chromium
PATCH 1/1 chromium
There are several nacl binaries that need labels.
Put an ifdef debian for some chromium paths.
Git policy misses chromium_role() lines, were they in another patch that was submitted at the same time?
I don't know what this is for but doesn't seem harmful to allow it:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : proctitle=/bin/bash /usr/bin/google-chrome
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x563328f7b590 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=0 ppid=5158 pid=5166 auid=test uid=test gid=test euid=test suid=test fsuid=test egid=test sgid=test fsgid=test tty=pts7 ses=232 comm=google-chrome exe=/bin/bash subj=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { associate } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=filesystem
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { create } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=file
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { add_name } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=dirAllow domain_use_interactive_fds() for running via ssh -X.
Allow managing xdg data, cache, and config.
Allow reading public data from apt and dpkg, probably from lsb_release or some other shell script.
How does the whold naclhelper thing work anyway? I'm nervous about process share access involving chromium_sandbox_t, is that really what we want?
Added lots of other stuff like searching cgroup dirs etc.
policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc +6 -1
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /opt/google/chrome/chrome_sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/chrome/google-chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0) -/opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0) +/opt/google/chrome/nacl_.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/chrome/libudev.so.0 gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) /opt/google/chrome-beta/chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
@@ -19,9 +19,14 @@ /opt/google/chrome-unstable/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/chrome-unstable/libudev.so.0 gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +ifdef(`distro_debian',` +/usr/lib/chromium/chromium -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/chromium/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0) +', ` /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome_sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0) +') /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chromium-launcher\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/chromium-browser/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
policy/modules/roles/staff.te +4 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` + chromium_role(staff_r, staff_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` cron_role(staff_r, staff_t) ')
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +4 -0
@@ -1272,6 +1272,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` + chromium_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` cron_admin_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ')
policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te +4 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` + chromium_role(user_r, user_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` cron_role(user_r, user_t) ')
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +35 -10
120 lines not on this page · raw message
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +18 -0
@@ -2364,6 +2364,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',` ######################################## ## <summary> +## Associate a file to proc_t (/proc) +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`kernel_associate_proc',` + gen_require(` + type proc_t; + ') + allow $1 proc_t:filesystem associate; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> ## Send a kill signal to unlabeled processes. ## </summary> ## <param name="domain">
Quoted 105 lines · Russell Coker
There are several nacl binaries that need labels.
Put an ifdef debian for some chromium paths.
Git policy misses
chromium_role()lines, were they in another patch that was submitted at the same time?I don't know what this is for but doesn't seem harmful to allow it:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : proctitle=/bin/bash/usr/bin/google-chrome
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x563328f7b590 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=0 ppid=5158 pid=5166 auid=test uid=test gid=test euid=test suid=test fsuid=test egid=test sgid=test fsgid=test tty=pts7 ses=232 comm=google-chrome exe=/bin/bash subj=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 key=(null)type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { associate } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=filesystem type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { create } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { add_name } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=dirAllow
domain_use_interactive_fds()for running via ssh -X.Allow managing xdg data, cache, and config.
Allow reading public data from apt and dpkg, probably from
lsb_releaseor some other shell script.How does the whold naclhelper thing work anyway? I'm nervous about process share access involving
chromium_sandbox_t, is that really what we want?Added lots of other stuff like searching cgroup dirs etc.
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc
===================================================================policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc +6
-1@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ /opt/google/chrome/chrome_sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/chrome/google-chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0) -/opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0) +/opt/google/chrome/nacl_.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/chrome/libudev.so.0 gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) /opt/google/chrome-beta/chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)@@ -19,9 +19,14 @@ /opt/google/chrome-unstable/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/chrome-unstable/libudev.so.0 gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +ifdef(`distro_debian',` +/usr/lib/chromium/chromium -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/chromium/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0) +', ` /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome_sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0) +') /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chromium-launcher\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/chromium-browser/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
===================================================================policy/modules/roles/staff.te +4
-0@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` + chromium_role(staff_r, staff_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` cron_role(staff_r, staff_t) ')Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
===================================================================policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +4
-0@@ -1272,6 +1272,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` + chromium_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` cron_admin_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ')Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
===================================================================policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te +4
-0@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` + chromium_role(user_r, user_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` cron_role(user_r, user_t) ')Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
===================================================================
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t) · line 82
Quoted 5 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +2
-0@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t) # execmem for load in plugins allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal }; +allow chromium_t self:dir { write add_name }; +allow chromium_t self:file create;
I dropped this and the related proc_t associate. I would like to have a better understanding what is happening. The domain type on file/dir/lnk_file is supposed to be exclusively for the the /proc/pid entries. The domain shouldn't be creating files with this type. The fact that it is creating it in proc is even weirder.
Quoted 47 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +11
-2allow chromium_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow chromium_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow chromium_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket client_stream_socket_perms;@@ -94,11 +96,14 @@ allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:shm allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; -allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; -allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; +allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { getattr read write }; +allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write }; allow chromium_t chromium_naclhelper_t:process { share }; +# for self:file create +kernel_associate_proc(chromium_t) + # tmp has a wide class access (used for plugins) manage_files_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_tmp_t, chromium_tmp_t) allow chromium_t chromium_tmp_t:file map;@@ -149,6 +154,7 @@ dev_rw_xserver_misc(chromium_t) dev_map_xserver_misc(chromium_t) domain_dontaudit_search_all_domains_state(chromium_t) +domain_use_interactive_fds(chromium_t) files_list_home(chromium_t) files_search_home(chromium_t)@@ -159,12 +165,17 @@ files_read_etc_files(chromium_t) files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(chromium_t) fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(chromium_t) +fs_getattr_tmpfs(chromium_t) +fs_search_cgroup_dirs(chromium_t) miscfiles_read_all_certs(chromium_t) miscfiles_read_localization(chromium_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(chromium_t) +# for /run/udev/data/* +udev_read_pid_files(chromium_t) + userdom_user_content_access_template(chromium, chromium_t) userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(chromium_t) # Debugging. Also on user_tty_device_t if X is started through "startx" for instance
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_t) · line 188
Quoted 9 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +3
-3@@ -172,12 +183,10 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_t) userdom_manage_user_certs(chromium_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_cert(chromium_t, dir, ".pki") -xdg_create_cache_dirs(chromium_t) -xdg_create_config_dirs(chromium_t) -xdg_create_data_dirs(chromium_t) +xdg_manage_cache(chromium_t) +xdg_manage_config(chromium_t) +xdg_manage_data(chromium_t)
It seems like it might be best to have chromium-specific cache/data/config if it is modifying them.
Quoted 86 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +19
-5xdg_manage_downloads(chromium_t) -xdg_read_config_files(chromium_t) -xdg_read_data_files(chromium_t) xserver_user_x_domain_template(chromium, chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)@@ -195,6 +204,8 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_rw_usb_dev',` tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_info',` kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t) # Memory optimizations & optimizations based on OS/version + kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chromium_t) + kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t) kernel_read_system_state(chromium_t) # Debugging (sys/kernel/debug) and device information (sys/bus and sys/devices).@@ -237,6 +248,13 @@ optional_policy(` ') ') +optional_policy(` + apt_read_cache(chromium_t) + apt_read_db(chromium_t) + dpkg_exec(chromium_t) + dpkg_read_db(chromium_t) +') + ifdef(`use_alsa',` optional_policy(` alsa_domain(chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)@@ -309,23 +327,27 @@ allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:dir allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:file rw_file_perms; -allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; -allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; +allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write }; +allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_dgram_socket { getattr read write }; kernel_list_proc(chromium_sandbox_t) domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(chromium_sandbox_t) +domain_use_interactive_fds(chromium_sandbox_t) userdom_use_user_ptys(chromium_sandbox_t) chromium_domtrans(chromium_sandbox_t) +domtrans_pattern(chromium_sandbox_t, chromium_naclhelper_exec_t, chromium_naclhelper_t) +allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_naclhelper_t:process share; ########################################## # # Chromium nacl helper local policy # -allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; +allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write }; +allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write }; domain_mmap_low_uncond(chromium_naclhelper_t)@@ -338,3 +360,6 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_inf kernel_dontaudit_read_kernel_sysctl(chromium_naclhelper_t) kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(chromium_naclhelper_t) ') + +dev_read_sysfs(chromium_naclhelper_t) +dev_read_urand(chromium_naclhelper_t)Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
===================================================================policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +11
-0@@ -2364,6 +2364,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',` ######################################## ## <summary> +## Associate a file to proc_t (/proc) +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`kernel_associate_proc',` + gen_require(`
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',` · line 2387
Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +7
-0+ type proc_t; + ') + allow $1 proc_t:filesystem associate; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> ## Send a kill signal to unlabeled processes. ## </summary> ## <param name="domain">
Otherwise merged.
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
Quoted 25 lines · AEDT Chris PeBenito
Quoted 25 lines
I don't know what this is for but doesn't seem harmful to allow it:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : proctitle=/bin/bash/usr/bin/google-chrometype=SYSCALL msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x563328f7b590 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=0 ppid=5158 pid=5166 auid=test uid=test gid=test euid=test suid=test fsuid=test egid=test sgid=test fsgid=test tty=pts7 ses=232 comm=google-chrome exe=/bin/bash subj=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { associate } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=filesystem type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { create } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted {add_name} for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=dirIndex: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
===================================================================policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +0
-0@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t)
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +0
-0# execmem for load in pluginsallow
chromium_tself:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal }; +allowchromium_tself:dir { writeadd_name}; +allowchromium_tself:file create;I dropped this and the related
proc_tassociate. I would like to have a better understanding what is happening. The domain type on file/dir/lnk_file is supposed to be exclusively for the the/proc/pidentries. The domain shouldn't be creating files with this type. The fact that it is creating it in proc is even weirder.
It seems easily repeatable by starting Chrome. I don't know why openat() is triggering that. I'll leave this in the Debian tree and come back to it later.
Quoted 9 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_t) · line 188
Quoted 6 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +3
-3-xdg_create_cache_dirs(chromium_t) -xdg_create_config_dirs(chromium_t) -xdg_create_data_dirs(chromium_t) +xdg_manage_cache(chromium_t) +xdg_manage_config(chromium_t) +xdg_manage_data(chromium_t)It seems like it might be best to have chromium-specific cache/data/config if it is modifying them.
I guess. I'll leave that in the Debian tree, I don't have time to do more about this at the moment.
Signature · 2 lines
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