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powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace

PATCH Superseded Nayna Jain 4 participants 13 messages Aug 21, 2019 – Aug 26, 2019

Subsystems (7)

v2 of 9 Superseded Latest is v9 →

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Nayna Jain

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace

In order to verify the OS kernel on PowerNV systems, secure boot requires X.509 certificates trusted by the platform. These are stored in secure variables controlled by OPAL, called OPAL secure variables. In order to enable users to manage the keys, the secure variables need to be exposed to userspace.

OPAL provides the runtime services for the kernel to be able to access the secure variables[1]. This patchset defines the kernel interface for the OPAL APIs. These APIs are used by the hooks, which load these variables to the keyring and expose them to the userspace for reading/writing.

The previous version[2] of the patchset added support only for the sysfs interface. This patch adds two more patches that involves loading of the firmware trusted keys to the kernel keyring. This patchset is dependent on the base CONFIG PPC_SECURE_BOOT added by ima arch specific patches for POWER[3]

Overall, this patchset adds the following support:

* expose secure variables to the kernel via OPAL Runtime API interface
* expose secure variables to the userspace via kernel sysfs interface
* load kernel verification and revocation keys to .platform and .blacklist keyring respectively.

The secure variables can be read/written using simple linux utilities cat/hexdump.

For example:
Path to the secure variables is:
/sys/firmware/secvar/vars

Each secure variable is listed as directory.

$ ls -l
total 0
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 db
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 KEK
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 0 Aug 20 21:20 PK

The attributes of each of the secure variables are(for example: PK):
[PK]$ ls -l
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root 32000 Aug 21 08:28 data -r--r--r--. 1 root root 65536 Aug 21 08:28 name -r--r--r--. 1 root root 65536 Aug 21 08:28 size --w-------. 1 root root 32000 Aug 21 08:28 update

The "data" is used to read the existing variable value using hexdump. The data is stored in ESL format.
The "update" is used to write a new value using cat. The update is to be submitted as AUTH file.

[1] Depends on skiboot OPAL API changes which removes metadata from the API. The new version with the changes are going to be posted soon.
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/13/1644
[3] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/19/402

Changelog:

v2:
* removes complete efi-sms from the sysfs implementation and is simplified
* includes Greg's and Oliver's feedbacks:
* adds sysfs documentation
* moves sysfs code to arch/powerpc
* other code related feedbacks.
* adds two new patches to load keys to .platform and .blacklist keyring. These patches are added to this series as they are also dependent on OPAL APIs.

Nayna Jain (4):
powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable
powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
powerpc: load firmware trusted keys into kernel keyring

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar        |  27 +++
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                          |   9 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h           |   5 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h               |   6 +
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h             |  55 +++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile                  |   3 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c              |  25 +++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c            | 210 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig        |   6 +
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile       |   1 +
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c    |   3 +
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c  | 102 +++++++++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c         |   5 +
 security/integrity/Kconfig                    |   9 +
 security/integrity/Makefile                   |   6 +-
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  80 +++++++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h          |  35 +++
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   |  94 ++++++++
 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c |  67 +-----
 19 files changed, 679 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/4 powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable

The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and required to secure boot the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables, which are controlled by OPAL.

This patch adds firmware/kernel interface to read and write OPAL secure variables based on the unique key.

This support can be enabled using CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h          |   5 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h              |   6 ++
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h            |  55 ++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile                 |   2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c             |  25 +++++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig       |   6 ++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile      |   1 +
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c   |   3 +
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c        |   5 +
 10 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h +4 -1
index 383242eb0dea..b238b4f26c5b 100644
@@ -208,7 +208,10 @@
 #define OPAL_HANDLE_HMI2			166
 #define	OPAL_NX_COPROC_INIT			167
 #define OPAL_XIVE_GET_VP_STATE			170
-#define OPAL_LAST				170
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET                         173
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT                    174
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE              175
+#define OPAL_LAST                               175
 
 #define QUIESCE_HOLD			1 /* Spin all calls at entry */
 #define QUIESCE_REJECT			2 /* Fail all calls with OPAL_BUSY */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +6 -0
index 57bd029c715e..247adec2375f 100644
@@ -388,6 +388,12 @@ void opal_powercap_init(void);
 void opal_psr_init(void);
 void opal_sensor_groups_init(void);
 
+extern int opal_secvar_get(uint64_t k_key, uint64_t k_key_len,
+			   uint64_t k_data, uint64_t k_data_size);
+extern int opal_secvar_get_next(uint64_t k_key, uint64_t k_key_len,
+				uint64_t k_key_size);
+extern int opal_secvar_enqueue_update(uint64_t k_key, uint64_t k_key_len,
+				      uint64_t k_data, uint64_t k_data_size);
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_OPAL_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file +55 -0

55 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -1
index 520b1c814197..9041563f1c74 100644
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT)	+= epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST)		+= kvm.o kvm_emul.o
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)	+= secboot.o ima_arch.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)	+= secboot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o
 
 # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
 GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c new file +25 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..198222499848
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * secvar-ops.c
+ *      - initialize secvar operations for PowerPC Secureboot
+ */
+
+#include<stddef.h>
+#include<asm/secvar.h>
+
+static struct secvar_operations *secvars_ops;
+
+void set_secvar_ops(struct secvar_operations *ops)
+{
+	if (!ops)
+		secvars_ops = NULL;
+	secvars_ops = ops;
+}
+
+struct secvar_operations *get_secvar_ops(void)
+{
+	return secvars_ops;
+}
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig +6 -0
index 850eee860cf2..65b060539b5c 100644
@@ -47,3 +47,9 @@ config PPC_VAS
 	  VAS adapters are found in POWER9 based systems.
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config OPAL_SECVAR
+	bool "OPAL Secure Variables"
+	depends on PPC_POWERNV
+	help
+	  This enables the kernel to access OPAL secure variables.
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile +1 -0
index da2e99efbd04..6651c742e530 100644
@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += opal-imc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE)	+= memtrace.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_VAS)	+= vas.o vas-window.o vas-debug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_OCXL_BASE)	+= ocxl.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c +3 -0
index 29ca523c1c79..93106e867924 100644
@@ -287,3 +287,6 @@ OPAL_CALL(opal_pci_set_pbcq_tunnel_bar,		OPAL_PCI_SET_PBCQ_TUNNEL_BAR);
 OPAL_CALL(opal_sensor_read_u64,			OPAL_SENSOR_READ_U64);
 OPAL_CALL(opal_sensor_group_enable,		OPAL_SENSOR_GROUP_ENABLE);
 OPAL_CALL(opal_nx_coproc_init,			OPAL_NX_COPROC_INIT);
+OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_get,                     OPAL_SECVAR_GET);
+OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_get_next,                 OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT);
+OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_enqueue_update,           OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE);
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file +102 -0

102 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +5 -0
index aba443be7daa..ffe6f1cf0830 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
 #include <asm/mce.h>
 #include <asm/imc-pmu.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
+#include <asm/secvar.h>
+#include <asm/secboot.h>
 
 #include "powernv.h"
 
@@ -988,6 +990,9 @@ static int __init opal_init(void)
 	/* Initialise OPAL Power control interface */
 	opal_power_control_init();
 
+	if (is_powerpc_secvar_supported())
+		secvar_init();
+
 	return 0;
 }
 machine_subsys_initcall(powernv, opal_init);
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable

Quoted 48 lines · Nayna Jain

The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and required to secure boot the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables, which are controlled by OPAL.

This patch adds firmware/kernel interface to read and write OPAL secure variables based on the unique key.

This support can be enabled using CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h          |   5 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h              |   6 ++
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h            |  55 ++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile                 |   2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c             |  25 +++++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig       |   6 ++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile      |   1 +
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c   |   3 +
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c        |   5 +
 10 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h +4 -1
index 383242eb0dea..b238b4f26c5b 100644
@@ -208,7 +208,10 @@
 #define OPAL_HANDLE_HMI2			166
 #define	OPAL_NX_COPROC_INIT			167
 #define OPAL_XIVE_GET_VP_STATE			170
-#define OPAL_LAST				170
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET                         173
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT                    174
+#define OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE              175
+#define OPAL_LAST                               175
 
 #define QUIESCE_HOLD			1 /* Spin all calls at entry */
 #define QUIESCE_REJECT			2 /* Fail all calls with OPAL_BUSY */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +0 -0
index 57bd029c715e..247adec2375f 100644

arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h void opal_powercap_init(void); · line 389

Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +0 -0
@@ -388,6 +388,12 @@ void opal_powercap_init(void);
 void opal_psr_init(void);
 void opal_sensor_groups_init(void);

Put these with the rest of the OPAL API wrapper prototypes (i.e. just after opal_nx_coproc_init()) rather than with the internal functions.

arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h void opal_powercap_init(void); · line 396

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +5 -0
 > +extern int opal_secvar_get(uint64_t k_key, uint64_t k_key_len,
+			   uint64_t k_data, uint64_t k_data_size);
+extern int opal_secvar_get_next(uint64_t k_key, uint64_t k_key_len,
+				uint64_t k_key_size);
+extern int opal_secvar_enqueue_update(uint64_t k_key, uint64_t k_key_len,
+				      uint64_t k_data, uint64_t k_data_size);

Everything in asm/opal.h is intended for consumption by the kernel, so use a useful kernel type (or annotation) rather than blank uint64_t for the parameters that are actually pointers. You should also ditch the k_ prefix since it doesn't make much sense having it inside the kernel.

As a general comment, don't use extern on function prototypes. They're extern by default and, more importantly, it's contrary to the normal kernel style.

Quoted 12 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +0 -0
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_OPAL_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file +3 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..645654456265
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * PowerPC secure variable operations.

arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h line 13

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file +10 -0
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef SECVAR_OPS_H
+#define SECVAR_OPS_H
+
+#include<linux/types.h>
+#include<linux/errno.h>

missing space

arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h line 22

Quoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file +9 -0
+
+struct secvar_operations {
+	int (*get_variable)(const char *key, unsigned long key_len, u8 *data,
+			    unsigned long *data_size);
+	int (*get_next_variable)(const char *key, unsigned long *key_len,
+				 unsigned long keysize);
+	int (*set_variable)(const char *key, unsigned long key_len, u8 *data,
+			    unsigned long data_size);
+};

Calling them requires writing code like:

	secvar_ops->get_variable(blah);

Why not shorten it to:

	secvar_ops->get(blah);
Quoted 19 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file +19 -0
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT
+
+extern void set_secvar_ops(struct secvar_operations *ops);
+extern struct secvar_operations *get_secvar_ops(void);
+
+#else
+
+static inline void set_secvar_ops(struct secvar_operations *ops)
+{
+}
+
+static inline struct secvar_operations *get_secvar_ops(void)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR
+

arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h line 53

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file +10 -0
+extern int secvar_init(void);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int secvar_init(void)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#endif

The init function is always going to be platform specific so having an opal-specific secvar_init() in a generic header doesn't make much sense to me.

Quoted 23 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/secvar.h new file +2 -0
+
+#endif
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -1
index 520b1c814197..9041563f1c74 100644
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT)	+= epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST)		+= kvm.o kvm_emul.o
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)	+= secboot.o ima_arch.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)	+= secboot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o
 
 # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
 GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c new file +2 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..198222499848
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c line 11

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c new file +9 -0
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * secvar-ops.c
+ *      - initialize secvar operations for PowerPC Secureboot
+ */
+
 
+#include<stddef.h>
+#include<asm/secvar.h>

missing space

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c

Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c new file +2 -0
+
+static struct secvar_operations *secvars_ops;

should be const

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c line 25

Quoted 12 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-ops.c new file +12 -0
+
+void set_secvar_ops(struct secvar_operations *ops)
+{
+	if (!ops)
+		secvars_ops = NULL;
+	secvars_ops = ops;
+}
+
+struct secvar_operations *get_secvar_ops(void)
+{
+	return secvars_ops;
+}

Is this really any better than just making the ops pointer global?

Quoted 60 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig +6 -0
index 850eee860cf2..65b060539b5c 100644
@@ -47,3 +47,9 @@ config PPC_VAS
 	  VAS adapters are found in POWER9 based systems.
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config OPAL_SECVAR
+	bool "OPAL Secure Variables"
+	depends on PPC_POWERNV
+	help
+	  This enables the kernel to access OPAL secure variables.
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile +1 -0
index da2e99efbd04..6651c742e530 100644
@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += opal-imc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE)	+= memtrace.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_VAS)	+= vas.o vas-window.o vas-debug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_OCXL_BASE)	+= ocxl.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-call.c +3 -0
index 29ca523c1c79..93106e867924 100644
@@ -287,3 +287,6 @@ OPAL_CALL(opal_pci_set_pbcq_tunnel_bar,		OPAL_PCI_SET_PBCQ_TUNNEL_BAR);
 OPAL_CALL(opal_sensor_read_u64,			OPAL_SENSOR_READ_U64);
 OPAL_CALL(opal_sensor_group_enable,		OPAL_SENSOR_GROUP_ENABLE);
 OPAL_CALL(opal_nx_coproc_init,			OPAL_NX_COPROC_INIT);
+OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_get,                     OPAL_SECVAR_GET);
+OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_get_next,                 OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT);
+OPAL_CALL(opal_secvar_enqueue_update,           OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE);
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file +20 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b0f97cea7675
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * PowerNV code for secure variables
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Claudio Carvalho <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * APIs to access secure variables managed by OPAL.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "secvar: "fmt
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <asm/opal.h>
+#include <asm/secvar.h>
+
+static bool is_opal_secvar_supported(void)
+{
+	static bool opal_secvar_supported;

arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c line 29

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file +9 -0
+	static bool initialized;
+
+	if (initialized)
+		return opal_secvar_supported;
+
+	if (!opal_check_token(OPAL_SECVAR_GET)
+			|| !opal_check_token(OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT)
+			|| !opal_check_token(OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE)) {
 
+		pr_err("OPAL doesn't support secure variables\n");

This should only print an error if OPAL has advertised support for secure variables through the DT, but doesn't support the OPAL calls. Otherwise we'll get a spurious error message on any system running currently released firmware.

Quoted 7 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file +7 -0
+		opal_secvar_supported = false;
+	} else {
+		opal_secvar_supported = true;
+	}
+
+	initialized = true;
+

arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c line 46

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file +10 -0
+	return opal_secvar_supported;
+}
+
+static int opal_get_variable(const char *key, unsigned long ksize,
+			     u8 *data, unsigned long *dsize)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!is_opal_secvar_supported())
+		return OPAL_UNSUPPORTED;

This should be -ENXIO or -ENOSUPP. OPAL_UNSUPPORTED is an OPAL return code, not a kernel one. That said, if the firmware doesn't support secure variables we should never be calling this function anyway since the ops pointer is never set.

Quoted 41 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file +41 -0
+
+	if (dsize)
+		*dsize = cpu_to_be64(*dsize);
+
+	rc = opal_secvar_get(__pa(key), ksize,
+			__pa(data), __pa(dsize));
+
+	if (dsize)
+		*dsize = be64_to_cpu(*dsize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int opal_get_next_variable(const char *key, unsigned long *keylen,
+				  unsigned long keysize)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!is_opal_secvar_supported())
+		return OPAL_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+	if (keylen)
+		*keylen = cpu_to_be64(*keylen);
+
+	rc = opal_secvar_get_next(__pa(key), __pa(keylen), keysize);
+
+	if (keylen)
+		*keylen = be64_to_cpu(*keylen);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int opal_set_variable(const char *key, unsigned long ksize, u8 *data,
+			     unsigned long dsize)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!is_opal_secvar_supported())
+		return OPAL_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+	rc = opal_secvar_enqueue_update(__pa(key), ksize, __pa(data), dsize);

arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c line 96

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file +9 -0
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 
+static struct secvar_operations secvar_ops = {
+	.get_variable = opal_get_variable,
+	.get_next_variable = opal_get_next_variable,
+	.set_variable = opal_set_variable,
+};

should be const

arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c line 102

Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-secvar.c new file +5 -0
+int secvar_init(void)
+{
+	set_secvar_ops(&secvar_ops);
+	return 0;
+}

Rename this to opal_secvar_init() and put the prototype in arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/powernv.h

Quoted 14 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +2 -0
index aba443be7daa..ffe6f1cf0830 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
 #include <asm/mce.h>
 #include <asm/imc-pmu.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
+#include <asm/secvar.h>
+#include <asm/secboot.h>
 
 #include "powernv.h"
 

arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c static int __init opal_init(void) · line 995

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +3 -0
@@ -988,6 +990,9 @@ static int __init opal_init(void)
 	/* Initialise OPAL Power control interface */
 	opal_power_control_init();
 
+	if (is_powerpc_secvar_supported())
+		secvar_init();
+

The usual pattern here is to have the init function check for support internally.

Also, is_powerpc_secvar_supported() doesn't appear to be defined anywhere. Is that supposed to be is_opal_secvar_supported()? Or is this series supposed to be applied on top of another series?

Quoted 3 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +0 -0
 	return 0;
 }
 machine_subsys_initcall(powernv, opal_init);
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable

Quoted 26 lines · Oliver O'Halloran
Quoted 14 lines · Nayna Jain
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +2 -0
index aba443be7daa..ffe6f1cf0830 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
 #include <asm/mce.h>
 #include <asm/imc-pmu.h>
 #include <asm/bug.h>
+#include <asm/secvar.h>
+#include <asm/secboot.h>
 
 #include "powernv.h"
 

arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c static int __init opal_init(void) · line 995

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +3 -0
@@ -988,6 +990,9 @@ static int __init opal_init(void)
      /* Initialise OPAL Power control interface */
      opal_power_control_init();
 
+     if (is_powerpc_secvar_supported())
+             secvar_init();
+

The usual pattern here is to have the init function check for support internally.

Quoted 3 lines

Also, is_powerpc_secvar_supported() doesn't appear to be defined anywhere. Is that supposed to be is_opal_secvar_supported()? Or is this series supposed to be applied on top of another series?

To answer my own question, yes it depends on the series at [1] which adds IMA support. Turns out actually reading the cover letter helps, who knew.

That said, I'm still not entirely sure about this. The implementation of is_powerpc_secvar_supported() in [2] parses the DT and seems to assume the DT bindings that OPAL produces. Are those common with the DT bindings produced by OF when running on pseries?

[1] http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linuxppc-dev/list/?series=125961
[2] http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1149257/

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c +0 -0
      return 0;
 }
 machine_subsys_initcall(powernv, opal_init);
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/4 powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs

In reply to Nayna Jain

PowerNV secure variables, which store the keys used for OS kernel verification, are managed by the firmware. These secure variables need to be accessed by the userspace for addition/deletion of the certificates.

This patch adds the sysfs interface to expose secure variables for PowerNV secureboot. The users shall use this interface for manipulating the keys stored in the secure variables.

---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar |  27 ++++
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                   |   9 ++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile           |   1 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c     | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 247 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file +27 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..68f0e03d873d
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+What:		/sys/firmware/secvar
+Date:		August 2019
+Contact:	Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
+Description:
+		This directory exposes interfaces for interacting with
+		the secure variables managed by OPAL firmware.
+
+		This is only for the powerpc/powernv platform.
+
+		Directory:
+		vars:		This directory lists all the variables that
+				are supported by the OPAL. The variables are
+				represented in the form of directories with
+				their variable names. The variable name is
+				unique and is in ASCII representation. The data
+				and size can be determined by reading their
+				respective attribute files.
+
+		Each variable directory has the following files:
+		name:		An ASCII representation of the variable name
+		data:		A read-only file containing the value of the
+				variable
+		size:		An integer representation of the size of the
+				content of the variable. In other works, it
+				represents the size of the data
+		update:		A write-only file that is used to submit the new
+				value for the variable.
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +9 -0
index 42109682b727..b4bdf77837b2 100644
@@ -925,6 +925,15 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
 	  allows user to enable OS Secure Boot on PowerPC systems that
 	  have firmware secure boot support.
 
+config SECVAR_SYSFS
+        tristate "Enable sysfs interface for POWER secure variables"
+        depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT
+        help
+          POWER secure variables are managed and controlled by firmware.
+          These variables are exposed to userspace via sysfs to enable
+          read/write operations on these variables. Say Y if you have
+	  secure boot enabled and want to expose variables to userspace.
+
 endmenu
 
 config ISA_DMA_API
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 9041563f1c74..4ea7b738c3a3 100644
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT)	+= epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST)		+= kvm.o kvm_emul.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)	+= secboot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECVAR_SYSFS)     += secvar-sysfs.o
 
 # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
 GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +210 -0

210 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs

Quoted 20 lines · Nayna Jain
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+What:		/sys/firmware/secvar
+Date:		August 2019
+Contact:	Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
+Description:
+		This directory exposes interfaces for interacting with
+		the secure variables managed by OPAL firmware.
+
+		This is only for the powerpc/powernv platform.
+
+		Directory:
+		vars:		This directory lists all the variables that
+				are supported by the OPAL. The variables are
+				represented in the form of directories with
+				their variable names. The variable name is
+				unique and is in ASCII representation. The data
+				and size can be determined by reading their
+				respective attribute files.

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar line 27

Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file +10 -0
+
+		Each variable directory has the following files:
+		name:		An ASCII representation of the variable name
+		data:		A read-only file containing the value of the
+				variable
+		size:		An integer representation of the size of the
+				content of the variable. In other works, it
+				represents the size of the data
+		update:		A write-only file that is used to submit the new
+				value for the variable.

Can you break this out into one-entry-per-file like most other entries are defined? That makes it easier for tools to parse (specifically the tool in the tree right now...)

arch/powerpc/Kconfig config PPC_SECURE_BOOT · line 930

Quoted 11 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +3 -0
index 42109682b727..b4bdf77837b2 100644
@@ -925,6 +925,15 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
 	  allows user to enable OS Secure Boot on PowerPC systems that
 	  have firmware secure boot support.
 
+config SECVAR_SYSFS
+        tristate "Enable sysfs interface for POWER secure variables"
+        depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT

No depends on SYSFS?

arch/powerpc/Kconfig config PPC_SECURE_BOOT · line 935

Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +5 -0
+        help
+          POWER secure variables are managed and controlled by firmware.
+          These variables are exposed to userspace via sysfs to enable
+          read/write operations on these variables. Say Y if you have
+	  secure boot enabled and want to expose variables to userspace.

Mix of tabs and spaces :(

arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT) += epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o · line 161

Quoted 13 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1 -0
+
 endmenu
 
 config ISA_DMA_API
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 9041563f1c74..4ea7b738c3a3 100644
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT)	+= epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST)		+= kvm.o kvm_emul.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)	+= secboot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECVAR_SYSFS)     += secvar-sysfs.o

No tab?

Quoted 14 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +0 -0
 # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
 GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +5 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e46986bb29a0
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This code exposes secure variables to user via sysfs

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 15

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <asm/opal.h>
+#include <asm/secvar.h>
+
+//Approximating it for now, it is bound to change.

" " before "A" here please.

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 26

Quoted 11 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +11 -0
+#define VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE  32000
+
+static struct kobject *powerpc_kobj;
+static struct secvar_operations *secvarops;
+struct kset *secvar_kset;
+
+static ssize_t name_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			 char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s", kobj->name);
+}

Why do you need this entry as it is the directory name? Userspace already "knows" it if they can open this file.

Quoted 62 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +62 -0
+
+static ssize_t size_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			 char *buf)
+{
+	unsigned long dsize;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error retrieving variable size %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = sprintf(buf, "%ld", dsize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static ssize_t data_read(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj,
+			 struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off,
+			 size_t count)
+{
+	unsigned long dsize;
+	int rc;
+	char *data;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error getting variable size %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	pr_debug("dsize is %ld\n", dsize);
+
+	data = kzalloc(dsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name)+1, data,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error getting variable %d\n", rc);
+		goto data_fail;
+	}
+
+	rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &off, data, dsize);
+
+data_fail:
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static ssize_t update_write(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj,
+			    struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off,
+			    size_t count)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	pr_debug("count is %ld\n", count);
+	rc = secvarops->set_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name)+1, buf,
+				     count);

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 98

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error setting the variable %s\n", kobj->name);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute name_attr =
+__ATTR(name, 0444, name_show, NULL);

__ATTR_RO()?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 101

Quoted 3 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +3 -0
+
+static struct kobj_attribute size_attr =
+__ATTR(size, 0444, size_show, NULL);

__ATTR_RO()?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 107

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +6 -0
+
+static struct bin_attribute data_attr = {
+	.attr = {.name = "data", .mode = 0444},
+	.size = VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE,
+	.read = data_read,
+};

__BIN_ATTR_RO()?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 114

Quoted 7 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +7 -0
+
+
+static struct bin_attribute update_attr = {
+	.attr = {.name = "update", .mode = 0200},
+	.size = VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE,
+	.write = update_write,
+};

__BIN_ATTR_RO()?

Quoted 7 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +7 -0
+
+static struct bin_attribute  *secvar_bin_attrs[] = {
+	&data_attr,
+	&update_attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 131

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+static struct attribute *secvar_attrs[] = {
+	&name_attr.attr,
+	&size_attr.attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+const struct attribute_group secvar_attr_group = {
+	.attrs = secvar_attrs,
+	.bin_attrs = secvar_bin_attrs,
+};

static?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 136

Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +5 -0
+
+int secvar_sysfs_load(void)
+{
+
+	char *name;

No blank line. You didn't run this this through checkpatch, did you :(

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 142

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +6 -0
+	unsigned long namesize;
+	struct kobject *kobj;
+	int status;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	name = kzalloc(1024, GFP_KERNEL);

Why 1024?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 152

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+	if (!name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	do {
+
+		status = secvarops->get_next_variable(name, &namesize, 1024);
+		if (status != OPAL_SUCCESS)
+			break;
+
+		pr_info("name is %s\n", name);

Please delete debugging messages.

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 155

Quoted 3 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +3 -0
+		kobj = kobject_create_and_add(name, &(secvar_kset->kobj));
+		if (kobj) {
+			rc = sysfs_create_group(kobj, &secvar_attr_group);

You just raced userspace and lost :(

If you set your kobj_type to have the attribute group you will not race and loose, the core will handle it for you.

Quoted 16 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +16 -0
+			if (rc)
+				pr_err("Error creating attributes for %s variable\n",
+				name);
+		} else {
+			pr_err("Error creating sysfs entry for %s variable\n",
+				name);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+	} while ((status == OPAL_SUCCESS) && (rc == 0));
+
+	kfree(name);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int secvar_sysfs_init(void)

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 181

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+{
+	powerpc_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("secvar", firmware_kobj);
+	if (!powerpc_kobj) {
+		pr_err("secvar: Failed to create firmware kobj\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	secvar_kset = kset_create_and_add("vars", NULL, powerpc_kobj);
+	if (!secvar_kset) {
+		pr_err("secvar: sysfs kobject registration failed.\n");

You juat leaked a kobject :(

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 189

Quoted 8 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +8 -0
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	secvarops = get_secvar_ops();
+	if (!secvarops) {
+		kobject_put(powerpc_kobj);
+		pr_err("secvar: failed to retrieve secvar operations.\n");
+		return -ENODEV;

You just leaked 2 things from above :(

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 193

Quoted 4 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +4 -0
+	}
+
+	secvar_sysfs_load();
+	pr_info("Secure variables sysfs initialized");

Do not be noisy when all goes just fine. The kernel log should be quiet when all goes well.

thanks,

greg k-h

#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs

Quoted 304 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 20 lines · Nayna Jain
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+What:		/sys/firmware/secvar
+Date:		August 2019
+Contact:	Nayna Jain<[email protected]>
+Description:
+		This directory exposes interfaces for interacting with
+		the secure variables managed by OPAL firmware.
+
+		This is only for the powerpc/powernv platform.
+
+		Directory:
+		vars:		This directory lists all the variables that
+				are supported by the OPAL. The variables are
+				represented in the form of directories with
+				their variable names. The variable name is
+				unique and is in ASCII representation. The data
+				and size can be determined by reading their
+				respective attribute files.

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar line 27

Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file +10 -0
+
+		Each variable directory has the following files:
+		name:		An ASCII representation of the variable name
+		data:		A read-only file containing the value of the
+				variable
+		size:		An integer representation of the size of the
+				content of the variable. In other works, it
+				represents the size of the data
+		update:		A write-only file that is used to submit the new
+				value for the variable.

Can you break this out into one-entry-per-file like most other entries are defined? That makes it easier for tools to parse (specifically the tool in the tree right now...)

arch/powerpc/Kconfig config PPC_SECURE_BOOT · line 930

Quoted 11 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +3 -0
index 42109682b727..b4bdf77837b2 100644
@@ -925,6 +925,15 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
  	  allows user to enable OS Secure Boot on PowerPC systems that
  	  have firmware secure boot support.
 
+config SECVAR_SYSFS
+        tristate "Enable sysfs interface for POWER secure variables"
+        depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT

No depends on SYSFS?

arch/powerpc/Kconfig config PPC_SECURE_BOOT · line 935

Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +5 -0
+        help
+          POWER secure variables are managed and controlled by firmware.
+          These variables are exposed to userspace via sysfs to enable
+          read/write operations on these variables. Say Y if you have
+	  secure boot enabled and want to expose variables to userspace.

Mix of tabs and spaces :(

arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT) += epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o · line 161

Quoted 13 lines
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1 -0
+
  endmenu
 
  config ISA_DMA_API
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 9041563f1c74..4ea7b738c3a3 100644
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT)	+= epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST)		+= kvm.o kvm_emul.o
 
  obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)	+= secboot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECVAR_SYSFS)     += secvar-sysfs.o

No tab?

Quoted 14 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +0 -0
  # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
  GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +5 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e46986bb29a0
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation<[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This code exposes secure variables to user via sysfs

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 15

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <asm/opal.h>
+#include <asm/secvar.h>
+
+//Approximating it for now, it is bound to change.

" " before "A" here please.

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 26

Quoted 11 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +11 -0
+#define VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE  32000
+
+static struct kobject *powerpc_kobj;
+static struct secvar_operations *secvarops;
+struct kset *secvar_kset;
+
+static ssize_t name_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			 char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s", kobj->name);
+}

Why do you need this entry as it is the directory name? Userspace already "knows" it if they can open this file.

Quoted 62 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +62 -0
+
+static ssize_t size_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			 char *buf)
+{
+	unsigned long dsize;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error retrieving variable size %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = sprintf(buf, "%ld", dsize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static ssize_t data_read(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj,
+			 struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off,
+			 size_t count)
+{
+	unsigned long dsize;
+	int rc;
+	char *data;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error getting variable size %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	pr_debug("dsize is %ld\n", dsize);
+
+	data = kzalloc(dsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name)+1, data,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error getting variable %d\n", rc);
+		goto data_fail;
+	}
+
+	rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &off, data, dsize);
+
+data_fail:
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static ssize_t update_write(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj,
+			    struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off,
+			    size_t count)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	pr_debug("count is %ld\n", count);
+	rc = secvarops->set_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name)+1, buf,
+				     count);

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 98

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error setting the variable %s\n", kobj->name);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute name_attr =
+__ATTR(name, 0444, name_show, NULL);

__ATTR_RO()?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 101

Quoted 3 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +3 -0
+
+static struct kobj_attribute size_attr =
+__ATTR(size, 0444, size_show, NULL);

__ATTR_RO()?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 107

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +6 -0
+
+static struct bin_attribute data_attr = {
+	.attr = {.name = "data", .mode = 0444},
+	.size = VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE,
+	.read = data_read,
+};

__BIN_ATTR_RO()?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 114

Quoted 7 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +7 -0
+
+
+static struct bin_attribute update_attr = {
+	.attr = {.name = "update", .mode = 0200},
+	.size = VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE,
+	.write = update_write,
+};

__BIN_ATTR_RO()?

Quoted 7 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +7 -0
+
+static struct bin_attribute  *secvar_bin_attrs[] = {
+	&data_attr,
+	&update_attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 131

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+static struct attribute *secvar_attrs[] = {
+	&name_attr.attr,
+	&size_attr.attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+const struct attribute_group secvar_attr_group = {
+	.attrs = secvar_attrs,
+	.bin_attrs = secvar_bin_attrs,
+};

static?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 136

Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +5 -0
+
+int secvar_sysfs_load(void)
+{
+
+	char *name;

No blank line. You didn't run this this through checkpatch, did you :(

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 142

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +6 -0
+	unsigned long namesize;
+	struct kobject *kobj;
+	int status;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	name = kzalloc(1024, GFP_KERNEL);

Why 1024?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 152

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+	if (!name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	do {
+
+		status = secvarops->get_next_variable(name, &namesize, 1024);
+		if (status != OPAL_SUCCESS)
+			break;
+
+		pr_info("name is %s\n", name);

Please delete debugging messages.

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 155

Quoted 3 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +3 -0
+		kobj = kobject_create_and_add(name, &(secvar_kset->kobj));
+		if (kobj) {
+			rc = sysfs_create_group(kobj, &secvar_attr_group);

You just raced userspace and lost :(

If you set your kobj_type to have the attribute group you will not race and loose, the core will handle it for you.

Quoted 16 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +16 -0
+			if (rc)
+				pr_err("Error creating attributes for %s variable\n",
+				name);
+		} else {
+			pr_err("Error creating sysfs entry for %s variable\n",
+				name);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+	} while ((status == OPAL_SUCCESS) && (rc == 0));
+
+	kfree(name);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int secvar_sysfs_init(void)

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 181

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+{
+	powerpc_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("secvar", firmware_kobj);
+	if (!powerpc_kobj) {
+		pr_err("secvar: Failed to create firmware kobj\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	secvar_kset = kset_create_and_add("vars", NULL, powerpc_kobj);
+	if (!secvar_kset) {
+		pr_err("secvar: sysfs kobject registration failed.\n");

You juat leaked a kobject :(

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 189

Quoted 8 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +8 -0
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	secvarops = get_secvar_ops();
+	if (!secvarops) {
+		kobject_put(powerpc_kobj);
+		pr_err("secvar: failed to retrieve secvar operations.\n");
+		return -ENODEV;

You just leaked 2 things from above :(

Quoted 7 lines

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 193

Quoted 4 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +4 -0
+	}
+
+	secvar_sysfs_load();
+	pr_info("Secure variables sysfs initialized");

Do not be noisy when all goes just fine. The kernel log should be quiet when all goes well.

Thanks Greg for feedback. I just posted v3 version with the fixes suggested by you and Oliver.

Currently, the name length as 1024 is taken from examples of efivars. Probably a smaller one is fine. In v3 version, it is still 1024 but made it #define.

Thanks & Regards,
      - Nayna

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs

In reply to Nayna Jain
Quoted 95 lines · Nayna Jain

PowerNV secure variables, which store the keys used for OS kernel verification, are managed by the firmware. These secure variables need to be accessed by the userspace for addition/deletion of the certificates.

This patch adds the sysfs interface to expose secure variables for PowerNV secureboot. The users shall use this interface for manipulating the keys stored in the secure variables.

---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar |  27 ++++
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                   |   9 ++
 arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile           |   1 +
 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c     | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 247 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file +27 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..68f0e03d873d
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+What:		/sys/firmware/secvar
+Date:		August 2019
+Contact:	Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
+Description:
+		This directory exposes interfaces for interacting with
+		the secure variables managed by OPAL firmware.
+
+		This is only for the powerpc/powernv platform.
+
+		Directory:
+		vars:		This directory lists all the variables that
+				are supported by the OPAL. The variables are
+				represented in the form of directories with
+				their variable names. The variable name is
+				unique and is in ASCII representation. The data
+				and size can be determined by reading their
+				respective attribute files.
+
+		Each variable directory has the following files:
+		name:		An ASCII representation of the variable name
+		data:		A read-only file containing the value of the
+				variable
+		size:		An integer representation of the size of the
+				content of the variable. In other works, it
+				represents the size of the data
+		update:		A write-only file that is used to submit the new
+				value for the variable.
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +9 -0
index 42109682b727..b4bdf77837b2 100644
@@ -925,6 +925,15 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
 	  allows user to enable OS Secure Boot on PowerPC systems that
 	  have firmware secure boot support.
 
+config SECVAR_SYSFS
+        tristate "Enable sysfs interface for POWER secure variables"
+        depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT
+        help
+          POWER secure variables are managed and controlled by firmware.
+          These variables are exposed to userspace via sysfs to enable
+          read/write operations on these variables. Say Y if you have
+	  secure boot enabled and want to expose variables to userspace.
+
 endmenu
 
 config ISA_DMA_API
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 9041563f1c74..4ea7b738c3a3 100644
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT)	+= epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST)		+= kvm.o kvm_emul.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)	+= secboot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECVAR_SYSFS)     += secvar-sysfs.o
 
 # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
 GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +6 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e46986bb29a0
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This code exposes secure variables to user via sysfs
+ */

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 16

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <asm/opal.h>
+#include <asm/secvar.h>
+
+//Approximating it for now, it is bound to change.
+#define VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE  32000

this needs to be communicated from the secvar backend, maybe via a field in the ops structure?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 18

Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +2 -0
+
+static struct kobject *powerpc_kobj;

Call it secvar_kobj or something.

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 19

Quoted 1 line
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +1 -0
+static struct secvar_operations *secvarops;

Ah, the old I-can't-believe-it's-not-global trick.

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 20

Quoted 1 line
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +1 -0
+struct kset *secvar_kset;

shouldn't that be static too?

Quoted 78 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +78 -0
+
+static ssize_t name_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			 char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s", kobj->name);
+}
+
+static ssize_t size_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			 char *buf)
+{
+	unsigned long dsize;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error retrieving variable size %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = sprintf(buf, "%ld", dsize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static ssize_t data_read(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj,
+			 struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off,
+			 size_t count)
+{
+	unsigned long dsize;
+	int rc;
+	char *data;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error getting variable size %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	pr_debug("dsize is %ld\n", dsize);
+
+	data = kzalloc(dsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name)+1, data,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error getting variable %d\n", rc);
+		goto data_fail;
+	}
+
+	rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &off, data, dsize);
+
+data_fail:
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static ssize_t update_write(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj,
+			    struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off,
+			    size_t count)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	pr_debug("count is %ld\n", count);
+	rc = secvarops->set_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name)+1, buf,
+				     count);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error setting the variable %s\n", kobj->name);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute name_attr =
+__ATTR(name, 0444, name_show, NULL);

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 107

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +9 -0
+
+static struct kobj_attribute size_attr =
+__ATTR(size, 0444, size_show, NULL);
+
 
+static struct bin_attribute data_attr = {
+	.attr = {.name = "data", .mode = 0444},
+	.size = VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE,
+	.read = data_read,
+};

Should they be globally readable? If efivars is globally readable I'm happy to follow that example, but mpe might have opinions.

Quoted 27 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +27 -0
+
+
+static struct bin_attribute update_attr = {
+	.attr = {.name = "update", .mode = 0200},
+	.size = VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE,
+	.write = update_write,
+};
+
+static struct bin_attribute  *secvar_bin_attrs[] = {
+	&data_attr,
+	&update_attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+static struct attribute *secvar_attrs[] = {
+	&name_attr.attr,
+	&size_attr.attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+const struct attribute_group secvar_attr_group = {
+	.attrs = secvar_attrs,
+	.bin_attrs = secvar_bin_attrs,
+};
+
+int secvar_sysfs_load(void)
+{

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 144

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+
+	char *name;
+	unsigned long namesize;
+	struct kobject *kobj;
+	int status;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	name = kzalloc(1024, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!name)
+		return -ENOMEM;

Where'd the 1024 restriction on the length of the variable name come from? is that enforced by firmware? If so, how does firmware communicate the limited key length?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 148

Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +4 -0
+
+	do {
+
 
+		status = secvarops->get_next_variable(name, &namesize, 1024);

does namesize need to be initialised for the first call?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 150

Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +2 -0
+		if (status != OPAL_SUCCESS)
+			break;

You might want to differentiate between the error case and the "no extra variables" case. Come to think of it, since the point of abstracting secvar ops is to make this code indepdendent of the backend why are we checking for OPAL_SUCCESS? The ops functions should be returning linux return code (EIO, etc) rather than OPAL codes.

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c

Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +2 -0
+
+		pr_info("name is %s\n", name);

pr_info?

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 165

Quoted 13 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +13 -0
+		kobj = kobject_create_and_add(name, &(secvar_kset->kobj));
+		if (kobj) {
+			rc = sysfs_create_group(kobj, &secvar_attr_group);
+			if (rc)
+				pr_err("Error creating attributes for %s variable\n",
+				name);
+		} else {
+			pr_err("Error creating sysfs entry for %s variable\n",
+				name);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+	} while ((status == OPAL_SUCCESS) && (rc == 0));

Checking status here isn't needed here since we checked it above and broken out of the loop.

Quoted 15 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +15 -0
+
+	kfree(name);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int secvar_sysfs_init(void)
+{
+	powerpc_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("secvar", firmware_kobj);
+	if (!powerpc_kobj) {
+		pr_err("secvar: Failed to create firmware kobj\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	secvar_kset = kset_create_and_add("vars", NULL, powerpc_kobj);
+	if (!secvar_kset) {

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 190

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
+		pr_err("secvar: sysfs kobject registration failed.\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	secvarops = get_secvar_ops();
+	if (!secvarops) {
+		kobject_put(powerpc_kobj);
+		pr_err("secvar: failed to retrieve secvar operations.\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}

Not having secvar support isn't an error. IMO checking if the ops are defined is the first thing you should be doing. If we don't have a defined set of ops then we don't need to do anything else.

Quoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +9 -0
+
+	secvar_sysfs_load();
+	pr_info("Secure variables sysfs initialized");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secvar_sysfs_init);
+
+static void secvar_sysfs_exit(void)

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 208

Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +9 -0
+{
+	kobject_put(powerpc_kobj);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secvar_sysfs_exit);
+
+module_init(secvar_sysfs_init);
+module_exit(secvar_sysfs_exit);
+
 
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Nayna Jain<[email protected]>");

needs a space between your name and the opening '<' of the email

Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +2 -0
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("sysfs interface to POWER secure variables");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs

Quoted 100 lines · Oliver O'Halloran
Quoted 99 lines · Nayna Jain

PowerNV secure variables, which store the keys used for OS kernel verification, are managed by the firmware. These secure variables need to be accessed by the userspace for addition/deletion of the certificates.

This patch adds the sysfs interface to expose secure variables for PowerNV secureboot. The users shall use this interface for manipulating the keys stored in the secure variables.

---
  Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar |  27 ++++
  arch/powerpc/Kconfig                   |   9 ++
  arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile           |   1 +
  arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c     | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
  4 files changed, 247 insertions(+)

create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar new file +27 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..68f0e03d873d
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+What:		/sys/firmware/secvar
+Date:		August 2019
+Contact:	Nayna Jain<[email protected]>
+Description:
+		This directory exposes interfaces for interacting with
+		the secure variables managed by OPAL firmware.
+
+		This is only for the powerpc/powernv platform.
+
+		Directory:
+		vars:		This directory lists all the variables that
+				are supported by the OPAL. The variables are
+				represented in the form of directories with
+				their variable names. The variable name is
+				unique and is in ASCII representation. The data
+				and size can be determined by reading their
+				respective attribute files.
+
+		Each variable directory has the following files:
+		name:		An ASCII representation of the variable name
+		data:		A read-only file containing the value of the
+				variable
+		size:		An integer representation of the size of the
+				content of the variable. In other works, it
+				represents the size of the data
+		update:		A write-only file that is used to submit the new
+				value for the variable.
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +9 -0
index 42109682b727..b4bdf77837b2 100644
@@ -925,6 +925,15 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
  	  allows user to enable OS Secure Boot on PowerPC systems that
  	  have firmware secure boot support.
 
+config SECVAR_SYSFS
+        tristate "Enable sysfs interface for POWER secure variables"
+        depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT
+        help
+          POWER secure variables are managed and controlled by firmware.
+          These variables are exposed to userspace via sysfs to enable
+          read/write operations on these variables. Say Y if you have
+	  secure boot enabled and want to expose variables to userspace.
+
  endmenu
 
  config ISA_DMA_API
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index 9041563f1c74..4ea7b738c3a3 100644
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EPAPR_PARAVIRT)	+= epapr_paravirt.o epapr_hcalls.o
  obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST)		+= kvm.o kvm_emul.o
 
  obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)	+= secboot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECVAR_SYSFS)     += secvar-sysfs.o
 
  # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
  GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +10 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e46986bb29a0
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation<[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This code exposes secure variables to user via sysfs
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
Quoted 8 lines

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 16

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +6 -0
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <asm/opal.h>
+#include <asm/secvar.h>
+
+//Approximating it for now, it is bound to change.
+#define VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE  32000

this needs to be communicated from the secvar backend, maybe via a field in the ops structure?

Thanks Oliver, I have just posted v3 version which includes yours and Greg's feedbacks.
And giving some of the responses here.
Yes for this one,  thinking of doing it via device-tree as they will be fixed values for a particular platform

Quoted 91 lines

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 18

Quoted 2 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +2 -0
+
+static struct kobject *powerpc_kobj;

Call it secvar_kobj or something.

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 19

Quoted 1 line
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +1 -0
+static struct secvar_operations *secvarops;

Ah, the old I-can't-believe-it's-not-global trick.

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 20

Quoted 1 line
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +1 -0
+struct kset *secvar_kset;

shouldn't that be static too?

Quoted 81 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +81 -0
+
+static ssize_t name_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			 char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s", kobj->name);
+}
+
+static ssize_t size_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			 char *buf)
+{
+	unsigned long dsize;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error retrieving variable size %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = sprintf(buf, "%ld", dsize);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static ssize_t data_read(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj,
+			 struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off,
+			 size_t count)
+{
+	unsigned long dsize;
+	int rc;
+	char *data;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name) + 1, NULL,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error getting variable size %d\n", rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	pr_debug("dsize is %ld\n", dsize);
+
+	data = kzalloc(dsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = secvarops->get_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name)+1, data,
+				     &dsize);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error getting variable %d\n", rc);
+		goto data_fail;
+	}
+
+	rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &off, data, dsize);
+
+data_fail:
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static ssize_t update_write(struct file *filep, struct kobject *kobj,
+			    struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off,
+			    size_t count)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	pr_debug("count is %ld\n", count);
+	rc = secvarops->set_variable(kobj->name, strlen(kobj->name)+1, buf,
+				     count);
+	if (rc) {
+		pr_err("Error setting the variable %s\n", kobj->name);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute name_attr =
+__ATTR(name, 0444, name_show, NULL);
+
+static struct kobj_attribute size_attr =
+__ATTR(size, 0444, size_show, NULL);
Quoted 8 lines

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 107

Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +6 -0
+
+static struct bin_attribute data_attr = {
+	.attr = {.name = "data", .mode = 0444},
+	.size = VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE,
+	.read = data_read,
+};

Should they be globally readable? If efivars is globally readable I'm happy to follow that example, but mpe might have opinions.

efivars are globally readable.

Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 32 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +32 -0
+
+
+static struct bin_attribute update_attr = {
+	.attr = {.name = "update", .mode = 0200},
+	.size = VARIABLE_MAX_SIZE,
+	.write = update_write,
+};
+
+static struct bin_attribute  *secvar_bin_attrs[] = {
+	&data_attr,
+	&update_attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+static struct attribute *secvar_attrs[] = {
+	&name_attr.attr,
+	&size_attr.attr,
+	NULL,
+};
+
+const struct attribute_group secvar_attr_group = {
+	.attrs = secvar_attrs,
+	.bin_attrs = secvar_bin_attrs,
+};
+
+int secvar_sysfs_load(void)
+{
+
+	char *name;
+	unsigned long namesize;
+	struct kobject *kobj;
+	int status;
Quoted 8 lines

arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c line 144

Quoted 5 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/secvar-sysfs.c new file +5 -0
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	name = kzalloc(1024, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!name)
+		return -ENOMEM;

Where'd the 1024 restriction on the length of the variable name come from? is that enforced by firmware? If so, how does firmware communicate the limited key length?

It is not enforced by the firmware. Currently, it is sort of agreed upon value between the firmware and the kernel, and taken from the examples of efivars. Probably it can be reduced.

author
#9 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/4 x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file

In reply to Nayna Jain

This patch moves the common code to keyring_handler.c

---
 security/integrity/Makefile                   |  3 +-
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          | 80 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h          | 35 ++++++++
 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +---------------
 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
security/integrity/Makefile +2 -1
index 19faace69644..525bf1d6e0db 100644
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
-					platform_certs/load_uefi.o
+				      platform_certs/load_uefi.o \
+				      platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
 $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
 
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c new file +80 -0

80 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h new file +35 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..829a14b95218
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
+ */
+#ifndef PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H
+#define PLATFORM_CERTS_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+
+void blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,
+		    size_t len, const char *type,
+		    size_t type_len);
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
+ */
+void blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Blacklist the hash of an executable.
+ */
+void blacklist_binary(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the db.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+#endif
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +1 -66

79 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file

Quoted 1 line · Nayna Jain

This patch moves the common code to keyring_handler.c

That says _what_ you are doing, but not _why_ you are doing it. We have no idea :(

author
#11 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/4 powerpc: load firmware trusted keys into kernel keyring

In reply to Nayna Jain

The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by OPAL as secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform keyring and revocation keys into .blacklist keyring. This enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which are trusted by firmware.

---
 security/integrity/Kconfig                    |  9 ++
 security/integrity/Makefile                   |  3 +
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   | 94 +++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
security/integrity/Kconfig +9 -0
index 0bae6adb63a9..2b4109c157e2 100644
@@ -72,6 +72,15 @@ config LOAD_IPL_KEYS
        depends on S390
        def_bool y
 
+config LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	bool "Enable loading of platform and revocation keys for POWER"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+	depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT
+	def_bool y
+	help
+	  Enable loading of db keys to the .platform keyring and dbx keys to
+	  the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms.
+
 config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
 	bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
 	depends on AUDIT
security/integrity/Makefile +3 -0
index 525bf1d6e0db..9eeb6b053de3 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
 				      platform_certs/load_uefi.o \
 				      platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
+					 platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \
+					 platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
 $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
 
 subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file +94 -0

94 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys into kernel keyring

Quoted 19 lines · Nayna Jain

The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by OPAL as secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform keyring and revocation keys into .blacklist keyring. This enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which are trusted by firmware.

---
 security/integrity/Kconfig                    |  9 ++
 security/integrity/Makefile                   |  3 +
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   | 94 +++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
security/integrity/Kconfig +0 -0
index 0bae6adb63a9..2b4109c157e2 100644

security/integrity/Kconfig config LOAD_IPL_KEYS · line 79

Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/Kconfig +5 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,15 @@ config LOAD_IPL_KEYS
        depends on S390
        def_bool y
 
+config LOAD_PPC_KEYS
+	bool "Enable loading of platform and revocation keys for POWER"
+	depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+	depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT
+	def_bool y

def_bool y only for things that the system will not boot if it is not enabled because you added a new feature. Otherwise just do not set the default.

Quoted 27 lines
security/integrity/Kconfig +4 -0
+	help
+	  Enable loading of db keys to the .platform keyring and dbx keys to
+	  the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms.
+
 config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
 	bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
 	depends on AUDIT
security/integrity/Makefile +3 -0
index 525bf1d6e0db..9eeb6b053de3 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
 				      platform_certs/load_uefi.o \
 				      platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
+					 platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \
+					 platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
 $(obj)/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar
 
 subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f4d869171062

security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c line 6

Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c new file +6 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * load_powernv.c

That's not the name of this file :(

And the perfect example of why you NEVER have the name of the file in the file itself, as it's not needed and easy to get wrong :)

thanks,

greg k-h