add new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure kexec boot cmdline args
Subsystems (6)
v7 cover add new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure kexec boot cmdline args
The motive behind the patch series is to measure the boot cmdline args used for soft reboot/kexec case.
For secure boot attestation, it is necessary to measure the kernel command line and the kernel version. For cold boot, the boot loader can be enhanced to measure these parameters.
(https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/48897.html)
However, for attestation across soft reboot boundary, these values also need to be measured during kexec_file_load.
Currently for Kexec(kexec_file_load)/soft reboot scenario the boot cmdline args for the next kernel are not measured. For
normal case of boot/hardreboot the cmdline args are measured into the TPM. The hash of boot command line is calculated and added to the current running kernel's measurement list.
On a soft reboot like kexec, no cmdline arguments measurement takes place.
To achive the above the patch series does the following
-adds a new ima hook: ima_kexec_cmdline which measures the cmdline args
into the ima log, behind a new ima policy entry KEXEC_CMDLINE.
-since the cmldine args cannot be appraised, a new template field(buf) is
added. The template field contains the buffer passed(cmldine args), which can be used to appraise/attest at a later stage.
-call the ima_kexec_cmdline(...) hook from kexec_file_load call.
The ima logs need to be carried over to the next kernel, which will be followed up by other patchsets for x86_64 and arm64.
The kexec cmdline hash can be verified using
sudo cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements |
grep kexec-cmdline | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum
Changelog:
V7:
- rebased to next-queued-testing
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git/log/?h=next-queued-testing
V6:
-add a new ima hook and policy to measure the cmdline
args(ima_kexec_cmdline)
-add a new template field buf to contain the buffer measured. [suggested by Mimi Zohar]
add new fields to ima_event_data to store/read buffer data.
[suggested by Roberto]
-call ima_kexec_cmdline from kexec_file_load path
v5:
-add a new ima hook and policy to measure the cmdline
args(ima_kexec_cmdline)
-add a new template field buf to contain the buffer measured.
[suggested by Mimi Zohar]
-call ima_kexec_cmdline from kexec_file_load path
v4:
- per feedback from LSM community, removed the LSM hook and renamed the IMA policy to KEXEC_CMDLINE
v3: (rebase changes to next-general)
- Add policy checks for buffer[suggested by Mimi Zohar]
- use the IMA_XATTR to add buffer
- Add kexec_cmdline used for kexec file load
- Add an LSM hook to allow usage by other LSM.[suggestd by Mimi Zohar]
v2:
- Add policy checks for buffer[suggested by Mimi Zohar]
- Add an LSM hook to allow usage by other LSM.[suggestd by Mimi Zohar]
- use the IMA_XATTR to add buffer instead of sig template
v1:
-Add kconfigs to control the ima_buffer_check -measure the cmdline args suffixed with the kernel file name -add the buffer to the template sig field.
Prakhar Srivastava (3):
Add a new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure cmdline args add a new ima template field buf
call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the cmdline args
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 1 + Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 2 +- include/linux/ima.h | 2 + kernel/kexec_file.c | 8 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 5 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 20 ++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 ++ 12 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v7 1/3 Add a new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure cmdline args
This patch adds support in ima to measure kexec cmdline args during soft reboot kexec_file_load.
- A new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline is defined to be called by the kexec code.
- A new function process_buffer_measurement is defined to measure the buffer hash into the ima log.
- A new func policy KEXEC_CMDLINE is defined to control the measurement.[Suggested by Mimi]
Hash computation can be tested using
sudo cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements |
grep kexec-cmdline | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 1 + include/linux/ima.h | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 ++++ 6 files changed, 91 insertions(+)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Description: base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value
include/linux/ima.h +2 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);extern int ima_post_read_file (struct file *file,void *buf,loff_t size,enum kernel_read_file_id id);extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry); +extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (const void *buf,int size);#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer (struct kimage *image);
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) return; } +static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (const void *buf,int size) {}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \ hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \ hook(POLICY_CHECK) \ + hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE) \ hook(MAX_CHECK) #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM,
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -0
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK +* | KEXEC_CMDLINE * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value *
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +77 -0
83 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +9 -0
@@ -292,6 +292,13 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; +/* only incase of KEXEC_CMDLINE, inode is NULL */ +if (func ==KEXEC_CMDLINE ) { +if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && + (rule->func == func) && (!inode)) +return true; +return false; + }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;
@@ -880,6 +887,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func =KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK ; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = POLICY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0) + entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE; else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
PATCH v7 2/3 add a new ima template field buf
In reply to Prakhar SrivastavaA buffer(kexec cmdline args) measured into ima cannot be appraised without already being aware of the buffer contents. Since hashes are non-reversible, raw buffer is needed for validation or regenerating hash for appraisal/attestation.
This patch adds support to ima to allow store/read the buffer contents in HEX.
- Add two new fields to ima_event_data to hold the buf and buf_len [Suggested by Roberto]
- Add a new temaplte field 'buf' to be used to store/read the buffer data.[Suggested by Mimi]
- Updated process_buffer_meaurement to add the buffer to ima_event_data. process_buffer_measurement added in "Add a new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure cmdline args"
--- Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 ++++ 8 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst +2 -2
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5); - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations; - - 'sig': the file signature. - + - 'sig': the file signature; + - 'buf': the buffer data that was used to generate the hash without size limitations; Below, there is the list of defined template descriptors:
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ struct ima_event_data {struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;int xattr_len;const char *violation; +const void *buf; +int buf_len; };/* IMA template field data definition */
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +2 -2
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,struct ima_template_entry *entry;struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename,NULL ,0 , - cause}; + cause,NULL ,0 };int violation =1 ;int result;
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct ima_template_entry *entry;struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, xattr_value, - xattr_len,NULL }; + xattr_len,NULL ,NULL ,0 };int violation =0 ;if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +1 -1
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)struct ima_template_entry *entry;struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint,NULL , boot_aggregate_name, -NULL ,0 ,NULL }; +NULL ,0 ,NULL ,NULL ,0 };int result = -ENOMEM ;int violation =0 ;struct {
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +2 -0
@@ -641,6 +641,8 @@ static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,memset (&hash,0 ,sizeof (hash)); event_data.filename = eventname; + event_data.buf = buf; + event_data.buf_len = size; iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr; iint->ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +2 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, + {.field_id = "buf", .field_init = ima_eventbuf_init, + .field_show = ima_show_template_buf}, };#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN 15
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +20 -0
@@ -162,6 +162,12 @@ void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,ima_show_template_field_data (m, show,DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); } +void ima_show_template_buf (struct seq_file *m,enum ima_show_type show, +struct ima_field_data *field_data) +{ +ima_show_template_field_data (m, show,DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); +} +/** * ima_parse_buf() - Parses lengths and data from an input buffer * @bufstartp: Buffer start address.
@@ -389,3 +395,17 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,return ima_write_template_field_data (xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); } + +/* +* ima_eventbuf_init - include the buffer(kexec-cmldine) as part of the +* template data. +*/ +int ima_eventbuf_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data, +struct ima_field_data *field_data) +{ +if ((!event_data->buf) || (event_data->buf_len ==0 )) +return 0 ; + +return ima_write_template_field_data (event_data->buf, event_data->buf_len, +DATA_FMT_HEX , field_data); +}
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +4 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show, struct ima_field_data *field_data);void ima_show_template_sig (struct seq_file *m,enum ima_show_type show,struct ima_field_data *field_data); +void ima_show_template_buf (struct seq_file *m,enum ima_show_type show, +struct ima_field_data *field_data);int ima_parse_buf (void *bufstartp,void *bufendp,void **bufcurp,int maxfields,struct ima_field_data *fields,int *curfields,unsigned long *len_mask,int enforce_mask,char *bufname);
@@ -42,4 +44,6 @@ int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data);int ima_eventsig_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data,struct ima_field_data *field_data); +int ima_eventbuf_init (struct ima_event_data *event_data, +struct ima_field_data *field_data);#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
PATCH v7 3/3 call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the cmdline args
In reply to Prakhar SrivastavaDuring soft reboot(kexec_file_load) boot cmdline args are not measured.Thus the new kernel on load boots with an assumption of cold reboot.
This patch makes a call to the ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline, added in "Add a new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline to measure cmdline args"
to measure the boot cmdline args into the ima log.
- call ima_kexec_cmdline from kexec_file_load.
- move the call ima_add_kexec_buffer after the cmdline args have been measured.
--- kernel/kexec_file.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/kexec_file.c +5 -3
@@ -198,9 +198,6 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,return ret; image->kernel_buf_len = size; -/* IMA needs to pass the measurement list to the next kernel. */ -ima_add_kexec_buffer (image); -/* Call arch image probe handlers */ ret =arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe (image, image->kernel_buf, image->kernel_buf_len);
@@ -241,8 +238,13 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; } + +ima_kexec_cmdline (image->cmdline_buf, image->cmdline_buf_len -1 ); } +/* IMA needs to pass the measurement list to the next kernel. */ +ima_add_kexec_buffer (image); +/* Call arch image load handlers */ ldata =arch_kexec_kernel_image_load (image);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Mimi Zohar
maintainerHi Prakhar,
The patch/patch set title in the Subject line should not explain "how" you add a new feature. In this case an appropriate patch set title would be, "Add support for measuring the boot command line". Similarly, the first patch in this patch set could be named "Define a new IMA hook to measure the boot command line arguments".
Quoted 2 lines · Prakhar Srivastava
The motive behind the patch series is to measure the boot cmdline args used for soft reboot/kexec case.
When mentoring, I suggest starting out with a simple status statement (eg. "The kexec boot command line arguments are not currently being measured."), followed by the problem statement in the first paragraph.
Quoted 2 lines
For secure boot attestation, it is necessary to measure the kernel
Secure boot enforces local file data integrity. The term here should be "trusted boot attestation".
Quoted 1 line
command line and the kernel version.
The original version of this patch set included the kernel version. This version is just measuring the boot command line arguments.
Quoted 21 lines
For cold boot, the boot loader
can be enhanced to measure these parameters.
(https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/48897.html)
However, for attestation across soft reboot boundary, these values also need to be measured duringkexec_file_load.Currently for Kexec(kexec_file_load)/soft reboot scenario the boot cmdline args for the next kernel are not measured. For
normal case of boot/hardreboot the cmdline args are measured into the TPM. The hash of boot command line is calculated and added to the current running kernel's measurement list.
On a soft reboot like kexec, no cmdline arguments measurement takes place.To achive the above the patch series does the following
-adds a new ima hook:ima_kexec_cmdlinewhich measures the cmdline args
into the ima log, behind a new ima policy entryKEXEC_CMDLINE.
-since the cmldine args cannot be appraised, a new template field(buf) is
added. The template field contains the buffer passed(cmldine args), which can be used to appraise/attest at a later stage.
-call theima_kexec_cmdline(...)hook fromkexec_file_loadcall.
Quoted 4 lines
The ima logs need to be carried over to the next kernel, which will be followed up by other patchsets for
x86_64and arm64.The kexec cmdline hash
^stored in the "d-ng" field of the template data
Quoted 4 lines
can be verified using
sudo cat
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements|
grep kexec-cmdline | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum
Until per policy template field rule support is added, a template name needs to be defined. Please define "ima-buf" as:
{.name = "ima-buf", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|buf"}
I'm still seeing some scripts/checkpatch "WARNING: line over 80 characters". scripts/Lindent should provide the correct way of formatting these lines.
Some people feel that references to Lindent should be removed, but I tend to agree with the Documentation/hwmon/submitting-patches.rst comment pertaining to scripts/Lindent.
"* Running your patch or driver file(s) through checkpatch does not mean its formatting is clean. If unsure about formatting in your new driver, run it through Lindent. Lindent is not perfect, and you may have to do some minor cleanup, but it is a good start."
Examples of where the line formatting is off is the call to ima_get_action() in process_buffer_measurement() and the call to process_buffer_measurement() in ima_kexec_cmdline().
thanks,
Mimi
Quoted 61 lines
Changelog:
V7:
- rebased to next-queued-testing
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git/log/?h=next-queued-testingV6:
-add a new ima hook and policy to measure the cmdline
args(ima_kexec_cmdline)
-add a new template field buf to contain the buffer measured. [suggested by Mimi Zohar]
add new fields toima_event_datato store/read buffer data.
[suggested by Roberto]
-callima_kexec_cmdlinefromkexec_file_loadpathv5:
-add a new ima hook and policy to measure the cmdline
args(ima_kexec_cmdline)
-add a new template field buf to contain the buffer measured.
[suggested by Mimi Zohar]
-callima_kexec_cmdlinefromkexec_file_loadpathv4:
- per feedback from LSM community, removed the LSM hook and renamed the IMA policy toKEXEC_CMDLINEv3: (rebase changes to next-general)
- Add policy checks for buffer[suggested by Mimi Zohar]
- use theIMA_XATTRto add buffer
- Addkexec_cmdlineused for kexec file load
- Add an LSM hook to allow usage by other LSM.[suggestd by Mimi Zohar]v2:
- Add policy checks for buffer[suggested by Mimi Zohar]
- Add an LSM hook to allow usage by other LSM.[suggestd by Mimi Zohar]
- use theIMA_XATTRto add buffer instead of sig templatev1:
-Add kconfigs to control theima_buffer_check-measure the cmdline args suffixed with the kernel file name -add the buffer to the template sig field.Prakhar Srivastava (3):
Add a new ima hookima_kexec_cmdlineto measure cmdline args add a new ima template field buf
callima_kexec_cmdlineto measure the cmdline argsDocumentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 1 + Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 2 +- include/linux/ima.h | 2 + kernel/kexec_file.c | 8 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 5 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 20 ++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 ++ 12 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Quoted 20 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Prakhar,
The patch/patch set title in the Subject line should not explain "how" you add a new feature. In this case an appropriate patch set title would be, "Add support for measuring the boot command line".
Similarly, the first patch in this patch set could be named "Define a
new IMA hook to measure the boot command line arguments".Quoted 2 lines · Prakhar Srivastava
The motive behind the patch series is to measure the boot cmdline args used for soft reboot/kexec case.
When mentoring, I suggest starting out with a simple status statement (eg. "The kexec boot command line arguments are not currently being measured."), followed by the problem statement in the first paragraph.
Quoted 2 lines
For secure boot attestation, it is necessary to measure the kernel
Quoted 8 lines
Secure boot enforces local file data integrity. The term here should be "trusted boot attestation".
Quoted 1 line
command line and the kernel version.
The original version of this patch set included the kernel version. This version is just measuring the boot command line arguments.
Sorry missed it while updating the cover letter.
<snip>
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The ima logs need to be carried over to the next kernel, which will be followed up by other patchsets for
x86_64and arm64.The kexec cmdline hash
^stored in the "d-ng" field of the template data
I will add another template-name for ima-buf
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 4 lines
can be verified using
sudo cat
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements|
grep kexec-cmdline | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sumUntil per policy template field rule support is added, a template name needs to be defined. Please define "ima-buf" as:
{.name = "ima-buf", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|buf"}I'm still seeing some
scripts/checkpatch"WARNING: line over 80 characters".scripts/Lindentshould provide the correct way of formatting these lines.
Quoted 9 lines
Some people feel that references to Lindent should be removed, but I tend to agree with the
Documentation/hwmon/submitting-patches.rstcomment pertaining toscripts/Lindent."* Running your patch or driver file(s) through checkpatch does not mean its formatting is clean. If unsure about formatting in your new driver, run it through Lindent. Lindent is not perfect, and you may have to do some minor cleanup, but it is a good start."
I will double check fix the issues.
Quoted 4 lines
Examples of where the line formatting is off is the call to
ima_get_action()inprocess_buffer_measurement()and the call toprocess_buffer_measurement()inima_kexec_cmdline().
Thanks,
Prakhar Srivastava
Quoted 3 lines
thanks,
Mimi
<snip>