · Mimi Zohar

James is staging the subsystem patches independently of each other, in case of a similar problem, so that they can be pulled separately. ?There's a new "next-general" branch.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

If you send me a pull request, I'm combining branches into next-testing, too, which is pulled into -next.

linux-next already has the IMA patches, which might be confusing.

Not if they are the same *commits* i.e. if the tree/branch that James merges is the same as the one that I already merge of yours
(git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity#next)

James' security tree is based on -rc3, while the integrity tree is based on -rc4. ?The rebased integrity patches are now in my security- next-integrity branch.

Mimi

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#9 lore raw

Hi Mimi,

Quoted 19 lines · On Wed, 08 Nov 2017 16:04:07 -0500 Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 17 lines · Stephen Rothwell
Quoted 14 lines · On Wed, 08 Nov 2017 15:46:22 -0500 Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> wrote:

[Cc'ing Stephen Rothwell]

Quoted 8 lines · James Morris
Quoted 3 lines · Mimi Zohar

James is staging the subsystem patches independently of each other, in case of a similar problem, so that they can be pulled separately. ?There's a new "next-general" branch.

If you send me a pull request, I'm combining branches into next-testing, too, which is pulled into -next.

linux-next already has the IMA patches, which might be confusing.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Not if they are the same *commits* i.e. if the tree/branch that James merges is the same as the one that I already merge of yours
(git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity#next)

James' security tree is based on -rc3, while the integrity tree is based on -rc4. ?The rebased integrity patches are now in my security- next-integrity branch.

So since those patches are now in James tree, you should drop them from the integrity tree.

Signature · 6 lines
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell
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author
#10 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · Stephen Rothwell

Hi Mimi,

Quoted 23 lines · On Wed, 08 Nov 2017 16:04:07 -0500 Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 20 lines · Stephen Rothwell
Quoted 6 lines · On Wed, 08 Nov 2017 15:46:22 -0500 Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> wrote:

[Cc'ing Stephen Rothwell]

Quoted 2 lines · James Morris

On Mon, 30 Oct 2017, Mimi Zohar wrote:

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

James is staging the subsystem patches independently of each other, in case of a similar problem, so that they can be pulled separately. ?There's a new "next-general" branch.

If you send me a pull request, I'm combining branches into next-testing, too, which is pulled into -next.

linux-next already has the IMA patches, which might be confusing.

Not if they are the same *commits* i.e. if the tree/branch that James merges is the same as the one that I already merge of yours
(git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity#next)

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

James' security tree is based on -rc3, while the integrity tree is based on -rc4. ?The rebased integrity patches are now in my security- next-integrity branch.

So since those patches are now in James tree, you should drop them from the integrity tree.

Ok, I had been planning on sending an independent pull request to Linus, as requested.

Mimi

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#11 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 2 lines

So since those patches are now in James tree, you should drop them from the integrity tree.

Ok, I had been planning on sending an independent pull request to Linus, as requested.

That was not requested. Linus wants separate branches to pull from, but this does not mean separate trees. The x86 and some other subsystems use separate branches in the same tree, which is the model we're now using generally with the security subsystem.

It's _also_ possible to send pull requests independently (which is what the SELinux and AppArmor maintainers decided to do), although that was not what Linus was asking for.

It's up to you if you want to send pull requests directly to Linus or continue to merge via the security tree.

- James

Signature · 7 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>

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author
#12 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · James Morris
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 2 lines

So since those patches are now in James tree, you should drop them from the integrity tree.

Ok, I had been planning on sending an independent pull request to Linus, as requested.

That was not requested. Linus wants separate branches to pull from, but this does not mean separate trees. The x86 and some other subsystems use separate branches in the same tree, which is the model we're now using generally with the security subsystem.

Quoted 6 lines

It's _also_ possible to send pull requests independently (which is what the SELinux and AppArmor maintainers decided to do), although that was not what Linus was asking for.

It's up to you if you want to send pull requests directly to Linus or continue to merge via the security tree.

Thank you for the clarification (and patience). ?There are a lot of interactions between the integrity subsystem and the other security subsystems, especially the TPM. ?Assuming it is acceptable, as you said, I'd really prefer continuing to have the integrity subsystem merged via the security tree.

Mimi

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#13 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Mimi Zohar

Thank you for the clarification (and patience). ?There are a lot of interactions between the integrity subsystem and the other security subsystems, especially the TPM. ?Assuming it is acceptable, as you said, I'd really prefer continuing to have the integrity subsystem merged via the security tree.

That's fine, whatever works for you.

Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>
#14 lore raw

I've made the revisions suggested. See the attached patch.

David
---
commit 721c0994b824b91acd3c412abe55ae41287fc64d

Author: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Date:   Mon Oct 23 11:59:47 2017 -0400

ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode

Require the "secure_boot" rules, whether or not it is specified on the boot command line, for both the builtin and custom policies in secure boot lockdown mode.

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +29 -10
index 95209a5f8595..f64f2be2dc0c 100644
@@ -427,14 +427,21 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
  */
 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
-	int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries;
+	int i;
+	int measure_entries = 0;
+	int appraise_entries = 0;
+	int secure_boot_entries = 0;
+	bool kernel_locked_down = kernel_is_locked_down();
 
 	/* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
-	measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
-	appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
-			 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
-	secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ?
-			ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0;
+	if (ima_policy)
+		measure_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules);
+
+	if (ima_use_appraise_tcb)
+		appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules);
+
+	if (ima_use_secure_boot || kernel_locked_down)
+		secure_boot_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
 		list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
@@ -455,11 +462,23 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to
-	 * any other appraise rules.
+	 * any other appraise rules.  In secure boot lock-down mode, also
+	 * require these appraise rules for custom policies.
 	 */
-	for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++)
-		list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list,
-			      &ima_default_rules);
+	for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) {
+		struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+
+		/* Include for builtin policies */
+		list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
+
+		/* Include for custom policies */
+		if (kernel_locked_down) {
+			entry = kmemdup(&secure_boot_rules[i], sizeof(*entry),
+					GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (entry)
+				list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
+		}
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
 		list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,

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author
#15 lore raw
Quoted 1 line · David Howells

I've made the revisions suggested. See the attached patch.

It looks good, except for a mistake in the original I patch posted.

Quoted 19 lines

---
commit 721c0994b824b91acd3c412abe55ae41287fc64d

Author: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Date:   Mon Oct 23 11:59:47 2017 -0400

ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode

Require the "secure_boot" rules, whether or not it is specified on the boot command line, for both the builtin and custom policies in secure boot lockdown mode.

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0 -0
index 95209a5f8595..f64f2be2dc0c 100644

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void ima_update_policy_flag(void) · line 434

Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +5 -1
@@ -427,14 +427,21 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
  */
 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
-	int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries, secure_boot_entries;
+	int i;
+	int measure_entries = 0;
+	int appraise_entries = 0;
+	int secure_boot_entries = 0;
+	bool kernel_locked_down = kernel_is_locked_down();

kernel_is_locked_down() requires a string.

Mimi

Quoted 47 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +24 -10
 	/* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
-	measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
-	appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
-			 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
-	secure_boot_entries = ima_use_secure_boot ?
-			ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules) : 0;
+	if (ima_policy)
+		measure_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules);
+
+	if (ima_use_appraise_tcb)
+		appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules);
+
+	if (ima_use_secure_boot || kernel_locked_down)
+		secure_boot_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
 		list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
@@ -455,11 +462,23 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to
-	 * any other appraise rules.
+	 * any other appraise rules.  In secure boot lock-down mode, also
+	 * require these appraise rules for custom policies.
 	 */
-	for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++)
-		list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list,
-			      &ima_default_rules);
+	for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) {
+		struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+
+		/* Include for builtin policies */
+		list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
+
+		/* Include for custom policies */
+		if (kernel_locked_down) {
+			entry = kmemdup(&secure_boot_rules[i], sizeof(*entry),
+					GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (entry)
+				list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
+		}
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
 		list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
--
Quoted 4 lines

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#16 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Mimi Zohar

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c void ima_update_policy_flag(void) · line 434

Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -0
+	bool kernel_locked_down = kernel_is_locked_down();

kernel_is_locked_down() requires a string.

Hmmm... Probably don't want to call kernel_is_locked_down() here as that'll get a message printed saying that you tried to do something that's disallowed.

Possibly:

	... = __kernel_is_locked_down("", false);

Though it might be better to provide a second vector.

David
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