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System-wide hard RLIMIT_STACK in 4.14.4+ w/ SELinux

DISCUSSION Tomáš Trnka 3 participants 7 messages Dec 12, 2017

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#0 lore raw

Hello,

Commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375 "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()" that made it into 4.14.4 effectively changes the default hard RLIMIT_STACK on machines with SELinux (seen on Fedora 27).

selinux_bprm_set_creds() sets bprm->secureexec for any SELinux domain transition that does not have the "noatsecure" permission. The secureexec logic thus kicks in for virtually every process launched by PID 1 systemd (init_t), including gettys, display managers, etc.

I can see that 8 MiB "should be enough for everyone" using normal software, but sadly the HPC stuff around here tends to need a little more (due to a deficiency in gfortran).

Minimal example (the actual types are not too important):

# /bin/ulimit -Hs
unlimited
# runcon -r system_r -t sysadm_t runcon -t rpm_script_t /bin/ulimit -Hs
8192

Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy (allowing blanket noatsecure permission for init_t and possibly others) or by pam_limits (for components using PAM). Unfortunately, systemd's LimitSTACK= is also broken (calls setrlimit before exec). Anyway, I wasn't expecting any of that in connection with the 4.14.3->.4 upgrade.

--
Best regards,

Tomáš Trnka
Software for Chemistry & Materials

#1 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines

Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy (allowing blanket noatsecure permission for init_t and possibly others) or by pam_limits (for components using PAM).

Correction: pam_limits also usually doesn't help here, as it's often followed by another secureexec (for example when login (local_login_t) executes the shell with transition to unconfined_t).

2T

#2 lore raw
In reply to Tomáš Trnka
Quoted 10 lines · Tomáš Trnka

Hello,

Commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375 "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()" that made it into 4.14.4 effectively changes the default hard RLIMIT_STACK on machines with SELinux (seen on Fedora 27).

selinux_bprm_set_creds() sets bprm->secureexec for any SELinux domain transition that does not have the "noatsecure" permission. The secureexec logic thus kicks in for virtually every process launched by PID 1 systemd (init_t), including gettys, display managers, etc.

Uuugh. Okay, we need to revert that commit. I'll send a patch for 4.15 (with a fix for -stable too).

I will design an alternative, which was considered much earlier:
keeping a copy of the rlimits in the bprm during exec so it can't change out from under the execing process. This will avoid needing to set the hard limit, avoid the locking race that commit was trying to fix, etc.

This is an interesting state for the system to be in, though, it means AT_SECURE is being set for virtually all processes too? I would expect that might break a lot too (but clearly it hasn't).

Quoted 18 lines

I can see that 8 MiB "should be enough for everyone" using normal software, but sadly the HPC stuff around here tends to need a little more (due to a deficiency in gfortran).

Minimal example (the actual types are not too important):

# /bin/ulimit -Hs
unlimited
# runcon -r system_r -t sysadm_t runcon -t rpm_script_t /bin/ulimit -Hs
8192

Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy (allowing blanket noatsecure permission for init_t and possibly others) or by pam_limits (for components using PAM). Unfortunately, systemd's LimitSTACK= is also broken (calls setrlimit before exec). Anyway, I wasn't expecting any of that in connection with the 4.14.3->.4 upgrade.

Quoted 5 lines

--
Best regards,

Tomáš Trnka
Software for Chemistry & Materials

Thanks for the report and examples!

-Kees

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
#3 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · On Tuesday, 12 December 2017 20:23:47 CET Kees Cook wrote:

This is an interesting state for the system to be in, though, it means AT_SECURE is being set for virtually all processes too? I would expect that might break a lot too (but clearly it hasn't).

Not really. AT_SECURE is set only for the exec that triggers a domain transition, but unlike the rlimits it's not inherited by descendants (as long as they stay within the same SELinux domain).

2T

#4 lore raw
In reply to Kees Cook
Quoted 46 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 10 lines · Tomáš Trnka

Hello,

Commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375 "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()" that made it into 4.14.4 effectively changes the default hard RLIMIT_STACK on machines with SELinux (seen on Fedora 27).

selinux_bprm_set_creds() sets bprm->secureexec for any SELinux domain transition that does not have the "noatsecure" permission. The secureexec logic thus kicks in for virtually every process launched by PID 1 systemd (init_t), including gettys, display managers, etc.

Uuugh. Okay, we need to revert that commit. I'll send a patch for 4.15 (with a fix for -stable too).

I will design an alternative, which was considered much earlier:
keeping a copy of the rlimits in the bprm during exec so it can't change out from under the execing process. This will avoid needing to set the hard limit, avoid the locking race that commit was trying to fix, etc.

This is an interesting state for the system to be in, though, it means AT_SECURE is being set for virtually all processes too? I would expect that might break a lot too (but clearly it hasn't).

Quoted 21 lines

I can see that 8 MiB "should be enough for everyone" using normal software, but sadly the HPC stuff around here tends to need a little more (due to a deficiency in gfortran).

Minimal example (the actual types are not too important):

# /bin/ulimit -Hs
unlimited
# runcon -r system_r -t sysadm_t runcon -t rpm_script_t /bin/ulimit -Hs
8192

Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy (allowing blanket noatsecure permission for init_t and possibly others) or by pam_limits (for components using PAM). Unfortunately, systemd's LimitSTACK= is also broken (calls setrlimit before exec). Anyway, I wasn't expecting any of that in connection with the 4.14.3->.4 upgrade.

--
Best regards,

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Tomáš Trnka
Software for Chemistry & Materials

Thanks for the report and examples!

-Kees

FWIW, the issue I reported offline yesterday
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1524083 still happens with selinux disabled. The conclusion there is still that trafficserver needs to be fixed.

Thanks,
Laura

#5 lore raw
Quoted 62 lines · Laura Abbott
Quoted 61 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 8 lines · Tomáš Trnka

Hello,

Commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375 "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()" that made it into 4.14.4 effectively changes the default
hard RLIMIT_STACK on machines with SELinux (seen on Fedora 27).

Quoted 4 lines

selinux_bprm_set_creds() sets bprm->secureexec for any SELinux domain transition that does not have the "noatsecure" permission. The secureexec logic thus kicks in for virtually every process launched by PID 1 systemd (init_t), including gettys, display managers, etc.

Uuugh. Okay, we need to revert that commit. I'll send a patch for 4.15 (with a fix for -stable too).

I will design an alternative, which was considered much earlier:
keeping a copy of the rlimits in the bprm during exec so it can't change out from under the execing process. This will avoid needing to set the hard limit, avoid the locking race that commit was trying to fix, etc.

This is an interesting state for the system to be in, though, it means AT_SECURE is being set for virtually all processes too? I would expect that might break a lot too (but clearly it hasn't).

Quoted 23 lines

I can see that 8 MiB "should be enough for everyone" using normal software,
but sadly the HPC stuff around here tends to need a little more (due to a deficiency in gfortran).

Minimal example (the actual types are not too important):

# /bin/ulimit -Hs
unlimited
# runcon -r system_r -t sysadm_t runcon -t rpm_script_t /bin/ulimit -Hs
8192

Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy
(allowing blanket noatsecure permission for init_t and possibly others) or by
pam_limits (for components using PAM). Unfortunately, systemd's LimitSTACK= is
also broken (calls setrlimit before exec). Anyway, I wasn't expecting any of
that in connection with the 4.14.3->.4 upgrade.

Quoted 5 lines

--
Best regards,

Tomáš Trnka
Software for Chemistry & Materials

Thanks for the report and examples!

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

-Kees

FWIW, the issue I reported offline yesterday
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1524083 still happens with selinux disabled. The conclusion there is still that trafficserver needs to be fixed.

I've sent a revert regardless. I think the bprm needs to hold a copy of the rlimits so they can't be manipulated during exec. This will keep the hardlimit from being messed with, etc.

-Kees

Signature · 2 lines
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
#6 lore raw
Quoted 71 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 62 lines · Laura Abbott
Quoted 61 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 8 lines · Tomáš Trnka

Hello,

Commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375 "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()" that made it into 4.14.4 effectively changes the default
hard RLIMIT_STACK on machines with SELinux (seen on Fedora 27).

Quoted 4 lines

selinux_bprm_set_creds() sets bprm->secureexec for any SELinux domain transition that does not have the "noatsecure" permission. The secureexec logic thus kicks in for virtually every process launched by PID 1 systemd (init_t), including gettys, display managers, etc.

Uuugh. Okay, we need to revert that commit. I'll send a patch for 4.15 (with a fix for -stable too).

I will design an alternative, which was considered much earlier:
keeping a copy of the rlimits in the bprm during exec so it can't change out from under the execing process. This will avoid needing to set the hard limit, avoid the locking race that commit was trying to fix, etc.

This is an interesting state for the system to be in, though, it means AT_SECURE is being set for virtually all processes too? I would expect that might break a lot too (but clearly it hasn't).

Quoted 23 lines

I can see that 8 MiB "should be enough for everyone" using normal software,
but sadly the HPC stuff around here tends to need a little more (due to a deficiency in gfortran).

Minimal example (the actual types are not too important):

# /bin/ulimit -Hs
unlimited
# runcon -r system_r -t sysadm_t runcon -t rpm_script_t /bin/ulimit -Hs
8192

Of course this can be somewhat worked around by adjusting the SELinux policy
(allowing blanket noatsecure permission for init_t and possibly others) or by
pam_limits (for components using PAM). Unfortunately, systemd's LimitSTACK= is
also broken (calls setrlimit before exec). Anyway, I wasn't expecting any of
that in connection with the 4.14.3->.4 upgrade.

Quoted 5 lines

--
Best regards,

Tomáš Trnka
Software for Chemistry & Materials

Thanks for the report and examples!

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

-Kees

FWIW, the issue I reported offline yesterday
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1524083 still happens with selinux disabled. The conclusion there is still that trafficserver needs to be fixed.

Quoted 6 lines

I've sent a revert regardless. I think the bprm needs to hold a copy of the rlimits so they can't be manipulated during exec. This will keep the hardlimit from being messed with, etc.

-Kees

Understood. I just wanted to clarify that the issues were separate since there was still some question about where the secureexec was coming from.

Thanks,
Laura