Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Subsystems (19)
v21 cover Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
CET can protect applications and the kernel. This series enables only application-level protection, and has three parts:
- Shadow stack [2],
- Indirect branch tracking [3], and
- Selftests [4].
I have run tests on these patches for quite some time, and they have been very stable. Linux distributions with CET are available now, and Intel processors with CET are already on the market. It would be nice if CET support can be accepted into the kernel. I will be working to address any issues should they come up.
Changes in v21:
- Patch #2: Remove X86_CET's dependency on X86_64, since it now depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK.
- Patch #8: Create helpers for _PAGE_DIRTY/_PAGE_COW swapping.
- Patch #21: Update commit logs, explain token checking.
- Patch #23: Instead of RLIMIT_STACK, use stack_size passed from clone3() as thread shadow stack size.
- Patch #25: split out moving arch_vm_get_page_prot() and arch_calc_vm_prot_ bits() to a separate patch.
- Pick up Reviewed-by tags.
- Rebase to Linus tree v5.11.
[1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32- architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4
[2] CET Shadow Stack patches v20:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[3] Indirect Branch Tracking patches v20.
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[4] I am holding off the selftests changes and working to get Reviewed-by's. The earlier version of the selftests patches:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[5] The kernel ptrace patch is tested with an Intel-internal updated GDB. I am holding off the kernel ptrace patch to re-test it with my earlier patch for fixing regset holes.
Yu-cheng Yu (26):
Documentation/x86: Add CET description
x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow
protection
x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow
Enforcement Technology (CET)
x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for
transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 + Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 136 +++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 5 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 28 ++ arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 + arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 17 + arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 44 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 17 +- arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 + arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 10 + arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 23 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 85 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 19 + arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 10 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 254 ++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 48 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 28 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 348 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 60 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 14 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 100 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 10 +- arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 21 +- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 32 ++ arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 10 + arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 63 ++++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 + arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 2 + arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 25 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +- fs/aio.c | 2 +- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 + fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/linux/elf.h | 6 + include/linux/mm.h | 38 +- include/linux/pgtable.h | 35 ++ include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +- include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 9 + ipc/shm.c | 2 +- mm/gup.c | 8 +- mm/huge_memory.c | 10 +- mm/memory.c | 5 +- mm/migrate.c | 3 +- mm/mmap.c | 23 +- mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- mm/nommu.c | 4 +- mm/util.c | 2 +- 65 files changed, 1606 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 1/26 Documentation/x86: Add CET description
Explain no_user_shstk/no_user_ibt kernel parameters, and introduce a new document on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 + Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 136 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 143 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +6 -0
@@ -3202,6 +3202,12 @@ noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default) noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings + no_user_shstk [X86-64] Disable Shadow Stack for user-mode + applications + + no_user_ibt [X86-64] Disable Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode + applications + nosmap [X86,PPC] Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention) even if it is supported by processor.
Documentation/x86/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation tlb mtrr pat + intel_cet intel-iommu intel_txt amd-memory-encryption
Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst new file +136 -0
136 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 2/26 x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
In reply to Yu-cheng YuShadow Stack provides protection against function return address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has CONFIG_X86_CET enabled, and the application is built for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +22 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ config X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128 select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF + select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE
@@ -1951,6 +1952,27 @@ config X86_SGX If unsure, say N. +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + def_bool n + +config X86_CET + prompt "Intel Control-flow protection for user-mode" + def_bool n + depends on AS_WRUSS + depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + help + Control-flow protection is a set of hardware features which place + additional restrictions on indirect branches. These help + mitigate ROP attacks. Applications must be enabled to use it, + and old userspace does not get protection "for free". + Support for this feature is present on Tiger Lake family of + processors released in 2020 or later. Enabling this feature + increases kernel text size by 3.7 KB. + See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst for more information. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler +5 -0
@@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ config AS_TPAUSE def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx) help Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7 + +config AS_WRUSS + def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx)) + help + Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 3/26 x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAdd CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7] Shadow stack CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 20] Indirect Branch Tracking
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 12 ++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -0
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (16*32+ 4)/* OS Protection Keys Enable */ #define X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG (16*32+ 5)/* UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2 (16*32+ 6)/* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK (16*32+ 7)/* Shadow Stack */ #define X86_FEATURE_GFNI (16*32+ 8)/* Galois Field New Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_VAES (16*32+ 9)/* Vector AES */ #define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ (16*32+10)/* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
@@ -377,6 +378,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_TSXLDTRK (18*32+16)/* TSX Suspend Load Address Tracking */ #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG (18*32+18)/* Intel PCONFIG */ #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR (18*32+19)/* Intel ARCH LBR */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBT (18*32+20)/* Indirect Branch Tracking */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16 (18*32+23)/* AVX512 FP16 */ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26)/* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27)/* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +10 -2
@@ -68,6 +68,14 @@# define DISABLE_SGX (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SGX & 31))#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0 +#define DISABLE_IBT 0 +#else +#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31)) +#define DISABLE_IBT (1 << (X86_FEATURE_IBT & 31)) +#endif +/* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */
@@ -88,9 +96,9 @@#define DISABLED_MASK14 0#define DISABLED_MASK15 0#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP| \ - DISABLE_ENQCMD) + DISABLE_ENQCMD|DISABLE_SHSTK)#define DISABLED_MASK17 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK18 (DISABLE_IBT)#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +2 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = { { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16, X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW }, { X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, { X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA, X86_FEATURE_MBA }, + { X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, + { X86_FEATURE_IBT, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, {} };
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 4/26 x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions
In reply to Yu-cheng YuIntroduce a software-defined X86_FEATURE_CET, which indicates either Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking (or both) is present. Also introduce related cpu init/setup functions.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 5 ++++- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -1
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID ( 3*32+26)/* Extended APICID (8 bits) */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM ( 3*32+27)/* AMD multi-node processor */ #define X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF ( 3*32+28)/* P-State hardware coordination feedback capability (APERF/MPERF MSRs) */ -/* free ( 3*32+29) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_CET ( 3*32+29)/* Control-flow enforcement */ #define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 ( 3*32+30)/* TSC doesn't stop in S3 state */ #define X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ ( 3*32+31)/* TSC has known frequency */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +4 -1
@@ -71,9 +71,11 @@#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET #define DISABLE_SHSTK 0#define DISABLE_IBT 0 +#define DISABLE_CET 0#else #define DISABLE_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))#define DISABLE_IBT (1 << (X86_FEATURE_IBT & 31)) +#define DISABLE_CET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_CET & 31))#endif /*
@@ -82,7 +84,8 @@#define DISABLED_MASK0 (DISABLE_VME)#define DISABLED_MASK1 0#define DISABLED_MASK2 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK3 (DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR|DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR|DISABLE_K6_MTRR) +#define DISABLED_MASK3 (DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR|DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR|DISABLE_K6_MTRR| \ + DISABLE_CET)#define DISABLED_MASK4 (DISABLE_PCID)#define DISABLED_MASK5 0#define DISABLED_MASK6 0
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h +2 -0
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@#define X86_CR4_SMAP _BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT)#define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT 22/* enable Protection Keys support */ #define X86_CR4_PKE _BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT) +#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT 23/* enable Control-flow Enforcement */ +#define X86_CR4_CET _BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)/* * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +14 -0
@@ -510,6 +510,14 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)__setup ("nopku" , setup_disable_pku);#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_CET )) +return ; + +cr4_set_bits (X86_CR4_CET ); +} +/* * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -1252,6 +1260,11 @@ static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void)if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"noxsaves" ))setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_XSAVES ); +if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"no_user_shstk" )) +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ); +if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"no_user_ibt" )) +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_IBT ); + arglen =cmdline_find_option (boot_command_line,"clearcpuid" , arg,sizeof (arg));if (arglen <=0 )return ;
@@ -1591,6 +1604,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)x86_init_rdrand (c);setup_pku (c); +setup_cet (c);/* * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +3 -0
@@ -333,6 +333,9 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)static void bsp_init_intel (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { +if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) ||cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_IBT )) +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_CET ); +resctrl_cpu_detect (c); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 5/26 x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
In reply to Yu-cheng YuControl-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces these MSRs:
MSR_IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings), MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack pointer),
MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack pointer), MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP (Privilege Level 1 shadow stack pointer), MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP (Privilege Level 2 shadow stack pointer), MSR_IA32_S_CET (kernel-mode CET settings), MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB (exception shadow stack table).
The two user-mode MSRs belong to XFEATURE_CET_USER. The first three of kernel-mode MSRs belong to XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL. Both XSAVES states are supervisor states. This means that there is no direct, unprivileged access to these states, making it harder for an attacker to subvert CET.
For sigreturn and future ptrace() support, shadow stack address and MSR reserved bits are checked before written to the supervisor states.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 ++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 10 +++++++++- 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h +21 -2
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ enum xfeature {XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR ,XFEATURE_PKRU ,XFEATURE_PASID , -XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11 , -XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_12 , +XFEATURE_CET_USER , +XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL ,XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13 ,XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_14 , XFEATURE_LBR,
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ enum xfeature {#define XFEATURE_MASK_PT (1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)#define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)#define XFEATURE_MASK_PASID (1 << XFEATURE_PASID) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER (1 << XFEATURE_CET_USER) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL (1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL)#define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR (1 << XFEATURE_LBR)#define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
@@ -237,6 +239,23 @@ struct pkru_state {u32 pad; } __packed; +/* +* State component 11 is Control-flow Enforcement user states +*/ +struct cet_user_state { +u64 user_cet;/* user control-flow settings */ +u64 user_ssp;/* user shadow stack pointer */ +}; + +/* +* State component 12 is Control-flow Enforcement kernel states +*/ +struct cet_kernel_state { +u64 kernel_ssp;/* kernel shadow stack */ +u64 pl1_ssp;/* privilege level 1 shadow stack */ +u64 pl2_ssp;/* privilege level 2 shadow stack */ +}; +/* * State component 15: Architectural LBR configuration state. * The size of Arch LBR state depends on the number of LBRs (lbr_depth).
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h +4 -2
@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)/* All currently supported supervisor features */ -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)/* * A supervisor state component may not always contain valuable information,
@@ -62,7 +63,8 @@* Unsupported supervisor features. When a supervisor feature in this mask is * supported in the future, move it to the supported supervisor feature mask. */ -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)/* All supervisor states including supported and unsupported states. */ #define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_ALL (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED | \
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +19 -0
@@ -933,4 +933,23 @@#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117 +/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0/* user mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2/* kernel mode cet setting */ +#define CET_SHSTK_EN BIT_ULL(0) +#define CET_WRSS_EN BIT_ULL(1) +#define CET_ENDBR_EN BIT_ULL(2) +#define CET_LEG_IW_EN BIT_ULL(3) +#define CET_NO_TRACK_EN BIT_ULL(4) +#define CET_SUPPRESS_DISABLE BIT_ULL(5) +#define CET_RESERVED (BIT_ULL(6) | BIT_ULL(7) | BIT_ULL(8) | BIT_ULL(9)) +#define CET_SUPPRESS BIT_ULL(10) +#define CET_WAIT_ENDBR BIT_ULL(11) + +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4/* kernel shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP 0x6a5/* ring-1 shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP 0x6a6/* ring-2 shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7/* user shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8/* exception shadow stack table */ +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +9 -1
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] ="Processor Trace (unused)" ,"Protection Keys User registers" ,"PASID state" , +"Control-flow User registers" , +"Control-flow Kernel registers" , "unknown xstate feature" , };
@@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ,X86_FEATURE_PKU ,X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD , +X86_FEATURE_CET ,/* XFEATURE_CET_USER */ + X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL */ };/*
@@ -321,6 +325,8 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void)print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM);print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU );print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID ); +print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER ); +print_xstate_feature (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL ); }/*
@@ -596,6 +602,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr) XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM, struct avx_512_hi16_state); XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PKRU, struct pkru_state); XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PASID, struct ia32_pasid_state); + XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_USER, struct cet_user_state); + XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL, struct cet_kernel_state);/* * Make *SURE* to add any feature numbers in below if
@@ -605,7 +613,7 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)if ((nr <XFEATURE_YMM ) || (nr >=XFEATURE_MAX ) || (nr ==XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR ) || - ((nr >=XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11 ) && (nr <=XFEATURE_LBR ))) { + ((nr >=XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13 ) && (nr <=XFEATURE_LBR ))) {WARN_ONCE (1 ,"no structure for xstate: %d\n" , nr);XSTATE_WARN_ON (1 ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v21 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
Quoted 16 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +8
-0@@ -933,4 +933,23 @@#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117 +/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0/* user mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2/* kernel mode cet setting */ +#define CET_SHSTK_EN BIT_ULL(0) +#define CET_WRSS_EN BIT_ULL(1) +#define CET_ENDBR_EN BIT_ULL(2) +#define CET_LEG_IW_EN BIT_ULL(3) +#define CET_NO_TRACK_EN BIT_ULL(4)
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h line 953
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +10
-0+#define CET_SUPPRESS_DISABLE BIT_ULL(5) +#define CET_RESERVED (BIT_ULL(6) | BIT_ULL(7) | BIT_ULL(8) | BIT_ULL(9)) +#define CET_SUPPRESS BIT_ULL(10) +#define CET_WAIT_ENDBR BIT_ULL(11) + +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4/* kernel shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP 0x6a5/* ring-1 shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP 0x6a6/* ring-2 shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7/* user shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8/* exception shadow stack table */
When you look at the formatting in that file and the MSR numbers in it, what stops you from formatting your addition the same way?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v21 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
Quoted 22 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 21 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +13
-0@@ -933,4 +933,23 @@#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117 +/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */ +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0/* user mode cet setting */ +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2/* kernel mode cet setting */ +#define CET_SHSTK_EN BIT_ULL(0) +#define CET_WRSS_EN BIT_ULL(1) +#define CET_ENDBR_EN BIT_ULL(2) +#define CET_LEG_IW_EN BIT_ULL(3) +#define CET_NO_TRACK_EN BIT_ULL(4) +#define CET_SUPPRESS_DISABLE BIT_ULL(5) +#define CET_RESERVED (BIT_ULL(6) | BIT_ULL(7) | BIT_ULL(8) | BIT_ULL(9)) +#define CET_SUPPRESS BIT_ULL(10) +#define CET_WAIT_ENDBR BIT_ULL(11) +
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h line 953
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +5
-0+#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4/* kernel shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP 0x6a5/* ring-1 shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP 0x6a6/* ring-2 shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7/* user shadow stack pointer */ +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8/* exception shadow stack table */ When you look at the formatting in that file and the MSR numbers in it, what stops you from formatting your addition the same way?
Ah, got it. I will add some leading zeros. Thanks!
--
Yu-cheng
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v21 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
Quoted 1 line · Yu-cheng
Ah, got it. I will add some leading zeros. Thanks!
And vertical alignment.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquettePATCH v21 6/26 x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
In reply to Yu-cheng YuA control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack; or an indirect JMP instruction, without the NOTRACK prefix, arrives at a non-ENDBR opcode.
The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 ++ arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +- 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +4 -0
@@ -574,6 +574,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_SS, exc_stack_segment);DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_GP , exc_general_protection);DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_AC , exc_alignment_check); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_CP , exc_control_protection); +#endif +/* Raw exception entries which need extra work */ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW (X86_TRAP_UD , exc_invalid_op);DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW (X86_TRAP_BP , exc_int3);
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c +4 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32 ) SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, entry_INT80_32),#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET + INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, asm_exc_control_protection), +#endif };/*
arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c +1 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)*/ BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGILL !=11 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGFPE !=15 ); -BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGSEGV !=9 ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGSEGV !=10 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGBUS !=5 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGTRAP !=5 );BUILD_BUG_ON (NSIGCHLD !=6 );
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +63 -0
75 lines not on this page · raw message
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +2 -1
@@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {#define SEGV_ADIPERR 7/* Precise MCD exception */ #define SEGV_MTEAERR 8/* Asynchronous ARM MTE error */ #define SEGV_MTESERR 9/* Synchronous ARM MTE exception */ -#define NSIGSEGV 9 +#define SEGV_CPERR 10/* Control protection fault */ +#define NSIGSEGV 10/* * SIGBUS si_codes
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v21 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 629
Quoted 9 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +9
-0+/* +* When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal to the responsible +* application. Currently, control protection is only enabled for user mode. +* This exception should not come from kernel mode. +*/ +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (exc_control_protection) +{ + static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL, + DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
Pls move that out of the function - those "static" qualifiers get missed easily when inside a function.
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +16
-0+struct task_struct *tsk; + +if (!user_mode (regs)) { +pr_emerg ("PANIC: unexpected kernel control protection fault\n" ); +die ("kernel control protection fault" , regs, error_code); +panic ("Machine halted." ); + } + +cond_local_irq_enable (regs); + +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_CET )) +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Control protection fault with CET support disabled\n" ); + + tsk = current; + tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; + tsk->thread.trap_nr =X86_TRAP_CP ;
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 655
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +10
-0+ +/* +* Ratelimit to prevent log spamming. +*/ +if (show_unhandled_signals &&unhandled_signal (tsk,SIGSEGV ) && +__ratelimit (&rs)) { +unsigned long ssp; +int err; + + err =array_index_nospec (error_code,ARRAY_SIZE (control_protection_err));
"err" as an automatic variable is confusing - we use those to denote whether the function returned an error or not. Call yours "cpf_type" or so.
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 667
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +12
-0+ +rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP , ssp); +pr_emerg ("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)" , + tsk->comm,task_pid_nr (tsk), + regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code, + control_protection_err[err]); +print_vma_addr (KERN_CONT " in " , regs->ip); +pr_cont ("\n" ); + } + +force_sig_fault (SIGSEGV ,SEGV_CPERR , + (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr (regs));
Why is this calling an uprobes function?
Also, do not break that line even if it is longer than 80.
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +4
-0+ cond_local_irq_disable(regs); +} +#endif +static bool do_int3 (struct pt_regs *regs) {int res;include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0
-0
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h typedef struct siginfo { · line 235
Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +2
-1@@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {#define SEGV_ADIPERR 7/* Precise MCD exception */ #define SEGV_MTEAERR 8/* Asynchronous ARM MTE error */ #define SEGV_MTESERR 9/* Synchronous ARM MTE exception */ -#define NSIGSEGV 9 +#define SEGV_CPERR 10/* Control protection fault */ +#define NSIGSEGV 10
I still don't see the patch adding this to the manpage of sigaction(2).
There's a git repo there: https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
and I'm pretty sure Michael takes patches.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v21 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 9 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +9
-0+/* +* When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal to the responsible +* application. Currently, control protection is only enabled for user mode. +* This exception should not come from kernel mode. +*/ +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (exc_control_protection) +{ + static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL, + DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
[...]
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +6
-0+ +rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP , ssp); +pr_emerg ("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)" , + tsk->comm,task_pid_nr (tsk), + regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code, + control_protection_err[err]);
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 667
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +6
-0+print_vma_addr (KERN_CONT " in " , regs->ip); +pr_cont ("\n" ); + } + +force_sig_fault (SIGSEGV ,SEGV_CPERR , + (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr (regs));Why is this calling an uprobes function?
I will change it to error_get_trap_addr().
Quoted 23 lines
Also, do not break that line even if it is longer than 80.
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +4
-0+ cond_local_irq_disable(regs); +} +#endif +static bool do_int3 (struct pt_regs *regs) {int res;include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +0
-0include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h typedef struct siginfo { · line 235
Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +2
-1@@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {#define SEGV_ADIPERR 7/* Precise MCD exception */ #define SEGV_MTEAERR 8/* Asynchronous ARM MTE error */ #define SEGV_MTESERR 9/* Synchronous ARM MTE exception */ -#define NSIGSEGV 9 +#define SEGV_CPERR 10/* Control protection fault */ +#define NSIGSEGV 10I still don't see the patch adding this to the manpage of sigaction(2).
Quoted 4 lines
There's a git repo there: https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/
and I'm pretty sure Michael takes patches.
I will send a patch.
--
Yu-cheng
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v21 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Quoted 7 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 667
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +2
-0+force_sig_fault (SIGSEGV ,SEGV_CPERR , + (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr (regs));Why is this calling an uprobes function?
I will change it to
error_get_trap_addr().
"/*
* Posix requires to provide the address of the faulting instruction for
* SIGILL (#UD) and SIGFPE (#DE) in the si_addr member of siginfo_t. ..."
Is yours SIGILL or SIGFPE?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v21 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 6 lines · Yu-cheng
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection) · line 667
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +2
-0+force_sig_fault (SIGSEGV ,SEGV_CPERR , + (void __user *)uprobe_get_trap_addr (regs));Why is this calling an uprobes function?
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
I will change it to
error_get_trap_addr()."/*
* Posix requires to provide the address of the faulting instruction for
* SIGILL (#UD) and SIGFPE (#DE) in thesi_addrmember ofsiginfo_t. ..."Is yours SIGILL or SIGFPE?
No. Maybe I am doing too much. The GP fault sets si_addr to zero, for example. So maybe do the same here?
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v21 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
No. Maybe I am doing too much. The GP fault sets
si_addrto zero, for example. So maybe do the same here?
No, you're looking at this from the wrong angle. This is going to be user-visible and the moment it gets upstream, it is cast in stone.
So the whole use case of what luserspace needs to do or is going to do or wants to do on a SEGV_CPERR, needs to be described, agreed upon by people etc before it goes out. And thus clarified whether the address gets copied out or not.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteAndy Lutomirski
maintainerRe: [PATCH v21 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
No. Maybe I am doing too much. The GP fault sets
si_addrto zero, for example. So maybe do the same here?
Quoted 7 lines
No, you're looking at this from the wrong angle. This is going to be user-visible and the moment it gets upstream, it is cast in stone.
So the whole use case of what luserspace needs to do or is going to do or wants to do on a
SEGV_CPERR, needs to be described, agreed upon by people etc before it goes out. And thus clarified whether the address gets copied out or not.
I vote 0. The address is in ucontext->gregs[REG_RIP] [0] regardless. Why do we need to stick a copy somewhere else?
[0] or however it's spelled. i can never remember.
Quoted 8 lines
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v21 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Quoted 14 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
No. Maybe I am doing too much. The GP fault sets
si_addrto zero, for example. So maybe do the same here?Quoted 7 lines
No, you're looking at this from the wrong angle. This is going to be user-visible and the moment it gets upstream, it is cast in stone.
So the whole use case of what luserspace needs to do or is going to do or wants to do on a
SEGV_CPERR, needs to be described, agreed upon by people etc before it goes out. And thus clarified whether the address gets copied out or not.
Quoted 4 lines
I vote 0. The address is in ucontext->gregs[REG_RIP] [0] regardless. Why do we need to stick a copy somewhere else?
[0] or however it's spelled. i can never remember.
Fine with me. Let's have this documented in the manpage and then we can move forward with this.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v21 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
Quoted 18 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 17 lines · Andy Lutomirski
Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
No. Maybe I am doing too much. The GP fault sets
si_addrto zero, for example. So maybe do the same here?Quoted 7 lines
No, you're looking at this from the wrong angle. This is going to be user-visible and the moment it gets upstream, it is cast in stone.
So the whole use case of what luserspace needs to do or is going to do or wants to do on a
SEGV_CPERR, needs to be described, agreed upon by people etc before it goes out. And thus clarified whether the address gets copied out or not.I vote 0. The address is in ucontext->gregs[REG_RIP] [0] regardless. Why do we need to stick a copy somewhere else?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
[0] or however it's spelled. i can never remember.
Fine with me. Let's have this documented in the manpage and then we can move forward with this.
Thx.
The man page at https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/sigaction.2.html says,
SIGILL, SIGFPE, SIGSEGV, SIGBUS, and SIGTRAP fill in si_addr with the address of the fault.
But it is not entirely true.
I will send a patch to update it, and another patch for the si_code.
--
Yu-cheng
PATCH v21 7/26 x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThe x86 family of processors do not directly create read-only and Dirty PTEs. These PTEs are created by software. One such case is that kernel read-only pages are historically setup as Dirty.
New processors that support Shadow Stack regard read-only and Dirty PTEs as shadow stack pages. This results in ambiguity between shadow stack and kernel read-only pages. To resolve this, removed Dirty from kernel read- only pages.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +3 -3
@@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ enum page_cache_mode {#define _KERNPG_TABLE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0| _ENC)#define _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0)#define _PAGE_TABLE (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0| _ENC) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO (__PP| 0| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX (__PP| 0| 0|___A| 0|___D| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO (__PP| 0| 0|___A|__NX| 0| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX (__PP| 0| 0|___A| 0| 0| 0|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G| __NC) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PP| 0|_USR|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PP| 0|_USR|___A|__NX| 0| 0|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D|_PSE|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC (__PP|__RW| 0|___A| 0|___D|_PSE|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_WP (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G| __WP)
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +1 -1
@@ -1932,7 +1932,7 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)int set_memory_ro (unsigned long addr,int numpages) { -return change_page_attr_clear (&addr, numpages,__pgprot (_PAGE_RW),0 ); +return change_page_attr_clear (&addr, numpages,__pgprot (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY),0 ); }int set_memory_rw (unsigned long addr,int numpages)
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 8/26 x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThere is essentially no room left in the x86 hardware PTEs on some OSes (not Linux). That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0, Dirty=1.
The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by hardware and cannot normally be set by hardware on a Write=0 PTE. Software must normally be involved to create one of these PTEs, so software can simply opt to not create them.
In places where Linux normally creates Write=0, Dirty=1, it can use the software-defined _PAGE_COW in place of the hardware _PAGE_DIRTY. In other words, whenever Linux needs to create Write=0, Dirty=1, it instead creates Write=0, Cow=1, except for shadow stack, which is Write=0, Dirty=1. This clearly separates shadow stack from other data, and results in the following:
(a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page: (Write=0, Cow=1)
(b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed: (Write=0, Cow=1)
The user page is in a R/O VMA, and get_user_pages() needs a writable copy. The page fault handler creates a copy of the page and sets the new copy's PTE as Write=0 and Cow=1.
(c) A shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Dirty=1)
(d) A shared shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Cow=1)
When a shadow stack page is being shared among processes (this happens at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so the next shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again. This is the COW equivalent for shadow stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than copy-on-write.
(e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write, set Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE. That's possible today, but will not happen on processors that support shadow stack.
Define _PAGE_COW and update pte_*() helpers and apply the same changes to pmd and pud.
After this, there are six free bits left in the 64-bit PTE, and no more free bits in the 32-bit PTE (except for PAE) and Shadow Stack is not implemented for the 32-bit kernel.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 42 +++++- 2 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +165 -20
@@ -121,11 +121,21 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;* The following only work if pte_present() is true. * Undefined behaviour if not.. */ -static inline int pte_dirty (pte_t pte) +static inline bool pte_dirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +/* +* A dirty PTE has Dirty=1 or Cow=1. +*/ +return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; } +static inline bool pte_shstk (pte_t pte) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return false; + +return (pte_flags (pte) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)) == _PAGE_DIRTY; +}static inline u32 read_pkru (void ) {
@@ -160,9 +170,20 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; } -static inline int pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) +static inline bool pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +/* +* A dirty PMD has Dirty=1 or Cow=1. +*/ +return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; +} + +static inline bool pmd_shstk (pmd_t pmd) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return false; + +return (pmd_flags (pmd) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)) == _PAGE_DIRTY; }static inline int pmd_young (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -170,9 +191,12 @@ static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; } -static inline int pud_dirty (pud_t pud) +static inline bool pud_dirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +/* +* A dirty PUD has Dirty=1 or Cow=1. +*/ +return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; }static inline int pud_young (pud_t pud)
@@ -182,7 +206,7 @@ static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)static inline int pte_write (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW; +return (pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW) ||pte_shstk (pte); }static inline int pte_huge (pte_t pte)
@@ -314,6 +338,24 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)return native_make_pte (v & ~clear); } +static inline pte_t pte_make_cow (pte_t pte) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return pte; + + pte =pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_COW); +} + +static inline pte_t pte_clear_cow (pte_t pte) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return pte; + + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_COW); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP static inline int pte_uffd_wp (pte_t pte) {
@@ -333,7 +375,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) { -return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pte_t pte_mkold (pte_t pte)
@@ -343,7 +385,16 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) { -return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); + pte =pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); + +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PTE (RW=0, Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (pte_dirty (pte)) + pte =pte_make_cow (pte); +return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkexec (pte_t pte)
@@ -353,7 +404,18 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pteval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PTEs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !pte_write (pte)) + dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pte_set_flags (pte, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +} + +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_shstk (pte_t pte) +{ +return pte_clear_cow (pte); }static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung (pte_t pte)
@@ -363,7 +425,12 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) { -return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); + +if (pte_dirty (pte)) + pte =pte_clear_cow (pte); + +return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkhuge (pte_t pte)
@@ -410,6 +477,24 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t clear)return native_make_pmd (v & ~clear); } +static inline pmd_t pmd_make_cow (pmd_t pmd) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return pmd; + + pmd =pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_COW); +} + +static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_cow (pmd_t pmd) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return pmd; + + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_COW); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP static inline int pmd_uffd_wp (pmd_t pmd) {
@@ -434,17 +519,36 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); + pmd =pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PMD (RW=0, Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (pmd_dirty (pmd)) + pmd =pmd_make_cow (pmd); +return pmd; }static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PMDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW)) + dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +} + +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_shstk (pmd_t pmd) +{ +return pmd_clear_cow (pmd); }static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdevmap (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -464,7 +568,11 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); + +if (pmd_dirty (pmd)) + pmd =pmd_clear_cow (pmd); +return pmd; }static inline pud_t pud_set_flags (pud_t pud,pudval_t set)
@@ -481,6 +589,24 @@ static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)return native_make_pud (v & ~clear); } +static inline pud_t pud_make_cow (pud_t pud) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return pud; + + pud =pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_COW); +} + +static inline pud_t pud_clear_cow (pud_t pud) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) +return pud; + + pud =pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_COW); +} +static inline pud_t pud_mkold (pud_t pud) {return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
@@ -488,17 +614,32 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkclean (pud_t pud) { -return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect (pud_t pud) { -return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); + pud =pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); + +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PUD (RW=0, Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (pud_dirty (pud)) + pud =pud_make_cow (pud); +return pud; }static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pudval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PUDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_RW)) + dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pud_set_flags (pud, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap (pud_t pud)
@@ -518,7 +659,11 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkyoung(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkwrite (pud_t pud) { -return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); + pud =pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); + +if (pud_dirty (pud)) + pud =pud_clear_cow (pud); +return pud; }#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
@@ -1131,7 +1276,7 @@ extern int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,#define pmd_write pmd_writestatic inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW; +return (pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW) ||pmd_shstk (pmd); }#define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +41 -1
60 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v21 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud) · line 185
Quoted 5 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +0
-1@@ -182,7 +206,7 @@ static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)static inline int pte_write (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW;
Put here a comment along the lines of:
/*
* Shadow stack pages are always writable - but not by normal
* instructions but only by shadow stack operations. Therefore, the
* W=0, D=1 test.
*/
to make it clear what this means.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear) · line 341
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +2
-0+return (pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW) ||pte_shstk (pte); }static inline int pte_huge (pte_t pte)@@ -314,6 +338,24 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)return native_make_pte (v & ~clear); } +static inline pte_t pte_make_cow (pte_t pte)
pte_mkcow like the rest of the "pte_mkX" functions.
And below too, for the other newly added pXd_make_* helpers.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd) · line 543
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +4
-1static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PMDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW))
!(pmd_write(pmd))
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +4
-0+ dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +}
...
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud) · line 639
Quoted 7 lines
static inline
pud_tpud_mkdirty(pud_t pud)
{arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +4
-1-return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pudval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PUDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_RW))
!(pud_write(pud))
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v21 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Quoted 49 lines · Borislav Petkov
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud) · line 185
Quoted 5 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +0
-1@@ -182,7 +206,7 @@ static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)static inline int pte_write (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW;Put here a comment along the lines of:
/*
* Shadow stack pages are always writable - but not by normal
* instructions but only by shadow stack operations. Therefore, the
* W=0, D=1 test.
*/to make it clear what this means.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear) · line 341
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +2
-0+return (pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW) ||pte_shstk (pte); }static inline int pte_huge (pte_t pte)@@ -314,6 +338,24 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)return native_make_pte (v & ~clear); } +static inline pte_t pte_make_cow (pte_t pte)
pte_mkcowlike the rest of the "pte_mkX" functions.And below too, for the other newly added pXd_make_* helpers.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd) · line 543
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +4
-1static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PMDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW))!(pmd_write(pmd))Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +4
-0+ dirty = _PAGE_COW; + +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +}...
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud) · line 639
Quoted 7 lines
static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty(pud_t pud) {arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +4
-1-return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pudval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PUDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_RW))!(pud_write(pud))
I will update. Thanks!
--
Yu-cheng
Re: [PATCH v21 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 1 line · Borislav Petkov
On Wed, Feb 17, 2021 at 02:27:12PM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
[...]
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd) · line 543
Quoted 7 lines
static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty(pmd_t pmd) {arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +4
-1-return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PMDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW))!(pmd_write(pmd))
There is a problem of doing that: pmd_write() is defined after this function. Maybe we can declare it first, or leave this as-is?
--
Yu-cheng
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v21 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
Quoted 2 lines · Yu-cheng
There is a problem of doing that:
pmd_write()is defined after this function. Maybe we can declare it first, or leave this as-is?
Or a third option: you lift those two functions in a prepatch and then in this patch use them directly.
Combined diff ontop:
---
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +14 -14
@@ -209,6 +209,18 @@ static inline int pte_write(pte_t pte)return (pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW) ||pte_shstk (pte); } +#define pmd_write pmd_write +static inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd) +{ +return (pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW) ||pmd_shstk (pmd); +} + +#define pud_write pud_write +static inline int pud_write (pud_t pud) +{ +return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_RW; +} +static inline int pte_huge (pte_t pte) {return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_PSE;
@@ -540,7 +552,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty(pmd_t pmd)pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY;/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PMDs */ -if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW)) +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !pmd_write (pmd)) dirty = _PAGE_COW;return pmd_set_flags (pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
@@ -636,7 +648,7 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty(pud_t pud)pudval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY;/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PUDs */ -if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !(pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_RW)) +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && !pud_write (pud)) dirty = _PAGE_COW;return pud_set_flags (pud, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
@@ -1273,12 +1285,6 @@ extern int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp); -#define pmd_write pmd_write -static inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd) -{ -return (pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW) ||pmd_shstk (pmd); -} -#define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEARstatic inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pmd_t *pmdp)
@@ -1300,12 +1306,6 @@ static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,clear_bit (_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp); } -#define pud_write pud_write -static inline int pud_write (pud_t pud) -{ -return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_RW; -} -#ifndef pmdp_establish#define pmdp_establish pmdp_establish static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquettePATCH v21 9/26 drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAfter the introduction of _PAGE_COW, a modified page's PTE can have either _PAGE_DIRTY or _PAGE_COW. Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c +1 -1
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ static int split_2MB_gtt_entry(struct intel_vgpu *vgpu, }/* Clear dirty field. */ - se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY; + se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; ops->clear_pse (se); ops->clear_ips (se);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 10/26 x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThe read-only and Dirty PTE has been used to indicate copy-on-write pages. However, newer x86 processors also regard a read-only and Dirty PTE as a shadow stack page. In order to separate the two, the software-defined _PAGE_COW is created to replace _PAGE_DIRTY for the copy-on-write case, and pte_*() are updated.
Pte_modify() changes a PTE to 'newprot', but it doesn't use the pte_*(). Introduce fixup_dirty_pte(), which sets a dirty PTE, based on _PAGE_RW, to either _PAGE_DIRTY or _PAGE_COW.
Apply the same changes to pmd_modify().
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +33 -0
@@ -777,6 +777,21 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkinvalid(pmd_t pmd)static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard (u64 oldval,u64 val,u64 mask); +static inline pteval_t fixup_dirty_pte (pteval_t pteval) +{ +pte_t pte =__pte (pteval); + +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) &&pte_dirty (pte)) { + pte =pte_mkclean (pte); + +if (pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW) + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY); +else + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_COW); + } +return pte_val (pte); +} +static inline pte_t pte_modify (pte_t pte,pgprot_t newprot) {pteval_t val =pte_val (pte), oldval = val;
@@ -787,16 +802,34 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)*/ val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK; val |=check_pgprot (newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK; + val =fixup_dirty_pte (val); val =flip_protnone_guard (oldval, val,PTE_PFN_MASK );return __pte (val); } +static inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd); +static inline pmdval_t fixup_dirty_pmd (pmdval_t pmdval) +{ +pmd_t pmd =__pmd (pmdval); + +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) &&pmd_dirty (pmd)) { + pmd =pmd_mkclean (pmd); + +if (pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW) + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY); +else + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_COW); + } +return pmd_val (pmd); +} +static inline pmd_t pmd_modify (pmd_t pmd,pgprot_t newprot) {pmdval_t val =pmd_val (pmd), oldval = val; val &= _HPAGE_CHG_MASK; val |=check_pgprot (newprot) & ~_HPAGE_CHG_MASK; + val =fixup_dirty_pmd (val); val =flip_protnone_guard (oldval, val,PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK );return __pmd (val); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v21 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot) · line 805
Quoted 5 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +1
-0@@ -787,16 +802,34 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)*/ val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK; val |=check_pgprot (newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK; + val =fixup_dirty_pte (val);
Do I see it correctly that you can do here and below:
/*
* Fix up potential shadow stack page flags because the RO, Dirty PTE is
* special.
*/
if (pte_dirty()) {
pte_mkclean();
pte_mkdirty();
}?
That fixup thing looks grafted and not like a normal flow to me.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v21 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
Quoted 18 lines · Borislav Petkov
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot) · line 805
Quoted 5 lines · Yu-cheng Yu
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +1
-0@@ -787,16 +802,34 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)*/ val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK; val |=check_pgprot (newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK; + val =fixup_dirty_pte (val);Do I see it correctly that you can do here and below:
/* * Fix up potential shadow stack page flags because the RO, Dirty PTE is * special. */ if (pte_dirty()) { pte_mkclean(); pte_mkdirty(); }
Quoted 1 line
?
Yes, this looks better. Thanks!
Quoted 3 lines
That fixup thing looks grafted and not like a normal flow to me.
PATCH v21 11/26 x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
In reply to Yu-cheng YuWhen Shadow Stack is introduced, [R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY] PTE is reserved for shadow stack. Copy-on-write PTEs have [R/O + _PAGE_COW].
When a PTE goes from [R/W + _PAGE_DIRTY] to [R/O + _PAGE_COW], it could become a transient shadow stack PTE in two cases:
The first case is that some processors can start a write but end up seeing a read-only PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit, creating a transient shadow stack PTE. However, this will not occur on processors supporting Shadow Stack, and a TLB flush is not necessary.
The second case is that when _PAGE_DIRTY is replaced with _PAGE_COW non- atomically, a transient shadow stack PTE can be created as a result. Thus, prevent that with cmpxchg.
Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided many insights to the issue. Jann Horn provided the cmpxchg solution.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +36 -0
@@ -1280,6 +1280,24 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pte_t *ptep) { +/* +* If Shadow Stack is enabled, pte_wrprotect() moves _PAGE_DIRTY +* to _PAGE_COW (see comments at pte_wrprotect()). +* When a thread reads a RW=1, Dirty=0 PTE and before changing it +* to RW=0, Dirty=0, another thread could have written to the page +* and the PTE is RW=1, Dirty=1 now. Use try_cmpxchg() to detect +* PTE changes and update old_pte, then try again. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +pte_t old_pte, new_pte; + + old_pte =READ_ONCE (*ptep); +do { + new_pte =pte_wrprotect (old_pte); + }while (!try_cmpxchg (&ptep->pte, &old_pte.pte, new_pte.pte)); + +return ; + }clear_bit (_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte); }
@@ -1330,6 +1348,24 @@ static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pmd_t *pmdp) { +/* +* If Shadow Stack is enabled, pmd_wrprotect() moves _PAGE_DIRTY +* to _PAGE_COW (see comments at pmd_wrprotect()). +* When a thread reads a RW=1, Dirty=0 PMD and before changing it +* to RW=0, Dirty=0, another thread could have written to the page +* and the PMD is RW=1, Dirty=1 now. Use try_cmpxchg() to detect +* PMD changes and update old_pmd, then try again. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +pmd_t old_pmd, new_pmd; + + old_pmd =READ_ONCE (*pmdp); +do { + new_pmd =pmd_wrprotect (old_pmd); + }while (!try_cmpxchg ((pmdval_t *)pmdp, (pmdval_t *)&old_pmd,pmd_val (new_pmd))); + +return ; + }clear_bit (_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 12/26 mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
In reply to Yu-cheng YuA shadow stack PTE must be read-only and have _PAGE_DIRTY set. However, read-only and Dirty PTEs also exist for copy-on-write (COW) pages. These two cases are handled differently for page faults. Introduce VM_SHSTK to track shadow stack VMAs.
--- Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 + arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 2 ++ fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++ include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst +1 -0
@@ -549,6 +549,7 @@ encoded manner. The codes are the following: mg mergable advise flag bt arm64 BTI guarded page mt arm64 MTE allocation tags are enabled + ss shadow stack page == ======================================= Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c +2 -0
@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy)const char *arch_vma_name (struct vm_area_struct *vma) { +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) +return "[shadow stack]" ;return NULL ; }
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +3 -0
@@ -661,6 +661,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma) [ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT4)] = "",#endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET + [ilog2(VM_SHSTK)] = "ss", +#endif };size_t i;
include/linux/mm.h +8 -0
@@ -312,11 +312,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5 37/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4) +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -332,6 +334,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +# define VM_SHSTK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 +#else +# define VM_SHSTK VM_NONE +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_X86 )# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC )
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 13/26 x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
In reply to Yu-cheng YuShadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping. These accesses are performed implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer. These accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like WRUSSQ.
Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and copy-on-write.
Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack mapping.
In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow stack mapping. It is always an error otherwise. For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. Because clearing _PAGE_DIRTY (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack read fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are handled as a write access.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access +* bit 6 == 1: shadow stack access fault * bit 15 == 1: SGX MMU page-fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code {
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {X86_PF_RSVD =1 <<3 ,X86_PF_INSTR =1 <<4 ,X86_PF_PK =1 <<5 , +X86_PF_SHSTK =1 <<6 , X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15, };
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +19 -0
@@ -1131,6 +1131,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))return 1 ; +/* +* Verify a shadow stack access is within a shadow stack VMA. +* It is always an error otherwise. Normal data access to a +* shadow stack area is checked in the case followed. +*/ +if (error_code &X86_PF_SHSTK ) { +if (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK )) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; + } +if (error_code &X86_PF_WRITE ) {/* write, present and write, not present: */ if (unlikely (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )))
@@ -1296,6 +1307,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,perf_sw_event (PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS ,1 , regs, address); +/* +* Clearing _PAGE_DIRTY is used to detect shadow stack access. +* This method cannot distinguish shadow stack read vs. write. +* For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect +* copy-on-write. +*/ +if (hw_error_code &X86_PF_SHSTK ) + flags |=FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;if (hw_error_code &X86_PF_WRITE ) flags |=FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;if (hw_error_code &X86_PF_INSTR )
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 14/26 x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuWhen serving a page fault, maybe_mkwrite() makes a PTE writable if its vma has VM_WRITE.
A shadow stack vma has VM_SHSTK. Its PTEs have _PAGE_DIRTY, but not _PAGE_WRITE. In fork(), _PAGE_DIRTY is cleared to effect copy-on-write, and in page fault, _PAGE_DIRTY is restored and the shadow stack page is writable again.
Update maybe_mkwrite() by introducing arch_maybe_mkwrite(), which sets _PAGE_DIRTY for a shadow stack PTE.
Apply the same changes to maybe_pmd_mkwrite().
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++++ arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++ include/linux/pgtable.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/huge_memory.c | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -1955,12 +1955,16 @@ config X86_SGX config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK def_bool n +config ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE + def_bool n + config X86_CET prompt "Intel Control-flow protection for user-mode" def_bool n depends on AS_WRUSS depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE help Control-flow protection is a set of hardware features which place additional restrictions on indirect branches. These help
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +18 -0
@@ -610,6 +610,24 @@ int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE +pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK )) + pte =pte_mkwrite_shstk (pte); +return pte; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE +pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK )) + pmd =pmd_mkwrite_shstk (pmd); +return pmd; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ +/** * reserve_top_address - reserves a hole in the top of kernel address space * @reserve - size of hole to reserve
include/linux/mm.h +2 -0
@@ -993,6 +993,8 @@ static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma) {if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) pte =pte_mkwrite (pte); +else + pte =arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte, vma);return pte; }
include/linux/pgtable.h +24 -0
@@ -1439,6 +1439,30 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void) }#endif /* !_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED */ +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE +pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE +pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma); +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ + +#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ +static inline pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return pte; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE +static inline pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +return pmd; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ + +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ +#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ +/* * Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks *
mm/huge_memory.c +2 -0
@@ -478,6 +478,8 @@ pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma) {if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) pmd =pmd_mkwrite (pmd); +else + pmd =arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd, vma);return pmd; }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 15/26 mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
In reply to Yu-cheng YuWhen serving a page fault, maybe_mkwrite() makes a PTE writable if it is in a writable vma. A shadow stack vma is writable, but its PTEs need _PAGE_DIRTY to be set to become writable. For this reason, maybe_mkwrite() has been updated.
There are a few places that call pte_mkwrite() directly, but effect the same result as from maybe_mkwrite(). These sites need to be updated for shadow stack as well. Thus, change them to maybe_mkwrite():
- do_anonymous_page() and migrate_vma_insert_page() check VM_WRITE directly and call pte_mkwrite(), which is the same as maybe_mkwrite(). Change them to maybe_mkwrite().
- In do_numa_page(), if the numa entry 'was-writable', then pte_mkwrite() is called directly. Fix it by doing maybe_mkwrite().
- In change_pte_range(), pte_mkwrite() is called directly. Replace it with maybe_mkwrite().
A shadow stack vma is writable but has different vma
flags, and handled accordingly in maybe_mkwrite().
--- mm/memory.c | 5 ++--- mm/migrate.c | 3 +-- mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/memory.c +2 -3
@@ -3549,8 +3549,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) entry =mk_pte (page, vma->vm_page_prot); entry =pte_sw_mkyoung (entry); -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE ) - entry =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry)); + entry =maybe_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry), vma); vmf->pte =pte_offset_map_lock (vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address, &vmf->ptl);
@@ -4205,7 +4204,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) pte =pte_modify (old_pte, vma->vm_page_prot); pte =pte_mkyoung (pte);if (was_writable) - pte =pte_mkwrite (pte); + pte =maybe_mkwrite (pte, vma);ptep_modify_prot_commit (vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, old_pte, pte);update_mmu_cache (vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
mm/migrate.c +1 -2
@@ -2970,8 +2970,7 @@ static void migrate_vma_insert_page(struct migrate_vma *migrate, } }else { entry =mk_pte (page, vma->vm_page_prot); -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE ) - entry =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry)); + entry =maybe_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry), vma); } ptep =pte_offset_map_lock (mm, pmdp, addr, &ptl);
mm/mprotect.c +1 -1
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,if (dirty_accountable &&pte_dirty (ptent) && (pte_soft_dirty (ptent) || !(vma->vm_flags &VM_SOFTDIRTY ))) { - ptent =pte_mkwrite (ptent); + ptent =maybe_mkwrite (ptent, vma); }ptep_modify_prot_commit (vma, addr, pte, oldpte, ptent); pages++;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 16/26 mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
In reply to Yu-cheng YuINCSSP(Q/D) increments shadow stack pointer and 'pops and discards' the first and the last elements in the range, effectively touches those memory areas.
The maximum moving distance by INCSSPQ is 255 * 8 = 2040 bytes and 255 * 4 = 1020 bytes by INCSSPD. Both ranges are far from PAGE_SIZE. Thus, putting a gap page on both ends of a shadow stack prevents INCSSP, CALL, and RET from going beyond.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 10 ++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h +10 -0
@@ -115,4 +115,14 @@#define KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE (512 * 1024 * 1024)#endif +/* +* Shadow stack pointer is moved by CALL, RET, and INCSSP(Q/D). INCSSPQ +* moves shadow stack pointer up to 255 * 8 = ~2 KB (~1KB for INCSSPD) and +* touches the first and the last element in the range, which triggers a +* page fault if the range is not in a shadow stack. Because of this, +* creating 4-KB guard pages around a shadow stack prevents these +* instructions from going beyond. +*/ +#define ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP PAGE_SIZE +#endif /* _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_DEFS_H */
include/linux/mm.h +20 -4
@@ -2640,6 +2640,10 @@ extern vm_fault_t filemap_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf);int __must_check write_one_page (struct page *page);void task_dirty_inc (struct task_struct *tsk); +#ifndef ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP +#define ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP 0 +#endif +extern unsigned long stack_guard_gap;/* Generic expand stack which grows the stack according to GROWS{UP,DOWN} */ extern int expand_stack (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long address);
@@ -2672,9 +2676,15 @@ static inline struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * mstatic inline unsigned long vm_start_gap (struct vm_area_struct *vma) {unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start; +unsigned long gap =0 ; -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSDOWN ) { - vm_start -= stack_guard_gap; +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSDOWN ) + gap = stack_guard_gap; +else if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) + gap =ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP ; + +if (gap !=0 ) { + vm_start -= gap;if (vm_start > vma->vm_start) vm_start =0 ; }
@@ -2684,9 +2694,15 @@ static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap (struct vm_area_struct *vma) {unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end; +unsigned long gap =0 ; + +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSUP ) + gap = stack_guard_gap; +else if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) + gap =ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP ; -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSUP ) { - vm_end += stack_guard_gap; +if (gap !=0 ) { + vm_end += gap;if (vm_end < vma->vm_end) vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 17/26 mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAccount shadow stack pages to stack memory.
--- arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 7 +++++++ include/linux/pgtable.h | 11 +++++++++++ mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +7 -0
@@ -895,3 +895,10 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK +bool arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ +return (vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ); +} +#endif
include/linux/pgtable.h +11 -0
@@ -1463,6 +1463,17 @@ static inline pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */ #endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK +bool arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags_t vm_flags); +#else +static inline bool arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags_t vm_flags) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK */ +#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ +/* * Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks *
mm/mmap.c +5 -0
@@ -1720,6 +1720,9 @@ static inline int accountable_mapping(struct file *file, vm_flags_t vm_flags)if (file &&is_file_hugepages (file))return 0 ; +if (arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vm_flags)) +return 1 ; +return (vm_flags & (VM_NORESERVE |VM_SHARED |VM_WRITE )) ==VM_WRITE ; }
@@ -3389,6 +3392,8 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, vm_flags_t flags, long npages) mm->stack_vm += npages; else if (is_data_mapping(flags)) mm->data_vm += npages; + else if (arch_shadow_stack_mapping(flags)) + mm->stack_vm += npages; }static vm_fault_t special_mapping_fault (struct vm_fault *vmf);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 18/26 mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuCan_follow_write_pte() ensures a read-only page is COWed by checking the FOLL_COW flag, and uses pte_dirty() to validate the flag is still valid.
Like a writable data page, a shadow stack page is writable, and becomes read-only during copy-on-write, but it is always dirty. Thus, in the can_follow_write_pte() check, it belongs to the writable page case and should be excluded from the read-only page pte_dirty() check. Apply the same changes to can_follow_write_pmd().
--- mm/gup.c | 8 +++++--- mm/huge_memory.c | 8 +++++--- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/gup.c +5 -3
@@ -357,10 +357,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty. */ -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte (pte_t pte,unsigned int flags) +static inline bool can_follow_write_pte (pte_t pte,unsigned int flags, +struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return pte_write (pte) || - ((flags &FOLL_FORCE ) && (flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pte_dirty (pte)); + ((flags &FOLL_FORCE ) && (flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pte_dirty (pte) && + !arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vma->vm_flags)); } static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -403,7 +405,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, }if ((flags &FOLL_NUMA ) &&pte_protnone (pte)) goto no_page; -if ((flags &FOLL_WRITE ) && !can_follow_write_pte (pte, flags)) { +if ((flags &FOLL_WRITE ) && !can_follow_write_pte (pte, flags, vma)) {pte_unmap_unlock (ptep, ptl);return NULL ; }
mm/huge_memory.c +5 -3
@@ -1337,10 +1337,12 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty. */ -static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd (pmd_t pmd,unsigned int flags) +static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd (pmd_t pmd,unsigned int flags, +struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return pmd_write (pmd) || - ((flags &FOLL_FORCE ) && (flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pmd_dirty (pmd)); + ((flags &FOLL_FORCE ) && (flags &FOLL_COW ) &&pmd_dirty (pmd) && + !arch_shadow_stack_mapping (vma->vm_flags)); } struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1353,7 +1355,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,assert_spin_locked (pmd_lockptr (mm, pmd)); -if (flags &FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd (*pmd, flags)) +if (flags &FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd (*pmd, flags, vma)) goto out;/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 19/26 mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThere was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap(), and vm_flags was removed from the function's input by:
commit 45e55300f114 ("mm: remove unnecessary wrapper function do_mmap_pgoff()").
There is a new user now. Shadow stack allocation passes VM_SHSTK to do_mmap(). Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap(), but without the old wrapper do_mmap_pgoff(). Instead, make all callers of the wrapper pass a zero vm_flags to do_mmap().
--- fs/aio.c | 2 +- include/linux/mm.h | 3 ++- ipc/shm.c | 2 +- mm/mmap.c | 10 +++++----- mm/nommu.c | 4 ++-- mm/util.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/aio.c +1 -1
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int aio_setup_ring(struct kioctx *ctx, unsigned int nr_events) ctx->mmap_base =do_mmap (ctx->aio_ring_file,0 , ctx->mmap_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE , -MAP_SHARED ,0 , &unused,NULL ); +MAP_SHARED ,0 ,0 , &unused,NULL );mmap_write_unlock (mm);if (IS_ERR ((void *)ctx->mmap_base)) { ctx->mmap_size =0 ;
include/linux/mm.h +2 -1
@@ -2585,7 +2585,8 @@ extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, struct list_head *uf);extern unsigned long do_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long addr,unsigned long len,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate,struct list_head *uf); +vm_flags_t vm_flags,unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate, +struct list_head *uf);extern int __do_munmap (struct mm_struct *,unsigned long ,size_t ,struct list_head *uf,bool downgrade); extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t,
ipc/shm.c +1 -1
@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, goto invalid; } - addr =do_mmap (file, addr, size, prot, flags,0 , &populate,NULL ); + addr =do_mmap (file, addr, size, prot, flags,0 ,0 , &populate,NULL ); *raddr = addr; err =0 ;if (IS_ERR_VALUE (addr))
mm/mmap.c +5 -5
@@ -1403,11 +1403,11 @@ static inline bool file_mmap_ok(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,*/ unsigned long do_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long addr,unsigned long len,unsigned long prot, -unsigned long flags,unsigned long pgoff, -unsigned long *populate,struct list_head *uf) +unsigned long flags,vm_flags_t vm_flags, +unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate, +struct list_head *uf) {struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; -vm_flags_t vm_flags;int pkey =0 ; *populate =0 ;
@@ -1469,7 +1469,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,* to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open * of the memory object, so we don't do any here. */ - vm_flags =calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) |calc_vm_flag_bits (flags) | + vm_flags |=calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) |calc_vm_flag_bits (flags) | mm->def_flags |VM_MAYREAD |VM_MAYWRITE |VM_MAYEXEC ;if (flags &MAP_LOCKED )
@@ -3049,7 +3049,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, file =get_file (vma->vm_file); ret =do_mmap (vma->vm_file, start, size, - prot, flags, pgoff, &populate,NULL ); + prot, flags,0 , pgoff, &populate,NULL );fput (file); out:mmap_write_unlock (mm);
mm/nommu.c +2 -2
@@ -1071,6 +1071,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, + vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf)
@@ -1078,7 +1079,6 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma;struct vm_region *region;struct rb_node *rb; -vm_flags_t vm_flags;unsigned long capabilities, result;int ret;
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,/* we've determined that we can make the mapping, now translate what we * now know into VMA flags */ - vm_flags =determine_vm_flags (file, prot, flags, capabilities); + vm_flags |=determine_vm_flags (file, prot, flags, capabilities);/* we're going to need to record the mapping */ region =kmem_cache_zalloc (vm_region_jar,GFP_KERNEL );
mm/util.c +1 -1
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,if (!ret) {if (mmap_write_lock_killable (mm))return -EINTR ; - ret =do_mmap (file, addr, len, prot, flag, pgoff, &populate, + ret =do_mmap (file, addr, len, prot, flag,0 , pgoff, &populate, &uf);mmap_write_unlock (mm);userfaultfd_unmap_complete (mm, &uf);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 20/26 x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
In reply to Yu-cheng YuIntroduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines. A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK flag and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 28 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 147 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 182 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/types.h> + +struct task_struct ; +/* +* Per-thread CET status +*/ +struct cet_status { +unsigned long shstk_base; +unsigned long shstk_size; +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +int cet_setup_shstk (void ); +void cet_disable_shstk (void ); +void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p); +#else +static inline void cet_disable_shstk (void ) {} +static inline void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {} +#endif + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +5 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;#include <asm/unwind_hints.h> #include <asm/vmxfeatures.h> #include <asm/vdso/processor.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -536,6 +537,10 @@ struct thread_struct { unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +struct cet_status cet; +#endif +/* Floating point and extended processor state */ struct fpu fpu;/*
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev-es.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet.o + ### # 64 bit specific files ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c new file +147 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 21/26 x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuTo deliver a signal, create a shadow stack restore token and put the token and the signal restorer address on the shadow stack. For sigreturn, verify the token and restore from it the shadow stack pointer.
A shadow stack restore token marks a restore point of the shadow stack, and the address in a token must point directly above the token, which is within the same shadow stack. This is distinctively different from other pointers on the shadow stack; those pointers point to executable code area.
In sigreturn, restoring from a token ensures the target address is the location pointed by the token.
Introduce WRUSS, which is a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack. It is used to construct the user signal stack as described above.
Currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context. Introduce a signal context extension 'struct sc_ext', which is used to save shadow stack restore token address and WAIT_ENDBR status. WAIT_ENDBR will be introduced later in the Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) series, but add that into sc_ext now to keep the struct stable in case the IBT series is applied later.
--- arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 17 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 10 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 ++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 152 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 10 ++ 8 files changed, 338 insertions(+)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c +17 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@#include <asm/sigframe.h> #include <asm/sighandling.h> #include <asm/smap.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> static inline void reload_segments (struct sigcontext_32 *sc) {
@@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs, void __user **fpstate) {unsigned long sp, fx_aligned, math_size; +void __user *restorer =NULL ;/* Default to using normal stack */ sp = regs->sp;
@@ -218,8 +220,23 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs, ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer) sp = (unsigned long ) ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer; +if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags &SA_RESTORER ) { + restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer; + }else if (current->mm->context.vdso) { +if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags &SA_SIGINFO ) + restorer = current->mm->context.vdso + + vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_rt_sigreturn; +else + restorer = current->mm->context.vdso + + vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_sigreturn; + } + sp =fpu__alloc_mathframe (sp,1 , &fx_aligned, &math_size); *fpstate = (struct _fpstate_32 __user *) sp; + +if (save_cet_to_sigframe (1 , *fpstate, (unsigned long )restorer)) +return (void __user *)-1L ; +if (copy_fpstate_to_sigframe (*fpstate, (void __user *)fx_aligned, math_size) <0 )return (void __user *)-1L ;
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +8 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@#include <linux/types.h> struct task_struct ; +struct sc_ext ; +/* * Per-thread CET status */
@@ -18,9 +20,15 @@ struct cet_status {int cet_setup_shstk (void );void cet_disable_shstk (void );void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p); +int cet_verify_rstor_token (bool ia32,unsigned long ssp,unsigned long *new_ssp); +void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc); +int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor,struct sc_ext *sc);#else static inline void cet_disable_shstk (void ) {}static inline void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {} +static inline void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc) {return ; } +static inline int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor, +struct sc_ext *sc) {return -EINVAL ; }#endif #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h +10 -0
@@ -443,6 +443,16 @@ static inline void copy_kernel_to_fpregs(union fpregs_state *fpstate)__copy_kernel_to_fpregs (fpstate,-1 ); } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +extern int save_cet_to_sigframe (int ia32,void __user *fp, +unsigned long restorer); +#else +static inline int save_cet_to_sigframe (int ia32,void __user *fp, +unsigned long restorer) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#endif extern int copy_fpstate_to_sigframe (void __user *buf,void __user *fp,int size);/*
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h +32 -0
@@ -234,6 +234,38 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p) : [pax] "a" (p)); } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +#if defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION ) || defined(CONFIG_X86_X32 ) +static inline int write_user_shstk_32 (unsigned long addr,unsigned int val) +{ + asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussd %1, (%0)\n" + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail]) + :: "r" (addr), "r" (val) + :: fail); +return 0 ; +fail: +return -EPERM ; +} +#else +static inline int write_user_shstk_32 (unsigned long addr,unsigned int val) +{ +WARN_ONCE (1 ,"%s used but not supported.\n" , __func__); +return -EFAULT ; +} +#endif + +static inline int write_user_shstk_64 (unsigned long addr,unsigned long val) +{ + asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %1, (%0)\n" + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail]) + :: "r" (addr), "r" (val) + :: fail); +return 0 ; +fail: +return -EPERM ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_CET */ +#define nop () asm volatile ("nop")static inline void serialize (void )
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +9 -0
@@ -196,6 +196,15 @@ struct _xstate {/* New processor state extensions go here: */ }; +/* +* Located at the end of sigcontext->fpstate, aligned to 8. +*/ +struct sc_ext { +unsigned long total_size; +unsigned long ssp; +unsigned long wait_endbr; +}; +/* * The 32-bit signal frame: */
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +152 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +100 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +10 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #include <asm/sigframe.h> #include <asm/signal.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /*
@@ -239,6 +240,9 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,unsigned long buf_fx =0 ;int onsigstack =on_sig_stack (sp);int ret; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +void __user *restorer =NULL ; +#endif /* redzone */ if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))
@@ -270,6 +274,12 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,if (onsigstack && !likely (on_sig_stack (sp)))return (void __user *)-1L ; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +if (ka->sa.sa_flags &SA_RESTORER ) + restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer; + ret =save_cet_to_sigframe (0 , *fpstate, (unsigned long )restorer); +#endif +/* save i387 and extended state */ ret =copy_fpstate_to_sigframe (*fpstate, (void __user *)buf_fx, math_size);if (ret <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 22/26 ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
In reply to Yu-cheng YuAn ELF file's .note.gnu.property indicates arch features supported by the file. These features are extracted by arch_parse_elf_property() and stored in 'arch_elf_state'.
Introduce x86 feature definitions and arch_setup_elf_property(), which enables such features. The first use-case of this function is Shadow Stack.
ARM64 is the other arch that has ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY and arch_parse_elf_ property(). Add arch_setup_elf_property() for it.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 5 +++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/elf.h | 6 ++++++ include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 9 +++++++++ 7 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h +5 -0
@@ -281,6 +281,11 @@ static inline int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data,return 0 ; } +static inline int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *arch) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static inline int arch_elf_pt_proc (void *ehdr,void *phdr,struct file *f,bool is_interp,struct arch_elf_state *state)
arch/x86/Kconfig +2 -0
@@ -1965,6 +1965,8 @@ config X86_CET depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS select ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE + select ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY + select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE help Control-flow protection is a set of hardware features which place additional restrictions on indirect branches. These help
arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h +13 -0
@@ -390,6 +390,19 @@ extern int compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,extern bool arch_syscall_is_vdso_sigreturn (struct pt_regs *regs); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE +struct arch_elf_state { +unsigned int gnu_property; +}; + +#define INIT_ARCH_ELF_STATE { \ + .gnu_property = 0, \ +} + +#define arch_elf_pt_proc (ehdr, phdr, elf, interp, state) (0) +#define arch_check_elf (ehdr, interp, interp_ehdr, state) (0) +#endif +/* Do not change the values. See get_align_mask() */ enum align_flags {ALIGN_VA_32 =BIT (0 ),
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +32 -0
@@ -835,3 +835,35 @@ unsigned long KSTK_ESP(struct task_struct *task) {return task_pt_regs (task)->sp; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY +int arch_parse_elf_property (u32 type,const void *data,size_t datasz, +bool compat,struct arch_elf_state *state) +{ +if (type !=GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND ) +return 0 ; + +if (datasz !=sizeof (unsigned int )) +return -ENOEXEC ; + + state->gnu_property = *(unsigned int *)data; +return 0 ; +} + +int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *state) +{ +int r =0 ; + +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_CET )) +return r; + +memset (¤t->thread.cet,0 ,sizeof (struct cet_status )); + +if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +if (state->gnu_property &GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK ) + r =cet_setup_shstk (); + } + +return r; +} +#endif
fs/binfmt_elf.c +4 -0
@@ -1245,6 +1245,10 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)set_binfmt (&elf_format); + retval =arch_setup_elf_property (&arch_state); +if (retval <0 ) + goto out; +#ifdef ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES retval =ARCH_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES (bprm, elf_ex, !!interpreter);if (retval <0 )
include/linux/elf.h +6 -0
@@ -92,9 +92,15 @@ static inline int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, {return 0 ; } + +static inline int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *arch) +{ +return 0 ; +}#else extern int arch_parse_elf_property (u32 type,const void *data,size_t datasz,bool compat,struct arch_elf_state *arch); +extern int arch_setup_elf_property (struct arch_elf_state *arch);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_ELF_PROT
include/uapi/linux/elf.h +9 -0
@@ -455,4 +455,13 @@ typedef struct elf64_note {/* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI */ #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI (1U << 0) +/* .note.gnu.property types for x86: */ +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND 0xc0000002 + +/* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND */ +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT 0x00000001 +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK 0x00000002 +#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_VALID (GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT | \ + GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK) +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_ELF_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 23/26 x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThe kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new shadow stack for a pthread child.
It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall and set the child's shadow stack pointer to NULL and let the child thread allocate a shadow stack for itself. There are two issues in this approach: It is not compatible with existing code that does inline syscall and it cannot handle signals before the child can successfully allocate a shadow stack.
Use stack_size passed from clone3() syscall for thread shadow stack size, but cap it to min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB). A compat-mode thread shadow stack size is further reduced to 1/4. This allows more threads to run in a 32- bit address space.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 5 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 15 +++++++-- 4 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +5 -0
@@ -18,12 +18,17 @@ struct cet_status {#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET int cet_setup_shstk (void ); +int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p,unsigned long clone_flags, +unsigned long stack_size);void cet_disable_shstk (void );void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p);int cet_verify_rstor_token (bool ia32,unsigned long ssp,unsigned long *new_ssp);void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc);int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor,struct sc_ext *sc);#else +static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p, +unsigned long clone_flags, +unsigned long stack_size) {return 0 ; }static inline void cet_disable_shstk (void ) {}static inline void cet_free_shstk (struct task_struct *p) {}static inline void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc) {return ; }
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +3 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/paravirt.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
@@ -146,6 +147,8 @@ do { \#else #define deactivate_mm (tsk, mm) \ do { \ + if (!tsk->vfork_done) \ + cet_free_shstk(tsk); \ load_gs_index(0); \ loadsegment(fs, 0); \ } while (0)
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +49 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/process.c +12 -3
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include <asm/io_bitmap.h> #include <asm/proto.h> #include <asm/frame.h> +#include <asm/cet.h> #include "process.h"
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)free_vm86 (t); +cet_free_shstk (tsk);fpu__drop (fpu); }
@@ -122,8 +124,9 @@ static int set_new_tls(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long tls)return do_set_thread_area_64 (p,ARCH_SET_FS , tls); } -int copy_thread (unsigned long clone_flags,unsigned long sp,unsigned long arg, -struct task_struct *p,unsigned long tls) +int copy_thread (unsigned long clone_flags,unsigned long sp, +unsigned long stack_size,struct task_struct *p, +unsigned long tls) {struct inactive_task_frame *frame;struct fork_frame *fork_frame;
@@ -163,7 +166,7 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,/* Kernel thread ? */ if (unlikely (p->flags &PF_KTHREAD )) {memset (childregs,0 ,sizeof (struct pt_regs )); -kthread_frame_init (frame, sp, arg); +kthread_frame_init (frame, sp, stack_size);return 0 ; }
@@ -181,6 +184,12 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,if (clone_flags &CLONE_SETTLS ) ret =set_new_tls (p, tls); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +/* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */ +if (!ret) + ret =cet_setup_thread_shstk (p, clone_flags, stack_size); +#endif +if (!ret &&unlikely (test_tsk_thread_flag (current,TIF_IO_BITMAP )))io_bitmap_share (p);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 24/26 x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng Yuarch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, u64 *args)
Get CET feature status.
The parameter 'args' is a pointer to a user buffer. The kernel returns the following information:
*args = shadow stack/IBT status
*(args + 1) = shadow stack base address
*(args + 2) = shadow stack size
32-bit binaries use the same interface, but only lower 32-bits of each item.
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned int features)
Disable CET features specified in 'features'. Return -EPERM if CET is locked.
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
Lock in CET features.
Also change do_arch_prctl_common()'s parameter 'cpuid_enabled' to 'arg2', as it is now also passed to prctl_cet().
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 4 +++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 6 ++-- 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h +3 -0
@@ -14,9 +14,11 @@ struct sc_ext;struct cet_status {unsigned long shstk_base;unsigned long shstk_size; +unsigned int locked:1 ; };#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +int prctl_cet (int option,u64 arg2);int cet_setup_shstk (void );int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p,unsigned long clone_flags,unsigned long stack_size);
@@ -26,6 +28,7 @@ int cet_verify_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *new_ssp)void cet_restore_signal (struct sc_ext *sc);int cet_setup_signal (bool ia32,unsigned long rstor,struct sc_ext *sc);#else +static inline int prctl_cet (int option,u64 arg2) {return -EINVAL ; }static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk (struct task_struct *p,unsigned long clone_flags,unsigned long stack_size) {return 0 ; }
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +4 -0
@@ -14,4 +14,8 @@#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS 0x3001 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE 0x3002 +#define ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK 0x3003 +#endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev-es.o -obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet.o cet_prctl.o ### # 64 bit specific files
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c new file +60 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/process.c +3 -3
@@ -980,14 +980,14 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p) }long do_arch_prctl_common (struct task_struct *task,int option, -unsigned long cpuid_enabled) +unsigned long arg2) {switch (option) {case ARCH_GET_CPUID :return get_cpuid_mode ();case ARCH_SET_CPUID : -return set_cpuid_mode (task, cpuid_enabled); +return set_cpuid_mode (task, arg2); } -return -EINVAL ; +return prctl_cet (option, arg2); }
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 25/26 mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
In reply to Yu-cheng YuTo prepare changes to arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() in the next patch, and be consistent with other architectures, move arch_vm_get_page_prot() and arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 27 +++------------------------ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h new file +30 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H + +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <uapi/asm/mman.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS +/* +* Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags +* value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in +* to a pte. +* +* Only override these if Protection Keys are available +* (which is only on 64-bit). +*/ +#define arch_vm_get_page_prot (vm_flags) __pgprot( \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) + +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ + ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) +#endif + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +3 -24
@@ -1,31 +1,10 @@/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ -#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H -#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H#define MAP_32BIT 0x40/* only give out 32bit addresses */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS -/* -* Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags -* value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in -* to a pte. -* -* Only override these if Protection Keys are available -* (which is only on 64-bit). -*/ -#define arch_vm_get_page_prot (vm_flags) __pgprot( \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) - -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ - ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) -#endif #include <asm-generic/mman.h> -#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
PATCH v21 26/26 mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
In reply to Yu-cheng YuThere are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API:
an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect(). Each has its advantages and compromises.
An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86 arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in registers [1], but no active discussion on that.
A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of mmap()/mprotect().
The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to VM_SHSTK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the attacker would have to get to the syscall first.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 + include/linux/mm.h | 1 + mm/mmap.c | 8 ++++- 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h +56 -1
@@ -20,11 +20,66 @@ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \ ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) +#else +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) (0) +#endif + +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (unsigned long prot, +unsigned long pkey) +{ +unsigned long vm_prot_bits =pkey_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey); + +if (!(prot &PROT_WRITE ) && (prot &PROT_SHSTK )) + vm_prot_bits |=VM_SHSTK ; + +return vm_prot_bits; +} + +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET +static inline bool arch_validate_prot (unsigned long prot,unsigned long addr) +{ +unsigned long valid =PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE |PROT_EXEC |PROT_SEM ; + +if (prot & ~(valid |PROT_SHSTK )) +return false; + +if (prot &PROT_SHSTK ) { +struct vm_area_struct *vma; + +if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size) +return false; + +/* +* A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only +* the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write +* instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually +* exclusive. +*/ +if (prot &PROT_WRITE ) +return false; + + vma =find_vma (current->mm, addr); +if (!vma) +return false; + +/* +* Shadow stack cannot be backed by a file or shared. +*/ +if (vma->vm_file || (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHARED )) +return false; + } + +return true; +} + +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot#endif #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +1 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#define MAP_32BIT 0x40/* only give out 32bit addresses */ +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10/* shadow stack pages */ #include <asm-generic/mman.h>
include/linux/mm.h +1 -0
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#if defined(CONFIG_X86 )# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ +# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHSTK#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC )# define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1/* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC )
mm/mmap.c +7 -1
@@ -1483,6 +1483,12 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);unsigned long flags_mask; +/* +* Call stack cannot be backed by a file. +*/ +if (vm_flags &VM_SHSTK ) +return -EINVAL ; +if (!file_mmap_ok (file, inode, pgoff, len))return -EOVERFLOW ;
@@ -1547,7 +1553,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, }else {switch (flags &MAP_TYPE ) {case MAP_SHARED : -if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN |VM_GROWSUP )) +if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN |VM_GROWSUP |VM_SHSTK ))return -EINVAL ;/* * Ignore pgoff.
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0