System-wide hard RLIMIT_STACK in 4.14.4+ w/ SELinux
Hello,
Commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375 "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()" that made it into 4.14.4 effectively changes the default hard RLIMIT_STACK on machines with SELinux (seen on Fedora 27).
selinux_bprm_set_creds() sets bprm->secureexec for any SELinux domain transition that does not have the "noatsecure" permission. The secureexec logic thus kicks in for virtually every process launched by PID 1 systemd (init_t), including gettys, display managers, etc.
I can see that 8 MiB "should be enough for everyone" using normal software, but sadly the HPC stuff around here tends to need a little more (due to a deficiency in gfortran).
Minimal example (the actual types are not too important):
# /bin/ulimit -Hs unlimited # runcon -r system_r -t sysadm_t runcon -t rpm_script_t /bin/ulimit -Hs 8192
Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy (allowing blanket noatsecure permission for init_t and possibly others) or by pam_limits (for components using PAM). Unfortunately, systemd's LimitSTACK= is also broken (calls setrlimit before exec). Anyway, I wasn't expecting any of that in connection with the 4.14.3->.4 upgrade.
--
Best regards,
Tomáš Trnka
Software for Chemistry & Materials
Quoted 3 lines
Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy (allowing blanket noatsecure permission for
init_tand possibly others) or bypam_limits(for components using PAM).
Correction: pam_limits also usually doesn't help here, as it's often followed by another secureexec (for example when login (local_login_t) executes the shell with transition to unconfined_t).
2T
Quoted 10 lines · Tomáš Trnka
Hello,
Commit
04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375"exec: avoidRLIMIT_STACKraces withprlimit()" that made it into 4.14.4 effectively changes the default hardRLIMIT_STACKon machines with SELinux (seen on Fedora 27).
selinux_bprm_set_creds()setsbprm->secureexecfor any SELinux domain transition that does not have the "noatsecure" permission. The secureexec logic thus kicks in for virtually every process launched by PID 1 systemd (init_t), including gettys, display managers, etc.
Uuugh. Okay, we need to revert that commit. I'll send a patch for 4.15 (with a fix for -stable too).
I will design an alternative, which was considered much earlier:
keeping a copy of the rlimits in the bprm during exec so it can't change out from under the execing process. This will avoid needing to set the hard limit, avoid the locking race that commit was trying to fix, etc.
This is an interesting state for the system to be in, though, it means AT_SECURE is being set for virtually all processes too? I would expect that might break a lot too (but clearly it hasn't).
Quoted 18 lines
I can see that 8 MiB "should be enough for everyone" using normal software, but sadly the HPC stuff around here tends to need a little more (due to a deficiency in gfortran).
Minimal example (the actual types are not too important):
# /bin/ulimit -Hs unlimited # runcon -r system_r -t sysadm_t runcon -t rpm_script_t /bin/ulimit -Hs 8192Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy (allowing blanket noatsecure permission for
init_tand possibly others) or bypam_limits(for components using PAM). Unfortunately, systemd's LimitSTACK= is also broken (calls setrlimit before exec). Anyway, I wasn't expecting any of that in connection with the 4.14.3->.4 upgrade.
Quoted 5 lines
--
Best regards,Tomáš Trnka
Software for Chemistry & Materials
Thanks for the report and examples!
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Pixel Security
Quoted 3 lines · On Tuesday, 12 December 2017 20:23:47 CET Kees Cook wrote:
This is an interesting state for the system to be in, though, it means
AT_SECUREis being set for virtually all processes too? I would expect that might break a lot too (but clearly it hasn't).
Not really. AT_SECURE is set only for the exec that triggers a domain transition, but unlike the rlimits it's not inherited by descendants (as long as they stay within the same SELinux domain).
2T
Quoted 46 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 10 lines · Tomáš Trnka
Hello,
Commit
04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375"exec: avoidRLIMIT_STACKraces withprlimit()" that made it into 4.14.4 effectively changes the default hardRLIMIT_STACKon machines with SELinux (seen on Fedora 27).
selinux_bprm_set_creds()setsbprm->secureexecfor any SELinux domain transition that does not have the "noatsecure" permission. The secureexec logic thus kicks in for virtually every process launched by PID 1 systemd (init_t), including gettys, display managers, etc.Uuugh. Okay, we need to revert that commit. I'll send a patch for 4.15 (with a fix for -stable too).
I will design an alternative, which was considered much earlier:
keeping a copy of the rlimits in the bprm during exec so it can't change out from under the execing process. This will avoid needing to set the hard limit, avoid the locking race that commit was trying to fix, etc.This is an interesting state for the system to be in, though, it means
AT_SECUREis being set for virtually all processes too? I would expect that might break a lot too (but clearly it hasn't).Quoted 21 lines
I can see that 8 MiB "should be enough for everyone" using normal software, but sadly the HPC stuff around here tends to need a little more (due to a deficiency in gfortran).
Minimal example (the actual types are not too important):
# /bin/ulimit -Hs unlimited # runcon -r system_r -t sysadm_t runcon -t rpm_script_t /bin/ulimit -Hs 8192Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy (allowing blanket noatsecure permission for
init_tand possibly others) or bypam_limits(for components using PAM). Unfortunately, systemd's LimitSTACK= is also broken (calls setrlimit before exec). Anyway, I wasn't expecting any of that in connection with the 4.14.3->.4 upgrade.--
Best regards,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Tomáš Trnka
Software for Chemistry & MaterialsThanks for the report and examples!
-Kees
FWIW, the issue I reported offline yesterday
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1524083 still happens with selinux disabled. The conclusion there is still that trafficserver needs to be fixed.
Thanks,
Laura
Quoted 62 lines · Laura Abbott
Quoted 61 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 8 lines · Tomáš Trnka
Hello,
Commit
04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375"exec: avoidRLIMIT_STACKraces withprlimit()" that made it into 4.14.4 effectively changes the default
hardRLIMIT_STACKon machines with SELinux (seen on Fedora 27).Quoted 4 lines
selinux_bprm_set_creds()setsbprm->secureexecfor any SELinux domain transition that does not have the "noatsecure" permission. The secureexec logic thus kicks in for virtually every process launched by PID 1 systemd (init_t), including gettys, display managers, etc.Uuugh. Okay, we need to revert that commit. I'll send a patch for 4.15 (with a fix for -stable too).
I will design an alternative, which was considered much earlier:
keeping a copy of the rlimits in the bprm during exec so it can't change out from under the execing process. This will avoid needing to set the hard limit, avoid the locking race that commit was trying to fix, etc.This is an interesting state for the system to be in, though, it means
AT_SECUREis being set for virtually all processes too? I would expect that might break a lot too (but clearly it hasn't).Quoted 23 lines
I can see that 8 MiB "should be enough for everyone" using normal software,
but sadly the HPC stuff around here tends to need a little more (due to a deficiency in gfortran).Minimal example (the actual types are not too important):
# /bin/ulimit -Hs unlimited # runcon -r system_r -t sysadm_t runcon -t rpm_script_t /bin/ulimit -Hs 8192Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy
(allowing blanket noatsecure permission forinit_tand possibly others) or bypam_limits(for components using PAM). Unfortunately, systemd's LimitSTACK= is
also broken (calls setrlimit before exec). Anyway, I wasn't expecting any of
that in connection with the 4.14.3->.4 upgrade.Quoted 5 lines
--
Best regards,Tomáš Trnka
Software for Chemistry & MaterialsThanks for the report and examples!
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
-Kees
FWIW, the issue I reported offline yesterday
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1524083 still happens with selinux disabled. The conclusion there is still that trafficserver needs to be fixed.
I've sent a revert regardless. I think the bprm needs to hold a copy of the rlimits so they can't be manipulated during exec. This will keep the hardlimit from being messed with, etc.
-Kees
Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook Pixel Security
Quoted 71 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 62 lines · Laura Abbott
Quoted 61 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 8 lines · Tomáš Trnka
Hello,
Commit
04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375"exec: avoidRLIMIT_STACKraces withprlimit()" that made it into 4.14.4 effectively changes the default
hardRLIMIT_STACKon machines with SELinux (seen on Fedora 27).Quoted 4 lines
selinux_bprm_set_creds()setsbprm->secureexecfor any SELinux domain transition that does not have the "noatsecure" permission. The secureexec logic thus kicks in for virtually every process launched by PID 1 systemd (init_t), including gettys, display managers, etc.Uuugh. Okay, we need to revert that commit. I'll send a patch for 4.15 (with a fix for -stable too).
I will design an alternative, which was considered much earlier:
keeping a copy of the rlimits in the bprm during exec so it can't change out from under the execing process. This will avoid needing to set the hard limit, avoid the locking race that commit was trying to fix, etc.This is an interesting state for the system to be in, though, it means
AT_SECUREis being set for virtually all processes too? I would expect that might break a lot too (but clearly it hasn't).Quoted 23 lines
I can see that 8 MiB "should be enough for everyone" using normal software,
but sadly the HPC stuff around here tends to need a little more (due to a deficiency in gfortran).Minimal example (the actual types are not too important):
# /bin/ulimit -Hs unlimited # runcon -r system_r -t sysadm_t runcon -t rpm_script_t /bin/ulimit -Hs 8192Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy
(allowing blanket noatsecure permission forinit_tand possibly others) or bypam_limits(for components using PAM). Unfortunately, systemd's LimitSTACK= is
also broken (calls setrlimit before exec). Anyway, I wasn't expecting any of
that in connection with the 4.14.3->.4 upgrade.Quoted 5 lines
--
Best regards,Tomáš Trnka
Software for Chemistry & MaterialsThanks for the report and examples!
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
-Kees
FWIW, the issue I reported offline yesterday
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1524083 still happens with selinux disabled. The conclusion there is still that trafficserver needs to be fixed.
Quoted 6 lines
I've sent a revert regardless. I think the bprm needs to hold a copy of the rlimits so they can't be manipulated during exec. This will keep the hardlimit from being messed with, etc.
-Kees
Understood. I just wanted to clarify that the issues were separate since there was still some question about where the secureexec was coming from.
Thanks,
Laura