KVM: Enable host userspace mapping for guest_memfd-backed memory for non-CoCo VMs
Subsystems (11)
v16 cover KVM: Enable host userspace mapping for guest_memfd-backed memory for non-CoCo VMs
Main changes since v15 [1]:
* Rework and simplify Kconfig selection and dependencies.
* Always enable guest_memfd for KVM x86 (64-bit) and arm64, which simplifies the enablement checks.
* Based on kvm-x86/next: commit 33f843444e28 ("Merge branch 'vmx'").
This patch series enables host userspace mapping of guest_memfd-backed memory for non-CoCo VMs. This is required for several evolving KVM use cases:
* Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests entirely backed by guest_memfd [2]. This provides a unified memory management model for both confidential and non-confidential guests, simplifying VMM design.
* Enhanced Security via direct map removal: When combined with Patrick's series for direct map removal [3], this provides additional hardening against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by eliminating the need for host kernel direct maps of guest memory.
* Lays the groundwork for *restricted* mmap() support for guest_memfd-backed memory on CoCo platforms [4] that permit in-place sharing of guest memory with the host.
Patch breakdown:
* Patches 1-9: Primarily infrastructure refactoring, Kconfig cleaning, and renames to decouple guest_memfd from the concept of "private" memory.
* Patches 10-11: Add support for the host to map guest_memfd backed memory for non-CoCo VMs, which includes support for mmap() and fault handling. This is gated by a new configuration option, toggled by a new flag, and advertised to userspace by a new capability (introduced in patch 20).
* Patches 12-15: Implement x86 guest_memfd mmap support.
* Patches 16-19: Implement arm64 guest_memfd mmap support.
* Patch 20: Introduce the new capability to advertise this support and update the documentation.
* Patches 21-22: Update and expand selftests for guest_memfd to include mmap functionality and improve portability.
To test this patch series and boot a guest utilizing the new features, please refer to the instructions in v8 of the series [5]. Note that kvmtool for Linux 6.16 (available at [6]) is required, as the KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP capability number has changed, additionally, drop the --sw_protected kvmtool parameter to test with the default VM type.
Cheers,
/fuad
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[6] https://android-kvm.googlesource.com/kvmtool/+/refs/heads/tabba/guestmem-basic-6.16
Ackerley Tng (1):
KVM: x86/mmu: Rename .private_max_mapping_level() to
.gmem_max_mapping_level()
Fuad Tabba (15):
KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD
KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE
KVM: Rename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to kvm_slot_has_gmem()
KVM: Fix comments that refer to slots_lock
KVM: Fix comment that refers to kvm uapi header path
KVM: x86: Enable KVM_GUEST_MEMFD for all 64-bit builds
KVM: guest_memfd: Add plumbing to host to map guest_memfd pages
KVM: guest_memfd: Track guest_memfd mmap support in memslot
KVM: arm64: Refactor user_mem_abort()
KVM: arm64: Handle guest_memfd-backed guest page faults
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle VNCR_EL2-triggered faults backed by guest_memfd
KVM: arm64: Enable support for guest_memfd backed memory
KVM: Allow and advertise support for host mmap() on guest_memfd files
KVM: selftests: Do not use hardcoded page sizes in guest_memfd test
KVM: selftests: guest_memfd mmap() test when mmap is supported
Sean Christopherson (6):
KVM: x86: Have all vendor neutral sub-configs depend on KVM_X86, not
just KVM
KVM: x86: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM directly from
KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
KVM: x86: Select TDX's KVM_GENERIC_xxx dependencies iff
CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=y
KVM: x86/mmu: Hoist guest_memfd max level/order helpers "up" in mmu.c
KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering
hugepages
KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared
mappings
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 9 + arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 203 ++++++++++++----- arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 41 +++- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 +- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 26 ++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 143 +++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 7 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 5 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 38 ++-- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 + .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 205 +++++++++++++++--- virt/kvm/Kconfig | 15 +- virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 2 +- virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 81 ++++++- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 12 +- virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h | 4 +- 26 files changed, 623 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
base-commit: 33f843444e28920d6e624c6c24637b4bb5d3c8de
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 1/22 KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD
Rename the Kconfig option CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD. The original name implied that the feature only supported "private" memory. However, CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM enables guest_memfd in general, which is not exclusively for private memory. Subsequent patches in this series will add guest_memfd support for non-CoCo VMs, whose memory is not private.
Renaming the Kconfig option to CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD more accurately reflects its broader scope as the main Kconfig option for all guest_memfd-backed memory. This provides clearer semantics for the option and avoids confusion as new features are introduced.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 14 +++++++------- virt/kvm/Kconfig | 8 ++++---- virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 2 +- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 4 ++-- virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h | 4 ++-- 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -2276,7 +2276,7 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level, int tdp_max_root_level, int tdp_huge_page_level); -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem)#else #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm) false
include/linux/kvm_host.h +7 -7
@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot {short id;u16 as_id; -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD struct { /* * Writes protected by kvm->slots_lock. Acquiring a
@@ -720,10 +720,10 @@ static inline int kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)#endif /* -* Arch code must define kvm_arch_has_private_mem if support for private memory -* is enabled. +* Arch code must define kvm_arch_has_private_mem if support for guest_memfd is +* enabled. */ -#if !defined(kvm_arch_has_private_mem) && !IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ) +#if !defined(kvm_arch_has_private_mem) && !IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD )static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem (struct kvm *kvm) {return false;
@@ -2505,7 +2505,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) { -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM ) && +return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ) &&kvm_get_memory_attributes (kvm, gfn) &KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE ; }#else
@@ -2515,7 +2515,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn) }#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD int kvm_gmem_get_pfn (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn,kvm_pfn_t *pfn,struct page **page,int *max_order);
@@ -2528,7 +2528,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,KVM_BUG_ON (1 , kvm); return -EIO; } -#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM */ +#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD */ #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn,kvm_pfn_t pfn,int max_order);
virt/kvm/Kconfig +4 -4
@@ -112,19 +112,19 @@ config KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES depends on KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER bool -config KVM_PRIVATE_MEM +config KVM_GUEST_MEMFD select XARRAY_MULTI bool config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES - select KVM_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD bool config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE bool - depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM + depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE bool - depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM + depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD
virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm +1 -1
@@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_ASYNC_PF) += $(KVM)/async_pf.o kvm-$(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING) += $(KVM)/irqchip.o kvm-$(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING) += $(KVM)/dirty_ring.o kvm-$(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_PFNCACHE) += $(KVM)/pfncache.o -kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM) += $(KVM)/guest_memfd.o +kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD) += $(KVM)/guest_memfd.o
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +2 -2
@@ -4915,7 +4915,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg)case KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES :return kvm_supported_mem_attributes (kvm);#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD :return !kvm ||kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm);#endif
@@ -5352,7 +5352,7 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,case KVM_GET_STATS_FD : r =kvm_vm_ioctl_get_stats_fd (kvm);break ; -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD case KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD : {struct kvm_create_guest_memfd guest_memfd;
virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h +2 -2
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static inline void gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start(struct kvm *kvm, }#endif /* HAVE_KVM_PFNCACHE */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD void kvm_gmem_init (struct module *module);int kvm_gmem_create (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_create_guest_memfd *args); int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
@@ -91,6 +91,6 @@ static inline void kvm_gmem_unbind(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) {WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); } -#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM */ +#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD */ #endif /* __KVM_MM_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 2/22 KVM: x86: Have all vendor neutral sub-configs depend on KVM_X86, not just KVM
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Make all vendor neutral KVM x86 configs depend on KVM_X86, not just KVM, i.e. gate them on at least one vendor module being enabled and thus on kvm.ko actually being built. Depending on just KVM allows the user to select the configs even though they won't actually take effect, and more importantly, makes it all too easy to create unmet dependencies. E.g. KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM can't be selected by KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM, because the KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER dependency is select by KVM_X86.
Hiding all sub-configs when neither KVM_AMD nor KVM_INTEL is selected also helps communicate to the user that nothing "interesting" is going on, e.g.
--- Virtualization
<M> Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support < > KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support < > KVM for AMD processors support
--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +8 -8
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ config KVM_WERROR # FRAME_WARN, i.e. KVM_WERROR=y with KASAN=y requires special tuning. # Building KVM with -Werror and KASAN is still doable via enabling # the kernel-wide WERROR=y. - depends on KVM && ((EXPERT && !KASAN) || WERROR) + depends on KVM_X86 && ((EXPERT && !KASAN) || WERROR) help Add -Werror to the build flags for KVM.
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ config KVM_WERROR config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" depends on EXPERT - depends on KVM && X86_64 + depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 help Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV config KVM_IOAPIC bool "I/O APIC, PIC, and PIT emulation" default y - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 help Provides support for KVM to emulate an I/O APIC, PIC, and PIT, i.e. for full in-kernel APIC emulation.
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ config KVM_IOAPIC config KVM_SMM bool "System Management Mode emulation" default y - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 help Provides support for KVM to emulate System Management Mode (SMM) in virtual machines. This can be used by the virtual machine
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ config KVM_SMM config KVM_HYPERV bool "Support for Microsoft Hyper-V emulation" - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 default y help Provides KVM support for emulating Microsoft Hyper-V. This allows KVM
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ config KVM_HYPERV config KVM_XEN bool "Support for Xen hypercall interface" - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 help Provides KVM support for the hosting Xen HVM guests and passing Xen hypercalls to userspace.
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ config KVM_XEN config KVM_PROVE_MMU bool "Prove KVM MMU correctness" depends on DEBUG_KERNEL - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 depends on EXPERT help Enables runtime assertions in KVM's MMU that are too costly to enable
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ config KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING config KVM_MAX_NR_VCPUS int "Maximum number of vCPUs per KVM guest" - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 range 1024 4096 default 4096 if MAXSMP default 1024
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Re: [PATCH v16 02/22] KVM: x86: Have all vendor neutral sub-configs depend on KVM_X86, not just KVM
Quoted 10 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Make all vendor neutral KVM x86 configs depend on
KVM_X86, not just KVM, i.e. gate them on at least one vendor module being enabled and thus on kvm.ko actually being built. Depending on just KVM allows the user to select the configs even though they won't actually take effect, and more importantly, makes it all too easy to create unmet dependencies. E.g.KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMcan't be selected byKVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM, because theKVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIERdependency is select byKVM_X86.
Quoted 7 lines
Hiding all sub-configs when neither
KVM_AMDnorKVM_INTELis selected also helps communicate to the user that nothing "interesting" is going on, e.g.--- Virtualization
<M> Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support < > KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support < > KVM for AMD processors support
Quoted 83 lines
Fixes ea4290d77bda ("KVM: x86: leave kvm.ko out of the build if no vendor module is requested")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +8
-8@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ config KVM_WERROR # FRAME_WARN, i.e. KVM_WERROR=y with KASAN=y requires special tuning. # Building KVM with -Werror and KASAN is still doable via enabling # the kernel-wide WERROR=y. - depends on KVM && ((EXPERT && !KASAN) || WERROR) + depends on KVM_X86 && ((EXPERT && !KASAN) || WERROR) help Add -Werror to the build flags for KVM.@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ config KVM_WERROR config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" depends on EXPERT - depends on KVM && X86_64 + depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 help Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV config KVM_IOAPIC bool "I/O APIC, PIC, and PIT emulation" default y - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 help Provides support for KVM to emulate an I/O APIC, PIC, and PIT, i.e. for full in-kernel APIC emulation.@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ config KVM_IOAPIC config KVM_SMM bool "System Management Mode emulation" default y - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 help Provides support for KVM to emulate System Management Mode (SMM) in virtual machines. This can be used by the virtual machine@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ config KVM_SMM config KVM_HYPERV bool "Support for Microsoft Hyper-V emulation" - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 default y help Provides KVM support for emulating Microsoft Hyper-V. This allows KVM@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ config KVM_HYPERV config KVM_XEN bool "Support for Xen hypercall interface" - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 help Provides KVM support for the hosting Xen HVM guests and passing Xen hypercalls to userspace.@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ config KVM_XEN config KVM_PROVE_MMU bool "Prove KVM MMU correctness" depends on DEBUG_KERNEL - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 depends on EXPERT help Enables runtime assertions in KVM's MMU that are too costly to enable@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ config KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING config KVM_MAX_NR_VCPUS int "Maximum number of vCPUs per KVM guest" - depends on KVM + depends on KVM_X86 range 1024 4096 default 4096 if MAXSMP default 1024
Re: [PATCH v16 02/22] KVM: x86: Have all vendor neutral sub-configs depend on KVM_X86, not just KVM
In reply to Fuad TabbaQuoted 14 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Make all vendor neutral KVM x86 configs depend on
KVM_X86, not just KVM, i.e. gate them on at least one vendor module being enabled and thus on kvm.ko actually being built. Depending on just KVM allows the user to select the configs even though they won't actually take effect, and more importantly, makes it all too easy to create unmet dependencies. E.g.KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMcan't be selected byKVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM, because theKVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIERdependency is select byKVM_X86.Hiding all sub-configs when neither
KVM_AMDnorKVM_INTELis selected also helps communicate to the user that nothing "interesting" is going on, e.g.--- Virtualization
Quoted 8 lines
<M> Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support < > KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support < > KVM for AMD processors supportFixes ea4290d77bda ("KVM: x86: leave kvm.ko out of the build if no vendor module is requested")Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>---
Signature · 3 lines
Cheers, David / dhildenb
PATCH v16 3/22 KVM: x86: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM directly from KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Now that KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM doesn't have a hidden dependency on KVM_X86, select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM from within KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM instead of conditionally selecting it from KVM_X86.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ config KVM_X86 select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM select KVM_WERROR if WERROR config KVM
@@ -84,6 +83,7 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" depends on EXPERT depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 + select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM help Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Re: [PATCH v16 03/22] KVM: x86: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM directly from KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
Quoted 11 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Now that
KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VMdoesn't have a hidden dependency onKVM_X86, selectKVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMfrom withinKVM_SW_PROTECTED_VMinstead of conditionally selecting it fromKVM_X86.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>---
Signature · 3 lines
Cheers, David / dhildenb
Re: [PATCH v16 03/22] KVM: x86: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM directly from KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
In reply to Fuad TabbaQuoted 10 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Now that
KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VMdoesn't have a hidden dependency onKVM_X86, selectKVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMfrom withinKVM_SW_PROTECTED_VMinstead of conditionally selecting it fromKVM_X86.No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
Quoted 24 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +1
-1@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ config KVM_X86 select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM select KVM_WERROR if WERROR config KVM@@ -84,6 +83,7 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" depends on EXPERT depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 + select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM help Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for
PATCH v16 4/22 KVM: x86: Select TDX's KVM_GENERIC_xxx dependencies iff CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=y
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM and KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES directly from KVM_INTEL_TDX, i.e. if and only if TDX support is fully enabled in KVM. There is no need to enable KVM's private memory support just because the core kernel's INTEL_TDX_HOST is enabled.
--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +2 -2
@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM config KVM_INTEL tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support" depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST - select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if INTEL_TDX_HOST help Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT extensions, a.k.a. Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX).
@@ -135,6 +133,8 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support" default y depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST + select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES help Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) confidential VMs on Intel processors.
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Re: [PATCH v16 04/22] KVM: x86: Select TDX's KVM_GENERIC_xxx dependencies iff CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=y
Quoted 10 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Select
KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMandKVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTESdirectly fromKVM_INTEL_TDX, i.e. if and only if TDX support is fully enabled in KVM. There is no need to enable KVM's private memory support just because the core kernel'sINTEL_TDX_HOSTis enabled.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>---
Signature · 3 lines
Cheers, David / dhildenb
Re: [PATCH v16 04/22] KVM: x86: Select TDX's KVM_GENERIC_xxx dependencies iff CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=y
In reply to Fuad TabbaQuoted 9 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Select
KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMandKVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTESdirectly fromKVM_INTEL_TDX, i.e. if and only if TDX support is fully enabled in KVM. There is no need to enable KVM's private memory support just because the core kernel'sINTEL_TDX_HOSTis enabled.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
Quoted 18 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +0
-2@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM config KVM_INTEL tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support" depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST - select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if INTEL_TDX_HOST help Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT extensions, a.k.a. Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX).
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig config KVM_INTEL_TDX · line 137
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +2
-0@@ -135,6 +133,8 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support" default y depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST + select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
I had a similar patch internally, while my version doesn't select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES here since it's selected by KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
Anyway, next patch clean it up as well.
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +0
-0help Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) confidential VMs on Intel processors.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v16 04/22] KVM: x86: Select TDX's KVM_GENERIC_xxx dependencies iff CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=y
Quoted 41 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 9 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Select
KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMandKVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTESdirectly fromKVM_INTEL_TDX, i.e. if and only if TDX support is fully enabled in KVM. There is no need to enable KVM's private memory support just because the core kernel'sINTEL_TDX_HOSTis enabled.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]>Quoted 18 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +0
-2@@ -95,8 +95,6 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM config KVM_INTEL tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support" depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST - select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if INTEL_TDX_HOST help Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT extensions, a.k.a. Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX).arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig config KVM_INTEL_TDX · line 137
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +2
-0@@ -135,6 +133,8 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support" default y depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST + select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTESI had a similar patch internally, while my version doesn't select
KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTEShere since it's selected byKVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
Quoted 1 line
Anyway, next patch clean it up as well.
Yeah, I saw this oddity when writing this patch, and decided it'd be easier to just deal with it in the next patch.
PATCH v16 5/22 KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE
In reply to Fuad TabbaThe original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate() function, which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
The new name, HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the
option: to enable arch-specific guest_memfd population mechanisms. It also follows the same pattern as the other HAVE_KVM_ARCH_* configuration options.
This improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately reflects the functionality it controls, especially as guest_memfd support expands beyond purely "private" memory scenarios.
Note that the vm type KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM does not need the populate function. Therefore, ensure that the correct configuration is selected when KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM is enabled.
--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++---- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- virt/kvm/Kconfig | 9 ++++----- virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +10 -4
@@ -79,11 +79,16 @@ config KVM_WERROR If in doubt, say "N". +config KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + bool + config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" depends on EXPERT depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM help Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for
@@ -133,8 +138,8 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support" default y depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM - select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE help Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) confidential VMs on Intel processors.
@@ -157,9 +162,10 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64 depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m) select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE + select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE help Provides support for launching encrypted VMs which use Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV), Secure Encrypted Virtualization with
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -2534,7 +2534,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn,kvm_pfn_t pfn,int max_order);#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE /** * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data *
virt/kvm/Kconfig +4 -5
@@ -116,11 +116,6 @@ config KVM_GUEST_MEMFD select XARRAY_MULTI bool -config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM - select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES - select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD - bool - config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE bool depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD
@@ -128,3 +123,7 @@ config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE bool depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + +config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE + bool + depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +1 -1
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_gmem_get_pfn); -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE long kvm_gmem_populate (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t start_gfn,void __user *src,long npages,kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate,void *opaque) {
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Re: [PATCH v16 05/22] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE
Quoted 9 lines · Fuad Tabba
The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This
Kconfigoption specifically enables and gates thekvm_gmem_populate()function, which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.The new name,
HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the
option: to enable arch-specificguest_memfdpopulation mechanisms. It also follows the same pattern as the other HAVE_KVM_ARCH_* configuration options.
Quoted 7 lines
This improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately reflects the functionality it controls, especially as
guest_memfdsupport expands beyond purely "private" memory scenarios.Note that the vm type
KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VMdoes not need the populate function. Therefore, ensure that the correct configuration is selected whenKVM_SW_PROTECTED_VMis enabled.
the changelog needs to be enhanced. At least it doesn't talk about KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM at all.
If Sean is going to queue this version, I think he can help refine it when queuing.
Quoted 9 lines
Reviewed-by Ira Weiny <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Shivank Garg <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>Co-developed-by David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
Quoted 102 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++---- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- virt/kvm/Kconfig | 9 ++++----- virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +10
-4@@ -79,11 +79,16 @@ config KVM_WERROR If in doubt, say "N". +config KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + bool + config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" depends on EXPERT depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM help Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for@@ -133,8 +138,8 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support" default y depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM - select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES + select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE help Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) confidential VMs on Intel processors.@@ -157,9 +162,10 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64 depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m) select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM - select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE + select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE help Provides support for launching encrypted VMs which use Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV), Secure Encrypted Virtualization withinclude/linux/kvm_host.h +1
-1@@ -2534,7 +2534,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn,kvm_pfn_t pfn,int max_order);#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE /** * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data * virt/kvm/Kconfig +4
-5@@ -116,11 +116,6 @@ config KVM_GUEST_MEMFD select XARRAY_MULTI bool -config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM - select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES - select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD - bool - config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE bool depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD@@ -128,3 +123,7 @@ config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE bool depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD + +config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE + bool + depends on KVM_GUEST_MEMFDvirt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +1
-1@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_gmem_get_pfn); -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE long kvm_gmem_populate (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t start_gfn,void __user *src,long npages,kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate,void *opaque) {
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v16 05/22] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE
Quoted 18 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 9 lines · Fuad Tabba
The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This
Kconfigoption specifically enables and gates thekvm_gmem_populate()function, which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.The new name,
HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the
option: to enable arch-specificguest_memfdpopulation mechanisms. It also follows the same pattern as the other HAVE_KVM_ARCH_* configuration options.Quoted 7 lines
This improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately reflects the functionality it controls, especially as
guest_memfdsupport expands beyond purely "private" memory scenarios.Note that the vm type
KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VMdoes not need the populate function. Therefore, ensure that the correct configuration is selected whenKVM_SW_PROTECTED_VMis enabled.
Quoted 5 lines
the changelog needs to be enhanced. At least it doesn't talk about
KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEMat all.If Sean is going to queue this version, I think he can help refine it when queuing.
My bad, I simply forgot. How's this?
--
The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate() function, which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
The new name, HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the
option: to enable arch-specific guest_memfd population mechanisms. It also follows the same pattern as the other HAVE_KVM_ARCH_* configuration options.
This improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately reflects the functionality it controls, especially as guest_memfd support expands beyond purely "private" memory scenarios.
Temporarily keep KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM as an x86-only config so as to minimize the churn, and to hopefully make it easier to see what features require HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE. On that note, omit GMEM_POPULATE for KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, as regular ol' memset() suffices for software-protected VMs.
As for KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM, a future change will select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD for all 64-bit KVM builds, at which point the intermedidate config will become obsolete and can/will be dropped.
Re: [PATCH v16 05/22] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE
Quoted 19 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 18 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 16 lines · Fuad Tabba
The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This
Kconfigoption specifically enables and gates thekvm_gmem_populate()function, which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.The new name,
HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the
option: to enable arch-specificguest_memfdpopulation mechanisms. It also follows the same pattern as the other HAVE_KVM_ARCH_* configuration options.This improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately reflects the functionality it controls, especially as
guest_memfdsupport expands beyond purely "private" memory scenarios.Note that the vm type
KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VMdoes not need the populate function. Therefore, ensure that the correct configuration is selected whenKVM_SW_PROTECTED_VMis enabled.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
the changelog needs to be enhanced. At least it doesn't talk about
KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEMat all.If Sean is going to queue this version, I think he can help refine it when queuing.
My bad, I simply forgot. How's this?
looks good to me.
Quoted 25 lines
--
The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This
Kconfigoption specifically enables and gates thekvm_gmem_populate()function, which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.The new name,
HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the
option: to enable arch-specificguest_memfdpopulation mechanisms. It also follows the same pattern as the other HAVE_KVM_ARCH_* configuration options.This improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately reflects the functionality it controls, especially as
guest_memfdsupport expands beyond purely "private" memory scenarios.Temporarily keep
KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMas an x86-only config so as to minimize the churn, and to hopefully make it easier to see what features requireHAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE. On that note, omitGMEM_POPULATEforKVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, as regular ol'memset()suffices for software-protected VMs.As for
KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM, a future change will selectKVM_GUEST_MEMFDfor all 64-bit KVM builds, at which point the intermedidate config will become obsolete and can/will be dropped.
PATCH v16 6/22 KVM: Rename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to kvm_slot_has_gmem()
In reply to Fuad TabbaRename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to kvm_slot_has_gmem() to improve clarity and accurately reflect its purpose.
The function kvm_slot_can_be_private() was previously used to check if a given kvm_memory_slot is backed by guest_memfd. However, its name implied that the memory in such a slot was exclusively "private".
As guest_memfd support expands to include non-private memory (e.g., shared host mappings), it's important to remove this association. The new name, kvm_slot_has_gmem(), states that the slot is backed by guest_memfd without making assumptions about the memory's privacy attributes.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2 -2
@@ -3312,7 +3312,7 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) { -bool is_private =kvm_slot_can_be_private (slot) && +bool is_private =kvm_slot_has_gmem (slot) &&kvm_mem_is_private (kvm, gfn);return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, gfn,PG_LEVEL_NUM , is_private);
@@ -4551,7 +4551,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, {int max_order, r; -if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private (fault->slot)) { +if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem (fault->slot)) {kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit (vcpu, fault);return -EFAULT ; }
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2 -2
@@ -2365,7 +2365,7 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)mutex_lock (&kvm->slots_lock); memslot =gfn_to_memslot (kvm, params.gfn_start); -if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private (memslot)) { +if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem (memslot)) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; }
@@ -4719,7 +4719,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code) } slot =gfn_to_memslot (kvm, gfn); -if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private (slot)) { +if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem (slot)) {pr_warn_ratelimited ("SEV: Unexpected RMP fault, non-private slot for GPA 0x%llx\n" , gpa);return ;
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot {#endif }; -static inline bool kvm_slot_can_be_private (const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) +static inline bool kvm_slot_has_gmem (const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) {return slot && (slot->flags &KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD ); }
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +1 -1
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, longreturn -EINVAL ; slot =gfn_to_memslot (kvm, start_gfn); -if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private (slot)) +if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem (slot))return -EINVAL ; file =kvm_gmem_get_file (slot);
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 7/22 KVM: Fix comments that refer to slots_lock
In reply to Fuad TabbaFix comments so that they refer to slots_lock instead of slots_locks (remove trailing s).
--- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ struct kvm {struct notifier_block pm_notifier;#endif #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES -/* Protected by slots_locks (for writes) and RCU (for reads) */ +/* Protected by slots_lock (for writes) and RCU (for reads) */ struct xarray mem_attr_array;#endif char stats_id[KVM_STATS_NAME_SIZE ];
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +1 -1
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,* All current use cases for flushing the TLBs for a specific memslot * are related to dirty logging, and many do the TLB flush out of * mmu_lock. The interaction between the various operations on memslot -* must be serialized by slots_locks to ensure the TLB flush from one +* must be serialized by slots_lock to ensure the TLB flush from one * operation is observed by any other operation on the same memslot. */ lockdep_assert_held (&kvm->slots_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 8/22 KVM: Fix comment that refers to kvm uapi header path
In reply to Fuad TabbaThe comment that points to the path where the user-visible memslot flags are refers to an outdated path and has a typo.
Update the comment to refer to the correct path.
--- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@/* * The bit 16 ~ bit 31 of kvm_userspace_memory_region::flags are internally * used in kvm, other bits are visible for userspace which are defined in -* include/linux/kvm_h. +* include/uapi/linux/kvm.h. */ #define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID (1UL << 16)
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 9/22 KVM: x86: Enable KVM_GUEST_MEMFD for all 64-bit builds
In reply to Fuad TabbaEnable KVM_GUEST_MEMFD for all KVM x86 64-bit builds, i.e. for "default" VM types when running on 64-bit KVM. This will allow using guest_memfd to back non-private memory for all VM shapes, by supporting mmap() on guest_memfd.
Opportunistically clean up various conditionals that become tautologies once x86 selects KVM_GUEST_MEMFD more broadly. Specifically, because SW protected VMs, SEV, and TDX are all 64-bit only, private memory no longer needs to take explicit dependencies on KVM_GUEST_MEMFD, because it is effectively a prerequisite.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 12 ++++-------- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 9 ++------- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -3
@@ -2276,10 +2276,8 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level, int tdp_max_root_level, int tdp_huge_page_level); -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem) -#else -#define kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm) false#endif #define kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem (kvm) (!(kvm)->arch.has_protected_state)
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +4 -8
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ config KVM_X86 select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY select KVM_WERROR if WERROR + select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD if X86_64 config KVM tristate "Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support"
@@ -79,16 +80,11 @@ config KVM_WERROR If in doubt, say "N". -config KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM - select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES - select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD - bool - config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" depends on EXPERT depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 - select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES help Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for
@@ -138,7 +134,7 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support" default y depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST - select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE help Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)
@@ -162,7 +158,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64 depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m) select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM - select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE
include/linux/kvm_host.h +2 -7
@@ -719,11 +719,7 @@ static inline int kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) }#endif -/* -* Arch code must define kvm_arch_has_private_mem if support for guest_memfd is -* enabled. -*/ -#if !defined(kvm_arch_has_private_mem) && !IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ) +#ifndef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem (struct kvm *kvm) {return false;
@@ -2505,8 +2501,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) { -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ) && -kvm_get_memory_attributes (kvm, gfn) &KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE ; +return kvm_get_memory_attributes (kvm, gfn) &KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE ; }#else static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +2 -2
@@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm, {u32 valid_flags =KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES ; -if (kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm)) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD )) valid_flags |=KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD ;/* Dirty logging private memory is not currently supported. */
@@ -4917,7 +4917,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg)#endif #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD : -return !kvm ||kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm); +return 1 ;#endif default :break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Re: [PATCH v16 09/22] KVM: x86: Enable KVM_GUEST_MEMFD for all 64-bit builds
Quoted 4 lines · Fuad Tabba
Enable
KVM_GUEST_MEMFDfor all KVM x86 64-bit builds, i.e. for "default" VM types when running on 64-bit KVM. This will allow usingguest_memfdto back non-private memory for all VM shapes, by supportingmmap()onguest_memfd.
It's a bit weird, because mmap() support gets added in a later patch. But I suspect this is fine.
Signature · 3 lines
Cheers, David / dhildenb
Re: [PATCH v16 09/22] KVM: x86: Enable KVM_GUEST_MEMFD for all 64-bit builds
In reply to Fuad TabbaQuoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
Enable
KVM_GUEST_MEMFDfor all KVM x86 64-bit builds, i.e. for "default" VM types when running on 64-bit KVM. This will allow usingguest_memfdto back non-private memory for all VM shapes, by supportingmmap()onguest_memfd.
Quoted 8 lines
Opportunistically clean up various conditionals that become tautologies once x86 selects
KVM_GUEST_MEMFDmore broadly. Specifically, because SW protected VMs, SEV, and TDX are all 64-bit only, private memory no longer needs to take explicit dependencies onKVM_GUEST_MEMFD, because it is effectively a prerequisite.Suggested-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
It matches with my thought on v14 that gmem can be allowed for all x86 VM types[*]. Get rid of .supports_gmem and achieve it through CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD looks much cleaner!
[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Quoted 120 lines
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +--- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 12 ++++-------- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 9 ++------- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-3@@ -2276,10 +2276,8 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level, int tdp_max_root_level, int tdp_huge_page_level); -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem) -#else -#define kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm) false#endif #define kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem (kvm) (!(kvm)->arch.has_protected_state)arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig +4
-8@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ config KVM_X86 select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY select KVM_WERROR if WERROR + select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD if X86_64 config KVM tristate "Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support"@@ -79,16 +80,11 @@ config KVM_WERROR If in doubt, say "N". -config KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM - select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES - select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD - bool - config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM bool "Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs" depends on EXPERT depends on KVM_X86 && X86_64 - select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES help Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs. Currently, software- protected VMs are purely a development and testing vehicle for@@ -138,7 +134,7 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support" default y depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST - select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE help Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)@@ -162,7 +158,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64 depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m) select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM - select KVM_X86_PRIVATE_MEM + select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATEinclude/linux/kvm_host.h +2
-7@@ -719,11 +719,7 @@ static inline int kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) }#endif -/* -* Arch code must define kvm_arch_has_private_mem if support for guest_memfd is -* enabled. -*/ -#if !defined(kvm_arch_has_private_mem) && !IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ) +#ifndef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem (struct kvm *kvm) {return false;@@ -2505,8 +2501,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) { -return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD ) && -kvm_get_memory_attributes (kvm, gfn) &KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE ; +return kvm_get_memory_attributes (kvm, gfn) &KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE ; }#else static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn)virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +2
-2@@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm, {u32 valid_flags =KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES ; -if (kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm)) +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD )) valid_flags |=KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD ;/* Dirty logging private memory is not currently supported. */ @@ -4917,7 +4917,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg)#endif #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD : -return !kvm ||kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm); +return 1 ;#endif default :break ;
PATCH v16 10/22 KVM: guest_memfd: Add plumbing to host to map guest_memfd pages
In reply to Fuad TabbaIntroduce the core infrastructure to enable host userspace to mmap() guest_memfd-backed memory. This is needed for several evolving KVM use cases:
* Non-CoCo VM backing: Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests entirely backed by guest_memfd, even for non-CoCo VMs [1]. This provides a unified memory management model and simplifies guest memory handling.
* Direct map removal for enhanced security: This is an important step for direct map removal of guest memory [2]. By allowing host userspace to fault in guest_memfd pages directly, we can avoid maintaining host kernel direct maps of guest memory. This provides additional hardening against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by removing a potential attack surface within the kernel.
* Future guest_memfd features: This also lays the groundwork for future enhancements to guest_memfd, such as supporting huge pages and enabling in-place sharing of guest memory with the host for CoCo platforms that permit it [3].
Enable the basic mmap and fault handling logic within guest_memfd, but hold off on allow userspace to actually do mmap() until the architecture support is also in place.
[1] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/#u
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 +++++++ include/linux/kvm_host.h | 4 +++ virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +11 -0
@@ -13518,6 +13518,16 @@ bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_arch_no_poll); +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +/* + * KVM doesn't yet support mmap() on guest_memfd for VMs with private memory + * (the private vs. shared tracking needs to be moved into guest_memfd). + */ +bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + return !kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_order) {
@@ -13531,6 +13541,7 @@ void kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end)kvm_x86_call (gmem_invalidate)(start, end); }#endif +#endif int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value (u64 value) {
include/linux/kvm_host.h +4 -0
@@ -726,6 +726,10 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm) }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap (struct kvm *kvm); +#endif +#ifndef kvm_arch_has_readonly_memstatic inline bool kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem (struct kvm *kvm) {
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +70 -0
83 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Re: [PATCH v16 10/22] KVM: guest_memfd: Add plumbing to host to map guest_memfd pages
Quoted 29 lines · Fuad Tabba
Introduce the core infrastructure to enable host userspace to
mmap()guest_memfd-backed memory. This is needed for several evolving KVM use cases:* Non-CoCo VM backing: Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests entirely backed by
guest_memfd, even for non-CoCo VMs [1]. This provides a unified memory management model and simplifies guest memory handling.* Direct map removal for enhanced security: This is an important step for direct map removal of guest memory [2]. By allowing host userspace to fault in
guest_memfdpages directly, we can avoid maintaining host kernel direct maps of guest memory. This provides additional hardening against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by removing a potential attack surface within the kernel.* Future
guest_memfdfeatures: This also lays the groundwork for future enhancements toguest_memfd, such as supporting huge pages and enabling in-place sharing of guest memory with the host for CoCo platforms that permit it [3].Enable the basic mmap and fault handling logic within
guest_memfd, but hold off on allow userspace to actually dommap()until the architecture support is also in place.[1] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/#u
Quoted 6 lines
Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Shivank Garg <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
Quoted 14 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 11 +++++++ include/linux/kvm_host.h | 4 +++ virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +0
-0@@ -13518,6 +13518,16 @@ bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_arch_no_poll);
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 13530
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +10
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +/* +* KVM doesn't yet support mmap() on guest_memfd for VMs with private memory +* (the private vs. shared tracking needs to be moved into guest_memfd). +*/ +bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return !kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm); +} +
I think it's better to move the kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() stuff to patch 20. Because we don't know how kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() is going to be used unitll that patch.
Quoted 115 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn,kvm_pfn_t pfn,int max_order) {@@ -13531,6 +13541,7 @@ void kvm_arch_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end)kvm_x86_call (gmem_invalidate)(start, end); }#endif +#endif int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value (u64 value) {include/linux/kvm_host.h +4
-0@@ -726,6 +726,10 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm) }#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap (struct kvm *kvm); +#endif +#ifndef kvm_arch_has_readonly_memstatic inline bool kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem (struct kvm *kvm) {virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +70
-0@@ -312,7 +312,72 @@ static pgoff_t kvm_gmem_get_index(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)return gfn - slot->base_gfn + slot->gmem.pgoff; } +static bool kvm_gmem_supports_mmap (struct inode *inode) +{ +return false; +} + +static vm_fault_t kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping (struct vm_fault *vmf) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (vmf->vma->vm_file); +struct folio *folio; +vm_fault_t ret =VM_FAULT_LOCKED ; + +if (((loff_t )vmf->pgoff <<PAGE_SHIFT ) >=i_size_read (inode)) +return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + + folio =kvm_gmem_get_folio (inode, vmf->pgoff); +if (IS_ERR (folio)) { +int err =PTR_ERR (folio); + +if (err == -EAGAIN ) +return VM_FAULT_RETRY ; + +return vmf_error (err); + } + +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (folio_test_large (folio))) { + ret =VM_FAULT_SIGBUS ; + goto out_folio; + } + +if (!folio_test_uptodate (folio)) { +clear_highpage (folio_page (folio,0 )); +kvm_gmem_mark_prepared (folio); + } + + vmf->page =folio_file_page (folio, vmf->pgoff); + +out_folio: +if (ret !=VM_FAULT_LOCKED ) { +folio_unlock (folio); +folio_put (folio); + } + +return ret; +} + +static const struct vm_operations_struct kvm_gmem_vm_ops = { + .fault = kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping, +}; + +static int kvm_gmem_mmap (struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (!kvm_gmem_supports_mmap (file_inode (file))) +return -ENODEV ; + +if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED |VM_MAYSHARE )) != + (VM_SHARED |VM_MAYSHARE )) { +return -EINVAL ; + } + + vma->vm_ops = &kvm_gmem_vm_ops; + +return 0 ; +} +static struct file_operations kvm_gmem_fops = { + .mmap = kvm_gmem_mmap, .open = generic_file_open, .release = kvm_gmem_release, .fallocate = kvm_gmem_fallocate,@@ -391,6 +456,11 @@ static const struct inode_operations kvm_gmem_iops = { .setattr = kvm_gmem_setattr, }; +bool __weak kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap (struct kvm *kvm) +{ +return true; +} +static int __kvm_gmem_create (struct kvm *kvm,loff_t size,u64 flags) {const char *anon_name ="[kvm-gmem]" ;
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v16 10/22] KVM: guest_memfd: Add plumbing to host to map guest_memfd pages
Quoted 14 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 13 lines · Fuad Tabba
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +6
-0@@ -13518,6 +13518,16 @@ bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (kvm_arch_no_poll); +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD +/* +* KVM doesn't yet support mmap() on guest_memfd for VMs with private memory +* (the private vs. shared tracking needs to be moved into guest_memfd). +*/ +bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap (struct kvm *kvm)
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c bool kvm_arch_no_poll(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 13530
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +4
-0+{ +return !kvm_arch_has_private_mem (kvm); +} +I think it's better to move the
kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap()stuff to patch
20. Because we don't know howkvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap()is going to be used unitll that patch.
No strong preference on my end.
PATCH v16 11/22 KVM: guest_memfd: Track guest_memfd mmap support in memslot
In reply to Fuad TabbaAdd a new internal flag, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, to the top half of memslot->flags (which makes it strictly for KVM's internal use). This flag tracks when a guest_memfd-backed memory slot supports host userspace mmap operations, which implies that all memory, not just private memory for CoCo VMs, is consumed through guest_memfd: "gmem only".
This optimization avoids repeatedly checking the underlying guest_memfd file for mmap support, which would otherwise require taking and releasing a reference on the file for each check. By caching this information directly in the memslot, we reduce overhead and simplify the logic involved in handling guest_memfd-backed pages for host mappings.
--- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 ++++++++++- virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/kvm_host.h +10 -1
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@* used in kvm, other bits are visible for userspace which are defined in * include/uapi/linux/kvm.h. */ -#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID (1UL << 16) +#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID (1UL << 16) +#define KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY (1UL << 17)/* * Bit 63 of the memslot generation number is an "update in-progress flag",
@@ -2490,6 +2491,14 @@ static inline void kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, vcpu->run->memory_fault.flags |=KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE ; } +static inline bool kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only (const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot) +{ +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD )) +return false; + +return slot->flags &KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY ; +} +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES static inline unsigned long kvm_get_memory_attributes (struct kvm *kvm,gfn_t gfn) {
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +2 -0
@@ -578,6 +578,8 @@ int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,*/ WRITE_ONCE (slot->gmem.file, file); slot->gmem.pgoff = start; +if (kvm_gmem_supports_mmap (inode)) + slot->flags |=KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY ;xa_store_range (&gmem->bindings, start, end -1 , slot,GFP_KERNEL );filemap_invalidate_unlock (inode->i_mapping);
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 12/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Rename .private_max_mapping_level() to .gmem_max_mapping_level()
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>
Rename kvm_x86_ops.private_max_mapping_level() to .gmem_max_mapping_level() in anticipation of extending guest_memfd support to non-private memory.
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 +- 9 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h +1 -1
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons); KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(get_untagged_addr) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(alloc_apic_backing_page) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(gmem_prepare) -KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(private_max_mapping_level) +KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(gmem_max_mapping_level) KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(gmem_invalidate) #undef KVM_X86_OP
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -1922,7 +1922,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,gfn_t gfn,int max_order);void (*gmem_invalidate)(kvm_pfn_t start,kvm_pfn_t end); -int (*private_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn); +int (*gmem_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn); };struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1 -1
@@ -4532,7 +4532,7 @@ static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn,if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (private_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); + req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn);if (req_max_level) max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level);
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -1
@@ -4947,7 +4947,7 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) } } -int sev_private_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) {int level, rc;bool assigned;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
@@ -5180,7 +5180,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = { .gmem_prepare = sev_gmem_prepare, .gmem_invalidate = sev_gmem_invalidate, - .private_max_mapping_level = sev_private_max_mapping_level, + .gmem_max_mapping_level = sev_gmem_max_mapping_level, };/*
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +2 -2
@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code);void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int sev_gmem_prepare (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,gfn_t gfn,int max_order);void sev_gmem_invalidate (kvm_pfn_t start,kvm_pfn_t end); -int sev_private_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn); +int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn);struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa);#else
@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static inline int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, inreturn 0 ; }static inline void sev_gmem_invalidate (kvm_pfn_t start,kvm_pfn_t end) {} -static inline int sev_private_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) {return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +3 -3
@@ -831,10 +831,10 @@ static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)return tdx_vcpu_ioctl (vcpu, argp); } -static int vt_gmem_private_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +static int vt_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) {if (is_td (kvm)) -return tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level (kvm, pfn); +return tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (kvm, pfn);return 0 ; }
@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = { .mem_enc_ioctl = vt_op_tdx_only(mem_enc_ioctl), .vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl = vt_op_tdx_only(vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl), - .private_max_mapping_level =vt_op_tdx_only (gmem_private_max_mapping_level) + .gmem_max_mapping_level =vt_op_tdx_only (gmem_max_mapping_level) };struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops__initdata = {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1 -1
@@ -3338,7 +3338,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)return ret; } -int tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) {return PG_LEVEL_4K ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +1 -1
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);void tdx_flush_tlb_current (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void tdx_flush_tlb_all (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void tdx_load_mmu_pgd (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,hpa_t root_hpa,int root_level); -int tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn); +int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn);#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 13/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Hoist guest_memfd max level/order helpers "up" in mmu.c
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Move kvm_max_level_for_order() and kvm_max_private_mapping_level() up in mmu.c so that they can be used by __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level().
Opportunistically drop the "inline" from kvm_max_level_for_order().
No functional change intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +36 -36
@@ -3285,6 +3285,42 @@ static int host_pfn_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,return level; } +static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order (int order) +{ +BUILD_BUG_ON (KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL >PG_LEVEL_1G ); + +KVM_MMU_WARN_ON (order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G ) && + order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M ) && + order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_4K )); + +if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G )) +return PG_LEVEL_1G ; + +if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M )) +return PG_LEVEL_2M ; + +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +} + +static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, +u8 max_level,int gmem_order) +{ +u8 req_max_level; + +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + + max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level); +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + + req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +if (req_max_level) + max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); + +return max_level; +} +static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn,int max_level,bool is_private)
@@ -4503,42 +4539,6 @@ void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work) vcpu->stat.pf_fixed++; } -static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order (int order) -{ -BUILD_BUG_ON (KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL >PG_LEVEL_1G ); - -KVM_MMU_WARN_ON (order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G ) && - order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M ) && - order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_4K )); - -if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G )) -return PG_LEVEL_1G ; - -if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M )) -return PG_LEVEL_2M ; - -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; -} - -static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, -u8 max_level,int gmem_order) -{ -u8 req_max_level; - -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - - max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level); -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - - req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); -if (req_max_level) - max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); - -return max_level; -} -static void kvm_mmu_finish_page_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,int r) {
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Re: [PATCH v16 13/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Hoist guest_memfd max level/order helpers "up" in mmu.c
Quoted 11 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Move
kvm_max_level_for_order()andkvm_max_private_mapping_level()up inmmu.cso that they can be used by__kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level().Opportunistically drop the "inline" from
kvm_max_level_for_order().No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
Quoted 94 lines
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +36
-36@@ -3285,6 +3285,42 @@ static int host_pfn_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,return level; } +static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order (int order) +{ +BUILD_BUG_ON (KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL >PG_LEVEL_1G ); + +KVM_MMU_WARN_ON (order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G ) && + order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M ) && + order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_4K )); + +if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G )) +return PG_LEVEL_1G ; + +if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M )) +return PG_LEVEL_2M ; + +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +} + +static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, +u8 max_level,int gmem_order) +{ +u8 req_max_level; + +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + + max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level); +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + + req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +if (req_max_level) + max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); + +return max_level; +} +static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn,int max_level,bool is_private)@@ -4503,42 +4539,6 @@ void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work) vcpu->stat.pf_fixed++; } -static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order (int order) -{ -BUILD_BUG_ON (KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL >PG_LEVEL_1G ); - -KVM_MMU_WARN_ON (order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G ) && - order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M ) && - order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_4K )); - -if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G )) -return PG_LEVEL_1G ; - -if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M )) -return PG_LEVEL_2M ; - -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; -} - -static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, -u8 max_level,int gmem_order) -{ -u8 req_max_level; - -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - - max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level); -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - - req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); -if (req_max_level) - max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); - -return max_level; -} -static void kvm_mmu_finish_page_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,int r) {
Re: [PATCH v16 13/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Hoist guest_memfd max level/order helpers "up" in mmu.c
In reply to Fuad TabbaQuoted 107 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Move
kvm_max_level_for_order()andkvm_max_private_mapping_level()up inmmu.cso that they can be used by__kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level().Opportunistically drop the "inline" from
kvm_max_level_for_order().No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +36
-36@@ -3285,6 +3285,42 @@ static int host_pfn_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,return level; } +static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order (int order) +{ +BUILD_BUG_ON (KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL >PG_LEVEL_1G ); + +KVM_MMU_WARN_ON (order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G ) && + order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M ) && + order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_4K )); + +if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G )) +return PG_LEVEL_1G ; + +if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M )) +return PG_LEVEL_2M ; + +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +} + +static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, +u8 max_level,int gmem_order) +{ +u8 req_max_level; + +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + + max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level); +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + + req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +if (req_max_level) + max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); + +return max_level; +} +static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn,int max_level,bool is_private)@@ -4503,42 +4539,6 @@ void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work) vcpu->stat.pf_fixed++; } -static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order (int order) -{ -BUILD_BUG_ON (KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL >PG_LEVEL_1G ); - -KVM_MMU_WARN_ON (order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G ) && - order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M ) && - order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_4K )); - -if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G )) -return PG_LEVEL_1G ; - -if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M )) -return PG_LEVEL_2M ; - -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; -} - -static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, -u8 max_level,int gmem_order) -{ -u8 req_max_level; - -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - - max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level); -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - - req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); -if (req_max_level) - max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); - -return max_level; -} -static void kvm_mmu_finish_page_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,int r) {Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Reviewed-by:
Re: [PATCH v16 13/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Hoist guest_memfd max level/order helpers "up" in mmu.c
In reply to Fuad TabbaQuoted 107 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Move
kvm_max_level_for_order()andkvm_max_private_mapping_level()up inmmu.cso that they can be used by__kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level().Opportunistically drop the "inline" from
kvm_max_level_for_order().No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +36
-36@@ -3285,6 +3285,42 @@ static int host_pfn_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,return level; } +static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order (int order) +{ +BUILD_BUG_ON (KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL >PG_LEVEL_1G ); + +KVM_MMU_WARN_ON (order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G ) && + order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M ) && + order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_4K )); + +if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G )) +return PG_LEVEL_1G ; + +if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M )) +return PG_LEVEL_2M ; + +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +} + +static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, +u8 max_level,int gmem_order) +{ +u8 req_max_level; + +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + + max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level); +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + + req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +if (req_max_level) + max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); + +return max_level; +} +static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn,int max_level,bool is_private)@@ -4503,42 +4539,6 @@ void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work) vcpu->stat.pf_fixed++; } -static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order (int order) -{ -BUILD_BUG_ON (KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL >PG_LEVEL_1G ); - -KVM_MMU_WARN_ON (order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G ) && - order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M ) && - order !=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_4K )); - -if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_1G )) -return PG_LEVEL_1G ; - -if (order >=KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT (PG_LEVEL_2M )) -return PG_LEVEL_2M ; - -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; -} - -static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, -u8 max_level,int gmem_order) -{ -u8 req_max_level; - -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - - max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level); -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - - req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); -if (req_max_level) - max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); - -return max_level; -} -static void kvm_mmu_finish_page_fault (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,int r) {Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 14/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Rework kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to consult guest_memfd (and relevant) vendor code when recovering hugepages, e.g. after disabling live migration. The flaw has existed since guest_memfd was originally added, but has gone unnoticed due to lack of guest_memfd hugepage support.
Get all information on-demand from the memslot and guest_memfd instance, even though KVM could pull the pfn from the SPTE. However, the max order/level needs to come from guest_memfd, and using kvm_gmem_get_pfn() avoids adding a new gmem API, and avoids having to retrieve the pfn and plumb it into kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() (the pfn is needed for SNP to consult the RMP).
Note, calling kvm_mem_is_private() in the non-fault path is safe, so long as mmu_lock is held, as hugepage recovery operates on shadow-present SPTEs, i.e. calling kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() with @fault=NULL is mutually exclusive with kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes() changing the PRIVATE attribute of the gfn.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +48 -35
@@ -3302,31 +3302,55 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)return PG_LEVEL_4K ; } -static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, -u8 max_level,int gmem_order) +static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) { -u8 req_max_level; +struct page *page; +kvm_pfn_t pfn; +u8 max_level; -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ +if (fault) { + pfn = fault->pfn; + max_level = fault->max_level; + }else { +/* TODO: Constify the guest_memfd chain. */ +struct kvm_memory_slot *__slot = (struct kvm_memory_slot *)slot; +int max_order, r; - max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level); -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + r =kvm_gmem_get_pfn (kvm, __slot, gfn, &pfn, &page, &max_order); +if (r) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); -if (req_max_level) - max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); +if (page) +put_page (page); -return max_level; + max_level =kvm_max_level_for_order (max_order); + } + +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return max_level; + +return min (max_level, +kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn)); } -static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm, -const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, -gfn_t gfn,int max_level,bool is_private) +int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) {struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo; -int host_level; +int host_level, max_level; +bool is_private; + +lockdep_assert_held (&kvm->mmu_lock); + +if (fault) { + max_level = fault->max_level; + is_private = fault->is_private; + }else { + max_level =PG_LEVEL_NUM ; + is_private =kvm_mem_is_private (kvm, gfn); + } max_level =min (max_level, max_huge_page_level);for ( ; max_level >PG_LEVEL_4K ; max_level--) {
@@ -3335,25 +3359,16 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,break ; } -if (is_private) -return max_level; -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - host_level =host_pfn_mapping_level (kvm, gfn, slot); +if (is_private) + host_level =kvm_max_private_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn); +else + host_level =host_pfn_mapping_level (kvm, gfn, slot);return min (host_level, max_level); } -int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm, -const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) -{ -bool is_private =kvm_slot_has_gmem (slot) && -kvm_mem_is_private (kvm, gfn); - -return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, gfn,PG_LEVEL_NUM , is_private); -} -void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault) {struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;
@@ -3374,9 +3389,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault* Enforce the iTLB multihit workaround after capturing the requested * level, which will be used to do precise, accurate accounting. */ - fault->req_level =__kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (vcpu->kvm, slot, - fault->gfn, fault->max_level, - fault->is_private); + fault->req_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (vcpu->kvm, fault, + fault->slot, fault->gfn);if (fault->req_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K || fault->huge_page_disallowed)return ;
@@ -4564,8 +4578,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, } fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags &KVM_MEM_READONLY ); - fault->max_level =kvm_max_private_mapping_level (vcpu->kvm, fault->pfn, - fault->max_level, max_order); + fault->max_level =kvm_max_level_for_order (max_order);return RET_PF_CONTINUE ; }
@@ -7165,7 +7178,7 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct kvm *kvm,* mapping if the indirect sp has level = 1. */ if (sp->role.direct && - sp->role.level <kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, sp->gfn)) { + sp->role.level <kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm,NULL , slot, sp->gfn)) {kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte (kvm, rmap_head, sptep);if (kvm_available_flush_remote_tlbs_range ())
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +1 -1
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return r; } -int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm, +int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn);void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault);void disallowed_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_page_fault *fault,u64 spte,int cur_level);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +1 -1
@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ static void recover_huge_pages_range(struct kvm *kvm,if (iter.gfn < start || iter.gfn >= end)continue ; - max_mapping_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, iter.gfn); + max_mapping_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm,NULL , slot, iter.gfn);if (max_mapping_level < iter.level)continue ;
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Re: [PATCH v16 14/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages
Quoted 70 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Rework
kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level()to consultguest_memfd(and relevant) vendor code when recovering hugepages, e.g. after disabling live migration. The flaw has existed sinceguest_memfdwas originally added, but has gone unnoticed due to lack ofguest_memfdhugepage support.Get all information on-demand from the memslot and
guest_memfdinstance, even though KVM could pull the pfn from the SPTE. However, the max order/level needs to come fromguest_memfd, and usingkvm_gmem_get_pfn()avoids adding a new gmem API, and avoids having to retrieve the pfn and plumb it intokvm_mmu_max_mapping_level()(the pfn is needed for SNP to consult the RMP).Note, calling
kvm_mem_is_private()in the non-fault path is safe, so long asmmu_lockis held, as hugepage recovery operates on shadow-present SPTEs, i.e. callingkvm_mmu_max_mapping_level()with @fault=NULL is mutually exclusive withkvm_vm_set_mem_attributes()changing the PRIVATE attribute of the gfn.Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +18
-11@@ -3302,31 +3302,55 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)return PG_LEVEL_4K ; } -static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, -u8 max_level,int gmem_order) +static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) { -u8 req_max_level; +struct page *page; +kvm_pfn_t pfn; +u8 max_level; -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ +if (fault) { + pfn = fault->pfn; + max_level = fault->max_level; + }else { +/* TODO: Constify the guest_memfd chain. */ +struct kvm_memory_slot *__slot = (struct kvm_memory_slot *)slot; +int max_order, r; - max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level); -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + r =kvm_gmem_get_pfn (kvm, __slot, gfn, &pfn, &page, &max_order); +if (r) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); -if (req_max_level) - max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); +if (page) +put_page (page);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3336
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +8
-1-return max_level; + max_level =kvm_max_level_for_order (max_order); + } + +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return max_level; + +return min (max_level, +kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn)); }
I don't mean to want a next version.
But I have to point it out that, the coco_level stuff in the next patch should be put in this patch actually. Because this patch does the wrong thing to change from
req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); if (req_max_level) max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level);
to
return min(max_level, kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn));
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v16 14/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages
Quoted 1 line · Xiaoyao Li
On 7/23/2025 6:47 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
...
Quoted 13 lines
Review
Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +5
-0+ if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) + return max_level; + + return min(max_level, + kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn)); }I don't mean to want a next version.
But I have to point it out that, the
coco_levelstuff in the next patch should be put in this patch actually. Because this patch does the wrong thing to change from
Quoted 8 lines
req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); if (req_max_level) max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level);to
return min(max_level, kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn));
Gah, nice catch. Let's do one more version (knock wood). I have no objection to fixing up my own goof, but the selftest needs to be reworked too, and I think it makes sense for Paolo to grab this directly. The fewer "things" we need to handoff to Paolo, the better.
The fixup will generate a minor conflict, but it's trivial to resolve, and the resting state should end up identical.
As fixup:
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +11 -3
@@ -3305,9 +3305,9 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) { +u8 max_level, coco_level;struct page *page;kvm_pfn_t pfn; -u8 max_level;/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ if (fault) {
@@ -3331,8 +3331,16 @@ static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return max_level; -return min (max_level, -kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn)); +/* +* CoCo may influence the max mapping level, e.g. due to RMP or S-EPT +* restrictions. A return of '0' means "no additional restrictions", to +* allow for using an optional "ret0" static call. +*/ + coco_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +if (coco_level) + max_level =min (max_level, coco_level); + +return max_level; } int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
base-commit: f937c99dad18339773f18411f2a0193b5db8b581
Signature · 31 lines
Or a full patch: From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2025 11:47:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages Rework kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to consult guest_memfd (and relevant) vendor code when recovering hugepages, e.g. after disabling live migration. The flaw has existed since guest_memfd was originally added, but has gone unnoticed due to lack of guest_memfd hugepage support. Get all information on-demand from the memslot and guest_memfd instance, even though KVM could pull the pfn from the SPTE. However, the max order/level needs to come from guest_memfd, and using kvm_gmem_get_pfn() avoids adding a new gmem API, and avoids having to retrieve the pfn and plumb it into kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() (the pfn is needed for SNP to consult the RMP). Note, calling kvm_mem_is_private() in the non-fault path is safe, so long as mmu_lock is held, as hugepage recovery operates on shadow-present SPTEs, i.e. calling kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() with @fault=NULL is mutually exclusive with kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes() changing the PRIVATE attribute of the gfn. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> --- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +56 -35
136 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +1 -1
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return r; } -int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm, +int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn);void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault);void disallowed_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_page_fault *fault,u64 spte,int cur_level);
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +1 -1
@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ static void recover_huge_pages_range(struct kvm *kvm,if (iter.gfn < start || iter.gfn >= end)continue ; - max_mapping_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, iter.gfn); + max_mapping_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm,NULL , slot, iter.gfn);if (max_mapping_level < iter.level)continue ;
base-commit: 84ca709e4f4d54aae3b8d4df74490d8d3d2b1272 --
Re: [PATCH v16 14/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages
Quoted 116 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line · Xiaoyao Li
On 7/23/2025 6:47 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
...
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, · line 3378
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +5
-0+if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return max_level; + +return min (max_level, +kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn)); }I don't mean to want a next version.
But I have to point it out that, the
coco_levelstuff in the next patch should be put in this patch actually. Because this patch does the wrong thing to change fromQuoted 8 lines
req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); if (req_max_level) max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level);to
return min(max_level, kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn));Gah, nice catch. Let's do one more version (knock wood). I have no objection to fixing up my own goof, but the selftest needs to be reworked too, and I think it makes sense for Paolo to grab this directly. The fewer "things" we need to handoff to Paolo, the better.
The fixup will generate a minor conflict, but it's trivial to resolve, and the resting state should end up identical.
As fixup:
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +11
-3@@ -3305,9 +3305,9 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) { +u8 max_level, coco_level;struct page *page;kvm_pfn_t pfn; -u8 max_level;/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ if (fault) {@@ -3331,8 +3331,16 @@ static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return max_level; -return min (max_level, -kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn)); +/* +* CoCo may influence the max mapping level, e.g. due to RMP or S-EPT +* restrictions. A return of '0' means "no additional restrictions", to +* allow for using an optional "ret0" static call. +*/ + coco_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +if (coco_level) + max_level =min (max_level, coco_level); + +return max_level; } int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,base-commit:
f937c99dad18339773f18411f2a0193b5db8b581Signature · 31 lines
Or a full patch: From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2025 11:47:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages Rework kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to consult guest_memfd (and relevant) vendor code when recovering hugepages, e.g. after disabling live migration. The flaw has existed since guest_memfd was originally added, but has gone unnoticed due to lack of guest_memfd hugepage support. Get all information on-demand from the memslot and guest_memfd instance, even though KVM could pull the pfn from the SPTE. However, the max order/level needs to come from guest_memfd, and using kvm_gmem_get_pfn() avoids adding a new gmem API, and avoids having to retrieve the pfn and plumb it into kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() (the pfn is needed for SNP to consult the RMP). Note, calling kvm_mem_is_private() in the non-fault path is safe, so long as mmu_lock is held, as hugepage recovery operates on shadow-present SPTEs, i.e. calling kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() with @fault=NULL is mutually exclusive with kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes() changing the PRIVATE attribute of the gfn. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> --- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3306
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-2@@ -3302,31 +3302,63 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)return PG_LEVEL_4K ; } -static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, -u8 max_level,int gmem_order) +static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn)
Would you consider renaming this kvm_max_gmem_mapping_level()? Or something that doesn't limit the use of this function to private memory?
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +8
-3{ -u8 req_max_level; +u8 max_level, coco_level; +struct page *page; +kvm_pfn_t pfn; -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ +if (fault) { + pfn = fault->pfn; + max_level = fault->max_level; + }else {
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3326
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +10
-0+/* TODO: Constify the guest_memfd chain. */ +struct kvm_memory_slot *__slot = (struct kvm_memory_slot *)slot; +int max_order, r; + + r =kvm_gmem_get_pfn (kvm, __slot, gfn, &pfn, &page, &max_order); +if (r) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + +if (page) +put_page (page);
When I was working on this, I added a kvm_gmem_mapping_order() [1] where guest_memfd could return the order that this gfn would be allocated at without actually doing the allocation. Is it okay that an allocation may be performed here?
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3332
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +4
-2+ + max_level =kvm_max_level_for_order (max_order); + } - max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level);if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +return max_level;
I think the above line is a git-introduced issue, there probably shouldn't be a return here.
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3342
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +8
-3- req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); -if (req_max_level) - max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); +/* +* CoCo may influence the max mapping level, e.g. due to RMP or S-EPT +* restrictions. A return of '0' means "no additional restrictions", to +* allow for using an optional "ret0" static call. +*/ + coco_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +if (coco_level) + max_level =min (max_level, coco_level);
This part makes sense :)
Quoted 118 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +24
-25return max_level; } -static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm, -const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, -gfn_t gfn,int max_level,bool is_private) +int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) {struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo; -int host_level; +int host_level, max_level; +bool is_private; + +lockdep_assert_held (&kvm->mmu_lock); + +if (fault) { + max_level = fault->max_level; + is_private = fault->is_private; + }else { + max_level =PG_LEVEL_NUM ; + is_private =kvm_mem_is_private (kvm, gfn); + } max_level =min (max_level, max_huge_page_level);for ( ; max_level >PG_LEVEL_4K ; max_level--) {@@ -3335,25 +3367,16 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,break ; } +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +if (is_private) -return max_level; - -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - - host_level =host_pfn_mapping_level (kvm, gfn, slot); + host_level =kvm_max_private_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn); +else + host_level =host_pfn_mapping_level (kvm, gfn, slot);return min (host_level, max_level); } -int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm, -const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) -{ -bool is_private =kvm_slot_has_gmem (slot) && -kvm_mem_is_private (kvm, gfn); - -return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, gfn,PG_LEVEL_NUM , is_private); -} -void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault) {struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;@@ -3374,9 +3397,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault* Enforce the iTLB multihit workaround after capturing the requested * level, which will be used to do precise, accurate accounting. */ - fault->req_level =__kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (vcpu->kvm, slot, - fault->gfn, fault->max_level, - fault->is_private); + fault->req_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (vcpu->kvm, fault, + fault->slot, fault->gfn);if (fault->req_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K || fault->huge_page_disallowed)return ;@@ -4564,8 +4586,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, } fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags &KVM_MEM_READONLY ); - fault->max_level =kvm_max_private_mapping_level (vcpu->kvm, fault->pfn, - fault->max_level, max_order); + fault->max_level =kvm_max_level_for_order (max_order);return RET_PF_CONTINUE ; }@@ -7165,7 +7186,7 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct kvm *kvm,* mapping if the indirect sp has level = 1. */ if (sp->role.direct && - sp->role.level <kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, sp->gfn)) { + sp->role.level <kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm,NULL , slot, sp->gfn)) {kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte (kvm, rmap_head, sptep);if (kvm_available_flush_remote_tlbs_range ())arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +1
-1@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return r; } -int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm, +int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn);void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault);void disallowed_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_page_fault *fault,u64 spte,int cur_level);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +1
-1@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ static void recover_huge_pages_range(struct kvm *kvm,if (iter.gfn < start || iter.gfn >= end)continue ; - max_mapping_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, iter.gfn); + max_mapping_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm,NULL , slot, iter.gfn);if (max_mapping_level < iter.level)continue ;base-commit:
84ca709e4f4d54aae3b8d4df74490d8d3d2b1272--
Re: [PATCH v16 14/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages
Quoted 164 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 116 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 1 line · Xiaoyao Li
On 7/23/2025 6:47 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
...
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, · line 3378
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +5
-0+if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return max_level; + +return min (max_level, +kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn)); }I don't mean to want a next version.
But I have to point it out that, the
coco_levelstuff in the next patch should be put in this patch actually. Because this patch does the wrong thing to change fromQuoted 8 lines
req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); if (req_max_level) max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level);to
return min(max_level, kvm_x86_call(gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn));Gah, nice catch. Let's do one more version (knock wood). I have no objection to fixing up my own goof, but the selftest needs to be reworked too, and I think it makes sense for Paolo to grab this directly. The fewer "things" we need to handoff to Paolo, the better.
The fixup will generate a minor conflict, but it's trivial to resolve, and the resting state should end up identical.
As fixup:
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +11
-3@@ -3305,9 +3305,9 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) { +u8 max_level, coco_level;struct page *page;kvm_pfn_t pfn; -u8 max_level;/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ if (fault) {@@ -3331,8 +3331,16 @@ static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return max_level; -return min (max_level, -kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn)); +/* +* CoCo may influence the max mapping level, e.g. due to RMP or S-EPT +* restrictions. A return of '0' means "no additional restrictions", to +* allow for using an optional "ret0" static call. +*/ + coco_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +if (coco_level) + max_level =min (max_level, coco_level); + +return max_level; } int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,base-commit:
f937c99dad18339773f18411f2a0193b5db8b581Signature · 31 lines
Or a full patch: From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2025 11:47:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages Rework kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to consult guest_memfd (and relevant) vendor code when recovering hugepages, e.g. after disabling live migration. The flaw has existed since guest_memfd was originally added, but has gone unnoticed due to lack of guest_memfd hugepage support. Get all information on-demand from the memslot and guest_memfd instance, even though KVM could pull the pfn from the SPTE. However, the max order/level needs to come from guest_memfd, and using kvm_gmem_get_pfn() avoids adding a new gmem API, and avoids having to retrieve the pfn and plumb it into kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() (the pfn is needed for SNP to consult the RMP). Note, calling kvm_mem_is_private() in the non-fault path is safe, so long as mmu_lock is held, as hugepage recovery operates on shadow-present SPTEs, i.e. calling kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() with @fault=NULL is mutually exclusive with kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes() changing the PRIVATE attribute of the gfn. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> --- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3306
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-2@@ -3302,31 +3302,63 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)return PG_LEVEL_4K ; } -static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, -u8 max_level,int gmem_order) +static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn)Would you consider renaming this
kvm_max_gmem_mapping_level()? Or something that doesn't limit the use of this function to private memory?Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +8
-3{ -u8 req_max_level; +u8 max_level, coco_level; +struct page *page; +kvm_pfn_t pfn; -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ +if (fault) { + pfn = fault->pfn; + max_level = fault->max_level; + }else {arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3326
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +10
-0+/* TODO: Constify the guest_memfd chain. */ +struct kvm_memory_slot *__slot = (struct kvm_memory_slot *)slot; +int max_order, r; + + r =kvm_gmem_get_pfn (kvm, __slot, gfn, &pfn, &page, &max_order); +if (r) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; + +if (page) +put_page (page);When I was working on this, I added a
kvm_gmem_mapping_order()[1] whereguest_memfdcould return the order that this gfn would be allocated at without actually doing the allocation. Is it okay that an allocation may be performed here?Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +3
-0+ + max_level =kvm_max_level_for_order (max_order); + }
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3332
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1
-2- max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level);if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +return max_level;I think the above line is a git-introduced issue, there probably shouldn't be a return here.
My bad, this is a correct short-circuiting of the rest of the function since there's no smaller PG_LEVEL than PG_LEVEL_4K.
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3342
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +8
-3- req_max_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); -if (req_max_level) - max_level =min (max_level, req_max_level); +/* +* CoCo may influence the max mapping level, e.g. due to RMP or S-EPT +* restrictions. A return of '0' means "no additional restrictions", to +* allow for using an optional "ret0" static call. +*/ + coco_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn); +if (coco_level) + max_level =min (max_level, coco_level);This part makes sense :)
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +24
-25return max_level; } -static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm, -const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, -gfn_t gfn,int max_level,bool is_private) +int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) {struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo; -int host_level; +int host_level, max_level; +bool is_private; + +lockdep_assert_held (&kvm->mmu_lock); + +if (fault) { + max_level = fault->max_level; + is_private = fault->is_private; + }else { + max_level =PG_LEVEL_NUM ; + is_private =kvm_mem_is_private (kvm, gfn); + } max_level =min (max_level, max_huge_page_level);for ( ; max_level >PG_LEVEL_4K ; max_level--) {@@ -3335,25 +3367,16 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,break ; } +if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +if (is_private) -return max_level; - -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; - - host_level =host_pfn_mapping_level (kvm, gfn, slot); + host_level =kvm_max_private_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn); +else + host_level =host_pfn_mapping_level (kvm, gfn, slot);return min (host_level, max_level); } -int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm, -const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) -{ -bool is_private =kvm_slot_has_gmem (slot) && -kvm_mem_is_private (kvm, gfn); - -return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, gfn,PG_LEVEL_NUM , is_private); -} -void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault) {struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;@@ -3374,9 +3397,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault* Enforce the iTLB multihit workaround after capturing the requested * level, which will be used to do precise, accurate accounting. */ - fault->req_level =__kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (vcpu->kvm, slot, - fault->gfn, fault->max_level, - fault->is_private); + fault->req_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (vcpu->kvm, fault, + fault->slot, fault->gfn);if (fault->req_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K || fault->huge_page_disallowed)return ;@@ -4564,8 +4586,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, } fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags &KVM_MEM_READONLY ); - fault->max_level =kvm_max_private_mapping_level (vcpu->kvm, fault->pfn, - fault->max_level, max_order); + fault->max_level =kvm_max_level_for_order (max_order);return RET_PF_CONTINUE ; }@@ -7165,7 +7186,7 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct kvm *kvm,* mapping if the indirect sp has level = 1. */ if (sp->role.direct && - sp->role.level <kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, sp->gfn)) { + sp->role.level <kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm,NULL , slot, sp->gfn)) {kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte (kvm, rmap_head, sptep);if (kvm_available_flush_remote_tlbs_range ())arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h +1
-1@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,return r; } -int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm, +int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault,const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn);void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_page_fault *fault);void disallowed_hugepage_adjust (struct kvm_page_fault *fault,u64 spte,int cur_level);arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c +1
-1@@ -1813,7 +1813,7 @@ static void recover_huge_pages_range(struct kvm *kvm,if (iter.gfn < start || iter.gfn >= end)continue ; - max_mapping_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm, slot, iter.gfn); + max_mapping_level =kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level (kvm,NULL , slot, iter.gfn);if (max_mapping_level < iter.level)continue ;base-commit:
84ca709e4f4d54aae3b8d4df74490d8d3d2b1272--
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v16 14/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages
Quoted 11 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 9 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 8 lines · Sean Christopherson
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0@@ -3302,31 +3302,63 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)return PG_LEVEL_4K ; }
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3306
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +2
-2-static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, -u8 max_level,int gmem_order) +static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn)Would you consider renaming this
kvm_max_gmem_mapping_level()? Or something that doesn't limit the use of this function to private memory?
Heh, see the next patch, which does exactly that and is appropriately titled "KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings".
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +15
-3-u8 req_max_level; +u8 max_level, coco_level; +struct page *page; +kvm_pfn_t pfn; -if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ +if (fault) { + pfn = fault->pfn; + max_level = fault->max_level; + }else { +/* TODO: Constify the guest_memfd chain. */ +struct kvm_memory_slot *__slot = (struct kvm_memory_slot *)slot; +int max_order, r; + + r =kvm_gmem_get_pfn (kvm, __slot, gfn, &pfn, &page, &max_order); +if (r) +return PG_LEVEL_4K ;
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3326
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +3
-0+ +if (page) +put_page (page);When I was working on this, I added a
kvm_gmem_mapping_order()[1] whereguest_memfdcould return the order that this gfn would be allocated at without actually doing the allocation. Is it okay that an allocation may be performed here?
No, it's not. From a guest_memfd semantics perspective, it'd be ok. But allocating can block, and mmu_lock is held here.
I routed this through kvm_gmem_get_pfn(), because for this code to do the right thing, KVM needs to the PFN. That could be plumbed in from the existing SPTE, but I don't love the idea of potentially mixing the gmem order for pfn X with pfn Y from the SPTE, e.g. if the gmem backing has changed and an invalidation is pending.
KVM kinda sorta has such races with non-gmem memory, but for non-gmem KVM will never fully consume a "bad" PFN, whereas for this path, KVM could (at least in theory) immediately consume the pfn via an RMP lookup. Which is probably fine? but I don't love it.
I assume getting the order will basically get the page/pfn as well, so plumbing in the pfn from the SPTE, *knowing* that it could be stale, feels all kinds of wrong.
I also don't want to effectively speculatively add kvm_gmem_mapping_order() or expand kvm_gmem_get_pfn(), e.g. to say "no create", so what if we just do this?
/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */
if (fault) {
pfn = fault->pfn;
max_level = fault->max_level;
} else {
/* TODO: Call into guest_memfd once hugepages are supported. */
pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT;
max_level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
}
if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
return max_level;or alternatively:
/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */
if (fault) {
pfn = fault->pfn;
max_level = fault->max_level;
} else {
/* TODO: Call into guest_memfd once hugepages are supported. */
return PG_LEVEL_4K;
}
if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
return max_level;Functionally, it's 100% safe, even if/when guest_memfd supports hugepages. E.g. if we fail/forget to update this code, the worst case scneario is that KVM will neglect to recover hugepages.
While it's kinda weird/silly, I'm leaning toward the first option of setting max_level and relying on the common "max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K" check to avoid doing an RMP looking with KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT. I like that it helps visually captures that KVM needs to get both the max_level *and* the pfn from guest_memfd.
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[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
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arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +3
-0+ + max_level =kvm_max_level_for_order (max_order); + }Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order) · line 3332
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +1
-2- max_level =min (kvm_max_level_for_order (gmem_order), max_level);if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K ) -return PG_LEVEL_4K ; +return max_level;I think the above line is a git-introduced issue, there probably shouldn't be a return here.
Quoted 2 lines
My bad, this is a correct short-circuiting of the rest of the function since there's no smaller
PG_LEVELthanPG_LEVEL_4K.
Off topic: please trim your replies.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v16 14/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
On Thu, Jul 24, 2025, Ackerley Tng wrote:
I also don't want to effectively speculatively addkvm_gmem_mapping_order()or expandkvm_gmem_get_pfn(), e.g. to say "no create", so what if we just do this?/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ if (fault) { pfn = fault->pfn; max_level = fault->max_level; } else { /* TODO: Call into guest_memfd once hugepages are supported. */
Aha! Even better, we can full on WARN:
WARN_ONCE(1, "Get pfn+order from guest_memfd");
Because guest_memfd doesn't yet support dirty logging:
/* Dirty logging private memory is not currently supported. */ if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD) valid_flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
which kills off the kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages() call from kvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(). And if KVM ever supports in-place recover for kvm_recover_nx_huge_pages() (which is doubtful given that mitigation shouldn't be required going forward), lack of hugepage support means any guest_memfd-based shadow page can't be a possible NX hugepage.
Re: [PATCH v16 14/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering hugepages
Quoted 22 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
On Thu, Jul 24, 2025, Ackerley Tng wrote:
I also don't want to effectively speculatively addkvm_gmem_mapping_order()or expandkvm_gmem_get_pfn(), e.g. to say "no create", so what if we just do this?/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ if (fault) { pfn = fault->pfn; max_level = fault->max_level; } else { /* TODO: Call into guest_memfd once hugepages are supported. */Aha! Even better, we can full on WARN:
WARN_ONCE(1, "Get pfn+order from guest_memfd");Because
guest_memfddoesn't yet support dirty logging:/* Dirty logging private memory is not currently supported. */ if (mem->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD) valid_flags &= ~KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
Quoted 5 lines
which kills off the
kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages()call fromkvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(). And if KVM ever supports in-place recover forkvm_recover_nx_huge_pages()(which is doubtful given that mitigation shouldn't be required going forward), lack of hugepage support means any guest_memfd-based shadow page can't be a possible NX hugepage.
Thanks, this sounds good!
PATCH v16 15/22 KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
In reply to Fuad TabbaFrom: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Rework kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to consult guest_memfd for all mappings, not just private mappings, so that hugepage support plays nice with the upcoming support for backing non-private memory with guest_memfd.
In addition to getting the max order from guest_memfd for gmem-only memslots, update TDX's hook to effectively ignore shared mappings, as TDX's restrictions on page size only apply to Secure EPT mappings. Do nothing for SNP, as RMP restrictions apply to both private and shared memory.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 5 +++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 5 ++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 +- 7 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -1922,7 +1922,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,gfn_t gfn,int max_order);void (*gmem_invalidate)(kvm_pfn_t start,kvm_pfn_t end); -int (*gmem_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn); +int (*gmem_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private); };struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +17 -7
@@ -3302,12 +3302,13 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)return PG_LEVEL_4K ; } -static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, -const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) +static u8 kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn, +bool is_private) { +u8 max_level, coco_level;struct page *page;kvm_pfn_t pfn; -u8 max_level;/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ if (fault) {
@@ -3331,8 +3332,16 @@ static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return max_level; -return min (max_level, -kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn)); +/* +* CoCo may influence the max mapping level, e.g. due to RMP or S-EPT +* restrictions. A return of '0' means "no additional restrictions", to +* allow for using an optional "ret0" static call. +*/ + coco_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn, is_private); +if (coco_level) + max_level =min (max_level, coco_level); + +return max_level; } int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
@@ -3362,8 +3371,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return PG_LEVEL_4K ; -if (is_private) - host_level =kvm_max_private_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn); +if (is_private ||kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only (slot)) + host_level =kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn, + is_private);else host_level =host_pfn_mapping_level (kvm, gfn, slot);return min (host_level, max_level);
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1 -1
@@ -4947,7 +4947,7 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) } } -int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private) {int level, rc;bool assigned;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +2 -2
@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code);void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int sev_gmem_prepare (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,gfn_t gfn,int max_order);void sev_gmem_invalidate (kvm_pfn_t start,kvm_pfn_t end); -int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn); +int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private);struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa);#else
@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static inline int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, inreturn 0 ; }static inline void sev_gmem_invalidate (kvm_pfn_t start,kvm_pfn_t end) {} -static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private) {return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +3 -2
@@ -831,10 +831,11 @@ static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)return tdx_vcpu_ioctl (vcpu, argp); } -static int vt_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +static int vt_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, +bool is_private) {if (is_td (kvm)) -return tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (kvm, pfn); +return tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (kvm, pfn, is_private);return 0 ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +4 -1
@@ -3338,8 +3338,11 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)return ret; } -int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private) { +if (!is_private) +return 0 ; +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +1 -1
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);void tdx_flush_tlb_current (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void tdx_flush_tlb_all (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void tdx_load_mmu_pgd (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,hpa_t root_hpa,int root_level); -int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn); +int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private);#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Re: [PATCH v16 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
Quoted 78 lines · Fuad Tabba
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Rework
kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level()to consultguest_memfdfor all mappings, not just private mappings, so that hugepage support plays nice with the upcoming support for backing non-private memory withguest_memfd.In addition to getting the max order from
guest_memfdfor gmem-only memslots, update TDX's hook to effectively ignore shared mappings, as TDX's restrictions on page size only apply to Secure EPT mappings. Do nothing for SNP, as RMP restrictions apply to both private and shared memory.Suggested-by Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 5 +++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 5 ++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 2 +- 7 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1
-1@@ -1922,7 +1922,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,gfn_t gfn,int max_order);void (*gmem_invalidate)(kvm_pfn_t start,kvm_pfn_t end); -int (*gmem_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn); +int (*gmem_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private); };struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +14
-5@@ -3302,12 +3302,13 @@ static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)return PG_LEVEL_4K ; } -static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, -const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn) +static u8 kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_page_fault *fault, +const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,gfn_t gfn, +bool is_private) { +u8 max_level, coco_level;struct page *page;kvm_pfn_t pfn; -u8 max_level;/* For faults, use the gmem information that was resolved earlier. */ if (fault) {@@ -3331,8 +3332,16 @@ static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return max_level; -return min (max_level, -kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn)); +/* +* CoCo may influence the max mapping level, e.g. due to RMP or S-EPT +* restrictions. A return of '0' means "no additional restrictions", to +* allow for using an optional "ret0" static call. +*/ + coco_level =kvm_x86_call (gmem_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn, is_private); +if (coco_level) + max_level =min (max_level, coco_level); + +return max_level; } int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, · line 3378
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +3
-2@@ -3362,8 +3371,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return PG_LEVEL_4K ; -if (is_private) - host_level =kvm_max_private_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn); +if (is_private ||kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only (slot)) + host_level =kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn, + is_private);else host_level =host_pfn_mapping_level (kvm, gfn, slot);
No change required now, would like to point out that in this change there's a bit of an assumption if kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(), even for shared pages, guest_memfd will be the only source of truth.
This holds now because shared pages are always split to 4K, but if shared pages become larger, might mapping in the host actually turn out to be smaller?
Quoted 86 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0return min (host_level, max_level);arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +1
-1@@ -4947,7 +4947,7 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) } } -int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private) {int level, rc;bool assigned;arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +2
-2@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code);void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);int sev_gmem_prepare (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,gfn_t gfn,int max_order);void sev_gmem_invalidate (kvm_pfn_t start,kvm_pfn_t end); -int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn); +int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private);struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa);#else @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static inline int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, inreturn 0 ; }static inline void sev_gmem_invalidate (kvm_pfn_t start,kvm_pfn_t end) {} -static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +static inline int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private) {return 0 ; }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c +3
-2@@ -831,10 +831,11 @@ static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)return tdx_vcpu_ioctl (vcpu, argp); } -static int vt_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +static int vt_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn, +bool is_private) {if (is_td (kvm)) -return tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (kvm, pfn); +return tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (kvm, pfn, is_private);return 0 ; }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +4
-1@@ -3338,8 +3338,11 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)return ret; } -int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn) +int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private) { +if (!is_private) +return 0 ; +return PG_LEVEL_4K ; }arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h +1
-1@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp);void tdx_flush_tlb_current (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void tdx_flush_tlb_all (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void tdx_load_mmu_pgd (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,hpa_t root_hpa,int root_level); -int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn); +int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level (struct kvm *kvm,kvm_pfn_t pfn,bool is_private);#endif #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */ Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v16 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
Quoted 6 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct
kvm_page_fault*fault,arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0@@ -3362,8 +3371,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return PG_LEVEL_4K ;
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, · line 3378
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +3
-2-if (is_private) - host_level =kvm_max_private_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn); +if (is_private ||kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only (slot)) + host_level =kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn, + is_private);else host_level =host_pfn_mapping_level (kvm, gfn, slot);No change required now, would like to point out that in this change there's a bit of an assumption if
kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(), even for shared pages,guest_memfdwill be the only source of truth.
It's not an assumption, it's a hard requirement.
Quoted 3 lines
This holds now because shared pages are always split to 4K, but if shared pages become larger, might mapping in the host actually turn out to be smaller?
Yes, the host userspace mappens could be smaller, and supporting that scenario is very explicitly one of the design goals of guest_memfd. From commit a7800aa80ea4 ("KVM: Add KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD ioctl() for guest-specific backing memory"):
: A guest-first memory subsystem allows for optimizations and enhancements : that are kludgy or outright infeasible to implement/support in a generic : memory subsystem. With guest_memfd, guest protections and mapping sizes
: are fully decoupled from host userspace mappings. E.g. KVM currently
: doesn't support mapping memory as writable in the guest without it also : being writable in host userspace, as KVM's ABI uses VMA protections to : define the allow guest protection. Userspace can fudge this by : establishing two mappings, a writable mapping for the guest and readable : one for itself, but that’s suboptimal on multiple fronts.
:
: Similarly, KVM currently requires the guest mapping size to be a strict : subset of the host userspace mapping size, e.g. KVM doesn’t support : creating a 1GiB guest mapping unless userspace also has a 1GiB guest : mapping. Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely : map only what is needed without impacting guest performance, e.g. to : harden against unintentional accesses to guest memory.
Re: [PATCH v16 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
Quoted 29 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct
kvm_page_fault*fault,arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +0
-0@@ -3362,8 +3371,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault,if (max_level ==PG_LEVEL_4K )return PG_LEVEL_4K ;Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, · line 3378
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +3
-2-if (is_private) - host_level =kvm_max_private_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn); +if (is_private ||kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only (slot)) + host_level =kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level (kvm, fault, slot, gfn, + is_private);else host_level =host_pfn_mapping_level (kvm, gfn, slot);No change required now, would like to point out that in this change there's a bit of an assumption if
kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(), even for shared pages,guest_memfdwill be the only source of truth.It's not an assumption, it's a hard requirement.
Quoted 3 lines
This holds now because shared pages are always split to 4K, but if shared pages become larger, might mapping in the host actually turn out to be smaller?
Yes, the host userspace mappens could be smaller, and supporting that scenario is very explicitly one of the design goals of
guest_memfd. From commita7800aa80ea4("KVM: AddKVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFDioctl()for guest-specific backing memory"):
Quoted 16 lines
: A guest-first memory subsystem allows for optimizations and enhancements : that are kludgy or outright infeasible to implement/support in a generic : memory subsystem. With
guest_memfd, guest protections and mapping sizes
: are fully decoupled from host userspace mappings. E.g. KVM currently
: doesn't support mapping memory as writable in the guest without it also : being writable in host userspace, as KVM's ABI uses VMA protections to : define the allow guest protection. Userspace can fudge this by : establishing two mappings, a writable mapping for the guest and readable : one for itself, but that’s suboptimal on multiple fronts.
:
: Similarly, KVM currently requires the guest mapping size to be a strict : subset of the host userspace mapping size, e.g. KVM doesn’t support : creating a 1GiB guest mapping unless userspace also has a 1GiB guest : mapping. Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely : map only what is needed without impacting guest performance, e.g. to : harden against unintentional accesses to guest memory.
Let me try to understand this better. If/when guest_memfd supports larger folios for shared pages, and guest_memfd returns a 2M folio from kvm_gmem_fault_shared(), can the mapping in host userspace turn out to be 4K?
If that happens, should kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level() return 4K for a memslot with kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only() == true?
The above code would skip host_pfn_mapping_level() and return just what guest_memfd reports, which is 2M.
Or do you mean that guest_memfd will be the source of truth in that it must also know/control, in the above scenario, that the host mapping is also 2M?
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v16 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
Quoted 48 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 29 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct
kvm_page_fault*fault,(quoted diff) +0
-0@@ -3362,8 +3371,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) return PG_LEVEL_4K;Quoted 11 lines
Review int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, · line 3378
Quoted 7 lines
(quoted diff) +3
-2- if (is_private) - host_level = kvm_max_private_mapping_level(kvm, fault, slot, gfn); + if (is_private || kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(slot)) + host_level = kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(kvm, fault, slot, gfn, + is_private); else host_level = host_pfn_mapping_level(kvm, gfn, slot);No change required now, would like to point out that in this change there's a bit of an assumption if
kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(), even for shared pages,guest_memfdwill be the only source of truth.It's not an assumption, it's a hard requirement.
Quoted 3 lines
This holds now because shared pages are always split to 4K, but if shared pages become larger, might mapping in the host actually turn out to be smaller?
Yes, the host userspace mappens could be smaller, and supporting that scenario is very explicitly one of the design goals of
guest_memfd. From commita7800aa80ea4("KVM: AddKVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFDioctl()for guest-specific backing memory"):Quoted 16 lines
: A guest-first memory subsystem allows for optimizations and enhancements : that are kludgy or outright infeasible to implement/support in a generic : memory subsystem. With
guest_memfd, guest protections and mapping sizes
: are fully decoupled from host userspace mappings. E.g. KVM currently
: doesn't support mapping memory as writable in the guest without it also : being writable in host userspace, as KVM's ABI uses VMA protections to : define the allow guest protection. Userspace can fudge this by : establishing two mappings, a writable mapping for the guest and readable : one for itself, but that’s suboptimal on multiple fronts.
:
: Similarly, KVM currently requires the guest mapping size to be a strict : subset of the host userspace mapping size, e.g. KVM doesn’t support : creating a 1GiB guest mapping unless userspace also has a 1GiB guest : mapping. Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely : map only what is needed without impacting guest performance, e.g. to : harden against unintentional accesses to guest memory.
Quoted 4 lines
Let me try to understand this better. If/when
guest_memfdsupports larger folios for shared pages, andguest_memfdreturns a 2M folio fromkvm_gmem_fault_shared(), can the mapping in host userspace turn out to be 4K?
It can be 2M, 4K, or none.
Quoted 2 lines
If that happens, should
kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level()return 4K for a memslot withkvm_memslot_is_gmem_only()== true?
No.
Quoted 2 lines
The above code would skip
host_pfn_mapping_level()and return just whatguest_memfdreports, which is 2M.
Yes.
Quoted 3 lines
Or do you mean that
guest_memfdwill be the source of truth in that it must also know/control, in the above scenario, that the host mapping is also 2M?
No. The userspace mapping, _if_ there is one, is completely irrelevant. The entire point of guest_memfd is eliminate the requirement that memory be mapped into host userspace in order for that memory to be mapped into the guest.
Invoking host_pfn_mapping_level() isn't just undesirable, it's flat out wrong, as KVM will not verify slot->userspace_addr actually points at the (same) guest_memfd instance.
To demonstrate, this must pass (and does once "KVM: x86/mmu: Handle guest page faults for guest_memfd with shared memory" is added back).
--- .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +64 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/bitmap.h> #include <linux/falloc.h> +#include <linux/sizes.h> #include <setjmp.h> #include <signal.h> #include <sys/mman.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@#include "kvm_util.h" #include "test_util.h" +#include "ucall_common.h" static void test_file_read_write (int fd) {
@@ -298,6 +300,66 @@ static void test_guest_memfd(unsigned long vm_type)kvm_vm_free (vm); } +static void guest_code (uint8_t *mem,uint64_t size) +{ +size_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) +__GUEST_ASSERT (mem[i] ==0xaa , +"Guest expected 0xaa at offset %lu, got 0x%x" , i, mem[i]); + +memset (mem,0xff , size); +GUEST_DONE (); +} + +static void test_guest_memfd_guest (void ) +{ +/* +* Skip the first 4gb and slot0. slot0 maps <1gb and is used to back +* the guest's code, stack, and page tables, and low memory contains +* the PCI hole and other MMIO regions that need to be avoided. +*/ +const uint64_t gpa =SZ_4G ; +const int slot =1 ; + +struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; +struct kvm_vm *vm; +uint8_t *mem; +size_t size; +int fd, i; + +if (!kvm_has_cap (KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP )) +return ; + + vm =__vm_create_shape_with_one_vcpu (VM_SHAPE_DEFAULT , &vcpu,1 , guest_code); + +TEST_ASSERT (vm_check_cap (vm,KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP ), +"Default VM type should always support guest_memfd mmap()" ); + + size = vm->page_size; + fd =vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, size,GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP ); +vm_set_user_memory_region2 (vm, slot,KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD , gpa, size,NULL , fd,0 ); + + mem =mmap (NULL , size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem !=MAP_FAILED ,"mmap() on guest_memfd failed" ); +memset (mem,0xaa , size); +munmap (mem, size); + +virt_pg_map (vm, gpa, gpa); +vcpu_args_set (vcpu,2 , gpa, size); +vcpu_run (vcpu); + +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (get_ucall (vcpu,NULL ),UCALL_DONE ); + + mem =mmap (NULL , size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem !=MAP_FAILED ,"mmap() on guest_memfd failed" ); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (mem[i],0xff ); + +close (fd); +kvm_vm_free (vm); +} +int main (int argc,char *argv[]) {unsigned long vm_types, vm_type;
@@ -314,4 +376,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])for_each_set_bit (vm_type, &vm_types,BITS_PER_TYPE (vm_types))test_guest_memfd (vm_type); + +test_guest_memfd_guest (); }
base-commit: 9a82b11560044839b10b1fb83ff230d9a88785b8
Re: [PATCH v16 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
Quoted 66 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 48 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 29 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 5 lines · Fuad Tabba
int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct
kvm_page_fault*fault,(quoted diff) +0
-0@@ -3362,8 +3371,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K) return PG_LEVEL_4K;Quoted 11 lines
Review int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, · line 3378
Quoted 7 lines
(quoted diff) +3
-2- if (is_private) - host_level = kvm_max_private_mapping_level(kvm, fault, slot, gfn); + if (is_private || kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(slot)) + host_level = kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(kvm, fault, slot, gfn, + is_private); else host_level = host_pfn_mapping_level(kvm, gfn, slot);No change required now, would like to point out that in this change there's a bit of an assumption if
kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(), even for shared pages,guest_memfdwill be the only source of truth.It's not an assumption, it's a hard requirement.
Quoted 3 lines
This holds now because shared pages are always split to 4K, but if shared pages become larger, might mapping in the host actually turn out to be smaller?
Yes, the host userspace mappens could be smaller, and supporting that scenario is very explicitly one of the design goals of
guest_memfd. From commita7800aa80ea4("KVM: AddKVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFDioctl()for guest-specific backing memory"):Quoted 16 lines
: A guest-first memory subsystem allows for optimizations and enhancements : that are kludgy or outright infeasible to implement/support in a generic : memory subsystem. With
guest_memfd, guest protections and mapping sizes
: are fully decoupled from host userspace mappings. E.g. KVM currently
: doesn't support mapping memory as writable in the guest without it also : being writable in host userspace, as KVM's ABI uses VMA protections to : define the allow guest protection. Userspace can fudge this by : establishing two mappings, a writable mapping for the guest and readable : one for itself, but that’s suboptimal on multiple fronts.
:
: Similarly, KVM currently requires the guest mapping size to be a strict : subset of the host userspace mapping size, e.g. KVM doesn’t support : creating a 1GiB guest mapping unless userspace also has a 1GiB guest : mapping. Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely : map only what is needed without impacting guest performance, e.g. to : harden against unintentional accesses to guest memory.Quoted 4 lines
Let me try to understand this better. If/when
guest_memfdsupports larger folios for shared pages, andguest_memfdreturns a 2M folio fromkvm_gmem_fault_shared(), can the mapping in host userspace turn out to be 4K?It can be 2M, 4K, or none.
Quoted 2 lines
If that happens, should
kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level()return 4K for a memslot withkvm_memslot_is_gmem_only()== true?No.
Quoted 2 lines
The above code would skip
host_pfn_mapping_level()and return just whatguest_memfdreports, which is 2M.Yes.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Or do you mean that
guest_memfdwill be the source of truth in that it must also know/control, in the above scenario, that the host mapping is also 2M?No. The userspace mapping, _if_ there is one, is completely irrelevant. The entire point of
guest_memfdis eliminate the requirement that memory be mapped into host userspace in order for that memory to be mapped into the guest.
If it's not mapped into the host at all, host_pfn_mapping_level() would default to 4K and I think that's a safe default.
Quoted 4 lines
Invoking
host_pfn_mapping_level()isn't just undesirable, it's flat out wrong, as KVM will not verifyslot->userspace_addractually points at the (same)guest_memfdinstance.
This is true too, that invoking host_pfn_mapping_level() could return totally wrong information if slot->userspace_addr points somewhere else completely.
What if slot->userspace_addr is set up to match the fd+offset in the same guest_memfd, and kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level() returns 2M but it's actually mapped into the host at 4K?
A little out of my depth here, but would mappings being recovered to the 2M level be a problem?
For enforcement of shared/private-ness of memory, recovering the mappings to the 2M level is okay since if some part had been private, guest_memfd wouldn't have returned 2M.
As for alignment, if guest_memfd could return 2M to kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(), then userspace_addr would have been 2M aligned, which would correctly permit mapping recovery to 2M, so that sounds like it works too.
Maybe the right solution here is that since slot->userspace_addr need not point at the same guest_memfd+offset configured in the memslot, when guest_memfd responds to kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(), it should check if the requested GFN is mapped in host userspace, and if so, return the smaller of the two mapping levels.
Quoted 3 lines
To demonstrate, this must pass (and does once "KVM: x86/mmu: Handle guest page faults for
guest_memfdwith shared memory" is added back).
Makes sense :)
[snip]
Re: [PATCH v16 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
Quoted 10 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson
Invoking
host_pfn_mapping_level()isn't just undesirable, it's flat out wrong, as KVM will not verifyslot->userspace_addractually points at the (same)guest_memfdinstance.This is true too, that invoking
host_pfn_mapping_level()could return totally wrong information ifslot->userspace_addrpoints somewhere else completely.
Quoted 6 lines
What if
slot->userspace_addris set up to match the fd+offset in the sameguest_memfd, andkvm_gmem_max_mapping_level()returns 2M but it's actually mapped into the host at 4K?A little out of my depth here, but would mappings being recovered to the 2M level be a problem?
No, because again, by design, the host userspace mapping has _zero_ influence on the guest mapping.
Quoted 9 lines
For enforcement of shared/private-ness of memory, recovering the mappings to the 2M level is okay since if some part had been private,
guest_memfdwouldn't have returned 2M.As for alignment, if
guest_memfdcould return 2M tokvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(), thenuserspace_addrwould have been 2M aligned, which would correctly permit mapping recovery to 2M, so that sounds like it works too.
Quoted 5 lines
Maybe the right solution here is that since
slot->userspace_addrneed not point at the same guest_memfd+offset configured in the memslot, whenguest_memfdresponds tokvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(), it should check if the requested GFN is mapped in host userspace, and if so, return the smaller of the two mapping levels.
NAK.
I don't understand what problem you're trying to solve, at all. Setting aside guest_memfd for the moment, GFN=>HVA mappings are 100% userspace controlled, via memslots. If userspace is accessing guest memory, it is userspace's responsibility to ensure it's accessing the _right_ guest memory.
That doesn't change in any way for guest_memfd. It is still userspace's responsibility to ensure any accesses to guest memory through an HVA access the correct GFN.
But for guest_memfd guest mappings, the HVA is irrelevant, period. The only reason we aren't going to kill off slot->userspace_addr entirely is so that _KVM_ accesses to guest memory Just Work, without any meaningful changes to (a well-behaved) userspace.
For CoCo VMs (including pKVM), guest_memfd needs to ensure it doesn't create a hugepage that contains mixed memory, e.g. must not create a 2MiB userspace mapping if the 2MiB range contains private memory. But that is simply a sub-case of the generate requirement that untrusted entities don't have access to private memory, and that KVM doesn't induce memory corruption due to mapping memory as both shared and private.
Re: [PATCH v16 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
Quoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 14 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson
Invoking
host_pfn_mapping_level()isn't just undesirable, it's flat out wrong, as KVM will not verifyslot->userspace_addractually points at the (same)guest_memfdinstance.This is true too, that invoking
host_pfn_mapping_level()could return totally wrong information ifslot->userspace_addrpoints somewhere else completely.What if
slot->userspace_addris set up to match the fd+offset in the sameguest_memfd, andkvm_gmem_max_mapping_level()returns 2M but it's actually mapped into the host at 4K?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
A little out of my depth here, but would mappings being recovered to the 2M level be a problem?
No, because again, by design, the host userspace mapping has _zero_ influence on the guest mapping.
Not trying to solve any problem but mostly trying to understand mapping levels better.
Before guest_memfd, why does kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() need to do host_pfn_mapping_level()?
Was it about THP folios?
Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 9 lines
For enforcement of shared/private-ness of memory, recovering the mappings to the 2M level is okay since if some part had been private,
guest_memfdwouldn't have returned 2M.As for alignment, if
guest_memfdcould return 2M tokvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(), thenuserspace_addrwould have been 2M aligned, which would correctly permit mapping recovery to 2M, so that sounds like it works too.Quoted 5 lines
Maybe the right solution here is that since
slot->userspace_addrneed not point at the same guest_memfd+offset configured in the memslot, whenguest_memfdresponds tokvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(), it should check if the requested GFN is mapped in host userspace, and if so, return the smaller of the two mapping levels.NAK.
I don't understand what problem you're trying to solve, at all. Setting aside
guest_memfdfor the moment, GFN=>HVA mappings are 100% userspace controlled, via memslots. If userspace is accessing guest memory, it is userspace's responsibility to ensure it's accessing the _right_ guest memory.That doesn't change in any way for
guest_memfd. It is still userspace's responsibility to ensure any accesses to guest memory through an HVA access the correct GFN.But for
guest_memfdguest mappings, the HVA is irrelevant, period. The only reason we aren't going to kill offslot->userspace_addrentirely is so that _KVM_ accesses to guest memory Just Work, without any meaningful changes to (a well-behaved) userspace.For CoCo VMs (including pKVM),
guest_memfdneeds to ensure it doesn't create a hugepage that contains mixed memory, e.g. must not create a 2MiB userspace mapping if the 2MiB range contains private memory. But that is simply a sub-case of the generate requirement that untrusted entities don't have access to private memory, and that KVM doesn't induce memory corruption due to mapping memory as both shared and private.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v16 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
Quoted 23 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 14 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson
Invoking
host_pfn_mapping_level()isn't just undesirable, it's flat out wrong, as KVM will not verifyslot->userspace_addractually points at the (same)guest_memfdinstance.This is true too, that invoking
host_pfn_mapping_level()could return totally wrong information ifslot->userspace_addrpoints somewhere else completely.What if
slot->userspace_addris set up to match the fd+offset in the sameguest_memfd, andkvm_gmem_max_mapping_level()returns 2M but it's actually mapped into the host at 4K?Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
A little out of my depth here, but would mappings being recovered to the 2M level be a problem?
No, because again, by design, the host userspace mapping has _zero_ influence on the guest mapping.
Quoted 7 lines
Not trying to solve any problem but mostly trying to understand mapping levels better.
Before
guest_memfd, why doeskvm_mmu_max_mapping_level()need to dohost_pfn_mapping_level()?Was it about THP folios?
And HugeTLB, and Device DAX, and probably at least one other type of backing at this point.
Without guest_memfd, guest mappings are a strict subset of the host userspace mappings for the associated address space (i.e. process) (ignoring that the guest and host mappings are separate page tables).
When mapping memory into the guest, KVM manages a Secondary MMU (in mmu_notifier parlance), where the Primary MMU is managed by mm/, and is for all intents and purposes synonymous with the address space of the userspace VMM.
To get a pfn to insert into the Secondary MMU's PTEs (SPTE, which was originally "shadow PTEs", but has been retrofitted to "secondary PTEs" so that it's not an outright lie when using stage-2 page tables), the pfn *must* be faulted into and mapped in the Primary MMU. I.e. under no circumstance can a SPTE point at memory that isn't mapped into the Primary MMU.
Side note, except for VM_EXEC, protections for Secondary MMU mappings must also be a strict subset of the Primary MMU's mappings. E.g. KVM can't create a WRITABLE SPTE if the userspace VMA is read-only. EXEC protections are exempt, so that guest memory doesn't have to be mapped executable in the VMM, which would basically make the VMM a CVE factory :-)
All of that holds true for hugepages as well, because that rule is just a special case of the general rule that all memory must be first mapped into the Primary MMU. Rather than query the backing store's allowed page size, KVM x86 simply looks at the Primary MMU's userspace page tables. Originally, KVM _did_ query the VMA directly for HugeTLB, but when things like DAX came along, we realized that poking into backing stores directly was going to be a maintenance nightmare.
So instead, KVM was reworked to peek at the userspace page tables for everything, and knock wood, that approach has Just Worked for all backing stores.
Which actually highlights the brilliance of having KVM be a Secondary MMU that's fully subordinate to the Primary MMU. Modulo some terrible logic with respect to VM_PFNMAP and "struct page" that has now been fixed, literally anything that can be mapped into the VMM can be mapped into a KVM guest, without KVM needing to know *anything* about the underlying memory.
Jumping back to guest_memfd, the main principle of guest_memfd is that it allows _KVM_ to be the Primary MMU (mm/ is now becoming another "primary" MMU, but I would call KVM 1a and mm/ 1b). Instead of the VMM's address space and page tables being the source of truth, guest_memfd is the source of truth. And that's why I'm so adamant that host_pfn_mapping_level() is completely out of scope for guest_memfd; that API _only_ makes sense when KVM is operating as a Seconary MMU.
Re: [PATCH v16 15/22] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared mappings
Quoted 71 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 23 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 14 lines · Ackerley Tng
Quoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson
Invoking
host_pfn_mapping_level()isn't just undesirable, it's flat out wrong, as KVM will not verifyslot->userspace_addractually points at the (same)guest_memfdinstance.This is true too, that invoking
host_pfn_mapping_level()could return totally wrong information ifslot->userspace_addrpoints somewhere else completely.What if
slot->userspace_addris set up to match the fd+offset in the sameguest_memfd, andkvm_gmem_max_mapping_level()returns 2M but it's actually mapped into the host at 4K?Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
A little out of my depth here, but would mappings being recovered to the 2M level be a problem?
No, because again, by design, the host userspace mapping has _zero_ influence on the guest mapping.
Quoted 7 lines
Not trying to solve any problem but mostly trying to understand mapping levels better.
Before
guest_memfd, why doeskvm_mmu_max_mapping_level()need to dohost_pfn_mapping_level()?Was it about THP folios?
And HugeTLB, and Device DAX, and probably at least one other type of backing at this point.
Without
guest_memfd, guest mappings are a strict subset of the host userspace mappings for the associated address space (i.e. process) (ignoring that the guest and host mappings are separate page tables).When mapping memory into the guest, KVM manages a Secondary MMU (in
mmu_notifierparlance), where the Primary MMU is managed bymm/, and is for all intents and purposes synonymous with the address space of the userspace VMM.To get a pfn to insert into the Secondary MMU's PTEs (SPTE, which was originally "shadow PTEs", but has been retrofitted to "secondary PTEs" so that it's not an outright lie when using stage-2 page tables), the pfn *must* be faulted into and mapped in the Primary MMU. I.e. under no circumstance can a SPTE point at memory that isn't mapped into the Primary MMU.
Side note, except for
VM_EXEC, protections for Secondary MMU mappings must also be a strict subset of the Primary MMU's mappings. E.g. KVM can't create a WRITABLE SPTE if the userspace VMA is read-only. EXEC protections are exempt, so that guest memory doesn't have to be mapped executable in the VMM, which would basically make the VMM a CVE factory :-)All of that holds true for hugepages as well, because that rule is just a special case of the general rule that all memory must be first mapped into the Primary MMU. Rather than query the backing store's allowed page size, KVM x86 simply looks at the Primary MMU's userspace page tables. Originally, KVM _did_ query the VMA directly for HugeTLB, but when things like DAX came along, we realized that poking into backing stores directly was going to be a maintenance nightmare.
So instead, KVM was reworked to peek at the userspace page tables for everything, and knock wood, that approach has Just Worked for all backing stores.
Which actually highlights the brilliance of having KVM be a Secondary MMU that's fully subordinate to the Primary MMU. Modulo some terrible logic with respect to
VM_PFNMAPand "struct page" that has now been fixed, literally anything that can be mapped into the VMM can be mapped into a KVM guest, without KVM needing to know *anything* about the underlying memory.
Quoted 6 lines
Jumping back to
guest_memfd, the main principle ofguest_memfdis that it allows _KVM_ to be the Primary MMU (mm/is now becoming another "primary" MMU, but I would call KVM 1a andmm/1b). Instead of the VMM's address space and page tables being the source of truth,guest_memfdis the source of truth. And that's why I'm so adamant thathost_pfn_mapping_level()is completely out of scope forguest_memfd; that API _only_ makes sense when KVM is operating as a Seconary MMU.
Thanks! Appreciate the detailed response :)
It fits together for me now.
PATCH v16 16/22 KVM: arm64: Refactor user_mem_abort()
In reply to Fuad TabbaRefactor user_mem_abort() to improve code clarity and simplify assumptions within the function.
Key changes include:
* Immediately set force_pte to true at the beginning of the function if logging_active is true. This simplifies the flow and makes the condition for forcing a PTE more explicit.
* Remove the misleading comment stating that logging_active is guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP memslots, as this assertion is not entirely correct.
* Extract reusable code blocks into new helper functions:
* prepare_mmu_memcache(): Encapsulates the logic for preparing and topping up the MMU page cache.
* adjust_nested_fault_perms(): Isolates the adjustments to shadow S2 permissions and the encoding of nested translation levels.
* Update min(a, (long)b) to min_t(long, a, b) for better type safety and consistency.
* Perform other minor tidying up of the code.
These changes primarily aim to simplify user_mem_abort() and make its logic easier to understand and maintain, setting the stage for future modifications.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +59 -51
@@ -1470,13 +1470,56 @@ static bool kvm_vma_mte_allowed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)return vma->vm_flags &VM_MTE_ALLOWED ; } +static int prepare_mmu_memcache (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool topup_memcache, +void **memcache) +{ +int min_pages; + +if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled ()) + *memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache; +else + *memcache = &vcpu->arch.pkvm_memcache; + +if (!topup_memcache) +return 0 ; + + min_pages =kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages (vcpu->arch.hw_mmu); + +if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled ()) +return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache (*memcache, min_pages); + +return topup_hyp_memcache (*memcache, min_pages); +} + +/* +* Potentially reduce shadow S2 permissions to match the guest's own S2. For +* exec faults, we'd only reach this point if the guest actually allowed it (see +* kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault). +* +* Also encode the level of the original translation in the SW bits of the leaf +* entry as a proxy for the span of that translation. This will be retrieved on +* TLB invalidation from the guest and used to limit the invalidation scope if a +* TTL hint or a range isn't provided. +*/ +static void adjust_nested_fault_perms (struct kvm_s2_trans *nested, +enum kvm_pgtable_prot *prot, +bool *writable) +{ + *writable &=kvm_s2_trans_writable (nested); +if (!kvm_s2_trans_readable (nested)) + *prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R ; + + *prot |=kvm_encode_nested_level (nested); +} +static int user_mem_abort (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,phys_addr_t fault_ipa,struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,unsigned long hva,bool fault_is_perm) {int ret =0 ; -bool write_fault, writable, force_pte = false; +bool topup_memcache; +bool write_fault, writable;bool exec_fault, mte_allowed;bool device = false, vfio_allow_any_uc = false;unsigned long mmu_seq;
@@ -1488,6 +1531,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,gfn_t gfn;kvm_pfn_t pfn;bool logging_active =memslot_is_logging (memslot); +bool force_pte = logging_active;long vma_pagesize, fault_granule;enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot =KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R ;struct kvm_pgtable *pgt;
@@ -1498,17 +1542,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, fault_granule =kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule (vcpu); write_fault =kvm_is_write_fault (vcpu); exec_fault =kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault (vcpu); -VM_BUG_ON (write_fault && exec_fault); - -if (fault_is_perm && !write_fault && !exec_fault) { -kvm_err ("Unexpected L2 read permission error\n" ); -return -EFAULT ; - } - -if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled ()) - memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache; -else - memcache = &vcpu->arch.pkvm_memcache; +VM_WARN_ON_ONCE (write_fault && exec_fault);/* * Permission faults just need to update the existing leaf entry,
@@ -1516,17 +1550,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,* only exception to this is when dirty logging is enabled at runtime * and a write fault needs to collapse a block entry into a table. */ -if (!fault_is_perm || (logging_active && write_fault)) { -int min_pages =kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages (vcpu->arch.hw_mmu); - -if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled ()) - ret =kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache (memcache, min_pages); -else - ret =topup_hyp_memcache (memcache, min_pages); - -if (ret) -return ret; - } + topup_memcache = !fault_is_perm || (logging_active && write_fault); + ret =prepare_mmu_memcache (vcpu, topup_memcache, &memcache); +if (ret) +return ret;/* * Let's check if we will get back a huge page backed by hugetlbfs, or
@@ -1540,16 +1567,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,return -EFAULT ; } -/* -* logging_active is guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP -* memslots. -*/ -if (logging_active) { - force_pte = true; +if (force_pte) vma_shift =PAGE_SHIFT ; - }else { +else vma_shift =get_vma_page_shift (vma, hva); - }switch (vma_shift) {#ifndef __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED
@@ -1601,7 +1622,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, max_map_size =PAGE_SIZE ; force_pte = (max_map_size ==PAGE_SIZE ); - vma_pagesize =min (vma_pagesize, (long )max_map_size); + vma_pagesize =min_t (long, vma_pagesize, max_map_size); }/*
@@ -1630,7 +1651,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,* Rely on mmap_read_unlock() for an implicit smp_rmb(), which pairs * with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(). */ - mmu_seq = vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq; + mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;mmap_read_unlock (current->mm); pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(memslot, gfn, write_fault ? FOLL_WRITE : 0,
@@ -1665,24 +1686,8 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,if (exec_fault && device)return -ENOEXEC ; -/* -* Potentially reduce shadow S2 permissions to match the guest's own -* S2. For exec faults, we'd only reach this point if the guest -* actually allowed it (see kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault). -* -* Also encode the level of the original translation in the SW bits -* of the leaf entry as a proxy for the span of that translation. -* This will be retrieved on TLB invalidation from the guest and -* used to limit the invalidation scope if a TTL hint or a range -* isn't provided. -*/ -if (nested) { - writable &=kvm_s2_trans_writable (nested); -if (!kvm_s2_trans_readable (nested)) - prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R ; - - prot |=kvm_encode_nested_level (nested); - } +if (nested) +adjust_nested_fault_perms (nested, &prot, &writable);kvm_fault_lock (kvm); pgt = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt;
@@ -1953,6 +1958,9 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto out_unlock; } +VM_WARN_ON_ONCE (kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault (vcpu) && + !write_fault && !kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault (vcpu)); + ret =user_mem_abort (vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva,esr_fsc_is_permission_fault (esr));if (ret ==0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 17/22 KVM: arm64: Handle guest_memfd-backed guest page faults
In reply to Fuad TabbaAdd arm64 architecture support for handling guest page faults on memory slots backed by guest_memfd.
This change introduces a new function, gmem_abort(), which encapsulates the fault handling logic specific to guest_memfd-backed memory. The kvm_handle_guest_abort() entry point is updated to dispatch to gmem_abort() when a fault occurs on a guest_memfd-backed memory slot (as determined by kvm_slot_has_gmem()).
Until guest_memfd gains support for huge pages, the fault granule for these memory regions is restricted to PAGE_SIZE.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +83 -3
@@ -1512,6 +1512,82 @@ static void adjust_nested_fault_perms(struct kvm_s2_trans *nested, *prot |=kvm_encode_nested_level (nested); } +#define KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_MEMABORT_FLAGS (KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_HANDLE_FAULT | KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_SHARED) + +static int gmem_abort (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,phys_addr_t fault_ipa, +struct kvm_s2_trans *nested, +struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,bool is_perm) +{ +bool write_fault, exec_fault, writable; +enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags =KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_MEMABORT_FLAGS ; +enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot =KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R ; +struct kvm_pgtable *pgt = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt; +unsigned long mmu_seq; +struct page *page; +struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm; +void *memcache; +kvm_pfn_t pfn; +gfn_t gfn; +int ret; + + ret =prepare_mmu_memcache (vcpu, true, &memcache); +if (ret) +return ret; + +if (nested) + gfn =kvm_s2_trans_output (nested) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; +else + gfn = fault_ipa >>PAGE_SHIFT ; + + write_fault =kvm_is_write_fault (vcpu); + exec_fault =kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault (vcpu); + +VM_WARN_ON_ONCE (write_fault && exec_fault); + + mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq; +/* Pairs with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(). */ +smp_rmb (); + + ret =kvm_gmem_get_pfn (kvm, memslot, gfn, &pfn, &page,NULL ); +if (ret) { +kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit (vcpu, fault_ipa,PAGE_SIZE , + write_fault, exec_fault, false); +return ret; + } + + writable = !(memslot->flags &KVM_MEM_READONLY ); + +if (nested) +adjust_nested_fault_perms (nested, &prot, &writable); + +if (writable) + prot |=KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W ; + +if (exec_fault || + (cpus_have_final_cap (ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC ) && + (!nested ||kvm_s2_trans_executable (nested)))) + prot |=KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_X ; + +kvm_fault_lock (kvm); +if (mmu_invalidate_retry (kvm, mmu_seq)) { + ret = -EAGAIN ; + goto out_unlock; + } + + ret =KVM_PGT_FN (kvm_pgtable_stage2_map)(pgt, fault_ipa,PAGE_SIZE , +__pfn_to_phys (pfn), prot, + memcache, flags); + +out_unlock: +kvm_release_faultin_page (kvm, page, !!ret, writable); +kvm_fault_unlock (kvm); + +if (writable && !ret) +mark_page_dirty_in_slot (kvm, memslot, gfn); + +return ret != -EAGAIN ? ret :0 ; +} + static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa, struct kvm_s2_trans *nested, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, unsigned long hva,
@@ -1536,7 +1612,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot =KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R ;struct kvm_pgtable *pgt;struct page *page; -enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags =KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_HANDLE_FAULT |KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_SHARED ; +enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags =KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_MEMABORT_FLAGS ;if (fault_is_perm) fault_granule =kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule (vcpu);
@@ -1961,8 +2037,12 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)VM_WARN_ON_ONCE (kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault (vcpu) && !write_fault && !kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault (vcpu)); - ret =user_mem_abort (vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva, -esr_fsc_is_permission_fault (esr)); +if (kvm_slot_has_gmem (memslot)) + ret =gmem_abort (vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, +esr_fsc_is_permission_fault (esr)); +else + ret =user_mem_abort (vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva, +esr_fsc_is_permission_fault (esr));if (ret ==0 ) ret =1 ; out:
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 18/22 KVM: arm64: nv: Handle VNCR_EL2-triggered faults backed by guest_memfd
In reply to Fuad TabbaHandle faults for memslots backed by guest_memfd in arm64 nested virtualization triggered by VNCR_EL2.
* Introduce is_gmem output parameter to kvm_translate_vncr(), indicating whether the faulted memory slot is backed by guest_memfd.
* Dispatch faults backed by guest_memfd to kvm_gmem_get_pfn().
* Update kvm_handle_vncr_abort() to handle potential guest_memfd errors. Some of the guest_memfd errors need to be handled by userspace instead of attempting to (implicitly) retry by returning to the guest.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c +35 -6
@@ -1172,8 +1172,9 @@ static u64 read_vncr_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)return (u64 )sign_extend64 (__vcpu_sys_reg (vcpu,VNCR_EL2 ),48 ); } -static int kvm_translate_vncr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static int kvm_translate_vncr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,bool *is_gmem) { +struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;bool write_fault, writable;unsigned long mmu_seq;struct vncr_tlb *vt;
@@ -1216,10 +1217,25 @@ static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)smp_rmb (); gfn = vt->wr.pa >>PAGE_SHIFT ; - pfn =kvm_faultin_pfn (vcpu, gfn, write_fault, &writable, &page); -if (is_error_noslot_pfn (pfn) || (write_fault && !writable)) + memslot =gfn_to_memslot (vcpu->kvm, gfn); +if (!memslot)return -EFAULT ; + *is_gmem =kvm_slot_has_gmem (memslot); +if (!*is_gmem) { + pfn =__kvm_faultin_pfn (memslot, gfn, write_fault ?FOLL_WRITE :0 , + &writable, &page); +if (is_error_noslot_pfn (pfn) || (write_fault && !writable)) +return -EFAULT ; + }else { + ret =kvm_gmem_get_pfn (vcpu->kvm, memslot, gfn, &pfn, &page,NULL ); +if (ret) { +kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit (vcpu, vt->wr.pa,PAGE_SIZE , + write_fault, false, false); +return ret; + } + } + scoped_guard(write_lock, &vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock) {if (mmu_invalidate_retry (vcpu->kvm, mmu_seq))return -EAGAIN ;
@@ -1292,23 +1308,36 @@ int kvm_handle_vncr_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)if (esr_fsc_is_permission_fault (esr)) {inject_vncr_perm (vcpu); }else if (esr_fsc_is_translation_fault (esr)) { -bool valid; +bool valid, is_gmem = false;int ret;scoped_guard (read_lock, &vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock) valid = kvm_vncr_tlb_lookup(vcpu);if (!valid) - ret =kvm_translate_vncr (vcpu); + ret =kvm_translate_vncr (vcpu, &is_gmem);else ret = -EPERM ;switch (ret) {case -EAGAIN : -case -ENOMEM :/* Let's try again... */ break ; +case -ENOMEM : +/* +* For guest_memfd, this indicates that it failed to +* create a folio to back the memory. Inform userspace. +*/ +if (is_gmem) +return 0 ; +/* Otherwise, let's try again... */ +break ;case -EFAULT : +case -EIO : +case -EHWPOISON : +if (is_gmem) +return 0 ; + fallthrough;case -EINVAL :case -ENOENT :case -EACCES :
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 19/22 KVM: arm64: Enable support for guest_memfd backed memory
In reply to Fuad TabbaNow that the infrastructure is in place, enable guest_memfd for arm64.
* Select CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD in KVM/arm64 Kconfig.
* Enforce KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY for guest_memfd on arm64: Ensure that guest_memfd-backed memory slots on arm64 are only supported if they are intended for shared memory use cases (i.e., kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only() is true). This design reflects the current arm64 KVM ecosystem where guest_memfd is primarily being introduced for VMs that support shared memory.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ menuconfig KVM select HAVE_KVM_VCPU_RUN_PID_CHANGE select SCHED_INFO select GUEST_PERF_EVENTS if PERF_EVENTS + select KVM_GUEST_MEMFD help Support hosting virtualized guest machines.
arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +7 -0
@@ -2276,6 +2276,13 @@ int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,if ((new->base_gfn + new->npages) > (kvm_phys_size (&kvm->arch.mmu) >>PAGE_SHIFT ))return -EFAULT ; +/* +* Only support guest_memfd backed memslots with mappable memory, since +* there aren't any CoCo VMs that support only private memory on arm64. +*/ +if (kvm_slot_has_gmem (new) && !kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only (new)) +return -EINVAL ; + hva = new->userspace_addr; reg_end = hva + (new->npages <<PAGE_SHIFT );
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 20/22 KVM: Allow and advertise support for host mmap() on guest_memfd files
In reply to Fuad TabbaNow that all the x86 and arm64 plumbing for mmap() on guest_memfd is in place, allow userspace to set GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP and advertise support via a new capability, KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP.
The availability of this capability is determined per architecture, and its enablement for a specific guest_memfd instance is controlled by the GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP flag at creation time.
Update the KVM API documentation to detail the KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP capability, the associated GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP, and provide essential information regarding support for mmap in guest_memfd.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 9 +++++++++ include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 ++ virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 7 ++++++- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +9 -0
@@ -6414,6 +6414,15 @@ most one mapping per page, i.e. binding multiple memory regions to a single guest_memfd range is not allowed (any number of memory regions can be bound to a single guest_memfd file, but the bound ranges must not overlap). +When the capability KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP is supported, the 'flags' field +supports GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP. Setting this flag on guest_memfd creation +enables mmap() and faulting of guest_memfd memory to host userspace. + +When the KVM MMU performs a PFN lookup to service a guest fault and the backing +guest_memfd has the GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP set, then the fault will always be +consumed from guest_memfd, regardless of whether it is a shared or a private +fault. + See KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 for additional details. 4.143 KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +2 -0
@@ -961,6 +961,7 @@ struct kvm_enable_cap {#define KVM_CAP_ARM_EL2 240#define KVM_CAP_ARM_EL2_E2H0 241#define KVM_CAP_RISCV_MP_STATE_RESET 242 +#define KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP 243struct kvm_irq_routing_irqchip {__u32 irqchip;
@@ -1597,6 +1598,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_attributes {#define KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE (1ULL << 3)#define KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xd4, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd) +#define GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP (1ULL << 0)struct kvm_create_guest_memfd {__u64 size;
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c +6 -1
@@ -314,7 +314,9 @@ static pgoff_t kvm_gmem_get_index(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)static bool kvm_gmem_supports_mmap (struct inode *inode) { -return false; +const u64 flags = (u64 )inode->i_private; + +return flags &GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP ; }static vm_fault_t kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping (struct vm_fault *vmf)
@@ -522,6 +524,9 @@ int kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd *args)u64 flags = args->flags;u64 valid_flags =0 ; +if (kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap (kvm)) + valid_flags |=GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP ; +if (flags & ~valid_flags)return -EINVAL ;
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +2 -0
@@ -4918,6 +4918,8 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg)#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD :return 1 ; +case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP : +return !kvm ||kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap (kvm);#endif default :break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 21/22 KVM: selftests: Do not use hardcoded page sizes in guest_memfd test
In reply to Fuad TabbaUpdate the guest_memfd_test selftest to use getpagesize() instead of hardcoded 4KB page size values.
Using hardcoded page sizes can cause test failures on architectures or systems configured with larger page sizes, such as arm64 with 64KB pages. By dynamically querying the system's page size, the test becomes more portable and robust across different environments.
Additionally, build the guest_memfd_test selftest for arm64.
--- tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 11 ++++++----- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm +1 -0
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += arch_timer TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += coalesced_io_test TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += dirty_log_perf_test TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += get-reg-list +TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += guest_memfd_test TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += memslot_modification_stress_test TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += memslot_perf_test TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += mmu_stress_test
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +6 -5
@@ -146,24 +146,25 @@ static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(struct kvm_vm *vm) {int fd1, fd2, ret;struct stat st1, st2; +size_t page_size =getpagesize (); - fd1 =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm,4096 ,0 ); + fd1 =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, page_size,0 );TEST_ASSERT (fd1 !=-1 ,"memfd creation should succeed" ); ret =fstat (fd1, &st1);TEST_ASSERT (ret !=-1 ,"memfd fstat should succeed" ); -TEST_ASSERT (st1.st_size ==4096 ,"memfd st_size should match requested size" ); +TEST_ASSERT (st1.st_size == page_size,"memfd st_size should match requested size" ); - fd2 =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm,8192 ,0 ); + fd2 =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, page_size *2 ,0 );TEST_ASSERT (fd2 !=-1 ,"memfd creation should succeed" ); ret =fstat (fd2, &st2);TEST_ASSERT (ret !=-1 ,"memfd fstat should succeed" ); -TEST_ASSERT (st2.st_size ==8192 ,"second memfd st_size should match requested size" ); +TEST_ASSERT (st2.st_size == page_size *2 ,"second memfd st_size should match requested size" ); ret =fstat (fd1, &st1);TEST_ASSERT (ret !=-1 ,"memfd fstat should succeed" ); -TEST_ASSERT (st1.st_size ==4096 ,"first memfd st_size should still match requested size" ); +TEST_ASSERT (st1.st_size == page_size,"first memfd st_size should still match requested size" );TEST_ASSERT (st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino,"different memfd should have different inode numbers" );close (fd2);
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
PATCH v16 22/22 KVM: selftests: guest_memfd mmap() test when mmap is supported
In reply to Fuad TabbaExpand the guest_memfd selftests to comprehensively test host userspace mmap functionality for guest_memfd-backed memory when supported by the VM type.
Introduce new test cases to verify the following:
* Successful mmap operations: Ensure that MAP_SHARED mappings succeed when guest_memfd mmap is enabled.
* Data integrity: Validate that data written to the mmap'd region is correctly persistent and readable.
* fallocate interaction: Test that fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) correctly zeros out mapped pages.
* Out-of-bounds access: Verify that accessing memory beyond the guest_memfd's size correctly triggers a SIGBUS signal.
* Unsupported mmap: Confirm that mmap attempts fail as expected when guest_memfd mmap support is not enabled for the specific guest_memfd instance or VM type.
* Flag validity: Introduce test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity() to systematically test that only allowed guest_memfd creation flags are accepted for different VM types (e.g., GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP for default VMs, no flags for CoCo VMs).
The existing tests for guest_memfd creation (multiple instances, invalid sizes), file read/write, file size, and invalid punch hole operations are integrated into the new test_with_type() framework to allow testing across different VM types.
--- .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 194 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 173 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +173 -21
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@#include <linux/bitmap.h> #include <linux/falloc.h> +#include <setjmp.h> +#include <signal.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -34,12 +36,83 @@ static void test_file_read_write(int fd) "pwrite on a guest_mem fd should fail"); } -static void test_mmap (int fd,size_t page_size) +static void test_mmap_supported (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size) +{ +const char val =0xaa ; +char *mem; +size_t i; +int ret; + + mem =mmap (NULL , total_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_PRIVATE , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem ==MAP_FAILED ,"Copy-on-write not allowed by guest_memfd." ); + + mem =mmap (NULL , total_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem !=MAP_FAILED ,"mmap() for guest_memfd should succeed." ); + +memset (mem, val, total_size); +for (i =0 ; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + + ret =fallocate (fd,FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE |FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE ,0 , + page_size); +TEST_ASSERT (!ret,"fallocate the first page should succeed." ); + +for (i =0 ; i < page_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]),0x00 ); +for (; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + +memset (mem, val, page_size); +for (i =0 ; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + + ret =munmap (mem, total_size); +TEST_ASSERT (!ret,"munmap() should succeed." ); +} + +static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf; +void fault_sigbus_handler (int signum) +{ +siglongjmp (jmpbuf,1 ); +} + +static void test_fault_overflow (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size) +{ +struct sigaction sa_old, sa_new = { + .sa_handler = fault_sigbus_handler, + }; +size_t map_size = total_size *4 ; +const char val =0xaa ; +char *mem; +size_t i; +int ret; + + mem =mmap (NULL , map_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem !=MAP_FAILED ,"mmap() for guest_memfd should succeed." ); + +sigaction (SIGBUS , &sa_new, &sa_old); +if (sigsetjmp (jmpbuf,1 ) ==0 ) { +memset (mem,0xaa , map_size); +TEST_ASSERT (false,"memset() should have triggered SIGBUS." ); + } +sigaction (SIGBUS , &sa_old,NULL ); + +for (i =0 ; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + + ret =munmap (mem, map_size); +TEST_ASSERT (!ret,"munmap() should succeed." ); +} + +static void test_mmap_not_supported (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size) {char *mem; mem =mmap (NULL , page_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 );TEST_ASSERT_EQ (mem,MAP_FAILED ); + + mem =mmap (NULL , total_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (mem,MAP_FAILED ); }static void test_file_size (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size)
@@ -120,26 +193,19 @@ static void test_invalid_punch_hole(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size) } } -static void test_create_guest_memfd_invalid (struct kvm_vm *vm) +static void test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes (struct kvm_vm *vm, +uint64_t guest_memfd_flags, +size_t page_size) { -size_t page_size =getpagesize (); -uint64_t flag;size_t size;int fd;for (size =1 ; size < page_size; size++) { - fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, size,0 ); -TEST_ASSERT (fd ==-1 && errno ==EINVAL , + fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, size, guest_memfd_flags); +TEST_ASSERT (fd <0 && errno ==EINVAL ,"guest_memfd() with non-page-aligned page size '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL" , size); } - -for (flag =BIT (0 ); flag; flag <<=1 ) { - fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, page_size, flag); -TEST_ASSERT (fd ==-1 && errno ==EINVAL , -"guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL" , - flag); - } }static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple (struct kvm_vm *vm)
@@ -171,30 +237,116 @@ static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(struct kvm_vm *vm)close (fd1); } -int main (int argc,char *argv[]) +static bool check_vm_type (unsigned long vm_type) { -size_t page_size; +/* +* Not all architectures support KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES. However, those that +* support guest_memfd have that support for the default VM type. +*/ +if (vm_type ==VM_TYPE_DEFAULT ) +return true; + +return kvm_check_cap (KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES ) &BIT (vm_type); +} + +static void test_with_type (unsigned long vm_type,uint64_t guest_memfd_flags) +{ +struct kvm_vm *vm;size_t total_size; +size_t page_size;int fd; -struct kvm_vm *vm; -TEST_REQUIRE (kvm_has_cap (KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD )); +if (!check_vm_type (vm_type)) +return ; page_size =getpagesize (); total_size = page_size *4 ; - vm =vm_create_barebones (); + vm =vm_create_barebones_type (vm_type); -test_create_guest_memfd_invalid (vm);test_create_guest_memfd_multiple (vm); +test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes (vm, guest_memfd_flags, page_size); - fd =vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, total_size,0 ); + fd =vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, total_size, guest_memfd_flags);test_file_read_write (fd); -test_mmap (fd, page_size); + +if (guest_memfd_flags &GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP ) { +test_mmap_supported (fd, page_size, total_size); +test_fault_overflow (fd, page_size, total_size); + + }else { +test_mmap_not_supported (fd, page_size, total_size); + } +test_file_size (fd, page_size, total_size);test_fallocate (fd, page_size, total_size);test_invalid_punch_hole (fd, page_size, total_size);close (fd); +kvm_vm_free (vm); +} + +static void test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity (unsigned long vm_type, +uint64_t expected_valid_flags) +{ +size_t page_size =getpagesize (); +struct kvm_vm *vm; +uint64_t flag =0 ; +int fd; + +if (!check_vm_type (vm_type)) +return ; + + vm =vm_create_barebones_type (vm_type); + +for (flag =BIT (0 ); flag; flag <<=1 ) { + fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, page_size, flag); + +if (flag & expected_valid_flags) { +TEST_ASSERT (fd >=0 , +"guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should be valid" , + flag); +close (fd); + }else { +TEST_ASSERT (fd <0 && errno ==EINVAL , +"guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL" , + flag); + } + } + +kvm_vm_free (vm); +} + +static void test_gmem_flag_validity (void ) +{ +uint64_t non_coco_vm_valid_flags =0 ; + +if (kvm_has_cap (KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP )) + non_coco_vm_valid_flags =GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP ; + +test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity (VM_TYPE_DEFAULT , non_coco_vm_valid_flags); + +#ifdef __x86_64__ +test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity (KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM ,0 ); +test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity (KVM_X86_SEV_VM ,0 ); +test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity (KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM ,0 ); +test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity (KVM_X86_SNP_VM ,0 ); +test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity (KVM_X86_TDX_VM ,0 ); +#endif +} + +int main (int argc,char *argv[]) +{ +TEST_REQUIRE (kvm_has_cap (KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD )); + +test_gmem_flag_validity (); + +test_with_type (VM_TYPE_DEFAULT ,0 ); +if (kvm_has_cap (KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP )) +test_with_type (VM_TYPE_DEFAULT ,GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP ); + +#ifdef __x86_64__ +test_with_type (KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM ,0 ); +#endif }
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1.470.g6ba607880d-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v16 22/22] KVM: selftests: guest_memfd mmap() test when mmap is supported
Quoted 3 lines · Fuad Tabba
Reviewed-by James Houghton <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Shivank Garg <[email protected]>
These reviews probably should be dropped given that the test fails...
Quoted 16 lines
Co-developed-by Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>---
(quoted diff) +10
-1+static bool check_vm_type(unsigned long vm_type) { - size_t page_size; + /* + * Not all architectures support KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES. However, those that + * support guest_memfd have that support for the default VM type. + */ + if (vm_type == VM_TYPE_DEFAULT) + return true; + + return kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(vm_type); +}
...
Quoted 6 lines
++static void
test_gmem_flag_validity(void)(quoted diff) +5
-0+{ + uint64_t non_coco_vm_valid_flags = 0; + + if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP)) + non_coco_vm_valid_flags = GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP;
Review
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10
-0+ + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, non_coco_vm_valid_flags); + +#ifdef __x86_64__ + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, 0); + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SEV_VM, 0); + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, 0); + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SNP_VM, 0); + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_TDX_VM, 0); +#endif
mmap() support has nothing to do with CoCo, it's all about KVM's lack of support for VM types that use guest_memfd for private memory. This causes failures on x86 due to MMAP being supported on everything except SNP_VM and TDX_VM.
All of this code is quite ridiculous. KVM allows KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION on a VM FD specifically so that userspace can query whether or not a feature is supported for a given VM. Just use that, don't hardcode whether or not the flag is valid.
If we want to validate that a specific VM type does/doesn't support KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP, then we should add a test for _that_ (though IMO it'd be a waste of time).
Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +5
-0+} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD));
Review
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10
-0+ + test_gmem_flag_validity(); + + test_with_type(VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, 0); + if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP)) + test_with_type(VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP); + +#ifdef __x86_64__ + test_with_type(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, 0); +#endif
Similarly, don't hardocde the VM types to test, and then bail if the type isn't supported. Instead, pull the types from KVM and iterate over them.
Do that, and the test can provide better coverage is fewer lines of code. Oh, and it passes too ;-)
---
From: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2025 11:47:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: selftests: guest_memfd mmap() test when mmap is
supported
Expand the guest_memfd selftests to comprehensively test host userspace mmap functionality for guest_memfd-backed memory when supported by the VM type.
Introduce new test cases to verify the following:
* Successful mmap operations: Ensure that MAP_SHARED mappings succeed when guest_memfd mmap is enabled.
* Data integrity: Validate that data written to the mmap'd region is correctly persistent and readable.
* fallocate interaction: Test that fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) correctly zeros out mapped pages.
* Out-of-bounds access: Verify that accessing memory beyond the guest_memfd's size correctly triggers a SIGBUS signal.
* Unsupported mmap: Confirm that mmap attempts fail as expected when guest_memfd mmap support is not enabled for the specific guest_memfd instance or VM type.
* Flag validity: Introduce test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity() to systematically test that only allowed guest_memfd creation flags are accepted for different VM types (e.g., GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP for default VMs, no flags for CoCo VMs).
The existing tests for guest_memfd creation (multiple instances, invalid sizes), file read/write, file size, and invalid punch hole operations are integrated into the new test_with_type() framework to allow testing across different VM types.
--- .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 162 +++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 140 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +140 -22
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@#include <linux/bitmap.h> #include <linux/falloc.h> +#include <setjmp.h> +#include <signal.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -34,12 +36,83 @@ static void test_file_read_write(int fd) "pwrite on a guest_mem fd should fail"); } -static void test_mmap (int fd,size_t page_size) +static void test_mmap_supported (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size) +{ +const char val =0xaa ; +char *mem; +size_t i; +int ret; + + mem =mmap (NULL , total_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_PRIVATE , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem ==MAP_FAILED ,"Copy-on-write not allowed by guest_memfd." ); + + mem =mmap (NULL , total_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem !=MAP_FAILED ,"mmap() for guest_memfd should succeed." ); + +memset (mem, val, total_size); +for (i =0 ; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + + ret =fallocate (fd,FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE |FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE ,0 , + page_size); +TEST_ASSERT (!ret,"fallocate the first page should succeed." ); + +for (i =0 ; i < page_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]),0x00 ); +for (; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + +memset (mem, val, page_size); +for (i =0 ; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + + ret =munmap (mem, total_size); +TEST_ASSERT (!ret,"munmap() should succeed." ); +} + +static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf; +void fault_sigbus_handler (int signum) +{ +siglongjmp (jmpbuf,1 ); +} + +static void test_fault_overflow (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size) +{ +struct sigaction sa_old, sa_new = { + .sa_handler = fault_sigbus_handler, + }; +size_t map_size = total_size *4 ; +const char val =0xaa ; +char *mem; +size_t i; +int ret; + + mem =mmap (NULL , map_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem !=MAP_FAILED ,"mmap() for guest_memfd should succeed." ); + +sigaction (SIGBUS , &sa_new, &sa_old); +if (sigsetjmp (jmpbuf,1 ) ==0 ) { +memset (mem,0xaa , map_size); +TEST_ASSERT (false,"memset() should have triggered SIGBUS." ); + } +sigaction (SIGBUS , &sa_old,NULL ); + +for (i =0 ; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + + ret =munmap (mem, map_size); +TEST_ASSERT (!ret,"munmap() should succeed." ); +} + +static void test_mmap_not_supported (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size) {char *mem; mem =mmap (NULL , page_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 );TEST_ASSERT_EQ (mem,MAP_FAILED ); + + mem =mmap (NULL , total_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (mem,MAP_FAILED ); }static void test_file_size (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size)
@@ -120,26 +193,19 @@ static void test_invalid_punch_hole(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size) } } -static void test_create_guest_memfd_invalid (struct kvm_vm *vm) +static void test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes (struct kvm_vm *vm, +uint64_t guest_memfd_flags, +size_t page_size) { -size_t page_size =getpagesize (); -uint64_t flag;size_t size;int fd;for (size =1 ; size < page_size; size++) { - fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, size,0 ); -TEST_ASSERT (fd ==-1 && errno ==EINVAL , + fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, size, guest_memfd_flags); +TEST_ASSERT (fd <0 && errno ==EINVAL ,"guest_memfd() with non-page-aligned page size '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL" , size); } - -for (flag =BIT (0 ); flag; flag <<=1 ) { - fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, page_size, flag); -TEST_ASSERT (fd ==-1 && errno ==EINVAL , -"guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL" , - flag); - } }static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple (struct kvm_vm *vm)
@@ -171,30 +237,82 @@ static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(struct kvm_vm *vm)close (fd1); } -int main (int argc,char *argv[]) +static void test_guest_memfd_flags (struct kvm_vm *vm,uint64_t valid_flags) { -size_t page_size; -size_t total_size; +size_t page_size =getpagesize (); +uint64_t flag;int fd; + +for (flag =BIT (0 ); flag; flag <<=1 ) { + fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, page_size, flag); +if (flag & valid_flags) { +TEST_ASSERT (fd >=0 , +"guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should succeed" , + flag); +close (fd); + }else { +TEST_ASSERT (fd <0 && errno ==EINVAL , +"guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL" , + flag); + } + } +} + +static void test_guest_memfd (unsigned long vm_type) +{ +uint64_t flags =0 ;struct kvm_vm *vm; - -TEST_REQUIRE (kvm_has_cap (KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD )); +size_t total_size; +size_t page_size; +int fd; page_size =getpagesize (); total_size = page_size *4 ; - vm =vm_create_barebones (); + vm =vm_create_barebones_type (vm_type); + +if (vm_check_cap (vm,KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP )) + flags |=GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP ; -test_create_guest_memfd_invalid (vm);test_create_guest_memfd_multiple (vm); +test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes (vm, flags, page_size); - fd =vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, total_size,0 ); + fd =vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, total_size, flags);test_file_read_write (fd); -test_mmap (fd, page_size); + +if (flags &GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP ) { +test_mmap_supported (fd, page_size, total_size); +test_fault_overflow (fd, page_size, total_size); + + }else { +test_mmap_not_supported (fd, page_size, total_size); + } +test_file_size (fd, page_size, total_size);test_fallocate (fd, page_size, total_size);test_invalid_punch_hole (fd, page_size, total_size); +test_guest_memfd_flags (vm, flags); +close (fd); +kvm_vm_free (vm); +} + +int main (int argc,char *argv[]) +{ +unsigned long vm_types, vm_type; + +TEST_REQUIRE (kvm_has_cap (KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD )); + +/* +* Not all architectures support KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES. However, those that +* support guest_memfd have that support for the default VM type. +*/ + vm_types =kvm_check_cap (KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES ); +if (!vm_types) + vm_types =VM_TYPE_DEFAULT ; + +for_each_set_bit (vm_type, &vm_types,BITS_PER_TYPE (vm_types)) +test_guest_memfd (vm_type); }
base-commit: 7f4eb3d4fb58f58b3bbe5ab606c4fec8db3b5a3f --
Re: [PATCH v16 22/22] KVM: selftests: guest_memfd mmap() test when mmap is supported
Hi Sean,
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Fuad Tabba
Reviewed-by James Houghton <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Shivank Garg <[email protected]>These reviews probably should be dropped given that the test fails...
At least on my setup, these tests passed on x86 and on arm64. Sorry about that.
Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 16 lines
Co-developed-by Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>---
(quoted diff) +10
-1+static bool check_vm_type(unsigned long vm_type) { - size_t page_size; + /* + * Not all architectures support KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES. However, those that + * support guest_memfd have that support for the default VM type. + */ + if (vm_type == VM_TYPE_DEFAULT) + return true; + + return kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(vm_type); +}...
Quoted 6 lines
++static void
test_gmem_flag_validity(void)(quoted diff) +5
-0+{ + uint64_t non_coco_vm_valid_flags = 0; + + if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP)) + non_coco_vm_valid_flags = GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP;Review
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10
-0+ + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, non_coco_vm_valid_flags); + +#ifdef __x86_64__ + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, 0); + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SEV_VM, 0); + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, 0); + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SNP_VM, 0); + test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_TDX_VM, 0); +#endif
mmap()support has nothing to do with CoCo, it's all about KVM's lack of support for VM types that useguest_memfdfor private memory. This causes failures on x86 due to MMAP being supported on everything exceptSNP_VMandTDX_VM.
Quoted 7 lines
All of this code is quite ridiculous. KVM allows
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSIONon a VM FD specifically so that userspace can query whether or not a feature is supported for a given VM. Just use that, don't hardcode whether or not the flag is valid.If we want to validate that a specific VM type does/doesn't support
KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP, then we should add a test for _that_ (though IMO it'd be a waste of time).
Ack.
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +5
-0+} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD));Review
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10
-0+ + test_gmem_flag_validity(); + + test_with_type(VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, 0); + if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP)) + test_with_type(VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP); + +#ifdef __x86_64__ + test_with_type(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, 0); +#endifSimilarly, don't hardocde the VM types to test, and then bail if the type isn't supported. Instead, pull the types from KVM and iterate over them.
Quoted 2 lines
Do that, and the test can provide better coverage is fewer lines of code. Oh, and it passes too ;-)
Thanks for that.
Cheers,
/fuad
Quoted 275 lines
---
From: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2025 11:47:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: selftests:guest_memfdmmap()test when mmap is
supportedExpand the
guest_memfdselftests to comprehensively test host userspace mmap functionality for guest_memfd-backed memory when supported by the VM type.Introduce new test cases to verify the following:
* Successful mmap operations: Ensure that
MAP_SHAREDmappings succeed whenguest_memfdmmap is enabled.* Data integrity: Validate that data written to the mmap'd region is correctly persistent and readable.
* fallocate interaction: Test that
fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE)correctly zeros out mapped pages.* Out-of-bounds access: Verify that accessing memory beyond the guest_memfd's size correctly triggers a SIGBUS signal.
* Unsupported mmap: Confirm that mmap attempts fail as expected when
guest_memfdmmap support is not enabled for the specificguest_memfdinstance or VM type.* Flag validity: Introduce
test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity()to systematically test that only allowedguest_memfdcreation flags are accepted for different VM types (e.g.,GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAPfor default VMs, no flags for CoCo VMs).The existing tests for
guest_memfdcreation (multiple instances, invalid sizes), file read/write, file size, and invalid punch hole operations are integrated into the newtest_with_type()framework to allow testing across different VM types.Cc James Houghton <[email protected]>Cc Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Cc Shivank Garg <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>--- .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 162 +++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 140 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c +140
-22@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@#include <linux/bitmap.h> #include <linux/falloc.h> +#include <setjmp.h> +#include <signal.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> @@ -34,12 +36,83 @@ static void test_file_read_write(int fd) "pwrite on a guest_mem fd should fail"); } -static void test_mmap (int fd,size_t page_size) +static void test_mmap_supported (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size) +{ +const char val =0xaa ; +char *mem; +size_t i; +int ret; + + mem =mmap (NULL , total_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_PRIVATE , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem ==MAP_FAILED ,"Copy-on-write not allowed by guest_memfd." ); + + mem =mmap (NULL , total_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem !=MAP_FAILED ,"mmap() for guest_memfd should succeed." ); + +memset (mem, val, total_size); +for (i =0 ; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + + ret =fallocate (fd,FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE |FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE ,0 , + page_size); +TEST_ASSERT (!ret,"fallocate the first page should succeed." ); + +for (i =0 ; i < page_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]),0x00 ); +for (; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + +memset (mem, val, page_size); +for (i =0 ; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + + ret =munmap (mem, total_size); +TEST_ASSERT (!ret,"munmap() should succeed." ); +} + +static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf; +void fault_sigbus_handler (int signum) +{ +siglongjmp (jmpbuf,1 ); +} + +static void test_fault_overflow (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size) +{ +struct sigaction sa_old, sa_new = { + .sa_handler = fault_sigbus_handler, + }; +size_t map_size = total_size *4 ; +const char val =0xaa ; +char *mem; +size_t i; +int ret; + + mem =mmap (NULL , map_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT (mem !=MAP_FAILED ,"mmap() for guest_memfd should succeed." ); + +sigaction (SIGBUS , &sa_new, &sa_old); +if (sigsetjmp (jmpbuf,1 ) ==0 ) { +memset (mem,0xaa , map_size); +TEST_ASSERT (false,"memset() should have triggered SIGBUS." ); + } +sigaction (SIGBUS , &sa_old,NULL ); + +for (i =0 ; i < total_size; i++) +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (READ_ONCE (mem[i]), val); + + ret =munmap (mem, map_size); +TEST_ASSERT (!ret,"munmap() should succeed." ); +} + +static void test_mmap_not_supported (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size) {char *mem; mem =mmap (NULL , page_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 );TEST_ASSERT_EQ (mem,MAP_FAILED ); + + mem =mmap (NULL , total_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE ,MAP_SHARED , fd,0 ); +TEST_ASSERT_EQ (mem,MAP_FAILED ); }static void test_file_size (int fd,size_t page_size,size_t total_size)@@ -120,26 +193,19 @@ static void test_invalid_punch_hole(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size) } } -static void test_create_guest_memfd_invalid (struct kvm_vm *vm) +static void test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes (struct kvm_vm *vm, +uint64_t guest_memfd_flags, +size_t page_size) { -size_t page_size =getpagesize (); -uint64_t flag;size_t size;int fd;for (size =1 ; size < page_size; size++) { - fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, size,0 ); -TEST_ASSERT (fd ==-1 && errno ==EINVAL , + fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, size, guest_memfd_flags); +TEST_ASSERT (fd <0 && errno ==EINVAL ,"guest_memfd() with non-page-aligned page size '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL" , size); } - -for (flag =BIT (0 ); flag; flag <<=1 ) { - fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, page_size, flag); -TEST_ASSERT (fd ==-1 && errno ==EINVAL , -"guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL" , - flag); - } }static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple (struct kvm_vm *vm)@@ -171,30 +237,82 @@ static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(struct kvm_vm *vm)close (fd1); } -int main (int argc,char *argv[]) +static void test_guest_memfd_flags (struct kvm_vm *vm,uint64_t valid_flags) { -size_t page_size; -size_t total_size; +size_t page_size =getpagesize (); +uint64_t flag;int fd; + +for (flag =BIT (0 ); flag; flag <<=1 ) { + fd =__vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, page_size, flag); +if (flag & valid_flags) { +TEST_ASSERT (fd >=0 , +"guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should succeed" , + flag); +close (fd); + }else { +TEST_ASSERT (fd <0 && errno ==EINVAL , +"guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL" , + flag); + } + } +} + +static void test_guest_memfd (unsigned long vm_type) +{ +uint64_t flags =0 ;struct kvm_vm *vm; - -TEST_REQUIRE (kvm_has_cap (KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD )); +size_t total_size; +size_t page_size; +int fd; page_size =getpagesize (); total_size = page_size *4 ; - vm =vm_create_barebones (); + vm =vm_create_barebones_type (vm_type); + +if (vm_check_cap (vm,KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MMAP )) + flags |=GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP ; -test_create_guest_memfd_invalid (vm);test_create_guest_memfd_multiple (vm); +test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes (vm, flags, page_size); - fd =vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, total_size,0 ); + fd =vm_create_guest_memfd (vm, total_size, flags);test_file_read_write (fd); -test_mmap (fd, page_size); + +if (flags &GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP ) { +test_mmap_supported (fd, page_size, total_size); +test_fault_overflow (fd, page_size, total_size); + + }else { +test_mmap_not_supported (fd, page_size, total_size); + } +test_file_size (fd, page_size, total_size);test_fallocate (fd, page_size, total_size);test_invalid_punch_hole (fd, page_size, total_size); +test_guest_memfd_flags (vm, flags); +close (fd); +kvm_vm_free (vm); +} + +int main (int argc,char *argv[]) +{ +unsigned long vm_types, vm_type; + +TEST_REQUIRE (kvm_has_cap (KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD )); + +/* +* Not all architectures support KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES. However, those that +* support guest_memfd have that support for the default VM type. +*/ + vm_types =kvm_check_cap (KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES ); +if (!vm_types) + vm_types =VM_TYPE_DEFAULT ; + +for_each_set_bit (vm_type, &vm_types,BITS_PER_TYPE (vm_types)) +test_guest_memfd (vm_type); }base-commit:
7f4eb3d4fb58f58b3bbe5ab606c4fec8db3b5a3f--
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 22 lines · Fuad Tabba
Ackerley Tng (1):
KVM: x86/mmu: Rename .private_max_mapping_level() to
.gmem_max_mapping_level()Fuad Tabba (15):
KVM: RenameCONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEMtoCONFIG_KVM_GUEST_MEMFD
KVM: RenameCONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMto
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_POPULATE
KVM: Renamekvm_slot_can_be_private()tokvm_slot_has_gmem()
KVM: Fix comments that refer toslots_lock
KVM: Fix comment that refers to kvm uapi header path
KVM: x86: EnableKVM_GUEST_MEMFDfor all 64-bit builds
KVM:guest_memfd: Add plumbing to host to mapguest_memfdpages
KVM:guest_memfd: Trackguest_memfdmmap support in memslot
KVM: arm64: Refactoruser_mem_abort()
KVM: arm64: Handle guest_memfd-backed guest page faults
KVM: arm64: nv: Handle VNCR_EL2-triggered faults backed byguest_memfd
KVM: arm64: Enable support forguest_memfdbacked memory
KVM: Allow and advertise support for hostmmap()onguest_memfdfiles
KVM: selftests: Do not use hardcoded page sizes inguest_memfdtest
KVM: selftests:guest_memfdmmap()test when mmap is supported
Quoted 12 lines
Sean Christopherson (6):
KVM: x86: Have all vendor neutral sub-configs depend onKVM_X86, not
just KVM
KVM: x86: SelectKVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMdirectly from
KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
KVM: x86: Select TDX'sKVM_GENERIC_xxxdependencies iff
CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX=y
KVM: x86/mmu: Hoistguest_memfdmax level/order helpers "up" inmmu.c
KVM: x86/mmu: Enforce guest_memfd's max order when recovering
hugepages
KVM: x86/mmu: Extend guest_memfd's max mapping level to shared
mappings
AFAICT, I've run out of things to complain about. :-D
I say wait one more day just in case the peanut gallery comes alive, then spin a hopefully-final v17 early next week. Or holler if you want me to tidy things up and send v17, most of the goofs that necessitate v17 are mine :-)
Fuad Tabba <[email protected]> writes:
[snip]
Did the patch [1] for x86/mmu that actually allows faulting when kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only() get dropped by accident?
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Ackerley Tng
Fuad Tabba <[email protected]> writes:
[snip]
Did the patch [1] for x86/mmu that actually allows faulting when
kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only()get dropped by accident?
Ah shoot, it did get dropped. I have a feeling Fuad read "drop the helper" as "drop the patch" :-)
Faud, given the growing list of x86-specific goofs, any objection to me sending v17? I'd also like to tack on a selftest patch to verify that KVM can actually fault-in non-private memory via a guest_memfd fd.
Hi Sean,
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines · Ackerley Tng
Fuad Tabba <[email protected]> writes:
[snip]
Did the patch [1] for x86/mmu that actually allows faulting when
kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only()get dropped by accident?
Quoted 6 lines
Ah shoot, it did get dropped. I have a feeling Fuad read "drop the helper" as "drop the patch" :-)
Faud, given the growing list of x86-specific goofs, any objection to me sending v17? I'd also like to tack on a selftest patch to verify that KVM can actually fault-in non-private memory via a
guest_memfdfd.
Whatever you prefer. No objection from me for you sending out a v17.
Thanks!
/fuad