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crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)

PATCH Applied David Howells 3 participants 7 messages Jun 16, 2023 – Jun 20, 2023

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)

If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.

Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg() function. If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be ignored.

Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen.

---
 crypto/algif_hash.c |   38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
crypto/algif_hash.c +25 -13
index dfb048cefb60..0ab43e149f0e 100644
@@ -76,13 +76,30 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 	if (!continuing) {
-		if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
-			hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
+		/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */
+		hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
+		if (!msg_data_left(msg))
+			goto done; /* Zero-length; don't start new req */
 		need_init = true;
+	} else if (!msg_data_left(msg)) {
+		/*
+		 * No data - finalise the prev req if MSG_MORE so any error
+		 * comes out here.
+		 */
+		if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) {
+			err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx);
+			if (err)
+				goto unlock_free;
+			ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL,
+						ctx->result, 0);
+			err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req),
+					      &ctx->wait);
+			if (err)
+				goto unlock_free;
+		}
+		goto done_more;
 	}
 
-	ctx->more = false;
-
 	while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = ctx->sgl.sgl;
 		ctx->sgl.sgt.nents = 0;
@@ -93,15 +110,6 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		if (npages == 0)
 			goto unlock_free;
 
-		if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sgl.sgl)) {
-			err = -ENOMEM;
-			ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl =
-				kvmalloc(array_size(npages,
-						    sizeof(*ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)),
-					 GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)
-				goto unlock_free;
-		}
 		sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, npages);
 
 		ctx->sgl.need_unpin = iov_iter_extract_will_pin(&msg->msg_iter);
@@ -150,7 +158,9 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
 	}
 
+done_more:
 	ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE;
+done:
 	err = 0;
 unlock:
 	release_sock(sk);
@@ -158,6 +168,8 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 
 unlock_free:
 	af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl);
+	hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
+	ctx->more = false;
 	goto unlock;
 }
 
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 47 lines · David Howells

If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.

Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg() function. If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be ignored.

Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen.

---
 crypto/algif_hash.c |   38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
crypto/algif_hash.c +0 -0
index dfb048cefb60..0ab43e149f0e 100644

crypto/algif_hash.c static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, · line 80

Quoted 7 lines
crypto/algif_hash.c +2 -2
@@ -76,13 +76,30 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 	if (!continuing) {
-		if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
-			hash_free_result(sk, ctx);
+		/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */
+		hash_free_result(sk, ctx);

Please revert this change as I explained in the other message.

crypto/algif_hash.c static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, · line 82

Quoted 2 lines
crypto/algif_hash.c +2 -0
+		if (!msg_data_left(msg))
+			goto done; /* Zero-length; don't start new req */

This is still broken in the case of a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set. Here you will short-circuit out without ever calling crypto_ahash_init. However, hash_recvmsg will directly call crypto_ahash_final on this, which is undefined.

Cheers,

Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
#2 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Herbert Xu

Review

Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +1 -0
+		hash_free_result(sk, ctx);

Please revert this change as I explained in the other message.

crypto/algif_hash.c static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, · line 82

Quoted 2 lines
crypto/algif_hash.c +2 -0
+		if (!msg_data_left(msg))
+			goto done; /* Zero-length; don't start new req */

This is still broken in the case of a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set. Here you will short-circuit out without ever calling crypto_ahash_init. However, hash_recvmsg will directly call crypto_ahash_final on this, which is undefined.

Not so. hash_recvmsg() will call crypto_ahash_init() first because ctx->more is false (hence why we came down this branch in hash_sendmsg()) and the result was released on the previous line (which you're objecting to). If it goes to the "done" label, it will skip setting ctx->more to true if MSG_MORE is passed.

However, given you want sendmsg() to do the init->digest cycle on zero length data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes a pass of the loop even with no data.

David

maintainer Acked-by
#3 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · David Howells

Not so. hash_recvmsg() will call crypto_ahash_init() first because ctx->more is false (hence why we came down this branch in hash_sendmsg()) and the result was released on the previous line (which you're objecting to). If it goes to the "done" label, it will skip setting ctx->more to true if MSG_MORE is passed.

I see, yes it should work.

Quoted 3 lines

However, given you want sendmsg() to do the init->digest cycle on zero length data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes a pass of the loop even with no data.

Let's get this fixed ASAP and we can refine it later.

Thanks,

Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
#4 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 3 lines

However, given you want sendmsg() to do the init->digest cycle on zero length data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes a pass of the loop even with no data.

Let's get this fixed ASAP and we can refine it later.

Um. Is that against this patch or the old version?

David

maintainer
#5 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · David Howells
Quoted 7 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 3 lines

However, given you want sendmsg() to do the init->digest cycle on zero length data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes a pass of the loop even with no data.

Let's get this fixed ASAP and we can refine it later.

Um. Is that against this patch or the old version?

This is against v2 which started this thread.

Cheers,

Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
#6 lore raw
In reply to David Howells
This patch was applied to netdev/net-next.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net-next.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:

Quoted 9 lines · On Fri, 16 Jun 2023 12:10:32 +0100 you wrote:

If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [net-next,v2] crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)

    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/b6d972f68983

You are awesome, thank you!

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