crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v2 1/1 crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)
If an AF_ALG socket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set and then recvmsg() is called without first sending another message without MSG_MORE set to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance because hash_sendmsg() now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can use crypto_ahash_digest() - and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.
Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the hash_sendmsg() function. If we're not continuing the previous sendmsg(), then just ignore the send (hash_recvmsg() will invent something when called); if we are continuing, then we finalise the request at this point if MSG_MORE is not set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be ignored.
Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if we get more than ALG_MAX_PAGES - this shouldn't happen.
--- crypto/algif_hash.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
crypto/algif_hash.c +25 -13
@@ -76,13 +76,30 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,lock_sock (sk);if (!continuing) { -if ((msg->msg_flags &MSG_MORE )) -hash_free_result (sk, ctx); +/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */ +hash_free_result (sk, ctx); +if (!msg_data_left (msg)) + goto done;/* Zero-length; don't start new req */ need_init = true; + }else if (!msg_data_left (msg)) { +/* +* No data - finalise the prev req if MSG_MORE so any error +* comes out here. +*/ +if (!(msg->msg_flags &MSG_MORE )) { + err =hash_alloc_result (sk, ctx); +if (err) + goto unlock_free; +ahash_request_set_crypt (&ctx->req,NULL , + ctx->result,0 ); + err =crypto_wait_req (crypto_ahash_final (&ctx->req), + &ctx->wait); +if (err) + goto unlock_free; + } + goto done_more; } - ctx->more = false; -while (msg_data_left (msg)) { ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = ctx->sgl.sgl; ctx->sgl.sgt.nents =0 ;
@@ -93,15 +110,6 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,if (npages ==0 ) goto unlock_free; -if (npages >ARRAY_SIZE (ctx->sgl.sgl)) { - err = -ENOMEM ; - ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = -kvmalloc (array_size (npages, -sizeof (*ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)), -GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl) - goto unlock_free; - }sg_init_table (ctx->sgl.sgl, npages); ctx->sgl.need_unpin =iov_iter_extract_will_pin (&msg->msg_iter);
@@ -150,7 +158,9 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,af_alg_free_sg (&ctx->sgl); } +done_more: ctx->more = msg->msg_flags &MSG_MORE ; +done: err =0 ; unlock:release_sock (sk);
@@ -158,6 +168,8 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, unlock_free:af_alg_free_sg (&ctx->sgl); +hash_free_result (sk, ctx); + ctx->more = false; goto unlock; }
Herbert Xu
maintainerQuoted 47 lines · David Howells
If an
AF_ALGsocket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message withMSG_MOREset and thenrecvmsg()is called without first sending another message withoutMSG_MOREset to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance becausehash_sendmsg()now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can usecrypto_ahash_digest()- and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.Fix this by handling zero-length sends at the top of the
hash_sendmsg()function. If we're not continuing the previoussendmsg(), then just ignore the send (hash_recvmsg()will invent something when called); if we are continuing, then we finalise the request at this point ifMSG_MOREis not set to get any error here, otherwise the send is of no effect and can be ignored.Whilst we're at it, remove the code to create a kvmalloc'd scatterlist if we get more than
ALG_MAX_PAGES- this shouldn't happen.Fixes c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES")Reported-by [email protected]Reported-by [email protected]Reported-by [email protected]Reported-by [email protected]Signed-off-by David Howells <[email protected]>Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>cc Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>cc Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>cc Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>cc Jens Axboe <[email protected]>cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>--- crypto/algif_hash.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)crypto/algif_hash.c +0
-0
crypto/algif_hash.c static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, · line 80
Quoted 7 lines
crypto/algif_hash.c +2
-2@@ -76,13 +76,30 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,lock_sock (sk);if (!continuing) { -if ((msg->msg_flags &MSG_MORE )) -hash_free_result (sk, ctx); +/* Discard a previous request that wasn't marked MSG_MORE. */ +hash_free_result (sk, ctx);
Please revert this change as I explained in the other message.
crypto/algif_hash.c static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, · line 82
Quoted 2 lines
crypto/algif_hash.c +2
-0+if (!msg_data_left (msg)) + goto done;/* Zero-length; don't start new req */
This is still broken in the case of a zero-length message with MSG_MORE set. Here you will short-circuit out without ever calling crypto_ahash_init. However, hash_recvmsg will directly call crypto_ahash_final on this, which is undefined.
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Quoted 11 lines · Herbert Xu
Review
Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +1
-0+ hash_free_result(sk, ctx);Please revert this change as I explained in the other message.
crypto/algif_hash.c static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, · line 82
Quoted 2 lines
crypto/algif_hash.c +2
-0+if (!msg_data_left (msg)) + goto done;/* Zero-length; don't start new req */ This is still broken in the case of a zero-length message with
MSG_MOREset. Here you will short-circuit out without ever callingcrypto_ahash_init. However,hash_recvmsgwill directly callcrypto_ahash_finalon this, which is undefined.
Not so. hash_recvmsg() will call crypto_ahash_init() first because ctx->more is false (hence why we came down this branch in hash_sendmsg()) and the result was released on the previous line (which you're objecting to). If it goes to the "done" label, it will skip setting ctx->more to true if MSG_MORE is passed.
However, given you want sendmsg() to do the init->digest cycle on zero length data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes a pass of the loop even with no data.
David
Quoted 6 lines · David Howells
Not so.
hash_recvmsg()will callcrypto_ahash_init()first becausectx->moreis false (hence why we came down this branch inhash_sendmsg()) and the result was released on the previous line (which you're objecting to). If it goes to the "done" label, it will skip settingctx->moreto true ifMSG_MOREis passed.
I see, yes it should work.
Quoted 3 lines
However, given you want
sendmsg()to do theinit->digestcycle on zero length data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes a pass of the loop even with no data.
Let's get this fixed ASAP and we can refine it later.
Thanks,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Quoted 7 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 3 lines
However, given you want
sendmsg()to do theinit->digestcycle on zero length data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes a pass of the loop even with no data.Let's get this fixed ASAP and we can refine it later.
Acked-by Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Um. Is that against this patch or the old version?
David
Herbert Xu
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · David Howells
Quoted 7 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 3 lines
However, given you want
sendmsg()to do theinit->digestcycle on zero length data, I think we should revert to the previous version of the patch that makes a pass of the loop even with no data.Let's get this fixed ASAP and we can refine it later.
Acked-by Herbert Xu <[email protected]>Um. Is that against this patch or the old version?
This is against v2 which started this thread.
Cheers,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
This patch was applied to netdev/net-next.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net-next.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:
Quoted 9 lines · On Fri, 16 Jun 2023 12:10:32 +0100 you wrote:
If an
AF_ALGsocket bound to a hashing algorithm is sent a zero-length message withMSG_MOREset and thenrecvmsg()is called without first sending another message withoutMSG_MOREset to end the operation, an oops will occur because the crypto context and result doesn't now get set up in advance becausehash_sendmsg()now defers that as long as possible in the hope that it can usecrypto_ahash_digest()- and then because the message is zero-length, it the data wrangling loop is skipped.[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net-next,v2] crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net-next/c/b6d972f68983
You are awesome, thank you!
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