enable early printing of hashed pointers
Subsystems (4)
v7 cover enable early printing of hashed pointers
Currently printing pointers early in the boot sequence can result in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being printed. While resolving this issue it was noticed that we can use the hw RNG if available for hashing pointers.
Patch one and two do the ground work to be able to use hw RNG removing from get_random_bytes_arch() the call to get_random_bytes() and returning the number of bytes of random material successfully returned.
Patch three uses the hw RNG to get keying material if it is available.
Patch four further assists debugging early in the boot sequence for machines that do not have a hw RNG by adding a command line option 'debug_boot_weak_hash'. If enabled, non-cryptographically secure hashing is used instead of siphash so we can hash at any time.
No changes to logic since v6.
thanks,
Tobin.
v7
- Remove unused variable, clearing compiler warning (found by Stephen Rothwell's linux-next build infrastructure).
v6
- Rebase on top of Steve's patch (fixing race condition). Uses static branch instead of memory barrier.
v5
- Use 'upside-down-xmas-tree' style to declare local variables (Steve)
- Added Reviewed-by tag from Steve (patch 2 and 3).
v4
- remove last patch of series (command line option patch)
v3
- Add __ro_after_init (suggested by Kees).
v2
- Use min_t() instead of min() (thanks checkpatch).
- Add __must_check to function declaration (thanks Steve).
- Use hw RNG by default if available (as originally suggested by Kees).
- Add command line option to use cryptographically insecure hashing. If debug_early_boot is enabled use hash_long() instead of siphash (as requested by Steve, and solves original problem for Anna-Maria).
- Added Acked-by tag from Ted (patch 1 and 2)
Tobin C. Harding (4):
random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++++++ drivers/char/random.c | 19 +++++++++-------- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- lib/vsprintf.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
PATCH v7 1/4 random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
There are a couple of whitespace issues around the function get_random_bytes_arch(). In preparation for patching this function let's clean them up.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -2
@@ -1736,7 +1736,7 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)if (!arch_get_random_long (&v))break ; - +memcpy (p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; nbytes -= chunk;
@@ -1747,7 +1747,6 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch); -/* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data *
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
PATCH v7 2/4 random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
In reply to Tobin C. HardingCurrently the function get_random_bytes_arch() has return value 'void'. If the hw RNG fails we currently fall back to using get_random_bytes(). This defeats the purpose of requesting random material from the hw RNG in the first place.
There are currently no intree users of get_random_bytes_arch().
Only get random bytes from the hw RNG, make function return the number of bytes retrieved from the hw RNG.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 16 +++++++++------- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +9 -7
@@ -1724,26 +1724,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);* key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to * have put in a back door. +* +* Return number of bytes filled in. */ -void get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes) +int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes) { +int left = nbytes;char *p = buf; -trace_get_random_bytes_arch (nbytes, _RET_IP_); -while (nbytes) { +trace_get_random_bytes_arch (left, _RET_IP_); +while (left) {unsigned long v; -int chunk =min (nbytes, (int )sizeof (unsigned long )); +int chunk =min_t (int, left, (int )sizeof (unsigned long ));if (!arch_get_random_long (&v))break ;memcpy (p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; - nbytes -= chunk; + left -= chunk; } -if (nbytes) -get_random_bytes (p, nbytes); +return nbytes - left; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch);
include/linux/random.h +1 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);extern int wait_for_random_bytes (void );extern int add_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy);extern void del_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy); -extern void get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes); +extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes);#ifndef MODULE extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Re: [PATCH v7 2/4] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
drivers/char/random.c EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); · line 1738
Quoted 7 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Currently the function
get_random_bytes_arch()has return value 'void'. If the hw RNG fails we currently fall back to usingget_random_bytes(). This defeats the purpose of requesting random material from the hw RNG in the first place.drivers/char/random.c +1
-1-int chunk =min (nbytes, (int )sizeof (unsigned long )); +int chunk =min_t (int, left, (int )sizeof (unsigned long ));
Isn't this (int) implied when you use min_t(int, ...) ?
Signature · 2 lines
With Best Regards, Andy Shevchenko
Steven Rostedt
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 2/4] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
Quoted 11 lines · On Tue, 12 Jun 2018 11:39:56 +0300 Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>…
drivers/char/random.c EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); · line 1738
Quoted 7 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Currently the function
get_random_bytes_arch()has return value 'void'. If the hw RNG fails we currently fall back to usingget_random_bytes(). This defeats the purpose of requesting random material from the hw RNG in the first place.drivers/char/random.c +1
-1-int chunk =min (nbytes, (int )sizeof (unsigned long )); +int chunk =min_t (int, left, (int )sizeof (unsigned long ));Isn't this (int) implied when you use
min_t(int, ...)?
I would say so...
#define min_t(type, x, y) __careful_cmp((type)(x), (type)(y), <)
-- Steve
Re: [PATCH v7 2/4] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
In reply to Andy ShevchenkoOn Tue, Jun 12, 2018 at 11:39:56AM +0300, Andy Shevchenko wrote:.
Quoted 10 lines · Tobin C. Harding
drivers/char/random.c EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback); · line 1738
Quoted 7 lines
Currently the function
get_random_bytes_arch()has return value 'void'. If the hw RNG fails we currently fall back to usingget_random_bytes(). This defeats the purpose of requesting random material from the hw RNG in the first place.drivers/char/random.c +1
-1-int chunk =min (nbytes, (int )sizeof (unsigned long )); +int chunk =min_t (int, left, (int )sizeof (unsigned long ));Isn't this (int) implied when you use
min_t(int, ...)?
thanks Andy, will spin another version.
Tobin
PATCH v7 3/4 vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
In reply to Tobin C. HardingCurrently we must wait for enough entropy to become available before hashed pointers can be printed. We can remove this wait by using the hw RNG if available.
Use hw RNG to get keying material.
--- lib/vsprintf.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/vsprintf.c +9 -1
@@ -1675,8 +1675,16 @@ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {static int __init initialize_ptr_random (void ) { -int ret =add_random_ready_callback (&random_ready); +int key_size =sizeof (ptr_key); +int ret; + +/* Use hw RNG if available */ +if (get_random_bytes_arch (&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) { +static_branch_disable (¬_filled_random_ptr_key); +return 0 ; + } + ret =add_random_ready_callback (&random_ready);if (!ret) {return 0 ; }else if (ret == -EALREADY ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Re: [PATCH v7 3/4] vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
Quoted 7 lines · On Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:39:13 +1000 "Tobin C. Harding" <[email protected]> wrote:
Currently we must wait for enough entropy to become available before hashed pointers can be printed. We can remove this wait by using the hw RNG if available.
Use hw RNG to get keying material.
Cc Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
-- Steve
Quoted 28 lines
Suggested-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>--- lib/vsprintf.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)lib/vsprintf.c +9
-1@@ -1675,8 +1675,16 @@ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {static int __init initialize_ptr_random (void ) { -int ret =add_random_ready_callback (&random_ready); +int key_size =sizeof (ptr_key); +int ret; + +/* Use hw RNG if available */ +if (get_random_bytes_arch (&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) { +static_branch_disable (¬_filled_random_ptr_key); +return 0 ; + } + ret =add_random_ready_callback (&random_ready);if (!ret) {return 0 ; }else if (ret == -EALREADY ) {
Re: [PATCH v7 3/4] vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
Quoted 7 lines · Steven Rostedt
Quoted 4 lines · On Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:39:13 +1000 "Tobin C. Harding" <[email protected]> wrote:
Currently we must wait for enough entropy to become available before hashed pointers can be printed. We can remove this wait by using the hw RNG if available.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Use hw RNG to get keying material.
Cc Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
Thanks for reviewing this patch again Steve. My mistake, I forgot to add your reviewed-by from the last version.
thanks for your patience.
Tobin
PATCH v7 4/4 vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
In reply to Tobin C. HardingCurrently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.
If new command line option debug_boot_weak_hash is enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -0
@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level). + debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you are + seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on + production kernels. + debug_locks_verbose= [KNL] verbose self-tests Format=<0|1>
lib/vsprintf.c +18 -0
@@ -1651,6 +1651,18 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,return widen_string (buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); } +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */ +static int debug_boot_weak_hash__ro_after_init ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (debug_boot_weak_hash); + +static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable (char *str) +{ + debug_boot_weak_hash =1 ; +pr_info ("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n" ); +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("debug_boot_weak_hash" , debug_boot_weak_hash_enable); +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (not_filled_random_ptr_key);static siphash_key_t ptr_key__read_mostly ;
@@ -1703,6 +1715,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)const char *str =sizeof (ptr) ==8 ?"(____ptrval____)" :"(ptrval)" ;unsigned long hashval; +/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash */ +if (unlikely (debug_boot_weak_hash)) { + hashval =hash_long ((unsigned long )ptr,32 ); +return pointer_string (buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec); + } +if (static_branch_unlikely (¬_filled_random_ptr_key)) { spec.field_width =2 *sizeof (ptr);/* string length must be less than default_width */
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Re: [PATCH v7 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Quoted 16 lines · On Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:39:14 +1000 "Tobin C. Harding" <[email protected]> wrote:
lib/vsprintf.c +12
-0+/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */ +static int debug_boot_weak_hash__ro_after_init ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (debug_boot_weak_hash); + +static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable (char *str) +{ + debug_boot_weak_hash =1 ; +pr_info ("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n" ); +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("debug_boot_weak_hash" , debug_boot_weak_hash_enable); +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (not_filled_random_ptr_key);static siphash_key_t ptr_key__read_mostly ;
lib/vsprintf.c static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec) · line 1719
Quoted 5 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +2
-0@@ -1703,6 +1715,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)const char *str =sizeof (ptr) ==8 ?"(____ptrval____)" :"(ptrval)" ;unsigned long hashval; +/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash */ +if (unlikely (debug_boot_weak_hash)) {
I was hoping to find a way to make the debug_boot_weak_hash into a static_branch, but its setting is too early to have for a jump label.
I toyed with nesting this inside a static_branch too, but it seems too much overkill.
Hence, I'll just punt and accept this patch as is ;-)
-- Steve
Quoted 7 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +4
-0+ hashval =hash_long ((unsigned long )ptr,32 ); +return pointer_string (buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec); + } +if (static_branch_unlikely (¬_filled_random_ptr_key)) { spec.field_width =2 *sizeof (ptr);/* string length must be less than default_width */
Steven Rostedt
maintainerRe: [PATCH v7 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
In reply to Tobin C. Hardinglib/vsprintf.c char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn, · line 1656
Quoted 11 lines · On Tue, 12 Jun 2018 10:39:14 +1000 "Tobin C. Harding" <[email protected]> wrote:
lib/vsprintf.c +3
-0@@ -1651,6 +1651,18 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,return widen_string (buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); } +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */ +static int debug_boot_weak_hash__ro_after_init ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (debug_boot_weak_hash);
I was too busy trying to make this use a static_branch, that I forgot to mention this in my review.
Why did you add that EXPORT_SYMBOL()? It's useless with a static variable. I think you can nuke that line.
-- Steve