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sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()

PATCH Applied Michael Bommarito 3 participants 3 messages Jun 8 – Jun 10

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()

__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length.

An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.

Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.

The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 ("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop").

Fixes df2185771439 ("[SCTP]: Update association lookup to look at ASCONF chunks as well")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8

---
v3:
- Simplify to a single bounds check that the whole address parameter fits in the chunk, written as an addition to avoid unsigned wrap (David Laight); drop the redundant lower-bound test and the param_space/plen locals (Xin Long).
v2:
- Regenerate from net/main so the patch has index lines and applies cleanly (Xin Long).
- Use unsigned int for the decoded length and compare it against the remaining parameter space after the ADDIP header (David Laight).
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

 net/sctp/input.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/sctp/input.c +8 -0
index e119e460ccde0..864741fae4187 100644
@@ -1204,6 +1204,14 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(
 	/* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */
 	param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf + 1);
 
+	/* The whole address parameter must lie within the chunk before
+	 * af->from_addr_param() reads the variable-length address; otherwise a
+	 * truncated trailing ASCONF chunk lets it read uninitialized bytes past
+	 * the parameter.
+	 */
+	if (sizeof(*asconf) + ntohs(param->p.length) > ntohs(ch->length))
+		return NULL;
+
 	af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param->p.type));
 	if (unlikely(!af))
 		return NULL;

base-commit: 9988931df99cf5d68af360e1f23b9c674a0b1b4f

Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
maintainer Acked-by on v3 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 60 lines · Michael Bommarito

__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length.

An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.

Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.

The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 ("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop").

Fixes df2185771439 ("[SCTP]: Update association lookup to look at ASCONF chunks as well")
Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8

---
v3:
- Simplify to a single bounds check that the whole address parameter fits in the chunk, written as an addition to avoid unsigned wrap (David Laight); drop the redundant lower-bound test and the param_space/plen locals (Xin Long).
v2:
- Regenerate from net/main so the patch has index lines and applies cleanly (Xin Long).
- Use unsigned int for the decoded length and compare it against the remaining parameter space after the ADDIP header (David Laight).
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

 net/sctp/input.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/sctp/input.c +8 -0
index e119e460ccde0..864741fae4187 100644
@@ -1204,6 +1204,14 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(
        /* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */
        param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf + 1);
 
+       /* The whole address parameter must lie within the chunk before
+        * af->from_addr_param() reads the variable-length address; otherwise a
+        * truncated trailing ASCONF chunk lets it read uninitialized bytes past
+        * the parameter.
+        */
+       if (sizeof(*asconf) + ntohs(param->p.length) > ntohs(ch->length))
+               return NULL;
+
        af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param->p.type));
        if (unlikely(!af))
                return NULL;
Quoted 4 lines

base-commit: 9988931df99cf5d68af360e1f23b9c674a0b1b4f --
2.53.0

Note in:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260608122234.459098-1-michael.bommarito%40gmail.com

The pre-existing issue reported looks real to me, I may address it in sctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_init() in a separate patch.

Thanks.

#2 lore raw
In reply to Michael Bommarito
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:

Quoted 11 lines · On Mon, 8 Jun 2026 08:22:34 -0400 you wrote:

__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length.

An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [net,v3] sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()

    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/f8373d7090b7

You are awesome, thank you!

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