sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v2 1/1 sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()
__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length.
An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.
Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.
The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 ("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop").
---
v2:
- Regenerate from net/main so the patch has index lines and applies cleanly (Xin Long).
- Use unsigned int for the decoded length and compare it against the remaining parameter space after the ADDIP header (David Laight).
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
net/sctp/input.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
net/sctp/input.c +13 -0
@@ -1197,13 +1197,26 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(struct sctp_af *af;union sctp_addr_param *param;union sctp_addr paddr; +unsigned int param_space; +unsigned int plen;if (ntohs (ch->length) <sizeof (*asconf) +sizeof (struct sctp_paramhdr ))return NULL ; + param_space =ntohs (ch->length) -sizeof (*asconf); +/* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */ param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf +1 ); +/* The whole address parameter must lie within the chunk before +* af->from_addr_param() reads the variable-length address; otherwise a +* truncated trailing ASCONF chunk lets it read uninitialized bytes past +* the parameter. +*/ + plen =ntohs (param->p.length); +if (plen <sizeof (struct sctp_paramhdr ) || plen > param_space) +return NULL ; + af =sctp_get_af_specific (param_type2af (param->p.type));if (unlikely (!af))return NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Xin Long
maintainerQuoted 52 lines · Michael Bommarito
__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()innet/sctp/input.conly checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then callsaf->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length.An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path,
from_addr_param()then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.
The sibling
__sctp_rcv_init_lookup()bounds parameters withsctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk beforefrom_addr_param()reads it, the same class of fix as commit51e5ad549c43("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value insctp_inq_pop").Fixes df2185771439 ("[SCTP]: Update association lookup to look at ASCONF chunks as well")Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8Signed-off-by Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>---
v2:
- Regenerate from net/main so the patch has index lines and applies cleanly (Xin Long).
- Use unsigned int for the decoded length and compare it against the remaining parameter space after the ADDIP header (David Laight).
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/net/sctp/input.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)net/sctp/input.c +4
-0@@ -1197,13 +1197,26 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(struct sctp_af *af;union sctp_addr_param *param;union sctp_addr paddr; +unsigned int param_space; +unsigned int plen;if (ntohs (ch->length) <sizeof (*asconf) +sizeof (struct sctp_paramhdr ))return NULL ; + param_space =ntohs (ch->length) -sizeof (*asconf); +/* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */ param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf +1 );
net/sctp/input.c static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup( · line 1219
Quoted 10 lines
net/sctp/input.c +9
-0+/* The whole address parameter must lie within the chunk before +* af->from_addr_param() reads the variable-length address; otherwise a +* truncated trailing ASCONF chunk lets it read uninitialized bytes past +* the parameter. +*/ + plen =ntohs (param->p.length); +if (plen <sizeof (struct sctp_paramhdr ) || plen > param_space) +return NULL ; +
I think we don't really need to check plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This check is to ensure param->p.length can be safely accessed, but it's already guaranteed by the early check:
if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*asconf) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr))
I think you can just simplify your patch to:
if (ntohs(param->p.length) > ntohs(ch->length) - sizeof(*asconf))
return NULL;
Also note ntohs(param->p.length) < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) will be caught by af->from_addr_param(sctp_v4/v6_from_addr_param) and return NULL.
Thanks.
Quoted 5 lines
net/sctp/input.c +0
-1af =sctp_get_af_specific (param_type2af (param->p.type));if (unlikely (!af))return NULL ; --2.53.0
Quoted 68 lines · On Sun, 7 Jun 2026 19:42:25 -0400 Xin Long <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 52 lines · Michael Bommarito
__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()innet/sctp/input.conly checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then callsaf->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length.An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path,
from_addr_param()then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.
The sibling
__sctp_rcv_init_lookup()bounds parameters withsctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk beforefrom_addr_param()reads it, the same class of fix as commit51e5ad549c43("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value insctp_inq_pop").Fixes df2185771439 ("[SCTP]: Update association lookup to look at ASCONF chunks as well")Assisted-by Claude:claude-opus-4-8Signed-off-by Michael Bommarito <[email protected]>---
v2:
- Regenerate from net/main so the patch has index lines and applies cleanly (Xin Long).
- Use unsigned int for the decoded length and compare it against the remaining parameter space after the ADDIP header (David Laight).
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/net/sctp/input.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)net/sctp/input.c +4
-0@@ -1197,13 +1197,26 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(struct sctp_af *af;union sctp_addr_param *param;union sctp_addr paddr; +unsigned int param_space; +unsigned int plen;if (ntohs (ch->length) <sizeof (*asconf) +sizeof (struct sctp_paramhdr ))return NULL ; + param_space =ntohs (ch->length) -sizeof (*asconf); +/* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */ param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf +1 );net/sctp/input.c static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup( · line 1219
Quoted 10 lines
net/sctp/input.c +9
-0+/* The whole address parameter must lie within the chunk before +* af->from_addr_param() reads the variable-length address; otherwise a +* truncated trailing ASCONF chunk lets it read uninitialized bytes past +* the parameter. +*/ + plen =ntohs (param->p.length); +if (plen <sizeof (struct sctp_paramhdr ) || plen > param_space) +return NULL ; +I think we don't really need to check plen <
sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This check is to ensureparam->p.lengthcan be safely accessed, but it's already guaranteed by the early check:
Quoted 6 lines
if (
ntohs(ch->length)<sizeof(*asconf)+sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr))I think you can just simplify your patch to:
if (
ntohs(param->p.length)>ntohs(ch->length)-sizeof(*asconf))return NULL;
To stop having to think about the values wrapping, how about swapping to:
if (sizeof(*asconf) + ntohs(param->p.length) > ntohs(ch->length)) return NULL;
so that it is 100% clear they don't.
Even if the earlier test is missing/incorrect that will only read invalid data and then return NULL.
-- David
Quoted 12 lines
Also note
ntohs(param->p.length)<sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)will be caught byaf->from_addr_param(sctp_v4/v6_from_addr_param)and return NULL.Thanks.
Quoted 5 lines
net/sctp/input.c +0
-1af =sctp_get_af_specific (param_type2af (param->p.type));if (unlikely (!af))return NULL ; --2.53.0