image-sig: Ensure that hashed-nodes is null-terminated
PATCH 1/2 image-sig: Ensure that hashed-nodes is null-terminated
From: Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>
A specially crafted FIT image leads to memory corruption in the stack when using the verified boot feature. The function fit_config_check_sig has a logic error that makes it possible to write past the end of the stack allocated array node_inc. This could potentially be used to bypass the signature check when using verified boot.
This change ensures that the number of strings is correct when counted.
--- common/image-sig.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
common/image-sig.c +5 -0
@@ -334,6 +334,11 @@ int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int required_keynode,return -1 ; } +if (prop && prop_len >0 && prop[prop_len -1 ] !='\0' ) { + *err_msgp ="hashed-nodes property must be null-terminated" ; +return -1 ; + } +/* Add a sanity check here since we are using the stack */ if (count >IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES ) { *err_msgp ="Number of hashed nodes exceeds maximum" ;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
PATCH 1/2 image-sig: Ensure that hashed-nodes is null-terminated
Quoted 8 lines · Tom Rini
From: Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>
A specially crafted FIT image leads to memory corruption in the stack when using the verified boot feature. The function
fit_config_check_sighas a logic error that makes it possible to write past the end of the stack allocated arraynode_inc. This could potentially be used to bypass the signature check when using verified boot.
Quoted 4 lines
This change ensures that the number of strings is correct when counted.
Signed-off-by Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>
Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!
Signature · 8 lines
Tom -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/attachments/20181117/b460938b/attachment.sig>
PATCH 1/2 image-sig: Ensure that hashed-nodes is null-terminated
In reply to Tom RiniQuoted 8 lines · Tom Rini
From: Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>
A specially crafted FIT image leads to memory corruption in the stack when using the verified boot feature. The function
fit_config_check_sighas a logic error that makes it possible to write past the end of the stack allocated arraynode_inc. This could potentially be used to bypass the signature check when using verified boot.
Quoted 6 lines
This change ensures that the number of strings is correct when counted.
Signed-off-by Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>--- common/image-sig.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
PATCH 2/2 fdt_region: Ensure that depth never goes below -1
In reply to Tom RiniFrom: Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>
A specially crafted FIT image makes it possible to overflow the stack with controlled values when using the verified boot feature. Depending on the memory layout, this could be used to overwrite configuration variables on the heap and setting them to 0, e.g. disable signature verification, thus bypassing it.
This change fixes a bug in fdt_find_regions where the fdt structure is parsed. A lower value than -1 of depth can lead to a buffer underflow write on the stack.
--- lib/libfdt/fdt_region.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
lib/libfdt/fdt_region.c +3 -0
@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ int fdt_find_regions(const void *fdt, char * const inc[], int inc_count,break ;case FDT_END_NODE : +/* Depth must never go below -1 */ +if (depth <0 ) +return -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE ; include = want; want = stack[depth--];while (end > path && *--end !='/' )
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
PATCH 2/2 fdt_region: Ensure that depth never goes below -1
Quoted 8 lines · Tom Rini
From: Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>
A specially crafted FIT image makes it possible to overflow the stack with controlled values when using the verified boot feature. Depending on the memory layout, this could be used to overwrite configuration variables on the heap and setting them to 0, e.g. disable signature verification, thus bypassing it.
Quoted 9 lines
This change fixes a bug in
fdt_find_regionswhere the fdt structure is parsed. A lower value than -1 of depth can lead to a buffer underflow write on the stack.Signed-off-by Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>--- lib/libfdt/fdt_region.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
PATCH 2/2 fdt_region: Ensure that depth never goes below -1
In reply to Tom RiniQuoted 8 lines · Tom Rini
From: Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>
A specially crafted FIT image makes it possible to overflow the stack with controlled values when using the verified boot feature. Depending on the memory layout, this could be used to overwrite configuration variables on the heap and setting them to 0, e.g. disable signature verification, thus bypassing it.
Quoted 6 lines
This change fixes a bug in
fdt_find_regionswhere the fdt structure is parsed. A lower value than -1 of depth can lead to a buffer underflow write on the stack.Signed-off-by Konrad Beckmann <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Simon Glass <[email protected]>
Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!
Signature · 8 lines
Tom -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/attachments/20181117/b6a29d72/attachment.sig>