enable early printing of hashed pointers
Subsystems (4)
v8 cover enable early printing of hashed pointers
Ted,
Version 8 changes patch 2 which you previously acked. Change is to remove integer cast as suggested on LKML. I've kept the ACK.
Changes made to patch with reviewed-by tag from Steve were acknowledged on LKML, I've also kept Steve's tag.
Currently printing pointers early in the boot sequence can result in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being printed. While resolving this issue it was noticed that we can use the hw RNG if available for hashing pointers.
Patch one and two do the ground work to be able to use hw RNG removing from get_random_bytes_arch() the call to get_random_bytes() and returning the number of bytes of random material successfully returned.
Patch three uses the hw RNG to get keying material if it is available.
Patch four further assists debugging early in the boot sequence for machines that do not have a hw RNG by adding a command line option 'debug_boot_weak_hash'. If enabled, non-cryptographically secure hashing is used instead of siphash so we can hash at any time.
thanks,
Tobin.
v8
- Remove pointless EXPORT_SYMBOL on static variable (thanks Steve).
- Remove unnecessary integer cast from min_t() argument (thanks Andy).
v7
- Remove unused variable, clearing compiler warning (found by Stephen Rothwell's linux-next build infrastructure).
v6
- Rebase on top of Steve's patch (fixing race condition). Uses static branch instead of memory barrier.
v5
- Use 'upside-down-xmas-tree' style to declare local variables (Steve)
- Added Reviewed-by tag from Steve (patch 2 and 3).
v4
- remove last patch of series (command line option patch)
v3
- Add __ro_after_init (suggested by Kees).
v2
- Use min_t() instead of min() (thanks checkpatch).
- Add __must_check to function declaration (thanks Steve).
- Use hw RNG by default if available (as originally suggested by Kees).
- Add command line option to use cryptographically insecure hashing. If debug_early_boot is enabled use hash_long() instead of siphash (as requested by Steve, and solves original problem for Anna-Maria).
- Added Acked-by tag from Ted (patch 1 and 2)
Tobin C. Harding (4):
random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++ drivers/char/random.c | 19 ++++++------- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- lib/vsprintf.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 1/4 random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
There are a couple of whitespace issues around the function get_random_bytes_arch(). In preparation for patching this function let's clean them up.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -2
@@ -1736,7 +1736,7 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)if (!arch_get_random_long (&v))break ; - +memcpy (p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; nbytes -= chunk;
@@ -1747,7 +1747,6 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch); -/* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data *
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 2/4 random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
In reply to Tobin C. HardingCurrently the function get_random_bytes_arch() has return value 'void'. If the hw RNG fails we currently fall back to using get_random_bytes(). This defeats the purpose of requesting random material from the hw RNG in the first place.
There are currently no intree users of get_random_bytes_arch().
Only get random bytes from the hw RNG, make function return the number of bytes retrieved from the hw RNG.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 16 +++++++++------- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +9 -7
@@ -1724,26 +1724,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);* key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to * have put in a back door. +* +* Return number of bytes filled in. */ -void get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes) +int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes) { +int left = nbytes;char *p = buf; -trace_get_random_bytes_arch (nbytes, _RET_IP_); -while (nbytes) { +trace_get_random_bytes_arch (left, _RET_IP_); +while (left) {unsigned long v; -int chunk =min (nbytes, (int )sizeof (unsigned long )); +int chunk =min_t (int, left,sizeof (unsigned long ));if (!arch_get_random_long (&v))break ;memcpy (p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; - nbytes -= chunk; + left -= chunk; } -if (nbytes) -get_random_bytes (p, nbytes); +return nbytes - left; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch);
include/linux/random.h +1 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);extern int wait_for_random_bytes (void );extern int add_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy);extern void del_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy); -extern void get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes); +extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes);#ifndef MODULE extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 3/4 vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
In reply to Tobin C. HardingCurrently we must wait for enough entropy to become available before hashed pointers can be printed. We can remove this wait by using the hw RNG if available.
Use hw RNG to get keying material.
--- lib/vsprintf.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
lib/vsprintf.c +9 -1
@@ -1675,8 +1675,16 @@ static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {static int __init initialize_ptr_random (void ) { -int ret =add_random_ready_callback (&random_ready); +int key_size =sizeof (ptr_key); +int ret; + +/* Use hw RNG if available */ +if (get_random_bytes_arch (&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) { +static_branch_disable (¬_filled_random_ptr_key); +return 0 ; + } + ret =add_random_ready_callback (&random_ready);if (!ret) {return 0 ; }else if (ret == -EALREADY ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 4/4 vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
In reply to Tobin C. HardingCurrently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.
If new command line option debug_boot_weak_hash is enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +9 -0
@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level). + debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you are + seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on + production kernels. + debug_locks_verbose= [KNL] verbose self-tests Format=<0|1>
lib/vsprintf.c +17 -0
@@ -1651,6 +1651,17 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,return widen_string (buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); } +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */ +static int debug_boot_weak_hash__ro_after_init ; + +static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable (char *str) +{ + debug_boot_weak_hash =1 ; +pr_info ("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n" ); +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("debug_boot_weak_hash" , debug_boot_weak_hash_enable); +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE (not_filled_random_ptr_key);static siphash_key_t ptr_key__read_mostly ;
@@ -1703,6 +1714,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)const char *str =sizeof (ptr) ==8 ?"(____ptrval____)" :"(ptrval)" ;unsigned long hashval; +/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash */ +if (unlikely (debug_boot_weak_hash)) { + hashval =hash_long ((unsigned long )ptr,32 ); +return pointer_string (buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec); + } +if (static_branch_unlikely (¬_filled_random_ptr_key)) { spec.field_width =2 *sizeof (ptr);/* string length must be less than default_width */
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Randy Dunlap
reviewerRe: [PATCH v8 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Quoted 23 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(
____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.If new command line option
debug_boot_weak_hashis enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.Signed-off-by Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 755
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5
-0@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level). + debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you are
maybe:
to see hashed pointer values
i.e., not raw pointers.
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 762
Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +4
-0+ seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on + production kernels. + debug_locks_verbose= [KNL] verbose self-tests Format=<0|1>
thanks,
Signature · 1 line
~Randy
Re: [PATCH v8 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Quoted 27 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 26 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(
____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.If new command line option
debug_boot_weak_hashis enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.Signed-off-by Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 755
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5
-0+ debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you aremaybe:
to see hashed pointer values
i.e., not raw pointers.
You cannot see 'raw pointers' anyways?
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 758
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-0+ seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on + production kernels.
thanks for the review, I don't quiet see how to use your suggestion to make the text clearer. If you still feel this change is needed perhaps you could write so I understand i.e 'Use this option if ...'
thanks,
Tobin.
Randy Dunlap
reviewerRe: [PATCH v8 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Quoted 38 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 27 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 26 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(
____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.If new command line option
debug_boot_weak_hashis enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.Signed-off-by Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 755
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5
-0+ debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you aremaybe:
to see hashed pointer values
i.e., not raw pointers.
Quoted 1 line
You cannot see 'raw pointers' anyways?
only if using %px ?
Maybe it's just terminology. I don't consider a hashed value as a pointer value. It's just a key or handle or some other number, but it's not a pointer.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 758
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-0+ seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on + production kernels.thanks for the review, I don't quiet see how to use your suggestion to make the text clearer. If you still feel this change is needed perhaps you could write so I understand i.e 'Use this option if ...'
OK, if you are good with it, I am too. :)
thanks,
Signature · 1 line
~Randy
Re: [PATCH v8 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Quoted 56 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 38 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 27 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 26 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(
____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.If new command line option
debug_boot_weak_hashis enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.Signed-off-by Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 755
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5
-0+ debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you aremaybe:
to see hashed pointer values
i.e., not raw pointers.Quoted 1 line
You cannot see 'raw pointers' anyways?
only if using %px ?
Maybe it's just terminology. I don't consider a hashed value as a pointer value. It's just a key or handle or some other number, but it's not a pointer.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 758
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-0+ seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on + production kernels.thanks for the review, I don't quiet see how to use your suggestion to make the text clearer. If you still feel this change is needed perhaps you could write so I understand i.e 'Use this option if ...'
Quoted 1 line
OK, if you are good with it, I am too. :)
I get you know. I agree, how about this
[KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need to print pointers with %px during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on production kernels.
thanks for clarifying,
Tobin.
Randy Dunlap
reviewerRe: [PATCH v8 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Quoted 61 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 56 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 38 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 27 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 26 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(
____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.If new command line option
debug_boot_weak_hashis enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.Signed-off-by Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 755
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5
-0+ debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you aremaybe:
to see hashed pointer values
i.e., not raw pointers.Quoted 1 line
You cannot see 'raw pointers' anyways?
only if using %px ?
Maybe it's just terminology. I don't consider a hashed value as a pointer value. It's just a key or handle or some other number, but it's not a pointer.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 758
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-0+ seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on + production kernels.thanks for the review, I don't quiet see how to use your suggestion to make the text clearer. If you still feel this change is needed perhaps you could write so I understand i.e 'Use this option if ...'
Quoted 1 line
OK, if you are good with it, I am too. :)
I get you know. I agree, how about this
Quoted 7 lines
[KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need to print pointers with %px during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances of '(
___ptrval___)'). Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on production kernels.
Sorry, I'm still confused by this paragraph. It seems to say two different things.
(a) If [this option] is enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash.
(b) Use this option to print pointers with %px [during early boot].
Maybe they aren't contradictory? Is (b) in effect until there is enough entropy, then (a) takes over?
and nit: s/i.e/i.e./
thanks,
Signature · 1 line
~Randy
Re: [PATCH v8 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Quoted 70 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 61 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 56 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 38 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 27 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 26 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(
____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.If new command line option
debug_boot_weak_hashis enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.Signed-off-by Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 755
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5
-0+ debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you aremaybe:
to see hashed pointer values
i.e., not raw pointers.Quoted 1 line
You cannot see 'raw pointers' anyways?
only if using %px ?
Maybe it's just terminology. I don't consider a hashed value as a pointer value. It's just a key or handle or some other number, but it's not a pointer.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 758
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-0+ seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on + production kernels.thanks for the review, I don't quiet see how to use your suggestion to make the text clearer. If you still feel this change is needed perhaps you could write so I understand i.e 'Use this option if ...'
Quoted 1 line
OK, if you are good with it, I am too. :)
I get you know. I agree, how about this
Quoted 7 lines
[KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need to print pointers with %px during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances of '(
___ptrval___)'). Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on production kernels.
Quoted 2 lines
Sorry, I'm still confused by this paragraph. It seems to say two different things.
My bad, I got totally confused myself. After all this time you would think I knew which specifier hashed and which didn't. My apologies, how about this:
[KNL] Enable printing [hashed] pointers early in the boot sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you are seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)') and need to see a value (hashed pointer) instead. Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on production kernels.
thanks for your patience,
Tobin.
Randy Dunlap
reviewerRe: [PATCH v8 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Quoted 86 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 70 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 61 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 56 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 38 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 27 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 26 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(
____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.If new command line option
debug_boot_weak_hashis enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.Signed-off-by Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 755
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5
-0+ debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you aremaybe:
to see hashed pointer values
i.e., not raw pointers.Quoted 1 line
You cannot see 'raw pointers' anyways?
only if using %px ?
Maybe it's just terminology. I don't consider a hashed value as a pointer value. It's just a key or handle or some other number, but it's not a pointer.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 758
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-0+ seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on + production kernels.thanks for the review, I don't quiet see how to use your suggestion to make the text clearer. If you still feel this change is needed perhaps you could write so I understand i.e 'Use this option if ...'
Quoted 1 line
OK, if you are good with it, I am too. :)
I get you know. I agree, how about this
Quoted 7 lines
[KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need to print pointers with %px during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances of '(
___ptrval___)'). Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on production kernels.Quoted 2 lines
Sorry, I'm still confused by this paragraph. It seems to say two different things.
My bad, I got totally confused myself. After all this time you would think I knew which specifier hashed and which didn't. My apologies, how about this:
[KNL] Enable printing [hashed] pointers early in the boot sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you are seeing instances of '(
___ptrval___)') and need to see a value (hashed pointer) instead. Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on production kernels.
Quoted 2 lines
thanks for your patience,
Tobin.
Yes, that's good. Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
~Randy
Re: [PATCH v8 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash
Quoted 87 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 86 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 70 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 61 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 56 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 38 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Quoted 27 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 26 lines · Tobin C. Harding
Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be available. Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case resulting in a dummy string '(
____ptrval____)' being printed. This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult. We can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging. This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel behaviour the same.If new command line option
debug_boot_weak_hashis enabled use cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.Signed-off-by Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0
-0@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@ debug [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 755
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +5
-0+ debug_boot_weak_hash + [KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot + sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of + siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need + to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you aremaybe:
to see hashed pointer values
i.e., not raw pointers.Quoted 1 line
You cannot see 'raw pointers' anyways?
only if using %px ?
Maybe it's just terminology. I don't consider a hashed value as a pointer value. It's just a key or handle or some other number, but it's not a pointer.
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Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt line 758
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Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3
-0+ seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)'). + Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on + production kernels.thanks for the review, I don't quiet see how to use your suggestion to make the text clearer. If you still feel this change is needed perhaps you could write so I understand i.e 'Use this option if ...'
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OK, if you are good with it, I am too. :)
I get you know. I agree, how about this
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[KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you need to print pointers with %px during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances of '(
___ptrval___)'). Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on production kernels.Quoted 2 lines
Sorry, I'm still confused by this paragraph. It seems to say two different things.
My bad, I got totally confused myself. After all this time you would think I knew which specifier hashed and which didn't. My apologies, how about this:
[KNL] Enable printing [hashed] pointers early in the boot sequence. If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash pointers. Use this option if you are seeing instances of '(
___ptrval___)') and need to see a value (hashed pointer) instead. Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on production kernels.
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thanks for your patience,
Tobin.Yes, that's good. Thanks.
Awesome, v9 on it's way :)
thanks,
Tobin.