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let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image

PATCH Superseded Kairui Song 4 participants 12 messages Jan 18, 2019 – Jan 21, 2019

Subsystems (10)

v4 of 5 Superseded Latest is v5 →

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#0 lore raw

v4 cover let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image

This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.

This patch series also let kexec_file_load use platform keyring as fall back if it failed to verify the image against secondary keyring, make it possible to load kernel signed by keys provides by firmware.

After this patch kexec_file_load will be able to verify a signed PE bzImage using keys in platform keyring.

Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the cert to EFI's MokList variable.

To test this patch series on latest kernel, you need to ensure this commit is applied as there is an regression bug in sanity_check_segment_list():

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/commit/?id�3a110319a4a60aadbd02f6defdebe048f7773b

Update from V3:
- Tweak and simplify commit message as suggested by Mimi Zohar

Update from V2:
- Use IS_ENABLED in kexec_file_load to judge if platform_trusted_keys should be used for verifying image as suggested by Mimi Zohar

Update from V1:
- Make platform_trusted_keys static, and update commit message as suggested by Mimi Zohar
- Always check if platform keyring is initialized before use it

Kairui Song (2):
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify

 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 certs/system_keyring.c            | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/keys/system_keyring.h     |  5 +++++
 include/linux/verification.h      |  1 +
 security/integrity/digsig.c       |  6 ++++++
 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/2 integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring

commit 9dc92c45177a ('integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring') introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for verifying kernel images' signature. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature stored in xattr.

This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for verifying PE signed kernel images as well.

---
 certs/system_keyring.c        | 9 +++++++++
 include/keys/system_keyring.h | 5 +++++
 security/integrity/digsig.c   | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
certs/system_keyring.c +9 -0
index 81728717523d..4690ef9cda8a 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+static struct key *platform_trusted_keys;
+#endif
 
 extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
 extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
@@ -265,4 +268,10 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring) {
+	platform_trusted_keys = keyring;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
include/keys/system_keyring.h +5 -0
index 359c2f936004..9e1b7849b6aa 100644
@@ -61,5 +61,10 @@ static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+
+extern void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key* keyring);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING */
 
 #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
security/integrity/digsig.c +6 -0
index f45d6edecf99..bfabc2a8111d 100644
@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm,
 		keyring[id] = NULL;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+	if (id = INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM) {
+		set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
+	}
+#endif
+
 	return err;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring

Quoted 64 lines · Kairui Song

commit 9dc92c45177a ('integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring') introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for verifying kernel images' signature. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature stored in xattr.

This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for verifying PE signed kernel images as well.

---
  certs/system_keyring.c        | 9 +++++++++
  include/keys/system_keyring.h | 5 +++++
  security/integrity/digsig.c   | 6 ++++++
  3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
certs/system_keyring.c +9 -0
index 81728717523d..4690ef9cda8a 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
  static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;
  #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+static struct key *platform_trusted_keys;
+#endif
 
  extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
  extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
@@ -265,4 +268,10 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring) {
+	platform_trusted_keys = keyring;
+}
+#endif
+
  #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
include/keys/system_keyring.h +5 -0
index 359c2f936004..9e1b7849b6aa 100644
@@ -61,5 +61,10 @@ static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void)
  }
  #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+
+extern void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key* keyring);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING */
 
  #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
security/integrity/digsig.c +0 -0
index f45d6edecf99..bfabc2a8111d 100644

security/integrity/digsig.c static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm, · line 93

Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/digsig.c +2 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm,
  		keyring[id] = NULL;
  	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+	if (id = INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM) {

Shouldn't it also check that keyring[id] is not NULL ?

Thanks & Regards,
    - Nayna

Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/digsig.c +4 -0
+		set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
+	}
+#endif
+
  	return err;
  }
 
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring

Quoted 68 lines · Nayna
Quoted 67 lines · Kairui Song

commit 9dc92c45177a ('integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring') introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for verifying kernel images' signature. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature stored in xattr.

This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for verifying PE signed kernel images as well.

---
  certs/system_keyring.c        | 9 +++++++++
  include/keys/system_keyring.h | 5 +++++
  security/integrity/digsig.c   | 6 ++++++
  3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
certs/system_keyring.c +9 -0
index 81728717523d..4690ef9cda8a 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
  static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;
  #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+static struct key *platform_trusted_keys;
+#endif
 
  extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
  extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
@@ -265,4 +268,10 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring) {
+     platform_trusted_keys = keyring;
+}
+#endif
+
  #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
include/keys/system_keyring.h +5 -0
index 359c2f936004..9e1b7849b6aa 100644
@@ -61,5 +61,10 @@ static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void)
  }
  #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+
+extern void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key* keyring);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING */
 
  #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
security/integrity/digsig.c +0 -0
index f45d6edecf99..bfabc2a8111d 100644
@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm,
              keyring[id] = NULL;
      }
 
Quoted 4 lines

security/integrity/digsig.c static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm, · line 93

Quoted 2 lines
security/integrity/digsig.c +2 -0
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+     if (id = INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM) {

Shouldn't it also check that keyring[id] is not NULL ?

Good catch, if it's NULL then platform_trusted_keyring will be set to NULL as well, which will work just fine as in this case platform_trusted_keyring is still considered not initialized. I'll add a sanity check here to check err value just in case.
Thanks for your suggestion!

Quoted 17 lines

Thanks & Regards,
- Nayna

security/integrity/digsig.c static int __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id, key_perm_t perm, · line 100

Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/digsig.c +4 -0
+             set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
+     }
+#endif
+
      return err;
  }
 

_______________________________________________
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[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards,
Kairui Song
#4 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/2 kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify

In reply to Kairui Song

This patch let kexec_file_load makes use of .platform keyring as fall back if it failed to verify a PE signed image against secondary or builtin keyring, make it possible to verify kernel image signed with preboot keys as well.

This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY, so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it won't generate extra noises.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 certs/system_keyring.c            | 13 ++++++++++++-
 include/linux/verification.h      |  1 +
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +10 -3
index 7d97e432cbbc..2c007abd3d40 100644
@@ -534,9 +534,16 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
 static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				       VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
-				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+	int ret;
+	ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+				      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+	if (ret = -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
+		ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+					      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					      VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
+	}
+	return ret;
 }
 #endif
 
certs/system_keyring.c +12 -1
index 4690ef9cda8a..7085c286f4bd 100644
@@ -240,11 +240,22 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
 #else
 		trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
 #endif
+	} else if (trusted_keys = VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+		trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys;
+#else
+		trusted_keys = NULL;
+#endif
+		if (!trusted_keys) {
+			ret = -ENOKEY;
+			pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n");
+			goto error;
+		}
 	}
 	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		if (ret = -ENOKEY)
-			pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
+			pr_devel("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
 		goto error;
 	}
 
include/linux/verification.h +1 -0
index cfa4730d607a..018fb5f13d44 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
  * should be used.
  */
 #define VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ((struct key *)1UL)
+#define VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING  ((struct key *)2UL)
 
 /*
  * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
maintainer
#5 lore raw
In reply to Kairui Song
Quoted 4 lines · Kairui Song

This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.

Kairui, when people review patches, the comments could be specific, but are normally generic.  My review included a couple of generic suggestions - not to use "#ifdef" in C code (eg. is_enabled), use the term "preboot" keys, and remove any references to "other components".

After all the wording suggestions I've made, you are still saying, "So other components could use this keyring as well".  Really?!  How the platform keyring will be used in the future, is up to you and others to convince Linus.  At least for now, please limit its usage to verifying the PE signed kernel image.  If this patch set needs to be reposted, please remove all references to "other components".

Dave/David, are you ok with Kairui's usage of "#ifdef's"?  Dave, you Acked the original post.  Can I include it?  Can we get some additional Ack's on these patches?

thanks!

Mimi

Quoted 39 lines

This patch series also let kexec_file_load use platform keyring as fall back if it failed to verify the image against secondary keyring, make it possible to load kernel signed by keys provides by firmware.

After this patch kexec_file_load will be able to verify a signed PE bzImage using keys in platform keyring.

Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the cert to EFI's MokList variable.

To test this patch series on latest kernel, you need to ensure this commit is applied as there is an regression bug in sanity_check_segment_list():

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/commit/?id�3a110319a4a60aadbd02f6defdebe048f7773b

Update from V3:
- Tweak and simplify commit message as suggested by Mimi Zohar

Update from V2:
- Use IS_ENABLED in kexec_file_load to judge if platform_trusted_keys should be used for verifying image as suggested by Mimi Zohar

Update from V1:
- Make platform_trusted_keys static, and update commit message as suggested by Mimi Zohar
- Always check if platform keyring is initialized before use it

Kairui Song (2):
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify

 arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 certs/system_keyring.c            | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/keys/system_keyring.h     |  5 +++++
 include/linux/verification.h      |  1 +
 security/integrity/digsig.c       |  6 ++++++
 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
#6 lore raw
Quoted 19 lines · On Fri, Jan 18, 2019, 19:54 Mimi Zohar <[email protected] wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · Kairui Song

This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.

Kairui, when people review patches, the comments could be specific, but are normally generic. My review included a couple of generic suggestions - not to use "#ifdef" in C code (eg. is_enabled), use the term "preboot" keys, and remove any references to "other components".

After all the wording suggestions I've made, you are still saying, "So other components could use this keyring as well". Really?! How the platform keyring will be used in the future, is up to you and others to convince Linus. At least for now, please limit its usage to verifying the PE signed kernel image. If this patch set needs to be reposted, please remove all references to "other components".

Quoted 8 lines

Dave/David, are you ok with Kairui's usage of "#ifdef's"? Dave, you Acked the original post. Can I include it? Can we get some additional Ack's on these patches?

thanks!

Mimi

Hi, Mimi, thanks for your feedback. My bad I reused the old cover letter without checking it carefully, hopefully, the commit messages should have a proper wording now. If the cover letter needs to be updated I can resend the patch, let me just hold a while before update again.

#7 lore raw
In reply to Mimi Zohar
Quoted 18 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 4 lines · Kairui Song

This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.

Kairui, when people review patches, the comments could be specific, but are normally generic.  My review included a couple of generic suggestions - not to use "#ifdef" in C code (eg. is_enabled), use the term "preboot" keys, and remove any references to "other components".

After all the wording suggestions I've made, you are still saying, "So other components could use this keyring as well".  Really?!  How the platform keyring will be used in the future, is up to you and others to convince Linus.  At least for now, please limit its usage to verifying the PE signed kernel image.  If this patch set needs to be reposted, please remove all references to "other components".

Quoted 3 lines

Dave/David, are you ok with Kairui's usage of "#ifdef's"?  Dave, you Acked the original post.  Can I include it?  Can we get some additional Ack's on these patches?

It is better to update patch to use IS_ENABLED in patch 1/2 as well. Other than that, for kexec part I'm fine with an ack.

Thanks
Dave

#8 lore raw
Quoted 19 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 18 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 4 lines · Kairui Song

This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.

Kairui, when people review patches, the comments could be specific, but are normally generic.  My review included a couple of generic suggestions - not to use "#ifdef" in C code (eg. is_enabled), use the term "preboot" keys, and remove any references to "other components".

After all the wording suggestions I've made, you are still saying, "So other components could use this keyring as well".  Really?!  How the platform keyring will be used in the future, is up to you and others to convince Linus.  At least for now, please limit its usage to verifying the PE signed kernel image.  If this patch set needs to be reposted, please remove all references to "other components".

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Dave/David, are you ok with Kairui's usage of "#ifdef's"?  Dave, you Acked the original post.  Can I include it?  Can we get some additional Ack's on these patches?

It is better to update patch to use IS_ENABLED in patch 1/2 as well.

Hmm, not only for patch 1/2, patch 2/2 also need an update

Quoted 4 lines

Other than that, for kexec part I'm fine with an ack.

Thanks
Dave

#9 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 19 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 18 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 4 lines · Kairui Song

This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.

Kairui, when people review patches, the comments could be specific, but are normally generic. My review included a couple of generic suggestions - not to use "#ifdef" in C code (eg. is_enabled), use the term "preboot" keys, and remove any references to "other components".

After all the wording suggestions I've made, you are still saying, "So other components could use this keyring as well". Really?! How the platform keyring will be used in the future, is up to you and others to convince Linus. At least for now, please limit its usage to verifying the PE signed kernel image. If this patch set needs to be reposted, please remove all references to "other components".

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Dave/David, are you ok with Kairui's usage of "#ifdef's"? Dave, you Acked the original post. Can I include it? Can we get some additional Ack's on these patches?

It is better to update patch to use IS_ENABLED in patch 1/2 as well.

Hmm, not only for patch 1/2, patch 2/2 also need an update

Quoted 4 lines

Other than that, for kexec part I'm fine with an ack.

Thanks
Dave

Thanks for the review again, will update the patch using IS_ENABLED along with update the cover letter shortly.

Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards,
Kairui Song
#10 lore raw
Quoted 36 lines · Kairui Song
Quoted 21 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 19 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 18 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 4 lines · Kairui Song

This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.

Kairui, when people review patches, the comments could be specific, but are normally generic. My review included a couple of generic suggestions - not to use "#ifdef" in C code (eg. is_enabled), use the term "preboot" keys, and remove any references to "other components".

After all the wording suggestions I've made, you are still saying, "So other components could use this keyring as well". Really?! How the platform keyring will be used in the future, is up to you and others to convince Linus. At least for now, please limit its usage to verifying the PE signed kernel image. If this patch set needs to be reposted, please remove all references to "other components".

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Dave/David, are you ok with Kairui's usage of "#ifdef's"? Dave, you Acked the original post. Can I include it? Can we get some additional Ack's on these patches?

It is better to update patch to use IS_ENABLED in patch 1/2 as well.

Hmm, not only for patch 1/2, patch 2/2 also need an update

Quoted 4 lines

Other than that, for kexec part I'm fine with an ack.

Thanks
Dave

Quoted 6 lines

Thanks for the review again, will update the patch using IS_ENABLED along with update the cover letter shortly.

--
Best Regards,
Kairui Song

Hi, before I update it again, most part of the new platform_trusted_keyring related code is following how secondary_trusted_keyring is implemented (surrounded by ifdefs). I thought this could reduce unused code when the keyring is not enabled. Else, all ifdef could be simply removed, when platform_keyring is not enabled, the platform_trusted_keys will always be NULL, and verify_pkcs7_signature will simply return NOKEY if anyone try to use platform keyring.

Any suggestions? Or I can just remove the ifdef in security/integrity/digsig.c and make set_platform_trusted_keys a inline empty function in system_keyring.h.

Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards,
Kairui Song
#11 lore raw
Quoted 54 lines · Kairui Song
Quoted 36 lines · Kairui Song
Quoted 21 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 19 lines · Dave Young
Quoted 18 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 4 lines · Kairui Song

This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform keyring is being initialized it will be updated. So other component could use this keyring as well.

Kairui, when people review patches, the comments could be specific, but are normally generic. My review included a couple of generic suggestions - not to use "#ifdef" in C code (eg. is_enabled), use the term "preboot" keys, and remove any references to "other components".

After all the wording suggestions I've made, you are still saying, "So other components could use this keyring as well". Really?! How the platform keyring will be used in the future, is up to you and others to convince Linus. At least for now, please limit its usage to verifying the PE signed kernel image. If this patch set needs to be reposted, please remove all references to "other components".

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Dave/David, are you ok with Kairui's usage of "#ifdef's"? Dave, you Acked the original post. Can I include it? Can we get some additional Ack's on these patches?

It is better to update patch to use IS_ENABLED in patch 1/2 as well.

Hmm, not only for patch 1/2, patch 2/2 also need an update

Quoted 4 lines

Other than that, for kexec part I'm fine with an ack.

Thanks
Dave

Quoted 6 lines

Thanks for the review again, will update the patch using IS_ENABLED along with update the cover letter shortly.

--
Best Regards,
Kairui Song

Hi, before I update it again, most part of the new platform_trusted_keyring related code is following how secondary_trusted_keyring is implemented (surrounded by ifdefs). I thought this could reduce unused code when the keyring is not enabled. Else, all ifdef could be simply removed, when platform_keyring is not enabled, the platform_trusted_keys will always be NULL, and verify_pkcs7_signature will simply return NOKEY if anyone try to use platform keyring.

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Any suggestions? Or I can just remove the ifdef in security/integrity/digsig.c and make set_platform_trusted_keys a inline empty function in system_keyring.h.

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Best Regards,
Kairui Song

Hi, after a second thought I'll drop the #ifdef in security/integrity/digsig.c in PATCH 1/2, and make the set_platform_trusted_keys function a empty inline function when CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING is undefined.
But for other ifdefs in certs/system_keyring.c I think maybe just keep then untouched. They were used to strip out the platform_trusted_keyring variable and related function when CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING is not used, this should help reduce unused code and prevent compile error, also make code style aligns with existing code in system_keyring.c.

Will sent v5 with above updates and fix a potential problem found by Nayna.

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Best Regards,
Kairui Song