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USB: s2255 & stkwebcam: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors

PATCH In review Young Xiao 2 participants 5 messages Apr 12, 2019 1 message not in the archive

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Young Xiao

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 USB: s2255 & stkwebcam: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors

From: Young Xiao <[email protected]>

The driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least one endpoint on the interface before using it.

This vulnerability is same as CVE-2016-2188.

---
 drivers/media/usb/s2255/s2255drv.c       | 7 +++++++
 drivers/media/usb/stkwebcam/stk-webcam.c | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/media/usb/s2255/s2255drv.c +7 -0
index 5b3e54b..82dd661 100644
@@ -2263,6 +2263,13 @@ static int s2255_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
 	iface_desc = interface->cur_altsetting;
 	dev_dbg(&interface->dev, "num EP: %d\n",
 		iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints);
+
+	if (iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints < 1) {
+		dev_err(&interface->dev, "Invalid number of endpoints\n");
+		retval = -EINVAL;
+		goto errorEP;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
 		endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
 		if (!dev->read_endpoint && usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(endpoint)) {
drivers/media/usb/stkwebcam/stk-webcam.c +6 -0
index 8f54586..e427c3d 100644
@@ -1350,6 +1350,12 @@ static int stk_camera_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
 	 * for the current alternate setting */
 	iface_desc = interface->cur_altsetting;
 
+	if (iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints < 1) {
+		dev_err(&interface->dev, "Invalid number of endpoints\n");
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
 		endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
 
Signature · 1 line
1.9.1
#1 lore raw

Please mark updated patches with a version number or some other indication that it replaces a previous patch. Including a summary of changes is also normal.

And speaking of normal: We do build test our patches, don't we?

Quoted 5 lines · Young Xiao

From: Young Xiao <[email protected]>

The driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.

No, it won't. Did you test this? Can you provide the oops?

This is perfectly fine as it is:

	dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct s2255_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
..
	for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
		endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
		if (!dev->read_endpoint && usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(endpoint)) {
			/* we found the bulk in endpoint */
			dev->read_endpoint = endpoint->bEndpointAddress;
		}
	}

	if (!dev->read_endpoint) {
		dev_err(&interface->dev, "Could not find bulk-in endpoint\n");
		goto errorEP;
	}
Quoted 1 line
 drivers/media/usb/stkwebcam/stk-webcam.c | 6 ++++++

I didn't bother looking at this driver to see if your patch there makes more sense. That is your home work now. Please explain why you believe it is. An actual oops would be good.

<rant>
Yes, and I do have some objections to this whole "protect against malicious devices". How do you intend to protect against a USB device disguising itself as a keyboard or ethernet adapater or whatever? Allowing potentionally malicious devices is crazy enough for USB, and it gets completely wacko when people start talking about it in the context of firewire or PCIe

Fixing bugs in drivers is fine. But it won't make any difference wrt security if you connect malicious devices to your system. Don't do that if you want a secure system.

Allocating CVE numbers to arbitrary driver bugs is just adding noise. This noise makes it harder for sysadmins and others to to notice the really important problems. No one will care anymore if every kernel release fixes thousands of CVEs. Which is pretty close to the truth if you start allocating CVE numbers to any bug with a security impact. </rant>

Bjørn

author
#2 lore raw

Hello,

Thanks for your response, firstly.

The affected version ranges from v3.7 to v5.1.

-------------------------------------------------------------
Below is the analysis of the vulnerability:

As said in the comment, the driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious descritors that spcify 0 for the number of endpoints, then there is a null pointer deference when calling function usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in.

       for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
                endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
                if (!dev->read_endpoint && usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(endpoint)) {
                        /* we found the bulk in endpoint */
                        dev->read_endpoint = endpoint->bEndpointAddress;
                }
        }

static inline int usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(
const struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd)
{
return usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk(epd) && usb_endpoint_dir_in(epd); }

static inline int usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk(
const struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd)
{
return ((epd->bmAttributes & USB_ENDPOINT_XFERTYPE_MASK) == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_BULK);
}

There is a call to function usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in after assignment to endpoint.
And the field bmAttributes is accessed in function usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk (usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in -> usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk).
Since the number of descriptors is 0, endpoint is assignment to NULL. Then NULL pointer deference in function usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk (oops).

If you insist on a PoC, sorry for that. I found the vulnerability by analyzing the code staticlly.

Below is the reply of your rant:
Everyone wants to build a secury Linux kernel with different ways. Fuzzing, static analysis are all good ways.
And there are many missing fixes when a vulnerability is found indeed, since there are much code clone in codebase.

I agree with you on your explain about alllocating CVE numbers to arbitrary driver bugs.
Complaint is useless. As main developer of kernel, I think you can disscuss the problem with other main developers.
There should be a baseline. Which vulnerabilities should be assigned with a CVE number, and which should not.

However, if there are real bugs or vulnerabilities, we still need to fix them, don't we?

Besides, I am sorry for not explaining the patch clearly when I submitted the patch. I will try to analyse the possible vulnerability when submitting patches next time.

Young

Quoted 64 lines · Bjørn Mork

Please mark updated patches with a version number or some other indication that it replaces a previous patch. Including a summary of changes is also normal.

And speaking of normal: We do build test our patches, don't we?

Quoted 5 lines · Young Xiao

From: Young Xiao <[email protected]>

The driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.

No, it won't. Did you test this? Can you provide the oops?

This is perfectly fine as it is:

        dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct s2255_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
..
        for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
                endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
                if (!dev->read_endpoint && usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(endpoint)) {
                        /* we found the bulk in endpoint */
                        dev->read_endpoint = endpoint->bEndpointAddress;
                }
        }

        if (!dev->read_endpoint) {
                dev_err(&interface->dev, "Could not find bulk-in endpoint\n");
                goto errorEP;
        }
Quoted 1 line
 drivers/media/usb/stkwebcam/stk-webcam.c | 6 ++++++

I didn't bother looking at this driver to see if your patch there makes more sense. That is your home work now. Please explain why you believe it is. An actual oops would be good.

<rant>
Yes, and I do have some objections to this whole "protect against malicious devices". How do you intend to protect against a USB device disguising itself as a keyboard or ethernet adapater or whatever? Allowing potentionally malicious devices is crazy enough for USB, and it gets completely wacko when people start talking about it in the context of firewire or PCIe

Fixing bugs in drivers is fine. But it won't make any difference wrt security if you connect malicious devices to your system. Don't do that if you want a secure system.

Allocating CVE numbers to arbitrary driver bugs is just adding noise. This noise makes it harder for sysadmins and others to to notice the really important problems. No one will care anymore if every kernel release fixes thousands of CVEs. Which is pretty close to the truth if you start allocating CVE numbers to any bug with a security impact. </rant>

Bjørn

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): CAKgHYH05R2CQ1XmS-KCTtL0J49D2kpnkBgyYxdPc47SNpaf8vA@mail.gmail.com

#4 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Yang Xiao

If given malicious descritors that spcify 0 for the number of endpoints, then there is a null pointer deference when calling function usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in.

       for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {

Try this:

#include <stdio.h>
int main()

{
        int i;
        for (i=0; i<0; ++i)
                printf("%d\n");
        return 0;
}

How many lines did it print?

Bjørn

author
#5 lore raw

I am so sorry. I misunderstood the reason of CVE-2016-2188.

Sorry again!!!

Quoted 24 lines · Bjørn Mork
Quoted 5 lines · Yang Xiao

If given malicious descritors that spcify 0 for the number of endpoints, then there is a null pointer deference when calling function usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in.

       for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {

Try this:

#include <stdio.h>
int main()

{
        int i;
        for (i=0; i<0; ++i)
                printf("%d\n");
        return 0;
}

How many lines did it print?

Bjørn