Skip to contentSkip to conversation

chromium

PATCH In review Russell Coker 2 participants 3 messages Jan 28, 2019 – Jan 30, 2019

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 chromium

There are several nacl binaries that need labels.

Put an ifdef debian for some chromium paths.

Git policy misses chromium_role() lines, were they in another patch that was submitted at the same time?

I don't know what this is for but doesn't seem harmful to allow it:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : proctitle=/bin/bash /usr/bin/google-chrome
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x563328f7b590 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=0 ppid=5158 pid=5166 auid=test uid=test gid=test euid=test suid=test fsuid=test egid=test sgid=test fsgid=test tty=pts7 ses=232 comm=google-chrome exe=/bin/bash subj=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 key=(null)

type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc:  granted  { associate } for  pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=filesystem 
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc:  granted  { create } for  pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=file 
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc:  granted  { add_name } for  pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=dir

Allow domain_use_interactive_fds() for running via ssh -X.

Allow managing xdg data, cache, and config.

Allow reading public data from apt and dpkg, probably from lsb_release or some other shell script.

How does the whold naclhelper thing work anyway? I'm nervous about process share access involving chromium_sandbox_t, is that really what we want?

Added lots of other stuff like searching cgroup dirs etc.

policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc +6 -1
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc
===================================================================
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /opt/google/chrome/chrome_sandbox			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
 /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
 /opt/google/chrome/google-chrome			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
-/opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrap		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
+/opt/google/chrome/nacl_.*				--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
 /opt/google/chrome/libudev.so.0					gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
 
 /opt/google/chrome-beta/chrome				--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
@@ -19,9 +19,14 @@
 /opt/google/chrome-unstable/nacl_helper_bootstrap	--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
 /opt/google/chrome-unstable/libudev.so.0			gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
 
+ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+/usr/lib/chromium/chromium				--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/chromium/chrome-sandbox			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
+', `
 /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
 /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome_sandbox		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
 /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome-sandbox		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
+')
 /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chromium-launcher\.sh		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
 /usr/lib/chromium-browser/nacl_helper_bootstrap		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
 
policy/modules/roles/staff.te +4 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
===================================================================
@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
 	')
 
 	optional_policy(`
+		chromium_role(staff_r, staff_t)
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
 		cron_role(staff_r, staff_t)
 	')
 
policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +4 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
===================================================================
@@ -1272,6 +1272,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
 	')
 
 	optional_policy(`
+		chromium_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
 		cron_admin_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
 	')
 
policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te +4 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
===================================================================
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
 	')
 
 	optional_policy(`
+		chromium_role(user_r, user_t)
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
 		cron_role(user_r, user_t)
 	')
 
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +35 -10

120 lines not on this page · raw message

policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +18 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
===================================================================
@@ -2364,6 +2364,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',`
 
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
+##	Associate a file to proc_t (/proc)
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`kernel_associate_proc',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type proc_t;
+	')
+	allow $1 proc_t:filesystem associate;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
 ##	Send a kill signal to unlabeled processes.
 ## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
#1 lore raw
Quoted 105 lines · Russell Coker

There are several nacl binaries that need labels.

Put an ifdef debian for some chromium paths.

Git policy misses chromium_role() lines, were they in another patch that was submitted at the same time?

I don't know what this is for but doesn't seem harmful to allow it:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : proctitle=/bin/bash /usr/bin/google-chrome
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x563328f7b590 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=0 ppid=5158 pid=5166 auid=test uid=test gid=test euid=test suid=test fsuid=test egid=test sgid=test fsgid=test tty=pts7 ses=232 comm=google-chrome exe=/bin/bash subj=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 key=(null)

type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc:  granted  { associate } for  pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=filesystem
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc:  granted  { create } for  pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=file
type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc:  granted  { add_name } for  pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=dir

Allow domain_use_interactive_fds() for running via ssh -X.

Allow managing xdg data, cache, and config.

Allow reading public data from apt and dpkg, probably from lsb_release or some other shell script.

How does the whold naclhelper thing work anyway? I'm nervous about process share access involving chromium_sandbox_t, is that really what we want?

Added lots of other stuff like searching cgroup dirs etc.

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc
===================================================================

policy/modules/apps/chromium.fc +6 -1
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  /opt/google/chrome/chrome_sandbox			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
  /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
  /opt/google/chrome/google-chrome			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
-/opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrap		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
+/opt/google/chrome/nacl_.*				--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
  /opt/google/chrome/libudev.so.0					gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
 
  /opt/google/chrome-beta/chrome				--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
@@ -19,9 +19,14 @@
  /opt/google/chrome-unstable/nacl_helper_bootstrap	--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
  /opt/google/chrome-unstable/libudev.so.0			gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0)
 
+ifdef(`distro_debian',`
+/usr/lib/chromium/chromium				--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
+/usr/lib/chromium/chrome-sandbox			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
+', `
  /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome			--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
  /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome_sandbox		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
  /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome-sandbox		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_sandbox_exec_t,s0)
+')
  /usr/lib/chromium-browser/chromium-launcher\.sh		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_exec_t,s0)
  /usr/lib/chromium-browser/nacl_helper_bootstrap		--	gen_context(system_u:object_r:chromium_naclhelper_exec_t,s0)
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/staff.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/roles/staff.te +4 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
  	')
 
  	optional_policy(`
+		chromium_role(staff_r, staff_t)
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
  		cron_role(staff_r, staff_t)
  	')
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +4 -0
@@ -1272,6 +1272,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
  	')
 
  	optional_policy(`
+		chromium_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
  		cron_admin_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t)
  	')
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te +4 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',`
  	')
 
  	optional_policy(`
+		chromium_role(user_r, user_t)
+	')
+
+	optional_policy(`
  		cron_role(user_r, user_t)
  	')
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/apps/chromium.te xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t) · line 82

Quoted 5 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +2 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t)
 
  # execmem for load in plugins
  allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal };
+allow chromium_t self:dir { write add_name };
+allow chromium_t self:file create;

I dropped this and the related proc_t associate. I would like to have a better understanding what is happening. The domain type on file/dir/lnk_file is supposed to be exclusively for the the /proc/pid entries. The domain shouldn't be creating files with this type. The fact that it is creating it in proc is even weirder.

Quoted 47 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +11 -2
  allow chromium_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
  allow chromium_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
  allow chromium_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket client_stream_socket_perms;
@@ -94,11 +96,14 @@ allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:shm
  allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
  allow chromium_t chromium_renderer_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
 
-allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
-allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { getattr read write };
+allow chromium_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
 
  allow chromium_t chromium_naclhelper_t:process { share };
 
+# for self:file create
+kernel_associate_proc(chromium_t)
+
  # tmp has a wide class access (used for plugins)
  manage_files_pattern(chromium_t, chromium_tmp_t, chromium_tmp_t)
  allow chromium_t chromium_tmp_t:file map;
@@ -149,6 +154,7 @@ dev_rw_xserver_misc(chromium_t)
  dev_map_xserver_misc(chromium_t)
 
  domain_dontaudit_search_all_domains_state(chromium_t)
+domain_use_interactive_fds(chromium_t)
 
  files_list_home(chromium_t)
  files_search_home(chromium_t)
@@ -159,12 +165,17 @@ files_read_etc_files(chromium_t)
  files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(chromium_t)
 
  fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(chromium_t)
+fs_getattr_tmpfs(chromium_t)
+fs_search_cgroup_dirs(chromium_t)
 
  miscfiles_read_all_certs(chromium_t)
  miscfiles_read_localization(chromium_t)
 
  sysnet_dns_name_resolve(chromium_t)
 
+# for /run/udev/data/*
+udev_read_pid_files(chromium_t)
+
  userdom_user_content_access_template(chromium, chromium_t)
  userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(chromium_t)
  # Debugging. Also on user_tty_device_t if X is started through "startx" for instance

policy/modules/apps/chromium.te userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_t) · line 188

Quoted 9 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +3 -3
@@ -172,12 +183,10 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_t)
  userdom_manage_user_certs(chromium_t)
  userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_cert(chromium_t, dir, ".pki")
 
-xdg_create_cache_dirs(chromium_t)
-xdg_create_config_dirs(chromium_t)
-xdg_create_data_dirs(chromium_t)
+xdg_manage_cache(chromium_t)
+xdg_manage_config(chromium_t)
+xdg_manage_data(chromium_t)

It seems like it might be best to have chromium-specific cache/data/config if it is modifying them.

Quoted 86 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +19 -5
  xdg_manage_downloads(chromium_t)
-xdg_read_config_files(chromium_t)
-xdg_read_data_files(chromium_t)
 
  xserver_user_x_domain_template(chromium, chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
 
@@ -195,6 +204,8 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_rw_usb_dev',`
  tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_info',`
  	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
  	# Memory optimizations & optimizations based on OS/version
+	kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(chromium_t)
+	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chromium_t)
  	kernel_read_system_state(chromium_t)
 
  	# Debugging (sys/kernel/debug) and device information (sys/bus and sys/devices).
@@ -237,6 +248,13 @@ optional_policy(`
  	')
  ')
 
+optional_policy(`
+	apt_read_cache(chromium_t)
+	apt_read_db(chromium_t)
+	dpkg_exec(chromium_t)
+	dpkg_read_db(chromium_t)
+')
+
  ifdef(`use_alsa',`
  	optional_policy(`
  		alsa_domain(chromium_t, chromium_tmpfs_t)
@@ -309,23 +327,27 @@ allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:dir
  allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
  allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:file rw_file_perms;
 
-allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
-allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
+allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
+allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_t:unix_dgram_socket { getattr read write };
 
  kernel_list_proc(chromium_sandbox_t)
 
  domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(chromium_sandbox_t)
+domain_use_interactive_fds(chromium_sandbox_t)
 
  userdom_use_user_ptys(chromium_sandbox_t)
 
  chromium_domtrans(chromium_sandbox_t)
+domtrans_pattern(chromium_sandbox_t, chromium_naclhelper_exec_t, chromium_naclhelper_t)
+allow chromium_sandbox_t chromium_naclhelper_t:process share;
 
  ##########################################
  #
  # Chromium nacl helper local policy
  #
 
-allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
+allow chromium_naclhelper_t chromium_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
 
  domain_mmap_low_uncond(chromium_naclhelper_t)
 
@@ -338,3 +360,6 @@ tunable_policy(`chromium_read_system_inf
  	kernel_dontaudit_read_kernel_sysctl(chromium_naclhelper_t)
  	kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(chromium_naclhelper_t)
  ')
+
+dev_read_sysfs(chromium_naclhelper_t)
+dev_read_urand(chromium_naclhelper_t)

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +11 -0
@@ -2364,6 +2364,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',`
 
  ########################################
  ## <summary>
+##	Associate a file to proc_t (/proc)
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`kernel_associate_proc',`
+	gen_require(`

policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if interface(`kernel_rw_all_sysctls',` · line 2387

Quoted 10 lines
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +7 -0
+		type proc_t;
+	')
+	allow $1 proc_t:filesystem associate;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
  ##	Send a kill signal to unlabeled processes.
  ## </summary>
  ## <param name="domain">

Otherwise merged.

Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
#2 lore raw
Quoted 25 lines · AEDT Chris PeBenito
Quoted 25 lines

I don't know what this is for but doesn't seem harmful to allow it:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : proctitle=/bin/bash /usr/bin/google-chrome type=SYSCALL msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=yes exit=3 a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x563328f7b590 a2=O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC a3=0x1b6 items=0 ppid=5158 pid=5166 auid=test uid=test gid=test euid=test suid=test fsuid=test egid=test sgid=test fsgid=test tty=pts7 ses=232 comm=google-chrome exe=/bin/bash subj=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 key=(null) type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { associate } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 tclass=filesystem type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { create } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:object_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=file type=AVC msg=audit(28/01/19 19:31:42.361:3218) : avc: granted { add_name } for pid=5166 comm=google-chrome name=63 scontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tcontext=user_u:user_r:chromium_t:s0 tclass=dir

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/apps/chromium.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +0 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ xdg_cache_content(chromium_xdg_cache_t)
 
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +0 -0
 # execmem for load in plugins

allow chromium_t self:process { execmem getsched getcap setcap setrlimit setsched sigkill signal }; +allow chromium_t self:dir { write add_name }; +allow chromium_t self:file create;

I dropped this and the related proc_t associate. I would like to have a better understanding what is happening. The domain type on file/dir/lnk_file is supposed to be exclusively for the the /proc/pid entries. The domain shouldn't be creating files with this type. The fact that it is creating it in proc is even weirder.

It seems easily repeatable by starting Chrome. I don't know why openat() is triggering that. I'll leave this in the Debian tree and come back to it later.

Quoted 9 lines

policy/modules/apps/chromium.te userdom_use_user_terminals(chromium_t) · line 188

Quoted 6 lines
policy/modules/apps/chromium.te +3 -3
-xdg_create_cache_dirs(chromium_t)
-xdg_create_config_dirs(chromium_t)
-xdg_create_data_dirs(chromium_t)
+xdg_manage_cache(chromium_t)
+xdg_manage_config(chromium_t)
+xdg_manage_data(chromium_t)

It seems like it might be best to have chromium-specific cache/data/config if it is modifying them.

I guess. I'll leave that in the Debian tree, I don't have time to do more about this at the moment.

Signature · 2 lines
My Main Blog         http://etbe.coker.com.au/
My Documents Blog    http://doc.coker.com.au/